# Assessment of the Challenges to Nigeria’s Medium Power Role in Global Affairs: A Case Study of the Fourth Republic (1999-2015)

**BY**

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**A Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences,**

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**In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Master of Science (MSc) in Political Science**

# April, 2018

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# DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this work is the product of my own efforts and creativity; undertaken under the supervision of Professor Kayode Omojuwa and Dr Moveh David. This work has not been presented and will not be presented elsewhere for the award of a degree or certificate. All sources have been duly acknowledged.

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Suleiman, Muhammad Reza Date

# CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this dissertation by Muhammad Reza Suleiman (MSC/SOC- SCI/3698/2011-2012/ P16SSPS8687) was carried out under my supervision.

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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks and praises to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds, who gave me life, health and courage to begin and finish this academic marathon successfully. He always guides, assists and protects me. Alhamdulillah.

I owe a debt of gratitude to many people who contributed to the shape and form of the dissertation. Let me start with Professor Kayode Omojuwa, my supervisor, who in addition to reading and making significant corrections, also pointed out some essential materials that I used in this research. In addition, he stressed the importance of having proportional balance to the chapters. His measured criticisms of all the work gave it focus. Dr Moveh David read it all through page-by-page and made corrections in his red ink. His observations on the methodology are invaluable in making this work a success.

I thank the amiable Malam Garba Aminu for the warm and humorous lectures on Comparative Politics which all of us momentously liked. He set an apt typical that has helped us in all our seminars. It was a great experience working with Professor Umar Mohammed Kaoje. His scholarly and eloquent lectures on Political Economy are just something else. He is an erudite sage.

I wish to express my special appreciation to late Malam Saidu Adamu, who polished our understanding on Modern Political Analysis and the use and interpretation of data. Professor Ejembi Unobe took us through the interesting world of Classical Political Thought. His interpretations of logic were so beneficial to me. Professor Ayo Dunmoye‘s interactive seminars on Contemporary Political Analysis propped each one of us to stay up-to-date on the topics to save ourselves his scholarly and fatherly scolding and reproach.

Dr Jacob Audu‘s extensive criticisms refurbished this work. His emphasis on a suitable theoretical framework is significant towards giving this work clear focus. Professors Pinder P. Izzah and Abubakar Siddique Mohammed threw important light on Nigeria‘s role as a middle power. Their observations have been very significant in putting this research in context.

I will not forget Professor Yusuf A. Yakubu‘s interesting lectures on Nigerian foreign policy. His style of lacing theory with events in Nigerian foreign policy was unsurpassed. Dr Mohammed Faal‘s mastery of foreign policy and global events affecting international relations theory building is significant. His shrewd method of teaching is also incredible. Finally, Professor Kayode Omojuwa equally established a principle in his teaching that was challenging, yet, interesting. He never forced his view during our seminars but threw more light on the perspective each one of us took.

I would like to state that these three individuals, Professors Omojuwa, Yakubu and Faal, have very tremendous influence on my choice of this topic. Professor Omojuwa first unconsciously muted the concept of ―middle power‖ during the first seminar presentation in his class of International Politics, ―Motives of State Behavior: The Nature of the State‖, a paper I wrote and presented for that seminar. While Professor Yakubu made the history of Nigeria in international affairs very interesting to me, Dr Faal sounded the need to depart from the most dominant topics and theories of foreign policy and international relations. I cannot forget the encouragement and assistance by Dr Aliyu Yahaya, the Head of Political Science and International Studies. He is a rare academic that has compassion for his students. Thank you, Sir.

My External Examiner, Professor Usman A. Tar of the Nigerian Defense Academy, made valid observations that reconfigured this work and made it organized. His suggestions to expand the

work to six chapters with an additional chapter on the History of Nigeria‘s Engagement with the World makes it richer. He also suggested the expansion of Chapter Two, Literature Review, in order to capture other aspects international relations and power politics that were initially left out. Equally, my Internal/External Examiner, Dr Hussaini M. Lawal of the Department of Sociology, ABU Zaria, also made instructive comments especially regarding the use of new literature in order to avoid making the work normative. His observations regarding the referencing and also the need for me to observe the research ethics of not attaching the identities of interviewees to the excerpts.

Other lecturers in this Department have in one way or the other supported me during this program. Malam Abdullahi Umar Tanko encouraged me, in the first place, to apply to this program. Dr Mohammed Lawal Tafida was very generous with his time for discussions on this topic. He made valuable suggestions regarding the whole work. Thank you.

A BIG THANK YOU to all the personalities that granted me interviews during this research for without their views this work would have been more difficult to conduct. Professor Bolaji Akinyemi suspended a meeting immediately my arrival was announced to him and gave me audience. He also instructed his office to make copies of certain vital documents I used in this research. Ambassador Bunu Sheriff Musa also canceled a trip to grant me an interview. Thank you, Sirs.

Despite his ill health, Ambassador Ado Sanusi granted me an interview and Ambassador (Mrs) Salamatu Suleiman despite her tight schedules gave me an interview at her office and home. Ambassador Bulus Lolo is a kind and generous man. He granted me an interview and facilitated my meeting with Ambassador Laraba Abdullahi at the African Union Commission. He also gave

me a flat to stay within the Nigerian Embassy complex in Addis Ababa. His staff, the Deputy Head of Mission and Head of Chancery, the Information Attaché, Mr I. S. Barde, the Embassy Accountant, all made my stay very interesting. My drivers, Ashenafi, Mengistu and Suliman; and friends Tunde Iyanda of AUC Legal Department, Muhammad Zainu and Muhammad Zizu took me around to see historical places.

Ambassador Shuaibu Yola agreed and granted me an interview. He also made me an appointment with Ambassador Aminu Wali, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, although the meeting could not hold due to busy schedule of the Minister. Finally but not least, Ambassador Christopher Ariyo, ‗Baba No-Go-Slow‘ as we fondly called him at the Murtala Muhammed Foundation Lagos office, granted me two interviews and booked me an appointed with former President Olusegun Obasanjo. Thank you all for your kindness, generosity and interest in this research.

Mr (Baba) Dzarma Laushi, the Galadiman Garkida, was very supportive financially. His interests in this research have been an inspiration throughout. Farah Pahlavi, the former Empress of Iran, was equally supportive financially. Ambassador Ardasher Zahedi and Dr (Baba) Lema Jibrilu were equally helpful. Thank you all for mentoring and funding.

I am grateful to my colleagues, Idris Saminu, Umar Alhaji, Bello Balarabe, Kelechi, Malam Ray Dubem, Adam Samed from Ghana and all the others, in the MSc/2011-2012 class. Our seminars were made so interesting by all of you. Malam Ismail Aminu Danja was very generous with his office and offered me lunch and tea each time I went to Zaria. I hope we will continue to keep the comraderie.

Finally, my family was wonderful and I am grateful to them all, especially my mother, Hajiya Balaraba Ramat Yakubu, whom I owe an inestimable appreciation for all her support. She is a rare gem of unusual disposition. Thanks to my wife, Maryam Ibrahim Kunya, and son, Abdulraufh Muhammad (Imam), for tolerating me and, above all, for taking care of my computer and my precious papers which littered the whole place. Thank you for believing in me. My brothers, Shuaibu Ajani, Col. Zakariyya Ajani (rtd), Muhammad Mahe, Suleiman Ajani, Anas Dauda, Abdulrahman Ajani, Suleiman Ajani, Muhammad Wali Ajani; and sisters, Hajiya Aisha Ajani, Hajiya Fatima (Mila) Ajani, Hajiya Maryam Ahmed, Hajiya Rahama (Madam) Ajani, Malama Hasiya Ajani and Malama Rahama Ajani (Karama) have all been very supportive. Thank you.

To all other people too numerous to mention here who have directly or indirectly supported me and my research, I say THANK YOU and wish you all every happiness.

# DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my late father, Alhaji Ajani Suleiman Abdulraufh, for his love, care, support and mentorship. May Allah make Jannatul Firdausi his abode. Amin. *Allah ya jikan ka Babanmu*. Amin.

