**CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN GOMBE METROPOLIS**

**BY**

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**OCTORBER, 2018**

**CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN GOMBE METROPOLIS**

**Title Page**

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**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE DEGREE (B.SC) SOCIOLOGY**

**OCTORBER, 2018**

# DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this project is a product of my own effort. It has not been presented or published anywhere by any person, institution or organization or used for any previous application for degree or qualification. All source of information used have been duly acknowledged by means of references**.**

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Student

# APPROVAL PAGE

This project was supervised, read and approved for submission by **Mr. Mustapha Ahmad** to the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria**.**

Mr. Mustapha AhmadDate (Project Supervisor)

# CERTIFICATION

This project entitled “Causes and effects of political violence in Gombe metropolis”meets the regulations governing the award of Degree of B.Sc. Sociology, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge.

Mr. Mustapha AhmadDate (Project Supervisor)

Rev. I. D. Sule Date (Project Coordinator)

Dr. A. S. Maliki Date

(Head of Department)

# DEDICATION

I dedicate this research project to Almighty Allah (S.W.A) for His Infinites blessing and protection throughout my course of study in this great institution, and to my role model Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) and also to my mother Hajiya Hassana Yakubu, and my late father Alhaji Adamu SMD.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am very grateful to God Almighty Allah, creator of Heaven and Earth for giving me the grace, protection and inspiration in the pursuit of this academic programme. Without him, this journey to success would have been a futile effort. My deep appreciation goes to my able and dynamic supervisor, Mr. Mustapha Ahmad; whocreates time out of his tight schedules to go through this work and make honest and constructive input to make the work perfect and worthwhile. May Allah (SWA) reward him abundantly.

My appreciation goes to my beloved golden mother Hajiya Hassana Yakubu (Umma), I feel blessed and honored to have you as mother, you are the best mother in this world and I owe my success to you I love you, thank you for the blessings and prayers over the years and may Almighty Allah grand you Jannatil firdaus as your final home.

My deep appreciation goes to my lovely brothers and sisters, Habiba SMD, Samira SMD, Usman SMD, Yahaya SMD, Umar SMD and all other members of SMD family who are not mentioned I love and appreciate you all for your supports and prayers, may Allah (SWA) grand you Jannatil firdaus on the day of judgements amen.

My unalloyed thanks goes to my understandable lovely Ummu-Salma Adamu Salama for her prayers and support, I owe you a lot of gratitude, may Almighty

Allah shower HIS blessing on you in this duniya and grand you Jannatil firdaus on the day of reckoning.

My profound gratitude also goes to my friends, especially Abduljabbar Sani Abba, Bilal Ishiyaku, Irfa‟ulhaq Sani, Muhammad Sagir, Muhammad Sani Zahraddeen thank you all for the supports and advice throughout this four year of trying, May Almighty Allah fulfilled your dreams.

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# CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

## Introduction

The topic of the study; Causes and effects of political violence in Gombe metropolis. And the purpose of this first chapter is to outline the background of the study, statement of the problem, research questions, objectives of the research, scope of the study and definition of basic terms and concepts.

## Background of study

Political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors- including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies (Halliru, 2013).

According to Millington (2007), from confrontations during strikes to the street battles of extremist groups, violence was a feature of interwar European politics, as countries entered an age of mass politics, governments searched for ways to integrate their peoples into the political system. He stressed that, yet violence as a means of political expression and engagement persisted, even in democratic nations (Millington, 2007). Violent political conflict preceded the establishment of fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, and civil war in Spain, in Eastern Europe, the collapse of empire and the founding of new nation-states gave rise to violent

political struggle, in France and Britain, street fighting and rioting raised fears over the breakdown of order in the western democracies (Millington, 2007).

More so, according to Human Security Report Oxford university (2005) out of 30 major political violence recorded in 2000, there were 23 civil wars, of which ten were in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). These wars are estimated to have resulted in over four million deaths and have cost the countries in question more than $138 billion (in 1995 prices). However, by the turn of the 21st century, Sub-Saharan Africa has become the most violent region, accounting for more battle-related deaths than all other regions combined (Human Security Centre, 2005).

From the years 1999 Nigeria witnessed an unprecedented increase in acts of political violence across the country arising from the formation of ethnic and political militia, such as Oduduwa People Congress (OPC), in the South-West of Nigeria, ECOMOG in Borno State, Kalare in Gombe State, and Sara – Suka in Bauchi State among others (Umar, 2003). Furthermore, Individual politicians and groups (political parties and ethnic group formations) have in unequivocal terms demonstrated their readiness to employ violence to achieve their personal goals (Umar, 2003). This state of affairs has caused an ominous cloud over the sustenance of democracy and raised concerns over the future of Nigeria as a political entity (Umar, 2003).

Since the advent of civilian rule in 1999, Gombe State has experienced quite a number of political violence due largely to the involvement of Kalare into political activities (Umar, 2003). In 2003 Kalare activities virtually became part of the electoral process in the state making electoral campaign and voting as a battle ground where Kalare are used to harass, intimidate, assassinate and deter Political opponent during electoral campaign and Voting of candidates of their choices (Umar,2003).

However, there is a war plan of Governor Dankwambo to eliminate the menace of kalare in the state will not only be confined to the application of force (security agencies), but other alternative social measures are considered; The Governor also stated in his inauguration speech that a lot of packages await those that renounce their membership of the group, one of them is the establishment of skill acquisition centers across the state (Aliyu, 2011).

As cruel as Kalare is, all its members are automatic social destitute once election is over and politicians are sworn in (Aliyu, 2011). However, the government employed those renounced kalare youth as gate keepers of ministries and parastatals and Government houses with stipends ranges from 18000 to 23000 (Aliyu, 2011).

Also according to Hamagam (2011), the Police Inspector General also expressed willingness to hold consultations with judiciary in the country to ensure that any

political violator convicted must serve the jail term so as to serve as deterrent to others, and he further stated announced plans to hold a meeting with political party leaders to caution against the use of thugs during political activities towards finding lasting solution (Hamagam, 2011).

The main focus of this study is the causes of political violence, the victims of political violence (which are usually the youths) and its socio-economic effects on its victims in Gombe metropolis.

## Statement of the problems

According to Aikor (2007), persons within the age range of twelve to thirty years are dependent on their parents for survival. They are poor, and they constitute the powerless, jobless, and unemployed and so can be easily manipulated by the elite. All these conditions results to making them vulnerable to many social vices like crime, political violence. Therefore, in view of their poverty, they only serve as steady army for the powerful politicians that use them to create havoc on the political system especially during elections and pay them very meager amount of money and this in Gombe metropolis is not an exception. Political violence (kalare activities) in Gombe had become a tool of winning political seats over the years. It is mostly used by some selfish politicians and most political parties to violet electoral processes in pursue of their political gains.

One of the most recent and glaring case of election violence in Nigeria is the post 2011 election violence (Human Right Watch, 2013). The deadly election-related and communal violence in northern Nigeria following the April 2011 presidential voting left more than 800 people dead, the victims were killed in three days of rioting in 12 northern states (Human Right Watch, 2016). The violence began with widespread protests by supporters of the main opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Muslim from the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), following the re-election of incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the Niger Delta in the south, who was the candidate for the ruling People‟s Democratic Party (PDP), (The Lawyers Chronicle, 2016). The protests degenerated into violent riots or sectarian killings in the northern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. Relief officials estimate that more than 65,000 people were displaced as a result (The Lawyers Chronicle 2016). The presidential election divided the country along ethnic and religious lines (The Magazine for the African Lawyers, 2016).

Most of these thugs (yan kalare) were used to rig elections in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 general elections in Nigeria, especially in Gombe metropolis, where most of the elections were monitored and conducted by political thugs (yan kalare) under the cover of INEC`s ad-hoc staff. In fact, the officers who were officially assigned to do the job were overpowered by these political thugs (yan kalare) through

pointing out dangerous weapons to them, causing crisis and violence in the voting venues.

These thugs forced electorates to vote against their wishes. The party representatives at the polling booths were threatened to compromise, and INEC officials were forced to change election results in favour of a particular party.

The dreaded Kalare group extend their criminalities from political violence to gruesome murder, maiming, stealing/dispossessing people of their possessions at streets corners and dark lonely spots using dangerous weapons on their victims‟ which is now common incidents in Gombe metropolitan which made life difficult in Gombe in the past years, since then.

