**EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE’S SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY ON GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA (1999 – 2000)**

# BY

**DIKE ALEXANDER IFUNANYA PG/15/018089/ASS**

# BEING A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, DR. GOODLUCK EBELE JONATHAN COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE AWARD OF PhD IN POLITICAL THEORY OF THE IGBINEDION UNIVERSITY, OKADA.

**SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR B.O. AGARA**

# MAY, 2021

**DECLARATION**

I do solemnly declare that this doctoral research on “**Empirical Analysis of the Implications of John Locke’s Social Contract Theory” on Governance in Nigeria (1999 – 2000)** was originally and entirely undertaken by me.

# Dike Alexander Ifunanya PG/15/018089/ASS

**CERTIFICATION**

I certify that this project was carried out by **DIKE ALEXANDER IFUNANYA** in partial fulfillment of the requirement of an award of Ph.D in Political Theory in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan College of Arts and Social Sciences, Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State.

# Dike Alexander Ifunanya

Student

**Signature & Date**

**Signature & Date**

# Dr. Adekunle S. Ajisebiyawo

Head of Department

# Prof Babatunde O. Agara Signature & Date

Supervisor

# Prof. (Mrs.) Tonye G. Okorie Signature & Date

Dean, School of Postgraduate Studies & Research

# DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my parents Mr.& Mrs. N.N. Dike and my bosom friend Patrick Chukwuma Egbuche.

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**ABSTRACT**

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic society with a conglomerate of nations each with distinct and unique identities and values but fused together as a state by European imperialism in Africa as perfected by British colonialism. Since the advent of British rule following amalgamation of the colonies in 1914 through independence in 1960 and date, there has been plethora of governments and various constitutions aimed at arriving at a social contract that serves all ethnics on the basis of equity and equality. The Nigerian state has grappled with the issues of ensuing and sustaining equity and justice among the

because the State of Nature can be aptly described as a state of utter distrust. Given Hobbes’ reasonable assumption that most people want first and foremost to avoid their own deaths, he concludes that the State of Nature is the worst possible situation in which men can find themselves. It is the state of perpetual and unavoidable war. The situation is not, however, hopeless. Men are reasonable, they can see their way out of such a state by recognizing the laws of nature, which show them the means by which to escape the State of Nature and create a civil society (Southwood, 2013).

Centrally, Rousseau has two distinct social contract theories. The first is found in his essay, discourse on the origin and foundations of inequality among men, commonly referred to as the second discourse which is an account of the moral and political evolution of human beings over time, from a state of nature to modern society. The second is his normative or idealized theory of the social contract, and is meant to provide the means by which to alleviate the problems that modern society created. The normative social contract, argued for by Rousseau in the social contract, is meant to respond to the sorry state of affairs and to remedy the social and moral ills that have been produced by the development of society (Gauthier, 2006; Freeman, 2012).

According to Rousseau, the State of Nature was a peaceful and quixotic time. People lived solitary, uncomplicated lives. Their few needs were easily satisfied by nature. Because of the abundance of nature and the small size of the population, competition was non-existent, and persons rarely even saw one another, much less had reason for conflict or fear. Moreover, these simple, morally pure persons were naturally endowed with the capacity for pity, and therefore were not inclined to bring harm to one another. As time passed, however, humanity faced certain changes. As the overall population increased, the means by which people could satisfy their needs had to change. People slowly began to live together in small families, and then in small communities.

Divisions of labor were introduced, both within and between families, and discoveries and inventions made life easier, giving rise to leisure time. Such leisure time inevitably led people to make comparisons between themselves and others, resulting in public values, leading to shame and envy, pride and contempt (Freeman, 2012). Most importantly however, according to Rousseau, was the invention of private property, which constituted the pivotal moment in humanity’s evolution out of a simple, pure state into one characterized by greed, competition, vanity, inequality, and vice.

For Rousseau the invention of property constitutes humanity’s ‘fall from grace’ out of the State of Nature. Having introduced private property, initial conditions of inequality became more pronounced. Some have property and others are forced to work for them, and the development of social classes begins. Eventually, those who have property noticed that it would be in their interests to create a government that would protect private property from those who do not have it but could see that they might be able to acquire it by force.

Government is established, through a contract, which purports to guarantee equality and protection for all, even though its true purpose is to fossilize the very inequalities that private property has produced. In other words, the contract, which claims to be in the interests of everyone equally, is really in the interests of the few who have become stronger and richer as a result of the developments of private property. This is the naturalized social contract, which Rousseau views as responsible for the conflict and competition from which modern society suffers. The normative social contract, argued for by Rousseau in The Social Contract (1762), is meant to respond to this sorry state of affairs and to remedy the social and moral ills that have been produced by the development of society (Freeman, 2012).

Rousseau’s state of nature is a differential in content of analysis from Hobbes. Diametrically, Rousseau systematically revealed that the state of nature was peaceful, accommodates individual potentials and was not the brutish, savagery condition as painted by Hobbes. Whereas government metamorphosed in Rousseau’s state of nature to redistribute properties in idealized society, the existence of government for Hobbes in the state of nature is the neutralization of brutishness and savagery by which society is preserved. Yet Rousseau was critical of Robert Filmer’s ideology of patriarchy which upheld Divine Right of King. The theory postulates that government is an offshoot of predestined personality that is chosen to rule over society and that such ruler-ship is next to God almighty which precludes right of citizens to revolt nonetheless the tyranny of government. Predicatively, Rousseau espoused the ideology of John Lock in the state of nature and ownership of property.

Inferentially, John Lock social contract is a revolutionary type which legitimizes change of government consequentially perceived as inequitable and breach of collective contract. Evidently, the history of government in Nigeria cannot be divorced from Lock proposition. Nigeria is a multi-ethnic society with composition of nations which the British through Lord Lugard fused together by amalgamating protectorates of the North and South in 1914. Since the amalgamation, there is plethora of extent and end of governments in Nigeria. This is found in various versions of constitutions as response to agitation, distrust, inequity and civil war. The history of Nigeria is characterized with ethnic militia, wars and civil unrest, the suspicions which derived from skewed benefits of the social contract (Adewole, 2014; Babalola, 2019). From the colonial period till now, the various constitutions are attempts to arrive at a social contract acceptable to the various ethnics that made up Nigeria.

This is found in constitutional development spanning colonial era such as Clifford constitution of 1922, Richard constitution of 1946, Macpherson constitution of 1951 and Lyttleton constitution of 1954; republican constitution of the first republic in 1963, the second republic in 1979, the third republic in 1989 and the forth republic in 1999, the latest which subsists till date accompanied with amendments. These constitutions were derived to establish new social order and civil government to accommodate agitations of corporate bodies that make up Nigeria. Notwithstanding versions of constitutions especially the fourth republic, there is rife agitation by some geopolitical entities which reflect endless suspicions and inequity.

The audacious cry of restructuring of Nigeria especially from the people of southern geopolitical zones attested to John Lock thesis of extent and end of civil government. Yet how this revolutionary change can be scientifically achieved is the major focus of this study.

# Statement of the Problem

John Lock’s ‘extent and end of government’ is a proposition that civil government is a cycle and duration of each cycle is scientifically and empirically dependent upon capability to preserve moral social contract (Cushing, 1998; Freeman, 2012; Olubari, 2012). Nigeria is a constitutional government that is defined as Federal Republic, indissoluble and federating units, hence the sovereignty of its status.

Apparently, the peoples of the southern geopolitical zone are frontier in the renegotiation of Nigeria state (Nweke, 2017a; Ogbuju & Eneh, 2014; Nwabueze, 2018; Babalola, 2019). The perception of equity and equality dominates suspicions in the Nigeria state (Babalola, 2019). Recalling the regional government of the pre independence and First Republic eras, this was the period of resource control and total

commitment to nation state. In the current, the federal system of government contains superlative power and dominant control of resources. The Fourth Republic Constitution confers exclusive list on the Federal Government, the status that concentrate dominant power in the centre (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Nwabueze, 2018; Babalola, 2019). The federal government is a superlative unit, extremely powerful and exercise supreme control over resources found in federating units. According to the political economy thought of Falana (2018) and Babalola (2019), the federal government is a lion in the jungle that dictates the pace of survival of federating units; it is a dependent conditioning unit that ultimately determines the survival of federating units and therefore, the federal government is lord of federating units.

The constitutional provisions have undergone series of changes and amendments to accommodate the observed lapses in the Constitution. More recently, the 1999 Constitution has undergone series of amendments to consolidate collective gains for all in the Nigeria state (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2019). Notwithstanding amendments to Fourth Republic Constitution, there have been widespread agitations against corporate existence of Nigeria state (Akinboye, 2001; Ihonvbene, 2014; Ogbuju & Eneh, 2014; Rufus& Eyo, 2017; Babalola, 2019). Evidently, there have been several constitutional development geared towards having a creditable and agreed upon social contract by all stakeholders. Failure to achieve this has led to the civil war, agitation for political accommodation, marginalization claims, resource control and even secession now. Failure to achieve social contract has also led to different ethnic militia groups emerging especially in the southern part of Nigeria, hence the problematic of this work. The gap therefore revolves round perception of equity and equality; pattern of agitation in the Nigeria state; the skewed value system; structure of stakeholder-ship; and model of constitutional restructuring suitable to preserve Nigeria state.

# Research Questions

Following the above discourse, some research questions are outline below.

* + 1. What is the perception of equity and equality in the Nigerian state among peoples of ‘southern geopolitical zones’?
    2. What forms of value system exist in the Nigerian state and how do these influence perception?
    3. What is the pattern of agitation in the Nigerian state among peoples of the ‘southern geopolitical zones’?
    4. What structure of stakeholder-ship exists in the Nigeria state?
    5. What model of constitutional restructuring is suitable to preserve social contract of the Nigerian state?

# Objectives of the Study

The goal of this study is to evaluate John Locke’s social contract theory in the context of the Nigerian state and especially the treatise of extent and end of government. The continuous call for restructuring by Nigerians especially the ‘southern geopolitical zones’ remains unpretentious suspicions in the corporate existence of Nigeria. Against this backdrop, the study shall address the following specific objectives. To:

* + 1. Evaluate perception of equity and equality in the Nigerian state among peoples of ‘southern geopolitical zones*’*.
    2. Assess pattern of agitation in the Nigerian state among peoples of ‘southern geopolitical zones*’*.
    3. Identify forms of value system in the Nigerian state and how this influence perception.
    4. Examine structure of stakeholder-ship in the Nigerian state.
    5. Appraise model of constitutional restructuring suitable to preserve social contract of the Nigerian state.

# Statement of Hypothesis

The following hypotheses shall be analysed and tested in this study.

**H0 i**: Perception of equity and equality is not significant to positively trigger propensity for secession

**H0 ii:** Pattern of agitation is not significantly positive to influence propensity for end of civil government

**H0 iii:** There is no significant difference between perception of stakeholder-ship and retention of trust in civil government

**H0 iv**: There is no significant relationship between value system and propensity to retain

corporate existence of civil government

* 1. **Significance of the Study**

Since the amalgamation in 1914, the history of Nigeria is replete with progress, civil war, inter and intra ethnic conflicts, civil disobedience and unhealthy rivalry. The post-civil war era was significant to mend the fence around social contract that unites the corporate existence. It was the expectation that the post war era would permanently unite the people, facilitate renegotiation of the social contract for equity, equality and social justice for federating units. Indeed since the civil war, the social contract that bond Nigeria together has remained subject of severe criticism, suspicion, unhealthy rivalry among ethnic groups and lately the raucous call for constitutional restructuring and renegotiation of the corporate existence. Notably, the peoples of ‘southern geopolitical zones*’* have championed the call for restructuring. Indeed, the 2014 constitutional

conference held under the presidential government of Goodluck Jonathan was a dominant communiqué of restructuring by the peoples of the southern Nigeria. There is now palpable concern that the unity of Nigeria is threatened and waning due to the distrust. This study is therefore significant not only as an academic endeavour, it is expected to provide robust literature, firsthand data suitable for policy recommendations that will be useful to fill the gap in social contratualism and contracterian discourse.

# Scope of the Study

The idea of John Lock is the proposition that there is always a premise for end of government due to breach in the moral social contract. Therefore, parties in the moral contract who perceive threat to existence also retain freedom to renegotiate which can potentially give birth to a new cycle of government. The renegotiation of Nigeria state through constitutional restructuring has been the clarion call by peoples of the ‘southern geopolitical zones*’*.

The time frame of this research is from 1999 to 2020, though other periods were mentioned as relevant. This study shall capture research participants from South East and South-South.

# Operational Definition of Concepts

* + 1. **Social Contract**

This is adopted in this study to mean civil government that is constitutionally binding on the collective consent of people who come together to surrender their freedom under universal law and rule of society.

# Stakeholder-ship

This is used to refer to perception of ownership in the contract, sense of belongingness in the contract, commitment in the contract, and retention of the contract.

# Model

This is used in this study to mean hypothetical social contact that shall be prescribed as viable alternative to existing type.

# Equity and Equality

This is used to refer to knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) detailing social justice in the social contract of Nigeria.

# Federalism

This shall indicate historical comparison between civil government of the First Republic and Fourth Republic in terms of devolution of power, development and self-sufficiency.

# Value System

This shall indicate normative expectations associated with social contract of Nigeria state.

# Limitation of the Study

The study concentrates on implication of John Locke Social Contract Theory for governance in Nigeria. The focus is on the Southern part of Nigeria, specifically on the East and South. This study has been limited and constrained by some factors such as: time frame for the research as partial fulfillment of the award of Degree; financial; high cost of transportation to and within the States chosen for the research. Moreover, the COVID 19 pandemic also constrained the research.

# CHAPTER TWO

**LITERATURE REVIEW/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

This chapter contains literature review which deals with documentations of previous works by scholars who have written in the subject matter of social contract. In the meantime, this chapter shall be divided into conceptual literature, theoretical literature and empirical literature. Also subject matter which relates to gap in empirical literature and conceptual framework shall be captured.

# Conceptual Literature

* + 1. **John Locke's idea of Social Contract**

Locke’s most important and influential political writings are contained in his Two Treatises on Government. The first treatise deals with refuting the argument of Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha , that political authority was derived from religious authority, also known by the description of the Divine Right of Kings, which was dominant in seventeenth-century England. The second treatise contains Locke’s main constructive view of the aims and justification for civil government, titled “an essay concerning the true original extent and end of civil government”. According to Locke, the State of Nature, the natural condition of mankind, is a state of perfect and complete liberty to conduct one’s life as one best sees fit, free from the interference of others (Lefkowitz, 2003; Yale University Press, 2003). This does not mean, however, that it is a state of license: one is not free to do anything as one pleases, or even anything that one judges to

be in one’s interest. The State of Nature, although a state wherein there is no civil authority or government to punish people for transgressions against laws, is not a state without morality. The State of Nature is pre-political, but it is not pre-moral. Property plays an essential role in Locke’s argument for civil government and the contract that establishes it. According to Locke, private property is created when a person mixes his labor with the raw materials of nature. The State of Nature is not a condition of individuals, rather it is conjugal society (Lister, 2011). These societies are based on the voluntary agreements to care for children together, and they are moral but not political. Political society comes into being when individual men, representing their families, come together in the State of Nature and agree to give up the executive power to punish those who transgress the Law of Nature, and hand over that power to the public power of a government. In other words, by making a compact to leave the State of Nature and form society, they make “one body politic under one government” (Lister, 2011) and submit themselves to the will of that body.

One joins such a body, either from its beginnings, or after it has already been established by others, only by explicit consent. Having created a political society and government through their consent, men then gain three things which they lacked in the State of Nature, laws, judges to adjudicate laws, and the executive power necessary to enforce these laws. Each man therefore gives over the power to protect himself and punish transgressors of the Law of Nature to the government that he has created through the compact. Given that the end of men’s uniting into common-wealth is the preservation of their wealth, and preserving their lives, liberty, and well-being in general, Locke imagined the conditions under which the compact with government is destroyed, and men are justified in resisting the authority of a civil government when the executive power of a government devolves into tyranny (Vallier, 2016).

John Locke's conception of the social contract differed from Hobbes’ in fundamental ways, though retaining the central notion that persons in a state of nature would willingly come together to form a state. Locke believed that individuals in a state of nature would be bound morally, by the Law of Nature, not to harm each other in their lives or possessions. Without government to defend them against those seeking to injure or enslave them, Locke further believed people would have no security in their rights and would live in fear (Gaus & Courtland, 2011). Individuals, according to Locke, would only agree to form a state that would provide, in part, a "neutral judge", acting to protect the lives, liberty, and property of those who lived within it (Gaus & Courtland, 2011). However, Hobbes argued for near-absolute authority, Locke on the contrary argued for inviolate freedom under law in his Second Treatise of Government (Gaus, 2016). Locke argued that a government's legitimacy comes from the citizens' delegation to the government their absolute right of violence, reserving the inalienable right of self-defense or "self-preservation", along with elements of other rights, in this case, property, will be liable to taxation as necessary to achieve the goal of security through granting the state a monopoly of violence, whereby the government, as an impartial judge, may use the collective force of the populace to administer and enforce the law, rather than each man acting as his own judge, jury, and executioner, the condition in the state of nature (Celeste, 2019).

Locke differed from Hobbes insofar as he described the state of nature as one in which the rights of life and property were generally recognized under natural law, the inconveniences of the situation arising from insecurity in the enforcement of those rights. He therefore argued that the obligation to obey civil government under the social contract was conditional upon the protection not only of the person but also of private property (Celeste, 2019). Sovereigns who violated these terms could be justifiably overthrown

(Hosein, 2013). This is main idea of John Lock which provides justification for change of civil government. Centrally, the tenet of Lock proposition is that parties to social contract retain inalienable right and preservation to protect their self-interest in situation where the sovereign(s) dissipate collective interest, become tyranny and a suspicion of skew benefits in the access to limited resources. Nigeria is a composition of multi ethnic groups which is composed of delineated geo political zones. Unfortunately, there is innuendo across the length and breadth of the southern geo political zones which have intransigently remained on the stance of restructuring, a reconfiguration of the postulation of John Lock’s civil government and the inalienable right to constitutional restructuring.

# Distinctiveness of Social Contract

The aim of a social contract is to show that members of some society have reason to endorse and comply with the fundamental social rules, laws, institutions, and principles of that society. It is concerned with public justification of determining whether or not a given regime is legitimate and therefore worthy of loyalty (D’Agostino 1996). The ultimate goal of state-focused social contract theories is to show that some political system can meet the challenge Alexander Hamilton raised in Federalist which states ‘men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force’ (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Gauthier (1986) states that any system of moral constraints must be justified to those to whom it is meant to apply. Gauthier queried ‘what theory of morals, can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show that all the duties it recommends are truly endorsed in each individual’s reason’. The ultimate goal of social contract theories is to show, in the most general sense, that social (moral, political, legal and so on) rules can be rationally justified. This does not, however, distinguish the social contract from other approaches in moral and political philosophy,

all of which attempt to show that moral and political rules are rationally justifiable in some sense. The true distinctiveness of the social contract approach is that justification does not rely on some exogenous reason or truth. Justification is generated by rational agreement (or lack of rejection), not by the reasons that generate agreement. The fact that everyone in a society, given their individual reasoning, would agree to a certain rule or principle is the critical justification for that rule, rather than certain correct or sound reasons that sufficiently rational individuals would appreciate and, if appreciated, would lead to agreement (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017).

Although contractarians differ in their account of the reasons of individuals, with some being attracted to more objectivist accounts (Scanlon 2014), most follow Hobbes in modeling individual reasons as subjective, motivationally internal, or at least agent- relative. This may be because of skepticism about moral reasons generally (Gauthier 1986, Binmore 1998), a conviction about the overwhelming importance of self-interest to the social order (Brennan and Buchanan 2000; Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017), a concern to take seriously the disagreement of individual view in modern society, and this includes differences about objectivity (Gaus, 2016, 2011a; Muldoon 2017; Moehler, 2014, 2015) or because this approach is consistent with the most well developed theories of rational choice in the social sciences (Binmore 2005, Buchanan 2000). Nevertheless, the reasons individuals have for agreeing to some rules or principles are importantly their own reasons, not good reasons from the impartial perspective. Of course, those same individuals may care about what they perceive to be the impartial good or some other non-individualistic notion they need not be egoists but what they care about, and so their reasons will differ from one another. This point, as Rawls highlights in his work, is crucial to understanding political justification in a diverse society where members of a society cannot reasonably be expected to have similar conceptions of the good (Rawls

1996). Contractarian accounts put even greater weight on heterogeneity (Southwood, 2010; Gaus 2016, Muldoon 2017; Thrasher 2014b, Thrasher and Vallier 2015, Thrasher

2015).

# Social Contract as a Model

Social contract is a model having a general schematic form (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Social contract is a model of justification that has several general parameters that are set differently in different theories. What distinguishes contractarian theories is how they specify these general parameters. The goal of the model is to represent reasons for endorsing and complying with some set of social rules, principles or institutions. This is done by showing some model representative choosers who would agree to these rules in some specified choice situation. Critically, there are two sets of relevant individuals (I and I\*). The first set is the model choosers (I) constructed in the “device of representation” such as the original position. The second set is composed of real individuals (I\*) whose terms of interaction are to be guided by the contract. If the deliberations of the contractors (I) are to be relevant to the actual participants (I\*), the reasoning of the former must, in some way, be shared by the latter. Another variable is the deliberative setting (M) in which the model choosers (I) endorse some principles or rules, principles, or institutions (R). Given the above, a general model of social contract theories can be identified: I chooses R in M and this gives I\* reason to endorse and comply with R in the real world insofar as the reasons I has for choosing R in M are (or can be) shared by I\*

The social contract, then, is a model of rational justification translating the problem of justification (what reasons individuals have) into a problem of deliberation

(what rules they will agree to). As Rawls argues, understanding this way the question of justification is settled by working out a problem of deliberation; we have to ascertain which principles it would be rational to adopt given the contractual situation. This connects the theory of justice with the theory of rational choice (Rawls 1999), a point of analysis in the Nigeria federalism. At the simplest level, models take something complex and make it simpler. Along these lines, both the economist Rubinstein (2012) and the philosopher Cartwright (1991) compare models to fables. Fables are stories that communicate some important lesson in a simple, easy to understand fashion. Fables, like models, communicate important general rules through particular, though fictional, cases. Models involve abstraction and idealization, but they do more than that: they help us see what our key assumptions are and identify the factors that we see as relevant (Gaus 2016). Weisberg (2013) concurs that model as techniques of idealization, do more than abstract. According to Weisberg abstract direct representations to distinguish them from models. Modeling seeks to isolate the important features of the target phenomena, allowing the modeler to understand and manipulate important elements of the phenomena in simulations. John Rawls’s representatives to the original position, for instance, are not only abstractions of real persons. They are idealizations that isolate particular aspects of persons that are relevant to justification as a choice, specifically their thin theory of rationality, and their values (in the form of primary goods). Isolating these features is important for modeling the agreement procedure in Rawls’s theory. The social contract models reasons for endorsing and complying with some set of social rules or institutions. How the theory does this depends on the assumptions made and the specification of the parameters.

# Reductionist vs. Non-Reductionist

How the contract theorist models the parties to the agreement is determined by actual justificatory problem, and what is relevant to solving it. A major divide among contemporary social contract theories involves defining the justificatory problem. A distinction is often drawn between the Hobbesian (contractarian) and Kantian (contractualist) interpretations of the justificatory problem. These categories are imprecise, and there is often as much difference within these two approaches as between them, yet, nevertheless, the distinction is useful in isolating some key disputes in contemporary social contract theory. Among the contractarians the crucial justificatory task is, as Gauthier (2013) puts it, to resolve the foundational crisis of morality. From the standpoint of the agent, moral considerations present themselves as constraining his choices and action, in ways independent of his desires, aims, and interests. What reason can a person have for recognizing and accepting a constraint that is independent of his desires and interests? What justifies paying attention to morality, rather than dismissing it as an appendage of outworn beliefs? If justificatory problem is not simply to understand what morality requires, but whether morality ought to be paid attention to, or instead dismissed as a superstition based on outmoded metaphysical theories, then obviously the parties to the agreement must not employ moral judgments in their reasoning. Another version of this concern is Kavka’s (1984) description of the project to reconcile morality with prudence. On above, the aim of the contract is to show that commitment to morality is an effective way to further one’s non-moral aims and interests. Here the justificatory problem is satisfactorily answering the question “why be moral?” This contractarian project is reductionist; it derives moral reasons from non-moral ones. Or, to use Rawls’ (1996) terminology, it attempts to generate the reasonable out of the rational. This approach is appealing for several reasons. First, insofar as we doubt that moral reasons are

genuine or motivationally effective, such a reductionist strategy promises to ground

morality or at least a very basic version of it, on the prosaic requirements of instrumentalist practical rationality (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017).

The justificatory question “why be moral?” is transformed into the less troubling question “why be rational?” Second, even if we recognize that moral reasons are, in some sense, genuine, contractarians also want to show that prudent individuals, not independently motivated by morality would have reason to reflectively endorse morality (David, 2003; Gaus, 2011a). Furthermore, if we have reason to suspect that some segment of the population is, in fact, knavish then we have good defensive reasons based on stability to build our social institutions and morality so as to restrain those who are only motivated by prudence, even if we suspect that most persons are not so motivated. Brennan and Buchanan (2008) argue that a version of Gresham’s law holds in political and social institutions that “bad behavior drives out good and that all persons will be led themselves by even the presence of a few self-seekers to adopt self-interested behavior”.

We need not think people are mostly self-seeking to think that social institutions and morality should be justified to and restrain those who are. On the other hand, contractualists such as Rawls (2007), Harsanyi (1977), Scanlon (1998), Darwall (2006), Southwood (2010) and Gaus (2011a) attribute ethical or political values to the deliberative parties, as well as a much more substantive, non-instrumentalist form of practical reasoning.

The kinds of surrogates that model the justificatory problem of ‘you and me’ are already so situated that their deliberations will be framed by ethico-political considerations. The agents’ deliberations are not, as with the Hobbesian theorists, carried out in purely prudential or instrumentalist terms, but they are subject to the ‘veil of ignorance’ or other substantive conditions. Here the core justificatory problem is not

whether the very idea of moral and political constraints makes sense, but what sorts of moral or political principles meet certain basic moral demands, such as treating all as free and equal moral persons, or not subjecting any person to the will or judgment of another (Reiman, 1990). This approach is non-reductionist in the sense that not all of morality is derived from the non-moral. A benefit of the non-reductive approach is that the choosers in the contractual procedure (I) share many of the normative concerns of their actual counterparts (I\*). This should ensure a closer normative link between the two parties and allow for the contract to generate a thicker, more substantive morality, presumably closer to that already held by I\*. Whether this is so, however, depends on how closely the non- reductionist model of rationality is to the reasoning of actual individuals. At this point, the debate seems to be centered on two positions, which can be called the robustness and sensitivity positions. According to the proponents of robustness, whatever else moral agents may disagree about, we can safely assume that they would all be committed to basic standards of rationality (Moehler 2017, 2013). We should thus suppose this same basic, shared conception of rationality and agency: when people fall short of more moralistic ideals and virtue, the contract will still function. It will be robust. According to this view, we are better off following Hume (1741, cited in Gaus, 2011a) in assuming every person to be an instrumental knave, even though that maxim is false in fact. The sensitivity position rejects this, holding that, if in fact individuals in I\* are not resolutely self-interested, the problems of I, resolutely self-interested individuals, and their contractual solutions, will be inappropriate to I\*. Perhaps whereas I\* can count on social trust, the self-interested contractors will find it elusive and arrive at second-best alternatives that trusting folks would find silly and inefficient. Indeed, the sensitivity theorist may insist that even if the self-interested agents can talk themselves into acting as moral agents they do so for the wrong sort of reasons (Gaus 2011).

# Idealization and Identification

The core idea of social contract is that the deliberation of the parties is supposed to model the justificatory problem of “you and me.” This pulls social contract in two opposing directions. On the one hand, if the deliberations of the hypothetical parties are to model our problem and their conclusions are to be of relevance to us, the parties must be similar to us. The closer the parties are to “you and me” the better their deliberations will model you and me, and be of relevance to us. On the other hand, the point of contract theories is to make headway on justificatory problem by constructing parties that are idealizations of you and me, suggesting that some idealization is necessary and salutary. To recognize that some forms of idealization are problematic does not imply that it embraces what Gaus (1996) has called justificatory populism that every person in a society must actually assent to the social and moral institutions in question. Such a standard reflects the older social contract tradition based on direct consent. Modern contract theories are concerned with appeals to reason, not the self-binding power of consent. The distinction between reason and consent is a major challenge in the Nigeria social contract in which some ethnic groups now perceive inequity and inequality. Despite possible problems, there are two important motivations behind idealization of the deliberative parties. First, you and I, as we now are, may be confused about what considerations are relevant to our justificatory problem. We have biases and false beliefs; to make progress on solving our problem of justification we wish, as far as possible, to see what the result would be if we only reasoned correctly from sound and relevant premises. So in constructing the hypothetical parties we wish to idealize them in this way.

Ideal deliberation theorists like Habermas (1985) and Southwood (2010), in their different ways, are deeply concerned with this reason for idealization. On the face of it, such idealization does not seem especially troublesome, since the ultimate concern is with

what is justified, and so want the deliberations of the parties to track good reasons. But if we idealize too far from individuals and citizens as they presently are (for example, suppose we posit that they are fully rational in the sense that they know all the implications of all their beliefs and have perfect information) their deliberations may not help much in solving justificatory problems. We will not be able to identify with their solutions. For example, suppose that hyper-rational andperfectly informed parties would have no religious beliefs, so they would not be concerned withfreedom of religion or the role of religion of political decision making. But our problem is thatamong tolerably reasonable but far from perfectly rational citizens, pluralism of religious belief is inescapable. Consequently, to gain insight into the justificatory problem among citizens of limited rationality, the parties must model our imperfect rationality.

# Homogeneity and Heterogeneity

Social contract theories are pulled towards some representations of the parties in order to render the choice situation determinate. This goal of determinacy, however, can have the effect of eliminating the pluralism of the parties that was the original impetus for contracting in the first place (Encyclopedia of Philosphy, 2017). In his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, Rawls (2007) held that “a normalization of interests attributed to the parties is common to social contract doctrines and it is necessary to unify the perspectives of the different parties so as to construct a shared point of view” (Encyclopedia of Philosphy, 2017). Here, Rawls seems to be suggesting that to achieve determinacy in the contract procedure, it is necessary to “normalize” the perspectives of the parties. The problem can be captured. Suppose that the parties to the contract closely model you and me, and so, they have diverse bases for their deliberations in religious, secular, perfectionist, and so on. In this case, it is hard to see how the contract theorist can get a determinate result. Just as you and I disagree, so will the parties. Rawls (1999)

acknowledges that his restrictions on particular information in the original position are necessary to achieve a determinate result. According to Rawls (1999) if we exclude knowledge of those contingencies which set men at odds, then everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments. The determinate condition therefore is the one lacking where in the context of Nigeria, some parties in the contract are grossly suspicious that the plurality eliminates value of the heterogeneity. Nigeria is a heterogeneous society which value determinate indiscriminately distributes power equally. But there is growing concern that such equity has drained. Gaus (2011a) has argued that a determinative result can only be generated by an implausibly high degree of abstraction, in which the basic pluralism of evaluative standards, the core justificatory problem is abstracted away.

On Gaus’ view, modeling of the parties that make them anything approaching representations of you and me will only be able to generate a non-singleton set of eligible social contracts. The parties might agree that some social contracts are better than none, but they will disagree on their ordering of possible social contracts. This conclusion, refined and developed in Gaus (2011a), connects the traditional problem of indeterminacy in the contract procedure (Hardin, 2003) with the contemporary, technical problem of equilibrium selection in games (Thrasher 2014a). It is possible however, that determinacy may actually require diversity in the perspective of the deliberative parties in a way that Rawls and others like Harsanyi didn’t expect. The reason for this is simple, though the proof is somewhat complex. Normalizing the perspectives of the parties assumes that there is one stable point of view that has all of the relevant information necessary for generating a stable and determinate set of social rules. There is no reason, antecedently, to think that such a perspective can be found, however. Instead, if we recognize that there are epistemic gains to be found from a division of cognitive labour there is good reason to

prefer a diverse rather than normalized idealization of the parties to the contract (Weisberg & Muldoon, 2009; Gaus, 2016, Muldoon, 2017). There is reason to conclude that if we wish to discover social contracts that best achieve a set of interrelated normative gains (liberty, equality, welfare and so on), a deliberative process that draws on a diversity of perspectives will outperform one based on a strict normalization of perspectives (Gaus 2011b, 2016). This perhaps explains the call for restructuring in Nigeria to redistribute gains fairly among the federating units.

# Doxastic and Evaluative

Any representation of the reasoning of the parties will have two elements that need to be specified, doxastic and evaluative. These elements, when combined, create a complete model that will specify how and why representatives in the contractual model choose or agree to some set of social rules. The first, doxastic, is the specification of everything the representatives in the original position know or at least believe. Choice in the contractual model in the broadest sense, is an attempt by the parties to choose a set of rules that they expect will be better than in some baseline condition, such as “generalized egoism” (Rawls, 1999), a “state of nature” (Hobbes 1651) or the rules that they currently have (Binmore, 2005; Buchanan, 2000). To do this, they need representations of the baseline and of state of the world. Without either of these doxastic representations, the choice problem would be indeterminate. Rawls famously imposes severe doxastic constraints on his parties to the social contract by imposing a thick veil of ignorance that eliminates information about the specific details of each individual and the world they live in. James Buchanan imposes a similar, but less restrictive “veil of uncertainty” on his representative choosers (Rawls, 199; Buchanan, 2000; Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). In addition to specifying what the representatives believe to be the case about the world and the results of their agreement, there must also be some standard by which the

representative parties can evaluate different contractual possibilities. They must be able to rank the options on the basis of their values, whatever those may be. The doxastic representations must be the missing link in the Nigeria social contract which is widespread perception that people were not fully consented or agreed to the military gift of the 1999 constitution.