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# ABSTRACT

Middle powers are nations that have considerable influence in global affairs. These countries usually take a multilateral approach to solving international problems. Therefore, middle powers identify important transnational issues and mobilize other countries to tackle them. But middle powers must be countries with substantial power constituents – large economy and population, and strong military force. This study examined the medium power role of Nigeria in the global space between 1999 and 2015. This study adopted the realist theory of the elements of national power as theoretical framework to provide theoretical orientation to the study. Purposively, eight Nigerian diplomats were interviewed using the in-depth interview method. Using primary data collected through interviews and documentary analysis, the study found out that Nigeria is still a middle power that is very pivotal in African peace and stability, especially that of West Africa. Though the findings of this work maintain that Nigeria is still influential in regional as well as global politics, her role is consistently threatened by both domestic and external threats. These threats comprise internal security dilemma such as Boko Haram insurgency, Niger-Delta militancy, kidnappings; domestic political squabbles of corruption and economic retrogression; and the rise of South Africa, Ethiopia and other African powers. Despite these, Nigeria remains a pivotal state in world affairs. Finally, it is concluded that Nigeria is still a middle power even though it has scaled back in many respects. However, in order to remain a firm middle power, it must rebuild her image internationally by addressing the domestic as well as international challenges threatening her power. It is recommended that Nigeria must reconcile her domestic realities and her ambitions abroad. It must fight the Boko Haram and other domestic security threats squarely in order for the needed foreign investments to flow and for other African countries to continue to accept her leadership. Nigeria must also increase the number of her military force to a large force without sacrificing equipment and training. Nigeria must continue to engage Africa and the world with new initiatives in order to keep her role as a medium or middle power in global affairs.

# CHAPTER ONE GENERAL INTRODUCTION

# Background to the Study

The concept of middle power is a highly contested one in both academic and diplomatic circles. Conventionally, a middle power denotes a country that is neither a super power nor a small power, but which can influence the direction of either global, continental or regional politics. As a middle power, a country is a bridge between the great powers and small nations. But this is just a general perspective of a middle power.

Rudd (2006) writes that the concept of middle powers dates back to the 15th century European state system, when the Mayor of Milan divided the system into three categories: *grandssime* (empires), *mezano* (middle powers) and *piccolo* (small powers). Rudd (2006) defined middle powers as those countries that can ―stand on their own‖ and survive in that wild and conflict- prone world system. That is, once a country is able to defend itself against external aggression, and can also assert or declare a particular stance among countries, that country is a middle power. Nigeria, by virtue of her population, economy and military capabilities, falls into this category through its leadership of African initiatives and by extension the Black race and the global South.

Yalcin (2012) stated that the concept of ―middle power‖ is brought to light by Canadian and Australian diplomats and academics. He saw the concept of middle power in both a realist and liberal sense. According to his realist view, a middle power is that country that has considerable constituents of power in the international system, but does not view itself as a middle power, officially and otherwise. Yalcin (2012) liberal view of the concept implies to a situation where

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by a country possess large population, big economy and military capabilities, and sees itself as a power in the global system.

There is the functional view of middle power which revolves around the role played by a particular country (Baxter and Bishop, 2011). This view takes into consideration the area of expertise (peace keeping, mediation, environmental initiatives etc.) and the role that country plays in this area in global affairs. Canada‘s mediation role in the Suez Canal Crisis, Japan‘s human security initiative and Nigeria‘s role in the decolonization process of Africa and in global peacekeeping operations fall within this context. This view is similar to Holbraad (1971) argument that ―middle-size‖ countries can be identified by looking at the role these states play in international affairs. According to this view, the role such states play manifest in both bi-polar and multi-polar systems. Imperial Iran exhibited this character before the Anglo-Russian Invasion and from the beginning of the Cold War up to 1979 (Pahlavi, 1980a; Pahlavi, 1980b).

Nigerian and foreign diplomats, academics and analysts (Gambari, 2004; Kamil, 1996; Mbu, 1993; Ikoku, 1981) hold that Nigeria is a catalyst in world politics. The country‘s influence within West African community, its rich record in pan-African affairs within the African Union (since the days of OAU), and its role in the global arena, especially within the United Nations system are the credentials which inform such views that place Nigeria as a global middle power. Further still, Nigeria‘s economy, its military force, population and its geo-strategic location on the continent are other constituents which make the country a power in Africa and a player in global circles.

These, therefore, are credentials of a country that is a leader in the international community. As a newly independent nation, Nigeria was governed by a Prime Minister who was thought to be consulting London before taking a stance on international issues which formed the view that

while Nigeria was technically independent, it was still considered by the international community to be under British sphere of influence, thereby, lacking an independent foreign policy of its own (Ojigbo, 1981). A decade later, however, Nigeria became a self-proclaimed middle power and an active and assertive participant in the creation of many international organizations: the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU, now African Union), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the G-77, a group of mostly African, Asian and Latin American countries in the United Nations and many continental and regional initiatives. Not only these, Nigeria became a member and came to play very active role in the United Nations, Commonwealth of Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and several others, particularly, championing the course of Africa and the developing world (Ojigbo, 1981).

Compelled by the imperatives of regional leadership, Nigeria reconceived the idea of a regional union which brought about the founding of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Ojigbo, 1981). As a concerned and responsible global player, Nigeria learned that security meant more than just military strength; therefore it maintained a sizeable presence of her troops in various international peace missions (Ojigbo, 1981). By the 1980s, Nigeria had grown considerably very influential and richer, more powerful, confident and also armed with the both (economic and military) weapons of war in Africa and the world stage (Ojigbo, 1981).

Nigeria‘s position had started to wane beginning from the mid-1980s, particularly, as a result of both internal and external causes. The failure of Nigeria‘s industrialization process, irresponsible leadership, serious corruption and political instability, and the rise of South Africa and Ivory Coast, are but a few of these factors.

Nigeria returned to civilian presidential rule in 1999 and between this year and 2015, it had the first successful presidential changeover of power in a tenured transition. Presidential foreign policy decision making and leaders‘ personality have combined to consolidate, and in some instances, declined, Nigeria‘s leadership claims in African as well as global affairs. This is a period when Nigeria intervened to settle political instabilities that rocked several African countries like Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sudan and Guinea. Also, Nigeria spearheaded the Assembly that transformed Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union. President Obasanjo‘s personality made Nigeria‘s voice heavy, especially in African affairs, where many African states ―remained neutral on vital African issues until Nigeria took a stance‖ (Pham, 2007). However, this is a period when certain issues in domestic politics and international affairs have also posed serious constraints to Nigeria‘s medium power role in global affairs.

# Statement of the Research Problem

This study examined Nigeria as a medium power and the challenges it faces in maintaining this position in global affairs. Nigeria‘s position in the international system has waned. At both the United Nations and African Union, the country is increasingly losing its leadership position of Africa to South Africa. Possible reasons for this are the quick growth rate of the South African economy, its role in championing global human rights and democracy, the image of South African leaders and the quality of its diplomatic corps against Nigeria‘s rather reverse of these. South Africa is a member of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) forums widely believed to take over global power in the evolving multi-polar system. Nigeria is only an observer in these forums.

Even within the West African sub-region, Nigeria‘s position has been diminishing in the face of the rise of Ghanaian and Ivorian economies. Although Nigeria still commands some degree of

respect from ECOWAS states (Alli, 2012), its internal leadership crisis and credibility problems, security and socio-economic challenges have made smaller states to challenge Nigeria on some issues at bilateral level and within institutional frameworks.

However, one perspective within Nigeria‘s diplomatic corps is of the opinion that while South Africa has a fast growing economy, the size of Nigeria‘s economy is bigger than that of South Africa. More so the constituents of the South African economy are foreign, while Nigeria has a more local economy. Another similar view is the one that argued that were it not for the economic structures the White Minority Rule put in place, South African economy would have had lesser rate of growth than Nigeria (Alden and Mills, 2005).