## Research questions

1. What are the causes of political violence (kalare) in Gombe metropolis?
2. What are the socio-economic effects of political violence on the victims in Gombe metropolis?
3. Who are the victims of political violence in Gombe metropolis?
4. What are the possible solutions to the problem?

## Objective of the Study

1. To examine the causes of political violence in Gombe metropolis.
2. To explain the socio-economic effects of political violence on the victims in Gombe metropolis.
3. To identify the victims of political violence of Gombe metropolis.
4. To proper solution to political violence in Gombe metropolis.

## Significance of the Study

The study will be of immense benefits to the society, policy makers, and security personals because it will outline the causes of political violence in Gombe metropolis. This study is also significant because of the fact that it would reveal the major threats (effects) of political violence to democracy in Gombe metropolis and Nigeria at a whole. Again, the study also will equally be significant to the extent that it would outline the effects of kalare political violence to the lives and properties of the citizens of Gombe local government area.

The findings of this study will also provide valuable information in articulating potential policies that will help address the problems of political and electoral violence. In other word, the research could help the policy makers (lawmakers or government) in making laws and will help the securities to prevent the possible potential political and electoral violence in the city.

Finally, it will provide the relevant knowledge and serves as a tool and reference materials to future studies which would make useful contributions to any study on same topic or any related topic on elections and political violence.

## Scope of the Study

The focus of this study is on the causes and effects of political violence in Gombe metropolis. As such the research has been limited to five major wards in Gombe metropolis which comprises of Jekada Fari, Tudun-Wada, Kagarawal, Bolari and Bogo respectively being the area where the activities of Kalare is more pronounced. The studies emphases will be from 2003-2011 happened being the period that witnessed an unprecedented increase in the acts of political violence in the country and Gombe metropolis in particular.

## Definition of Terms and Concept

**Politics:** Is the activities with the governance of a state or area, especially the debate between parties having power.

**Political violence:** These are all forms of illegalities, manipulations and killings in order to secure political power at all cost.

**Election:** This is the system of selecting leaders and political representatives in a state through campaign and election.

**Yan kalare/kalare:** These are the individuals/group of thugs involves in the violation of political and electoral violence.

# CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW

## Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine various literature publications and research findings related to the study which the researcher will have an increased knowledge of the topic; the causes and effects of political violence in Gombe metropolis and its victims.

## Conceptual Review

According to Fischer (2002), political violence (conflict) is any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced “protection”, blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination (Fischer, 2002). Political violence generally involves political parties, their supporters, journalists, agents of the government, election administrators and the general population, and includes threats, assaults, murder, destruction of property, and physical or psychological harm (International Foundation for Election Systems, 2011; Fischer, 2002). Nweke (2005), define political violence as any form of physical force applied to the end of disorganizing the political process, ranging from the destruction of electoral materials to the intimidating of the electorates to vote against their wish (Nweke 2005). He stressed further that it

includes physical force aimed at influencing electoral officials to work in favour of particular groups or parties or persons as against an established procedure, also it is a harmful act targeted at causing disharmony during elections (Nweke, 2005). Political violence is a faceted process not open to a singular explanation but, unfortunately tending to reproduce itself in a series of socially disruptive behaviors (Olagbegi, 2004). Basically, political violence can be said to be any behaviour involving or tending to involve the use of physical force to cause damage to property of maim or kill an individual(s) in order to ensure of prevent political gains (Olagbegi, 2004). According to IIufoye (2005), electoral violence is a limited aspect of political violence that is associated with the process of elections (IIufoye, 2005). He reasons that forms of political violence occur before, during or after elections (IIufoye, 2005).

According to Jegede (2003), there are different manifestations of political violence e.g. murder, arson, abduction, assault, and violent seizure and destruction of electoral materials (Jegede, 2003). These acts are perpetuated by individuals and groups with the intention of positions after elections (Jegede, 2003).

Electoral or political violent mostly occurs in the conduct of an electoral contest before, during, and after elections, most often they are directed at altering, influencing, or changing, by force, the voting pattern or manipulating the electoral results in favour of a particular candidate or particular candidate or political party

(Ugoh, 2004). Igwe (2007), provides more insight on political violence. According to him, political violence connotes any forceful act intended to compel a re- direction nor affect the stable course of development of the political system, usually in response to natural or other emergencies, longstanding demands for changes or part of an evolutionary alternation of the system (Igwe, 2007). He maintains that political violence may or may not involve actual bloodshed, what is essential to amount to the condition is the effort to coercively carry out changes or the process of governance by means that are outside the normal, stable routine of the conventional legal machinery of the political society (Igwe, 2007).

Political violence according to him may also be perfectly legal and provided for within the constitutional order when taken in response to extreme situations demanding the temporary declaration of a marshal law or state of emergency, and the application of extra-judicial measures to return the political pendulum to normalcy (Igwe, 2007). Noli (2003), maintained “violence is necessary because the new ruling class must not only seize the various instruments of state power, it must also suppress the often determined resistance of the deposed ruling class, smash the old state machinery build its own state apparatus under circumstances in which it new and revolutionary values have not widely taken hold in the society and began to build a new society, based on the new values” (Noli, 2003). “In this regard, it is based on the process of destroying completely one in their place. In the

final analysis, a new must replace the old, so this cannot be done without violence” (Noli, 2003). Eckstion (1999), asserts that electoral or political violence aimed to change political order, its constitution, common authority and of such dimension that its incidence will affect the exercise of authority in the society (Eckstion, 1999).

Anifowose (1982), for instance provides an all embracing definition of political violence.; “as the use of threat or physical act carried out by an individual or individuals and/or property with the indentation to cause injury or death to persons and damage or destruction to property and whose objective, choice of the target or victims surrounding circumstances, implementation and effect have political significance, implementation and effect have that is tend to modify the behaviour of others in the existing arrangement of power structure that has some consequences to political system” (Anifowose, 1982). Political violence is a form violence that is associated mainly with the process of politics in a given society, precisely in a democratic setup or in the process of democratic translation (Afolabi, 2003).

## Historical Background to Political Violence in Nigeria

In the words of Oyediran (1997), the history of violence in Nigeria politics dates back to colonial era. From the 1950s, elections in Nigeria approximated a war wage to determine “who get what, when and how” (Oyediran, 1997). All weapons

were available for those combatants to use which include religion, ethnic sentiments, outright bribery, the power of incumbency, corruption, the abuse of electoral processes etc (Oyediran, 1997). Indeed, political behavior in Nigeria has never been guided by ideology, party programmes or the merit of those standing to be elected, but by a political calculus based on ethnic geopolitics, the means to assume power by all costs, either singly or by a small power bloc around a big power bloc for the purpose of fighting the war so as to win, rule and rule and then share the anticipated booty (Oyediran, 1997).

In the 1960s too, there were no parties that were not regionally bias; The Northern People‟s Congress (NPC), Action Group (AG) and National Council of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC) were based in the North, West and East respectively (Ogundiya, 1999). After independence, the first major national election by the political parties degenerated into conflict (Ogundiya, 1999). More importantly, the crisis within the AG which spread to other areas of the Western region and the whole country, affected in no small way the election (1964) in its conception, execution and outcome, for example, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) brought the NPC and the Akintola-led Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and other minor political parties together under one umbrella (Oyediran, 1997). Alibi, (2004) observes that, the electoral officers were terrorized into absconding from their offices once they receive the nomination papers of governing party candidates with

no opportunity of registering their nomination papers (Alibi, 2004). So fragrantly was the electoral procedure abused that at the close of nominations some 88 out of the total of 174 NPC Candidates in the North had their candidature unopposed, in the West, about 30 percent of the NPC were supposed to have been unopposed, the situation in the East was not much different (Alibi, 2004).

The electoral fraud of 1964 brought about the crisis that eventually led to the coup of 15th January, 1966, also the situation in 1979 and 1983 was not cordial (Agubamah, 2008). The five registered political parties were; National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), Nigerians People‟s Party (NPP), Great Nigerians Peoples Party (GNPP) and Advance Party which was later registered in 1983 (Ademolekan,1985). The federal election of 1979 contested by these political parties gave the impression that politicians may after all have learnt some lessons from the demise of the first Republic (Ali, 2006). However, it is important to state that the annulment of that election by Ibrahim Babangida, the then Military Head of State, recorded serious opposition to his regime; this was a bad signal for democracy in the country (Ali, 2006). The 1998/99 general elections lacked bitterness, boycotts, thuggery and other malpractices usually associated with electoral process in the country (Nnadozie, 2007). However, political violence was also a major issue of concern

throughout the 2007 political process, while some states enjoyed nearer (EU Report 2007 in Alfa &(Otaida, 2012).

