**THE IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN NIGERIA (STUDY BORNO STATE)**

ABSTRACT

The study compacts with the impact of boko haram insurgency in Nigeria, study of Borno State. The study proceeded with the objectives i.e. to investigate the implications of the Boko Haram insurgency on socioeconomic activities in the state. For this study, the use of primary data was applied to get first-hand information from residents of the state and the method of data collection as the questionnaire. Statistical tools were used to analyze the data collected part of which include frequency and percentages. Socioeconomic activities are the dependent variable while Boko Haram insurgency is the independent variable in this study. The result of the findings answers the first hypothesis to show that the government has responded positively in tackling the negative effects of Boko Haram insurgency on socioeconomic activities beyond 60% and also shows from tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 that the government’s response has positively impacted the socioeconomic activities in the state by 85% with significant collaboration on the hand of civil society /NGO at 57%. The socioeconomic activities respond positively to combined efforts from stakeholders which then responds favorably development of Borno state. The negative impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on socioeconomic activities has more implications on education as depicted by 27.5% of the responses. This was reported to have critically brought a downturn in general performance of the educational institutions. Government must collaborate with stakeholders such that include traditional leaders, civil society organizations and NGOs to act proactively in mitigating the effects of the Boko Haram insurgency on socioeconomic activities in the state.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The safety of lives and property has been a major source of concern for Human right from time immemorial, the search for security forms part of the reasons why ―people aggregated into bands, tribes, kingdoms, and nation-states to join international organizations (PadelFord, 1976). Even in ancient times, the need for security was expressed in the form of fruit gathering and periodic expeditions for the aim of meeting the most important socio-economic requirements of the people. Perhaps, the physical security need of the people constituted part of the reasons why they preferred rocky and mountainous topographies for shelter, (Peterside, 2014). Thus, one of the most important roles of any state is to protect its citizens and inhabitants against any threat, be it physical, social, or economic. In the words of Aristotle ―The state exists for the sake of life and continues for the sake of the best life.

The impacts of terrorism on the socio-economic activities of any society cannot be over-emphasized. Terror attacks or mere threats of terrorism can have so many socio-economic consequences, for instance, terror attacks can lead to the diversion of foreign direct investment (FDI), reduction in the level of trade, redirecting of public investment funds to security, destruction of public infrastructure, internal displacement, refugee outflow, homelessness, personal insecurity, the proliferation of widows and orphans, loss of means of livelihood, low productivity in the society among others. Terrorist attacks may also have spillover cost on neighboring communities,

Societies or countries. Terrorism in Nigeria predates its creation. The British colonist used state terrorism to conquer hitherto independent nations within the territory called Nigeria today. Some years after independence, Nigeria was flood in many internal crises. Some of these crises included: The Tiv riots in 1962, post-election violence 1964-65, and the 1966 first military coup d'état, Isaac Adaka Boro uprising in 1966, the counter coup d'état of 1966, the Nigerian Civil war.

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Since 2009 when Boko Haram initially started its insurgency and the aftermath of the killing of Mohammed Yusuf the leader of the sect, the activities of the sect have continued unabated despite the effort of the government to curtail the heinous crime of the sect, over 10,000 people have been killed by Boko Haram. Most of the operations of the sect are concentrated in the North-East of Nigeria. The sect has use kidnapping and raping of women as a weapon of war. The poor are the most victims of the sect cruelty and the implications of the sect insurgency fall on the ordinary Nigerians. The purpose of this study to examine the socio-economic implications of the sect where the sect operations are predominant.

The high rate of poverty, unemployment and political corruption in the region have been blamed on prolonging the conflict. Unfortunately, most of the foot soldiers of Boko Haram are youths which are frustrated because the lack employment, income and they have been disdained by politicians after being used by these politicians for their elections victory (Onuoha, 2014). He also asserts that the youths enlisted into Boko Haram because of the prevalence of poverty in the North. The poverty profile of Nigeria that was released in 2011 by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicated that the northern region has more poor people than people in the south. Apart from the killings, kidnapping and bombing of the sect, their activities constitute an obstruction to the socioeconomic development of the northeast where their operation is focused and Nigeria as a whole.

Boko Haram’s origins lie in a group of radical Islamist youth who worshipped at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri a decade ago. In 2002, an offshoot of this youth group (not yet known as Boko Haram) declared the city and the Islamic establishment to be intolerably corrupt and hopeless. The group declared it was embarking on hijra (a withdrawal along the lines of the Prophet Muhammad’s withdrawal from Mecca to Medina). It moved from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama, Yobe state, near the border with Niger, to set up a separatist community run on hardline Islamic principles. Its leader, Mohammed Ali, embraced anti-state ideology and called on other Muslims to join the group and return to a life under “true” Islamic law, with the aim of making a more perfect society away from the corrupt establishment. In December 2003, following a community dispute regarding fishing rights in a local pond, the group got into a conflict with the police. Group members overpowered a squad of officers and took their weapons. This confrontation led to a blockade of its mosque by the army that lasted into the New Year. The siege ended in a shootout in which most of the group’s seventy members were killed, including Mohammed Ali (World Report, 2015).

Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that believes politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. It wants to wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a “pure” Islamic state ruled by sharia law. Since August 2011 Boko Haram has planted bombs almost weekly in public or in churches in Nigeria’s northeast. The group has also broadened its targets to include setting fire to schools. In March 2012, some twelve public schools in Maiduguri were burned down during the night, and as many as 10,000 pupils were forced out of education.

The trigger to the current conflict was the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of an anti-government movement in Borno state, in 2009, which resulted in armed confrontations between his group and the government and soon escalated into a broad campaign of violence against the state and the civilian population.The tactics of the Boko Haram movement have been particularly violent and destructive, given the direct targeting of community leaders, churches, mosques, markets and other public facilities, including the use of terrorist attacks (suicide bombings), massacres and the abduction of hundreds of women and children. From 2014 onwards, the group escalated its attacks and considerably gained territory under its control (both in Nigeria and in neighboring countries) in an attempt to establish a ‘caliphate’. The Nigerian government’s response was in the form of a tough military operation which, in 2015, resulted in the progressive ‘roll-back’ of Boko Haram forces from most occupied territories in the bayq21 states. These counter-insurgency operations generated significant collateral damage to the civilian population, triggering further waves of displacement. This research intends to investigate the impact of socio-economic consequences of Boko haram insurgency in Borno state and suggest a possible solution to the problem. (World report and UN development programme 2017).

1.3 RESEARCH AIM

The primary aim of the study is to assess the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on socio –economic activities in Nigeria study of Borno State.