# Research Questions

This study is predicated on following questions:

* + 1. Does Nigeria possess the elements of national power to qualify her as a middle power in world affairs?
		2. To what extent has Nigeria played her role of a medium power in global affairs?
		3. What are the constraints facing Nigeria‘s aspirations as a middle power in international politics?
		4. How can Nigeria address the constraints to her medium power role in global affairs?

# Aims and Objectives of the Research

The objectives of this research are:

1. To examine the elements of national which may qualify Nigeria to be a middle power.
2. To examine the extent to which Nigeria projects her national power in global arena.
3. To investigate the challenges faced by Nigeria as a medium power in global affairs.
4. To suggest how Nigeria could address its challenges in global affairs.

# Research Assumptions

The research was guided by the following assumptions:

* + 1. Nigeria plays a stabilizing role in world politics
		2. Nigeria fulfills the criteria for a middle power by virtue of its elements of national power (population, economy, military and her role in African peace and security).
		3. The internal and external challenges to Nigeria‘s national power affect the performance of its middle power role global affairs.
		4. Re-building of Nigeria‘s national power will restore its middle power status and credibility in international politics.

# Significance of the Research

This research is significant because it looks at an important aspect of international politics and Nigerian foreign policy – the middle power politics. Although there are many studies written on Nigerian foreign policy, few of them such as Adebajo and Mustapha (2004) study Nigeria‘s foreign policy using the middle power approach. Thus, this research provides a standard by which Nigeria‘s status can be measured in international power relations.

This research serves as guide for Nigerian foreign policy decision-makers in the re-design of the already outdated ―Father Christmas‖ foreign policy fashion into a rational, sophisticated and reciprocal foreign policy. In addition, Nigeria‘s government can use this work in recruiting and detailing its ambassadors to head its diplomatic missions abroad.

# Scope of the Study

This research examined Nigeria‘s medium power role during the civilian rule in 1999 to 2015. This study, therefore, focused mainly at Nigeria‘s activism on international issues especially in

Africa, Nigeria‘s military and economy size as well as quality of its diplomatic corps within this period.

One challenge that came in the way of this study was getting the wherewithal to travel to United Nations in the United States, African Union Commission Ethiopia and the Developing-8 in Turkey. Though we succeeded in traveling to Ethiopia, the trip to United Nations Headquarters, New York and the Developing-8 in Ankara were not possible. In order to make up for this limitation, this researcher studied UN proceedings of resolutions, protocols, conventions, works and media programs relating to Nigeria as they constitute very important sources of data for this research.

Another challenge encountered in this research, which is common in studies of this nature, was mainly the primary data gathering. Attempts to conduct oral interviews at specified foreign missions and embassies (France, Senegal, South Africa, Mali, and Egypt) in Abuja were impossible. This was not unexpected as the claim was always about the inability for them to divulge classified information. Thus, the prolonged periods of trying to confirm dates of interviews and appointments, and getting the respondents committed to certain dates made the research work drag on longer than necessary. The Purposive Sampling, in which any diplomat that this researcher met which was willing to be interviewed was used.

# Organization of the Study

Chapter One is the General Introduction. It details the research proposal. It includes the Background of the Problem, the Statement of Research Problem, the Objective of the Problem, Research Questions, Significance of the Study, Scope and Limitations, and the Breakdown of Chapters.

Chapter Two is titled Literature Review and Theoretical Framework. It constitutes an Introduction and Literature Review. The review is organized in a thematic format. Finally, it contains the Theoretical Framework.

Chapter Three is titled Methodology and it contains the sources and types of data collected, the research design, interview population, type of interview used, as well as the challenges faced during field research.

Chapter Four is titled History of Nigeria‘s Engagement with the World and it gives the account of Nigeria‘s middle power engagement in global affairs from 1960 to 1999. This is organized in both thematic and chronological order.

Chapter Five is titled Challenges to Nigeria‘s Medium Power Role in Global Affairs under the 4th Republic, 1999-2015. This chapter presents the data collected through in-depth interviews, and analysis of the data is made in documentary fashion and finally, the research findings are enumerated.

Chapter Six is the final chapter and it contains the Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations.

# CHAPTER TWO

# LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

# Introduction

This chapter reviews theoretical international relations (IR) literature using the thematic literature review approach. A discussion of the Hans Morgenthau‘s realist theory of the elements of national power that gave this study theoretical orientation is made under this chapter.

# The Concept of Medium Power

Carsten Holbraad defines a middle power as a nation that occupies ―an intermediate place in the hierarchy of states, either a central situation in geography or a medial position in some antagonism‖ (Holbraad, 1971). From the above, any country that is located strategically, or a country which plays mediation role in conflict situation can be recognized as a middle power. This is a very narrow view especially the location aspect. Without economic power and military strength, location only cannot qualify a country as a medium power. The State of Djibouti, Yemen and Somalia are strategically located on the Strait of Hormuz, but without strong and large armed forces, they are considered small states in many international relations literature. However, Egypt which is also located in the same zone as above mentioned countries is considered to be an intermediate state due to its military power.

In yet another work, Holbraad raised the importance of middle powers in International Politics, and he stated that:

…focusing on great powers is like taking a too Olympian view of international life and conversely, focusing on small states is inadequate as they tend to be objects rather than subjects in the sense that their international behavior is highly conditioned by policies and relations of stronger powers. The best vantage ground for tackling some of the features of international life are the middle powers which are old and weary nations, exhausted from centuries of power politics at the highest level but rich in experience, including the young and energetic countries,

conscious of their potential and full of ambition, that emphasize coalition building and cooperation building (Holbraad, 1984).

From the above, Holbraad (1984) establishes grounds for the importance of middle powers in world affairs which essentially is about multilateralism at regional or global arenas. Also, this set of countries have many ―potentials‖ including economic resources, covering technology, mineral and natural resource deposits which make them aspire to influence global events.

But Cooper (1997) put forward the ―three waves‖ analysis of middle powers in the post-League international relations. The First Wave middle powers are the countries of the Non-Aligned world, notably India, Brazil and Indonesia and some former great powers like Italy, Portugal and Japan, whose position of influence, according to him had waned by the 1970s. But in reality, even though the influence of Italy and Portugal on international life fell in the 1970s, Japan is still an important nation in global institution building and agenda setting.

The Second Wave middle powers, according to Cooper (1997), emerged in the 1970s through the 1980s and according to him, they included Nigeria, Iran, Austria, Algeria and Mexico. And finally, the Third Wave middle powers emerged in the 1990s. They include Brazil, India, Ukraine, South Africa, and South Korea. However, some of these countries, like Brazil and India who are traditional middle powers of the 20th Century, reached the stage of consolidation during this period.

Ransom (1968) classified middle powers based on the hierarchy of ―national power‖. His analysis focused the major compositions of capabilities of a country – military power, diplomatic team and influence, size of economy and natural resources, population size. Nye (1996), Morgenthau (1985) and Baldwin (2002) hold similar view with Ransom (1968). But the military aspect can hardly be measured at once owing to the vague nature of defense policies.

But Cline (1975), using games analysis, proposed a simplified formula of measuring middle powers strength and influence.

PP = (C+E+M) X (S+W)

C – Critical Mass = Population + Territory E – Economic Power

M – Military Power (Hard Power)

S =Strategic Interests, and, W = Will to Pursue National Strategy

That is, according to him, a combination of the above factors in a nation indicates its power in the world environment. This view is similar to Morgenthau (1948) which we adopt as theoretical framework in this research.

Ping (2005) suggested nine indicators to be used in categorizing states as great, middle or small, in terms of power and influence. These indicators comprise population size, military size, geographic location, Gross Domestic Product, GDP growth rate, amount of exports as against imports, trade, GNP per capita, and standard of living.

International institutional Approach is that classification of a middle ranking nation‘s power based on the influence that country has within international organizations and regional institutions (Nolte, 2010). For example, membership of United Nations Security Council, possession of Nuclear Weapons, or ability to mobilize support for a particular issues (climate change, human trafficking, human rights, decolonization, peace, etc.) within an international organization and regional institutions or setting up regional agendas (development dialogue etc.) with consequences on global politics and economy. Hence, middle powers use institutional frameworks to settle or tackle these issues. This takes us back to Carsten Holbraad‘s coalition and cooperation building exhibited by middle powers through global institutions.

