Abstract

Purpose: This study critically examines development aid effectiveness under changing geopolitical alignments, focusing on Africa and using Nigeria as a strategic case study. It interrogates whether multipolar competitioncharacterized by the rise of non-DAC development partners alongside traditional Western donorsenhances or undermines aid effectiveness.

Design/Methodology: The research adopts a qualitative political economy approach, combining  elite interviews with critical analysis of peer-reviewed academic literature and policy documents. The analytical framework integrates institutional theory, rentier state analysis, and geopolitical competition perspectives to assess how donor diversification reshapes reform incentives, conditionality structures, and governance outcomes in Nigeria.

Findings: The findings reveal that geopolitical diversification increases Nigeria’s bargaining autonomy but simultaneously weakens coordinated reform pressure. Infrastructure-focused financing addresses visible capital deficits but does not guarantee institutional deepening. Security-driven aid reframes development priorities toward stabilization rather than structural transformation. Across all modalities, institutional capacity remains the decisive mediating variable. Aid effectiveness is therefore less dependent on donor origin and more contingent on whether financing strengthens or circumvents domestic governance systems.

Originality/Value: This study advances aid effectiveness scholarship by integrating geopolitical realignment into institutional analysis. It challenges econometric reductionism and demonstrates that development aid in a multipolar order operates as strategic negotiation rather than purely technocratic transfer. The Nigerian case illustrates how global power competition reshapes accountability structures, reform incentives, and the meaning of effectiveness itself.