The announcement of the results of 2011 presidential election sparked up violent demonstrations in some Northern states of the country following the declaration of President Goodluck Jonathan as the winner of the election, people believed to be supporters of opposition Congress for Progress Change (CPC), burst into violent uprising unleashing terror, destroying properties worth millions of naira (Otaida, 2012). The house of the Vice President, Namadi Sambo was looted and raised and palaces of prominent traditional rulers in the North were attacked, a number of members of National Youth Service Corps were killed in mayhem in Bauchi, Gombe among others. (EU, Report, 2011 in Alfa & Otaida, 2012).

## Causes of political violence

1. **Poverty and unemployment**

The majority of youth in this nation are jobless, with no means of livelihood, they are impoverished, and mercenary politics becomes the way out; the politicians capitalize on this and recruit the youth who not only constitute the pillar of society but also the most vulnerable to the self-inflicted poverty, as their thugs and touts to perpetrate violence (Asiegbu, 2011). The incidence of poverty in Nigeria is very high, with over 70 percent of the population living in poverty (Ottong, 2006; Abiodun, Agba & Ushie, 2007); it was estimated in 1980 that 17.7 million

Nigerians were poor, in 1985 the number increased to 34.7 million, while in 1992 and 1996 it was 39.2 million and 67.1 million respectively, in 2004, during Obsanjo‟s regime, the population living in poverty skyrocketed to 75.5 million (Federal office of statistics, 1990, Agba et al, 2007; Gbrabe, 2009). Political elites mobilize unemployed youths, often along ethnic, religious and party affiliations, as vital violent arsenals; the youths are induced to threaten or unleash violence as a means to achieve electoral and political success (Umar, 2003). More often than not political violence is paid for, used as a tool by prominent Nigerians to bolster their own political and financial positions (Nweke 2005).

## Corruption

Nigerian politics has become a do-or-die affair where the only rule of the game is survival of the fittest, regardless of crudeness or brutality (The Lawyers chronicle, 2016). Ballot boxes are snatched, voters and security agents maimed and killed, riotous protests, arson, armed gangs of thugs, soldiers and police using coercion to force people to vote for their benefactors and polling booth officials maimed or killed (Human Right Watch 2013). The extent and level of violence in elections is enough to have the elections cancelled since they were not in any respect free and fair (The Lawyers chronicle, 2016). Elections in Nigeria has also been marred by various forms of election malpractices ranging from double or multiple registration, deliberate late arrival of election materials by electoral officials,

stuffing/snatching of ballot boxes, destruction or hijacking of electoral materials, harassment and intimidation by armed groups, falsification of results, delay in announcing results with no satisfactory explanation etc, these practices logically results in violent conflicts and clashes (The Lawyers chronicle, 2016).

## Sit-tight Syndrome

According to Oyatope (2003), sit-tight syndrome is a situation in which an individual‟s tries to hold on to power for personal aggrandizement or gains, in an attempt to hang on to power, leaders often create a regime of violence, repression and bloodshed; they organize political thugs, hooligans and scavengers to sing their praises, intimidate opponents and kill them if they become intransigent (Oyatope, 2003). The unnecessary and uncoordinated urge to control, dominate and amass wealth for their progeny in the infinite future by the politicians informs the emergence of the sit-tight phenomenon (Oyatope, 2003).

## Prebendal politics

In Nigeria, politics is conceived as an investment (Jega and Wakili, 2002). The politicians, having invested colossally on campaigns and other political activities, coupled with the existing system of winner takes all, would want to win at all cost; and the need to employ the use of thugs and touts to destabilize and rig elections becomes inevitable, especially when such politicians are not popular candidates (Jega and Wakili, 2002).

## Refusal to accept defeat

Refusal to accept electoral defeat in good faith is a fertile factor that can breed thuggery and trigger violence in politics which mostly ends up in bloodshed, killings, arson among other political vices (Alibi, 2004).

## Absence of good governance

Absence of good governanceand low political culture are also contributive factors to the menace of thuggery and violence; hunger, marginalization, incapacitation, intolerance, domination, apathy and cynism etc are features of bad governance that can cause unrest in politics (Ezeife, 2002).

## Religious/Ethic Sentiments

Nigerians are overwhelmingly obsessed about religious and ethnic identities; sadly, religious and ethnic identities play more important roles in election, appointments, employment and admission into public institutions in Nigeria (Umar, 2003). The thick cloud of religious and ethnic sentiments has given birth to most political violence; this has brought global attention and scrutiny to Nigerian. Religious and ethnic sentiments have triggered major violence in Nigeria (Umar, 2003). Political violence particularly in Nigeria is quintessential elite affairs arising from the inordinate struggle for places in the structure of power that have often degenerate into open violence among ethno-communal groups or individuals who are deceived

into believed into believing that their interest is about to be imperiled (Umar, 2003).

Okoro (2011), attributed the 2011 post-election violence to the type of campaign embarked upon by politician and party leaders which incited the people to violence (Okoro, 2011). He is of the view that the immediate cause of the immediate cause of the post-election violence can be traced to the campaign of Congress for Progressive Chang (CPC) in which party leaders, during the presidential campaign urged their members to “protect their votes by all means” and ensure that the elections are not rigged (Okoro, 2011). Therefore, he attributed the cause of the cause of the post-election violence to the poor education and religious sentiments which in his view, is inextricably intertwined with political action (Okoro, 2011).

Northern leaders in a conference held in Kaduna agreed that institutional decay, poverty and religious intolerance were the key factor that led to the crisis in Nigerian politics (Abdullahi, 2014). Makarfi (2011), admitted that the failure of the National Assembly to implement Justice Uwais report which recommended a bill to establish electoral offences tribunal which would have served as a deterrent, and the delay in announcing election results by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as two factors which led to the post-election violence (Makarfi, 2011).

Basher Othman, a former presidential candidate of National Republic Convention (NRC); observed that the violence stemmed from ethnic and religious as well as political thuggery needs immediate and permanent solution (Tofa, 2011). In his opinion, the government should address the issue of Almajiris in the North and review the national policy that would address influx of children and criminals from neighboring countries (Tofa, 2011). Salisu (2011), one-time speaker of House of Representatives condemned the violence and singled out the media as one of the core motivators of the riots. According to him, opinion writers and political commentators on the national daily inflamed divisionary opinions that led to the crisis (Salilsu, 2011).

The Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU) in a press release assessing the post-election violence that swept Kaduna and some northern states in Nigeria, the union found out that the remote cause of the post-election violence was attributes to the People Democratic Party (PDP) zoning policy which became a burning issue following the death of President Musa Yar'Adua (SOKAPU, 2011). The zoning arrangement is a situation in which power is shared between the North and the South as stipulated in the party's constitution, therefore the indication of interest by vice-president Goodluck Jonathan, the immediate successor and southerner denied the North the chance for a second term (SOKAPU, 2011). These party issues later resulted into a national debate, igniting strong reactions from some Northern

elements who threw full support for Gen. Buhari, the CPC candidate while insisting that it was their slot and anything short of that they will make Nigeria ungovernable to President Jonathan (SOKAPU, 2011). The immediate cause of the post-election violence is said to be the conduct of the presidential elections of April 16, 2011; the official position of the CPC is that the violence was the product of the incumbent to win elections by all means (The Nation, 2011).

## Effects of political violence

1. **Threat to Democracy**

Political violence hinders public accountability of elective officers and thus is a bane to good governance in Nigeria (Mbaya, 2003). It also increases the crime rate and the emergence of credible candidates in elections and thus is a threat to the achievement of democratic dividends and exercise of citizenship rights in Nigeria (Mbaya, 2003).Political crisis is a serious threat to democratic consolidation in Nigeria because it scares credible candidates, including women from active participation in democratic process, it has also given rise to the militarization of the political space with the consequent proliferation of arms, ammunition and other dangerous weapons purposely for acts of criminality, including thuggery; this, in turn, has resulted in many unresolved politically motivated assassinations across the country, which diminishes the country‟s evolving democratic culture (Mbaya, 2003).

## Poverty and loss of Properties

Political violence is also responsible for massive disruption of socio-economic activities across the country. Most victims of electoral violence lose their businesses to looting and their homes are often destroyed and many sink into poverty (World Bank, 2010).