Nolte (2010) developed the Perception–derived thesis of middle powers which revolves on the matter of what other countries perceive a nation‘s position to be and it also entails looking at world politics and giving an opinion based on the reality at stake.

Balcer (2013) is of the opinion that the current global trend of cooperation building by advanced countries suggests the growing influence of middle powers. He pointed that many of G-20 members are middle powers (Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey). The Next-11 group consisted of eleven countries that are mostly Muslim countries. According to Balcer (2013), Vietnam, Nigeria and Philippines are said to be in the future very dynamic economies and will develop into the biggest world economies by 2050. Further according to Balcer (2013) each of them will have a GDP (PPP) bigger than Italy by that year.

# A Table Illustrating 18 Middle Powers Using the Purchasing Power Parity and Population

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **SN** | **Country** | **GDP (PPP) (bn USD)** | **Population** |
| 1 | Argentina | 711 | 41 |
| 2 | Bangladesh | 283 | 167 |
| 3 | Columbia | 468 | 46 |
| 4 | Egypt | 516 | 80 |
| 5 | Indonesia | 1122 | 240 |
| 6 | Iran | 930 | 76 |
| 7 | Malaysia | 447 | 29 |
| 8 | Mexico | 1659 | 110 |
| 9 | Nigeria | 489 | 175 |
| 10 | Pakistan | 465 | 177 |
| 11 | The Philippines | 394 | 96 |
| 12 | Saudi Arabia | 667 | 28 |
| 13 | South Africa | 555 | 50 |
| 14 | South Korea | 1556 | 49 |
| 15 | Thailand | 623 | 64 |
| 16 | Turkey | 1054 | 72 |
| 17 | Venezuela | 369 | 29 |
| 18 | Vietnam | 300 |  |

**Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook September 2014**

According to IMF (2011) the rate at which the economies of middle powers will grow will be higher than Russia, China, India and Brazil. Some of the middle powers, like Nigeria which

analysts project will grow two and a half times its present population and reach 400 million by 2050, have the potential of turning into ―one of the most populated nations of the world.‖ This will put Nigeria in the ―heavyweight category‖ and she will be able to play a key role in global political and economic decision making. However, the successes of the middle powers apart from South Korea will depend on their effective modernization and solving of their internal problems – defective democracy or a lack of it; corruption, economic stratification, organized crime, poverty, lower literacy rates, internal ethnic, religious and racial tensions and discrimination of women (Balcer, 2013).

According to Jordan (2003):

All middle powers display foreign policy behavior that stabilizes and legitimizes the global order, typically through [multilateral](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multilateralism) and cooperative initiatives. However, emerging and traditional middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioral differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, [egalitarian,](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egalitarian) [social democratic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_democracy) and not regionally influential. Behaviorally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform (Jordan, 2003).

But traditional and emerging middle powers are regionally influential and have strong grip of their region. Although they succumb to international pressures at times, which often lead them to make concessions (on territorial disputes, of democratizing etc.) they do so based on the principle of international law and best practices, not by force.

Ravenhill defined a middle power as a country that has physical capabilities of power; a country that concentrates on particular global issues; a country which is creative by providing innovative solutions to international problems; a country that uses coalition-building as framework for global initiatives; and country with considerable credibility in the comity of nations (Ravenhill, 1998).

Neumann (1992) stated that a country cannot be a middle power without commanding regional leadership or being a regional power house. His catalogue of ―a regional great power‖ includes a state i) which is geographically part of a defined region of the world; ii) which is able to condense and endure any threats from a group of other states; and iii) which is extremely vital to regional political, economic and security affairs.

Ostreud (1992) added that a middle power must also compete favorably with great powers in world affairs in addition to Neumann (1992) scaling. So middle powers are distinguished by their role or influence in international politics. Therefore, middle powers are first distinguished by their firm grip on their regions, and then the voice they have and the respect they command on the world stage in form of mobilization and leadership.

Balcer (2012) observed that in the coming decades, the role of the middle powers in the international arena is most probably going to increase substantially. However, the scope of their influence as well as the type of their political behavior will most of all depend on their ability to democratize and modernize themselves, and thus guarantee their internal stability. Increasing importance of the middle powers could potentially have two consequences: rising rivalry among them as well as between them and the great powers or a development of regional cooperation between them.

Laura Neak has the same opinion when she stated that:

Although there is some conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term middle power, middle powers are identified most often by their international behavior–called 'middle power diplomacy'—the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of ‗good international citizenship‘ to guide...their diplomacy. Middle powers are states who commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace. Middle powers help to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as

mediators and "go-betweens," and through international conflict management and resolution activities, such as UN peacekeeping (Neak, 1992).

Middle powers perform these internationalist activities because of an ―idealistic imperative‖ (Neak, 1992) they associate with being a middle power. The imperative is that the middle powers have a moral responsibility and collective ability to protect the international order from those who would threaten it, including, at times, the great powers or superpowers. This imperative was particularly profound during the most intense periods of the Cold War.

But broadly, middle powers can be differentiated according to potentials, functions and behavior. The potentials or capabilities of a nation are the hard power constituents of that nation which include the size and quality of its military force (including the possession of nuclear technology), the size and growth of its economy, the size and quality of its population, and other material power characteristics.

Secondly, when a middle power is said to be a functional one, it is seen as proactively engaged member of the international community in global problem- matrix. A nation cannot take such initiatives on intricate global issues as peace and stability, environment, human rights, and development, without sufficient wherewithal.

Finally, the international behavior a nation demonstrates in declarations or taking lead in global dialogues and enterprises, on its own, which directly or indirectly influence global economic, social and political system, can be said to be Middle power by international behavior.

# Origin of Middle Power Studies

On the origin of the ―Middle power‖, Rudd (2006) writes that it dates back to the 15th and 16th Century normative International Relations literature, where the Mayor of Milan classified European states into *grandissime* (empires), *mezzano* (medium) and *piccolo* (small.)

In the pre-Concert of Europe International Relations, the term, ―middle power‖, gained more ground as many scholars categorized nations of the world in a three-stage hierarchy. This schemer was established based on the size, power, economy and military capability of states. During the Concert of Europe, all countries were seen as equal and as such no country was a great power, superpower or small power (Mamose, 1990). But equality of states during this period as it is today is theoretical because any strong state can invade or bully a weaker one.

But with the formation of the League of Nations and later, the United Nations, the concept of

‗Middle Power‘ or middle–sized powers became more popular, especially with Canadian and Australian diplomats and policy-makers that represented these nations in the series of conferences that produced these organizations (Holbraad, 1971). During these periods, the national power, and the contribution such countries made in resolving the two World Wars and their expertise on international conflict mediation were the credentials forwarded by to claim the position of a middle power. However, according to John W. Holmes, the non-permanent membership of the League of Nations and the ―bloc realities‖ of Cold War made the actualization of this standard impossible as an official grading of countries (Holmes 1965).

After 1945, countries with relative national power standards started projecting their images as middle powers through specialized activities in the international arena, ranging from peacekeeping operations, conflict mediation, decolonization campaigns, human rights and democracy promotion to disarmament, climate change and deforestation (Holbraad, 1971; Holmes, 1965; Mamose, 1990; Yamasaki, 2009. Canada led the charge by mediating in several conflict situations between and among countries. The 1952 Suez Crisis was a major feat for Canadian diplomacy and since then, Canadian policy makers and diplomats have seen and portrayed their country as next to the great powers–the Big 5.

The wave of independence in the 1960s brought countries, which later became regional powers, and as such, entered the folk of middle powers, based on their national power constituents and the causes they advocate on the world stage (Ojigbo 1982; Ikoku 1981; Nigerian Government Supplement, 1991; Shagari 1981. Nigeria‘s economic boom, population and strategic role in Africa, informed her leadership of decolonization and its campaigns. Alongside other Third World Countries, Nigeria pushed for a New World Economic Order.