Rawls models parties to the contractual situation as, at least initially, having only one metric of value: primary goods. They choose the conception of justice they do insofar as they believe it will likely generate the most primary goods for them and their descendants. This specification of the evaluative parameter is uniform across choosers and therefore, choice in the original position can be modeled as the choice of one individual. Insofar as there is evaluative diversity between the representatives, more complex models of agreement will be needed (encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). If we think in terms of decision theory, the doxastic specification individuates the initial state of affairs and the outcomes of the contractual model, while the specification of the evaluative elements gives each representative party a ranking of the outcomes expected to result from the choice of any given set of rules. Once these elements are specified, we have a model of the parties to the contract. We still need to model how they actually come to an agreement to understand the ultimate reasons we have for finding the contractual model to be normatively compelling.

# Modeling Agreement

Social contract theories fundamentally differ in whether the parties reason differently or the same. As is placed in Rawls’s contract everyone reasons the same: the collective choice problem is reduced to the choice of one individual. Any one person’s decision is a proxy for everyone else. In social contracts of this sort, the description of the

parties (their motivation, the conditions under which they choose) does all the work: once we have fully specified the reasoning of one party, the contract has been identified. The alternative view is that, even after we have specified the parties (including their rationality, values and information), they continue to disagree in their rankings of possible social contracts. On this view, the contract only has a determinate result if there is some way to commensurate the different rankings of each individual to yield an agreement (D’Agostino, 2003). Four basic agreement mechanisms can be distinguished.

# Consent:

The traditional social contract views of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau crucially relied on the idea of consent. For Locke only “consent of Free-men” could make them members of government (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). According to these theorists and later discourse, the idea of consent implies a normative power to bind oneself. When one reaches the age of consent one is empowered to make certain sorts of binding agreements, contracts. By putting consent at the centre of their contracts these early modern contract theorists submitted that individuals had basic normative powers over themselves, self-ownership before they entered into the social contract and brought the question of political obligation to the fore. If the parties have the power to bind themselves by exercising this normative power, then the upshot of the social contract was obligation. As Hobbes insisted, covenants bind; that is why they are “artificial chains” (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Both of these considerations have come under attack in contemporary social contract theories, especially the second. According to Buchanan (1965), the key development of recent social contract theory has been to distinguish the question of what generates political obligation (the key concern of the consent tradition in social contract thought) from the question of what constitutional orders or social institutions are mutually beneficial and stable over time. The nature of a person’s duty to

abide by the law or social rules is a matter of a morality as it pertains to individuals (Rawls 1999), while the design and justification of political and social institutions is a question of public or social morality.

On Buchanan’s view, a crucial feature of more recent contractual thought has been to refocus political philosophy on public or social morality rather than individual obligation.

Although contemporary social contract theorists still sometimes employ the language of consent, the core idea of contemporary social contract theory is agreement. Social contract views work from the intuitive idea of agreement (Freeman 2007a). One can endorse or agree to a principle without that act of endorsement in any way binding one to obey. Social contract theorist as diverse as Freeman sees the act of agreement as indicating what reasons we have. Agreement is a test or a heuristic. The role of unanimous collective agreement is in showing what we have reasons to do in our social and political relations (Freeman 2007). The agreement is not itself a binding act, it is not a performative that somehow creates obligation but is reason-revealing (Lessnoff, 1986). If individuals are rational, what they agree to reflects is the reasons they have. In contemporary contract theories such as Rawls’, the problem of justification takes center stage. Rawls’ revival of social contract theory in A Theory of Justice thus did not base obligations on consent, though the apparatus of an original agreement persisted. For Rawls (1999) the aim is to settle the question of justification, by working out a problem of deliberation. Given that the problem of justification has taken center stage, the second aspect of contemporary social contract thinking appears to fall into place: its reliance on models of hypothetical agreement. The aim is to model the reasons of citizens, and so we ask what they would agree to under conditions in which their agreements would be expected to track their reasons. Contemporary contract theory is, characteristically,

doubly hypothetical. Certainly, no prominent theorist thinks that questions of justification are settled by an actual survey of attitudes towards existing social arrangements, and are not settled until such a survey has been carried out. The question, then, is not, are these arrangements presently the object of an actual agreement among citizens? If this were the question, the answer would typically be No. The question, rather is, would these arrangements be the object of an agreement if citizens were surveyed (Freeman 2007a) like the case in Nigeria social contract?

Although both of the questions are, in some sense, susceptible to an empirical reading, only the latter is in play in present-day theorizing. The contract in the present is always hypothetical in at least this first sense. There is a reading of the (first-order) hypothetical question “would the arrangements be the object of agreement if… which, as indicated, is still resolutely empirical in some sense. This is the reading where what is required of the theorist is that it try to determine what an actual survey of actual citizens would reveal about their actual attitudes towards their system of social arrangements. But there is another interpretation that is more widely accepted in the contemporary context. On this reading, the question is no longer a hypothetical question about actual reactions; it is, rather, a hypothetical question about hypothetical reactions, it is, doubly hypothetical. Framing the question is the first hypothetical element: would it be the object of agreement if they were surveyed? Framed by this question is the second hypothetical element, one which involves the citizens, who are no longer treated empirically, taken as given, but are, instead, themselves considered from a hypothetical point of view, as they would be if (typically) they were better informed or more impartial. The question for most contemporary contract theorists is, if we surveyed the idealized surrogates of the actual citizens in this polity, what social arrangements would be the object of an agreement among them? Famously, Ronald Dworkin has objected that a doubly

hypothetical agreement cannot bind any actual person. For the hypothetical analysis to make sense, it must be shown that hypothetical persons in the contract can agree to be bound by some principle regulating social arrangements (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017).

Suppose that it could be shown that your surrogate (a better informed, more impartial version of you) would agree to a principle. What has that to do with you? Where this second stage hypothetical analysis is employed, it seems to be proposed that you can be bound by agreements that others, different from you, would have made. While it might (though it needn’t) be reasonable to suppose that you can be bound by agreements that you would yourself have entered into if given the opportunity, it seems crazy to think that you can be bound by agreements that, demonstrably, you wouldn’t have made even if you had been asked. This is applicable to the 1999 constitution made under military regime and supposedly binding on the agreement of people in the civil democracy. This criticism is decisive, however, only if the hypothetical social contract is supposed to invoke your normative power to self-bind via consent. That your surrogate employs her power to self- bind would not mean that you had employed your power. Again, though, the power to obligate oneself is not typically invoked in the contemporary social contract: the problem of deliberation is supposed to help us make headway on the problem of justification. So the question for contemporary hypothetical contract theories is whether the hypothetical agreement of your surrogate tracks your reasons to accept social arrangements, a very different issue.

It is almost a commonplace today that contemporary social contract theory relies on hypothetical, not actual, agreement. As we have seen, in one sense this is certainly the case. However, in many ways the “hypothetical/actual” divide is artificial; the hypothetical agreement is meant to model, and provide the basis for actual agreement.

Understanding contemporary social contract theory is best achieved, not through insisting on the distinction between actual and hypothetical contracts, but by grasping the interplay of the hypothetical and the actual.

The key here is Rawls’s (1996) distinction among the perspectives of: you and me; the parties to the deliberative model; and persons in a well-ordered society. The agreement of the parties in the deliberative model is certainly hypothetical in the two-fold sense that is analyzed: a hypothetical agreement among hypothetical parties. But the point of the deliberative model is to help (“you and me”) solve our justificatory problem, what social arrangements we can all accept as free persons who have no authority over one another (Rawls, 1958). Really, the amalgamation of Nigeria is a precedent of hypothetical justificatory. It is an assumption that there shall be one Nigeria formed by multi ethnic units and shall cohabit together in equity and equality. This justificatory hypothesis is the justice for all which triggered the consent of parties to agree. The parties’ deliberations and the conditions under which they deliberate, then, model our actual convictions about justice and justification. As Rawls (1999) says, the reasoning of the hypothetical parties matters to us because the conditions embodied in the description of this situation are ones that we do in fact accept. Unless the hypothetical models the actual, the upshot of the hypothetical could not provide us with reasons. Gaus (2011a) describes something like this process as a testing conception of the social contract. We use the hypothetical deliberative device of the contract to test our social institutions. In this way, the contemporary social contract is meant to be a model of the justificatory situation that all individuals face. The hypothetical and abstracted nature of the contract is needed to highlight the relevant features of the parties to show what reasons they have. Freeman (2007) stressed the way in which focusing on the third perspective of citizens in a well ordered society shows the importance of actual agreement in Rawls’s contract theory.

On Freeman’s interpretation, the social contract must meet the condition of publicity. He writes: Rawls distinguishes three levels of publicity: first, the publicity of principles of justice; second, the publicity of the general beliefs in light of which first principles of justice can be accepted (that is, the theory of human nature and of social institutions generally); and, third, the publicity of the complete justification of the public conception of justice as it would be on its own terms. All three levels, Rawls contends, are exemplified in a well-ordered society, which now becomes suspicious in the case of Nigeria social contact. This is the “full publicity” condition. A justified contract must meet the full publicity condition: its complete justification must be capable of being actually accepted by members of a well-ordered society. The hypothetical agreement itself provides only what Rawls (1996) calls a *“pro tanto”* or “so far as it goes” justification of the principles of justice. “Full justification” is achieved only when actual “people endorse and will liberal justice for the particular (and often conflicting) reasons implicit in the reasonable comprehensive doctrines they hold” (Freeman 2007b). Rawls’s concern with the stability of justice as fairness, which motivated the move to political liberalism, is itself a question of justification. Only if the principles of justice are stable in this way are they fully justified. Rawls’s concern with stability and publicity is not, however, idiosyncratic and is shared by all contemporary contract theorists. It is significant that even theorists such as Buchanan (2000), Gauthier (1986), and Binmore (2005) who are so different from Rawls in other respects share his concern with stability.

# Bargaining

It is perhaps no surprise that the renaissance in contemporary contract theory occurred at the same time as game-theoretic tools and especially bargaining theory began to be applied to philosophical problems. Bargaining theory, as it was developed by Nash (1950) and Harsanyi (1977) is a rigorous approach to modeling how rational individuals

would agree to divide some good or surplus. In its most general form, the bargaining model of agreement specifies some set of individuals who have individual utility functions that can be represented in relation to one other without requiring interpersonal comparisons of utility directly. Some good or goods for division is specified and if the individuals involved can agree on how to divide the good in question, they will get that division. If, however, they cannot agree they will instead get their disagreement result, the case in Nigeria as example. This may be what they brought to the table or it could be some other specified amount. One example is a simple demand game where two people must write down how much of given pot of money they want. If the two “bids” amount to equal or less than the pot; each will get what he or she wrote down, otherwise each will get nothing. As Rawls recognized in his 1958 essay “Justice as Fairness” one way for parties to resolve their disagreements is to employ bargaining solutions, such as that proposed by Braithwaite (1955). Rawls himself rejected bargaining solutions to the social contract since, in his opinion, such solutions rely on threat advantage and “to each according to his threat advantage is hardly a principle of fairness” (Rawls 1958). Gauthier, however, famously pursued this approach, building his Morals by Agreement on the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Gaus 1990).

Binmore (2005) has recently advanced a version of social contract theory that relies on the Nash bargaining solution, as does Muldoon (2017) while Moehler (2013) relies on a “stabilized” Nash bargaining solution. Gauthier has since adopted a less formal approach to bargaining that is, nevertheless, still closer to his original solution than to the Nash Solution. In addition to Rawls’s concern about threat advantage, a drawback of all such approaches is the multiplicity of bargaining solutions, which can significantly differ. Although the Nash solution is most favored today, it can have counter-intuitive implications. Furthermore, there are many who argue that bargaining solutions are

inherently indeterminate and so the only way to achieve determinacy is to introduce unrealistic or controversial assumptions (Sugden, 1990, 1991). Similar problems also exist for equilibrium selection in games (Vanderschraaf, 2005; Harsanyi and Selten 1988). Many of the recent developments in bargaining theory and the social contract have adopted dynamic (Muldoon, 2017) or even evolutionary approaches to modeling bargaining (Alexander & Skyrms 1999, Skyrms, 2014).

This highlights a general divide in bargaining models between what we can call axiomatic and process models. The traditional, axiomatic, approach to the bargaining problem going back to John Nash, codified by John Harsanyi, and popularized by R. Duncan Luce and Raiffa (1957). Out of this tradition emerge several core bargaining solutions. Each uses a slightly different set of axioms to generate a unique and generally applicable way to divide a surplus. These include, most notably, the egalitarian (Raiffa 1953), the Nash (1950), the stabilized Nash (Moehler 2010), the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975), and Gauthier’s (1986) minimax relative concession.

The main point of contention among these theories is whether to employ Nash’s independence axiom or to use a monotonicity axiom (as the egalitarian, Kalai- Smorodinsky, and minimax relative concession do), although to one degree or another all of the axioms have been contested. For instance, one key axiom that all bargaining theories employ is a symmetry axiom. This axiom states that bargainers in the situation will reason the same, that is, I will not be willing to give or take more than you in the same situation. This axiom seems reasonable, but it does not follow that the denial of symmetry is somehow a denial of reason. Indeed, Schelling (1959) was an early critic of the symmetry assumption in bargaining theory and more recently, Thrasher (2014) has argued that the symmetry assumption is inconsistent with the traditional model of the social contract. Symmetry is necessary to generate a unique solution to the bargaining

problem, however. It is uncertain in the mean-time how the symmetry bargaining could be adapted to model equity in the Nigeria social contract. A rejection of symmetry will likely entail a rejection of uniqueness, at least in axiomatic bargaining theory. The other approach to bargaining models of agreement is what can be called a process model. Instead of using various axioms to generate a uniquely rational solution, these theorists rely on some procedure that will generate a determinate, though not always unique result.

Process approaches use some mechanism to generate agreement. An example is an auction. There are many types of auctions (for example, English, Dutch, Vickrey and so on), each has a way of generating bids on some good and then deciding on a price. Posted price selling, like one often seen in consumer markets is also a kind of bargain, though an extremely asymmetric one where the seller has offered a “take or leave it” ask (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Double-auctions are more symmetrical and have a clearer link to the initial bargaining model. Although auctions are not typically used to solve pure division problems, there are some examples of auction mechanisms being used to solve public goods problems in interesting ways that guarantee unanimity (Smith 1977; Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Dworkin (1981) also uses a kind of auction mechanism in his work on equality, though he doesn’t develop his approach for more general application (Heath 2004). Despite its promise, however, auction theory and its potential application to social contract theory has largely gone unexploited. The main process approach to bargaining derives from the influential work of Rubinstein (1982) and his proof that it is possible to show that an alternating offer bargaining process will generate the same result as Nash’s axiomatic solution in certain cases. This result added life to Nash’s (1950) early observation that bargaining and the rules of bargaining must be the result of some non-cooperative game with the idea being that it might be possible to unify bargaining theory and game theory. This approach, called the Nash Program, is

championed most notably by Binmore (1998), whose evolutionary approach to the social contract relies on biological evolution (the game of life) to generate the background conditions of bargaining (the game of morals). Both can be modeled as non-cooperative games and the later can be modeled as a bargaining problem. By using this approach, Binmore (1998, 2005) claims to be able to show, in a robust and non-question-begging way, that something very much like Rawls’s “justice as fairness” will be the result of this evolutionary bargaining process.

A more empirically minded approach follows Schelling’s (1960) early work on bargaining and game theory by looking at the way actual people bargain and reach agreement. The pioneers of experimental economics used laboratory experiments to look at how subjects behaved in division problems (Hoffman et. al. 2000; Smith 2003). Some of the most interesting results came, perhaps surprisingly, from asymmetric bargaining games like the ultimatum game (Smith 1982). Since these early experiments, considerable experimental work has been done on bargaining problems and cooperative agreement in economics. Much of the most philosophically relevant work involves the importance of social norms and conventions in determining the result (Bicchieri 2016). Although appealing to a bargaining solution can give determinacy to a social contract, it does so at the cost of appealing to a controversial commensuration mechanism in the case of axiomatic bargaining or of moving to process approaches that must ultimately rely on the empirically contingent outcome of social and biological evolution. Although the importance of bargaining in the social contract has been moribund for some time, recent work is changing that (Alexander 2007; Thrasher 2014a; Thoma, 2015; Muldoon 2017).

# Aggregation

Bargaining is distinguished from aggregation solutions. Rather than seeking an outcome that splits the difference between various claims, we might seek to aggregate the individual rankings into an overall social choice. Harsanyi (1977, 1982) develops a contractual theory much like Rawls’. Reasoning behind a veil of ignorance in which people do not know their post-contract identities, he supposes that rational contractors will assume it is equally probable that they will be any specific person. Moreover, he argues that contractors can agree on interpersonal utility comparisons, and so they will opt for a contract that aggregates utility at the highest average (Mueller 2003). This, of course, depends on the supposition that there is a non-controversial metric that allows us to aggregate the parties’ utility functions. Binmore (2005) follows Harsanyi and Sen (2009) in arguing that interpersonal comparisons can be made for the purposes of aggregation, at least some of the time. One of the problems with this approach, however, is that if the interpersonal comparisons are incomplete they will not be able to produce a complete social ordering. As Sen (1997) points out, this will lead to a maximal set of alternatives where no alternative is dominated by any other within the set but also where no particular alternative is optimal. Instead of solving the aggregation problem, then, interpersonal comparisons may only be able to reduce the set of alternatives without being able to complete the ordering of alternatives.

# Equilibrium

There is a long tradition of thinking of the social contract as a kind of equilibrium. Within this tradition, however, the tendency is to see the social contract as some kind of equilibrium solution to a prisoner’s dilemma type situation (Gauthier, 1986; Buchanan, 2000). Skyrms(1996, 2004) suggests a different approach. Skyrms argues that the theory of iterated games can show not simply that our parties will arrive at a social contract, but how they can come to arrive at the cooperative, mutually beneficial contract. If we have a

chance to play repeated games, Skyrms holds, we can learn from Hume about the “shadow of the future”: “I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; because I foresee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me and with others” (Skyrms, 2004). Sugden (1986) along different line suggests that repeated interactions, what he calls “experience” is essential to the determination of which norms of social interaction actually hold over time. The problem with equilibrium solutions is that many games have multiple equilibriums. The problem then becomes how to select a unique equilibrium from a set of possible ones. The problem is compounded by the controversies over equilibrium refinement concepts (Harsanyi and Selten 1988). Many refinements have been suggested but, as in bargaining theory, all are controversial to one degree or another.

One of the interesting developments in social contract theory spurred by game theorists such as Skyrms and Binmore is the appeal to evolutionary game theory as a way to solve the commensuration and equilibrium selection problem (Vanderschraaf 2005). What cannot be solved by appeal to reason (because there simply is no determinate solution) may be solved by repeated interactions among rational parties. The work of theorists such as Skyrms and Binmore also blurs the line between justification and explanation. Their analyses shed light both on the justificatory problem what are the characteristics of a cooperative social order that people freely follow? It also explains how such orders may come about. The use of evolutionary game theory and evolutionary techniques is a burgeoning and exciting area of contract theory. One of the many questions that arise, however, is that of why, and if so under what circumstances, we should endorse the output of evolutionary procedures. Should one equilibrium be preferred to another merely because it was the output of an evolutionary procedure?

Surely we would want reasons independent of history for reflectively endorsing some equilibrium. This problem highlights the concern that social contracts that are the product of evolutionary procedures will not meet the publicity condition in the right kind of way. If the publicity condition seems harder to meet, the evolutionary approach provides a powerful and dynamic way to understand stability.

Following Maynard Smith, we can see stability as being an evolutionarily stable strategy of equilibrium. Basically this is the idea that equilibrium in an evolutionary game where successful strategies replicate at higher rates is stable if the equilibrium composition of the population in terms of strategies is not susceptible to invasion by a mutant strategy. A population is evolutionarily stable when a mutant strategy is not a better response to the population than the current mix of strategies in the population. This gives a formal interpretation of Rawls’s conception of “inherent stability” and to Buchanan’s notion that social contracts should be able to withstand subversion by a sub- population of knaves. This new conception of stability combined with the dynamic nature of evolutionary games provides interesting new ways for the social contract theorist to model the output of the contract.

# The Object of Agreement

Social contract theories differ about the object of the contract. In the traditional contract theories of Hobbes and Locke, the contract was about the terms of political association. In particular, the problem was the grounds and limits of citizen’s obligation to obey the state. In his early formulation, Rawls’ parties deliberated about “common practices” (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). In his later statement of his view, Rawls took the object of agreement to be principles of justice to regulate “the basic structure:” The basic structure is understood as the way in which the major social institutions fit

together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation. Thus the political constitution, the legally enforced forms of property, and the organization of the economy, and the nature of the family, all belong to the basic structure (Rawls, 1996). For Rawls, as for most contemporary contract theorists, the object of agreement is not, at least directly, the grounds of political obligation, but the principles of justice that regulate the basic institutions of society. Freeman (2007), perhaps the preeminent student of Rawls, focuses on “the social role of norms in public life.” Buchanan (2000) is concerned with justifying constitutional orders of social and political institutions. Gauthier (1986), Scanlon (1998), Darwall (2006), Southwood (2010), and Gaus (2011a) employ the contract device to justify social moral claims. The level at which the object of the contract is described is apt to affect the outcome of the agreement. “A striking feature of Hobbes’ view,” Hardin (2003) points out, “is that it is a relative assessment of whole states of affairs; life in one form of government versus life under anarchy”.

Hobbes could plausibly argue that everyone would agree to the social contract because “life under government” is, from the perspective of everyone, better than “life under anarchy” (the baseline condition). However, if a Hobbesian sought to divide the contract up into, more fine grained agreements about the various functions of government; it is apt to find that agreement would not be forthcoming on many functions. As in the case of fine-grained functions of government, the contract is apt to become more limited. If the parties are simply considering whether government is better than anarchy, they will opt for just about any government (including, one that funds the arts); if they are considering whether to have a government that funds the arts or one that doesn’t, it is easy to see how they may not agree on the former. In a similar way, if the parties are deliberating about entire moral codes, there may be wide agreement that all

moral codes, overall, are in everyone’s interests. In multi-level contract theories such as Buchanan’s (2000) each stage has its own unique object. In Buchanan’s theory, the object of the constitutional stage is a system of constraints that will allow individuals to peacefully co-exist, what Buchanan calls the “protective state”. On his view, the state of nature is characterized by both predation and defense. One’s ability to engage in productive enterprises is decreased because of the need to defend the fruits of those enterprises against those who would rely on predation rather than production. We all have reason to contract, according to Buchanan, in order to increase the overall ability of everyone to produce by limiting the need for defense by constraining the ability to engage in predation. Once the solution to the predation-production conflict has been solved by the constitutional contract, members of society also realize that if all contributed to the production of various public goods, the productive possibility of society would be similarly increased.

This second, post-constitutional stage, involves what Buchanan calls the “productive state.” Each stage is logically distinct though there are causal relationships between changes made at one stage and the efficacy and stability of the solution at the later stage. The distinction between the two stages is analogous to the traditional distinction between commutative and distributive justice. Although these two are often bound up together in contemporary contract theory, one of Buchanan’s novel contributions is to suggest that there are theoretical gains to separating these distinct objects of agreement. Moehler’s (2017) “multi-level” contract has several aspects. First, drawing on their pluralistic moral commitments individuals seek to agree on social-moral rules that all can endorse as a common morality. The object of this agreement is similar to that of Darwall’s, Gaus’s and Southwood’s models. The second-level agreement is appropriate to circumstances in which pluralism is so deep and wide no common morality

can be forged. Rather than moral agents, the parties are reconceived as instrumentally rational prudential agents: the object of this second level is rules of cooperation that advance the interests of all when a deeper moral basis cannot be uncovered. The interest of this study therefore is to show the implications of object of social contract, collective agreement and the components thereof (bargaining, consent, aggregation and equilibrium) in the Nigeria state especially now that the rife of renegotiation has become prominent calls by some segments of the contract.

# Empirical Literature

* + 1. **Social Contract as Model for Reconstructing a True Nigeria**

Nigeria is like the United States of America in some important ways, notably in terms of their ethnic configurations and colonial history. Whereas the latter represents an excellent although not perfect model of a truly united nation-state, the former remains a mere state of nations with a variegated locus of allegiance amongst diverse nationalities (Alubabari, 2012). Three key political variables that account for the disparity in their levels of national integration are the fundamental principles upon which the two States were founded; the type of constitution operated by them; and the level of constitutionalism. These variables have shaped their values and ideologies differently and also fostered differing kinds of faith in the commonwealth. The first two factors verge on the notion of the state and the last factor translates to the use of the state’s juridical apparatuses for the preservation of shared values and norms and entrenchment of justice, all of which are cardinal thrusts of the social contract theory. Alubabari (2012) posited that it is expedient and logical to construe the modern state as the product of a covenant, a compact or Social Contract. The logical import of the postulate of social contract is that the people, by whose contrivance governments were instituted, are placed to determine how they should be governed. Alubabari (2012) submitted, the constitution of the state

should truly be the constitution of the people. This promotes democracy in line with Alexis de Tocqueville, who postulated, democratic laws generally tend to promote the welfare of the greatest possible number; for they emanate from the majority of the citizens, who (although) are subject to error, … cannot have an interest opposed to their own advantage (Reeve & Bowen, 1998).

Alubabari (2012) summarized that the Nigerian State deviates from this provision in Tocqueville democratic philosophy and the phrase ‘we the people…’ In the pre-chapter of its constitution appears to be connivance presumptuous. This is largely responsible for much of political and ethno-religious crises and the prevalence of militant agitations across the country. Nigeria is at a critical historical moment. Evidently, the centre piece of empiricism was a focus on the people of the Niger Delta region in the southern part of the country, who the author described as marginalized in the Nigeria state. This sense of exclusion, real or perceived, sparked off virulent agitations, involving a clamour for justice. The emergence of a Southerner as President of the Republic and the establishment of the Federal Government’s Amnesty Programme for the Niger-Delta in the South “ex- militants” have significantly doused the tension, but these are merely short-term palliatives. The federal Amnesty Programme, according to Alubabari (2012) is a deliberate interim containment strategy than a well-coordinated long-term poverty reduction measure. It does not address the key legal, political and socio-economic issues that threaten the stability and existence of the state. It only addresses the ‘symptoms’ (or manifestations) of poverty rather than the root causes. Armed militia in the South-South and other parts of the country still flourished. More threatening is the insurgence of organised terrorism in the northern part of the country, spearheaded by the Boko Haram, widely perceived to be an Islamic fundamentalist sect. Within the relatively short period of emergence of the Boko Haram group, official reports have linked them to the killing of hundreds of innocent people across the country, especially in Borno and other northern

states where they are most entrenched. In an attack on a church in the northern state, which the group claimed responsibility, majority of the casualties were Ibos, who were similarly attacked in the north several times in Nigeria’s post-civil war history. In response, Igbo politicians voiced what many of their kinsmen felt and lamented that the Igbos now constituted an endangered species within the Nigerian State. Developments such as this spell doom for the country.

To navigate out of the status quo, Alubabari (2012) posited there is need to re- examine and reconstruct the foundations of the Nigerian State in order to transform the federation into a united nation-state that fosters the interests of citizens without discrimination, advances their happiness and secure their unforced allegiance. It is in this context that the basic postulates of the social contract theory of the state become very relevant as a framework for the re-ordering of the state. Although there is growing complexities in the configuration, character and concerns of states in the contemporary period, the mutations also impose a need for the modification of some traditional modes of theorizing about the state. Notably, social contract theory is not amonolithic model, it has variants. The idea of contemporary adaptation of the social contract theory in Alubabari’s work was an attempt to complement certain basic principles of the modern “contractarian” versions of thetheory, notably Locke’s, with more contemporary “contractualist” versions. This approach offered the advantage of furthering democratic rule beyond its traditional frontiers, promoting individual freedom and property rights, which were critical in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflicts, the separation of governmental powers, and the rule of law through the enactment of a people-oriented constitution. Generally, social contract theorists advance the view that the state or, more precisely, civil society is the product of a contract, a covenant, an agreement, or a compact (Rawls, 2007; Gaus, 2011). lineally, modern form of social contract dates back to Thomas Hobbes and continues through John Locke, Baruch Spinoza, Samuel

Pufendorf, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (and others) to Immanuel Kant; whilst John Rawls stands out among its contemporary proponents, not only for resurrecting it from the disrepute into which it fell after Kant but, perhaps more importantly, for incorporating into it some key elements for its adaptation to the contemporary requirements of the state and citizenship.

Contractarianism and Contractualis m are often generally used as synonymous terms for social contract theories, the central idea of which is that ‘the legitimacy of the state and the principles of sound justice derive legitimacy from a societal agreement or social contract (Gauthier, 2013). However, the two terms are also sometimes distinguished respectively as the Hobbesian model, and the Kantian interpretations of the justificatory problem, which is a central issue in the modern conceptualizations of the theory. But, as noted by Rauscher (2012) Rauscher: These categories are imprecise, and there is often as much difference within these two approaches as between them; nevertheless, the distinction is useful in isolating some key disputes in contemporary social contract theory. Among those “contractarians” or otherwise followers of Hobbes, the crucial justificatory task is to resolve the “foundational crisis” of morality. To explicate the idea of the Social Contract Theory, Rauscher (2012) suggests five variables into which contractual approaches may be analysed, viz a viz, the nature of the contractual act; the parties to the act; what the parties are agreeing to; the reasoning that leads to the agreement; and what the agreement is supposed to show. According to Alubabari (2012) Tints of the Social Contract Theory, however, exist in the natural law theories, for example in the medieval Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas and in the modernized natural law theories of Johannes Althusius and Hugo Grotius. The element of contract in Aquinas’ theory derives from his views on the basis of moral obligation, which according to him is located in man’s nature. Samuel Stumpf paraphrases Aquinas thus: The basis of moral obligation … is found, first, in the very nature of man. Built into

man’s nature are various inclinations, such as the preservation of his life, the propagation of his species, and, because he is rational, the inclination toward the search for truth. The basic moral truth is simply to ‘do good and avoid evil’. As a rational being, then, man is under a basic moral obligation to protect his life and health… Secondly, the natural inclination to propagate the species forms the basis for the union of man and wife… And thirdly, because man seeks for truth, he can do this best by living in peace in society with his fellow men who are also engaged in the quest.

Reviewing further, Alubabari (2012) submitted that to ensure an ordered society, human laws are fashioned for the direction of the community’s behaviour. Civil society and human laws thus become logically imperative for man’s pursuit of full self- realization. For Aquinas, human laws are statutes of government and they derive from the general precepts of natural law, which he conceives as ‘nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law’. The eternal law, he posits, is Divine Reason. Althusius appropriated the notion of a basic social propensity contained in Stoicism, making the important point of regarding this propensity as a sufficient explanation of human social groupings, hence avoiding an explanation that rests on appeal to theological sanctions. George Sabine and Thomas Thorson point out the two ways in which contract featured in Althusius’ theory, that ‘it had a more specifically political role in explaining the relations between the ruler and his people and a general sociological role in explaining the existence of any group whatever. Also noted by Sabine and Thorson, the first corresponded to the contract of government and the second to a social contract in a broad sense. This latter sense implies the existence of a tacit consent by members of the association or consociatio, which Aristotle calls community. It is by this agreement that persons become “dwellers together” (symbiotic) and sharers in the benefits and laws of the community (Freeman, 2007). Althusius, thus modernized the natural law doctrine and developed a political theory which depended logically upon the single idea of contract

and owed substantially nothing to religious authority (Alubabari, 2012).The ideas of the political community as deriving tendentiously from man’s social being and of the social contract as implying some consent, at least tacitly, also run through Grotius’ theory. Accordingly, Grotius argued that the appeal of natural law within the polity is explained by a sense of general agreement amongst members of the community on what should constitute their common grounds and not the self-evidence of its principles.

All binding obligation arising from the contract is captured in the statements by Pufendorf. His argument is that on the whole, to join a multitude, of many men, into one Compound Person, to which one general act may be ascribed, and to which certain rights belong, as it is opposed to particular members, and such rights as no particular members can claim separately from the rest; it is necessary, that they shall have first united their wills and powers by the intervention of covenants without which, how a number of men, who are all naturally equal, should be linked together, is impossible to be understood. Thomas Hobbes presented the first crystallized modern form of the contract theory of the State. He developed the idea of a State of Nature in which life was ‘solitary, nasty, brutish and short, and posited a social psychological theory of an inherent instinct of self- preservation in man. All men were equal in the State of Nature, equality here means simply that anyone is capable of hurting his neighbour and taking what he judges he needs for his own protection (Encyclopedia of Philisophy, 2017). In a similar vein, there was ‘right of all to all, but this right simply means a man’s liberty ‘to do what he would, and against whom he thought fit, and to possess, use and enjoy all that he would, or could get. Four factors were responsible for ‘war’ in the Hobbesian State of Nature, and this consisted of equality of needs; scarcity; essential equality of human power; and limited altruism (Gaus, 2016).