## Loss of lives and Displacement of people

Massive internal displacement and loss of lives has also occurred due to electoral violence in some cases; Human Rights Watch said that the deadly election-related and communal violence in northern Nigeria following the April 2011 presidential voting left more than 800 people dead (Human Right Watch, 2013). The victims were killed in three days of rioting in 12 northern states; sectarian killings in the northern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. Relief officials estimate that more than 65,000 people were displaced as a result (Human Right Watch, 2013).

## Emergence of incompetent leaders

Incompetent leaders always emanated as we are seeing today, that is incompetent politicians tend to use the thugs group to get votes, so that they can win the election (Kabiru, 2015).He stressed further that through these thugs some politicians tend to get recognition and to be the favorite candidates (Kabiru, 2015).

## Victims of political violence

1. **Youths**

According to mamman (2012), youths constitute the readymade group for the perpetration of violence in the Northern states as well as the nation at large (mamman 2012). Politicians recruit them to serve as hit men, bodyguards and militia for the parties, which at the process of protecting the interests of the politicians, many will lose their lives, a lot will be injured and some will be imprisoned for violating the law (mamman 2012). The police spokesperson in Kaduna state told Human Right Watch that more than 500 people have been arrested and charged following the 2011 post-electoral violence in the state (Human Right Watch, 2013). Political violence is among the leading causes of death worldwide among people aged 15-44 years (World Health Organization 2002). According to Aikor (2007), persons within the age range of twelve to thirty years are dependent on their parents for survival; they are also very poor, and they constitute the powerless, jobless, and unemployed and so can be easily manipulated by the elite (Aikor, 2007). All these conditions results to making them vulnerable to many social vices like crime, political violence, drug abuse, alcoholism among others (Aikor, 2007). Therefore, in view of their poverty, they only serve as steady army for the powerful politicians that use them to create havoc on the political system especially during elections and pay them very meager

amount of money and are negatively affected of not fulfill the dream of having wealth, education, employment, among others when the elites are emerged winners (Aikor, 2007).

## Religious groups

According to the Christian Association of Nigeria, the umbrella organization representing the majority of Christian churches in Nigeria, at least 170 Christians were killed in the post-election riots, hundreds more were injured, and thousands displaced (CAN 2011). The organization also reported that more than 350 churches were burned or destroyed by the Muslim rioters across 10 northern states (CAN 2011).In the predominately Christian towns and villages of southern Kaduna State, including Zonkwa, Matsirga, and Kafanchan, sectarian clashes left more than 500 dead, according to Muslim and Christian leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch; the vast majority of the victims in these areas were Muslim (Human Right Watch, 2013).

## Residents

Both the police and the military were implicated in the excessive use of force and other serious abuses while responding to the rioting and political violence (Sani 2011). Human Rights Watch documented eight cases of alleged unlawful killing of unarmed residents by the police and soldiers in the cities of Zaria and Kaduna, and received credible reports of more than a dozen other incidents (Human Right

Watch, 2013). We received credible reports that the police and soldiers in Kaduna, Gombe, and Bauchi states systematically beat people rounded up during or after the riots (Human Right Watch, 2013).

## Government (The State)

If not the greatest one of the greatest victim of political violence is the state (Ademola 2015). He further stressed that the state will be paused in the face of development, economy may crash, infrastructures will be destroyed, security may become worrisome, when citizens dies state will be pressure to compensate among other vices (Ademola 2015). The previous administration had paid N3bn compensation to victims of the 2011 Kaduna post-election violence, even though about N15bn was due to them (Abati 2012). The President said that other states affected by the post-election violence got between N5bn and N7bn, adding that the level of destruction in Kaduna State alone was almost more than all the other parts of the country put together (Abati 2012).

## Economy

Trade and business were at an all-time low, fear and despair were prevalent, cost of goods and services increase by 85% largely attributable to poor transportation systems and insecurity in the country, there were increases in killings and crime by 90% most of these were politically motivated killings and other opportunistic criminal activities since security forces were now been deployed to monitor

election and therefore community policing reduced (Premium Times 2015). These waves of insecurity affected investor perception and GDP growth rate reduced by almost 65 percent; this was because commerce and trade interactions were only at 35 percent during the elections (Premium Times 2015).

## Theoretical framework

Theoretical frame work is an important aspect of scientific inquiry which “provides logical basis for expectations about the world” (Izah, 2012:28). Often time, socio- economic status is quoted as a potential reason for crime (political thuggery), there are several major theories of crime but strain theory is one of the most commonly used for explaining crime (political thuggery) with the help of a socio-economic element (Suleiman and Muhammad, 2017). Therefore, Robert K. Merton‟s theory of Social Strain and Anomie was adopted to examine the causes and effects of kalare political violence in Gombe metropolis on democratic and social activities in the metropolitan.

## Theory of Anomie

Robert K. Merton (1910 – 2003), Harvard Sociologist, was the one that popularize the concept of Anomie. In one of the most cited discussions of the twentieth century, the Merton‟s social structure and Anomie (1938); Merton explains crime on the basis of structural strain or frustration as a result of person‟s position in the social structure, especially the stratification system. He noted that the American

society places enormous emphasis on the pursuit of material success. He observed that human beings have a natural tendency to observe norms which are reflected by personalities called conscience. Yet, some people often act against their conscience because of the terrible strain upon them. He distinguishes between a social structure (which provided economic roots to success) and a culture (which provided norms, value and goals). “Anomie theory portrays a deviant as a person torn between guilt and desire, with desire gaining the upper hand” (Stark, 1987).

The index of success in the society is material possession. In stable societies, Merton noted that the conventional successes are achieved through talent and hard work. But in unstable societies, what is important is not the prescribed legitimate means but the goals. In the latter society, there is the proclamation of equal opportunity for everybody but in reality the opportunity is a mirage.

Merton pointed out that when a society is in a state of anomie, several reactions, or modes of adaptation”, are possible besides innovation. There are conformity, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion. Each of these modes of adjustment represents a way of coping with a balance or imbalance of goals and means. According to Merton, the five major modes of adaptation create a state of anomie. In the table below the plus (+) signifies “acceptance”, a minus (-) indicates “rejection” and the combination sign of plus and minus (+) indicate “rejection and substitution of new goals and means” (Carrabine, 2004).

These modes of adaptation are discussed below.

## Table 1 Merton’s Models of Individual Adaptation to Anomie

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Mode of Adaptation** | **Culture Goals** | **Institutionalized Means** |
| Conformity | + | + |
| Innovation | + | \_ |
| Ritualism | \_ | + |
| Retreatism | \_ | \_ |
| Rebellion | + | + |

These modes of adaptation shall be discussed in details.

## Conformity

Conformity refers to the acceptance of a society‟s goals and the approved means for achieving the goals. That is, it is an act of living a conventional life involving acceptance of culture/ goals and culture/ means. It accomplishes the true way of success to gain wealth and prestige through hard work and talent.

## Innovation

Innovation represents acceptance of the goals but rejection of the means for obtaining them. For instance, an individual who seek wealth through crime – say, by dealing in cocaine. Merton called this type of behavior – innovation. It is an attempt to achieve a culturally approved goal (wealth) by unconventional means (crime). They believed that hard work, honesty, saving, investment and education

cannot give them the ultimate goal, rather through cheats. They make money

illegally. The deviant behaviors exist in form of burglaries, robberies, drug, trafficking, prostitution, and other types of crime.

## Ritualism

Ritualism refers to a rejection of the goals but acceptance of the means. In Merton‟s scheme of things, it is the means-goal gap. Seeing that the goal of material success was very hard, people abandon it. They resolve the strain of limited success by abandoning cultural goals in favour of almost compulsive efforts to live respectably. In essence, they embrace the rules to the point that they lose sight of their larger goals. They believed that “a good name is greater than silver and gold”. They are honest people.

## Retreatism

Retreatism refers to the rejection of both the goals and means. That is, the rejection of the cultural goal of material success and access to the approved means. They may adopt an alternative lifestyle as a vagrant, pursue altered states of consciousness. Retreatism entails removing oneself from a reality that just does not seem workable. In effect, they are “dropouts”. They include alcoholics, drug addicts, and “Area – boys”. They don‟t believe in hard work, honest, investment and education, even in seeking wealth.

## Rebellion

Rebellion rejects the goals and means of the present society and attempt to establish a new social order. In contrast to retreatism, Merton termed rebellion as the rejection of both the cultural definition of success and the normative means of achieving it. People therefore invented a new cultural goals and new means of achieving the desires. That is, advocating a radical alternative to the existing social order. There are people who dedicate their lives to revolutionary organizations or transformative social movements, substituting new cultural goals and new means of adaptation.