Yamasaki (2009) distinguishes the usages of a self-professed middle power on the one hand, and a recognized middle power, on the other. A self-professed middle power is that nation which takes lead in ―mediation‖ activities; which is seen as neutral or moderate in tensions between West and East or as a country which serves a bridge between developed and developing countries in North-South issues or being a regional leader. Here, Imperial State of Iran proclaimed such position as the ―police‖ of the Persian Gulf. Nigeria also falls into this group as most of its foreign policy declarations depict that of a regional police and stabilizer.

A recognized middle power, on the other hand, is recognized to be such based on its international roles and diplomatic behavior. Here also, Nigeria‘s use of institutional frameworks to stop apartheid in the Southern African region and her spearheading the establishment of regional organizations like the Organization of African Unity (OAU, now African Union), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), G-77, are cases in point. Japan‘s economic development and human security initiative put her into this category.

# International Relations and Power Politics

Realism is the most dominant theory of international relations (IR). Although there are other theories of IR, realism is the most influential theory that studies power. Thucydides, the ancient Greek philosopher explained Athens bullying of the tiny island of Melos in 400BC stated that

―the strong do what they want and the weak endure the consequences‖ (quoted in Grast, 1989). This is graphic explanation about power. According to John Mearsheimer ―calculations about power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them‖. Power therefore is central to the realist discourse of international politics. Critics of realism as a theory of international relations charge that all the realists have a uniform understanding of power. However, the different broad strands of views –the classical and structural– within the realist school suggest that the realist hold different perceptions on the role of power in international relations (Schmit, 2005; Dunne and Schmit, 2005). For example, Schmit (2005), explained that realism broadly is concerned with defining power, who has power, the effects of power and the behavior of actors in the struggle for power, and finally, how capabilities and influence manifest.

# Classical Realism and International Power Politics

Power is the main objective in international relations. Morgenthau (1985) asserted that

―international politics, like all politics, is the struggle of power‖ and that ―whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.‖ E. H. Carr agreed with Hans Morgenthau that ―politics are, then, in one sense always power politics‖ (Carr, 1946). Writing before Carr (1946) and Morgenthau (1985), Frederick Schuman (1933) also established that power is indispensable in international politics. He stated that ―all politics is a struggle for power, but while power is sought in domestic politics as a means towards other ends, power is sought as an end in itself in international politics‖. Therefore, power is crucial in domestic as well as international politics.

Morgenthau (1985) defined power by considering the relational aspects of power and the elements of national power. Morgenthau argues that ―when we speak of power, we mean man‘s control over the minds and actions of other men‖. He then defines power as ―a psychological

relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.‖ This perspective is close to Max Weber‘s definition of power as ―the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests‖ (Weber, 1947). Therefore, Morgenthau demonstrated how individual and state political actors are able to induce a certain behavior or change that is favorable to the powerful.

Morgenthau, however, made a note of caution that political power and physical force are two different things. He contends that political power is the use of threat of force and violence to achieve certain political objectives while the actual use of physical force is ―abdication of political power in favor of military or pseudo-military power‖.

E. H. Carr also view international politics as intricately woven with power politics. Carr maintained that power was conjoined with international politics but for the purpose of analysis, it can be divided into three categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion (Carr, 1946). Carr contended that military power was the most important form of power in international politics because when war breaks out, military power is the most important. Carr elucidated that ―the supreme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that the ultima ratio of power in international relations is war‖ (Carr, 1946). He also revealed that economic power is next in importance to military power because it is used to provide and service military power. Carr then settled that military power is the most essential element in the life of the state that it is both a means and an end in itself.

Therefore, Classical Realists believe that the essential continuity of politics as a permanent struggle for power shoots from the ultimate human drive for power. One of Morgenthau‘s core assumptions about human nature was that all men held an insatiable ―lust for power‖. According

to Morgenthau, ―man is a political animal by nature‖ who ―is born to seek power‖ (Morgenthau, 1946). Morgenthau further argued that despite the fact that men seek power, the reality is that other men are ―slave to the power others‖. He ascribed that desire for power in men is an outcome of the drive by men to survive and ‗animus dominandi‘. While the former is the need to secure vital needs such as food, shelter, and sex, the latter is the desire by men to dominate other men which stems from the scarcity and competition for the limited resources. Morgethau concludes that ―while man‘s vital needs are capable of satisfaction, his lust for power would be satisfied only if the last man became an object of his domination, there being nobody above or beside him, that is, if he became like God‖ (Morgenthau, 1946).

Finally, Hans J. Morgenthau argued that the supposition that man‘s inherent lust for power can be used to study the states‘ behavior. The ―ubiquity of the struggle for power in all social relations on all levels of social organization‖, Morgenthau concludes that ―international politics is of necessity power politics‖. Just like individuals, he claimed, the goal of every state was to maximize power to the optimal level. He viewed the activity of international politics ―as a continuing effort to maintain and to increase the power of one‘s own nation and to keep in check or reduce the power of other nations‖. Morgenthau likened the three basic patterns of the struggle for power among states – keeping power (status quo), increasing power (imperialism), and demonstrating power (prestige) – to man‘s lust for power that is manifest in the ―desire to maintain the range of one‘s own person with regard to others, to increase it, or to demonstrate it‖. According to this view, international politics is a continuous struggle between the status quo and revisionist powers.

# Structural Realism and International Power Politics

Structural realists agree with classical realists that the realm of international politics is a continuous struggle for power. However, they discard the classical notion that certain tendencies found in the nature of man propel the struggle for power. Waltz (1979), for example, pens that

―international politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation‖. Another scholar that is seen to be a structural realist, Thomas Hobbes, also argued that in the absence of an overarching power human beings display ―a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death‖ (Hobbes, 1985). Thomas Hobbes contends that the desire ―for power after power‖ by man was neither the result of greed nor drive for the domination of others, but ―because he (man) cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more‖ (Hobbes, 1985, brackets mine).

Waltz expounds that ―from the vantage point of neorealist theory, competition and conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts of life under conditions of anarchy: states in an anarchic order must provide for their own security, and threats or seeming threats to their security abound‖ (Waltz, 1979). Structural realists maintain that self-help is necessarily the principle of action in a situation where there is not overarching structure or authority. Another structural realist, Nicholas Spykman saw that in an anarchical international society, ―each individual state has to continue to defend for its very existence, as much as for the enjoyment of its rights and the protection of its interests, primarily on its own strength or that of its protectors‖ (Spykman, 1942). States therefore have to be able to be ready at all times to defend their sovereignty because other states may attack them at any time.

Structural realists also argue that the most important measure that a state can take to help guarantee its own survival is to accumulate a sufficient amount of power. According to Gilpin,

―power refers simply to the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states‖ (Gilpin, 1981). However, Walt and other structural realists see the distribution of capabilities in the international system as the key independent variable to explaining international outcomes such as wars, alliances, and the operation of the balance of power. This prompts the question about effect the international distribution of power has on states‘ behavior. Particularly, Walt (2002) observes that great powers are always sensitive to the capabilities of other states. In order to ensure their own survival in a self-help environment, structural realists assume that prudent states will only seek an appropriate amount of power. According to them, power is a means to the end of security.

So, power is a central concept of realism and Mearsheimer (2001) concedes that it is only by clearly defining power that we can understand the behavior of the great powers. Like Waltz, Mearsheimer recommends the elements of the national power approach and defines power as

―nothing more than specific assets or material resources that are available to a state‖. Unlike Waltz, however, he devotes greater attention to discussing these elements and attempts to provide a reliable way to measure state power. Mearsheimer distinguished between two kinds of state power: military power and latent power. The essence of a state‘s effective power is its military power, based largely on the size and strength of the army, as it compares to the military forces of other states. Nevertheless, by endorsing the view that power is equivalent to the possession of tangible resources, both Waltz and Mearsheimer overlook the extent to which power is a matter of perception.