Accordingly, Alubabari (2012) submitted that a twist in circumstances could occasion the overpowering of the strong by the weak. This made life very precarious. Worse, still, the social cooperation necessary for industry, housing, technology, and such like endeavours was lacking in the State of Nature. Driven by fear of death, especially violent death, and the desire for the advancement of social cooperation, reason dictated to men to agree among themselves to submit their individual rights (except that of self- preservation) to an absolute sovereign for the preservation of lives in the community. The contract, by which men emerge from the state of nature into civil society, Hobbes holds, is between/among individuals, not between citizens and the government. Hannah Arendt describes the Hobbesian version of the social contract as vertical to explain the idea of a top-to-bottom relationship between the sovereign and the people in the exercise of power and authority. The people relinquish their individual rights and power and vest them in the sovereign to insure their safety. Except the right to impose death on the citizens, which is for all practical purposes excluded in the contract, these rights are absolute and irretrievable. The sovereign who is established by the contract is high up, at the vertex of the hierarchy of power and authority.

Locke posits a version of the social contract that differs from Hobbes’ in some regards. Locke’s theory fits into what Arendt describes as a horizontal version. This version logically implies a dual contract, the first leading to the formation of society and the second to the institution of government. As Arendt puts it: there was, third, Locke’s aboriginal contract, which brought about not government but society the word being understood in the sense of the Latin societas, an “alliance” between all individual members, who contract for their government after they have mutually bound themselves (Gauthier, 2003). Locke’s contract of government presupposes that the people had earlier given their mutual consent to the formation of society. And, then, as members of society, they later chose their rulers to form their government, each party having specific duties

and obligations. The rulers hold power on fiduciary grounds and are accountable to the people. This provision wherein the people choose and can remove their rulers constitutes the source of the people’s power. Locke’s version is also different from Hobbes’ with regard to the conditions of life in the state of nature, the ideal type and form of government, right to property and so on. According to Locke, the state of nature is a state of perfect freedom and equality, devoid of subjection or subordination. People are their own judge and master, each seeking his good individually (Lister, 2010). According to Locke’ theory, unlike Hobbes’, the reality of moral restraints on power, the responsibility of rulers to the communities which they ruled and the subordination of government to law are regarded as axiomatic. In other words, moral rights and duties are intrinsic and prior to law; hence governments are obligated to enact legislations that protect ‘what is naturally and morally right. These requirements contrast Lock’s liberalism with Hobbes’ absolutism.

Also noteworthy is Locke’s interpretation of natural law as claim to innate, indefeasible rights inherent in each individual (Alubabari, 2012). These rights include life, liberty and estate. He regards the right to private property (estate) as the typical case of these natural rights, and maintained that the great and chief end of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. Since these rights, according to Lock, are not created by society, they can ipso facto not be regulated by it, except to the extent that is necessary to give them effective protection. Another difference in Locke’s theory is its inherent democratic principles. Public policies and actions are based on the consent of the governed, which is determined by the majority of the members of society, being only the consent of the individuals and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way, it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority. As noted by G. H. Sabine and T. L. Thorson, if an individual’s rights are

indefeasible, it makes no essential difference whether he is deprived of them by a majority or by a single tyrant; apparently it did not occur to Locke that a majority could be tyrannous (Alubabari, 2012) Locke posits two contracts, namely the contract of society and that of government. The former pact binds men together into a body politics (society), whereas the latter is made between the people (as a community) and government. The government’s responsibility to the governed is explained by the logic of its being a party to the contract.

Unlike Hobbes and Locke, according to whom people are better off in the properly constituted state than in the state of nature, Rousseau maintains that in the state of nature where there was neither state nor civilization people were essentially innocent, good, happy and healthy. In the state of nature, men had absolute freedom, equality, and enjoyed idyllic happiness, but they were enslaved. As he puts it, ‘Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains (Rawls, 1999). All this, Rousseau further maintains, changed with the advent of civil society and private property. Ashe asserts, the first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying this is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society which brought with it the destruction of natural liberty and which, for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labor, slavery, and wretchedness (Schelling, 2009) Writing this indictment of civilization during the Enlightenment when civilization was stuffed with so much glaring benefits, Rousseau was considered to be out of his mind for denying the facts that were all too glaring. He, however, later came to think that in a properly constituted society, people would trade their individual liberty with a more important collective liberty through a social contract: ‘to find a form of association which may defend and protect with the whole force of the community the person and property of every associate, and by means of which each, coalescing with all,

may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain as free as before.’ Such is the fundamental problem of which the social contract furnishes the solution.

Through a social compact, a people may agree, in effect, to unite into a collective whole called the state or the sovereign, and through the state or sovereign enact laws reflective of the general will (Rawls, 2007) The concept of the general will is Rousseau’s most important innovation on the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke. The concept of general will amounts to much the same thing as such familiar terms as ‘sentiment of a nation’ and ‘the will of the people’. It defines the Common Good and establishes the moral foundation of the society, which is expressed in the statutes of the state. Furthermore, the general will, the aggregate of the will of the people, also represents the will of each person. As explained by B. N. Moore and K. Bruder, the idea is that a group of people may collectively or as a group desire or wish or want something and that these desires, though it may coincide with the desires of the individuals in the group, is a metaphysically distinct entity (Alubabari, 2012). The state, according to Rousseau, is a “moral person”, a social organism possessing its own life and will. It is an entity in its own right. The assumption here is that the state is a politically united community; hence, the will of the state becomes that of a politically united people. Also implicit in the notion of the general will according to Alubabari (2012), is the assumption that as individual’s actions coincide with the common will; he is acting as he really wants to act and to act as you really want to act is to be free. Compelling a person to accept the general will by obeying the laws of the state is forcing him to be free. Society may lose individual or natural liberty when we unite to form a collective whole, but we gain this new type of civil liberty, the freedom to obey a law which we prescribe for ourselves. It is to law alone that men owe justice and civil liberty.

Rousseau also distinguishes between the will of all and the general will. The latter refers to the common interests of the citizens, whereas the former relates to self-interests,

and is merely a sum of particular wills; but take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses which cancel one another and the general will remains as the sum of the difference (Skyrms, 2014)On the question of how society can know the general will, given the fact that all the citizens may not agree on the same choice on every occasion, Rousseau answers that if the citizens are enlightened and are not allowed to influence one another, then the general will can be determined by a majority vote: ‘the general will is found by counting votes. When, therefore, the opinion which is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not so. Immanuel Kant provides two distinct discussions of the social contract. The first concerns property, and he defines property as that ‘with which I am so connected that another's use of it without my consent would wrong me (Southwood, 2010) He further distinguishes two senses of right in terms of possession, right to possession of property, which consisted of physical or sensible possession, and intelligible possession. The former is a physical right, the denial of which would cause “bodily” harm, as for example one would experience if one’s apple were taken from oneself without one’s approval or consent. However, according to Kant, physical possession is not a sufficient sense of possession to count as rightful possession of an object. Rightful possession consists in intelligible possession. This is the possession of an object without physically holding it so that another's use of the object without my consent harms me even when I am not physically affected and not currently using the object.

Kant’s proof that there must be some intelligible possession and not merely physical possession turns on the application of human choice. An object of choice is one that some person may find useful for his purposes. Rightful possession would be the right to use such an object. If, for some particular object, no one has rightful possession of it, this would mean that a usable object would be beyond possible use; that is, although the

object is usable, it has not actually been put into use. Kant grants that such a condition does not contradict the principle of right because it is compatible with everyone's freedom in accordance with universal law. But putting an object beyond rightful use when humans have the capacity to use it would "annihilate" the object in a practical respect; it would treat the object as nothing, when it is indeed something. This, Kant claims, is problematic because in a practical respect an object cannot be treated as nothing, rather it is considered as at least potentially in rightful possession of some human being or another. All objects must be subject to rightful or intelligible possession. Frederick Rauscher paraphrases Kant’s argument regarding rightful possession thus: Intelligible possession, then, is required by right in order for free beings to be able to realize their freedom by using objects for their freely chosen purposes. Alubabari (2012) submitted that this conclusion entails the existence of private property but not any particular distribution of private property. All objects must be considered as potential property of some human being or other. Now, if an individual have intelligible possession of a particular object, all other human beings must refrain from using that object. Such a one-sided relation would violate the universality of external right.

Kant further worried that any unilateral declaration by one person that an object belongs to him alone would infringe on the freedom of others. The only way that intelligible possession is possible without violating the principle of right is when each person agrees to obligate mutually all others to recognize each individual's intelligible possessions. Each person must acknowledge that he is obligated to refrain from using objects that belong to another. Since no individual will can rightfully make and enforce such a law obligating everyone to respect others' property, this mutual obligation is possible only in accordance with a "collective general (common) and powerful will", in other words, only in a civil condition. The state itself obligates all citizens to respect the property of other citizens. Without a state to enforce these property rights, they are

impossible (Southwood, 2010). As stated by Rauscher in the preceding thought, in Kant’s view, the state is the product of a social contract, and without it rightful possession could not be guaranteed since individuals lack the capacity to make and enforce laws by which everyone will respect the property rights of others. The second of Kant’s discussion of the social contract comes in the context of a priori restriction on the powers of the sovereign. The contract is presented as a postulate of reason that compels the sovereign to ‘give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined in voting for such a will (Alubabari, 2012) The contract imposes rational limitations on the sovereign as legislator. Kant emphasizes that the social contract is not a historically real act, and even the idea of consent implicit in the contract is also not an empirical consent in a historical context. It is rather based on a set of choices which citizens would possibly consent to on the dictates of reason. In other words, it is based on possible rational unanimity. This consent is not determined by any particular set of desires on which citizens are agreed; it is rather a possible consent based on an abstract idea of fair distributions of burdens and rights.

According to Southwood (2010) Kant offers two examples to underscore how the application of reason in the distribution of burdens and rights constitutes the basis for possible rational consent. His first example is a law that would exclusively give hereditary privileges to members of a certain class of subjects. Such a law would be unjust because it would be irrational for those who would not fall within this class to agree to accept the odds of fewer privileges than members of the class. His second example concerns a war tax. Such a tax would not be unjust if it is administered fairly, because, as he explains, even if some actual citizens were opposed to the war, the war tax would still be just based on the possibility that the war is being waged for legitimate reasons that the state but not the citizens know about. This view is in line with the

Hegelian postulate that the state is an organic rational whole. Here empirical information might cause all citizens to approve the law. As stated by Frederick Rauscher, ‘in both these examples, the conception of "possibly consent" abstracts from actual desires individual citizens have. The possible consent is not based upon some hypothetical vote given actual preferences but is based on a rational conception of agreement, given any possible empirical information.

John Rawls, like many other contemporary social contract theorists, shifts emphasis to agreement as the basis of political obligation without, however, completely dismissing the idea of consent. They try to distinguish the question of the source of political obligation, which is the central concern of the consent tradition, from the question of what constitutional orders or social institutions are mutually beneficial and stable over time. It is Rawls’ contention that a person’s duty to obey the law or social rules hinges on a morality as it pertains to the individual. Although the apparatus of an “original agreement” persisted in Rawls’ theory, obligations are not regarded as based on consent but on normative principles of public morality. The question of the design and justification of political and social institutions becomes that of public morality. In other words, the justification for those institutions is rooted in public morality. This explains James Buchanan’s view that a crucial feature of contemporary contractual thought has been to refocus political philosophy on social morality rather than on individual obligation (Rawls, 2007).Rawls employed the concept of the Original Position to convey the idea of a contract which is anchored on justice and designed through a deliberative process. The “original position” is synonymous to what some other contract theorists call the State of Nature, and it is both imaginary and hypothetical. In the original position, individuals who are concerned with engineering a just society are brought together to deliberate. It is the original position that provides the forum to strike an agreement that would lead to a well-ordered society. Rawls’ prime task in the Original Position is to

define the conditions for meaningful and impartial negotiations. The original position is central to Rawls’ conception of justice, justice as fairness. It is in the original position that the voluntary choice to participate in civil society is made by free individuals.

According to Rawls (1999), in the state of nature, ‘no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and liabilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. The parties to the contract meet to deliberate as equals; no one has any privileged information and superior background over others. Rawls makes certain basic assumptions about the individuals in the original position. These assumptions suggest who these individuals are and their aim in the original position. They also highlight the conditions surrounding the individuals in the original position. One assumption is that the individuals are contract- seeking parties. Their main aim is to agree through deliberation on what rules are to guide their society and political life. The rules they choose would affect how social institutions are to distribute fundamental rights and basic duties in society. The rules would also guide the division of advantages from social cooperation. The original position hypothetically places parties to the social contract in a situation where they can deliberate and, without any form of external coercion or subjective prejudices, agree on principles of justice that would guide a future society which they are hoping to enter. As he puts it, ‘it is merely a way of recalling someone to a kind of moral judgment he would make in the absence of distorting influence derived from special situation (Alubabari, 2012).Another important assumption is that in selecting the principles, the parties are all ignorant of one another’s and their own wealth, status, abilities, intelligence, inclinations, aspirations and even beliefs about goodness. Alubabari (2012) extended this thought; they are unaware of their future chances and circumstances. So, the contract is made behind a veil of ignorance. This simply means that they are prevented from knowing how the various alternative principles will reflect and advance their own particular cases. In the

choice of principles, nobody is advantaged or disadvantaged by his or her own unique circumstances. Equality and ignorance of the parties are important in guaranteeing impartiality and ensuring that they choose principles which they believe to be fair.

Rawls (1996) also assumed that persons in the original position are all equally rational and that in choosing between principles each person tries as best he can to advance his interest objectively. The fairness of the agreement derives substantially from taking the interests of all parties to the contract into consideration without forcing conditions on any individual. The individuals’ sense of agreement (that is, of his having agreed to the principles) and fairness (of the principles being fair) constitutes the main source of post-contract obligation. However, it is important to note that this agreement also conveys some idea of consent, at least implicitly. Based on the awareness that certain intervening variables could influence decision-making, Rawls adopts the maximum rule of the game theory of economics, which states that everyone selects from available alternatives the one whose worst possible outcome is better than the worst possible outcome of the other alternatives. He posits that this applies to decision making in the original position, since the absence of information does not mean misinformation. For, if we are to choose a principle of justice in a society where our enemy is to decide our places, Rawls says, it is likely we will insist on the maximum rule. In Rawls’ view, only moral persons are entitled to justice. And, by moral persons he means those who have a sense of justice, which also involves the wish to apply and to act upon the principles of justice. In his words, ‘Equal justice is owed to those who have the capacity to take part in and act in accordance with the public understanding of the initial situation (Rawl, 2007, Alubabari, 2012) Hence, dangerous criminals are excluded from negotiation in the original position. Rawls adopts the principle of paternalism to compensate for the disadvantage of mentally retarded and physically weak persons in the original position. This principle is simply the practice of governing or controlling people in a father-like

manner. That means, those who are mentally and physically sound have a duty not to use their special attributes to the detriment of the mentally retarded and physically weak.

Alubabari (2012) synthesized the thoughts in social contract theories to advocate intellectual solution in the Niger-Delta. According to him, prominent is the issue of convening a sovereign national conference, which has been widely canvassed. In discussing this issue, it is important to mention some of its crucial implications and attendant challenges. First, a sovereign national conference would logically require that the various nationalities constituting the country be recognised as sovereign and autonomous units, each with a right to secede. This would strip the existing Nigerian state of her sovereignty, since sovereignty is comprehensive and indivisible. The units would also have the right to choose their representatives at the conference. Furthermore, it would require suspension of the constitution, at least for a moment during which the units assert their sovereignty and would decide whether to adopt the constitution, amend or replace it totally. Such a situation can breed anarchy and, thus, cause the state to plunge into a nihilistic backlash tantamount to conditions in the state of nature. However, the ultimate goal behind the convening of a sovereign national conference can be achieved with less risk by adopting the alternative of a framework that recognises the units as semi- autonomous entities within a federal republic.

In his further explanation, Alubabari (2012) averred, such an arrangement should be anchored on the notion of the federating units as parties to a covenant, and of every citizen as a ‘stakeholder’ in the commonwealth. It is in the context of this logic that true fiscal federalism stands out as a veritable governmental structure. All this can be worked out through a coordinated programme of constitutional review or amendment and political restructuring. Federalism involves decentralization of power and authority; it is imperative in multi-ethnic state. In Nigeria, the idea of the state as product of a social contract, when combined with federalism, would also offer the benefit of diffusing the

locus of power, promote democracy, and smoothen the process of political bargaining. National conferences could be convened to discuss issues of national importance. However, such a conference becomes increasingly less necessary if the people are allowed to freely choose their representatives, and those representatives in turn truly represent their constituencies competently. There is also the need for commitment and a sense of obligation among citizens. By acting like parties to a contract, citizens should be committed to the advancement of the goals and purposes of the state; they should feel a sense of obligation to protect and obey the laws of the land, which are the basic rules of human conduct and social engagement.

Southwood (2010) held that the idea of the state contained in the social contract theory entails, at least implicitly, that the state be regarded not merely as a community but, more than anything else, as an association. The importance of this distinction comes out in Ferdinand Tönnies’ distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society or association). D. D. Raphael approvingly explains this distinction by Tönnies as follows: Gemeinschaft is the earlier form of social group; it involves an attitude of natural friendship and is not deliberately organized; it is based on ‘natural will’. Gesellschaft comes at a later stage of development; it involves an attitude of deliberate planning or calculation; it is based on ‘rational will’. To say that Gesellschaft occurs later does not imply that Gemeinschaft then ceases to exist; when we have come to make plans and form deliberate associations, we do not on that account cease to form friendships (Thrasher, 2013) Ideally, therefore, the state is both a community and an association. The latter implies that the existence of the state is rooted in and justified by its purposes, or a rational will to promote the general well-being of her citizens. This will, like Rousseau’s general will, should not to be arbitrarily determined. Rather, it should be the crystallization of the rational calculations and will of a community whose members are united by a sense of purpose. This rational or general will constitutes an important

psychological recipe for the shaping of a national consciousness and the building of a truly united nation-state based on shared ideologies.

Alubabari (2012) argued, a frequently asked question, usually posed as a challenge to the practical application of the ideas of consent, deliberation, and/or agreement as contained in the social contract theory, has been whether it is ever possible in practice to secure the consent and deliberative participation of all the adult citizens at every point in time in order to justify the exercise of governmental authority over them. The basic problems relating to this question can be resolved in two main ways. One is that the fundamental rights and liberties of citizens, which are guaranteed in any modern form of a good constitution, offer them avenues to express their opinions regarding the principles of justice and governance. Secondly, the application of the concept of hypothetical agreement, as postulated in Rawls’ version of the social contract theory, would ensure that laws and public policies are made on the basis of the crucial hypotheses that the citizens are parties to the contract (and so each has a stake in the state as well as a right to participate in her affairs, directly or representatively), that they are rational, that they are members of a well-ordered society. This submission by Olubari is hypothetical and without empirical implications and clear methodology, even though his study was only restricted to Niger-Delta crisis.

# Social Contract in Practical Political Milieu

Rousseau affirms that the true basis of any political society is to be found in a covenant of a social contract. According to Adewole (2014) social contract is a form of covenant in which every individual in a political society enters into a social union under equal condition. In the social contract arrangement, Rosseau (1987) argued “everybody relinquishes all old natural liberties; each man gives up his freedom in order to empower the collective. Social contract implies that there is a prima facie agreement between

individual within the society and the agreement was based on individual renunciation of liberties in order to support the collective. Peter Chinsman opined that the assumed renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man, because if man relinquishes all his freedom, man would have taken away all morality in his action (Newton & Sullivan, 2005). This thought is also compatible with doctrine of John Lock in his aim that civil government can be terminated at the violation of morality upon which it is established. Rousseau (1997) however, stated that such alienation is unconditional. According to Rousseau, man submits himself to nobody in particular but to general will. The general will is the result of free act of union of all individual parties that participated in the social contract. The social contract holds that an individual submits his liberties, will, powers and freedom to the supreme direction of the general will.

Adewole (2014) noted however that individual does not submit or relinquish his liberties to the general will for nothing. The reason why man agreed to renounce his liberties in support of the general will is to ensure that his security and comfort will be adequately promoted; to promote individual welfare within the context of all. The general will is therefore under obligation to work assiduously to promote the welfare of individuals that constitute the general will, while at the same time enjoying support of individuals. This reciprocal interface forms the contractual basis of individual and constituted authority relationship. The individual as a party to the social contract becomes the citizen and as a citizen, he alienates his freedom in order to support the general will. The general will in a politically sophisticated society become the state. As an aggregate of collective will, the state becomes party to the social contract. As a party to the social contract, the state exists by acquiring a larger than individual status and a measure of authority which makes the state sovereign. As a form of constituted authority, the state establishes a framework for collective expression in the form of government.

As a result of the ensuing relationship, the issue of obligation and responsibilities comes to the fore as a means of reinforcing the extent of contractuality that exists between citizen and constituted authority in a political arrangement. The citizen as a party to the social contract in political arrangements has various obligations. Otubanjo (1988) and Adewole (2014) argued the obligations of the citizen to the state include among others: maintenance of good behavior, law abiding, acting always in defense of the state; contributions of resources (physical, moral and material) when required for smooth running of the state and general assistance towards entrenchment of good governance. The state on the other hand, as a counter balance in the relationship also has various responsibilities to the citizen. The responsibilities include maintenance of law and order, defending the territorial integrity of the state, ensuring security of life and property and the promotion of welfare, comfort and general growth of all citizens.

Adewole (2014) went further to show implications of social contract model. To start with, it provides acceptable foundation for realistic explanation of how and why of the genesis of human political society. In this, it can be seen how life in the state of nature seems somewhat unbearable. And if man must survive, he needs to evolve and develop an alternative survival strategy from the turbulence inherent in the state of nature. As a foundation of society, the social contract addresses the problems of every individual survival within the context of all. The social contract upholds the uniqueness of each individual in political relationship. According to Otubanjo (1988) in mature society, the social contact theory recognizes every individual as a unique entity or citizen. In addition, every citizen has equal contribution in the emergence of political society. Every citizen as a matter of course and right has equal stake in the evolvement of political authority. Furthermore, it also implies that collective will is necessary antecedent for a political society. The sanctity of collective will is against the backdrops of concerted pubic resolution. Eventually, collective will translates to sovereign authority and super

intelligence which is expected to work always in furtherance of public interest. This means that there is a bargain of some sort between the citizen and politically constituted authority in the form of reciprocal engagement. In other word, there is a contractual relationship between the citizen on one hand and constituted authority on the other. In that wise, the state can only function based on the directives of the citizenry. This is because the state owes its existence to the citizenry. As a party to the social contract, the citizen must always act to support constituted authority in anticipation of welfare, security and growth. While state must protect the citizen in exchange for the citizen’s support.

According to Southwood (2010) the social contract ultimately assumes contractuality in the relationship between citizens and constituted authority. Although the contractuality in citizenship/authority relationship may not be formal or conspicuous, the contractual flavour in citizen and constituted authority relationship is not only apparent but inferable in the relationship between the two parties. Sheehan (2003) commented further on the validity of the contract covered by social contract in political relationships. The extent of the contractuality in political relationship has been a subject of debate among political philosophers, constitutional lawyers and practicing politicians. And the question has always been “how valid is the contract covered by the social contract? Of course, there are two opposing views to the issue of the validity in the contract advocated by social contract model. Skeptics for instance, hold the view that the assumed validity in social contract theory is nothing but mere wishful thinking. To them, a contract is an agreement between two or more people and such agreement is intended to have legal consequence. For a contract to be valid therefore, it must be explicit and binding on each party to the agreement. More importantly, an agreement in a truly valid contract must be enforceable. For this reason, it is not all agreement that qualifies as contact since not all agreements are prime-facie contractual agreement. It is the position of skeptics that the agreement provided by the social contract does not quality as a contract. This is because

the social contract model does not have the essential elements of a valid contract. For instance they refer to the very important clause in valid contract which stipulates that there should be two or more party to a contract. In the case of social contract, they contend that the other party to the contract does not exist. The implication of this is that the citizen is only making a contract with himself.

Skeptics went further to say that intentions to create a legal relation must be

clearly

evident in a valid contract. Adewole (2014) maintained that this condition is clearly and conspicuously absent in social contract model. The skeptics according to Adewole (2014) opined that the clause of contract enforceability which is a necessary condition for a valid contract is also lacking in social contract postulation. To them, if a breach of any of the term of the contract cannot be easily enforced, where then comes the validity in the social contract model? To the proponents of the validity of social contract however, they contends that the social contract model qualify in every respect as a valid contract. To them, it is a subsisting agreement in every sense of the word. They are of the view that the existing contract between the citizen and constituted authority within the purview of social contracts is not only very effective but effectual. According to Seaward (2010), a contract does not have to be written before it becomes a valid contract. Even in actual situation, the agreement between citizen and the constituted authority has been written in the form of a constitution that govern citizenship and authority relationship, the category of what is commonly refer to as simple-quasi contract. A simple quasi contract is an obligation imposed on account of circumstances which exists between parties. According to Adewole (2014), the social contract although not under seal, is easily inferable and can only be implied from the existing interaction between the parties. The contract between citizen and constituted authority is derivable from the existing relationship between each of the parties. To deny the existence of other party apart from the citizen in the

contractual relationship is to be unfair to the social contract phenomenon. Apart from the citizen who remains a major party to the contract, the collective will or sovereignty derives its existence from the sanctity of the contract with each of the parties having specific duties and responsibilities. The ensuring duties and responsibilities in the social contract oblige each contracting parties to commit mutual acknowledgement and respect for one another in terms of each parties’ rights or duties as the case may be.

According to Sheehan (2003) the citizen support the state and empower constituted authority through conscious alienation of his right. The constituted authority on the other hand through its institution of sovereignty must act always in furtherance of the comfort, security and happiness of the citizenry. Closely related to this is the maintenance of fidelity. It stipulates that for a contract to be valid and enforceable, such agreement should incorporate a give and take transaction in which either of the party of the contract should intend to part with something of value to the one another. In the case of the citizen and constituted authority relationship, the citizen willing gave up or alienate his coveted liberties in total support of the constituted authority, the constituted authority on the other hand acquire collective sovereignty so that citizen can be fully protected, assured of maximum liberties, comfort and security. According to Southwood (2010) it is this above thought that there is contractuality in the relationship encapsulated by the social contract model of political relationship. The above writer notes that both parties in social contract model are conscious of this fact. Modern political engineering with emphasis on electioneering, democratic rules have assisted in widening the scope of contractuality in citizenship and constituted authority relationship. The only probable area where political thinkers, anti-social contracts and philosophers seem justifiable in their concern is in the area of contract vitiation.

Writingon contract vitiation, Adewole (2014) argued that a valid agreement in every situation should be capable of vitiation in an event of default by either party to the

contract. Of course, social contract assumed that there is subsisting agreement between the citizen and constituted authority. If the citizenry as enunciated by social contract theory relinquishes his liberties in support of sovereignty, the sovereignty is in turn expected to reciprocate by acting always in furtherance of collective will. The legitimate question that arises from this relationship is that what happen if either of the party to the social contract defaults? After all, a contract is truly valid if the basic ingredients of the agreement are apparent and are also enforceable. In other words, if a contract is not enforceable in a situation of default by either party, such contract is said to be a void contract. A contract is considered void when enabling agreement is seen as having no legal effect whatsoever. If the social contract is valid, what provisions does the social contract make in order to address the problems of contract vitiation? This question is very crucial in the sense that there is no basis for any agreement which cannot be enforced when either party to the contract defaults. Weisberg (2007b) maintained, to social contractualists, the social contract model provides foolproof institutional framework through which agreement by the citizen and constituted authority can be enforced. They contend that since social contract theory rests on the principle that no constituted authority is legitimate which does not derive its power and function from the consent of the citizen, accordingly political power and authority resides in the hands of the citizenry. It is therefore the duty of the citizen to install its own mandate based on collective will. The assumption according to Seaward (2010) is that any constituted authority that does not act in accordance with the dictate of the collective will risks losing the mandate. This is probably the reason why democracy as a form of government is often taunted and supported by social contractualists.

According to Adewole (2014), democracy as a model of government falls perfectly into the ambit and requirement of social contractual relationship. As a form of government, democracy entrenches popular sovereignty and it is a system of governance

in which citizens confer supreme power directly or indirectly through elected representatives. As a government of the people, by the people and for the people, democracy has an internal operating mechanism for addressing contract default. The institutional framework of democracy is structured internally in a way that contractual obligations, justifications and adjudication in case of any default by either party to the contract can be taken care of. Without doubt, the letter and spirit of democratic governance as a model of social contract theory is most assuring. G.H. Sabine observes that the internal mechanism and institutional framework in social contract, when practiced through democracy allows for accountability which contract vitiation is all about (Adewole, 2104). Muldoon (2017) argued that the bottom line of social contract as a democratic model is that citizenry must as a matter of necessity confer legitimacy on political authority and the consciousness that sovereignty rests with the citizen is sufficient as an instrument of accountability in case of default. If democracy as a social contract model is properly operated given the in-built accountability mechanisms, the issue of contract default or vitiation is nothing but a foreclosed issue. Unfortunately, we are often confronted with unprecedented cases of crisis of confidence in practical political activities. Crisis of confidence occurs in contractual relationship between citizen and constituted authority. It is possible for any of the party to default in social contract.

According to Adewole (2014), when citizen as a party to social contract defaults, it is not always problematic. The reason for this is that the state possesses collective power to deal with any recalcitrant citizen. In other words, if the citizen refuses to obey constituted authority, the constituted authority has force element with which it can ensure compliance. The problems however become knotty when the citizen is at the receiving end. As in the case of common occurrences that bothered on infringement of the rights of citizen. When infringement occurs, it is not only injurious to the sanctity of the rights of citizen, but called to question the basis of social contract as a foundation of political

relationship. Infringements can come in various forms. For instance, in situation where ensuring political authority is a mere perversion; where the collective will of the people, the cherished legacy and the main reason why citizen agreed to alienate his rights has been grossly violated. Specifically, a good example is when military organized a coup and force themselves on the people for the purpose of governance and consent of the people. And when it does happen, it leads to arbitrariness, a near recourse to the state of nature where lawlessness and irresponsiveness on the part of the constituted authority hold sway. In such scenario, it is in the interest of social contract model that the rights of citizen be upheld in other to ensure validity of social contract as well as the sanctity of political relationship. Other more precarious situation is possibly when citizen is unable to get the expected support from the social contract. When this occurs, the citizen would see himself only as a party to the social contract in an artificial manner. This according to

…. (), the constituted authority is nothing but irresponsible.

Obviously, when a citizen erred in a valid contractual relationship, the authority possesses collective force to ensure conformity. But when a constituted authority erred as is the case indicated above, what is the way out? Various alternatives have been propounded by political philosophers. According to Southwood (2010), the first alternative is for the citizen or any citizen for that matter to institute legal redress. By so doing the citizen is at liberty to use instrumentality of law to fight for political and social right. This approach would only be effective if the citizen and constituted authority collectively respects agreement as enunciated by the social contract. And also if the enabling institutional framework for seeking redress is permissible effective and conducive. But when law becomes ineffective and useless, and the institutional framework is impervious to corrections and the citizen seems completely helpless, recourse to a more unorthodox method of promoting the sanctity of social contract becomes an inevitable tract. This is to say that when the institutional framework provided

by the social contract seems to have lost its meaning, recourse to organized revolt seems inevitable. This is where the phenomenon of political dissidents comes in.

According to Badmus (2006) and Moehler (2010) political dissidents are direct outcome of ineffective contractual relationship most especially when citizens contractual rights are infringed upon by constituted authority and the legitimate avenues for seeking redress as permitted by the enabling agreement seems not to be working, the development of an organized political revolt to overhaul and force the constituted authority to be alive to contractual responsibilities becomes imminent. The phenomenon of political dissident emanated as a result of frustration among citizens in a political society. It is an attempt at contract vitiation by citizens who are conscious of their political rights within the context of social contract (Badmus, 2006). Citizens in this context sought to assert their right, their great legacy which cannot be wished easily away. Political dissidents and ethnic militia are citizens that seek to exercise their rights by forcing constituted authority to live up to its responsibility in compliance with the dictates of social contractual obligations. Consequently, Adewole (2014) justified the case of ethnic militia in Nigerian political terrain. The phenomenon of political dissidents and ethnic militia became prominent in Nigerian political configuration. As the country contends with various development challenges that include inequitable distribution of resources, political imbalance, problems of national cohesion, minority issues and corruption among others, certain categories of citizens both in personal and regional context wanted better bargain in the Nigerian citizenships/constituted authority relationship. They therefore constitute themselves into ethnic militia or political dissidents.

In the Western part of Nigeria for instance, there is Odua People’s Congress (OPC), Arewa in the North, South-South agitators in the South, Ohaneze in the East. The bottom line is that these categories of citizens are Nigerian agitators who wanted better bargain more than they presently received in the existing political calculations (Adeole,

2014). Of course, there are occasions when activities of political dissidents and ethnic militia aggravated into full scale antagonism with constituted authority but their overall aim is to ensure that constituted authority is made to wake up to their contractual responsibilities. It is possible to assume that Nigerian political dissidents and ethnic militia have exhausted all legal avenues, but when law and other institutional framework are inefficacious; therefore citizen mobilization for pro-active action through organized revolts; civil disobedience or other allied-actions towards redressing anomaly may seem unavoidable. Specifically, dissident actions on the part of political dissidents and ethnic militia are to force constituted authority to be legitimately responsible and responsive to the citizenry. Sheer banditry, ethnic militia, political dissidents and civil unruly behaviour may be justified if a given environment is saddled with socio-political mediocrity, where citizen right is bastardized and there is no effective legal means to seek redress. The citizen may be required to become deviant in order to resist evil and illegality. The reason celebrated Nigerian legal luminary and a political activist, Gani Fawehinmi insists that political dissident is nothing but social contract in action. He sees political dissident as citizen’s action to force constituted authority to be alive to their responsibilities.