1.4 RESEARCH AND OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives of the research are as follows:

1. To assess the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on socio-economic activities in Borno State Nigeria.
2. To assess the responses of the state government to the Boko Haram insurgency in Borno State.
3. To assess the impact of the responses of the government on socio-economic activities in Borno State.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. How has the Boko Haram insurgency impacted on the socio-economic activities in Borno State?
2. What are the responses of the state government to the Boko Haram insurgency in Borno State?
3. To what extent do government responses to the insurgency impact socio-economic activities in Borno State?

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study is expected to contribute to the advancement of knowledge on the insurgency of Boko haram terrorist group. The findings of this study are expected to stimulate further research in the field. It is also expected to contribute government’s effort in ensuring the positive development of the region through its socio-economic activities and also at fighting the surge of terrorist activities in the country so as to bring about peace and enhance national development and security therefore, this study will help to prefer solutions. Furthermore, it is hoped that the study will create awareness for all stakeholders of Nigeria’s security sector to the consequences posed by terrorism and the need to overcome them in order to enjoy peace not only in Borno but the entire country.

1.7 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

1. Ho. The Boko Haram insurgency has no impact on the socio-economic activities in Borno State.
2. Ho. There is no response by the government to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency in Borno State.
3. Ho. The responses of the government does not have impact on socio-economic activities in Borno State.

1.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.8.1 THEORY OF HUMAN SECURITY

The term ―Human Security was invented into use in the international system by the UN Development Programme in its 1994‘s Human Development Report. It defined Human Security as: ―the security of people through development not arms; through cooperation, not confrontation; through peace not war. Human security it said to have two main aspects. Firstly, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. Secondly, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life- whether in homes, in jobs or in communities (UNDP, 1994).

The report argues that the concept is not really a new one at all, that the founders of the UN have always given equal importance to people‘s security and to territorial security. The idea of freedom from ―want and freedom from fear‟ is found in Roosevelt‘s Four Freedoms during World War II and in many reports and analysis years ago.

The UN Commission on Human Security (CHS), in its final report ―Human Security, defines human security as: ― to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – which are the essence of life. It means protecting people from severe threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people‘s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that gives people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity (CHS: 2003). Therefore, the definition given by the CHS changed the meaning of security in a fundamental way by:

**(i)** Moving away from traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression, to one that concentrates on the security of the individuals, for instance their protection and empowerment. This is applicable to the study areas realities for, there are efforts to level up empowerment schemes by government, civil society as well as international development partners.


**(ii)** Drawing attention to multiple threats that cut across different aspects of human life and thus highlighting the linkage between security, development and human rights. The application of this model to this study highlights the assessment models that clarifies how insurgency in Borno state acts as a point of congestion to socioeconomic development and stability.

**(iii)** Promoting a new integrated, coordinated and people-centered approach to advancing peace, security and development within and across nations. The theory of human security is closely applicable to the context of the study for the impact of socioeconomic consequences of insurgency in Borno State, Nigeria whereby the object is set to assess the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on socio-economic activities in Borno State, the responses and their impact of the state towards the insurgency. All the objectives align with the basis for human security.

1.8.2 Poverty Breeds Conflict Hypothesis

The study will use the poverty breeds conflict hypothesis for the theoretical framework. Academic debates continue on the correlation between poverty and insecurity. Some scholars have argued that most of the conflicts in developing countries are caused by poverty. Ted Gurr deprivation theory subscribed to this assumption. The theory explains why the youths are always taking to violence. According to the deprivation theory, “aggression is always a consequence of frustration” and “frustration always lead to aggression” (Odomosu, 1999). “The poor are led to violence owing to their relative deprivation and needs” (Odumosu 1999 cited in Awojobi 2014). Frustration, lack of income, unemployment has prompted the youths in the northern Nigeria to become foot soldiers of Boko Haram. Insecurity, terrorism, conflicts and violence are caused by the high poverty rate in most societies (Gurr 1970 and Burton 1997). Sarmiento and Becerra (1998) and Sarmiento (1999) are the leading scholars on the poverty breeds conflict hypothesis. However, the likes of Gaitan (1995); Rubio (2000); Sanchez and Nunez (2001) and Sanchez, Solimano and Formisano (2005) objected to this hypothesis. Empirical evidence from the works of Collier and Hoeffler (2002); Bellows and Miguel (2006); Ford (2007) indicated that poverty was the major cause of conflict in Africa.

For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) examine conflicts in Africa, from their findings, they notice the connection between income and conflict. Rice et al. (2006); Collier and Hoeffler (2002); Fearon (2004); Walter (2004) subscribed to the notion that poverty helps to extend conflicts once it started. Evidence has shown that when income drops there is a tendency for conflict to reactivate. A study by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler from the Oxford University, James Fearson and David Laitin both from the Stanford University, and Professor Nicholas Sambanis from the Yale University gave credence to this hypothesis (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The table 1 below illustrates their findings.



Source: Rice et. al (2016).

For the focus of this research work, the theory applies in the sense that some of the literature reviewed and even some that are not in this study relating to the effects of insurgency on socioeconomic stability and growth highlight the effects of poverty in instigation, recruitment and proliferation of these acts of insurgencies. It shows a deepening relationship among the variables and illustrates the link between poverty and insurgency before and after the activities have been activated. This hypothesis therefore shows that insurgency militates against socioeconomic growth factors such as living standards, education and others that are considered basic necessities. The current study would therefore be conducted bearing this in mind and would inform the conclusions and recommendations from the analysis conducted post data collection. Onuoha (2013) in his empirical study on why the youth join Boko Haram, the findings of the study indicated that poverty played a major role in luring the youth in joining Boko Haram.

1.9 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study will be examining the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency and its impact on socio economic activities in Borno state. The study also looks at violence due to the insurgence created by the Boko Haram conflict and how it changes people’s lives forever, most especially the states’ economy as well as businesses. The temporal scope of the study is from 2015 through 2020 to ensure that data captures current realities and ensure that research findings would be suitable for current use.

However, the main limitation for this research is the inability to collect firsthand interview with the Boko Haram current and or former members. For, Boko Haram is an ongoing threat, especially with the current attacks, and there is an ongoing pandemic in which movement within states is highly restricted. Other limitations were the lack of an adequate time to conduct the study, insufficient documentation, lack of funds, family responsibility, and ongoing semester coursework.

1.10 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

**Terrorism:** Although the term is not subject to a universally agreed definition, terrorism can be broadly understood as a method of coercion that utilizes or threatens to utilize violence in order to spread fear and thereby attain political or ideological goals.

**Terrorist groups:** As scholar of terrorism, Brian Phillips has noted, how exactly to define a terrorist group or entity remains an open question. To the extent that there is a consensus about how to define a terrorist actor, it is the fact that they engage in violence or threat of violence, and the violence exists in oppositeness to criminal violence, state-led violence and conventional warfare. Technology companies should adopt any definition of terrorist groups that touches on each of these distinctions.