In summary, realists are the theorists of power politics. The image of states perpetually struggling for power and security provides the foundation of the realist analysis of international politics. Therefore, as noted by Stephen Walt, ―the concept of power is central to realist theory,

yet there is still little agreement on how it should be conceived and measured‖ (Walt, 2002). Nevertheless, there is a degree of consensus on how they define power. Although classical realists, and Morgenthau in particular, defined power in terms of both the relational and elements of the national power approach, the overwhelming majority of realists in all three categories endorse the latter view. Even though there is disagreement on the most important elements that contribute to the power of a state, realists have been reluctant to infer the power of a particular state based solely on its ability to influence or control the actions of another state.

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Instead, realists have defined power in terms of the possession of material resources. By refusing to define power in a relational manner, and by insisting that power is largely fungible across diverse issue areas, realists continue to be vulnerable to a wide range of criticisms (Baldwin, 2002; Keohane, 1983). In addition to defining power in terms of the possession of material resources, there is a general tendency among realists to associate power with military might. While not taking them to be synonymous, realists do regard war-fighting ability to be the essence of state power. Power is largely defined in military terms by realists because they believe that force is the ultima ratio of international politics.

And yet, in the end, and notwithstanding all of the conceptual and measurement difficulties identified by the critics, the essence of the realist conception of international politics as fundamentally determined by the struggle for power seems, for many, to be intuitively correct.

When Joseph S. Nye Jr., who has been a vocal critic of realism, asked the former United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld about the concept of ―soft power,‖ Rumsfeld replied ―I don‘t know what ‗soft power‘ is‖ (Traub. 2005).

One of the main criticisms that the early generation of realists put forward against the scholars of the interwar period was that they had neglected the important role of power in international politics. The most famous critique of the interwar scholars‘ failure to recognize the centrality of power was provided by E.H. Carr. He expounded that he had written the book ―with the deliberate aim of counteracting the glaring and dangerous defect of nearly all thinking, both academic and popular, about international politics in English-speaking countries from 1919 to 1939 – the almost total neglect of the factor of power‖ (Carr, 1946).

The close relationship that exists between the realist school and the concept of power stems from its basic perception: conflict and competition are intrinsic to the practice of international politics. Barry Buzan (1996) asserts that the focus on power politics provides the apparent continuity of the realist tradition. However, there are important disagreements among realists themselves on the best way to conceptualize and measure power. Some realists define power in terms of measurable attributes, such as the size of a country‘s population and military forces, while others define power in a relational manner as the ability to exercise influence over other actors in the international system. Power is considered by some realists to be an end in itself, while others assert that it is a means to an end. The behavior of the state as a self-seeking egomaniac is seen to be a reflection of the characteristics of the people that comprise the state. For classical realists,

human nature is what explains why international politics is necessarily power politics. This reduction of the driving force behind international politics to a condition of human nature is one of the defining characteristics of classical realism and is most famously represented in the work of Hans J. Morgenthau. Morgenthau held that ―politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature‖ (Morgenthau, 1985).

Structural realism shifts the focus away from the laws of human nature and argues that the power-seeking behavior of states is a function of international anarchy. For structural realists, who are influenced by Thomas Hobbes, the condition of anarchy – that is, the fact that there is no

‗higher power‘ to ensure the peace among sovereign states – is often viewed as synonymous with a state of war. Structural realists argue that because there is always the possibility that any particular state may resort to force, the outbreak of war is a likely scenario in an anarchical environment. According to Waltz, anarchy prevents states from entering into co-operative agreements to end the state of war. Moreover, Waltz argues that it is the structure of the system that compels states to seek power.

Another key obstacle in the endeavor to make power the central focus in IR is the difficulty of reaching a consensus on the most appropriate way to define and measure such an elusive concept. Power, like a host of other important concepts in IR, is an essentially contested concept

– it means quite different things to different people. David Baldwin describes the two dominant traditions of power analysis in IR ―in terms of the elements of the national power approach, which depicts power as resources, and the relational power approach, which depicts power as an actual or potential relationship‖ (Baldwin, 2002). Proponents of the elements of the national power approach equate power with the possession of specific resources. All of the important resources +that a state possesses are typically combined in some fashion to determine its overall

aggregate power. The resources that are most often used as an indicator of national power include the level of military expenditure, size of the armed forces, gross national product, size of territory, and population. One of the difficulties with the elements of the national power approach is the issue of power conversion; that is ―the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behavior of others‖. In the end, it is not the mere possession of power resources that matters, but the ability to convert these into actual influence. An alternative to the power as resources approach is the relational power approach that was championed by behavioral oriented political scientists during the 1950s and 1960s. According to Robert Dahl, who was an influential advocate of the relational conception of power, ―A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do‖ (Dahl, 1957). Fundamental to the relational conception of power is the ability to demonstrate a change in outcomes. According to this view, power is a process of interaction whereby a state is able to exercise influence over the actions of another state. Power as a set of resources is deemed to be less important than the actual ability of actor A to change the behavior of actor B.

# The International Balance of Power

Realism observes that international politics or the behavior of states towards each other is based on the constant struggle for power. Waltz states: "so long as the notion of self-help persists, the aim of maintaining the power position of the nation is paramount to all other considerations" (Waltz, 1979). In thisway, international politicsis essentially power politics and relations. In order to containpotential abuse of power, the balance of powerthereforebecomes imperative the realist perspective of international relations. The balance of power canbe understood by defining power (Kauppi and Viotti, 1999). Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* provides this within the

field of international relations bytransforming ‖ idealist advocacy to realist analysis," (Brecher and Harvey, 2002).

Morgenthau defines power basically as man's control over the minds and actions of other men or the ability to convince people to behave in a certain way. In military terms, he sees power as either the threat of the use of force or the actual use of force in war. He also believes that the use of power can be legitimate or illegitimate, depending on the existence or not of moral and legal justifications (Morgenthau, 1985). More importantly, he styles thatpower is relative, that is: the power of one state is evaluated in "terms of its capabilities relative to the capabilities of other states" (Kauppi and Viotti, 1999). Despite Morgenthau's efforts to clarify the concept of power, there is no agreement on the definition of power among realists. Some realists view power as absolute, others as relative (Kauppi and Viotti, 1999). So,definition of power is as fluid as there are many different ways to define it depending on the indices a particular scholar uses. This therefore forms part of the problems indefining what the balance of power is.

According to Morgenthau, the balance of power can be understood as a situation or as a policy. As a situation, the balance of power could be in equilibrium or disequilibrium. A balance of power in equilibrium refers to conditions whereby the power of one state or set of states is literally "balanced" by the equivalent power of another state or set of states (Claude, 1962), as it may have been the case during the Cold War between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union or NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A balance of power in disequilibrium describes a condition in which the distribution of power among the contending states is not balanced (Claude, 1962). This condition clearly favors the leading hegemon and may result in the abuse of power by the strongest state, "which neutralizes other states" and may feel "free to be the deciding force and the deciding

voice" (Claude, 1962). This seems to be the case with the U.S.A., after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The balance of power as a policy often refers to actual efforts to encourage the preservation of equilibrium (Claude, 1962). This policy to reach equilibrium would be most commonly found in a system that acknowledges that unbalanced power is unsafe (Claude, 1962).

On the other hand, the balance of power as a policy could also promote disequilibrium: "Morgenthau ... asserts that it has been standard American policy to maintain 'unchallengeable supremacy' in the Western Hemisphere" (Claude, 1962). For Morgenthau and others classical realists, however, a policy of equilibrium is essential to preserve the sovereignty of nations and the pluralistic nature of the international system. In this sense, they believe that the balance of power can be created by "statesmen" (Kauppi and Viotti, 1999) and that it may well be not only the best, but also the only choice: The balance of power and policies aiming at the preservation of the international balance of power are not only inevitable but are essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations; and that the instability of the international balance of power is due not to the faultiness of the principle but to the particular conditions under which the principle must operate in as society of sovereign nations (Morgenthau, 1985).