In general, the theory can explain the objective of the research because it contends that most people in society share the same goals of achieving wealth and success. But in every society there is division between lower class and their wealthier counterparts which is not different to that of Gombe metropolis. Those people from lower class don‟t have the same opportunities like those from the upper class do. As a result of that, the lower class gets frustrated because they are not able to achieve the upper class goals. That feeling that accompanies an experience of being thwarted in attaining their goals, or in other words – strain, leads to crime i.e. political thuggery.

However, Merton adapted five different ways to the structure of opportunities available: Conformity (accepting goals and attaining them), Innovation (accepting

the goals but no lack in attaining them lead as a result to resort to innovative means to attained the goals, such as turning to crime), Ritualism (accepting the goals while being aware of not attaining them), Retreatism (rejecting both) and Rebellion (creating own goals and achieving them).

From the foregoing, we can understand that this theory can explain the objectives of this research which are causes of violence in politics, its effects and its victims in Gombe. However, the theory explained that the quest for materialism among the lower class can be regards as causes of violence in politics which is said to be the same in Gombe metropolis. In other words, all people may be offered a chance at success but privileged groups can achieve more than the underprivileged groups because their pursuits are not limited by socioeconomic circumstances. It is through this inequality that deviance forms, which then leads to potential of criminal behavior which in turn those of higher class takes advantage and uses those underprivileged in politics (political thugs).

According to this theory the lower class are mostly the victims of crime (political violence) and that political violence do have effects on the goals of the underprivileged ones which is the same in the metropolitan city.

## Strengths of the theory

The major strength of this theory is that it can be able to explain the causes of political violence and who are the victims of political violence and/or how they become to be the victims of political violence in Gombe metropolis.

## Weakness

The major shortcoming of strain and anomie theory is that it failed to give solution to the political violence in Gombe metropolis.

# CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

## Introduction

Alfa (2011), sees research as process of steps used to collect and analyze information to increase our understanding of a topic or issues. It consists of three steps which are posing a question, collection of data to answer the question and present answer to the question. This chapter described the processes that will be employing in carrying out the research work. It contains Location of the study Population of the study, Types and Sources of data, Sample Size and Sampling techniques, Method of data collection method, and Method of data analysis.

## Location of the Study

Gombe is the capital city of Gombe state.It‟s located in the north eastern zone, right within the expansive savannah in the heart of Gombe state, allows the city (Gombe metropolis) to share common borders with some Local Governments; Akko, Yemaltu-Deba, Kwami, and Dukku Local Gov‟t Areas. The city has an area of 52 km² and a population of around 268,000 people as of 2006 census. Gombe metropolis is a multi-ethnic society that consists of the dominant Fulani tribe. Other ethnicities include the Hausa, Tera, Waja, Bolewa, and Kanuri, with their different cultures as well as lingual affiliations. The second largest ethnic group is Hausa. The state capital; Gombe, is a reflection of the heterogeneity of the state.

The location of the study was selected because of its proximity to the researcher, also, the presence of respondents who will provide answers to the research question and most importantly its history of political crisis in the metropolitan city.

## Population of the Study

For a researcher to collect the needed data or information, the researcher must specify entire population target. Therefore, the specific target population in this research were the residents Jekada-fari, Bolari, Kagarawal, Bogo and Tudun-wada which constitutes the five major wards in Gombe metropolis which have been carefully chosen as the focus of this research in order to reflect the area where the activities of political violence were more pronounced in Gombe metropolis.

## Types and Source of Data

For the study purpose both primary and secondary source of data collection were used. The primary data were collected from the population (residents of Gombe metropolis) through questionnaire and conduction of in-depth interview. And secondary data were collected from records of political unrest, these may be available written documents, books, journals, newspapers, news bulleting, internet materials and other related materials concerning political violence.

## Method of Data Collection

This study used both quantitative and qualitative method of data collection through the use of structured questionnaire and the use of structured In-depth interview

(IDI), respectively. For the questionnaire, it was designed in such a way that the respondent view can easily be understood, expressed and accurately interprets by the researcher. The questionnaire was given to the respondents to fill and return. One hundred questionnaires were being distributed to respondents to fill. The questionnaires will be divided in to four sections. „Section A‟ contained the demographic characteristics of the respondents. „Section B‟ will equally contains question on the causes of political violence in Gombe metropolitan. „Section C‟ contained the question on the effects of political violence and its victims in Gombe metropolis. Lastly „Section D‟ also contained the question on the possible solution to the political violence in Gombe.

As for the interview method (IDI), the interviewer personally met the informants and asked necessary questions to them regarding the subject of enquiry. A set of questions werewritten down, and questions were also asked in accordance with the research objectives. The questions included; the causes of political violence, its effects, its victims and possible solutions to the problem of political crisis in the Gombe metropolitan.

## Sample size and Sampling Techniques

For the purpose of this research simple random sample was adopted. Simple random sampling is a technique where there is an equal chance of each member of the population to get selected to form a sample. Gombe metropolis has five major

wards; Jekada-fari with 13 streets and 204 houses, Bolari with 11 streets and 166 houses, Kagarawal with 9 streets and 182 houses, Bogo with 6 streets and 124 houses and Tudun-wada with 9 streets and 151 houses. Lottery method was used to select 4 houses in each of the wards (20 houses in all the wards together). In each of the houses 5 questionnaires were distributed given a total of 100 questionnaires. Therefore, a total of 100 was the sample size for this study. The sample size was made up of males and females individual.

As for the interview (IDI), purposive sampling technique was employed in which researcher relied on his own judgement when choosing members of the population to participate in the study. Researcher often believed that he can obtain a representative sample by using a sound judgement (subjective sampling). However, 5 people were interviewed which are political youth leader, traditional leader, religious leader, a security and a victim of political violence in Gombe metropolis.

## Table 1: Sample Distribution of Selected Houses in Gombe Metropolis

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Wards** | **No. of Streets** | **No. of Houses** | **Selected Houses (in each ward)** | **Distributed Questionnaires** |
| Jekada-fari | 13 | 204 | 4 | 20 |
| Bolari | 11 | 166 | 4 | 20 |
| Kagarawal | 9 | 182 | 4 | 20 |
| Tudun-wada | 9 | 151 | 4 | 20 |
| Bogo | 6 | 124 | 4 | 20 |
| **Total** | **48** | **827** | **20** | **100** |

## Method of Data Analysis

In the quantitative data, techniques of data analysis employed in this research was descriptive statistics where frequency distribution table and percentage were used in presentation and analysis of data collected. In analyzing the qualitative method, data were elicited from the respondents; the data gotten in the course of in-depth interview were taken verbatim on paper. Then, the data were analyzed using prose format in which the actual and intended responses of the respondents were taken into account. From there, deduction was made as regards the issue under investigation (i.e. the IDI was analyzed descriptively in line with the research objectives).

## Problem Encounter in the Field

In the course field work, the researcher encountered, problems from respondents to fill in the questionnaires especially not literate, and also researcher faced the problem time constraints and financially issues. There was also refusal to fill the questionnaires by some people. However, these were surmounted by the researcher‟s desire to collect viable data for the research.

# CHAPTER FOUR ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

## Introduction

This chapter deals with the presentations and interpretation of data collected from the field through administered questionnaires and conduction of in-depth interview.

## Analysis and Interpretation of Data

This research is based on one hundred (100) questionnaire distributed out of which only ninety-six (96) were duly filled or returned back. All the findings were discussed based on ninety-six questionnaires successfully collected from the respondents. Data would be presented in table of frequency (F) and percentages (%) followed by a brief analysis for easy understanding.