**Social economics:** Social economics is a branch of economics that focuses on the relationship between social behavior and economics. It examines how social norms, ethics, emerging popular sentiments, and other social philosophies influence consumer behavior and shape public buying trends. It uses history, current events, politics, and other social sciences to predict potential results from changes to society or the economy.

**Insurgency:** According to J.W.J Lammers, insurgency in general can be define as taking place everywhere a group of actors uses violence to contest the sovereignty of the established regime, with the aim of political change.

1.11 RESEARCH OUTLINE

The research explores the socioeconomic effects of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeastern region of Borno State, Nigeria, where the activities are said to be prevalent. It therefore seeks to provide information on what is obtainable in terms of effects on socioeconomic activities and also, the roes being played by several actors in reversing some of the effects and preventing future occurrence if and when they are already faced by such challenges. The first chapter of this study gives a background of the study, the problem statement, the research gap and research questions then states the scope, terminology definitions and limitations.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

A lot has been written on Boko Haram terrorism, efforts were made in this chapter to review some literature on terrorism. These reviews were conducted under the following sub-themes: Conceptualizing terrorism, conceptualizing insurgency, Characteristics of terrorism, Types of terrorism, Global dynamics of terrorism, Causes of terrorism, Review of literature on socioeconomic consequences of Boko Haram terrorism in our study area and gaps in the literature.

2.2 CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

The word Terror originates from the Latin word, “terrere” which connotes frighten or tremble. If it is added to the French suffix isme, it means ―practicing the trembling or ― causing the frightening. Trembling and frightening are synonymous with fear, anxiety, and panic, and all these words could mean terror, (Chaliand and Blin, 2007).

According to Chaliand and Blin (2007) terrorism is not a new phenomenon, the concept terrorism does not have a single and universally accepted definition. It is conceived by the media, policy makers and politicians to mean different things and therefore viewed from different lenses. The same applies to analyst, scholars, government agencies, non-governmental organizations and other institutions alike.

Boko Haram as a group of Islamic fundamentalists is committed to carrying out holy war (jihad) and Islamizing northern states of Nigeria and probably conquering the entire country through Jihad. Unfortunately, many lives and properties have been lost to the sect attacks in Borno state (Dauda, 2014). Boko Haram insurgency has confronted Nigeria with massive assaults, which led to the loss of lives and the destruction of valuable properties across the length and width of the country, particularly in northern Nigeria. Hence an assessment of the impact and consequences the insurgency has had on the socio-economic activities of the people cannot be overemphasized.

2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW ON IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC ACTIVITES

The growing insecurity in the north has seriously affected the state’s economic condition such that many people including businessmen are fleeing to more peaceful environment in the southern parts of the country. Several studies conducted have highlighted the impact of insurgency on socioeconomic growth in the region. The literatures have some relationship to our current study and are reviewed here.

Akande (2012) asserted that since Boko Haram resumed its operations in 2010, foreign direct investment (FDI) into Nigeria has plummeted. Citing the World Investment Report (WIR) 2013, FDI flows into Nigeria dropped by 21.3 percent in just one year — from $8.9 billion in 2011 to $7 billion in 2012. He stated ― this substantial loss in FDI over a short period of time will have many consequences for the country. Firstly, FDI in Nigeria has a direct impact on trade, assuring progression of economic growth. Secondly, FDI inflow supplements the available domestic capital by stimulating the productivity of domestic investments. And lastly — but most worrisome — is the high co-dependency ratio between the inflow of FDI, the Nigerian oil sector, and the country’s GDP (Akande, 2012). In the same study, He made note of the rush to escape from the north is also affecting business establishments in that region as banks were reported to be closing down their outlets due to a decrease of economic activities in the area. The massive withdrawal of businesses from the northern region constitutes a reduction of economic affairs in the north as well as throwing those who are departing from the north into financial and psychological pressures.

Dauda (2014) stated that ―the impact of the horrific activities of Boko Haram insurgency on the social economic and political structure of Yobe State is over-whelming and devastating. Many businesses in the state have been affected by the activities of the insurgence. He stated that “Some shops have been taken over by the military personnel who have made it their base, forcing the business owners to either relocate or abandon it totally. Small businesses that use to strive in the night like Tea selling, restaurants, etc. are no longer operating as a result of the security situation.” He also observed that Besides loss of job occasioned by business closedown, insecurity in Adamawa, Borno, Yobe, Kano has cost the Nigerian economy N1.3trillion ($6 billion) as a result of attacks by the Boko Haram group (Dauda 2012).

Farrel, (2012) in his study of effects of insurgency on development remarked that;

“the nature and scale of the economic consequences (of Boko Haram insurgency) on productivity, the social consequences and the security implications of internal displacement, refugee outflow, homelessness, personal insecurity, proliferation of widows and orphans who lose loved ones to the crisis, the anguish of parents of Chibok girls and other kidnapped girls and women, and such other unspeakable horrors being daily visited on hapless and defenseless individuals is startling.”

He further noted that both for the internally displaced persons and the refugees in neighboring countries, some of the consequences include total loss of the means of livelihood, having to struggle for food or waiting for infrequent and often insufficient food hand-outs from the humanitarian services, living in unsanitary and unhygienic conditions and being exposed to epidemics, diseases (Farrel, 2012). The security challenge posed by Boko Haram has reached a point where indigenes and non-indigenes are leaving the northern region to avoid being killed by the insurgents while business owners close down their shops and escape. However, the economic activities of Borno, Yobe and other northern states where Boko Haram spread their immoral acts have been crippled economically (Farrel, 2012). Investors who are to contribute to the growth of the economy had no choice flee as a result of the devastation caused by the insurgency.

It has been observed that investors who moved away from this affected states reinvest their capital in other Nigerian communities free from the insurgence highlighting the difference. Okeke et. al (2016) posits that most of these investors fled to the southern part of the country as a result of the rising tide of insecurity in the region.

According to a report in an Afenmai online magazine (2016) as cited in Okeke et, al (2016), small business firms established by indigenes and non-indigenes between 2010-2014 have increased significantly in Edo state. Apart from this, the security challenge has also led to drastic reduction of people’s patronage of agricultural produce from the north to southern communities because of the recent rumor that members of the sect are planning to send poisonous products to other parts of the country (Okeke et, al, 2016).

Nwabueze (2016) recalled that owing to this development of relocation of businesses from the North East to Edo state, the system of farming has been improved through the use of mechanized farming to meet up with current demand for agricultural produce such as cassava, yam, palm oil, pepper, okra, melon and others. He stated that;

“the increase in patronage is largely an aftermath insecurity arising from Boko Haram insurgency. Bank transactions have also been affected and it has become very important for the banks in affected areas to review their operational hours from usual opening 8.00am and close by 4.00pm to unusual time from 9.00am to 12.00 noon” (Nwabueze, 2016).