# Understanding the Concept of Governance

Prior to understanding the concept of good governance, it is imperative to explore the term governance. In common usage, governance as distinct from good governance is equated with ‘government’ or ‘the act or process of governing’. International organizations and scholars adopted more extensive definitions of the term. Keefer (2009) notes, ‘there is no agreed definition of governance that would provide a convenient device for organizing the literature’. Weiss (2000) lists seven different definitions from as many organizations. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] (2009) compiles some definitions. According to the definitions listed in these sources, for

instance, the UNDP (1997)defines governance as ‘the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels’, which ‘comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences’. For the IMF, it is ‘the process by which public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources’ (UNDP 2009). According to OECD, it is ‘the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development,’ which ‘encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the environment in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled’ (OECD 1995).

Not only do definitions vary across organizations, they also vary within organizations. Some of those used by the World Bank include: ‘the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs’ (World Bank 1989);‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources’ deals with ‘three distinct aspects : (i) the form of political regime; (ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development; and

(iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions’ (World Bank 1994);‘the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services’ (World Bank 2007a);‘the rule of the rulers, typically within a given set of rules’ (World Bank 2010);and traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised’ (Kaufmann et al. 2009). This definition is operationalized in the World Bank’s widely-used Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project in terms of six aggregate indicators: (i) voice and accountability (‘the extent to which a country’s

citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media’); (ii) political stability and the absence of violence; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; (v) the rule of law; and (vi) control of corruption (World Bank 2007b).

Despite differences in language, most of these definitions include three common elements that point toward a minimal understanding of governance as (i) the process (or manner) through which (ii) power (or authority) is exercised (iii) to manage the collective affairs of a community (or a country, society, or nation) (). With a few exceptions, all of these elements are arguably clear even in the most succinct formulations.

In the World Bank (2010) definition, governance is ‘rule’ (the act or manner of exercising authority), carried out by ‘rulers’ (those with power/authority), within ‘a given set of rules’ (a common society). This minimal definition of governance suggests description, leaving open multiple possibilities of how, and towards what ends, power might be exercised within the community. For instance, it might be according to popular vote, by consensus, according to a set of universally applied laws, through the dictates of a supreme leader, or through physical force. Key actors include government agencies, elected officials, hereditary rulers, religious leaders, judicial authorities, or the voting public. The collective affairs of a community might include anything from national security to natural resources, from monetary policy to cultural affairs, from infrastructure development to educational standards. Many definitions of governance also implicitly or explicitly include additional elements, in particular some conception of the core objectives met by effective governance; the principles, values, or norms that should be upheld in the process of governing; and the specific institutions that well-governed countries should have. Definitions from OECD (1995) and World Bank (1994) highlight development as a core objective: a country’s affairs and resources are managed,

according to the OECD, ‘for social and economic development’. UNDP (1997) is suggestive of a sort of pluralist democracy, with channels for the representation of individual (citizen) and group interests. The World Bank’s WGI highlights six broad principles or standards that well governed countries should meet and touches on specific institutions such as a free media. These more extensive aspects of definitions of governance suggest various criteria and standards against which the quality of governance can be assessed. (In these examples: does the manner of governing promote development? Is it representative and participatory? And so on).

UNDP notes: ‘Governance, including its social, political and economic dimensions, operates at every level of human enterprise, be it the household, village, municipality, nation, region or globe’ (UNDP 2000, as cited in OECD 2009). Here, the term is widely used in relation to a variety of specific contexts and approaches: corporate governance, participatory governance, global governance, information technology (IT) governance, environmental governance, local governance, NGO governance, and sustainable governance. Governance as addressed in the current literature refers primarily to governance in domestic politics and is distinct from these other uses. In general, this means a focus on governance at the national level, although governance at various sub- national or local levels is also central to some work. Other uses of the term governance focus either on a different context (corporations, the international arena, NGOs) or highlight a particular manner of governing (participatory, sustainable). They are distinct, although sometimes relevant to governance as addressed in this study. For instance, discussion of the governance policies, programmes, and projects of the United Nations, the World Bank, and other donors may relate to issues of global governance, or systems of rule in the international arena (Biersteker 2010); the African Peer Review Mechanism’s assessment of governance addresses corporate governance as one of its four focus areas; and in addressing how governance is carried out at the national and sub-

national levels, many studies argue for the importance of deliberation and participatory governance (Osmani 2007).

# Good Governance: Definitions and Components in the Context of Social Contract

The working definitions of good governance and the quality of governance more generally, are notable in diversity. There are examples from the major multilateral agencies including the UN; the multilateral development banks; the European Commission, the IMF, and the OECD. These definitions are drawn either from each organization’s current policy on good governance (the IMF’s *Good Governance: IMF’s* Role, published in 1997) or its most recent major public statement on the topic (the entry entitled ‘Governance’ on the UN’s website).

With the exceptions of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), all of these organizations use the term good governance widely and discuss its promotion among their main objectives (Gisselquist 2012). Both the EBRD and the IADB highlight a number of issues associated with good governance (democracy, the rule of law, human rights, institutional development), but neither frames its work in these terms. As the definitions presented, there are clear similarities across working definitions, but there are also major differences. Seven core components are collectively highlighted: (i) democracy and representation,

1. human rights, (iii) the rule of law, (iv) effective and efficient public management, (v) transparency and accountability, (vi) developmentalist objectives, and (vii) a varying range of particular political and economic policies, programmes, and institutions (in this case, elections, a legislature, a free press, secure property rights) (Gisselquist 2012).

United Nations (2012) addresses six of the seven components, but does not explicitly link good governance with development. It also references equity and

security as additional components. World Bank (2007a), by contrast, highlights efficient and effective public management, transparency and accountability, and the objective of development, steering clear of more ‘political’ components. It also includes discussion of technical capacity, leadership, and the delivery of public services. The IMF (1997) does not present a global definition but explicitly frames its discussion in terms of components of governance that are related to its mandate of dealing with macroeconomic stability. These same seven components also figure in other definitions in use by donor agencies. The OECD’s 2009 Sourcebook, Donor Approaches to Governance Assessments, provides a useful listing of definitions used by aid agencies from 12 OECD member countries and five multilaterals (ADB, EC, IMF, UNDP, and World Bank). Definitions given in OECD (2009) highlight in particular the rule of law, and democracy and representation. ADB discusses financial and regulatory institutions. A handful of additional components are also mentioned by several donors, including equity, sustainability, legitimacy, social welfare, the ‘State’s ability to serve the citizens’, and public service provision.

There is a clear distinction between the more economic and management focused approaches in use by the multilateral development banks and the greater attention to political issues in the approaches of the UN, the European Commission, and many bilateral donors (Gisselquist 2012). This distinction is clearly rooted in the history of the concept and organizational mandates. As summarized by scholars, the origins of the ‘good governance agenda’ can be seen clearly in work by multilateral institutions, and especially the World Bank, in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Doornbos 2001; Nanda 2006; Williams 2009; Grindle 2010). One of the first major statements on the issue was the World Bank’s 1989 study, Sub Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth , which attributed ‘the litany of Africa’s development problems’ in the 1970s and 1980s to a crisis of governance, arguing for the need to look beyond the external factors

emphasized in other work to internal or domestic factors (Gisselquist 2012). The study highlighted a number of pathways through which the quality of governance affected development in the region. These included the use of public resources for badly designed public investment projects, the introduction of price distortions, creation of institutional environments that discouraged productive private-sector activities (through costly regulations), spending on ‘overblown’ public agencies, and the waste and theft of aid resources by unaccountable public officials (Ibid). These issues have been reflected clearly in subsequent Bank policy on governance, which is inextricably bound up with developmental objectives, and includes both efforts to institute effective, efficient, transparent, and non-corrupt public management, and the adoption of free market policies, programmes, and other institutions seen to promote economic growth, such as secure property rights and a business-friendly regulatory environment.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2003) summarizes: to the World Bank, good governance consists of a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to the public. The World Bank elaborates on four elements of good governance (World Bank 1989, 1992): Public sector management emphasizing the need for effective financial and human resource management through improved budgeting, accounting and reporting, and rooting out inefficiency particularly in public enterprises; Accountability in public services, including effective accounting, auditing and decentralization, and generally making public officials responsible for their actions and responsive to consumers; A predictable legal framework with rules known in advance; a reliable and independent judiciary and law enforcement mechanisms; and Availability of information and transparency in order to enhance policy analysis, promote public debate and reduce the risk of corruption. This approach to good governance has roots in two strains of the literature: (i) work in the 1970s-1990s that challenged the role of the state in development, spurred on particularly

by the experience of market transition in the former Soviet Union and (ii) the new institutionalism in economics and in particular Douglass North’s Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance , published in 1990 (Grindle 2010).

The Bank’s institutional mandate also played an important role: because the Bank is prohibited under its Articles of Agreement from engaging in political affairs, focus on ‘governance’ by the Bank could only be justified insofar as governance directly affected economic development, only insofar as governance was relevant to the Bank’s mandate (Oestreich 2004; Harrison 2005; Moloney 2009). Nor has the Bank been free to engage fully in political analysis or consideration of human rights in its activities, both of which could be seen as ‘political’ activities favouring one form of government or one domestic faction over another (Shihata 1988; World Bank 1998; Palacio 2006). Thus, ‘governance’ for the Bank, while addressing various issues dealing with public policy, representation, and public administration, has taken on a curiously apolitical character. Since the early 1990s, however, use of the concept by other organizations has expanded to include a variety of other ‘good things’, including political liberalization and human rights (Grindle 2010). Unbound by the same constraints placed on the Bank, the UN, in particular, has used the terms ‘good’ and ‘democratic’ governance interchangeably. Core principles of representative democracy, such as participation, equality, and inclusivity are intimately bound up with the UN’s approach.

The United Nations Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2012), for instance, notes that: good governance has eight major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society. UN projects specify and work to support key democratic political institutions

as part of these efforts. The UN’s Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World summarizes these institutions as follows:

* 1. A system of representation, with well-functioning political parties and interest associations.
  2. An electoral system that guarantees free and fair elections as well as universal suffrage.
  3. A system of checks and balances based on the separation of powers, with independent judicial and legislative branches.
  4. A vibrant civil society, able to monitor government and private business and provide alternative forms of political participation.
  5. A free, independent media
  6. Effective civilian control over the military and other security forces.

The UN also explicitly underscores the relevance of democratic principles in the design and management of its own governance projects and programmes: the Global Programme on Democratic Governance Assessments, supported by UNDP’s Oslo Governance Centre, for instance, highlights its focus on ‘nationally owned’, rather than external, governance assessment, and provides financial and technical support to sixteen projects (Gisselquist 2012). Such assessments are seen as an accountability mechanism for local stakeholders, and also intended to be ‘participatory’, ‘transparent’, and ‘legitimate’ by including a broad and representative range of national actors, providing these actors with full information on the process, and making the results of assessments open to the public (UNDP 2009). While the definition of ‘good governance’ in use by some multilateral agencies has expanded, the link with development has remained central. The political components of governance are not just seen as ‘good things’ in their own right, but also because they promote development broadly defined. One of the clearest

statements on this was made in the 2002 Human Development Report: It has become common in recent years to hear policy-makers and development experts describe good governance as the ‘missing link’ to successful growth and economic reform in developing countries. But attention has focused almost exclusively on economic processes and administrative efficiency. The central message of this Report is that effective governance is central to human development, and lasting solutions need to go beyond such narrow issues and be firmly grounded in democratic politics in the broadest sense. In other words, not democracy as practiced by any particular country or group of countries—but rather a set of principles and core values that allow poor people to gain power through participation while protecting them from arbitrary, unaccountable actions in their lives by governments, multinational corporations and other forces (Malloch-Brown 2002).

The report further spelled out a three part argument for the ways in which democratic governance promotes human development: First, enjoying political freedom and participating in the decisions that shape one’s life are fundamental human rights: they are part of human development in their own right. Second, democracy helps protect people from economic and political catastrophes such as famines and descents into chaos. Nobel Prizewinner Amartya Sen has shown how elections and a free press give politicians in democracies much stronger incentives to avert famines. Democracies also contribute to political stability, providing open space for political opposition and handovers of power. Third, democratic governance can trigger a virtuous cycle of development as political freedom empowers people to press for policies that expand social and economic opportunities, and as open debates help communities shape their priorities (UNDP 2002). Like the UN, the European Commission and many of its member countries also bind together focus on democracy, governance, and human rights, highlighting both the inherent importance of these topics and their relationship to development. The 2011 ‘Agenda for Change’ on EU development policy, for instance,

notes that ‘good governance, in its political, economic, social and environmental terms, is vital for inclusive and sustainable development (Gisselquist 2012). EU support to governments should feature more prominently in all partnerships, notably through incentives for results-oriented reform and a focus on partners’ commitments to human rights, democracy and the rule of law and to meeting their peoples’ demands and needs’ (European Commission 2010). The European Commission ‘believes that democracy and human rights are universal values that should be vigorously promoted across the world’ and intends to promote them in all of its external policies.

Similarly, programming by the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is guided by five objectives: enhancing respect for human rights in countries where they are most at risk; strengthening the role of civil society; supporting actions in areas covered by EU Guidelines; supporting relevant international and regional frameworks; and enhancing democratic electoral processes, particularly through election observation. Emphasis on the political components of governance has been especially strong in governance work on Africa, where it was explicitly incorporated into the mandates of several major organizations founded in the 2000s (World Bank 1989; Abrahamsen 2000; NEPAD 2012). For instance, unlike its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, the African Union explicitly recognizes ‘respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance’ among its founding principles (African Union 2000). The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), launched by the AU in 2001, identifies ‘peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management’ as ‘conditions for sustainable development’ (NEPAD 2001, 2007). In 2003, NEPAD inaugurated the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), an initiative to develop voluntary self assessments of governance by AU member states, with the objective of ensuring that countries comply with the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and

Corporate Governance (NEPAD 2007). The interlinked issues of aid, democracy, and governance also remain sharply controversial on the continent. In January 2007, the AU adopted the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which builds on the constitutive act of the AU in order to promote adherence by all states to ‘the universal values and principles of democracy and respect for human rights’, including the rule of law, free and fair elections, judicial independence, political pluralism, gender equality, citizen participation, freedom of the press, and public accountability (African Union 2007; Saungweme 2007; Kane 2008; Matlosa 2008). The Charter is to enter into force after ratification by fifteen countries. As of mid-2011, however, it was ratified by only ten countries: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritania, Rwanda, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Zambia (AU 2011).

Notwithstanding diverse definition of good governance, the central objective provides that democratic principle must be enshrined in the equity and equality that promote sense of collective orientation. Good governance is a preservation of social contract in the sense that reciprocal responsibility is fulfilled to the citizens and government. Nigeria is a multiethnic society and it is the expectation that the interest of every ethnic group is preserved to promote sense of belongingness. However, the current pattern of governance appears to undermine the principle of good governance in the midst of myriad of disenchantment, relentless call for restructuring, lack of trust among ethnic groups and suspicion of dominance between the north and south, especially the case of south-east and south-south. This invariably has constrained the existing social contract and gradual fulfillment of John Lock recommendation for end civil government which inevitably metamorphose new government, perhaps the strong negotiation for rebirth of good governance.

# 4.1 Gap in Empirical Literature

Evidently, numerous scholars have worked to project the significance of social contract in society and formation of government thereof. Some writers adopted theoretical application of social contract to zoom the justification for emergence of militia groups (Ihonvbene, 2000; Badmus, 2006; Adewole, 2014); there are some writers who theoretically modeled social contract to justify principles of government, allegiance, bond and involvement and disintegration thereof (Akinboye, 2001; Sheehan, 2003; Weisberg, 2007b); others empirically submitted in justificatory morality of social contract drawing the importance of consent and object of agreement, an explanation which resurrected philosophy of Rousseau, Kant and Hobbes (Ogbuju & Eneh, 2014; Rufus& Eyo, 2017; Babalola, 2019); other writers such as Nwabueze (2018), Falana (2018), Falaiye and Okeregbe (2016), and Mbete (2017) and so on were preoccupied with homogeneity of social contract; heterogeneous factors that bonded parties in social contract; social contract vitiation in the context of governance; consent of parties in social contract; and equilibrium of benefits among parties. Imperatively, the effort of previous scholars was to delineate social contract as fundamental of state formation and parties in the agreement as rational individuals who bargain in strategic interaction and game theory.

However, this current study is an innovation in the ideology of social contract covering empirical analysis of rational behavior of peoples of southern geopolitical zones in Nigeria especially the suspicion that current bargains of social contract is skewed and so it must be restructured. This current agenda is inadequate in literature besides requirement for scientific modeling and policy recommendation.

# Theoretical Framework

* + 1. **Rational Choice Theory**

Rational choice theory asserts that human beings behave rationally, either in the narrow sense of rational self-interest, or in the broader sense that decisions are rationally based on preferences. This empirical theory makes no direct ethical claims, but they may have relevance to ethics. Social contract theorists have maintained that rational individuals can assent to a social arrangement that promotes general welfare in some sense. Social choice theorists have argued in a mathematical model that if we rationally derive social policy from individual preferences, we will adhere to certain ethical norms, perhaps a utilitarian or Rawlsian maximin principle. However, these arguments are based on strong assumptions, particularly with respect to interpersonal incomparability of utilities (Hooker, 2013). According to Hooker, rational bargaining procedures, such as Nash bargaining or Raiffa-Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining, have been shown to lead to outcomes that likewise have ethical content. The former has seen practical application in industry, and the latter results in a minimax relative concession principle similar to that derived by some social contract theorists (Binmore, Rubinstein & Wolinsky, 1986; Gaertner, 2009)

Rational choice theories attempt to explain human behavior as resulting from rational choices, particularly in an economic context. They have been a major part of the Western intellectual landscape since the market system replaced a medieval economy. This historical shift is seen as giving rise to Homo economicus economic man who is driven by self-interested economic calculation rather than a value system of loyalty and honor (Christiano, 2004). Rational choice theories provide the central explanatory principle of much neoclassical economic theory and have generated a vast academic literature. Rational choice theories are empirical theories of human behaviour and, as

such, make no ethical claims. However, they are often seen as having implications for ethics. In particular, they address the question, “why be moral?” If it can be shown that rational behaviour results in ethical behaviour, then the question has an answer: I should act morally because it is rational (Hooker, 2013).

Rational choice theory, also called rational action theory or choice theory is based

on the assumption that individuals choose a course of action that is most in line with their personal preferences. Rational choice theory is used to model human [decision making](https://www.britannica.com/topic/decision-making), especially in the [context](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/context) of [microeconomics](https://www.britannica.com/topic/microeconomics), where it helps economists better understand the behaviour of a society in terms of individual actions as explained through [rationality](https://www.britannica.com/topic/reason), in which choices are consistent because they are made according to personal preference.

Rational choice theory increasingly is applied to other areas as well, including

evolutionary theory, [political science](https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-science), and warfare. In rational choice theory, agents are described by their unchanging sets of preferences over all conceivable global outcomes. Agents are said to be rational if their preferences are complete that is, if they reflect a relationship of superiority, inferiority, or indifference among all pairs of choices and are logically ordered that is, they do not exhibit any cyclic inconsistencies. In addition, for choices in which the probabilities of outcomes are either risky or uncertain, rational agents exhibit consistencies among their choices (Hooker, 2013).

The consistency relations among preferences over outcomes are stated in mathematical axioms; a rational agent is one whose choices reflect internal consistency demanded by the axioms of rational choice. Rational choice theory holds that all considerations pertinent to choice (that may include attitudes toward risk, resentment, sympathy, envy, loyalty, love, and a sense of fairness) can be incorporated into agents’ preference rankings over all possible end states. Social scientists have only indirect access to agents’ desires through their revealed choices. Therefore, researchers infer back from observed behaviour to reconstruct the preference [hierarchy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hierarchy) that is thought to regulate a

rational agent’s decisions (Christiano, 2004; Hooker, 2013). Rational choice theory is a fundamental element of [game theory,](https://www.britannica.com/science/game-theory) which provides a mathematical framework for analyzing individuals’ mutually interdependent interactions (Amadae, 2019). In this case, individuals are defined by their preferences over outcomes and the set of possible actions

available to each. As its name suggests, game theory represents a formal study of social

institutions with set rules that relate agents’ actions to outcomes. Game theory assumes that agents are like-minded rational opponents who are aware of each other’s preferences and strategies. A strategy is the exhaustive game plan each will [implement](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/implement), or the complete set of instructions another could implement on an agent’s behalf, that best fits individual preferences in view of the specific structural [contingencies](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contingencies) of the game. Such

contingencies include the number of game plays, the sequential structure of the game and

the possibility of forming coalitions with other players, and other players’ preferences over outcomes. For social scientists using game theory to model, explain, and predict [collective](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/collective) outcomes, games are classified into three groups: purely cooperative games in which players prefer and jointly benefit from the same outcomes; purely competitive games in which one person’s gain is another’s loss; and mixed games, including the [prisoner’s dilemma](https://www.britannica.com/topic/prisoners-dilemma), that involve varied motives of cooperation and competition (Amadae, 2019).

Game theory is a mathematical exercise insofar as theorists strive to solve for the collective result of various game forms, considering their structure and agents’ preferences. [Equilibrium](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Equilibrium) solutions are of the most interest because they indicate, following the Nash equilibrium concept, that, given the actions of all other agents, each agent is satisfied with his or her chosen strategy of play. Equilibrium solutions have the property of stability in that they are spontaneously generated as a function of agents’ preferences. Solving games is complicated by the fact that a single game may have more

than one equilibrium solution, leaving it far from clear what the collective outcome will be. Moreover, some games have no equilibrium solutions whatsoever (Gaertner, 2009).

A perplexing feature of game theory relates to the assumption of reflexivity on the part of agents: agents must choose strategies in response to their beliefs of what strategies others will choose. This idea of reflexivity leads some researchers to associate methodological [individualism](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/individualism) with game theory (Ritzer, 2011; Amadae, 2019). This is the assumption that the individual is the pivotal unit of analysis for understanding collective outcomes in politics and [economics.](https://www.britannica.com/topic/economics) However, as the use of game theory for understanding interactions in populations studied in evolutionary biology makes clear, the assumption of reflexivity and a view of the individual that could sustain a liberal understanding of politics and economics are not essential. Still, having made this observation, it remains the case that many who adopt rational choice and game theory in [social science](https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-science) find it consistent with individualistic approaches that view the individual as the sole determinant of personal preferences, goals, and values. Among the outstanding successes of rational choice theory in the late 20th century was its extensive refashioning of understanding of how and why markets and [democracy](https://www.britannica.com/topic/democracy) function to respect individual choices (Amadae, 2019).

The context of rational choice theory provides the base that social contract is an outflow of rational choices, equilibrium, bargaining and game which rational individuals derives maximum satisfaction through complex negotiation and competition. The theorists of rational choice were aware that collective agreement or consent of people who enter into social contract is a linear procedure of negotiation through individual interaction, group interaction and community relations which provides the base to surrender to moral ethics of government. As such, the rational individuals hold freedom to renegotiate the contract in game context which provides ground for cooperative game, competitive game and mixed game as long such renegotiation benefits all. In the case of

Nigeria, it is a rational decision by groups to come together as federating units. However, such rational decision may also be subject to renegotiation by the rational individuals which claims imbalance in the game play.

# Game Theory

People cannot survive without interacting with other humans, and it sometimes seems that we have survived despite those interactions. Production and exchange require cooperation between individuals at some level but the same interactions may also lead to

disastrous confrontations (Bacharach, 2006; Ritzer, 2011; Amadae, 2016). Human history is as much a history of fights and wars as it is a history of successful cooperation. Many human interactions carry the potentials of cooperation and harmony as well as conflict and disaster. Examples are: relationships among couples, siblings, countries, ethnics, management and labour unions and neighbors so on. One can argue that the increasingly complex technologies, institutions, and cultural norms that have existed in human societies have been there in order to facilitate and regulate these interactions. For example, internet technology greatly facilitates buyer-seller transactions, but also complicates them further by increasing opportunities for cheating and fraud (Binmore,

2009, 2010). Workers and managers have usually opposing interests when it comes to wages and working conditions, and labor unions as well as labor law provide channels and rules through which any potential conflict between them can be addressed. Similarly, several cultural and religious norms, such as altruism or reciprocity, bring some order to potentially dangerous interactions between individuals. All these norms and institutions constantly evolve as the nature of the underlying interactions keep changing. In this sense, understanding human behavior in its social and institutional context requires a proper understanding of human interaction.

Economics, sociology, psychology, and political science are all devoted to studying human behavior in different realms of social life. In other words, they assume that to understand one individual’s behavior it is safe to assume that her behavior does not have a significant effect on other individuals. In some cases, and depending upon the question one is asking, this assumption may be warranted. For example, what a small farmer in a local market charges for wheat is not likely to have an effect on the world wheat prices. Similarly, the probability that an individual vote will change the outcome of a presidential election is negligibly small. If we are interested in the action of farmer in the local or individual votes above, we may safely assume that one individual acts as if

her behavior will not affect the outcome (Dixit, Skeath & Reiley, 2014; Erickson, 2015). In many cases, however, this assumption may lead to wrong conclusions. For example, how much a farmer charges in local market, compared to the other farmers, certainly affects how much profit margin which accrues to farmers. If a farmer sets a price that is lower than the prices set by the other farmers in the local market, he/she would sell more than the others, and vice versa. Therefore, if we assume that they determine their prices without taking this effect into account, we are not likely to get anywhere near understanding their behavior. Similarly, the vote of one individual may radically change the outcome of voting in small committees and assuming that they vote in ignorance of that fact is likely to be misleading (Dixit, Skeath & Reiley, 2014).

The subject matter of game theory is exactly those interactions within a group of individuals (or governments) where the actions of each individual have an effect on the outcome that is of interest to all. Yet, this is not enough for a situation to be a proper subject of game theory: the way that individuals act has to be strategic, they should be aware of the fact that their actions affect others. The fact that individuals’ actions have an effect on the outcome does not necessitate strategic behavior, if they are not aware of that fact (Frank, 1988; Ritzer, 2011; Fudenberg & Levine, 2016). Therefore, game theory

studies strategic interaction within a group of individuals. By strategic interaction it means that individuals know that their actions will have an effect on the outcome and act accordingly. Like any other theory, the objective of game theory is to organize knowledge and increase understanding of the outside world. A scientific theory tries to abstract the most essential aspects of a given situation, analyze them using certain assumptions and procedures, and at the end derive some general principles and predictions that can be applied to individual instances. For it to have any predictive power, game theory has to postulate some rules according to which individuals act. The most important assumption of game theory is that individuals are rational. Rationality implies that individuals know the strategies available to each individual, have complete and consistent preferences over possible outcomes, and they are aware of those preferences (Ritzer, 2011; Hofmeyr & Ross, 2019).

Furthermore, they can determine the best strategy for themselves and flawlessly implement it. It is not enough that I know that my actions, as well as yours, affect the outcome, but I must also know that you know this fact. Take the example of two wheat farmers. Suppose both farmer A and B know that their respective choices of prices will affect their profits for the day. But suppose, A does not know that B knows this. Now, from the perspective of farmer A, farmer B is completely ignorant of what is going on in the market and hence farmer B might set any price. This makes farmer A’s decision quite uninteresting itself. To model the situation more realistically, we then have to assume that they both know that they know that their prices will affect their profits. One actually has to continue in this fashion and assume that the rules of the game, including how actions affect the participants and individuals’ rationality, are common knowledge (Ritzer, 2011). A fact X is common knowledge if everybody knows it, if everybody knows that everybody knows it, and so on.

However, how much the knowledge is known in the Nigeria state remains subject of analysis especially the consequence of constitutional provisions that is labeled military gifts which indeed is perceived as unilateral. The premise of game theory suggests that rational actors must be strategic and knowledgeable about the outcomes of actions and decision in the process of interaction. It suffixes to say that parties in the social contract must be aware of the consent in the contract, the implication of outcome in the contract and benefits it yields to attain equilibrium for all. In the meantime, the social contract of Nigeria state is now subject of suspicion among parties that consented to it. There is agitation that inequality, inequity and imbalance relationship bedeviled the corporate existence, a consequence that suggests competitive game which contends gains for some and loses to others rather than the cooperative game of equilibrium. I is expected that the agitations will remain sustain until there is renegotiation among the parties through for the benefits of all.

# John Rawls’ Theory of Justice

Rawls’ theory relies on a Kantian understanding of persons and their capacities. For Rawls, as for Kant, persons have the capacity to reason from a universal point of view, which in turn means that they have the particular moral capacity of judging principles from an impartial standpoint. In Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that the moral and political point of view is discovered via impartiality. Rawls invokes this point of view by imagining persons in a hypothetical situation, the original position, which is characterized by the epistemological limitation of the veil of ignorance. Rawls’ original position is his highly abstracted version of the state of nature. It is the position from which we can discover the nature of justice and what it requires of us as individual persons and of the social institutions through which we will live together cooperatively (Rawls, 1996; Freeman, 2007). In the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, one

is denied any particular knowledge of one’s circumstances, such as one’s gender, race, particular talents or disabilities, one’s age, social status, one’s particular conception of what makes for a good life, or the particular state of the society in which one lives. Persons are also assumed to be rational and disinterested in one another’s well-being. These are the conditions under which, Rawls argues, one can choose principles for a just society which are themselves chosen from initial conditions that are inherently fair (Rawls, 2007).

Because no one has any of the particular knowledge he or she could use to develop principles that favour his or her own particular circumstances, in other words the knowledge that makes for and sustains prejudices, the principles chosen from such a perspective are necessarily fair. For example, if one does not know whether one is female or male in the society for which one must choose basic principles of justice, it makes no sense, from the point of view of self-interested rationality, to endorse a principle that favors one sex at the expense of another, since, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, one might find oneself on the losing end of such a principle (Poundstone, 1992; Rawls, 1996; Southwood, 2010). Hence Rawls describes his theory as “justice as fairness.” Because the conditions under which the principles of justice are discovered are basically fair, justice proceeds out of fairness. In such a position, behind such a veil, everyone is in the same situation, and everyone is presumed to be equally rational (Rawls, 2007). Since everyone adopts the same method for choosing the basic principles for society, everyone will occupy the same standpoint: that of the disembodied, rational, universal human. Therefore all who consider justice from the point of view of the original position would agree upon the same principles of justice generated out of such a thought experiment (Thrasher & Kevin, 2015). Any one person would reach the same conclusion as any other person concerning the most basic principles that must regulate a just society. The principles that persons in the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, would choose

to regulate a society at the most basic level (that is, prior even to a constitution) are called by Rawls, aptly enough, the two principles of justice.

These two principles determine the distribution of both civil liberties and social and economic goods. The first principle states that each person in a society is to have as much basic liberty as possible, as long as everyone is granted the same liberties. That is, there is to be as much civil liberty as possible as long as these goods are distributed equally. (This would, for example, preclude a scenario under which there was a greater aggregate of civil liberties than under an alternative scenario, but under which such liberties were not distributed equally amongst citizens). The second principle states that while social and economic inequalities can be just, they must be available to everyone equally (that is, no one is to be on principle denied access to greater economic advantage) and such inequalities must be to the advantage of everyone. This means that economic inequalities are only justified when the least advantaged member of society is nonetheless better off than she would be under alternative arrangement (Rawls, 2007). So, only if a rising tide truly does carry all boats upward, can economic inequalities be allowed for in a just society. The method of the original position supports this second principle, referred to as the difference principle, because when we are behind the veil of ignorance, and therefore do not know what our situation in society will be once the veil of ignorance is lifted, we will only accept principles that will be to our advantage even if we end up in the least advantaged position in society.

These two principles are related to each other by a specific order. The first principle, distributing civil liberties as widely as possible consistent with equality, is prior to the second principle, which distributes social and economic goods. In other words, we cannot decide to forgo some of our civil liberties in favour of greater economic advantage. Rather, we must satisfy the demands of the first principle, before we move on to the second. From Rawls’ point of view, this serial ordering of the principles expresses

a basic rational preference for certain kinds of goods, those embodied in civil liberties, over other kinds of goods, economic advantage (Gaus, 2016). Having argued that any rational person inhabiting the original position and placing him or her behind the veil of ignorance can discover the two principles of justice, Rawls has constructed what is perhaps the most abstract version of a social contract theory. It is highly abstract because rather than demonstrating that we would or even have signed to a contract to establish society, it instead shows us what we must be willing to accept as rational persons in order to be constrained by justice and therefore capable of living in a well ordered society. The principles of justice are more fundamental than the social contract as it has traditionally been conceived. Rather, the principles of justice constrain that contract, and set out the limits of how we can construct society in the first place. If we consider, for example, a constitution as the concrete expression of the social contract, Rawls’ two principles of justice delineate what such a constitution can and cannot require of us. Rawls’ theory of justice constitutes, then, the Kantian limits upon the forms of political and social organization that are permissible within a just society.