## Table 4.1.1: Socio-Demographic Attributes of Respondents

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Category** | **Frequency (f)** | **Percentage (%)** |
| Ward | Kagarawal | 20 | 20.83 |
| Bolari | 19 | 19.79 |
| Jekada-fari | 20 | 20.83 |
| Bogo | 20 | 20.83 |
| Tudun-wada | 17 | 17.71 |
| ***Total*** | ***96*** | ***100%*** |
| Gender | Male | 61 | 63.54 |
| Female | 35 | 36.46 |
| ***Total*** | ***96*** | ***100%*** |
| Age | 18-24 | 38 | 39.58 |
| 25-34 | 24 | 25 |
| 35-44 | 15 | 15.62 |
| 44&above | 19 | 19.79 |
| ***Total*** | ***96*** | ***100%*** |
| Marital Status | Single | 45 | 46.87 |
| Married | 32 | 33.33 |
| Divorced | 11 | 11.46 |
| Widowed | 8 | 8.33 |
| ***Total*** | ***96*** | ***100%*** |
| Religion | Islam | 72 | 75 |
| Christianity | 24 | 25 |
| ***Total*** | ***96*** | ***100%*** |
| Education | Primary | 25 | 26.04 |
| Secondary | 44 | 45.83 |
| Tertiary | 21 | 21.88 |
| Informal Education | 6 | 6.25 |
| ***Total*** | ***96*** | ***100%*** |
| Occupation | Student | 22 | 22.92 |
| Civil Servant | 12 | 12.5 |
| Trader | 9 | 9.38 |
| Teacher | 10 | 10.42 |
| Unemployed | 33 | 34.38 |
| Others | 10 | 10.42 |
| ***Total*** | ***96*** | ***100%*** |

*Source: (Field Survey, 2018)*

Table 4.1.1 concerning the wards of the respondents, the finding shows out of the 96 filled and returned questionnaires, 20 respondents belong to each of the three wards (i.e. Kagarawal, Bogo, and Jekada-fari wards), where each of the three wards representing 20.83% respectively, 19 respondents from Bolari representing 19.79, and 17 respondents from Tudun-wada representing 17.71. Thus, Kagarawal, Bogo, Jekada-fari have equal number of respondents (20 each), while Bolari and Tudun-wada has 19 and 17 respectively.

As regards to gender, out of 96 filled and returned questionnaires, male category had 61 (63.54%) of the respondents. The remaining 35 (36.46%) of the respondents belong to the female category. Thus, the findings revealed that male category had the highest number of frequency (respondents) than their female counterpart.

Regarding the age distribution of the respondents, 38 (39.58%) of the respondents fall between the age of 18-24, 24 (25%) respondents were between the age of 25- 34, while 19 (19.79%) respondents were between the age 44&above, and 15 (15.62%) respondents were between 35-44years which were the least.

Based on marital status, out of 96 filled and returned questionnaires, single category had 45 (46.87%) of the respondents, 32 (33.33%) of the respondents were

married, 11 (11.46%) of the respondents were divorced, the remaining 8 (8.33%) of the respondents were widowed. Therefore, the finding revealed that single

category had the highest number of frequency of 45, followed by married, divorced and then widowed which are 32, 11, and 8 respondents respectively.

On the religion of the respondents, 72 (75%) of the respondents were Muslims, and 24 (25%) of the respondents were Christians. Therefore, the finding revealed that Islam category had the highest number of frequency of 72 respondents than of Christianity.

In terms of education, 44 (45.83%) of the respondents had secondary school qualification which were the majority, 25 (26.06%) of the respondents went to only primary school, 21 (21.88%) of the respondents had at least diploma or higher education, and 6 (6.25%) do not went to western school instead they went for informal education.

Based on occupation, 33 (34.38%) of the respondents were unemployed, 22 (22.92%) of the respondents were students, 12 (12.5%) of the respondents were civil servants, 10 (10.42%) of the respondents were teachers, another10 (10.42%) of the respondents engaged in other different occupation, and 9 (9.38%) of the respondents were teachers.

## Table 4.1.2: The Causes of Political Violence in Gombe Metropolis

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Causes** | **S/Agreed****{%}** | **Agreed****{%}** | **Disagreed****{%}** | **S/Disagreed****{%}** | **Undecided****{%}** | **Total** |
| Lack of politicalsocialization and orientation | 32(33.33%) | 39(40.63%) | 16(16.67%) | 4(4.16%) | 5(5.20%) | *96**(100%)* |
| Poverty and unemployment | 48(50%) | 22(22.92%) | 11(11.46%) | 8(8.33%) | 7(7.29%) | *96**(100%)* |
| The quest for materialism | 29(30.21%) | 33(34.38%) | 19(19.79%) | 10(10.42%) | 5(5.20%) | *96**(100%)* |
| Peer pressure | 42(43.75%) | 35(36.46%) | 13(13.54%) | 4(4.16%) | 2(2.08%) | *96**(100%)* |
| Illegal possessionof arms and ammunitions | 22(22.92%) | 41(42.71%) | 20(20.83%) | 12(12.50%) | 1(1.04%) | *96**(100%)* |
| Religious bigotry and ethnicity | 33(34.38%) | 44(45.83%) | 9(9.38%) | 7(7.29%) | 3(3.12%) | *96**(100%)* |
| Inefficiency on the part of law enforcementagencies/absence of good gov‟t | 22(22.92%) | 53(55.21%) | 10(10.42%) | 5(5.20%) | 6(6.25%) | *96**(100%)* |
| Refusal to accept defeat/or corruption | 31(32.29%) | 39(40.63%) | 21(21.88%) | 2(2.08%) | 3(3.12%) | *96**(100%)* |

*Source: (Field Survey, 2018)*

Table 4.1.2 indicates that 71 (73.96%) of the respondents either agreed/strongly agreed that lack of political socialization and orientation causes political violence; 20 (20.83%) either disagreed/strongly disagreed; and 5 (5.20%) undecided. This shows that majority of the respondents are of the view that lack of political

socialization and orientation causes political violence. Similarly, there is general agreements from the in-depth interview as the blame is showered on the politicians who used the youth taking advantage that most of them (the youth) are not well educated. As one of the interviewee said:

*“…these youths most of them do not know what to do best during the electoral process but because of lack of political socialization they were used by politician as gangs for ballot snatching, injuring political opponents among other crimes.”*

On whether poverty and unemployment causes political violence 70 (72.92%) of the respondents agreed/strongly disagreed; 19 (19.79%) of the respondents either disagreed/strongly disagreed; and 7 (7.29%) undecided. The data shows majority of the respondents are of the view the poverty and unemployment causes political violence. Arising from the above, it was observed that poverty and unemployment are causes of political violence; similarly, from the IDI the interviewees are technically in general view lack of job opportunities for the youths as a cause of political violence, whereas a result of having no source of income or other things to engage in politician counts on that to employed the youth as political thugs. This was affirmed by an interviewee who said:

*“The majority of youth in this city (Gombe metropolis) and the nation in general are jobless, with no means of livelihood, as such political elites mobilize unemployed youths as vital violent arsenals.”*

Concerning the quest for materialism among youths causes political violence 62 (64.59%) of the respondents either agreed/strongly agreed; 29 (30.21%) of the

respondents either disagreed/strongly disagreed; and 5 (5.20%) undecided. The responses implied that corruption causes political violence.

Regarding peer pressure causes political violence 77 (80.21%) of the respondents either agreed/strongly agreed; 17 (17.71%) either disagreed/strongly disagreed; and 2 (2.08%) undecided. This shows that majority of the respondents are of the view that peer pressure causes political violence; political violence is a group of illegal political militia who gang-up in numbers to distract the peace of a society (Anti- Kalare Records, 2007). From the in-depth interview the respondents also attributed causes of political violence in Gombe metropolis to feelings of indifference of who youth associates with by their parents, improper upbringing of child, lack of care from the parents to their children. As one interviewee stated:

*“one of the major causes of political violence are no other but improper upbringing of children and peer-group pressure were parents shows less care on their children and who they associated with… as a result of less care by parents on their children, the children become dropout from schools. And the politicians take advantage of that.”*

As regards to illegal possession of arms and ammunitions as a cause political violence 63 (65.62%) of the respondents either agreed/strongly agreed; 32 (33.33%) of the respondents either disagreed/strongly disagreed, and 1 (1.04%) undecided. This shows that the majority of the respondents are of the view that illegal possession of arms and ammunitions causes political violence. According to Anti-Kalare Records 2007, not less than 2 weapons were collected from each of

the youth arrested as a member of kalare in Gombe (Anti-Kalare Records, 2007). Pertaining the IDI, the interviewees sees the possession of arms as a cause of political violence and the interviewees all sees the politician as responsible for that. As one of the interviewee said:

*“…our politicians should be responsible for that because they are responsible for giving the youth weapons and the availability of those weapons is a major trigger for political unrest”.*

In terms of inefficiency on the part of law enforcement agencies and absence of good governance causes political violence 75 (78.12%) either agreed/strongly disagreed; 15 (15.62%) of the respondents either disagreed/strongly disagreed; and 6 (6.25%) undecided. That is the majority of the respondents are of the view that inefficiency on the part of law enforcement agencies causes political violence. Nigerian politics has become a do-or-die affair where the only rule of the game is survival of the fittest, regardless of crudeness or brutality and the security agencies are not given enough power to be independent and completely fair in their duties (The Lawyers chronicle, 2016). Similarly, from the IDI there is general Agreement that there is insufficiency in part of law agencies and the government is corrupt and serves only the interest of the few privileged individual. This can be asserted by one of the interviewees who said:

