Abstract

Purpose: This study examines the persistence of corruption in resource-rich states, focusing on Nigeria’s oil-dependent political economy. It seeks to explain why corruption remains entrenched despite extensive institutional reforms and governance interventions.

Design/Methodology: The paper adopts a qualitative political-economy approach, integrating theoretical analysis with interpretive evidence drawn from interdisciplinary literature and analytically constructed elite and community perspectives. The study employs thematic analysis and process tracing to explore the interaction between resource rents, institutional structures, and elite bargaining dynamics.

Findings: The findings reveal that corruption operates as a systemic and functional mechanism within a rent-based political order. It facilitates elite coalition maintenance, regulates access to state-controlled resources, and sustains political stability. Formal anti-corruption reforms and transparency initiatives are shown to be largely ineffective, as they are absorbed into existing patronage networks without altering underlying incentives. The study also highlights the territorial dimension of corruption, particularly in the Niger Delta, where rent distribution intersects with conflict management and coercive governance structures.

Originality/Value: The study advances the literature by reframing corruption as an embedded feature of political settlements rather than a deviation from institutional norms. It contributes a nuanced political-economy perspective that moves beyond technocratic explanations and underscores the need for structural reforms targeting the distribution of power and resource rents in resource-rich states