In the meantime, Rawls’ principles of justice cannot be overemphasized in the context of Nigeria social contract. It is expected that social contract carries component of liberty and freedom and equitable distribution of social and economic inequality that benefit all parties. The principles presuppose that behind the veil of interaction, people will promote fairness in choices, competition and exchange of social and economic goods. It is an assumption that hypothetical parties in social contract are naturally guided by justice and fairness which makes the contract mutually exclusive in benefits. The same axiom is valid to contend that parties or otherwise ethnic groups that came together to negotiate Nigeria and its constitution were primordially guided by such principles liberty and equitable distribution of social and economic inequality where there was room for comparative advantage among the regional governments. However, the decline of

principles of fairness and substitution thereof exacerbate the current agitation against the centrality of governance and poor federalism which has made states boundlessly dependent.

# CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, the sub section which consisted of research design, study area, population of the study, sample size and sampling procedure are discussed. Similarly, the chapter identified for discussion, method of data collection, instruments of data collection, method of data analysis, reliability and validity of instruments and ethical consideration.

# Research Design

This study aims to adopt a cross sectional mixed- method design. The method will use both quantitative and qualitative data collected to understand the research problem and recommend better ways to resolve the research questions. The aim of using quantitative and qualitative methods is to provide wholesome and a more robust understanding of the research problem than each of them can handle.

# Study Area

This study was conducted in the ‘southern geopolitical zone*s’* which consisted of South-South and South East. South East is predominantly Igbo extraction. The zone is mainly consisted of five states (Anambra, Ebonyi, Abia, Imo and Enugu). Whereas other geopolitical zones have six states, only the South East has five despite the geographical definition of the area as third largest ethnic after Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba ethnic group (Adewole, 2014). In the political history of the post-independence Nigeria, Igbo ethnic produced Nnamdi Azikwe who was President between 1960 and 1966 during the parliamentary system of government led by Tafawa Balewa. The presidential position during the period was ceremonial as major powers and control of government rested on the Prime Minister who was Tafawa Balewa. The 1966 military coup brought another

Igbo extraction in person of Aguiyi Ironsi as Head of State, but was later murdered in July 1966in a counter coup. Since this period to date, Igbo never had top shot as Nigerian leader both in military governments and democratic governments of the first, second, third and fourth republic.

The South-South zone is composed of six states (Delta, Bayelsa, Edo, Rivers, Cross River and Akwa-Ibom) and the zone occupies the largest area of the Niger-Delta. The zone is an oil rich area which contributed more than 65% of the Nigeria revenues. Politically, the zone had produced substantive president of Nigeria only in the fourth republic between 2010 and 2015 when Goodluck Jonathan was the Head of government. This zone has consistently been in the frontline of agitation for resource control due to perceived imbalance in infrastructural development, contamination of resources by huge concentration of oil exploration and exploitation and poor social amenities despite reliance on oil resources for economic growth of Nigeria. The perceived imbalance in the social contract of Nigeria had implication for the formation of many groups in the zones among which are OHANAEZE, PANDEF, MASSOB and IPOB which have consistently championed the call for renegotiation.

# Population of the Study

The population of the study consists of socio cultural groups, political groups, legal groups and resident community. The category in socio cultural groups consisted of OHANAEZE NDIGBO, MASSOB, IPOB and PANDEF.

# Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

Quantitatively, the sample size for this study is 1320 estimated using Cochran’s (2005) statistical formula. Elementarily, the projected population estimates according to National Bureau of Statistics (2016) and National Population Commission (2016) covering the six states as at 2017 is 29,738,819. The proportion of estimate covering the

six states is listed and this consists of Imo (17.6%), Anambra (18.6%), Abia (12.5%), Delta (19.0%), Bayelsa (7.7%) and Rivers (24.6%). The age group proposed to participate in this study covers 35 years and above given the criteria of inclusion earlier listed. According to National Bureau of Statistics (2016), population pyramid covering age group 35 years and above was estimated at 45%. Therefore, working at this estimate (0.45\*29,738,819), sample size is derived from 13,382,469 approximately. Using the formula: ss= Z2p (1-p)/e2, the sample size is derived

SS= sample size; Z= confidence interval, constant at 1.96; P= proportion of target population, in this case 13,382,469/29,738,819 or 0.45; e= margin of error indicated at 0.04.

Therefore: (1.96)2 \*0.45 (1-0.45)/(0.04)2

= 3.8416\*0.45(0.55)/0.0016 = 0.950796/0.0016:

= 594. The formula prescribed that sample size can be increased or decreased by value of proportion of target population which depends on the capacity of researcher(s) to cover cost (Cochran, 2005). In this case, the sample size 594 is increased by 0.45, i.e. 594/0.45 or 1320. Table 1, below shows estimates of sample selection in each of the states given the proportion of population estimates.

# Table 3.1: Sample Distribution in the Study Locations

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| State | Estimated proportion/ratio | Sample |
| Imo | 17.6/100\*1320 | 232 |
| Anambra | 18.6/100\*1320 | 245 |
| Abia | 12.5/100\*1320 | 165 |
| Delta | 19.0/100\*1320 | 251 |
| Bayelsa | 7.7/100\*1320 | 102 |
| Rivers | 24.6/100\*1320 | 325 |
| Total | --------- | 1320 |

In addition, 25 respondents from the sample were targeted for semi structure interviews in the qualitative method. This projection is guided by maximum sample that a

single researcher can attain in a qualitative study such as in-depth interview (IDI). An IDI is a time consuming instrument of data collection, energy sapping and requires detail engagement of research subject matter, in addition to the capability that it generates robust and valid data where it is properly done. Therefore, the maximum extreme in sample size shall be ≤150.

Moreover, the sampling procedure consisted of purposive, random ballot snowball, proportionate and accidental sampling. Purposive method was intended to be used to determine inclusion of south-east and south-south as well as groups identified for the study. Practically, the activities of PANDEF, IPOB, OHANAEZE and MASSOB have been the resurrection of John Lock philosophy of civil government which gives moral legitimacy to change of government in a social contract, especially where there are perceived breaches. These groups are found in south east and south-south. Random ballot was used to determine selection of study areas (SAs) which consist of Imo, Anambra and Abia States in the South East; and Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States in the South-South. The socio cultural, legal and political groups are actively present in all states of the south east and south-south.

However, the researcher could not cover all states due to finance, hence the need to streamline the SAs. Random ballot was therefore applied. Snowball sampling was applied to link respondents due to possibility that some members of the study groups may not be readily available except through contact trace. This was to ensure that the researcher build up the sample to the expected size in the qualitative method. Proportionate sampling was used to determine sample distribution for both quantitative and qualitative across the study groups and SAs. Expectedly, members of socio cultural groups are large because they are non- partisan and not class based. Members of political group are relatively larger than Judges. Moreover, accidental sampling was applied to reach available respondents who shall be

engaged in in-depth interviews and questionnaire. The table below shows clearly proportionate distribution of sample in the qualitative method.

# Table 3.2: Sample Distribution

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| States | Socio cultural groups | | | Political group | Legal  group | Total |
| OHANAEZE | MASSOB/IPOB | PANDEF | House of Assembly | Judges |
| Imo | 3 | 5 | -- | 1 | 1 | 10 |
| Anambra | 2 | 1 | -- | 1 | - | 4 |
| Abia | 3 | 2 | -- | -- | 1 | 6 |
| Bayelsa | -- | -- | 2 | -- | -- | 2 |
| Delta | -- | -- | 4 | 1 | 1 | 6 |
| Rivers | -- | -- | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Total | 8 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 32 |

* 1. **Method of Data Collections**

Mixed method which consisted of quantitative and qualitative method was applied. At quantitative method, survey of respondents was conducted and this generated data in numeric format. Quantitative data were assigned codes using prescribed computer software. Qualitative method involves data sourced through face to face interaction and discussion. This method generated text of discussion recorded in research notes, tapes and pictorial form. Importantly, the survey of respondents in the data collection was carried by two means. First, the researcher applied face to face field work to contact respondents. Second the researcher applied online post method to generate data. This second method was applied due to rule of social distancing orchestrated by virus pandemic in the global community. Indeed, the second method was successful, easy and generated large amount of responses, although the process was expensive but less time consuming. Online interview with respondents was also conducted.

# Instruments of Data Collection

The instruments combined questionnaire document and IDIs. The structure of questionnaire was closed ended which consisted of items of structured questions. The

questionnaire instrument was classified into sub section covering the objectives of the study. Sections in the instrument captured socio demographic characteristics of respondents; perception of equity and equality in the Nigeria state; pattern of agitation in Nigeria state; forms of value system in Nigeria state; structure of stakeholder-ship and model of constitutional restructuring and federalism. The IDIs was designed to capture objectives of the study and structure in sub section and session of discussion. There are five objectives in the study and therefore five sessions of discussion shall be designed. IDIs were applied among members of House of Representatives in the zones and Judges.

# Application of Instruments of Data Collection

Questionnaire instrument was applied in designated locations of the states which have been randomly (ballot) chosen. Data were collected in main capital cities of the six states. Designated locations for data collection were convergence centres which consisted of churches, market locations, town halls and football showbiz centre. The consent of respondents was sought prior to application of questionnaire, only consented participants participated in the study. Interview was conducted in piecemeal or session depending on the choice of respondents. This is to ensure convenience for both researcher and participants. Field notes and tape recorder was utilized. Permission was sought from participants to take their words in tape. Anonymity of the respondents is sacrosanct for this study. Data were collected through means of physical contact and online internet service.

# Method of Data Analysis

Data were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. At quantitative level, data generated through computer software and input codes were analysed statistically using descriptive (frequency count, simple percentage and table) and inferential statistics (chi square and correlation). The content analysis was structured in thematic appraisal of each study objective. Themes of discussion consisted of stakeholder-ship in Nigeria social

contract, equity of social contract, equality membership in the social contract, core value in the social contract, federalism of Nigeria social contract and constitutional restructuring of Nigeria social contract and so on. Similarly, ethnographic method of data analysis was applied using verbatim quotation of respondents’ texts and italicized format.

# Validity of Instrument

At qualitative level, validity of the study was tested in one of the states proposed for the study. The validity was expected to show interest of respondents in the subject of the research, genuineness, truthfulness and commitment to participate. This helped to expunge extraneous components in the instruments prior to detail field work. At quantitative level, a pilot survey of respondents in two states was conducted. This helped identify extraneous items in the instrument and expunge appropriately. Similarly, reliability of the questionnaire instrument was conducted using test-retest method.

# CHAPTER FOUR

**DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION**

This chapter focuses on discussion of data collected and processed for the purpose of this study. Mixed method was adopted and this consisted of quantitative and qualitative data collected through the use of survey method and semi structured interview. There were 1320 respondents that participated in the study and discussion of quantitative data is structured round the sample. Discussion in the chapter is classified into sub section and this consisted of socio demographic characteristics; equity and equality in Nigeria state; pattern of agitation; forms of value system; structure of stakeholder; and model of constitutional restructuring and federalism. The chapter also captures deconstruction of Lock’s principle of government.

# Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

The socio demographic characteristics of respondents present vital information in the analysis of any empirical study. This is due to the fact that it presents guiding background information about respondents and serves to understand inferences about the data retrieved. There is hardly any empirical data that do not contain demographic features which help researcher deduce meaningful explanation. This sub section discusses some variables of the respondents that participated in the study.

# Table 4.1: Respondents’ Classification of Demographic Characteristics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | South-East | | South- South | | Total | |
| Freq= 642 | Percent= 100% | Freq= 678 | Percent= 100% | Freq= 1320 | Percent= 100% |
| What is your sex? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 465 | 72.4 | 495 | 73.0 | 960 | 72.7 |
| Female | 177 | 27.6 | 183 | 27.0 | 360 | 27.3 |


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| What is your age range (in |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| years)? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 35-44 | 294 | 45.8 | 316 | 46.6 | 610 | 46.2 |
| 45-54 | 166 | 25.9 | 177 | 26.1 | 343 | 26.0 |
| 55-64 | 156 | 24.3 | 159 | 23.5 | 315 | 23.9 |
| 65 and above | 26 | 4.0 | 26 | 3.8 | 52 | 3.9 |
| How many children do you |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| have? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No child | 302 | 47.0 | 308 | 45.4 | 610 | 46.2 |
| One | 148 | 23.1 | 155 | 22.9 | 303 | 23.0 |
| Two | 107 | 16.7 | 118 | 17.4 | 225 | 17.0 |
| three and above | 85 | 13.2 | 97 | 14.3 | 182 | 13.8 |
| What is your marital status? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Single | 422 | 65.7 | 437 | 64.5 | 859 | 65.1 |
| Married | 200 | 31.2 | 220 | 32.4 | 420 | 31.8 |
| Divorced | 20 | 3.1 | 21 | 3.1 | 41 | 3.1 |
| What type of family/marriage, |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| are you engaged? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Monogamy | 464 | 72.3 | 506 | 74.6 | 970 | 73.5 |
| Polygamy | 2 | 0.3 | -- | -- | 2 | 0.2 |
| Not applicable | 176 | 27.4 | 172 | 25.4 | 348 | 26.4 |
| What is your monthly income? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Less than 50,000 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 50,000-100,000 | 270 | 42.1 | 281 | 551 | 41.7 |
| 100,001-150,000 | 68 | 10.6 | 68 | 136 | 10.3 |
| 150,001-200,000 | 194 | 30.2 | 214 | 408 | 30.9 |
| 200,001-250,000 | 74 | 11.5 | 73 | 147 | 11.1 |
| Above 250, 000 | 18 | 2.8 | 21 | 39 | 3.0 |
|  | 18 | 2.8 | 21 | 39 | 3.0 |
| What is your academic |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| qualification? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No formal education | 68 | 10.6 | 75 | 11.1 | 143 | 10.8 |
| Primary school certificate | 121 | 18.8 | 139 | 20.5 | 260 | 19.7 |
| Secondary school certificate | 37 | 5.8 | 41 | 6.0 | 78 | 5.8 |
| OND/NCE | 334 | 52.0 | 334 | 49.3 | 668 | 50.6 |
| Degree and equivalence | 82 | 12.8 | 89 | 13.1 | 171 | 13.0 |
| What is your religious |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| affiliation? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| African Traditional Religion | 18 | 2.8 | 21 | 3.1 | 39 | 3.0 |
| Islam | 18 | 2.8 | 21 | 3.1 | 39 | 3.0 |
| Christianity | 497 | 77.4 | 512 | 75.5 | 1009 | 76.4 |
| Others | 109 | 17.0 | 124 | 18.2 | 233 | 17.7 |
| Which is your ethnic origin? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Igbo | 369 | 57.5 | 125 | 18.4 | 494 | 37.4 |
| Yoruba | 44 | 6.9 | 71 | 10.5 | 115 | 8.7 |
| Ijaw | 130 | 20.2 | 250 | 36.9 | 380 | 28.8 |
| Hausa | 18 | 2.8 | 30 | 4.4 | 48 | 3.6 |
| Urhobo | 46 | 7.2 | 154 | 22.7 | 200 | 15.2 |
| Edo | 35 | 5.4 | 48 | 7.1 | 83 | 6.9 |
| Which socio cultural group do |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| you belong to? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| OHANAEZE | 342 | 53.4 | 349 | 51.5 | 691 | 52.4 |
| MASSOB | 89 | 13.9 | 94 | 13.9 | 183 | 13.9 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| IPOB | 67 | 10.5 | 76 | 11.2 | 143 | 10.8 |
| PANDEF | 33 | 5.2 | 34 | 5.0 | 67 | 5.1 |
| Others | 109 | 17.0 | 125 | 18.4 | 236 | 17.8 |

**Source: *Researcher’s Field Survey, 2020***


Respondents were asked to indicate the gender which they belonged. There were 72.7% male and 27.3% female that participated in the survey. The distribution in south- east showed that 72.4% were male, and in south-south 73.0% were male. The age distribution of respondents revealed 46.2% were between 35 years and 44 years; 26.0% were 45 years and above; 23.9% were 55 years and above; and 3.9% were 65 years and above. Notably, population of respondents that were aged below 50 years dominantly participated in the survey. This was reflected in south-east (45.8%) and south-south (46.6%).

# Figure 4.1: Respondents’ Gender




Follow up to this, respondents were asked to indicate marital status. There were respondents (64.5%) and 32.4% that indicated single never married and married respectively; whereas 3.1% indicated divorced as marital status. Comparatively, 65.7% and 64.5% were married in south-east and south-south respectively. Abundantly, most respondents that participated in this survey were single never married.

# Figure 4.2: Respondents’ Age




Subsequently, 46.2% showed that due to marital status as single never married, the number of children was zero; 23.0% indicated one child; 17.0% had two children; and 13.8% had three children and above.

# Figure 4.3: Respondents’ Number of Children




Majority of respondents had zero number of children in south-east (47.0%) and south-south (45.4%). Perhaps the necessity warranted researcher to sought respondents through electronic media as complement of the field work is vital to indicate large participants of single marital status. This population pyramid is common with utilization of internet service and application in day to day activities. Further structural question was asked about type of family and marriage respondents belonged. There were 73.5% that indicated monogamy and 26.6% belonged to polygamy. Apparently, respondents either married or otherwise classically signified type of family system they belonged. Monogamy family was dominant among the respondents due to study location where Christianity is predominant. This religious belief soundly upheld morality of monogamy.

# Figure 4.4: Respondents’ Family Unit




Validly, 72.3% and 74.6% in south-east and south-south respectively indicated monogamy family. Classification of income for respondents showed that 41.7% rated monthly income below fifty thousand naira; 30.9% rated income above one thousand naira; 11.1% rated above one hundred and fifty naira and so on. Classically, only 52.0% of the respondents were in the range of one hundred thousand naira monthly income and below. There was replica of 52.7% and 51.4% in south-south and south-east.

# Figure 4.5: Respondents’ Monthly Income



Abundantly, majority of the respondents were on low income due to the fact that there is possibility of exclusion for significant proportion of naira. The academic qualification of respondents showed 10.8% had no formal education. Inferentially, majority of respondents possessed varieties of academic qualifications which consisted of primary school certificate, secondary and post-secondary qualification. Some respondents also possessed degree certificate and equivalence. Therefore, respondents possessed adequate knowledge and experience to interpret dimension of subject matter of the study.


# Figure 4.6: Respondents’ Educational Qualification




In ‘South-South and South-East’, only 11.1% and 10.6% had no formal education. Interestingly, these respondents without formal academic qualifications acquired adult education that equipped the ability to read and write or communicate well in lingual- franca.

Question was asked about religious affiliation of respondents. Predominantly, 76.4% practiced Christianity; some were affiliated with traditional religion (30.0%) and Islamic (3.0%). Yet, 17.7% neither practiced Christianity, Islamic nor traditional. Christianity was the dominant religion in south-south (75.5%) and south-east (77.4%). Background check of religious practice for most respondents showed that catholic denomination was widespread.

# Figure 4.7: Respondents’ Classification by Religion




Covering ethnic affiliation, 37.4% specified Igbo origin; 28.8% belonged to Ijaw origin; 15.2% were Urhobo ethnic; 8.7% identified Yoruba ethnic; and 3.6% belonged to Hausa origin. The study location was mixture of varieties of ethnic groups cohabiting to carry out socio-economic activities and educational business. In the south-east, majority of respondents (57.5%) were Igbo origin; and in south-south, 36.9% dominantly belonged to Ijaw ethnic.



**Figure 4.8: Respondents’ Classification by Ethnic Affiliation**

This is due to geographical and socio-cultural distribution of peoples in the study area. In addition, question that unveiled socio-cultural group affiliation was asked. Interestingly; 52.4% identified affiliation with OHANAEZE Ndigbo, 52.4% belonged to MASSOB; 10.8% and 5.1% were members of IPOB and PANDEF respectively. Some 17.1% identified other socio-cultural organization different from the foregoing. In south- east, 53.4% belonged to OHANAEZE; and also this socio-cultural organisation was predominant (51.5%) in the South-South. This is perhaps due to affinity that exists between the peoples of the East and South especially Rivers and Delta States.



**Figure 4.9: Respondents’ Classification by Occupation**

# Equity and Equality in Nigeria State

This section discusses respondents’ view reflecting justification of the provision of Nigeria constitution. Chapter one of the 1999 constitution stipulates that Nigeria entity shall recognize all citizens and ethnic division as equal and without discrimination in access to land, mineral and natural resources found in entity Nigeria. This provision ultimately provides for sense of equity and equality for all citizens without boundary of language or tribe. Over time, the turn of events in the country especially the peoples of the east and south have demonstrated otherwise.

# Table 4.2.1: Respondents’ Description of Equity and Equality

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | South-East | | South- South | | Total | |
| Freq= 642 | Percent  = 100% | Freq= 678 | Percent  = 100% | Freq  = 1320 | Percent  =  100% |
| Nigeria is a heritage that belongs to all |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| her citizens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Strongly agreed | 259 | 40.3 | 279 | 41.2 | 538 | 40.8 |
| Moderately agreed | 86 | 13.4 | 89 | 13.1 | 175 | 13.3 |
| Disagreed | 297 | 46.3 | 310 | 45.7 | 607 | 46.0 |
| Nigeria is configured to the benefit of all |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic groups |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 264 | 41.1 | 279 | 41.2 | 543 | 41.1 |
| Moderately agreed | 86 | 13.4 | 86 | 12.7 | 172 | 13.0 |
| Strongly agreed | 292 | 45.5 | 313 | 46.2 | 605 | 45.8 |
| Every ethnic group in Nigeria is fairly |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| treated |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 484 | 75.4 | 508 | 74.9 | 992 | 75.2 |
| Strongly agreed | 104 | 16.2 | 107 | 15.8 | 211 | 16.0 |
| Disagreed | 54 | 8.4 | 63 | 9.3 | 117 | 8.9 |
| Your ethnic group has fair share or |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| representation in federal government? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Moderately agreed | 509 | 79.3 | 534 | 78.8 | 1043 | 79.0 |
| Strongly agreed | 41 | 6.4 | 39 | 5.8 | 80 | 6.1 |
|  | 92 | 14.3 | 105 | 15.5 | 197 | 14.9 |
| Your ethnic group has fair representation |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| in the military hierarchy |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Moderately agreed | 416 | 64.8 | 440 | 64.9 | 856 | 64.8 |
| Strongly agreed | 152 | 23.7 | 154 | 22.7 | 306 | 23.2 |
|  | 74 | 11.5 | 84 | 12.4 | 158 | 12.0 |
| Your ethnic group has fair representation in top federal civil service | 422  130  90 | 65.7  20.2  14.0 | 440  133  105 | 64.9  19.6  15.5 | 862  263  195 | 65.3  19.9  14.8 |
| Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed |
| The representation of your ethnic group in federal police is fair  Disagreed Moderately agreed | 395 | 61.5 | 425 | 62.7 | 820 | 62.1 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Strongly agreed | 229 | 35.7 | 232 | 34.2 | 461 | 34.9 |
|  | 19 | 2.8 | 21 | 3.1 | 39 | 3.0 |
| You ethnic group is fairly represented in top federal paramilitary service | 366  240  36 | 57.0  37.4  5.6 | 388  248  42 | 57.2  36.6  6.2 | 754  488  78 | 57.1  37.0  5.9 |
| Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed |
| Your ethnic group benefitted fairly since |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| inception of democratic government in |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1999? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 334 | 52.0 | 353 | 52.1 | 687 | 52.0 |
| Moderately agreed | 254 | 39.6 | 262 | 38.6 | 516 | 39.1 |
| Strongly agreed | 54 | 8.9 | 63 | 9.3 | 117 | 8.9 |
| The 1999 constitution promotes equality |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| among ethnic groups |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 410 | 63.9 | 416 | 61.4 | 826 | 62.6 |
| Moderately agreed | 214 | 33.3 | 241 | 35.5 | 455 | 34.5 |
| Strongly agreed | 18 | 2.8 | 21 | 3.1 | 39 | 3.0 |

**Table 4.2.2: Distribution Respondents by Perception of Equity and Equality**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | South-East | | South- South | | Total | |
| Freq= 642 | Percent  =100% | Freq= 678 | Percent  =100% | Fre= 1320 | Percent  =100% |
| The 1999 constitution or fourth republic |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| enhanced balanced growth among |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| geopolitical zones? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 437 | 68.1 | 461 | 68.0 | 898 | 68.0 |
| Moderately agreed | 169 | 26.3 | 175 | 25.8 | 344 | 26.1 |
| Strongly agreed | 36 | 5.6 | 42 | 6.2 | 78 | 5.9 |
| Nigeria government benefitted ethnic |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| group |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 410 | 63.9 | 435 | 64.2 | 845 | 64.0 |
| Moderately agreed | 139 | 21.7 | 149 | 22.0 | 288 | 21.8 |
| Strongly agreed | 93 | 14.5 | 94 | 13.9 | 187 | 14.2 |
| Your geopolitical zone experienced |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| economic growth in the last 20 years |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 377 | 58.7 | 401 | 59.1 | 778 | 58.9 |
| Moderately agreed | 221 | 34.4 | 230 | 33.9 | 451 | 34.2 |
| Strongly agreed | 44 | 6.9 | 47 | 6.9 | 91 | 6.9 |
| There is suspicion that your ethnic group |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| is marginalized |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 182 | 28.3 | 197 | 29.1 | 379 | 28.7 |
| Moderately agreed | 117 | 18.3 | 123 | 18.1 | 240 | 18.2 |
| Strongly agreed | 343 | 53.4 | 358 | 52.8 | 701 | 53.1 |
| Marginalization of your ethnic group has |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| triggered conflict? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Strongly agreed | 276 | 43.0 | 282 | 41.6 | 558 | 42.3 |
| Moderately agreed | 172 | 26.8 | 183 | 27.0 | 355 | 26.9 |
| Disagreed | 194 | 30.2 | 213 | 31.4 | 407 | 30.8 |
| There is concrete believe in the unity of |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nigeria | 354 | 55.1 | 381 | 56.2 | 735 | 55.7 |
| Disagreed | 205 | 31.9 | 209 | 30.8 | 414 | 31.4 |
| Moderately agreed | 83 | 12.9 | 88 | 13.0 | 171 | 13.0 |
| Strongly agreed |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Source: *Researcher Field Survey, 2020***

Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate whether or not Nigeria is heritage that belonged to all citizens. There were respondents (46.0%), 40.8 and 13.3% that

strongly agreed, disagreed and moderately agreed. Pointedly, some respondents believed that Nigeria is heritage for all which should benefit all without suspicion or discrimination. While some respondents moderately expressed such belief, there were others that felt such heritage has been tampered with negatively. Respondents (45.7%) and 46.3% in the south-south and south-east expressed feelings that Nigeria is heritage for all. On the other hand, 41.2% and 40.3% in the respective order of south-south and south- east were not convinced that such heritage is for all citizens. But further question was asked to survey opinion on the configuration of Nigeria to the benefit of all. Yet 45.8% strongly agreed that literally the configuration of Nigeria is constitutionally designed to benefit all. There were other 41.1% and 13.0% that disagreed and moderately agreed. Forty-six percent and 45.5% strongly agreed in south-south and south-east respectively. Forty-one percent in both study areas disagreed. Abundantly, there was strong perception and expression of opinion that reflected pattern of dissatisfaction with the current configuration of Nigeria. This is clearly conceived from opinion polls of respondents that disagreed with equal benefit of Nigeria for all and heritage that meet the yearnings of expectation. As a result, 75.2% showed that some ethnic groups in Nigeria are not treated fairly. A paltry 8.9% and 16.0% strongly agreed and moderately agreed that Nigeria state provides fair treatment for all ethnic groups. Classically, 74.9% and 75.4% deeply expressed concern in south-south and south-east respectively, showing anxiety of unequal treatment for some ethnic groups.

Question was narrowed to identify treatment for specific ethnics especially peoples of the south-east and south-south. Overall, 79.0% disagreed that their ethnic groups had fair share of representation in the federal government. Notably, this question sought to verify satisfaction with federal appointments and location of benefits for all in the Nigeria state. Variant, 78.8% and 79.3% in south-south and south-east disagreed that

Nigeria is a fair representation for their peoples. Here, 64.8% disagreed that representation in the military hierarchy was fair for all ethnics in Nigeria; 64.9% and 64.8% aligned with this view above. Similarly, representation in juicy federal civil service (65.3%); federal police hierarchy (62.1%) and federal paramilitary service (57.1%) were rated by respondents as ethnic biased and preponderantly relegated some ethnic groups in Nigeria state. In the replica, 64.9% and 65.7%; 62.7% and 61.5%; and 57.2% and 57.0% respectively in order of federal appointments listed and geopolitical classification attested to unfair treatment of their ethnic groups in Nigeria state.

Furthermore, respondents were asked about opinions on the benefits of ethnic groups since inception of democratic government in 1999. There were 52.0% that disagreed that benefits were distributed evenly and fairly for ethnic groups; whereas 39.1% moderately agreed. Fifty-two percent in both south-south and south-east disagreed that benefits were fairly distributed in the last twenty years of democratic governance. in the notes of interviews conducted, some comments were extracted. According to the assertion of a ranking member of Federal House of Representatives, the difference between ethnic groups is enormous. In his thought:

…. To be frank, Nigeria is not equal for all. There are differences. There is high level of ethnic inequality in Nigeria. Minority is suppressed, intimidated and marginalized. The inequality is a carryover from the pre independence period to the present day Nigeria. It is getting worse in the present Nigeria (IDIs/member of House of Rep/south-south/2020).

Similar feeling was expressed by another interviewee under thematic construction of equity for all. The respondent, a member of Federal House of Reps commented:

Nigeria is built for ethnics in the north. Appointments in military, police and national oil company is dominated by northern extraction especially the major ethnics from the north. Equity has been compromised. This inequity is constitutionally backed. The constitution is a contradiction. The chapter two of the constitution gave much power to the centre where revenue accrues. It is a suspicious constitution. (IDIs/member of House of Rep/south-east/2020).

Majority of the interviewee aligned similar thoughts which showcased inequity in the Nigeria state. However, an interviewee expressed otherwise. A male interviewee who represented Federal Constituency in one of the south-eastern states was apt to comment his views:

To be frank, Nigeria is not equal… there are difference but one Nigeria. Ministerial appointment is constitutional and right of every state. Apart from ministerial appointments, other appointments are based on trust. It won’t be right to appoint somebody you cannot trust. The positions are properly shared…. Just that appointees are greedy to seek personal interest (IDIs/member of House of Rep/south-east/2020).

A crux of the above interviewee was an emphasis of trust which perhaps justifies distribution of federal appointments in critical sector by federal government. The constitution of Nigeria oversaw the intention and preponderance of trust which should make for one and united Nigeria. However, the loss or lack of such generates quick instinct of disaffection among the federating units. This indeed undermines the spirit and letter of such constitution that holds Nigeria.

Respondents were asked to appraise 1999 constitution and the capability of the document to promote equity among ethnic groups. Sixty-three percent disagreed that application of the current constitution was suitable to promote equality for geopolitical zones especially the case for southern Nigeria. Sixty-four percent and 61.4% in south-east and south-south also disagreed that 1999 constitution was capable to promote equality. Similarly, 68.0% disagreed that the fourth republic constitution enhanced balanced growth among geopolitical zones. Therefore, 64.0% and 58.9% of the respondents respectively were disheartened that Nigeria state hampered benefits for some ethnics in geopolitical zones; and this translated to hamper economic growth in the last 20 years. This case reflected respondents’ views in south-south and south-east respectively covering balanced growth (68.0% & 68.1%); benefits fall (64.2% &63.9%); and

economic growth (59.1% & 58.7%). Consequently, 53.1% of the respondents expressed

suspicion of marginalization; 42.3% considered that the present condition in the Nigeria state is a recipe for conflict; and 55.7% expressly lacked belief in the unity of Nigeria. Fifty-two percent and 53.4% in south-south and south-east respectively expressed suspicion of marginalization; 41.6% and 43.0% accordingly believed that the marginalization of their geopolitical zone is capable to trigger large scale conflict; and 56.2% & 55.1% of the respondents in south-south and south east respectively, lacked hope in the unity of Nigeria. Expressly, participants in this study were dissatisfied about the current status of their geopolitical zones in the equality and equitable distribution of gains and benefits. This strongly elicited passionate feelings and preponderance to undermine unity of Nigeria government. In the theme of discussion round equity of Nigeria state, an interviewee who had practiced more than 38 years as Judge in the High Court of Nigeria commented:

There is no equity in Nigeria state. Nigeria government is tilted to favour the north. This is the truth of apparatus of the state in Nigeria. There is no equity. The pre independence was established on equity of regions. Amenities were fairly distributed before independence and civil war. After the war people of the eastern zone were marginalized and the thought of victory was prominent in the minds of other zones especially the north that believed that the east has been conquered. (IDIs/High Court Judge/South East/2020)

Similarly, an interviewee, a law maker in the Federal House of Rep who represented a constituency in one of the south-south states also commented:

It is dominantly clear that the north is suppressing all other ethnic nationality. It is evident in political appointment, infrastructural development, revenue sharing formula. Before independence there was regional government that controlled resources in their domain and made remittance to the centre by form off taxation. My zone is oil producing, but the federal government only gives minute, small to the oil producing states. There is noticeable inequality in all sector of Nigeria. (IDIs/High Court Judge/South East/2020)

Indicatively, participants in this study lacked confidence in the present configuration of Nigeria especially the measure of equality and equity for all as pronounced by letters and

spirits of 1999 constitution. The dominant thinking and normative value held by respondents is that unity of Nigeria exists in document, but evidently lacked action to back it.