*“As the elections draw nearer the Government disbanded the security agencies and gave some temporary employment to kalare members particularly those that are close to the administration”.*

On the issue of whether religious bigotry and ethnicity causes political violence 77 (80.21%) of the respondents either agreed/strongly agreed; 16 (16.67%) either disagreed/strongly disagreed and 3 (3.12%) undecided. This shows that majority of the respondents are of the view that religious bigotry and ethnicity causes political violence. According to Umar 2003, Nigerians are overwhelmingly obsessed about religious and ethnic identities; sadly, religious and ethnic identities play more important roles in election, appointments, employment and admission into public institutions in Nigeria (Umar, 2003). Corresponding from the in-depth interview most of the interview blame the religious leaders by not leading by examples and what they preach both in the mosques and churches mostly before, during and after elections. As one of the interviewee asserted that:

“*The problem in this state (Gombe) and Nigeria at large we don’t have human beings but only a Muslim and Christian; our religious leader preaches hate speech in places of our worships and emphases most on the differences between the religious rather than their similarity, especially when it’s time for election.”*

Regarding refusal to accept defeats/corruption causes political violence 70 (72.97) of the respondents either agreed/strongly agreed; 23 (23.96%) disagreed/strongly disagreed and 3 (3.12%) undecided. This shows that majority of the respondents are of the view that corruption causes political violence. In consistent with the above statement, the interviewee sees the causes of political violence from the political class who use their position to make the political process unpleasant to

their opponents and also use their position to rig elections in other to stick into power. This was affirmed by an interviewee who said that:

*“the causes of political violence are corrupt minded leaders/or political candidates whereby, they do anything just to hold on to power for personal or gains, in an attempt to hang/have power by all means, they often create a regime of violence, repression and bloodshed.”*

In view of the above, it can be said that political violence can be cause by many factors, and the major factors are poverty and unemployment, lack of political socialization and orientation, and peer-group pressure/or improper upbringing of children.

## Table 4.1.3: Effects of Political Violence in Gombe Metropolis

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Effects** | **Frequency (F)** | **Percentages (%)** |
| Death, injury and insecurity | 51 | 53.12% |
| Loss of property, poverty andemergence of incompetent leaders | 45 | 46.88% |
| ***Total*** | ***96*** | ***100%*** |

*Source: (Field Survey, 2018)*

Table 4.1.3 shows that 51 (53.12%) of the respondents indicated death, injury and insecurity as effect of political violence in Gombe metropolis; 45 (46.88%) of the respondents indicates loss of property, poverty and emergence of incompetent leaders as effects of political violence in Gombe metropolis. There are not less than 204 members belongs to kalare group prosecuted between 2004-2007 for various offences ranging from homicide, assault, hurts, robbery, among other crimes

(Police record Gombe state command, 2007). In view of the above, political violence has effects and challenges to the peace, unity and developments to Gombe metropolis. Basically, there were general agreements to that in the in-depth interview; that political violence do grow the number of crime and also weaken the democracy in the metropolitan city. As one of the interviewee asserted:

*“Political violence increases the crime rate and the emergence of less credible candidates in elections, and, thus is a threat to the achievement of democratic dividends and exercise of citizenship rights.”*

## Table 4.1.4: Victims of Political Violence in Gombe Metropolis

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Victims** | **Frequency (F)** | **Percentages (%)** |
| Youth, women &children, andresidents | 66 | 68.75% |
| Governments and economy | 24 | 25.0% |
| Religious groups | 6 | 6.25% |
| ***Total*** | ***96*** | ***100%*** |

*Source: (Field Survey, 2018)*

Table 4.1.4 shows that 66 (68.75%) of the respondents indicates youth, residents, and women & children as victims of political violence in Gombe metropolis; 24 (25.0%) indicates governments and the economy as the victims and minority 6 (6.25%) of the respondents indicates religious group as victims of political unrest in Gombe metropolis. In trying to identify the victims of political violence Umar, says: Youths constitute the readymade group for the perpetration of violence in the

North East as well as the nation at large (Umar 2003). Similar responds were gotten from the in-depth interview as emphasis were also on the youths, children, politicians and the overall safety of the city and its entire citizens. This was affirmed by an interviewee who said:

*“Youths are suffered the most, as the politician applied used-and- dump system on youths; after the election they might not be able to see the politicians anymore as they (youths) will be of no help to the politicians but a burdens to them, after all the difficulties that the youths went through before and during the election for the candidate to succeed.”*

## Table 4.1.5: Efforts of Government towards Controlling of Political Violence in Gombe Metropolis According to Respondents.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Level of Satisfaction** | **Frequency (F)** | **Percentages (%)** |
| Very satisfied | 12 | 12.5 |
| Satisfied | 19 | 19.79 |
| Not Satisfied | 44 | 45.83 |
| Not satisfied at all | 21 | 21.88 |
| ***Total*** | ***96*** | ***100%*** |

*Source: (Field Survey, 2018)*

Table 4.1.5 above disclosed the effectiveness of government response towards overcoming Political violence in Gombe metropolis. It shows the level of satisfaction of the respondents on government effort towards overcoming of political violence in Gombe metropolis. The majority 44 (45.83%) of the respondents were „Not satisfied; 21 (21.88%) of the respondents were „Not satisfied at all; also 19 (19.79%) of the respondents believed that government response towards overcoming political violence was simply „satisfied; however,

the least 12 (12.5%) of the total respondents answered that government response towards overcoming political violence in Gombe metropolis was „very satisfied‟.The most worrisome behavior of our politicians is the manner they have inter-twined politics with violence. They are not only ready to recruit and work with political thugs but have come to accept thugs and violence as a legitimate part of the political process (Aikor, 2007). The IDI is in agreements with the result as all the interviewees sees government efforts as below par in tackling political violence to serve their interest. This was affirmed by an interviewee who said:

*“The government’s efforts towards tackling political violence is very disappointing; because government take advantage of the violence in serving their personal interest and enriching their selves from the government’s account making false statements of funding security”.*

## Table 4.1.6: Solutions to Political Violence in Gombe Metropolis.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Solutions** | **Frequency (F)** | **Percentages (%)** |
| Provision of employments andprovision of scholarship for the less privileges | 56 | 58.33% |
| Conduction of free and fair election, tightening of security and acceptance of defeat | 40 | 41.67% |
| ***Total*** | ***96*** | ***100%*** |

*Source: (Field Survey, 2018)*

Table 4.1.6 above shows that 56 (58.33%) of the respondents indicates „Provision of employments and provision of scholarship for the less privileges‟ as a solution to political violence in Gombe metropolis; 40 (41.67%) of the respondents

indicates „conduction of free and fair election, tightening of security and acceptance of defeat as solution to political violence.The Government should create more job opportunities for the youth through agricultural loans, establishment of some small scale industries, and more vocational training programmes should be introduced. Similar solutions were gotten from the in-depth interview as all the interviewees offered identical view of provision of employments, conduction of free and fair election, tightening of security and acceptance of defeats by defeated candidate as solution to political violence. An interviewee asserted that:

*“… the political elites most stop mobilizing youths for their political gain. And the only way to do that is by creating job opportunities, conduct a free and fair election with maximum security support and do not force to stay in power if defeated.”*

## Discussion of Findings

The main objectives of this work are to examine the causes of political violence, it effects and victims in Gombe metropolis, and proper solution to the problem.

The findings of this study shows that the causes of political violence in Gombe metropolis, supports the with work of Umar (2003);„the role of youth and politicians in political violence in North-East Nigeria‟, where he identified selfish interest, poverty and unemployment, poor governance/corruption, refusal to accept defeats, religious and ethnic sentiments, and quest for materialism, which also

supported the theory of Robert K. Merton (strain and Anomie theory) where he referred these as those who accepts the goals but rejected of the means for obtaining them; an individuals who seek power/wealth through crime, Merton called this type of behavior – innovation.

On the second objective of the study,the study found out the effects of political violence in Gombe metropolis, the findings is corresponded with the work of Mbaya, (2003) „The implications of political thuggery on socio-economic and political development of Maiduguri, Borno state, Nigeria, International Journal of Asian Social Science, Number 3 (10) 2090-2103‟, where he mentioned death, injury, loss of property, threat to democracy and emergence incompetent leaders as the major effects of political insecurity.