According to Dauda (2014), this arrangement has made it difficult for customers especially traders to deposit their daily proceeds in the banks due to the limited banking operational hours that are no longer in their favor.

Umuoha (2012) did a survey of demand and supply as well as movement of goods in his study and found out shockingly that the situation has forced business owners to be hiding their money either in the shop or at home. This has also had an impact on the prices of food items being produced in the north as there was a rapid increase in prices as a result of a decline in production. The farmers found it difficult to carry out their legitimate right of farming and in some cases; goods are stockpiled wasting in the hands of farmers because the traders from the south are scared to travel to the north to buy goods because of the ongoing insurgency. Example of this is the killing of four traders. Therefore, immediately after the killing, the Ibadan Foodstuff Traders Association placed an indefinite ban on travelling to the region to purchase beans from its members.

Umuoha (2012) explained in the conclusive part of his research that the phenomenon of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has become a social problem and dangerous to economic Development. The population of IDPs in the north is unsettling because many of them are family men and women who are supposed to provide for their families. Umuoha (2012) stated that the fact cannot be denied that IDPs have their basic rights to existence, food, shelter, education, and security. However, funds meant for the development of the country are now being channeled towards providing basic needs for the IDPs. Billions of naira has been spent on this project and many of IDPs who are supposed to be working and contribute to the economy are denied their right to work. Private agencies, Local, state and federal government have spent billions of naira to distribute relief materials to the IDPs. Umuoha (2012) further stated that;

“On 26 of November 2015, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) distributed 1,120 bags of rice, 2,240 bags of maize, 2,120 bags of millet, 280 bags of cement, roofing sheets, ceilings, mosquito nets, mattresses, tissues, detergent and lastly, over 800million has been spent by Yobe state government on the welfare of the Pompomari Camp, Damaturu”.

All these have negative impacts on socio-economic development of the states affected by insurgency and Nigeria as a whole.

Dauda (2014), propose that the insurgence of Boko Haram in the north has drastically reduced government of the day’s performance in the affected area. It should be noted that security challenges in northern Nigeria have cost the economy of the country N1.3 trillion. Owing to this, his study highlights that the study needs continuous checks because of the negative effects of the insurgency on economic growth and development of the Northeastern region and the country at large. According to a publication by The Sun Newspaper (2016), the sect activities have led to the reduction of government derivation from the affected northern states as a result of agitation in those areas as well as reducing investment and growth of business. The insecurity challenge continues to make it impossible for the government to execute vital project for the people. Resources which normally could have been used to improve existing projects and start other ones are being diverted to restructure and replaced what has been destroyed by the insurgence.

Nneka (2016) examines that the threats of Boko Haram insurgency on human security in Nigeria assessed the series of violent attacks by Boko Haram in recent times which has been characterized by the abduction and killing of people; destruction of houses, schools, health care centers, churches, mosques, and farms has plunged the country into a chronic state of insecurity. She stated that the basics of food, health, shelter, education and protection which constitute security to the human individual primarily, has therefore been threatened by the Boko Haram insurgency. Nneka (2016) also mentions that there is a correlation between insecurity and living condition and standards. However, insurgency has claimed the lives and properties of people thereby compounding the food and nutrition insecurity and has resulted in the spread of infectious diseases, denied millions of children and youths access to education and increased the number of internally displaced persons with unspeakable need for food and shelter which has caused people to live in fear and anxiety.

She therefore concludes that Boko Haram Insurgency has negative impact on human security and socioeconomic development and recommends that counter-insurgency will be effective only when issues of poverty, corruption and bad governance are effectively addressed. Nneka (2016) work sets a precedent for our study of the impact of socio-economic consequences of boko haram insurgency in Borno state

Ugwu and Eme (2019) in their research to assess the socio-economic cost of insecurity on the public and the nation’s economy in particular set their rational to the fact that insecurity and its various multifaceted manifestations like bombings, kidnapping, keeping people as hostage, destruction of life and property, creation of fear among others, has become a numerous immoral acts not to be overcome by a single effort; which security agents in Nigeria appear incapable of addressing. Their study revealed that insecurity challenge is toxic and harmful to wellbeing of the citizens and has effects the areas such as low quality of life, population displacement, deaths, destruction of business, properties and equipments, relocation and closing down of businesses etc. Their study suggested that security agencies and Nigerian government should be proactive in improving their intelligence gathering techniques responses and create more employment opportunities for the unemployed while equipping and motivating her security forces better.

As developing economies or fragile states are generally unstable, investment comes at a higher risk. A survey by Kusimo (2012) showed that the effect of terrorism has been more dramatic in our country Nigeria where it has been estimated that the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) due to Boko Haram ‘s acts of terrorism dropped $6.1 billion in 2010 representing a decline of almost 30 percent from the previous fiscal year. As a result, terrorism in high risk countries drastically lowers investment. This has had negative impact on the inflow of FDI and has weakened investor confidence. Prompting investors to look elsewhere. This is the reason why it is necessary to examine the socio-economic impact of Boko Haram insurgency in Borno State, Nigeria – which is the research objective in this study.

Odita and Akan (2014) in their research titled “Boko Haram Activities: A Major Set Back to Nigerian Economic Growth” claim that the wide scale violence and insurgency are particularly disturbing for they directly impact negatively on the process of economic growth and affects the levels of economic activities and productivity of a country. In their study, Odita and Akan (2014) examined the effects of the wave of insurgency created by the Boko Harem sect in Nigeria after 2010. They explored the Boko Haram threats and their implications on the nation’s stability and found that impacts of the Boko Haram insurgence on the lives of Nigerians was an unbearable and the roots could not be overemphasized. Due to these, the study recommended the need for government to get to the bottom of the ongoing issues, and security personnel should be planted in nearly every area in the states (especially the northern states) that are venerable to attacks by these insurgents; In order for the government to improve on the state security with all machineries at her disposal that will help capture and prosecute Boko Haram insurgents.

Muhammad (2014) assessed the effect of boko haram crisis on socioeconomic activities in Yobe state - as they stated due to - the terrorizing effect of the activities of the fundamentalist sect, Boko Haram on the socio-economic situation of Yobe states of Nigeria has become so devastating that some financial institutions and other business ventures have closed down in many areas, thereby causing relocation of non-indigenes to their own states. Borno state, our area of study, is an immediate neighbor with Yobe state Muhammad (2014). The study discovered that the insecurity situation in the state was tense enough that even the indigenes had to send their children and wards to some other parts of the country for their education thereby causing severe discomfort and disruption. The study suggested that the government should develop the political will to expose and prosecute the high caliber individuals both within and outside the government who has been linked with the Islamist militant group. The adverse consequences highlighted in the study shows the need to conduct a similar research for Borno state, the study area of this current study and neighbor state of Yobe state.