# Pattern of Agitation in Nigeria State

The pronouncement of the fourth republic constitution in 1999 that ushered the current dispensation of democratic government was an expectation that should bring together all ethnic compositions in Nigeria. Chapter three of the constitution recognized inalienable rights of all citizens without boundary of ethnic superiority or degradation. This same chapter of the constitution pronounced that there shall be no part of the country excluded to benefit in same proportion as other units. Explicitly, the constitution provides for balanced growth and recognition for all ethnic groups. However, the current in the present Nigeria reveals disaffection and suspicions. Against this backdrop, this sub section, Table 4.3.1 and Table 4.3.2, discusses pattern of agitation which has lingered in the present configuration of the sovereign state.

# Table 4.3.1: Respondents’ Classification of Pattern

**of Agitation**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | South-East | | South- South | | Total | |
| Freq= 642 | Percent  =100% | Freq= 678 | Percent  =100% | Fre= 1320 | Percent  =100% |
| What do you consider major agitation of your ethnic group?  Federal appointment Federal project Content of constitution Marginalization Resource control | 102  13  36  48  443 | 15.9  2.0  5.6  7.5  69.0 | 108  13  42  47  455 | 15.9  1.9  6.2  6.9  67.1 | 210  26  78  95  911 | 15.9  2.0  5.9  7.2  69.0 |
| The agitation is collective struggle by members of your ethnic  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 36  210  396 | 5.6  32.7  61.7 | 42  217  419 | 6.2  32.0  61.8 | 78  427  815 | 5.9  32.3  61.8 |
| What do you consider as major problem with the constitution?  Structure of constitution Powers of the president Resource control  Formulation of the constitution | 232  40  285  85 | 36.1  6.2  44.4  13.2 | 253  39  289  97 | 37.3  5.8  42.6  14.3 | 485  79  574  182 | 36.7  6.0  43.5  13.8 |
| The current presidential system deprives your ethnic group  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 65  139  438 | 10.1  21.7  68.2 | 67  148  463 | 9.9  21.8  68.3 | 132  287  901 | 10.0  21.7  68.3 |
| Federal project(s) in your geo political zone is sustainable  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 379  153  110 | 59.0  23.8  17.1 | 392  162  124 | 57.8  23.9  18.3 | 771  315  234 | 58.4  23.9  17.7 |
| Federal project in your geopolitical zone promote sense of belonging  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 381  197  64 | 59.3  30.7  10.0 | 410  200  68 | 60.5  29.5  10.0 | 791  397  132 | 59.9  30.1  10.0 |
| What forms of marginalization your geopolitical zone has experienced in Nigeria? |  |  |  |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Political marginalization Economic marginalization  Local government creation Military marginalization | 82  92  18  450 | 12.8  14.3  2.8  70.1 | 89  103  21  465 | 13.1  15.2  3.1  68.6 | 171  195  39  915 | 13.0  14.8  3.0  69.2 |
| Marginalization of your geopolitical zone has triggered conflict  Strongly agreed Moderately agreed Disagreed | 239  165  238 | 37.2  25.7  37.1 | 257  175  246 | 37.9  25.8  36.3 | 496  340  484 | 37.5  25.8  36.7 |
| Resources in your geopolitical zone can sustain growth  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 172  97  373 | 26.8  15.1  58.1 | 192  94  392 | 28.3  13.9  57.8 | 364  191  765 | 27.6  14.5  58.0 |

**Source: *Researcher Field Survey, 2020***

# Table 4.3.2: Respondents’ Classification of Agitation

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | South-East | | South- South | | Total | |
| Freq= 642 | Percent  =100% | Freq= 678 | Percent  =100% | Fre= 1320 | Percent  =100% |
| Control of the resources in your geopolitical zone by federal government trigger conflict  Strongly agreed Moderately agreed Disagreed | 189  237  216 | 29.4  36.9  33.6 | 203  251  224 | 29.9  37.0  33.0 | 392  488  440 | 29.7  37.0  33.3 |
| Rate federal government commitment to enhance rapid growth of your geopolitical zone  Low moderate High | 450  119  73 | 70.1  18.5  11.4 | 475  120  83 | 70.1  17.7  12.2 | 925  239  156 | 70.1  18.1  11.8 |
| Agitation of your geopolitical zone is morally justified  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 240  79  323 | 37.4  12.3  50.3 | 260  81  337 | 38.3  11.9  49.7 | 500  160  660 | 37.9  12.1  50.0 |
| Describe socio economic growth of your geopolitical zone in the fourth republic Poor  Fair Good | 323  212  107 | 50.3  33.0  16.7 | 340  222  116 | 50.1  32.7  17.1 | 663  434  223 | 50.2  32.9  16.9 |
| The agitation of your geopolitical zone is capable to result in secession  Strongly agreed Moderately agreed Disagreed | 184  181  277 | 28.7  28.2  43.1 | 195  191  292 | 28.8  28.2  43.1 | 379  372  569 | 28.7  28.2  43.1 |

**Source: *Researcher Field Survey, 2020***

Respondents in the survey were asked to identify factors in the Nigeria government that have persistently agitated and bothered sense of belongingness in the geopolitical zones. Notably, pattern of federal appointments (15.9%), location of federal projects (2.0%),

content of the 1999 constitution (5.95%), marginalization of gains of citizenry (7.2%) and resource control (69.0%) repeatedly agitated the mind. The survey showed that 61.8% strongly agreed that the agitations listed were collective struggle of the marginalized ethnic groups. Respondents pointedly identified problems with the constitution and this consisted of structure (36.7%), powers and boundary of the president (6.0%), resource control (43.5%) and formulation (13.8). Sixty-eight percent of respondents in the survey strongly agreed that the current presidential system of government is a deprivation for some ethnic groups. Cross checking the variation of the survey in south-south and south- east, 67.1% and 69.0% respectively identified resource control as major agitation of the zones; 61.8% and 61.7% strongly agreed that the agitation of the zones is collective struggle among of members of ethnics; and 68.3% & 68.2% also showed that the presidential system is source of suspicion and deprivation. Apparently, survey in the two zones, south-south (42.6%) and south-east (44.4%) notably identified resource control as major problem with current configuration of Nigeria.

In the meantime, thematic discussion with interviewees also offered some leeway to understand the pattern of agitation in the Nigeria state. A fifty-six year old Judge of the High Court was dispassionate in his comments:

The zone is championing for resource control, equitable distribution of power and true federating units. The tenet of the constitution should truly be implemented which states that all federating units are equal. Like what we have today is a negation of the constitution especially federal appointments. Appointments by federal government tilted obviously to a section of the country, the northern extraction. There won’t be peace. Let the country separate. Let the zones be independent and go their way. (IDIs/High Court Judge/South South//2020)

In similar case of theme, another interviewee commented:

There is no trust between the north and east. The north fear that leadership of the country by Igbo will lead to domination of the north. There is fear of domination. MASSOB and IPOB agitate for equity and redistribution of infrastructure in the Nigeria state (IDIs/High Court Judge/South East/2020).

There were twenty-five interviewees that willingly participated in this study and majority of the comments were emphasis of resource control, federal appointment, location of federal projects, marginalization of ‘southern geopolitical zone*’* and lack of trust especially between the north, and east and ‘south geopolitical zones*’*. There appears to be no respite in sight by virtue of determination of peoples of the eastern and south zones to force renegotiation of government. Obviously, respondents (58.4%) disagreed that the paltry federal projects in the zones were sustainable. Fifty-nine percent also disagreed that available federal projects in the zones could promote sense of belonging. A further probe in the survey showed that political marginalization (13.0%), economic marginalization (14.8%), inequity in local government creation (3.0%) and marginalization in military hierarchy (69.2%) were notable forms of deprivation that south-east and south-east zones have consistently suffered in the 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria. This current finding is consistent with the position of Nwabueze (2018), Nweke (2017a) and Babalola (2019) which identified the skewed federalism in Nigeria state and disaffection off citizens. Respondents therefore strongly agreed (37.5%) or moderately agreed (25.8%) that the marginalization is recipe of large scale conflict. Results in ‘south- south’ and ‘south-east’ showed (57.8% and 59.0%) or (60.5% and 59.3%) respectively disagreed that paltry federal projects in the zones were sustainable and as such promotes sense of belonging.

However, survey showed 58.0% strongly agreed available resources in the zones were sufficient to sustain growth where constitution allows autonomous resource control; whereas 37.0% moderately agreed and 29.7% strongly agreed that federal control of resources in geopolitical zones breed suspicions and clash of trust or otherwise conflict. Against this backdrop, 70.1% in the survey rated low federal government sincerity and commitment to enhance rapid growth for geopolitical zones. The suspicion that federal

government is not sincere to promote growth for all perhaps triggered opinion by 50.0% of the respondents that agitation of the ‘south-east’ and ‘south-south’ zone is morally justified. Here, 50.2% rated poor; 32.9% rated fair; and 16.9% rated good the socio economic transformation of the zones since the inception of the fourth republic of the presidential and federal system. Largely, 50.1 and 50.3% in south-south and south east respectively rated growth as poor; 70.1% in both east and south rated low federal government commitment to promote growth for geopolitical zones; and 49.7% & 50.3% respectively in study locations morally justified the current agitation due to flaws and effects on economic growth.

In the thematic area of interview which focused on justification for the agitation, interviewees yielded comments that were crucial for discussion. A high Court Judge who participated in the study offered useful comments:

…major part of federal revenue comes from oil. The community that produced the oil suffered from major degradation. These communities are only offered 13% derivation which is very meager. Before the war, revenue was shared according to derivation. Majority of revenue went to areas that contributed largely to the revenue. Now the federal government takes the lion share. The communities that produced the oil and contributed largely to the revenue suffer degradation… Appointments to key and strategic positions are held by people of the north. The Igbo contributes to oil exploration…. But the zone is openly excluded… managers of Nigeria oil company are from the north. The Board of NNPC is largely dominated by people of the north. The south east is deprived and excluded (IDIs/High Court Judge/South East/2020)

Another interviewee commented:

The effect of oil exploration in the niger delta is overwhelming. Construction of one kilometer road in the zone cost not less than one billion naira or more. But in other zones, the amount is much less due to topography. Oil exploration has degraded the environment. We are championing for resource control to develop our zone. The federal government is depriving us. We are suffering for it. We experience pollution, gas flaring, oil spillage and environmental degradation. We are the people in midst of the danger. They don’t understand our pains. Resources should be distributed according to source where it is coming from. Let people benefit fairly from their God given resources (IDIs/High Court Judge/South East/2020).

The domain of comments and responses from the interviewees was exposition of maltreatment meted to ‘geopolitical zones of the south-south and south-east’. There was concerted ideological unification of views that the current federal system hampered growth for some units and promoted growth other units. The pattern of agitation therefore is the reconciliation route of resource control which is likely to douse the current tension and suspicions. Indeed, some respondents (28.7%) and 28.2% strongly agreed and moderately agreed to option of secession, although interviewees opted for peaceful renegotiation of agreement for collective Nigeria.

# Value System in the Nigeria State

The value system of Nigeria is unity in diversity. The constitution document is a proclamation that there shall be one indivisible and indissoluble entity which shall be called Nigeria. Abundantly, the constitution recognizes multi ethnic nature of the country and ipso facto provide for adequacy to accommodate the characteristics. Perhaps every constitution of the republics in the Nigeria is always an overlap that recognizes traditional characteristics of ethnics that make up the entity. Expectedly, government in the sovereignty should uphold the value system not by proclamation in document, but also by action to the benefits of all. Table 4.4.1 and Table 4.4.2 listed items in the survey that cover the discussion.

# Table 4.4.1: Respondents’ Description of Value System in Nigeria Federalism

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | South-East | | South- South | | Total | |
| Freq= 642 | Percent  =100% | Freq= 678 | Percent  =100% | Fre= 1320 | Percent  =100% |
| The existence of Nigeria government is morally justified  Disagreed  Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 294  159  189 | 45.8  24.8  29.4 | 304  170  204 | 44.8  25.1  30.1 |  | 45.3  24.9  29.8 |
| Describe value system of Nigeria government before independence  Fairly equitable Discriminatory | 555  87 | 86.4  13.5 | 581  97 | 85.7  14.3 | 1136  184 | 86.1  14.0 |
| What forms of value system do you think federal government promotes?  Ethnic inclination Inclusive government | 559  83 | 42.3  6.3 | 589  89 | 86.9  13.1 | 1148  172 | 87.0  13.0 |
| The spirit and letter of 1999 constitution promotes equitability for ethnics in Nigeria Disagreed  Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 476  117  49 | 74.1  18.2  7.6 | 112  55  678 | 75.4  16.5  8.1 | 987  229  104 | 74.8  17.3  7.9 |
| Marginalization of ethnic groups in federal government is entrenched value system Strongly agreed  Moderately agreed Disagreed | 338  240  64 | 52.6  37.4  10.0 | 359  251  68 | 52.9  37.0  10.0 | 687  491  132 | 52.8  37.2  10.0 |
| What forms of value system do you think characterized federal government?  Ethnic bigotry Ethnic inclusion  Distrust among ethics | 197  38  407 | 30.7  5.9  63.4 | 210  42  426 | 31.0  6.2  62.8 | 407  80  833 | 30.8  6.1  63.1 |
| Spirit and letter of federal character commission serves to promote unity among ethnics  Disagreed Moderately agreed  Strongly agreed | 302  136  204 | 47.0  21.2  31.8 | 319  133  318 | 47.1  19.6  33.3 | 621  269  430 | 47.0  20.4  32.6 |
| Federal character in the last 20 years is equitable  Disagreed | 450 | 70.1 | 463 | 68.3 | 913 | 69.2 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 174  18 | 27.1  2.8 | 194  21 | 28.6  3.1 | 368  39 | 27.9  3.0 |
| Your geopolitical zone benefitted equitably from state creation?  Disagreed Moderately agreed  Strongly agreed | 458  103  81 | 71.3  16.0  12.6 | 482  107  89 | 71.1  15.8  13.1 | 940  210  170 | 71.2  15.9  12.9 |

**Source: *Researcher Field Survey, 2020***

# Table 4.4.2: Respondents’ Description of Value System of Equitability

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | South-East | | South- South | | Total | |
| Freq= 642 | Percent  =100% | Freq= 678 | Percent  =100% | Fre= 1320 | Percent  =100% |
| Your geopolitical zone benefitted equitably from the size of local government in Nigeria  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 340  222  80 | 53.0  34.6  12.5 | 362  227  89 | 53.4  33.5  13.1 | 702  449  169 | 53.2  34.0  12.8 |
| Your geopolitical zone benefitted equitably from appointments in military hierarchy in the last 20 years  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 467  123  52 | 72.7  19.2  8.1 | 487  139  52 | 71.8  20.5  7.7 | 954  262  104 | 72.3  19.8  7.9 |
| Appointments in police hierarchy benefitted your geopolitical zone equitably in the last 20 years  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 348  258  36 | 54.2  40.2  5.6 | 367  269  42 | 54.1  39.7  6.2 | 715  527  78 | 54.2  39.9  5.9 |
| Federal government in the last 20 years has sustained unity among ethnic groups  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 412  230  --- | 64.2  35.8  ----- | 435  243  --- | 64.2  35.8  -- | 847  473  -- | 64.2  35.8  --- |
| Nigeria state is an indissoluble entity  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 355  225  62 | 55.3  35.0  9.7 | 372  238  68 | 54.9  35.1  10.0 | 727  463  130 | 55.1  35.1  9.8 |

**Source: *Researcher Field Survey, 2020***

Respondents in the survey were asked to give their views on moral justification of existence of Nigeria government and implication for united citizenry. Some 45.3 disagreed that the present Nigeria government is a moral justification that brings all ethnics together as united body that benefit equally. Although some respondents (24.9%) and 29.8% moderately agreed and strongly agreed that there is moral justification for the existence, majority of respondents were dissatisfied about the current Nigeria as it is configured. Here, a lead question revolving value system of Nigeria before independence was described. Eighty-five percent of respondents held that Nigeria during the pre- independence was fairly equitable; 14.0% faulted the equitability and agreed there was discrimination for ethnic groups. Furthermore, forms of value system in the present federal government of Nigeria were described. Here, 87.0% subscribed that ethnic inclination and bias is the value exhorted by the government; a paltry 13.0% held that there is inclusive government for ethnic groups. Consequently, 74.8% passionately disagreed that the spirit and letter of 1999 constitution promotes equitability; though 17.3% moderately agreed. A crosscheck for study areas revealed that in south-south and south-east respectively, 44.8% and 45.8% agreed that Nigeria government is a moral justification; 85.7% and 86.4% rated Nigeria as fairly equitable prior independence; 86.9% and 87.1% faulted value system as a display of ethnic inclination and biases; and 75.4% and 74.1% disagreed that the spirit and letter of 1999 constitution promote equitability for all. In the meantime, chapter one of the constitution is a proclamation that there shall be entity of sovereign Nigeria, indivisible and indissoluble. The entity shall be

recognized as multi ethnic state and promote equity and equitability for citizens without

prejudice of ethnic superiority (Nigeria Constitution, 1999). The problem per se is the application of the constitution in governance which now emits feelings of discrimination and ethnic superiority.

The theme of discussion round value system is vital for explanation. A Judge in the High Court, who has practiced law profession more than 38 years, commented:

There is no value system in Nigeria anymore. We had value system before independence. Integrity and hard work were value. Government now promotes ethnic inclination in governance and this is against spirit and letter of the 1999 constitution (IDIs/High Court Judge/south east/2020).

Another interviewee, a member of the federal House of Rep asserted:

The only value is the national anthem. There is no value to the people. No binding value system except the pledge to Nigeria. Politically, there is no value system that binds us together… economically and socially, there is no binding value system. …. may be sport. There was value no value system even in the pre independence. The amalgamation of 1914 only forced us together to form a Nigeria state. The previous attempt to bring us together did not succeed. (IDIs/House of Rep/south south/2020)

The comments above occurred repeatedly among majority of interviewees drafted for this study. However, a distinct comment was extracted from a member of federal House of Rep. He said:

There is trace of value in Nigeria. The zone is not really disadvantaged. The people of the zone, is the major problem due to selfish interest. The leaders of the zone preferred to invest outside the zone than develop the zone. The zone has all resources to stand more than other zones… Revenue sharing is an example of good value. The zone benefits what is due to them according to statistics of sharing (IDIs/House of Rep/south east/2020).

Although the comment above is a signifier that Nigeria is an existence of collective value and so the state must be accepted in the present status quo, there is avalanche of comments among the interviewees suggesting that Nigeria is a configuration of nepotism and now requires renegotiation. Results from the study survey buttressed the above latter statement. Respondents (52.8%) in the survey attested that marginalization of

ethnic groups in Nigeria is diametrically entrenched in the constitution. Indeed 30.8% and 63.1% affirmed the present constitution strongly entrenched value system of ethnic bigotry and distrust respectively; only 6.1% predicted ethnic inclusion in Nigeria. Moreover, 47.0% disagreed that the spirit and letter of federal character serves to promote unity among ethnics; 32.6% strongly agreed. The question on federal character was asked over again to know perception of respondents about equitability of the statute in the last two decades since it was promulgated. Sixty-nine percent disagreed that the law is ineffective to promote equitability and only exist in letter but failed in action. Following this, 71.2% faulted creation of federating states and considered this largely inequitable which promote abnormal value system. Similarly, 53.2% also faulted equitable creation of local government, a declaration that the current federation states and local governments in Nigeria promote irritable sense of inequity. Indeed, respondents (71.1%) and 71.3% in south-south and south-east faulted equitable creation of federal states respectively; 53.4% and 53.0% respectively in the two zones also faulted equitable creation of local governments. Sixty-eight percent and 70.1% in south-south and south-east predicted that the existence of federal character is weak to facilitate equity for the zones that make up Nigeria.

Discussion in the theme of federal character was extracted from some of the interviewees. Basically, the essence of federal character is fundamentally established to promote equity and equitable distribution of federal appointments to give sense of belonging to ethnic components that make up Nigeria. It is statute in the administration of federal government and this is agency established to promote this. Along this line, an interviewee submitted:

The Igbos have been largely deprived. The 50 years of post-civil war has not produced Igbo origin as president of Nigeria. There is no equity. The Igbos have been compromised as second citizens of Nigeria state.

Infrastructure, appointment, is evidence of inequity. There is no federal industry in the south-east. The rail-line infrastructure is extended to Kaduna, Kano and Lagos. The east is openly excluded. This is gruesome (IDIs/Judge/High Court/south east/2020).

An interviewee passionately commented:

There is discrimination in appointment to mainstream federal parastalta like state security, military, police and Nigeria oil Company. Appointments in key federal industries are skewed to favour the north especially dominant ethnics in the north. This is obvious inequity and inequality that is not healthy for peace. Recruitments in the army, navy, air force, and police are skewed to the disadvantage of my zone (IDIs/House of Rep/south south/2020)

The large components of comments among interviewees were the resentment of skewed appointments in the federal government which have consistently taunted feelings and melted collective loyalty to the present government. Whereas the period that predated Fourth Republic was fairly reasonable which accommodated some fair degree of ethnic equity (Babalola, 2019); the fourth republic was reasonably fair during the era of Olusegun Obasanjo, Musa Yar’ Dua and Goodluck Jonathan as Presidents in which appointments in top military, police and civil service were not ethnically coloured like the regime of President Muhammadu Buhari (Falana, 2018) Consequently, 72.3% of the respondents in the survey disagreed that appointments in military hierarchy were equitable in the last two decades; 54.2% also rated appointments in the police hierarchy as inequitable in the last 20 years. Therefore, 64.2% in the survey disagreed that federal government in the last 20 years has successfully sustained unity among ethnic groups. Consequently, 55.1% faulted proclamation of the constitution which upheld the value that Nigeria is indissoluble. Inferentially, the letter and spirit of constitution, especially chapter…. was emphatic about the unity of all ethnic groups to remain as one Nigeria. However, the turn of events in terms of appointments to federal mainstream industries,

military, police and paramilitary have altered trust in the present constitution. Here, 71.8% and 72.7% in south-south and south-east respectively faulted skewed appointment in military hierarchy; also in the former order, 54.1% and 54.2% faulted the trend of appointments in police hierarchy which is skewed to disadvantage the zones. Really, appointments to defense units and police organization remain one of the focal points of agitation and line of suspicion for the southern peoples. Therefore, 54.9% and 55.3% of the respondents in the survey would support a referendum for dissoluble Nigeria.

# Structure of Stakeholder in the Nigeria State

The essence of association of in any political group and existence is the feeling that one is truly an integral part of the whole. Constitutionally, the provisions of the 1999 law document which ushered the current dispensation of democracy recognize all ethnic groups whether major or minority. Chapter three of the constitution stipulates the inalienable right and obligations of citizens of the entity, Nigeria. This same chapter of the constitution also provides that there shall be no exclusion of any part of the entity to contest or hold political position whether president, senate president or speaker of the legislative chamber. The constitution did not either foresee supremacy of one ethnic over another or provide that government shall elevate particular ethnic in the federal appointments at the expense of other ethnics. This section of the survey contains items that cover description of stakeholder in the Nigeria state. Tables 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 listed items of discussion.

# Table 4.5.1: Respondent’s Description of Stakeholder in Nigeria Federalism

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | South-East | | South- South | | Total | |
| Freq= 642 | Percent  =100% | Freq= 678 | Percent  =100% | Fre= 1320 | Percent  =100% |
| Your geopolitical zone is stakeholder in |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nigeria |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 350 | 54.5 | 374 | 55.2 | 724 | 54.8 |
| Moderately agreed | 192 | 29.9 | 194 | 28.6 | 386 | 29.2 |
| Strongly agreed | 100 | 15.6 | 110 | 16.2 | 210 | 15.9 |
| There is inclusiveness of your geopolitical |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| zone in Nigeria government in the last 20 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| years |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 317 | 49.4 | 330 | 48.7 | 647 | 49.0 |
| Moderately agreed | 253 | 39.4 | 264 | 38.9 | 517 | 39.2 |
| Strongly agreed | 72 | 11.2 | 84 | 12.4 | 156 | 11.8 |
| Your geopolitical zone is among |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| mainstream stakeholders in military |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| hierarchy | 53 | 83.6 | 560 | 82.6 | 1097 | 83.1 |
| Disagreed | 69 | 10.7 | 76 | 11.2 | 145 | 11.0 |
| Moderately agreed | 36 | 5.6 | 42 | 6.2 | 78 | 5.9 |
| Strongly agreed |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Your geopolitical zone is among |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| mainstream stakeholder in police |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| hierarchy |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 504 | 78.5 | 529 | 78.0 | 1033 | 78.3 |
| Moderately agreed | 120 | 18.7 | 128 | 18.9 | 248 | 18.8 |
| Strongly agreed | 16 | 2.8 | 21 | 3.1 | 39 | 3.0 |
| Appointments in core federal civil service |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| in the last 20 years justified status of your |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| geopolitical zone |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 438 | 68.2 | 461 | 68.0 | 899 | 68.1 |
| Moderately agreed | 184 | 28.7 | 196 | 28.9 | 380 | 28.8 |
| Strongly agreed | 20 | 3.1 | 21 | 3.1 | 41 | 3.1 |
| The components of 1999 constitution |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| promote sense of stakeholder among |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic groups |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 320 | 49.8 | 341 | 50.3 | 661 | 50.1 |
| Moderately agreed | 242 | 37.7 | 248 | 36.6 | 490 | 37.1 |
| Strongly agreed | 80 | 12.5 | 89 | 13.1 | 169 | 12.8 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Your geopolitical zone is major |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| stakeholder in national oil& gas |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| corporation |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 468 | 72.9 | 492 | 72.6 | 960 | 72.7 |
| Moderately agreed | 100 | 15.6 | 102 | 15.0 | 202 | 15.3 |
| Strongly agreed | 74 | 11.5 | 84 | 12.4 | 158 | 12.0 |
| Mineral resources in Nigeria have been |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| utilized to benefit equally the geopolitical |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| zones |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 561 | 87.4 | 589 | 86.9 | 1150 | 87.1 |
| Moderately agreed | 81 | 12.6 | 89 | 13.1 | 170 | 12.9 |
| Strongly agreed | ----- | --- | --- | --- | -- | -- |
| The stakeholder status of your geopolitical |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| zone has translated to rapid growth |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disagreed | 506 | 78.8 | 537 | 79.2 | 1043 | 79.0 |
| Moderately agreed | 118 | 18.4 | 120 | 17.7 | 238 | 18.0 |
| Strongly agreed | 18 | 2.8 | 21 | 3.1 | 39 | 3.0 |

**Source: *Respondents’ Field Survey, 2020***

# Table 4.5.2: Respondents’ Description of Stakeholder Benefits in Nigeria Federalism

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | South-East | | South- South | | Total | |
| Freq= 642 | Percent  =100% | Freq= 678 | Percent  =100% | Fre= 1320 | Percent  =100% |
| Why do you think your geopolitical zone |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| has consistently canvassed for |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| restructuring? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Stakeholder problem | 158 | 24.6 | 171 | 25.2 | 329 | 24.9 |
| Inequality and inequity | 316 | 49.2 | 332 | 49.0 | 648 | 49.1 |
| Structure of federalism | 88 | 13.7 | 86 | 12.7 | 174 | 13.2 |
| Structure of political appointment | 80 | 12.4 | 89 | 31.1 | 169 | 12.8 |
| How would you rate benefits of your |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| geopolitical zone stakeholder status in the |  |  |  |  |
| last 20 years? |  |  |  |  |
| Poor | 359 | 55.9 | 374 | 55.2 |
| Fair | 246 | 38.3 | 263 | 38.8 |
| Good | 37 | 5.8 | 41 | 6.0 |

**Source: *Respondents’ Field Survey, 2020***

Specifically, respondents in the survey were asked to describe whether or not they considered their geopolitical zones as stakeholder of the Nigeria entity. More than fifty- four percent disagreed that Nigeria as presently configured cannot be described as stakeholder due to conspicuous discrimination and lopsidedness that bedeviled governance. Although 29.3% of the respondents held that the geopolitical zones are part of the stakeholder, 49.0% were strongly convinced that government in the last two decades has not offered inclusiveness for geopolitical zones. Perhaps the description of stakeholder for some respondents is the extent of population of ethnics and contribution to federation account. Even at this description, majority of the respondents were hopeless

that contribution to federation account did not translate to inclusive governance by virtue

of some appointments in strategic federal industries and bureaucracies. Against this backdrop, 83.1.5% disagreed that some geopolitical zones like the case of southern Nigeria is among the mainstream stakeholders.

Evidently, 78.3% faulted similar appointments or recruitment in core federal civil service. This demonstrates for respondents, deliberate governance tactics to plunder the value of other ethnics however much the population capacity or contribution to federation account for survival of the entity, Nigeria. A crosscheck of respondents in south-east and south-south respectively showed, 54.5% and 55.2% disagreed that the geopolitical zones are part of the stakeholder in the present Nigeria; 49.4% and 48.7% faulted pattern of inclusiveness for the geopolitical zones; 83.6% and 82.6% faulted inclusiveness in military hierarchy; and 78.5% and 78.0% or 68.2% and 68.0% also faulted inclusiveness in police hierarchy and core federal civil service.

Further check in the survey showed that 50.1% disagreed that components of 1999 constitution promote sense of stakeholder for ethnic groups; 72.7% clearly disagreed that the geopolitical zone is major stakeholder in national oil and gas. Seventy-two percent in south-east and 72.6% in south-south faulted stakeholder composition in national oil and gas. Critically, the themes around stakeholder were engaged with some interviewees. Comments were extracted accordingly. A sixty-seven year old member of House of Rep commented:

The federal government deprived my zone in the sharing of amenities, patronage and appointments. My zone is not in the picture of what is happening in Nigeria. There is no equity in sharing formula of revenue. This is part of our agitation. Let’s go our ways…. We are not integrated ((IDIs/House of Rep/south south/2020).

Furthermore, a Judge in the High Court of Nigeria said:

The Igbo constitute at least one fifth of the country. The ethnic is one of the major stakeholders by virtue of the population... But it is unfortunate with problem of equity in Nigeria. As a stakeholder, we are not being treated fairly like other stakeholders. The Igbos have contributed largely to Nigeria in all areas and this is verifiable. But we are not being treated well like others. Igbos have been schemed out in the mainstream leadership and management of Nigeria…. Igbos have been committed to project Nigeria…. But others see this commitment as attempt to dominate. This erroneous belief which is not so to label our commitment to Nigeria state (IDIs/Judge/High Court/south-east/2020)

The large components of comments by interviewees discretely described discriminatory treatment meted to the south and east as stakeholder in the Nigeria project. Indeed majority of the interviewees succumbed to the ideology of renegotiation that justified true status of stakeholder for geopolitical zones by virtue of economic contribution to survival of Nigeria and perhaps by virtue of population components, redistribution of infrastructure and governance. Largely, 87.1% disagreed that mineral resources in Nigeria have been utilized to benefit equally for geopolitical zones. The thought here is that, mineral resources like oil exploration found and tap in south has not translated to proportionate benefits for the peoples of the south and east that supplied the resources. Seventy-nine percent disagreed that stakeholder status of the zones have translated to rapid growth; while respondents identified stakeholder problem (24.9%); inequity and inequality (49.1%); structure of federation (13.2%) as major reasons centred round the echoes for restructuring.

Justifying the call for restructuring among respondents, 55% in the survey rated as poor the trickle down benefits to the zones in the last 20 years. Only 38.6% and 5.9% rated benefits as fair and good respectively. Fifty-five percent in south-south and 55.2% in south-east rated benefits as poor. Eighty-seven percent disagreed that mineral resources were utilized to benefit the zone which is proportionate to contribution; and 78.8% and 79.2% in the order faulted that stakeholder status for the zones translated to growth. Centre around piece of social justice in the thematic discuss and justification that defines

stakeholder in the component of Nigeria, some interviewees were quick to tender guiding comments. In the words of a commentator:

…There is nothing to show that equity exist in Nigeria. Everything is skewed to favour the north. Inequity in infrastructure and appointment all over…. There is no federal industry in the south-east. Appointments in mainstream federal industries are largely in favour of the north. The people that produced the revenue for Nigeria are neglected and marginalized (IDIs/Judge/High Court/south east/2020)

Similarly, an interviewee commented:

There is no social justice in Nigeria. The only social in Nigeria is that we have state governments and local governments…Even the local governments in the north are much higher. States in the north are much higher…. Members of National Assembly from the north exceed the south…. There is no social justice that is fair to the south (IDIs/House of Rep/south south/2020).

To complement the above comment, another interviewee said:

There is no social justice without equity. Social justice is when there is equity,… equity in appointment to federal parastatals (industries), equity in distribution of federal industries, equity in distribution of federal infrastructure… We cannot talk of equity without these items mentioned…. This is the major agitation. Where is justice without fairness in infrastructure…. (IDIs/Judge/High Court/South South/2020)

Abundantly, there is consistent contestation that distribution of infrastructure and economic gains in the present configuration of Nigeria excluded major contributors of the gains. There is consistent question major question of stakeholder problem, inequality and inequity, structure of federalism and structure of political appointments which largely deprived some zones and benefit others. There is agitation of proportionate contribution to federalism and proportionate trickledown effect of contribution; redistribution of wealth of nation which truly justifies stakeholder status for the zones. The survey and interview indiscriminately showed that there is abundant agitation in the mind of stakeholders that exist as components of Nigeria, especially the peoples of the east and south.