The third objective of the study; victims of political violence in Gombe metropolis, the study findings supported the research work of Sa‟ad, A. M. (2008)“In search of justice for Nigeria: A critical analysis of formal and informal justice system in Gongola State”, where he revealed youth, religious groups, government, economy, residents and women & children as victims of this political unrest before, during and after election.

The fourth objectives of this research was to ascertain the possible solutions to the problem, according to this finding, majority of the respondents suggest that,provision of employments, conduction of free and fair election, tighten of

security, provision of scholarship for the less privileges, and acceptance of defeat as solution to the problem, wherethe theory (strain and Anomie theory) used failed to provide solution to political violence in Gombe metropolis.

# CHAPTER FIVE

# SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## Introduction

This chapter is strictly on the summary of the findings from which the researcher will derives his conclusion and recommendation or possible solutions to the topic in question.

## Summary

The research work titled; Causes and Effects of political violence in Gombe metropolis” was designed to investigate the factors responsible for political violence, its consequences, and its victim in Gombe metropolis.

In this work, both primary and secondary source of data collection were used, also both quantitative and qualitative method of data collection through the use of structured questionnaire and the use of In-depth interview (IDI), and simple random sample was adopted for the study. It‟s noticed in this research that peer- group pressure and Religious bigotry and ethnicity is the major cause of political violence in Gombe metropolis.

Death, injury and insecurity are the major effects of political violence in Gombe state capital as of this research shows; it‟s noticed in this study that there is increment in crime rate which leds to the deaths and injury of the citizens in

Gombe metropolis and put them in state of fear, that is, they (members of the city) felt unsecured.

Also it is discovered in this study youth as the main victims of this political unrest, because; they are the most used by the politicians, most injured and most prosecuted before, during, and after election (Anti kalare records, 2007).

From the previous chapter (chapter four) we also find out the efforts of government towards controlling of political violence in Gombe metropolis according to this research is below average. As such, we have understood there is need in adjustments and restructuring in governance and electoral processes before the coming elections.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, Gombe post-independence history is replete with accounts of incidents of electoral violence. In the contemporary world, elections have become the most accepted means of changing the government. Although history has shown that, it is usually difficult to hold elections that are completely free and fair in Gombe and Nigeria at a whole. Consequently, it‟s argued that elections, which in other climes are processes that bring about peaceful change of government, have not been conducted in Nigeria according to international best practices governing their conduct.

Finally, the researcher made far reaching recommendation which it is hope that if those suggestions are adhered to would set the stage for the conduct of violence- free elections which would engender political stability and place Gombe and Nigeria at large in the echelon of powerful democracies in the world.

## Recommendations

In order to salvage the nation from collapsing into precipice and engender political stability, the researcher recommend the following:

* + - Mass reorientation/education of the citizens by the National Orientation Agency, Political Parties, Civil Society Organizations and the Mass Media on the dangers of electoral violence and possible punishments for offenders, through organizing of workshops in communities and organizing of discussion session via mass media channels.
		- Institutional strengthening of all agencies related to the elections, especially, the Nigerian Police Force to be discipline, combat ready, equipped and corruption free, through funding of the agencies and strict punishments for insubordination.
		- Full autonomy for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) without the interference of the state government. This autonomy would engender administrative efficiency and professionalism of the body.
		- Strengthening of the Judiciary to be fully independent, transparent and incorruptible, and exercise punitive measures against corrupt Judicial Officers that that pervade justice at the Electoral Tribunals, Appeal and Supreme Courts.
		- Political leaders carry a heavy responsibility and we urge them to ensure that their supporters reject violence as an instrument of politics. This will go a long way in promoting order and sanity in the electoral process.
		- States governments should embark on massive industrial and agricultural development to engage the unskilled youths productively. As was mentioned, jobless youth were willing tools in the hands of people who sponsored the violence. Therefore, meaningful engagement of the youth especially in the state capital will go a long way in forestalling future outbreak of violence.This can be done through agricultural loans, establishment of some small scale industries, and more vocational training programmes should be introduced. After the training tools and loans should be given to them to enable them establish their own businesses.

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Dear respondent,

# APPENDIX

**QUESTIONNAIRE**

I am a final year student from the department of sociology, faculty of social sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria conducting a research on “**The Causes and Effects of Political violence in Gombe metropolis”**. I will be very grateful if you can kindly answer the following questions. Your response will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will be used only for academic purposes as well as your anonymity is surely guaranteed.

# INSTRUCTION

*Please respond by ticking [√] the appropriate options that best describes your opinion for each of the item(s) as it appeals to you.*

# SECTION A

*{Please tick only one in this section}*

1. **Ward:** Jekada-fari [ ] Bolari [ ] Kagarawal [ ] Bogo [ ] Tudun-wada [ ]
2. **Gender:** Male [ ] Female [ ]
3. **Age:** 18-24 [ ] 25-34 [ ] 35-44 [ ] 45 & above [ ]
4. **Marital Status:** Single [ ] Married [ ] Divorced [ ] Widowed [ ]
5. **Religion:** Islam [ ] Christianity [ ] Others (specify)
6. **Education:** Primary [ ] Secondary [ ] Tertiary [ ] Informal education [ ]
7. **Occupation:** Student [ ] Civil servant [ ] Trader [ ] Teacher [ ] Unemployed [ ] Others {specify}

# SECTION B

*{Please tick only one option in this section}*

The following are some possible causes of political violence in Gombe metropolis?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **S/N** | **Cause** | **Agreed** | **Strongly****agreed** | **Disagreed** | **Strongly****Disagreed** | **Undecided** |
| 8. | Lack of politicalsocialization and orientation |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9. | Poverty andunemployment |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10. | The quest formaterialism |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11. | Peer pressure |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12. | Illegal possession of arms andammunitions |  |  |  |  |  |
| 13. | Religious bigotryand ethnicity |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14. | Inefficiency on the part of law enforcement agencies/absence of goodgovernance |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15. | Refusal to acceptdefeat/Corruption |  |  |  |  |  |

# SECTION C

*{Please tick as many as you want in this section}*

1. Which of the following do you consider to be the effects (consequences) of political violence in Gombe metropolis?
	1. Death
	2. Injury
	3. Loss of Property
	4. Poverty
	5. Emergence of incompetent leaders
	6. Insecurity
2. Which of the following do you consider victim of political violence in Gombe metropolis?
	1. Youths
	2. Religious groups

)c) Residents

1. Government (The State)
2. Economy
3. Women and children

# SECTION D

1. How satisfied are you with the way in which political violence is been controlled by government in Gombe metropolis? {*tick only one option}* Very satisfied [ ] Satisfied [ ] Not Satisfied [ ] Not Satisfied at all [ ]
2. In your opinion, what should be done to reduce or eradicate violence in politics of Gombe metropolis and Nigeria at large? *{Please tick as many as you want in this section}*
	1. Provision of employments
	2. Conduction of free and fair election
	3. Tightening of security
	4. Provision of scholarship for less privileges
	5. Acceptance of defeats by defeated candidate

# INDEPTH-INTERVIEW GUIDE (IDI)

Dear respondent,

I am a final year student from the department of sociology, faculty of social sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria conducting a research on “**The Causes and Effects of Political violence in Gombe metropolis”**. I will be very grateful if you can kindly

answer the following questions. Your response will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will be used only for academic purposes as well as your anonymity is surely guaranteed.

1. In your opinion, do you consider the following factors responsible for political violence in Gombe metropolis?

**PROBES**

* 1. Lack of political socialization and orientation
	2. Poverty and unemployment
	3. Refusal to accept defeat
	4. Religious and ethnic sentiments
	5. Peer-group pressure
	6. Illegal possession of arms and ammunitions
	7. Inefficiency on the part of law enforcement agencies/absence of good governance
1. Which of the followings in your view are effects or consequences of political violence in Gombe metropolis?

**PROBES**

* 1. Deaths
	2. Poverty
	3. Loss of property
	4. Insecurity
	5. Injury

Emergence of incompetent leaders

1. Which of the followings do you consider victim of political violence in Gombe metropolis?

**PROBES**

* 1. Youths
	2. Religious groups

*)*c) Residents

(d) Government (The State)

(f) Women and children

1. What should be done to stop or reduce violence in politics of Gombe metropolis?

**PROBES**

* 1. Provision of employments
	2. Conduction of free and fair election
	3. Tightening of security
	4. Acceptance of defeats by defeated candidate

(f) Provision of scholarship for less privileges

1. How satisfied are you with the way in which political violence is been controlled by government in Gombe metropolis?