Muhammad and Ahmad (2019) investigated the operations of Boko Haram insurgency and its consequences on Nigeria’s political and socio-economic arrangement as a whole. The study faults the sudden development of Boko Haram on the government inability to governance and civil society as well as the acts of some development partners. The methodology used for type of research was a qualitative one and relies more on the secondary form of data collection, and the theoretical inclinations of thrust links with Ted theory of Relative Deprivation which is not the one to be used in this study. The theory notes that the people of Northeast feel highly deprived in the scheme of things in Nigeria as a collective arm. The study recommended that, since development cannot take place in an insecure environment, there must be the full entrenchment of good governance, the military must be adequately strengthened, and poverty must be eradicated to reverse the harmful effects of the insurgency in the country. The study of Muhammad and Ahamd (2019) use a different approach in terms of theoretical framework compared to the one intended for this study.

Maurin and Blessing (2018) in their study dealt with the implication of insurgency on Nigeria economic growth. The study proceeded with the assessment of the implication of insurgency on Nigerian economic growth and use secondary source of data collection which was then run in OLS regression and used to analyze the data. In the study, Gross domestic product was the dependent variable, and it proxies on economic growth, while human development index, Global peace index, corruption rank, corruption perception index and relative corruption rank proxies’ insurgency was the independent variable. The result of the findings indicated that there is a linear relationship between GDP and the five independent variables. They stated that the economy responds favorably to measures taken to improve human capital development in Nigeria. The study also showed that the negative impact the of insurgency has critically brought a downturn in economic performance in general. They recommended that the government discourage the attractiveness of public offices by running a low cost government and invest more in public goods for the benefit of her citizens and public offices should be less attractive, proactive measure should be put in place to tackle insurgency both tactically and institutionally. Lastly, the military must be strengthened.

Eman (2017) conducted a research in partnership with some International development partners for Egypt termed, Egypt in Transition: Challenges of State and Societal Resilience. Resilience in the Egyptian context was defined as;

“a process of reform through which the state and society are more capable of overcoming political, social, and economic and security crises without threatening social stability or weakening political legitimacy”.

In the impact report, three main challenges were slowing the process of achieving state and societal resilience in Egypt. They included degrading living conditions, radicalism and terrorism, and the difficulty in working out a sound balance between security needs and political freedoms. The analysis examined state and societal resilience in Egypt within the framework of the EU Global Strategy. Egypt can be considered something of a unique case in the region due to the interconnectedness between the institutions of the state, the ruling elite and society. These linkages create their own dynamics that aﬀect the resilience of the state and society and how they manage to confront the three challenges examined in this paper.

The World (2015) stated that the development objective of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) economic and social impact assessment is to provide the Iraqi Government with an impact analysis of the current crisis at the regional level. It provided a foundation for international efforts to assist the KRG in its efforts to rally humanitarian support. The events which motivated the study include: Syrian civil war, which began in 2011; and the insurgency of the ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) group, which began in June 2014. The violence and inhumanity associated with each of these two events caused tens of thousands to flee their homes and many chose the relative safety of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), as refugees from the Syrian conflict and as internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the ISIS crisis. These events took place in the context of the fiscal crisis, which caused about a 90 percent drop in fiscal transfers from the central government in Baghdad starting in early 2014. In the report they provided the government with a technical assessment of the impact and stabilization costs associated with the inrush of refugees and IDPs. Impact refers to the immediate economic and fiscal effects on the KRG economy and budget, while stabilization cost refers to the additional spending that will be needed to restore the welfare of residents of the KRI. The report was the outcome of a process in which a World Bank team engaged intensively on the ground with regional government institutions and international partners to gather and mobilize data from disparate sources into a structured narrative and integrated technical presentation from which all stakeholders can draw to help them design and implement strategies for coping with the crisis as is the case here.

Since no investor would want to invest his capital in an atmosphere of insecurity, it is therefore, enough to say that the terrifying activities of Boko Haram are obstruction to economic  
development. Education is worst hit by the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria. Apart from the fact that the agitation of the sect is that Western education is forbidden and unislamic, formal education has remained the bedrock of human and capital developments in Nigeria. Today, millions of children from the north no longer have access to basic education. The insecurity challenge has led to the death of many teachers, students, and school properties destroyed making it impossible for pupils to go to school. This situation made Borno state government to close down public and private school for 18 months (Johnstone, 2018). Without any doubt, the future of many children from northern part of the country has been jeopardized as a result of the inability to go to school. For, education is one of the major institutions contributing to the sustainable development of the society and if it is affected, the economic activities of the state will also be threatened.

According to Johnstone (2018) the sect issued statement during the 2015 general election, warning residents not to participate in the election and as a result of these; many eligible voters became scared and decided to stay away from the poling boot. It is therefore obvious that activities of the Boko Haram group to deprive people in order to win elections, further show the danger it portrays to our hard earn democracy. Lastly, Boko Haram insurgency threatens national integration.

**2.3.1 GAPS IN THE LITERATURE**

Most available literature on Boko Haram terrorism focused on its implication on National Security, the causes of Boko Haram insurgency, its implication on Northern Nigeria, government response to Boko Haram insurgency while some resides on Boko Haram insurgency looking at it from the angle of insecurity.

For instance, Peterside (2014) wrote on ―A Threat to National Security: The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria―, Adenrele, (2012) wrote on “Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as a symptom of poverty and political alienation. Nwagwu (2014), wrote on ―Unemployment and Poverty in Nigeria: A Link To National Insecurity, Durotoye (2015) wrote on ―Economic Consequences and Manage of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, Chukwurah, et.al (2015) wrote on ―Implication of Boko Haram Terrorism on Northern Nigeria , Ovaga (n.d) wrote on ―The Socio-Economic Implications of Book-Haram Activities in Northern Nigeria, Okpaga, et.al (2012) wrote on ―Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria, Ugwu (2015) wrote on ―Boko Haram and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Quest for a Permanent Solution, Isyaku (2013) wrote on Terrorism: A New Challenge to Nigeria`s Stability in the 21st Century, while Chinwokwu (2013) wrote on ―Terrorism and the Dilemmas of Combating the Menace in Nigeria.

Fewer studies focused on the Socio-economic consequences of Boko Haram insurgency in North-Eastern part of Nigeria for example, Fawole (2014) wrote on the ―Political and Socio-economic Consequences of Insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria: The Way Out of the Quagmire. To the best of the knowledge of this researcher, given the strategic importance of the area, no study has empirically established the socio-economic consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency. Thus, this study was informed by the near absence of empirical literature on socio-economic consequences of Boko Haram terrorism in the study area.

Therefore, this study filled this gap by conducting empirical research using questionnaire. That is, the study did a micro-level analysis on the subject matter by going to the place of events to meet directly with victims of Boko Haram terrorism.