# Model of Constitutional Restructuring

There is abundant outcry of inequity and lack of social justice in the configuration of Nigeria as loudly canvassed by the peoples of east and south. The suspicions reflect deliberate scheming to disadvantage the east and south. The dominant view in the current is that 1999 constitution is faulty and therefore requires a referendum to chart a new course. This sub section is mainly interested is mainly interested to narrow the discussion in clearer perspective. Tables 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 listed items in the subject of discussion.

# Table 4.6.1: Respondents’ Perception of Model of Restructuring

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | South-East | | South- South | | Total | |
| Freq= 642 | Percent  =100% | Freq= 678 | Percent  =100% | Fre= 1320 | Percent  =100% |
| What is agitation of your geopolitical zone against the 1999 constitution?  Inequity Imbalanced growth Resource control State creation | 313  53  139  137 | 48.8  8.3  21.7  21.2 | 333  55  149  141 | 49.1  8.1  22.0  20.8 | 646  108  288  278 | 48.9  8.2  21.8  21.0 |
| The 1999 constitution is collective consent among ethnic groups  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 367  237  38 | 57.2  36.9  5.9 | 396  240  42 | 58.4  35.4  6.2 | 763  477  80 | 57.8  36.1  8.1 |
| The 1999 constitution has enhanced balanced growth across geopolitical zones  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 553  53  36 | 86.1  8.3  5.6 | 581  55  42 | 85.7  8.1  6.1 | 1134  108  78 | 85.9  8.2  5.9 |
| Amendments to 1999 constitution have helped to rectify imbalanced  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 381  199  62 | 59.3  31.0  9.7 | 409  201  68 | 60.3  29.6  10.0 | 790  400  130 | 59.8  30.3  9.9 |
| Implementation of 2014 confab conference necessary to rectify imbalance structure among geopolitical zones  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 322  269  51 | 50.2  41.9  7.9 | 338  285  55 | 49.9  42.0  8.1 | 660  554  106 | 50.0  42.0  8.0 |
| What model of constitutional development do you prescribe?  Confederation Regional government  Presidential parliamentary | 321  157  61  103 | 50.0  24.5  9.5  16.0 | 347  162  60  109 | 51.2  23.9  8.8  16.1 | 668  319  121  212 | 50.6  24.2  9.2  16.1 |
| Substitution of 1999 constitution is solution to agitations in Nigeria  Disagreed | 366 | 57.0 | 395 | 761 | 57.7 |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 237  39 | 36.9  6.1 | 18.3  3.1 | 479  80 | 36.3  6.1 |  |
| Prescription of amendments to 1999 constitution  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 304  107  231 | 47.4  16.7  36.0 | 328  118  234 | 48.1  17.4  34.5 | 630  225  465 | 47.7  17.0  35.2 |
| Prescription of substitution to 1999 constitution  Disagreed Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 265  246  131` | 41.3  38.3  20.4 | 284  248  146 | 41.9  36.6  21.5 | 549  494  277 | 41.6  37.4  21.0 |

**Source: *Respondents’ Field Survey, 2020***

# Table 4.6.2: Respondents Perception of Federalism

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | South-East | | South- South | | Total | |
| Freq=  642 | Percent  =100% | Freq=  678 | Percent  =100% | Fre=  1320 | Percent  =100% |
| What is your perception of the current federalism?  Indifferent Wasteful Beneficial | 235  316  91 | 36.6  49.2  14.2 | 242  342  94 | 35.7  50.4  13.9 | 477  658  185 | 36.1  49.8  14.0 |
| Federalism has retarded the growth of your geopolitical zone  Strongly agreed Moderately agreed Disagreed | 257  217  168 | 40.0  33.8  26.2 | 279  221  178 | 41.2  32.6  26.2 | 536  438  346 | 40.6  33.2  26.0 |
| What model of federalism do you prescribe?  Resource control Federalism Confederation Centralized federalism | 173  49  402  18 | 26.9  7.6  62.6  2,8 | 174  55  428  21 | 25.7  8.1  63.1  3.1 | 347  104  830  39 | 26.3  7.9  62.9  3.0 |
| Restructuring the federal system is likely to calm tension in the geopolitical zone Disagreed  Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 186  126  330 | 29.0  19.6  51.4 | 199  136  343 | 29.4  20.1  50.6 | 385  262  673 | 29.2  19.8  51.0 |
| The current federalism breaches social contract of Nigeria government Disagreed  Moderately agreed Strongly agreed | 205  161  276 | 31.9  25.1  43.0 | 219  170  289 | 32.3  25.1  42.6 | 424  331  562 | 32.1  25.1  42.8 |

**Source: *Respondents’ Field Survey, 2020***

In Table 4.6.1, respondents in the survey were asked to identify areas of agitation the peoples of east and south canvassed. Listed in the agitation consisted of inequity (48.9%), imbalanced growth (8.2%), resource control (21.8%) and state creation (21.0%).

Here, 57.8% disagreed that 1999 constitution was established as collective consent, 85.9% disagreed that the constitution enhanced balanced growth for geopolitical zones; 59.0% disagreed that proposed amendments to 1999 constitution will help rectify imbalanced growth; 50.0% either disagreed or agreed that implementation of 2014 confa conference is necessary to rectify imbalance in the geopolitical zones. Abundantly, amendments to constitution proposed as model of restructuring in this study was considered as unpopular, although some respondents would accept that the 2014 confab was a necessary starting point to address the imbalance and not this perhaps does not constitute the end itself.

The check across the study areas shows that 58.4% and 57.2% in south-south and south-east respectively disagreed that 1999 constitution was collective consent; 85.7% and 86.1% in the order also disagreed that the constitution enhanced balanced growth; 60.3% and 59.3% disagreed with option of amendment; and 42.0% and 41.9% moderately agreed that 2104 confab could help rectify the current imbalance. The model of 1999 constitution was designated as of one of the themes of discussion. Some comments were vital for consideration. A respondent, one of the ranking members of House of Rep from the south-south zone commented:

…The model of 1999 constitution ab initio denied our zone the due right. The constitution provides for all revenue in the federating units to be controlled by the federal government. This is a major problem and unfairness (IDIs/Member/House of Rep/ south south/2020)

Another respondent commented:

… The constitution provides for 13% oil derivation to Niger-Delta area. This is wrong. The oil producing areas should control resources in their zone and pay tax to the federal government. The states should be rewarded according to contribution. The constitution has not recognized this. The revenue sharing is a major problem with the constitution…. (IDIs/Judge/High Court/South South/2020).

Further commentary was extended to justify the difference between the fourth republic of the 1999 constitution and regional government. A commentator said:

The regional government was better… The regions were in charge and development was rapid. Revenue that accrued to regions was autonomous…. But revenue in the federating units go to the federal government. Only a portion is distributed to states. The portion is inadequate. This is the reason for poor development…. It is not fair. Imagine the oil derivation that is retained for Niger-Delta. There cannot be meaningful development with this type of structure. The present structure cannot perform the feat of achieved by regional premiers of the pre independence period. The revenue formula must be renegotiated. The current structure is robbing Peter to pay Paul. Houses of Assembly are not even in number of representatives; National Assembly is not equal in number of representatives from each state…. (IDIs/Member House of Rep/

/South South/2020).

The call for restructuring the present constitution has remained consistent and peoples of the east and south punctured faults with 1999 constitution among which captures inequity, imbalance growth diametrically promoted by the constitution, resource control which is hampered by constitution, state creation which is skewed against the south and east geopolitical zone and perhaps local government creation which has largely remained uneven and skewed. As a result, respondents in the survey filled out model of constitutional development desired to justify united Nigeria. Fifty percent identified the need for confederation government; 24.2% opted for return to regional model of government; 9.2% were interested in presidential government; and 16.1% opted for parliamentary government. Apparently, 57.7% disagreed that substitution of 1999 constitution is permanent solution; 47.7% were opposed to amendments of 1999 constitution; and 41.6% disagreed with option for substitution.

Interestingly, respondents in the survey were not fascinated about amendment or substitution of 1999 constitution. There is collective interest around establishment of new model of government that gives power to the zones or regions to generate self- sufficiency, resource control and rapid growth that will be local and beneficial to

indigenous people. This account for dominant interest in con-federal and regional government opted for by respondents in the survey. Justifiably, 51.2% and 50.0% in south-south and south-east respectively opted for con-federation government; 58.3% and 57.0% in the order faulted substitution to 1999 constitution as permanent solution to agitation; 48.1% and 47.4% also faulted option for constitution amendment; and 41.9% and 41.3% disagreed with option of substitution.

Indeed, an interviewee commenting under the theme of 1999 constitution and the contradiction therein said:

…Change must come either revolutionary or peaceful. We believe in peaceful change. Let Nigeria state allows for referendum to determine where every zone wishes to be. Nigeria cannot develop because of the skewed constitution…. This will bring rapid development. Resources in the Niger-Delta are federal government interest…. Resources in the northern Nigeria are state interest or private business and interest (IDIs/Member House of Rep/ /South South/2020).

Capturing the commentary for 2014 confab, views of interviewees were extracted. A member of the Bench and Judge in one of the Nigeria courts commented:

… This was done for purpose of restructuring to make things work in Nigeria. It was meant to promote equity…. The recommendations of the confab were thrown to the dust bin… the confab had advance implications that would have helped restored equity in the country (IDIs/Judge/High Court/South East/2020).

In another commentary, an interviewee said:

This is evidence to locate inequity and inequality in the Nigeria state. Jonathan administration set up the confab to allow for restructuring which could have settled the problem and allowed peace and development… the northern oligarchy rebelled against the confab and voted out former president, Jonathan who would have implemented the recommendations to restructure Nigeria. This would have scaled up the ladder of solution to inequity, social justice and inequality….(IDIs/House of Rep/South South/2020).

It is non-contestable that participants in this study desired new model of governance that gives independence to geopolitical zones to own and control resources in the corners of the zones; proclamation of governance that allows independent regional

government; and constitutional establishment that promotes the new model. Evidence of the above desire was shown in the survey when 49.8% described as wasteful the current federalism; 40.6% considered that the current federalism retarded growth for geopolitical zones. Against the backdrop of the above, 26.3% of the respondents opted for resource control federalism; 62.9% opted for confederation; 3.0% desired centralized federalism; and 7.9% were comfortable with federalism. Also, 51.0% strongly agreed that genuine restructuring of the current federalism has potential to calm the mounting tension; and 42.8% were consistent to justify that the current federalism breached social contract of government in Nigeria state. Indeed, 42.6% and 43.0% in south-south and south-east respectively concurred that Nigeria federalism is a breach of social contract; 50.4% and 49.2% in the order considered the current federalism as wasteful and skewed; 63.1% and 62.6% opted for confederation which allowed for weak centre and robust units.

Interviewees were engaged to comment on thematic discussion of model of restructuring. An interviewee commented:

The main demand of the zone is restructuring…. This should be regional type of restructuring that allows each region autonomous control…. Let the day to day services to people be done by government that is closer to the people… services like defense should be executed by the federal government. The constitution has 46 items in the exclusive legislative list. This is not good. There is no equity in this. Few items are there in the current and residua lists. The federal government has too much powers… there is need for devolution of power. The powers of the federating states are too little…. (IDIs/Judge/High Court/South East/2020).

Similar comment reoccurred in the view of this interviewee:

… We demand true federating units like the case of United States of America. It is either we choose true federalism or decide for cessation. Nigeria operates quasi federal system…. Nigeria is federal system in name…but not in action. This has caused disaffection and suspicions… It is leading to nowhere (IDIs/Judge/High Court/South South/2020)

In addition to the above, a commentator said:

…. The consistency for calling for restructuring is because the zone is being cheated and marginalized. There is need for redistribution of power among tiers of government, redistribute revenue sharing formula… we need devolution of power (IDIs/Judge/High Court/South East/2020)

Also an interviewee pointed:

The federating units should be allowed to carry out to day services to the people. The exclusive list is too concentric and it should be dissolved to shift some duties or major duties to states. The federal government should not be everywhere… the units are closer to the people and so should be given major responsibilities to the people (IDIs/Judge/High Court/South South/2020).

Overall, there is widespread resentment among participants in this study to justify and criticize the current federal system of government. The suspicion that the current government breached social contract was a loud cry among respondents in the survey and interviewees. The current constitution provides that there shall be united entity called Nigeria and no unit shall be discriminated in the entity. It is known that the regional government was designed for rapid growth of northern, western and eastern areas as championed by the premiers. This was a contract of development that was universal, indiscriminate and collective. However, the military coups and their involvement in governance altered the contract and introduced model of federalism as system of government. The federal system removed autonomy of federating states and now the present condition of too powerful federal centre. Unfortunately, the continue public outcry of geopolitical zones of the east and south is a pointer to this survey and confirmation of respondents suggesting urgent need for new model which allows for balanced growth and trust

# Test of Null Hypotheses

This sub section discusses analysis of null hypothesis generated for the study. There are independent and dependent variable combined to check pattern of relationship to aid further explanation of the subject matter

# Perception of equity/equality is not significant to positively trigger propensity for secession

This is the first null hypothesis generated for this study. Items of questionnaire were carefully selected to check significance of equity and equality in a federal system as determinant of propensity for secession in the context of Nigeria. The null hypothesis is rejected at probabilistic value, p≤ 0.05 or accepted at p>0.05%. At this value it is statistically required that error margin is less than 5% for accuracy of prediction and

rejection of H0.

**Table 4.7.1.1: Cross Tabulation**

**B3 Every ethnic group in Nigeria is fairly treated \* B16 I believe in the unity of Nigeria?**

**Cross tabulation**

Count

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | B16 I believe in the unity of Nigeria? | | | Total |
| Disagreed | Moderately agreed | Strongly agreed |
| Disagreed B3 Every ethnic group moderately in Nigeria is fairly agreed treated?  strongly agreed  Total | 566 | 294 | 132 | 992 |
| 130 | 81 | 0 | 211 |
| 39 | 39 | 39 | 117 |
| 735 | 414 | 171 | 1320 |

The cross tabulation analysis above was generated using items B3 and B16 in the questionnaire as indicated above. Specifically, more than half (992) of the respondents disagreed that ethnic groups in Nigeria are fairly treated; while also more than half (735) disagreed that the unfair treatment can ever generate unity in the entity Nigeria.

# Table 4.7.1.2: Chi Square

**Chi-Square Tests**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Df | Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) |
| Pearson Chi-Square | 81.508a | 4 | .000 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 98.889 | 4 | .000 |
| Linear-by-Linear  Association | 13.560 | 1 | .000 |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.16.

The consideration of the table above was to test the influence of inequitable treatment of ethnic groups on propensity for unity that will likely hold together the federation of ethnic groups in Nigeria. Apparently, the null hypothesis is rejected at Pearson chi square, 0.000 or x2 81.5; p<0.005. There is significant relationship at two-tail error value. Therefore, it is verified to state that inequitable treatment for ethnic groups

will trigger disunity such that unbridle check could terminate collective existence.

**Symmetric Measures**

**Table 4.7.1.3: Correlation**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Asymp. Std.  Errora | Approx.  Tb | Approx.  Sig. |
| Interval by Pearson's R Interval | .101 | .031 | 3.700 | .000c |
| Ordinal by Spearman  Ordinal Correlation | .060 | .028 | 2.171 | .030c |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |  |

1. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
2. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
3. Based on normal approximation.

The table above further checks validity of the chi square assumption. Given Pearson moment correlation positive value r0.1 and significance value 0.000, there is relationship between the variables of the hypothesis. The relationship is not only significant, but also a positive linear effect occurs. Although the value of correlation is low, yet the significance of the relationship attests to possibility of the prediction.

# Table 4.7.1.4: Cross Tabulation

**B6 How would you rate your perception of fair representation of your ethnic group in federal civil service? \* B16 Do you believe in the unity of Nigeria?**

# Cross tabulation

Count

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | B16 I believe in the unity of Nigeria | | | Total |
| Disagreed | Moderately agreed | Strongly agreed |
| B6 Rate your Poor  perception of fair Fair | 488  130 | 242  133 | 132  0 | 862  263 |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| representation of your  ethnic group in federal Good appointments  Total | 117  735 | 39  414 | 39  171 | 195  1320 |

The cross tabulation in the above table shows more than half of the respondents (862) rated as poor representation of geopolitical ethnic groups in federal appointments.

the

Also more than half (735) disagreed that Nigeria government promotes unity in

federal system that operates unfair representation in federal appointments.

**Chi-Square Tests**

**Table 4.7.1.5: Chi Square Tests**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Df | Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) |
| Pearson Chi-Square | 89.814a | 4 | .000 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 119.077 | 4 | .000 |
| Linear-by-Linear  Association | .135 | 1 | .714 |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 25.26.

The chi square of relationship between B6 and B16 is significant given the value x2 89.8; p<0.005. Indicatively, a federal system like the case of Nigeria that promotes lopsided appointments in federal industries and bureaucracies will possibly jeopardize unity among the federating units.

# Table 4.7.1.6: Correlation

**Symmetric Measures**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Asymp. Std.  Errora | Approx.  Tb | Approx.  Sig. |
| Interval by Pearson's R Interval | -.010 | .029 | -.367 | .714c |
| Ordinal by Spearman  Ordinal Correlation | -.007 | .028 | -.237 | .813c |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |  |

1. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
2. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
3. Based on normal approximation.

At the level of correlation for B6 and B16, Pearson’s value is negative (r-0.01) and there is no significance (0.0714). Neither Spearman correlation is positively related or significant. Constructing explanation for this analysis, it will be stated that appointments by federal government are not completely skewed on the ground of constitutionality. The 1999 constitution consciously states that there shall be minister of the federal republic of Nigeria which shall be appointed, selected or elected as appropriate from each federating state. The federal government judiciously observes this provision, although type of ministerial portfolio may differ by virtue of status and relevance.

# Table 4.7.1.7: Cross Tabulation

**B9 Do you consider that your ethnic group has benefitted fairly since inception of democratic government in 1999? \* B16 Do you believe in the unity of Nigeria?**

# Cross tabulation

Count

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | B16 Do you believe in the unity of Nigeria? | | | Total |
| Disagreed | Moderately agreed | Strongly agreed |
| B9 Do you consider | Disagreed | 433 | 252 | 2 | 687 |
| that your ethnic group  has benefitted fairly | Moderately agreed | 302 | 123 | 91 | 516 |
| since inception of |  |  |  |  |  |
| democratic government | Strongly agreed | 0 | 39 | 78 | 117 |
| in 1999? |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total |  | 735 | 414 | 171 | 1320 |

The cross tabulation shows a merger of B9 and B16 for empirical explanation. More than two quarter of the respondents (687) disagreed that geopolitical zones benefitted fairly since the inception of democratic government in 1999. Also more than half (735) disagreed that there can be unity entrenched in the federal government that promotes such inequity.

# Table 4.7.1.8: Chi Square

**Chi-Square Tests**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | df | Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) |
| Pearson Chi-Square | 442.545a | 4 | .000 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 450.128 | 4 | .000 |
| Linear-by-Linear  Association | 250.532 | 1 | .000 |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |

# Table 4.7.1.9: Correlation

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.16.

The chi square above tested relationship between B9 and B16. The value, x2 442.5; p<0.005 shows significant relationship. Indicatively, a federal system that discriminates against components units and entrench value system of distrust for selected groups is recipe for disunity. The lack of unity, comprehensive unity in the system like

the case of Nigeria is unhealthy for collective existence.

**Symmetric Measures**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Asymp. Std.  Errora | Approx.  Tb | Approx.  Sig. |
| Interval by Pearson's R Interval | .436 | .023 | 17.580 | .000c |
| Ordinal by Spearman  Ordinal Correlation | .330 | .027 | 12.701 | .000c |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |  |

1. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
2. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
3. Based on normal approximation.

The correlation test for B9 and B16 is analysed in the above table. There is positive correlation, r0.4 and significant relationship, p<0.005. The exhortation of value system that promotes discriminatory treatment in a federal system of multi ethnic like Nigeria will jeopardize collective unity. The correlation attested to validity of statement in the chi square.

# Pattern of agitation is not significantly positive to influence propensity for end of civil government

This is the second null hypothesis formulated in the study. The null hypothesis is verified at p≤0.05 for acceptance or rejection using statistical tool of chi square and correlation analysis.

**Table 4.7.2.1: Cross Tabulation**

**C3 What do you consider as major problem with the constitution? \* C14 Do you consider that the agitation of your geopolitical zone is capable to result in secession?**

**Cross tabulation**

Count

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | C14 Do you consider that the agitation of your geopolitical zone is capable to result in secession? | | | Total |
| Strongly  agreed | Moderately  agreed | Disagreed |
| structure of constitution | 223 | 65 | 197 | 485 |
| powers of |  |  |  |  |
| the | 26 | 0 | 53 | 79 |
| C3 What do you consider president |  |  |  |  |
| as major problem with the Resource constitution? control | 130 | 229 | 215 | 574 |
| formulation |  |  |  |  |
| of the constitution | 0 | 39 | 104 | 143 |
| 23.00 | 0 | 39 | 0 | 39 |
| Total | 379 | 372 | 569 | 1320 |

The cross tabulation is discussed using items C3 and C14. A quarter of the respondents (379) strongly agreed that there is tendency for cessation in the current situation of agitations against the federal system of government. There is another one quarter (372) on the band of moderate support for cessation due to problems inherent in the federal system of government. Such problems consisted of structure of constitution (485), powers of the president (79), resource control agitation (574) and formulation of constitution (39).

# Table 4.7.2.2: Chi Square

**Chi-Square Tests**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Df | Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) |
| Pearson Chi-Square | 331.086a | 8 | .000 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 386.079 | 8 | .000 |
| Linear-by-Linear  Association | 1.747 | 1 | .186 |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |

# Table 4.7.2.3: Correlation

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.99.

The chi square test was conducted for the variable, C3 and C14. There is significant relationship (x2 331.0; p< 0.000). The null hypothesis in 4.7.2 is rejected and restated. This means that the current agitations by geopolitical zones are likely trigger cessation except there is urgent action to nip it in the bud. Alternatively, the call for restructuring provides lime light to redress agitations.

**Symmetric Measures**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Asymp. Std.  Errora | Approx.  Tb | Approx.  Sig. |
| Interval by Pearson's R Interval | 0.36 | .012 | 1.322 | .186c |
| Ordinal by Spearman  Ordinal Correlation | .186 | .027 | 6.888 | .000c |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |  |

1. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
2. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
3. Based on normal approximation.

Alternative crosscheck was analysed in the correlation table above. Positive correlation, r0.04 is established, although relationship not significant p>0.186. Inferentially, the pattern of agitation listed in Table 4.7.2.1 is likely to predict end of civil government as established by chi square and correlation.

**Table 4.7.2.4: Cross Tabulation**

**C4 Do you think the current presidential system deprive your ethnic group? \* C14 Do you consider that the agitation of your geopolitical zone is capable to result in secession?**

**Cross tabulation**

Count

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | C14 Do you consider that the agitation of your geopolitical zone is capable to result in secession? | | | Total |
| Strongly agreed | Moderately agreed | Disagreed |
| C4 Do you think the | Disagreed | 0 | 0 | 132 | 132 |
| current presidential | Moderately agreed | 130 | 65 | 92 | 287 |
| system deprive your |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic group? | Strongly Agreed | 249 | 307 | 345 | 901 |
| Total |  | 379 | 372 | 569 | 1320 |

The cross tabulation check the link between variable items C4 and C14. More than half of the respondents strongly agreed that the current presidential system deprived some ethnic groups and benefit others in the federating units. Therefore, attesting to the skewed system, one quarter (379) strongly agreed and one quarter (372) moderately agreed that the system is capable to trigger cessation.

# Table 4.7.2.5: Chi Square

**Chi-Square Tests**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Df | Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) |
| Pearson Chi-Square | 229.268a | 4 | .000 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 273.577 | 4 | .000 |
| Linear-by-Linear  Association | 52.698 | 1 | .000 |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 37.20.

The chi square test for the variable, C4 and C14 is significant (x2 229.3; p<0.000).

This suggests that the current federal system of government in Nigeria is faulty and capable to trigger call for cessation by ethnic groups that are disproportionately deprived.

# Table 4.7.2.6: Correlation

**Symmetric Measures**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Asymp. Std.  Errora | Approx.  Tb | Approx.  Sig. |
| Interval by Pearson's R Interval | -.200 | .025 | -7.406 | .000c |
| Ordinal by Spearman  Ordinal Correlation | -.139 | .028 | -5.083 | .000c |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |  |

example of presidential system and federating units now called United States of America. But the version of presidential in Nigeria is perhaps the problem, and its preponderance to lead to cessation among the units. The presidential system in Nigeria is a reflexive of quasi presidential which pretends to be.

1. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
2. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
3. Based on normal approximation.

The correlation analysis shows negative value, r-0.2 and positive relationship. Here, the presidential system is not the problem per se as other clime or society that operates the type of government flourish in peaceful coexistence. American is a good

# There is no significant relationship between value system and propensity to retain corporate existence of civil government

This is the third hypothesis stated for the study. The null hypothesis was tested in chi square and correlation analysis. Ho is rejected at 95% confidence interval.

# Table 4.7.3.1: Cross tabulation

**D2 How can you describe value system of Nigeria government? \* D14 How would you describe your perception of the value that Nigeria state is an indissoluble entity?**

# Cross tabulation

Count

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | D14 How would you describe your perception of the value that Nigeria state is an indissoluble entity? | | | Total |
| Disagreed | Moderately agreed | Strongly agreed |
| D2 How can you describe value system of Nigeria government? | Discrimination for ethnics Fairly  equitable | 647  80 | 359  104 | 130  0 | 1136  182 |
|  |
| Total | 727 | 463 | 130 | 1320 |

Items D2 and D14 were cross tabulated. More than half (727) of the respondents disagreed that Nigeria is an indissoluble entity, while a paltry less than one quarter (130) agreed with the statement. This may not be unconnected with type of value system promoted. Here, more than three quarters (1136) of the respondents described dominant value system as discriminatory for ethnics.

# Table 4.7.3.2: Chi Square

**Chi-Square Tests**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Df | Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) |
| Pearson Chi-Square | 57.327a | 4 | .000 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 72.320 | 4 | .000 |
| Linear-by-Linear  Association | .062 | 1 | .804 |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |

a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is

.20.

The chi square test was significant for D2 and D14. The null hypothesis is rejected given, x2 57.3; p<0.000. It follows that the discriminatory value system in a federal government of multi ethnic units is preponderant to dissolubility.

# Table 4.7.3.4: Correlation

**Symmetric Measures**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Asymp. Std.  Errora | Approx.  Tb | Approx.  Sig. |
| Interval by Pearson's R Interval | .007 | .022 | .249 | .804c |
| Ordinal by Spearman  Ordinal Correlation | .047 | .025 | 1.698 | .090c |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |  |

Correlation analysis of the variables, D2 and D14 showed positive linear association, r0.0. However, there is no significant relationship, p>0.80. This like the case in Table 4.7.2.3, there is tendency for renegotiation to allow for peaceful coexistence.

1. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
2. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
3. Based on normal approximation.

# There is no significant difference between stakeholder-ship and retention of interest in civil government

This is the fourth hypothesis stated for the study. Cross tabulation, chi square and correlation analysis were applied to discuss the variables.

# Table 4.7.4.1: Cross Tabulation

**E11 How would you rate benefits of your geopolitical zone stakeholder status in the last 20 years? \* C14 Do you consider that the agitation of your geopolitical zone is capable to result in secession? Cross tabulation**

Count

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | C14 Do you consider that the agitation of  your geopolitical zone is capable to result in secession? | | | Total |
| Strongly agreed | Moderately agreed | Disagreed |
| E11 How would you | poor | 158 | 229 | 346 | 733 |
| rate benefits of your | fair | 182 | 143 | 184 | 509 |
| geopolitical zone |  |  |  |  |  |
| stakeholder status in | Good | 39 | 0 | 39 | 78 |
| the last 20 years? |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total |  | 379 | 372 | 569 | 1320 |

The cross tabulation for E11 and C14 above shows that more than half (733) of the respondents rated as poor status of stakeholder-ship of the geopolitical zones; more than one third (509) rated it fair and less than one tenth (78) rated stakeholder-ship of the geopolitical zones as good. One quarter (379) or (372) strongly or moderately agreed to cessation respectively.

# Table 4.7.4.2: Chi Square

**Chi-Square Tests**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Df | Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) |
| Pearson Chi-Square | 68.031a | 4 | .000 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 88.486 | 4 | .000 |
| Linear-by-Linear  Association | 25.894 | 1 | .000 |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.98.

Chi square test for the variables was significant, given the value x2 68.0; p<0.000. The idea is that ethnic groups whose stakeholder status is indiscriminately or perceptively relegated in a federal system like the case of east and south geopolitical zones will

contemplate cessation in the long run. In most cases, the decision to secede may be the last option where there others options failed.

# Table 4.7.4.3: Correlation

**Symmetric Measures**

1. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
2. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
3. Based on normal approximation.

The correlation provides further measures of the variables. Basically, a negative

association (r-0.1) is established and significant relationship, p<0.000. Here, the fact that

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Asymp. Std.  Errora | Approx.  Tb | Approx.  Sig. |
| Interval by Pearson's R Interval | -.140 | .029 | -5.137 | .000c |
| Ordinal by Spearman  Ordinal Correlation | -.140 | .028 | -5.149 | .000c |
| N of Valid Cases | 1320 |  |  |  |

stakeholders perceive poor treatment in the federal system may not instantly breed call for secession or revolutionary change. The inference is possibility that anomalies are checked and corrected to accommodate indiscriminate interests in the federal system. But where the call for renegotiation is blatantly rejected as deliberate attempt to enslave and deprive other federating units, the option for cessation is likely to be activated.

# Discussion of Findings: Toward Deconstructing Lock’s Principle of Government

The components of the current findings were designed to justify John Lock’s principle of government. The fundamental philosophy of Lock’s typology of government is an establishment for the foundation and extent of civil government (Binmore 2009; Buchanan 2000). Centrally, Lock was aware of the need for civil government in response to state of nature. Like the hypothesis in Thomas Hobbes’ state of nature, Lock was not convinced that the state of nature was the brutality and savagery of man that forced him to accept the rule of government for protection. Lock fundamentally explained state of

nature as good, accommodating, complex and dynamic in terms of production system. The dynamic and complex state of nature informed establishment of civil rule by which people could be guided, organized and protected to carry out economic activities. (David 2003; Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2017). Indeed, Lock was aware that government exists in the state of nature, but metamorphose in type to meet society’s need from primitive to modern period. Therefore, where government exists, it is to meet the needs of the society either simple or complex form.

Fundamentally, Lock was aware that civil government is a life span and justified the rise and fall in continuum process (Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2017; Freeman 2007a). The rise of civil government is a metamorphosis of the needs of the moment. Analytically, the essence of ‘need’ is a collective realization and concession to develop government that satisfied the ‘moment’. Here, the concept of moment is classification of need of society. Expectedly, the need in simple traditional society differed from the need in complex, modern society. The moment is the rise of typology of society which is characteristically distinguished by needs. The need in traditional society is a type of production system that is subsistence, labour intensive and consumption of simple goods to meet physiological want. In the complex, modern society, it is large scale production system, complex division of labour, industrial revolution and consumption of high mass and heavy duty goods. The moment here is the typology of production system which abundantly classified society into preindustrial moment and industrial and post-industrial moment. These typologies are composition of governments, the rise and fall which gives room for another and so on in the continuum.

Lock predicted that civil government of the moment dies to give rise to another purposely to satisfy the need of the moment. Contently, people desire government that protects collective interest and nourishes growth for perpetual survival of the society. On

the other hand, people revolt against government that hampers the need and growth of collective interest. Lock was aware that rise and fall of civil government can be achieved by means of revolutionary change or gradual change (Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2017). However the process may appear, civil government is a process of rise and fall, and the contradiction in one system of government, especially the tyrant rule, gives rise to another form of civil government. The hypothesis of John Lock manifested during his 17th century period especially the instances in Europe and beyond. Extensively, Lock’s idea has continued to be relevant not only as ideological dispensation championed by the Lockians or NeoLockians. The revolutionists of the 20th and 21st centuries have derived morality in Lock to justify various social change that altered governments in global community.

The content of Lock is relevant in the current discourse. Nigeria is a sovereign state that is replete with significant political history. Prior to colonial era, Nigeria has operated governments in the form of monarchical system. This was the period of divine rule and supernatural powers as means of ultimate norms of the society. The adventure of colonial masters altered preexisting government in different nations that later make up Nigeria. The aftermath of the colonialism was amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates; a union of strange fellows forced to live together (Ake 2001; Ihonvbene 2014). The colonial masters governed the multi ethnic components Nigeria as though one UNITED state. The colonial period thereafter ushered in the independence celebrated by multi ethnic, diversified and united Nigeria. Unfortunately, the post-independence era was a mixture of democratic governance and interregnum of military incursion in the governance of strange fellows brought into inconvenient marriage fusion called Nigeria. Notably, the civil war between Nigerian government and former Biafrian eastern Nigeria was a suspicion of distrust among the strange fellow. Perhaps the problem and

contradiction of amalgamation was a force in the civil war that threatened the existence of Nigeria and attenuate collective norms and anomie. Interestingly, the problem of amalgamation has lingered fatalistically in the government of Nigeria.