Morgenthau further argues that "the balancing process can be carried on either by diminishing the weight of the heavier scale or by increasing the weight of the lighter one" (Morgenthau, 1985). In this case, the balance of power would have to signify a policy aimed at changing the status quo or at preserving it. He offers four ways in which this balancing of power can be done. The first form make a hostile state weak by dividing it or keeping it divided. For example, "the Soviet Union, from the 1920s to the present, has consistently opposed all plans for the

unification of Western Europe" (Morgenthau, 1985). The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq could perhaps be seen in the same light.

The second manner to change, maintain or re-establish the balance is through territorial compensation. During the "later part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the principle of compensation was again deliberately applied to the distribution of colonial territories and the delimitation of colonial or semi-colonial sphere of influence" (Morgenthau, 1985). Although this particular form of maintaining the balance among European powers (and their dominance in the world) worked for a while, it soon led to the First World War, because of fundamental conflict of interests among European powers. One could even argue that a similar attempt to re-establish the balance, after the First World War, actually led to the Second World War.

The third way, in which a policy can change, maintain or re-establish the balance, is through arm races or disarmament. However, Morgenthau maintains that the arms race is unstable, because it increases "the burden of military preparations devouring and ever greater portion of the national budget and making forever deepening fears, suspicions, and insecurity"(Morgenthau, 1985: 200). On the other hand, disarmament could be a form of re-establishing the balance, "if not to establish permanent peace" (Morgenthau, 1985). Although disarmament may reduce military confrontations, Morgenthau and other realists argue that it is difficult to control disarmament among competing nations (Claude, 1962). Moreover, recently some feared that if the U.S and Canada participated jointly in building a missiles defense, this may have triggered an arms race, perhaps with China and Russia, mainly.

Lastly, alliances are "historically the most important manifestation of the balance of power." In this case, alliances can be either a policy aimed at changing, maintaining or re-establishing the

balance. For example, "Nations A and B, competing with each other ... to maintain and improve their relative power positions ... can add to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary" (Morgenthau, 1985). Although, the Allied Powers during the Second World War helped to stop the imperial threats from world domination by the Axis Powers, many realists do not recommend the formation of permanent alliances. They argue that alliances can also destabilize a peaceful situation at least in five ways:

1. Alliances would enable aggressive states to combine military capabilities for aggression.
2. Alliances threaten enemies and provoke them to form counter-alliances, which reduce the security for *both* nations.
3. Alliance formation may draw otherwise neutral parties into opposed coalitions.
4. Once states join forces, they must control the behavior of their own allies to discourage each member from reckless aggression against its enemies, which would undermine the security of the alliances' other members.
5. The possibility always exists that today's ally might become tomorrow's enemy (Kegley and Wittkopf, 534).

The balance of power or the policy of states to maintain, change or reestablish a preferred situation can be a very unstable process, since to do so states might often resort to war (Sheehan, 1990). For example, some realists argue that a multipolar system is more complex and unstable. On the other hand, they view a bipolar system as being more "simple and predictable": in such a system, "direct conflicts between superpowers" can be more easily circumvented (Kauppi and Viotti, 1999). Although the policy of balance of power seems to be unstable, one must also argue that the sovereignty of the state is important and the balance of power could be used to maintain a pluralist international system, even at the cost of war (Claude, 1962). Morgenthau agrees with

this view, but he also denies that the balance of power is the sole basis for securing the sovereignty of states.

The clouding picture begins when we find Morgenthau saying that "Small nations have always owed their independence either to the balance of power ... or to the preponderance of one protecting power... or to their lack of attractiveness for imperialistic aspirations. This would seem to indicate that the preservation of weak states depends upon an equilibrium, the absence of an equilibrium, or sheer luck (Claude, 1962).

According to Inis Claude, the picture becomes even more confused when some scholars assert that classical realism shows that a "preventive war" is a "natural outgrowth of balance of power" and that "most of the wars that have been fought since the beginning of the modem state system have their origin in the balance of power" (Claude, 1962). This idea leads them to raise the question of whether the balance of power views war as a means to an end or an "evil" that is supposed to be suppressed or both (Claude, 1962). Despite the criticisms that realism and the balance of power theory receive from scholars, including realist scholars themselves, we cannot easily discard the realist paradigm and replace it with completely new ones. It should rather be accepted that "a paradigm does not provide all answers, it may only provide scholars with the promise of some answers" (Brecher and Harvey, 2002).

In conclusion, the balance of power theory offer fundamental propositions about the international system. It gives us an understanding of the nature of man, the state and the international system, and why war occurs and how it could be avoided. Although explanations of various issues and situations are clearly ambiguous, classical realism and the balance of power theory help to understand our system better. For instance, Carr states that where "utopianism has become a hollow and intolerable sham, which serves merely as a disguise for the interests of the privileged,

the realist performs an indispensable service in unmasking [this sham, which is even a product of realism itself]" (Carr, 1946). Thus, as realism remains a leading paradigm of our times, it is certainly worth deepening our understanding of its potential contributions to the creation of a more stable future.

# State and the Projection of National Power

What makes a state superior or inferior to others? What should be the focus areas of state‘s development? What elements should be put together in order to make a state prosper? These questions have been the topics of debate since ancient times. The concept of the ―Elements of National Power‖ has evolved with time. It has taken new shape and meanings with the advent of capitalism, industrial revolution, modern transportation & communication and recently, the internet.

Power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get a desired outcome (Morgenthau, 1985; Carr, 1946). Some of the factors that are considered as elements of National power by most scholars include geography, natural resources, population, leadership, quality of governance, extent of economic development, industrial capacity, technology, military, ideology, National character and morale, diplomacy and government.

# What is National Power?

Many scholars such as Morgenthau, Carr, Waltz, Cline, have tried to group these factors. Some of these classifications include permanent and temporary, natural and social, as well as tangible and intangible elements. It can be appreciated that even boundaries between these classifications seem to wither away with time - factors once considered permanent such as geography can prove to be temporary. Similarly, natural factors such as population change shape quickly due to globalization factors bringing quick social changes.

All elements of National power are dependent on each other through a complex network of causes and effects (Morgenthau, 1946). Depending on a state‘s geography and relations with other states, strength in a few elements can cover up for lack in all others. As a corollary, lack in a few critical elements can render all other elements useless. National power can thus be considered as a complex concept, which is highly context dependent. A certain combination of National elements may make a state a super power in one part of the world or in a point in time, but may not be enough in a different context. National power is a relative concept, depending upon how well other states are doing. A state‘s true power is always relative to its neighbors, rivals, competitors - basically any other state with whom one may come in comparison.

# Measurement of National Power

The measurement of a state‘s power is a difficult matrix because it involves the task of measuring and analyzing a large number of tangible and intangible elements in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The need to analyze the actual and potential power of a state further makes the task difficult. However, political scientists advocate the measurement of National power in respect of following three factors:

# Domain of National Power

The domain of national power refers to ―the set of persons whose behavior is significantly changed by the application of power.‖ Domain is divided into internal and external domains. Internal domain is constituted by the territory and population within the boundaries of a country. External domain includes those territories and populations outside that belong to its ―sphere of influence‖ (Morgenthau, 1985).

The internal domain can be measured in terms of population, area and gross National product. The external domain can be analyzed in terms of spheres of influence, alliances, dependencies

and the degree of penetration in the political processes of other countries. The external domain of a country like Nigeria can be measured in terms of its alliances like African Standby Force or ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

However, measuring of domain is a difficult task. The quality of alliance relation is not measureable. African Standby Force continues to be in existence and has registered an expansion as well. However, it now operates with a relatively less effective and less useful role. It cannot be ascertained exactly as to how much influence Nigeria has over Cameroon, Chad or Niger. Therefore, measurement of domain of power can be done only in a limited way.

# Range of National Power

This is ―the difference between the highest reward and the worst punishment which a power holder can bestow or inflict upon some persons in his/her domain‖ (Morgenthau, 1985). Range is the intensity of the power exercised upon others. The internal range or intensity of power can be measured by taking into account the use of force and punishment as well as of reward or distribution of values for exercising power over the people at home. A democratic government uses influence, persuasion and rewards, whereas a tyrant or a dictator uses force and punishment for securing obedience to his policies and laws.