The second gap in the literature is on conceptualizing and designating groups as either terrorists or insurgents. Although a lot of research has been carried out and much written on the issues of insurgency, terrorism and the distinctions between the two related yet separated issues, there is a insufficiency of literature on the contemporary manifestations and modus operandi of terrorism and insurgency. This is primarily due to the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between insurgency and terrorist groups. In the last five years there has been an increasing rise in groups that can squarely fit into the descriptions of both terrorism and insurgency.

In classic literature, the distinctions between terrorism and insurgency for instance; the primary aim of an insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control of all or a chunk of its territory, whereas terrorists do not seek to take control of a territory from the government, insurgents fight the government forces directly while terrorists do not fight government forces directly, insurgents have large supporters among the people whereas terrorists do not‘‘, to mention but just a few, however, these distinctions can no longer be relied upon in classifying groups as either terrorists or insurgents. Going further, it is apparent that a gap does exist in conceptualizing and designating groups as either terrorists or insurgents. These designations are vital, as it guides governments and non state actors in formulating either counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency strategies. With these dividing lines between insurgency and terrorism disappearing, what is obtainable now is what this researcher refers to as ―hybrid terrorist or insurgent groups. These hybrid groups manifest a combination of both the characteristics of insurgent and terrorist groups such as the attempt for territorial control, direct confrontation with the government forces, having large supporters among the people, using modern sophisticated weapons, to mention but just a few.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the methods that would be used in the study. It explains the research design, the study population, sampling method and procedures, data collection procedures and instruments, data analysis, reporting and ethical issues.

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design was a survey design based on questionnaire. Survey, in research, is a method of collecting data in which people are asked to answer a number of questions. Survey research is often used to assess thoughts, opinions, and feelings (Shaughnessy et. al, 2011).

3.3 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

This research is a quantitative research and data collected will be analyzed using statistical tools. It is used in a wide variety of natural and social sciences, including physics, biology, psychology, sociology and geology (Aina, 2013). According to Cohen (1980), quantitative research is defined as social research that employs empirical methods and statements. These attributes make it a suitable device for this research. Data collection was done by hand after the respondents had filled the relevant sections.

3.4 POPULATION OF THE STUDY

In this study, the population of interest are residents of Borno State without barrier on ethnicity, religion or political affiliation. However, the population of the researcher was gotten from each geopolitical zone of the state.

3.5 SAMPLE AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUE

The research is conducted through a systematic random sampling procedure. This is a technique in which the researcher, based on his knowledge and understanding of the population, handpicks certain groups or individuals for their relevance to the subject of investigation (Aina 2001), within the study location. The process included about one hundred and ten individuals from the state of different background. Questionnaire is administered to them from time to time within the period of study so as to represent the socio-economic impact of the insurgency. These data were used in the analysis and presentation.


3.6 INSTRUMENTS FOR DATA COLLECTION

The instrument of data collection in this study is the questionnaire which also comprises demographic details of the respondents who are residents of the state. The questionnaire allows the experimenter to test what effect, if any, the activities had by assessing the differences.

3.7 PROCEDURE FOR DATA COLLECTION.

The data analysis for this study was an iterative process. Data analysis here consists of three activities: Data reduction, Data display, and Conclusion drawing”. Data reduction, this process is applied to qualitative data and focus remains on selection, simplification and transformation of data. In this continuous process the data is organized throughout the research to draw and finalize a conclusion.

Below is the overall population from which the sample is randomly selected.



Source: United Nations estimate (June, 2019). above is the entire population in all the senatorial district from which the sample size was drawn.

3.8 DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

The data collected and retrieved from the field is analyzed using relevant statistical methods simple enough to provide the required result. The answering of the research question and hypothesis was done using descriptive statistics which involve mean scores and or standard deviations.




Figure showing map of the study area.

Source: Researcher (2020).

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

4.1 SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

This section presents the socio-demographic information of the respondents presented in tables. The study found it crucial to discover the information since it was deemed that such information was an indicator of factors that may be of influence. The analysis relied on information of the respondents so as to categorize the different results according to their acquaintance and responses.

4.**1.1 Distribution by Gender**

The study sought to establish the distribution by gender of the respondents in selection of the sample. It was observed that majority (76.3%) of the respondents were male while 23.8% of the sample were female. The findings show that a majority of the respondents were male.

**Table 1**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent |
| Valid | Female | 19 | 23.8 | 23.8 |
| Male | 61 | 76.3 | 76.3 |
| Total | 80 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**Survey Data (2020)**

4.1.2 Level **of Educa**tion

The study sought to establish the distribution by level of education of the respondents in selection of the sample. It was observed that the majority (27.5%) of the respondents were Secondary school graduates while 8.8% of the sample were of the minority without formal education. The findings show majority of the respondents were Secondary school graduates but all were able to respond to the questionnaire correctly.

**Table 2**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent |
| Valid | NIL | 7 | 8.8 | 8.8 |
| Primary | 19 | 23.8 | 23.8 |
| JSS | 19 | 23.8 | 23.8 |
| SSS | 22 | 27.5 | 27.5 |
| Tertiary | 13 | 16.3 | 16.3 |
| Total | 80 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**Survey data 2020**

4.2 THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY.

The study sought to establish the distribution by perception on whether or not the Boko Haram insurgency is active in Borno state in selection of the sample. It was observed that majority (67.5%) of the respondents indicated “yes” while 32.5% of the sample “no”. The findings show that a majority of the respondents indicated yes, this was interpreted to mean that the insurgency is very much active in the state.

**Table 3**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent |
| Valid | No | 26 | 32.5 | 32.5 |
| Yes | 54 | 67.5 | 67.5 |
| Total | 80 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**Survey 2020**

4.3 DISTRIBUTION BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE EFFECT OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY.

The study sought to establish the distribution by the nature of negative effect of the Boko Haram Insurgency on the lifestyle of the residents in the region. It was observed that majority (60%) of the respondents indicated that the insurgency negatively affects their lifestyle while 40% of the sample had indicated “no”. The findings show that a majority of the respondents indicated more negative effect of the insurgency on their lifestyle.

**Table 4**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent |
| Valid | No | 32 | 40.0 | 40.0 |
| Yes | 48 | 60.0 | 60.0 |
| Total | 80 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**Survey Data (2020)**

4.5 DISTRIBUTION BASED ON MOST AFFECTED ASPECTS.

The study sought to establish the distribution by the most affected aspects as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency. It was observed that majority (27.5%) of the respondents indicated that there were more socioeconomic effects of the insurgency due to Boko Haram while minority (23.8%) of the sample had indicated human capital development (same for infrastructure). The findings show that the Boko Haram insurgency had more effect on socioeconomic activities.