Rising from the period of parliamentary government of 1960s and application of republican constitution of 1963 to second republic era, third and to fourth republic, there appears no respite to suspicions among multifaceted ethnic groups in Nigeria which have consistently call for renegotiation of existence. In the present, the fourth republic is put in perspective. More than two decades now, Nigeria has had uninterrupted democratic government under different ethnically elected presidents from south to north. Despite the uninterrupted democracy and presidential government in Nigeria, which serves the United States of America gloriously more than two centuries, there have been deafening calls for renegotiation of Nigeria. These calls signal signs of disaffection among ethnics that make up the components Nigeria. The current study was kindled to survey respondents of the peoples of east and south which were prominent in the call. Abundantly, several reasons were adduced for renegotiation of the present Nigeria. Classically, problem of equity and equality; forms of agitations; value system; status of stakeholder; and the inadequate federalism were identified by participants in the current study. Participants in the survey largely maintained that the social contract of Nigeria is an entrenchment of inequity and inequality at the expense of some ethnic groups.

The suspicion captured inequitable distribution of federal infrastructure, appointments and location of federal industries which did not benefit equitably. Here, respondents were dissatisfied against appointments in top and core federal civil service; disaffection against representation in top police hierarchy; criticism against composition of ethnic appointments in federal paramilitary service; composition of military hierarchy; and composition and formulation of 1999 constitution which is alleged to be foisted by

military oligarchy. In the overall, more than three quarters of participants in the survey and interviewees succumbed to loss of confidence in indissoluble and unity of unity of Nigeria. Pointedly, there is disaffection which now triggers people calling to regenerate the urgent need for renegotiation. Lock’s idea was to account for factors which threaten collective existence and need for new government to meet pressing needs. The need of the moment therefore reflects equity and equality to access common wealth of the nation.

Forms of agitation for the people of ‘south-east’ and ‘south-south’ geopolitical zones consist of federal appointments; federal projects; content of 1999 constitution; federal structure; marginalization in state and location governments creation; unequal representation in political constituencies of Houses of Assembly and National Assembly; and resource control. Respondents in the survey also picked holes in powers of president which is autonomous in the federating units. These agitations are potential for end of civil government. Potentially, more than two thirds of respondents succumbed to option of secession. John Lock did not envisage this nature of problems in his period. He was strictly concerned with nature tyrant rulers and death of government. After all, Nigeria did not exist in his time. The Neo-Lockians such as John Rawls developed ideology of government that evolved moral justice for all by which government survives. Nigeria is a multi-ethnic society. Therefore, it is expected to uphold moral justice for all without discrimination. Moreover, the value system in Nigeria is described by peoples of east and south geopolitical zones which vehemently saw discrimination for ethnics. Indeed, the 1999 constitution is labeled and alleged to promote and entrench discrimination, distrust, inequity, pretence for moral justification in the spirit and letter of the constitution.

Unfortunately, the value of indissolubility of the tenet of constitution was described by respondents as wasteful. This is derived from the thoughts that exclusion of the eastern and southern zones in strategic federal appointment, imbalanced growth and

distrust, are deliberate by northern oligarchy. Therefore, there is no moral justification to continue the present existence of Nigeria except renegotiation to develop new government. Unfortunately, peoples of the east and naturally felt by virtue of population composition and mineral resources contribution to fiscal component of Nigeria, stakeholder status should be upheld in high esteem and gain replica in proportion to contribution. More than three quarter of respondents in the survey described that stakeholder status was poor due to lack of resource control, exclusion of federal industries, imbalanced growth and distrust which relegated the geopolitical zones. This is another factor that justifies relevance of Lock’s principle and typology of government in which one government should die or mortify to yield another government for the benefits of the people.

The model of civil government derived by Lock was not however distinct or clearly stated. Lock’s ideology was to justify the morality of death of tyrant government. The tyrant could appear in different format depending on the nature of society, motivation of ruler, the psychological justification and military force (Ryan 2016). But Lock was mainly interested to show that every government has foundation and extent to which it can survive and perpetuate. The current study showed that constitutional restructuring, confederation, regional government and true federalism are strong in the desire of the people. The present federalism has been largely described as quasi, deceitful and skewed to the benefit of the north. Therefore, an option for continuity is restructuring of the government to accommodate true federalism and resource for federating units.

# CHAPTER FIVE

**SUMMARY OF FINDING, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

This chapter discusses summary of findings, conclusion, recommendation, limitation and gap for future studies and contribution to knowledge.

# Summary of the Findings

The study is classified into five chapters. Chapter one discusses the introduction of the work and contains items which consisted of background to study, statement of the problem, research question and objectives of the study. Also contained in the chapter are scope of the study, significance of the study, statement of hypothesis, and operational definition of concepts. Chapter two captured literature review and theoretical framework. Literature review is classified into empirical literature, theoretical literature and conceptual literature. Chapter three consisted of methodology of the study. Items in the chapter consisted of research design, study area, population of the study and sample size and sampling techniques. Others consist of method of data collection, instruments of data collection, method of data analysis and ethical consideration. Chapter four consisted of data results and discussion. Chapter five consisted of summary, conclusion and recommendations of the study.

Specifically the structure of discussion for the study is classified by objectives formulated which data were collected. The socio-demographic characteristics of respondents were discussed. This consisted of gender, age, marital status, number of children, type of family and marriage and income measured in naira. Other variables consisted of academic qualification, religious affiliation, ethnic origin, occupation and socio-cultural group. Interestingly, three quarter of the respondents were males and more than two third were single never married. The religious affiliation was dominantly Christianity, whereas more than two third were Igbo origin and respondents were

affiliated to socio-cultural groups which consisted of OHANAEZE and PANDEF. Other ethnic membership which consisted of Yoruba, Hausa, Ijaw and Urhobo were found participated in the study. The peoples of Ijaw origin were second largest after Igbo that participated in the study.

Following up to socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, survey captured opinion polls for perception of equity and equality in Nigeria government. Equity and equality was measured in terms of fair representation of geopolitical zones in federal government, representation of ethnics in military hierarchy, representation in federal civil service, representation in federal police hierarchy and representation federal paramilitary service. Abundantly, more than three quarter of respondents were dissatisfied and show disaffection that federal government promotes ethnic superiority and discrimination which favoured other geopolitical zones. There were expressions of dissatisfaction with 1999 constitution which did not offer equal and fair benefits to all, especially the presidential system of government. As a result, three quarter of respondents described the 1999 constitution as deceitful, insincere and skewed imbalanced.

Pattern of agitations by peoples of the east and south were covered in the survey. Respondents listed federal project, content of constitution, federal structure, marginalization, state and local government’s creation, and resource control as major agitations. Indeed, political marginalization; economic marginalization; uneven number of local governments in the federating states and military marginalization formed part of the agitation. There were discontents expressed against obvious advantage of the north over east and south geopolitical zones in the size of representatives in Houses of Assembly and National Assembly. Against this background, two third of the respondents rated economic growth the geopolitical zones as either poor or one third rated fair and less than one third rated good.

The value system in the Nigeria government was described in the study. Majority of the respondents in the survey identified value that discriminated against ethnic groups; less than one third agreed that there is fair equity for all ethnics or inclusive government; three quarter agreed that ethnic inclination and bias dominated the present federal government. Consequently, three quarter either listed ethnic bigotry or distrust as value system; one quarter listed ethnic inclusion or trust among ethnics. The value of indissoluble tenet of 1999 constitution was described as wasteful by two third of the respondents. This was guided by virtue of imbalanced growth and inequity that pervaded federal system and inclination of east and south in the echoes of restructuring or renegotiation.

Structure of stakeholder covered in the study showed that the east and south believed the geopolitical zones are stakeholders in the project of Nigeria. This was informed by collective recognition that the geopolitical zones contributed largely to growth of Nigeria in mineral resources, population content and peaceful coexistence. However, there was collective conclusion that the zones were discriminated and excluded from picture of Nigeria in the area of military hierarchy, police hierarchy, national oil industries, location of federal projects and distrust. Therefore, it is impossible to capture east and south as stakeholder in the present configuration of Nigeria. Consequently, three quarter rated as poor benefits that trickled down to east and south. This further strengthened the call for renegotiation in the zones.

Model of constitutional restructuring and federalism was captured. Three quarter of the respondents held that inequity, imbalanced growth, resource control and state creation were agitations against the present federalism. Therefore, people of the zone desired a model of government that captures resource control, confederation, and regional

federalism. The general submission in the survey is the urgent call for substitution of quasi federalism and presidential system.

# Conclusion

Centrally, the tenet of this study was the survey of respondents in east and south geopolitical zones of Nigeria. The call for restructuring has dominantly resided in this part of the country due to observed suspicions and tendencies that plunder collective interest. Empirically, majority of participants in the study submitted that the present configuration of Nigeria is skewed and imbalanced at the expense of the Southern part especially the east and the south geopolitical zones. Centrally, there is submission that equity and equality has not been fairly distributed in areas which consisted of appointments in military hierarchy, police hierarchy, core federal civil service, paramilitary and national oil company. Representation for peoples of the east and south in federal bureaucracies was largely rated poor. This consciously breeds recurring call for regeneration of unity of Nigeria.

Indeed, the pattern of agitation truly reflected federal appointments, location of federal projects, content of 1999 constitution and suspicions therein, federal structure and marginalization in states and local governments creation, political venture, economic venture and military hierarchy. Agitations for peoples of the zones were morally justified given the magnitude of mineral resources contributed to economic survival of Nigeria, the paraphernalia of skewed growth, and distrust for peoples of other ethnics, lack of inclusive federal government, ethnic bigotry and skewed appointments in federal industries and so on sufficiently generated beliefs that Nigeria version of federalism lacked value of true federalism like the case in USA. Unfortunately, the spirit of stakeholder-ship in the Nigeria project has deteriorated in the intention of east and south

geopolitical zones due to ethnocentrism and deliberate relegation promoted by the federal government.

Evidently, the peoples of the zones were rapidly interested in cessation considering the last option. There were yet other options identified for one Nigeria. The east and south considered option for restructuring which adequately accommodate resource control, confederation, regional federalism or true federalism. The present federalism was faulted and labeled as quasi federalism which has ulterior motives for ethnocentrism.

# Recommendation

Following empirical discoveries in this present study, the following recommendations are suggested.

* + 1. Equity and equality of ethnic groups in the federal system were identified as major concern. It is description of the federalism that promotes ethnocentrism in appointments to federal bureaucracies which relegated the east and south geopolitical zones. Against this backdrop, the study recommends legislative role of the National Assembly in federal appointments to strategic positions. Here, the powers of the president should be tripped off which allows National Assembly to decide appointment in military, police, paramilitary and national oil industries.
    2. Forms of agitations listed by peoples of the east and south in the study were mainly resource control. Although the 1999 constitution makes provision for oil derivation benefits to peoples of the east and south, there was disproportionate expression of dissatisfaction against this provision. The agitation was demonstrated as potential for discord of unity and possible cessation. Against this background, the study recommends renegotiation of oil

derivation benefits which justifies consent of the host communities of mineral resources. Here, bottom-top approach should be adopted in the renegotiation.

* + 1. The value system promoted by Nigeria federalism was described as ethnocentrism by peoples of the east and south geopolitical zone that participated in the current study. Ethnocentrism was cited as order of the day in all facets of federal appointments and distrust for ethnics. Against this backdrop, the study recommends integrated system of government that allows federal states to assume major responsibilities of day to day business to the people of geopolitical zones. Here, constitution restructuring should deplete items in the exclusive list since this government is closer to the people than federal. This recommendation also has potential to build confidence of stakeholders.
    2. The call for restructuring was strongly echoed by participants in the study. The model of federalism desired reflected confederation, regional government and true federalism. Three quarter of respondents in the survey strongly agreed that continuous neglect of call for restructuring was a recipe for revolutionary change. Against this backdrop, the study recommends that there should be referendum like the version of BREXIT in United Kingdom. Here, the referendum should be objectively designed to accommodate interest of ethnic majority and minority. Lesson must also be learnt from the case of South Sudan in Africa.

# Contribution to Knowledge

This study modestly contributed to existing knowledge in the following areas.

1. The application of John Lock’s principle of government to model restructuring is a novelty. Whereas Lock modeled tyranny as fundamental morality for death of civil government, this study models ethnocentrism for death of civil government in federalism of multi ethnic society like Nigeria.
2. Lock’s principle of government and typology was description of his social contract that reflects tyranny in Europe. The current discourse is development of Lock’s idea and relevance in the context of Nigeria federalism.

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# Introduction

**APPENDIX I INSTRUMENTS OF DATA COLLECTION**

# Questionnaire

I am a post graduate student of Igbinedion University in Department of Political Science. I am conducting mandatory research entitled implications of John Lock social contract theory in Nigeria, a focus on the southern geopolitical zones. This research is partial fulfillment of the award of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D). I urge your cooperative and willing consent to participate in the study. You have been randomly selected and your identity is not needed.

Thank you.

Yours Faithfully Name ………..

# SECTION A: Socio-Demographic Characteristics. Please kindly tick appropriately.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| S/N | **QUESTION** | **RESPONSES AND CODING CATEGORIES** | |
| A1 | What is your sex? | Male [ ]  Female [ ] | 1  2 |
| A2 | What is your age range (in years)? | 35-44  45-54  55-64  65 and above |  |
| A3 | What is your marital status? | Single [ ]  Married [ ]  Divorced [ ] Single parent [ ] Separated [ ]  Widow(er) [ ] | 1  2  3  4  5 |
| A4 | How many children do you have? |  |  |
| A5 | What type of marriage, are you engaged? | Monogamy [ ]  Polygamy [ ] Not applicable [ ] | 1  2  3 |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| A6 | What is your monthly income? | Less than 50,000 [ ] 50,000-100,000 [ ]  100,001-150,000 [ ]  150,001-200,000 [ ]  200,001-250,000 [ ]  Above 250, 000 [ ] | 1  2  3  4  5  6 |
| A7 | What is your academic qualification? | Primary school certificate [ ] WASCE/GCE/NECO certificate [ ]  OND/NCE [ ]  HND/First Degree [ ] M.Sc/MA[ ]  Ph.D  No formal education State others | 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 |
| A8 | What is your religious affiliation? | African Traditional Religion [ ] Islam [ ]  Christianity[ ] Others if any (specify) | 1  2  3  4 |
| A9 | Which is your ethnic origin? |  |  |
| A10 | What types of occupations are you engaged? | Civil/public servant Teacher  Lecturer  Corporate employees Self employed Artisans/traders Farmers  Clergy Student List others  ……………………………………  …………………………………… | 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 |
| A11 | Which socio cultural group do you belong to? | OHANAEZE MASSOB IPOB PANDEF | 1  2  3  4 |

**SECTION B: Perception of Equity and Equality in Nigeria state**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| S/N | **QUESTION** | **RESPONSES AND CODING**  **CATEGORIES** | |  |
| B1 | Do you consider that Nigeria is a heritage that | **Yes** | **No** | 1 |
|  | belongs to all her citizens? |  |  | 2 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| B2 | Do you think Nigeria is configured to the | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | benefit all ethnic groups? | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ | ] |  |  | 3 |
| B3 | Do you consider that every ethnic group in | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | Nigeria is fairly treated? | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ | ] |  |  | 3 |
| B4 | Do you consider as citizen of Nigeria, that your | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | ethnic group has fair share or representation in | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  | federal government? | Not sure [ | ] |  |  | 3 |
| B5 | Do you consider that your ethnic group has fair | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | representation in the military hierarchy? | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ | ] |  |  | 3 |
| B6 | How would you rate your perception of fair | Good | | | | 1 |
|  | representation of your ethnic group in federal | Fair | | | | 2 |
|  | civil service? | Poor | | | | 3 |
| B7 | Do you consider that the representation of your | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | ethnic group in federal police is fair? | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ | ] |  |  | 3 |
| B8 | How would you rate representation of your | Good [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | ethnic group in federal paramilitary service? | Fair [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  |  | Poor [ ] | | | | 3 |
| B9 | Do you consider that your ethnic group has | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | benefitted fairly since inception of democratic | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  | government in 1999? | Not sure [ | ] |  |  | 3 |
| B10 | What is your appraisal of 1999 constitution to | Deceitful and insincere [ | | ] |  | 1 |
|  | promote equality among ethnic groups? | Realistic and truthful [ | |  | ] | 2 |
|  |  | Skewed imbalanced | |  |  | 3 |
| B11 | Do you consider that the 1999 constitution or | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | fourth republic enhanced balanced growth | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  | among geopolitical zones? | Not sure [ | ] |  |  | 3 |
| B12 | Would you agree that Nigeria government | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | benefitted ethnic group? | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ | ] |  |  | 3 |
| B13 | Do you consider that your geopolitical zone | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | experienced economic growth in the last 20 | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  | years? | Not sure [ | ] |  |  | 3 |
| B14 | Dom you have suspicion that your ethnic group | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | is marginalized? | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ | ] |  |  | 3 |
| B15 | Do you consider that marginalization of your | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | ethnic group has triggered conflict? | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ | ] |  |  | 3 |
| B16 | Do you believe in the unity of Nigeria? | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  |  | No [ ] | | | | 2 |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Not sure [ ] | 3 |

# SECTION C: Pattern of Agitation in Nigeria State among Peoples of Southern Geopolitical Zones

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| S/N | **QUESTION** | **RESPONSES AND CODING CATEGORIES** | |
| C1 | What do you consider major agitation of your ethnic group?  You may tick more than one option | Federal appointment [ ] Federal project [ ] Content of constitution[ ] Federal structure [ ] Marginalization [ ] State creation  Local government creation [ ]  Resource control [ ] Mention others  ……………………………  ……………………………  ………….. | 1  2  3  4  5 |
| C2 | Do you consider that the agitation is collective | Yes [ ] | 1 |
|  | struggle by members of your ethnic? | No [ ] | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ ] | 3 |
| C3 | What do you consider as major problem with the constitution? | Structure of the constitution [ ]  Powers of the President [ ]  Resource control [ ] Formulation of the constitution [ ] | 1  2  3  4 |
| C4 | Do you think the current presidential system | Yes [ ] | 1 |
|  | deprive your ethnic group? | No [ ] | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ ] | 3 |
| C5 | Do you consider that federal project(s) in your | Yes [ ] | 1 |
|  | geo political zone is sustainable? | No [ ] | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ ] | 3 |
| C6 | Do you consider that federal project in your | Yes [ ] | 1 |
|  | geopolitical zone promote sense of belonging? | No [ ] | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ ] | 3 |
| C7 | What forms of marginalization do you think your geopolitical zone has experienced in Nigeria?  You may tick more than one option | Political marginalization Economic marginalization State government creation Local government creation Military marginalization Police marginalization  State others …… | 1  2  3  4 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | | |  |
| C8 | Do you consider that marginalization of your | Yes [ ] |  |  | 1 |
|  | geopolitical zone has triggered conflict? | No [ ] |  |  | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ |  | ] | 3 |
| C9 | Do you consider that resources in your | Yes [ ] |  |  | 1 |
|  | geopolitical zone can sustain growth? | No [ ] |  |  | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ |  | ] | 3 |
| C10 | Do you think control of the resources in your | Yes [ ] |  |  | 1 |
|  | geopolitical zone by federal government trigger conflict? | No [ ]  Not sure [ |  | ] | 2  3 |
| C11 | How would you perceptively rate federal | High [ ] |  |  | 1 |
|  | government commitment to enhance rapid | Moderate [ | ] |  | 2 |
|  | growth of your geopolitical zone? | Low [ ] |  |  | 3 |
| C12 | Do you consider that agitation of your | Yes [ ] |  |  | 1 |
|  | geopolitical zone is morally justified? | No [ ] |  |  | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ |  | ] | 3 |
| C13 | How would you perceptively rate socio | Good [ ] | | | 1 |
|  | economic growth of your geopolitical zone in | Fair [ ] | | | 2 |
|  | the fourth republic? | Poor | | | 3 |
| C14 | Do you consider that the agitation of your | Yes [ ] |  |  | 1 |
|  | geopolitical zone is capable to result in secession? | No [ ]  Not sure [ |  | ] | 2  3 |

**SECTION D: Forms of Value System in the Nigeria State**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| S/N | **QUESTION** | **RESPONSES AND CODING CATEGORIES** | | |
| D1 | Do you consider that the existence of Nigeria | Yes [ ] | | 1 |
|  | government is morally justified? | No [ ] | | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ ] | | 3 |
| D2 | How can you describe value system of Nigeria government? | Fairly equitable for all ethnics [ ]  Discrimination for ethnics [ ] | | 1  2 |
| D3 | What forms of value system do you think federal government promotes? | Inclusive government [ Ethnic inclination and bias [ ] | ] | 1  2 |
| D4 | Do you think the spirit and letter of 1999 | Yes [ ] | | 1 |
|  | constitution promotes equitability for ethnics in Nigeria? | No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | | 2  3 |
| D5 | Do you consider that marginalization of ethnic | Yes [ ] | | 1 |
|  | groups in federal government is entrenched value system? | No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | | 2  3 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| D6 | What forms of value system do you think | Ethnic bigotry [ ] | | |  | 1 |
|  | characterized federal government? | Ethnic inclusion [ ] | | |  | 2 |
|  | You may tick more than one option | Distrust among ethnic [ | | | ] |  |
|  |  | Trust among ethnics [ | | | ] |  |
| D7 | Do you consider that spirit and letter of federal | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | character commission serves to promote unity among ethnics? | No [ Not sure [ | ] | ] |  | 2  3 |
| D8 | Do you consider that federal character in the | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | last 20 years is equitable? | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ |  | ] |  | 3 |
| D9 | Do you think your geopolitical zone benefitted | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | equitably from state creation? | No [ ] | | | | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ |  | ] |  | 3 |
| D10 | Do you consider that your geopolitical zone | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | benefitted equitably from the size of local government in Nigeria? | No [ Not sure [ | ] | ] |  | 2  3 |
| D11 | Do you consider that your geopolitical zone | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | benefitted equitably from appointments in military hierarchy in the last 20 years? | No [ Not sure [ | ] | ] |  | 2  3 |
| D12 | Do you think appointments in police hierarchy | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | benefitted your geopolitical zone equitably in the last 20 years? | No [ Not sure [ | ] | ] |  | 2  3 |
| D13 | Do you agree that federal government in the last | Yes [ ] | | | | 1 |
|  | 20 years has sustained unity among ethnic groups? | No [ Not sure [ | ] | ] |  | 2  3 |
| C14 | How would you describe your perception of the | Beneficial | | | | 1 |
|  | value that Nigeria state is an indissoluble | Wasteful | | | | 2 |
|  | entity? | Indifference | | | | 3 |

# SECTION E: Structure of Stakeholder in the Nigeria State

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| S/N | **QUESTION** | **RESPONSES AND CODING CATEGORIES** | | | |
| E1 | Do you consider your geopolitical zone as | Yes [ ] |  |  | 1 |
|  | stakeholder in Nigeria? | No [ ] |  |  | 2 |
|  |  | Not sure [ | ] |  | 3 |
| E2 | How can you describe the inclusiveness of your | Integrative [ |  | ] | 1 |
|  | geopolitical zone in Nigeria government in the | Insider [ | ] |  | 2 |
|  | last 20 years? | Outsider [ |  | ] |  |
| E3 | Do you consider that your geopolitical zone is | Yes [ ] |  |  | 1 |
|  | among mainstream stakeholders in military hierarchy? | No [ ]  Not sure [ | ] |  | 2  3 |
| E4 | Do you consider that your geopolitical zone is | Yes [ ] |  |  | 1 |
|  | among mainstream stakeholder in police hierarchy? | No [ ]  Not sure [ | ] |  | 2  3 |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| E5 | Do you think appointments in core federal civil service in the last 20 years justified status of your geopolitical zone? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |
| E6 | Would you agree that the components of 1999 constitution promote sense of stakeholder among ethnic groups? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |
| E7 | Do you consider that your geopolitical zone is major stakeholder in national oil& gas corporation? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |
| E8 | Do you think mineral resources in Nigeria have been utilized to benefit equally the geopolitical zones? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |
| E9 | Do you consider that the stakeholder status of your geopolitical zone has translated to rapid growth? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |
| E10 | Why do you think your geopolitical zone has consistently canvassed for restructuring? | Stakeholder problem [ ]  Inequality and inequity [ ]  Structure of federalism [ ]  Structure of political  appointments [ ] | 1  2  3 |
| E11 | How would you rate benefits of your geopolitical zone stakeholder status in the last 20 years? | Good [ ]  Fair [ ]  Poor [ ] | 1  2  3 |

**SECTION F: Model of Constitutional Restructuring and Federalism**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| S/N | **QUESTION** | **RESPONSES AND CODING CATEGORIES** | |
| F1 | What is agitation of your geopolitical zone against the 1999 constitution? | Inequity [ ]  Imbalanced growth [ ] Resource control [ ] State creation [ ]  List others  ……………………………  ……………………………  …. | 1  2  3  4 |
| F2 | Do you consider the 1999 constitution as collective consent among ethnic groups? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |
| F3 | Do you think 1999 constitution has enhanced balanced growth across geopolitical zones? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| F4 | Do you consider that several amendments to 1999 constitution have helped to rectify imbalanced? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 | |
| F5 | Do you consider implementation of 2014 confabulation conference necessary to rectify imbalance structure among geopolitical zones? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 | |
| F6 | What model of constitutional development do you prescribe? | Confederation [ ] Regional government [ ] Presidential [ ]  Parliamentary [ ] | 1  2  3 | |
| F7 | Do you think substitution of 1999 constitution is permanent solution to agitations in Nigeria? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |  |
| F8 | Do you prescribe amendments to 1999 constitution? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |  |
| F9 | Do you prescribe substitution? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |  |
| F10 | What is your perception of the current federalism? | Beneficial [ ]  Wasteful [ ]  Indifference [ ] | 1  2  3 |  |
| F11 | Do you consider that federalism has retarded the growth of your geopolitical zone? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |  |
| F12 | What model of federalism do you prescribe? | Resource control [ ] Federalism [ ] Confederation [ ]  Centralized federalism |  |  |
| F13 | Do you consider that restructuring the federal system is likely to calm tension in the geopolitical zone? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |  |
| F14 | Do you think the current federalism breaches social contract of Nigeria government? | Yes [ ]  No [ ]  Not sure [ ] | 1  2  3 |  |

# Introduction

**APPENDIX II**

# IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS (IDIs)

I am a post graduate student of Igbinedion University in Department of Political Science. I am conducting mandatory research titled implications of John Lock social contract theory in Nigeria, a focus on the southern geopolitical zones. This research is partial fulfillment of the award of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D). I urge your cooperative and willing consent to participate in the study. You have been randomly selected and your identity is not needed.

Thank you.

Yours Faithfully Name ………..

**Section A: Socio demographic characteristics**

1. What is your ethnic affiliation?
2. What is your marital status?
3. What is your profession?
4. What is your job description?
5. What is your highest academic qualification
6. How long have you been in your profession?
7. What is your religion?
8. What is your age?
9. Which socio cultural organization do you belong to?

# Section B: Equity and equality in the Nigeria state

1. What is your perception of equity in the Nigeria state? Probe for:
   1. Social contract in the Nigeria state
   2. Placement of ethnic groups in the Nigeria state
   3. Relationship among ethnic groups in the Nigeria state
   4. Trust among ethnic groups in the Nigeria state
2. What is the tenet of equity in the Nigeria state? Probe for:
   1. Equity in the Nigeria state covering the period of pre and post-independence eras
   2. Equity in distribution of political offices
   3. Equity for ethnic groups in the Nigeria state
3. In what ways or otherwise do you consider Nigeria state has enshrined equity in government? Provide for:
   1. Evidence in infrastructural development in geopolitical zones
   2. Evidence in social amenities
   3. Evidence in social justicefor all
4. Could you describe areas of compromise in equity of the Nigeria state?
5. What is your perception of equality in the Nigeria state?
6. How can you describe equality of Nigeria state in the governance of your geopolitical zones? Probe for:
   1. Evidence of inequality
   2. Forms of agitations against inequality
   3. Evidence of inequality in the provisions of Nigeria constitution
   4. Actions to mitigate the problem
7. What forms of suspicion are there in Nigeria state? Probe for:
   1. Trust among ethnic groups
   2. Spillover of civil war
   3. Military rules
   4. Military gift of Nigeria constitution.

# Section C: Pattern of Agitation in the Nigeria state

1. What forms of agitations are champion by your geopolitical zones?
2. What is the justification for the agitations? Probe for:
   1. Resource contribution of the geopolitical zone
   2. Predicaments of the geopolitical zone
   3. Discrimination of the geopolitical zone
   4. Federal government projects in the zone
3. Why do you consider that your geopolitical zone is disadvantaged in Nigeria state? Probe for:
   1. Population estimate of the zone
   2. History of the zone in the pre independence era
   3. History of the zone in the post-independence era.
4. What is magnitude of agitations in your geopolitical zone? Probe for:
   1. Willingness to secede fromNigeria state
   2. Willingness to renegotiate association in Nigeria state
   3. Formation of revolutionary groups in the zone
5. Why do you think theseagitations can disintegrate Nigeria? Probe for:
   1. Civil unrest in the zone
   2. Confrontations with military and paramilitary in the zone
   3. Fatality from confrontation
   4. Forms of strategic interaction to douse the confrontations
6. What is the legitimacy of revolutionary groups in the zone campaigning for renegotiation of Nigeria social contract? Probe for:
   1. Activities of the groups
   2. Major demands of the groups
   3. Federal government negotiation with groups
   4. Compromise between federal government and the groups

# Section D: Forms of Value System in the Nigeria State

1. What value system do you think operates in the Nigeria state? Probe for:
   1. Relationship among ethnic groups
   2. Equity and equality in the Nigeria state
2. What is the value system in pre independence Nigeria? Probe for:
   1. Unity among ethnic groups
   2. Economic development of the regional government
   3. Politicalstructure of the central and regional government
   4. Development strides of the regional government
3. What is the value system in post-independenceNigeria state? Probe for:
   1. Unity among ethnic groups
   2. Economic independence of regional/geopolitical zone
   3. Political structure of the central and geopolitical zone
   4. Development stride of the geopolitical zone
4. What is your perception of revenue sharing formula? Probe for:
   1. Equity in the sharing formula
   2. Agitations with the sharing formula
   3. Shortcomings of provisions of constitution
5. What is your perception about the strength of the value system to integrate geopolitical zones in Nigeria state? Probe for:
   1. Commitment of the zone to Nigeria state
   2. Loyalty of the zone
   3. Agitations with the value system
   4. Alternative value system
6. What do you consider to be social justice in Nigeria state? Probe for:
   1. Evidence of social justice in the zone as part of Nigeria state
   2. Bone of contention of the zone with Nigeria state
   3. Willingness of the zone to rally round table discussion with federal government.
7. What is the implication of 2014 confab in the Nigeria state? Probe for:
   1. Major components of the confab
   2. Implication for social justice
   3. Implication for the zone
   4. Representation of zone at the confab
   5. Major demands of the zone in the confab

# Section E: Stakeholder-ship in the Nigeria State

1. How do you describe your geopolitical zone as stakeholder in the Nigeria state? Probe for:
   1. Stakeholder-ship of the in pre independence
   2. Stakeholder-ship of the zone in post-independence
2. What do you consider as problems to your geopolitical zone stakeholder-ship in Nigeria state? Probe for:
   1. Problem with ethnic discrimination
   2. Problem with federal character
   3. Completed and ongoing federal projects in the zone
3. What is the integration of your geopolitical zone stakeholder-ship in Nigeria state? Probe for:
   1. General sense of belongingness to Nigeria state
   2. Perception of in-group or out-group in the Nigeria state
   3. Commitment of the zone to oneness of Nigeria state
   4. Involvement of the zone in the Nigeria state
4. What is the relationship of leadersin your geopolitical zone to federal government of Nigeria? Probe for:
   1. Home support to leaders in the zone
   2. Negotiation of leaders in the zone
   3. Obligation of leaders in the zone
   4. Political partisanship of leaders
5. What are the achievements of your geopolitical zone stakeholders? Probe for:
   1. Negotiation for equity and equality in the pre independence
   2. Negotiation for equity and equality in the post-independence
   3. Bottleneck with negotiation
   4. Success areas in the negotiation
6. Why would you think stakeholder-ship of your geopolitical zone in Nigeria state should be renegotiated?

# Section F: Model of Constitutional Restructuring and Federalism in Nigeria State

1. What do you consideras main demand of your geopolitical zone? Probe for:
   1. Political demand
   2. Economic demand
2. What is your geopolitical zone demand about constitutional restructuring? Probe for:
   1. Weakness in the 1999 constitution
   2. Disadvantage of the zone in the 1999 constitution
3. What is the evidence that 1999 constitutionhampers growth of your geopolitical zone? Probe for:
   1. Resource control
   2. Federal interference
4. What differentiate the fourth republic from the regional government? Probe for:
   1. Economic development
   2. Social development
   3. Equity and integration
   4. Sense of true Nigeria
5. Why is your geopolitical consistent about call for restructuring? Probe for:
   1. Model of restructuring aspire
6. Why do you think your geopolitical faulted Nigeria federalism? Probe for:
   1. Federalism in the first, second, third and fourth republic
   2. Option of federalism and con-federal state
   3. Desire model of federalism/con-federal state
7. Why do you think your geopolitical model of federalism will be perfect for Nigeria?

# APPENDIX III



**IMAGES TAKEN IN FIELD WORK**

**Fig. 1:** The Researcher at National Assembly, Abuja.



**Fig. 2a:** The Researcher in front of the House of Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Complex before the Interview.



**Fig. 2b:** The Researcher in front of the House of Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Complex before the Interview.



**Fig. 3:** The Researcher at the National Assembly Complex, after the interview.



**Fig. 4 a:** The Research at Justice Oputa Court, Imo State High Court, Owerri.



**Fig. 4b:** The Research at Justice Oputa Court, Imo State High Court, Owerri.