Abstract

Objective: This study examines the relationship between judicial independence and democratic consolidation in post-authoritarian states. It seeks to determine whether independent judiciaries act as genuine safeguards of democracy or if they can be co-opted to reinforce elite dominance and hybrid authoritarianism.

Method: The study employs a doctrinal research methodology, using secondary sources including academic literature, judicial decisions, constitutional documents, and institutional reports. It analyses legal frameworks and institutional practices to evaluate formal and actual judicial independence across selected post-authoritarian jurisdictions.

Findings: Judicial independence is necessary but insufficient for democratic consolidation. Formal constitutional guarantees often coexist with informal political influence. Courts may initially stabilize democracy but risk later capture by political elites, undermining democratic accountability. Judicial autonomy is influenced by political incentives, institutional culture, and elite strategies.

Value: This study contributes to scholarship by integrating doctrinal, comparative, and political perspectives. It informs policymakers and legal institutions on mechanisms to strengthen judicial independence and sustain democratic governance in transitional states.