**Table 5**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent |
|  | Infrastructure | 19 | 23.8 | 23.8 |
| Human Capital Development | 19 | 23.8 | 23.8 |
| Socioeconomic activities | 22 | 27.5 | 27.5 |
| Security | 20 | 24.9 | 24.9 |
| Total | 80 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**Survey Data (2020)**

4.6 DISTRIBUTION BASED ON MOST AFFECTED SOCIOECONOMIC ASPECT.

The study sought to establish the distribution by the most affected socioeconomic activity as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency. It was observed that majority (27.5%) of the respondents indicated that there were more educational effects of the insurgency due to Boko Haram while minority (23.8%) of the sample had indicated cultural (same for environmental). From the data, it shows that majority of the respondents believed that education was one of the most affected as compared to other socioeconomic activities.

**Table 6**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent |
|  | Environmental | 19 | 23.8 | 23.8 |
| Cultural | 19 | 23.8 | 23.8 |
| Education | 22 | 27.5 | 27.5 |
| Financial | 20 | 24.9 | 24.9 |
| Total | 80 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**Survey Data (2020)**

4.5 DISTRIBUTION BASED ON THE BODIES THAT PLAY MAJOR ROLE IN TACKLING THE SOCIOECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE INSURGENCY.

The study sought to establish the distribution by the major contributor in mitigating the effects of the insurgency caused by Boko Haram. It was observed that majority 51.3% of the respondents indicated government while 8.8% of the sample indicated Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The findings show that a majority of the respondents see government as the lead actor in tackling socioeconomic effects of the insurgency.

**Table 7**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent |
| Valid | Civil Society | 10 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| NGOs | 7 | 8.8 | 8.8 |
| Security Agencies | 8 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| Government | 41 | 51.3 | 51.3 |
| Private Organizations | 14 | 17.5 | 17.5 |
| Total | 80 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**Survey data 2020**

4.6 DISTRIBUTION BASED ON PERCEPTION ON WHETHER OR NOT GOVERNMENT IS DOING ENOUGH TO TACKLE THE SOCIOECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE INSURGENCY.

The study sought to establish the distribution by distinction to whether or not the government is doing enough to tackle the socioeconomic effects of the Boko Haram. It was observed that majority (85.0%) of the respondents said “yes” while 15.0% of the sample picked “no”. The findings show that a majority of the respondents agree on the fact that the government is doing enough to tackle the socioeconomic effects of the insurgency (as highlighted in chapter two where palliatives, security personnel deployment and IDP camps are being put in place) even though there are lapses as some respondents claimed that the efforts of government are ineffective.

**Table 8**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent |
| Valid | Yes | 68 | 85.0 | 85.0 |
| No | 12 | 15.0 | 15.0 |
| Total | 80 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**Survey data 2020**

4.7 MOST COLLABORATIVE PARTNERS IN TACKLING THE SOCIOECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE INSURGENCY ALONGSIDE THE GOVERNMENT.

The study sought to establish the distribution by most collaborative partners in tackling the effects of Boko Haram insurgency on the socioeconomic activities in Borno state in selection of the sample. It was observed that majority 57.5% of the respondents indicated civil society organizations/NGOs while 8.8% of the sample indicated security agencies. The findings show that a majority of the respondents see civil society/NGOs as a major collaborator.

**Table 9**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent |
| Valid | Civil Society/NGOs | 46 | 57.5 | 57.5 |
| Traditional Rulers | 30 | 37.5 | 37.5 |
| Security Agencies | 4 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| Total | 80 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**Survey data 2020**

4.10. SUGGEST FREELY WHAT YOU THINK SHOULD BE DONE TO ADDRESS THE SOCIOECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN BORNO STATE.

The study sought to establish the distribution by suggestions pertaining effective management of socioeconomic activities, in selection of the sample. It was observed that majority (41.3%) of the respondents suggested defaulters of the law and insurgent’s effective prosecution while 15.0% of the sample suggested sensitization on peace and importance of a secure environment and donation of palliatives. This infers that lack of persecution of defaulters and allowing criminals to go free could be a major contributor to the challenges pertaining socioeconomic activities.

**Table 10**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent |
| Valid | Defaulters of law and insurgent’s effective prosecution | 31 | 41.3 | 41.3 |
| Increase available security personnel, training and ammunition. | 23 | 26.3 | 26.3 |
| Sensitization on peace and importance of a secure environment and palliatives. | 12 | 15.0 | 15.0 |
| Arming vigilante groups and training civil society | 14 | 17.5 | 17.5 |
| Total | 80 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**Survey data 2020**

4.8 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

From the analysis, the study answers the first research question and shows that there are negative effects of the Boko haram insurgency on socioeconomic activities in Borno state and some measures that the government is putting in place to address them, also they are also lapses in methods in which government, traditional rulers and security agencies intervene to address the challenges for socioeconomic activities. However, from tables such as 4.4 and 4.5, the people enjoy some level of security that has positively affected the socioeconomic activities - significantly from the government’s role in addressing the challenges as shown in table 4.8. More so, it answers the first research question to show that education is much affected by the Boko Haram insurgency followed by security and cultural and environmental aspects (27%, 24%, 23% and 23% respectively). It answers the first hypothesis to show that the government has responded positively in tackling the negative effects of Boko Haram insurgency. The final research question is answered by tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 to show that the government’s response has positively impacted the socioeconomic activities in the state by 85% with significant collaboration in with civil society/NGO at 57%.

Also, findings in this study indicate that strong relationship between government and civil society in addressing the effects of the insurgency concerning socioeconomic activities. The table 4.8 shows 51% contribution of the civil society (including government), showing a strong indicator. This study also found out that attitude of traditional rulers has been positive indicating rapid response of the government when concerns are put forward to the responsible agency so it is addressed as shown in table 4.8 and 4.3.

The findings also indicate that the government is working with civil society organizations/NGOs, security agencies to curb the effects of the insurgency of Boko Haram on socioeconomic activities such as putting more security personnel. On the streets, markets and government buildings The collaborative efforts of these stakeholders have facilitated the effectiveness of the actions of government in addressing some setback in socioeconomic activities for continued positive growth of socioeconomic activities. Based on the obtained responses, it is safe to say that the government clearly tries through various means such as palliatives as shown in table 4.9 and 4.10 amongst other approaches. The palliatives have been reported to include food items (such as grains), medications and soft loans for businesses as highlighted by Dauda (2014) to uphold community growth and development and commitment to ensuring a sustainable socioeconomic development. There should also be an increase in security measures to ensure the safety of people and businesses. The findings also indicate that respondents suggested that government should set clear cut roles of other stakeholders, such as traditional rulers and security agencies in ensuring socioeconomic development by all means and not to interfere directly when they are carrying out their activities in their respective areas of influence. From table 4.3 and 4.8, it could be discerned that the government, working alongside the traditional rulers have more positive influence than individual stakeholders working on their own. Collaboration is key to ensuring that policy embarked upon by all stakeholders to ensure that socioeconomic activities are not stalled.

The system being operated by government and traditional rulers in the region to address the socioeconomic challenges is relatively passive compared to previous decades as the government regulate the nature of most of the activities which are influenced by these traditional rulers for reasons that include politics and change in state level government priorities some of which might be questionable. It however remains a fact as highlighted by Dauda (2014) that these traditional rulers play a dominant role in ensuring that socioeconomic development is realized as they are closer to the people and share the similar experience with their environment, concerns and realities. The data collected and analyzed from this study shows that the communities, especially low-income have more confidence in the government in regards to socioeconomic progress in the region.

This show their roles as positive, despite externalities that has led to crisis that resulted in the displeasure of citizens, which in some areas considered to be crisis hotspots. Including kidnapping, robberies, terrorism and other frequent misdemeanors and felonies.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

This chapter summarizes the whole research process and concludes with recommendations. A brief summary of the whole study is given. It also provides a summary of the main findings of the study, conclusions of the study, recommendations and suggestions for further research pertinent to the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on socio-economic activities in Borno state, Nigeria. The study highlights the effects of Boko Haram insurgency on socioeconomic activities in Borno State, Nigeria. Findings here are show that several bodies such as Government, civil society organizations, Non-governmental organizations, security agencies and traditional leaders have played some role in addressing the socioeconomic challenges and the insurgency as well. However, it shows that government have larger role to play and should collaborate with other stakeholders locally and internationally, to curb the menace.

5.2 CONCLUSION

In this paper, the various definitions of are given ranging from insurgency to socioeconomic activities. The role of government and their counterparts in addressing the negative impact of the boko haram insurgency on socio-economic activities cannot be over exaggerated. They play a significant role in maintaining the daily activities involving their contributions to socioeconomic development. Education and businesses are most affected and if not properly handled will create problems of such as children not attending schools, businesses shutting down and insecurity worsening because. The study found that by being closer to the people, and by virtue of the respect people have for the traditional institutions, the task of settling disputes, palliatives, military coordination and psychosocial support has gone a long way in addressing some serious challenges facing the residents of the state while they conduct their socioeconomic activities.

The government both at the federal, and state levels has found it necessary to effectively use civil society/NGOs for promoting socioeconomic progress among the various communities. A lot of government programmes are carried out with massive support of NGOs, traditional rulers and security agencies in communities across the state through their enlightenment, mobilization drive. It is worthy of note that majority of the individuals who lead the approaches to address the socioeconomic development in Borno state are well educated and experienced in administration as they are from professional organizations. The experiences they acquire during their active years in services have placed them at a very good advantage as traditional rulers. However, there are certain challenges being faced by the traditional rulers some of which have been highlighted in chapter four and the recommendations are presented here in this chapter. Their roles should not be tampered with as they engage with communities to advocate for peace and other acts of good since they are respected by the residents.

The study gives relevant insights to researchers, private organizations, civil society organizations, security agencies and other stakeholders. The study showed other indicators which were not intended in the initiation of the study especially with respect to contributions of civil society organizations and lack of government agencies. More so, it also showed that there are significant benefits from frameworks that seek to foster socioeconomic development, human capital development and infrastructure.

A definite finding from the study is that good governance needs to be entrenched to enhance roles of traditional rulers, provision of employment opportunities, empowering the youths through skill acquisition and provision of necessary infrastructure as the means of improving the socioeconomic activities and reducing the negative effects of the insurgency in the state. This is consistent with Ukiwo and Chukwuma (2012) both argued that governance deficiency and general insecurity in the region are inter-linked and mutually reinforcing.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

This research elicited and examined a number of points of views about the Impact of of Boko Haram insurgency on Socio-economic activities in Borno state, Nigeria. Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations were outlined.

1. The study recommends that government should involve traditional leaders in activities that include policy monitoring and ideation, security briefing and strategy, donations and rehabilitation to see that the problem of insecurity is addressed and to foster socioeconomic growth as they have more knowledge about the localities.
2. The study recommends that the infrastructural shortage relevant to security must be addressed as a matter of urgency. Above all, every poverty related indicator should be taken care of by the authority to promote human security, freedom and dignity of residents in the state to foster a sustainable socioeconomic development and activities going further.
3. The study recommends that the government should implement policy on all conflicts in the state without fear or favor by involving all relevant stakeholders in decision making and implementation.
4. The study recommends tolerance by all as it will go a long way in sustaining peace and building a healthy relationship among citizens.
5. The study recommends that Defensive counter terrorism approach should be more applicable in the region, for example building of super camps, not taking the fight to the terrorists’ groups (Boko haram) but waiting for them to attack first so that the attack will be wade off.

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**APPENDIX**

QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear respondent,

I am a final year undergraduate student studying International Relations and Diplomacy in Baze University, Abuja Nigeria, conducting a research on the topic “The Impact of Boko haram insurgency on socio-economic activities in Nigeria, study of Borno state”. This is for partial fulfillment for the award of B.Sc. International Relations.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

* Please, kindly provide correct and sincere answers to the following questions.
* All information provided will be kept confidential so provide the right information as it is in reality.
* Please make a tick in the box () in front of the preferred option to indicate selection.
* The questionnaire exists as a hard copy questionnaire only. If any question is not clear, please call the attention of the questionnaire presenter where feasible. Thank You.

A: RESPONDENT BIO DATA

1. What is your gender? Female  Male 

2. Tick the age category you belong to.17 or younger  , 18-30  , 31-49 , 50 or older

3. Which of the following categories describes your education level?

No Formal Education , Primary , JSS  , SSS  , Tertiary .

4. How will you describe your economic status?

Lower Income , Middle Income , Upper Income

B: THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

5. Is the Boko Haram Insurgency active in Borno State? Yes  No 

6. Does the insurgency affect your lifestyle negatively? Yes  No 

7. Which among these has the insecurity most affected in the state?

Socioeconomic activities, Human capital development, Infrastructure, Security

8. The socioeconomic activities most affected by the insecurity is \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Education, Financial, Cultural , Environmental 

9. Which one among the following plays a larger role in tackling the socioeconomic effects of the insurgency?

Government, Civil Society/NGOs , Traditional Leaders 

C: SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

10. Is the government doing enough to tackle the socioeconomic effects of the insurgency?

Yes, No

11. The answer provided above is primarily as a result of corporation or lack of corporation from \_\_\_\_\_\_

Civil Society/NGOs, Traditional Rulers, Security Agencies  Citizens  Vigilante 

12. Suggest freely on what you think should be done to effectively address the socioeconomic effects of the Boko Haram insurgency in Borno State. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_