The external range or the intensity of the power can be measured in terms of the means which a state actually uses or can use for securing its desired ends and policies. The amount of economic rewards (aid, grant, loans) that a state gives or receives can indicate the range of power that it has in international relations. However, there exists no specific way to precisely measure the intensity of the power. USA has been the biggest aid giver and the most developed country of the world, yet we cannot exactly measure the intensity of its power over other states.

# Scope of National Power

Scope of National power covers ―the set or collection of all the particular classes of behavior, relations and affairs that are effectively subjected to government power‖ (Morgenthau, 1985). Scope consists of all the activities of the government, internal as well as external. The external activities include the demonstration of power to keep others dependent for one thing or the other and to use the interdependence of relations for ones benefit.

# Elements of National Power

National power refers to national capabilities which is state‘s ability to achieve an objective along with other states through the application of military, political, economic, psychological or other forms of power and influence (Dunmoye, 1995; Morgenthau, 1985; Holsti, 1977). It includes all physical object, talent or quality that can be used to affect the behavior of other states. There are many characteristics of power but the following shall be discussed because other elements may be subsumed under these: geography, population, natural resources, Gross National Product, military capabilities.

Geography, as a national power element, comprise the physical size of a state, its topography, political and strategic location, and climate. According to Dunmoye (1994) geography can be an advantage or otherwise for a state or it may have no effect on that state‘s power. While sheer size of a state may not be sufficient to make that state a super power (Morgenthau, 1985), it permits for large population, large industrial base and domestic source of food and natural resources. Physical size also has the positive advantage for military defense. Although smaller states are more vulnerable militarily, it is no guarantee that large states cannot be overwhelmed if they do not possess other attributes of national power. The republic of Niger is many times bigger that

the State of Israel, but the latter is more powerful because it controls sophisticated weapons of war and a stronger economy.

Population is very vital element of national power. Some scholars are of the opinion that it is very difficult to become a super power or a great power without a large population because it gives large number of people with talents and the man power for industrial, technological and military capabilities that also go to make a super power (Simon, 1990). However, there are many dimensions to the attribute of population. The age, sex, and spatial distributions of the population is very crucial to making a country powerful. According to Hans Morgenthau these ―quantifiable aspects of the population tell us something of the size of the population that is productive, suitable for military service and the unity and for production‖ (Morgenthau, 1985). Hans Morgenthau further emphasized that the quality of human resources within a state in order to assess the degree to which a people‘s capabilities have been developed so that they can make a contribution to national power. Morgenthau illustrated that the extent to which higher education and access to specialized knowledge in science have implications for national power cannot be overemphasized. This helps a state to build its military capabilities in form of weaponry, social scientists and administrators to advice government, and many other advanced people. The health of a state‘s population is an important base for power (Simon, 1990). Military power, according Morgenthau, depends in part on having a young and healthy population. He stressed that poor distribution of medical facilities and healthcare delivery will create physical and mental handicaps and military ―rejects‖.

Natural resources constitute a national power base for states (Dunmoye, 1995; Morgenthau, 1985). The more needs a state has the more vulnerable it becomes internationally. Therefore, states with natural resources deposits within their borders and have the technological knowhow

(Dunne and Schmidt, 2004) to explore and use these resources can be said to have attributes of national power. If a state can be self-sufficient in natural resources then that state is less vulnerable to foreign influence. Food and other agricultural sufficiency is another important attribute of national power (Alcock and Newcombe, 1977). Therefore, if a country cannot feed its population, then it can be influenced by other nations in international politics.

It is impossible to develop power in modern times without industrialization and it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a nation to get industrialized without adequate possession of key raw materials. Raw materials influence national power, national policies and international trade of the nation. The United States has been nearly self-sufficient in respect of key minerals and this fact has largely contributed to its industrial and military strength. The interdependence among nations stands largely constituted by the necessities of trade relations in respect of minerals and raw materials for their industrial needs.

A nation cannot hope to be a big military, industrial and economic power without the possession of adequate quantities of raw- materials. The importance of oil as the key source of energy is a well-known fact of present day international relations. Oil diplomacy in world politics of our times solely depends upon the fact that the OPEC countries monopolies world crude production and have vast oil reserves (Kao, 2006).

Oil has tremendous importance, both for industrial production and military strength and mobility. Georges Benjamin Clemenceau, a French politician once observed that: ―One drop of oil is worth one drop of blood of our soldiers‖, is true even today. The importance of uranium as a source of atomic power is well known. Adequate means of energy security contribute to the national power of a nation (Kao, 2006). As such, raw materials constitute an important element of national power.

However, merely the existence of raw materials cannot be automatically a source of power. The ability to exploit and utilize the raw- materials is a factor almost as important as the existence of raw-materials. This ability is directly linked with the level of scientific, technological and industrial advancement.

Food indeed is an important element of national power. Food determines policies. The existence of large stocks of food grains and surplus food production can be a source of vital strength of a nation. A nation deficient in food production can rarely become a major power. According to Hans Morgenthau, ―Nations self-sufficient in food are better placed than nations which import food‖ (Kao, 2006; Morgenthau, 1985: 119).

The food shortage in India was a highly limiting factor of the Indian foreign policy during 1950s and 60s (Morgenthau, 1985). Food shortage leads to power shortage. Acute food problem is a big source of weakness for all the developing countries. It is keeping them dependent upon developed states who have surplus food productions. The Green Revolution of 1970s enabled India not only to sustain its economy but also to preserve and develop its national power.

The military preparedness of a nation is dependent upon adequate supplies of food. A popular valid saying has been; ―Armies travel on their stomach‖. However, the food factor is also inseparably linked up with other factors particularly with population, science and technology. Food production is dependent upon agricultural technology and industrial capacity. Man-power is vitally important for food production. Production of food can be stepped up by human efforts and the application of advanced agricultural technology. The ability to utilize sea food resources can help a nation to overcome its food problem. This ability is dependent upon science and technology. As such food is again an element of national power. However its role as a factor of

National Power has to be evaluated along with other factors, population, climate, and level of scientific and technological development of a nation.

Military power is a vitally important part of national power of a state. The importance of military factor as an element of national power can be judged from the fact that many persons regard these synonymous. Military power is not national power, nevertheless it is an important part of national power which contributes to its strength and effectiveness.

Military preparedness is a background factor for the success of a foreign policy and it is a tangible factor capable of supporting the foreign policy and promoting national interest.‖ It influences the level of success of foreign policy. The super powers and other major powers of our times have been big military powers. By virtue of being a major military power, besides other factors, India is considered to be a major power having a potential to be a super power in the next 20 years or so (Payne, 2002). Military preparedness as a factor of national power covers:

1. War technology or technological innovations; ii) Military leadership; and, iii) Quantity and quality of soldiers.

War technology refers to the nature and type of weapon system that is available with the army of the state (Payne, 2002). Modern warfare is a sophisticated technological warfare. The quantity and technical quality of weapons and military equipment is a major factor that determines the level of military power of a nation. Advanced military technology is always a source of strength and strategic advantage.

War technology is an important factor but it can be fruitful only when backed by efficient planning and systematic and effective use. This brings into focus the role of military leadership. According to Keneth Payne, military planning is a valuable factor of military action in a war (Payne, 2002). Skilled, trained, experienced, dedicated, energetic and disciplined military

leadership alone can make the best use of available weapons, equipment and manpower. A war victory can be possible only under effective and efficient military leadership.

In a war situation, weapons and equipment play a key role but their role and effectiveness is dependent upon the quantity and quality of soldiers (Payne, 2002; Morgenthau, 1985). Military equipment and weapon-system is important, but not as much as the soldiers who actually use these weapons and equipment (Brown et al, 2004). The number, skill, training, discipline, dedication and morale of the soldiers are essential factors which can make possible an effective and successful use of military weapons and machines. One example was in the Indian-Pakistan wars. Pakistan had a superior weapon system, tanks and aircrafts in both the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. However, it failed to use this to its advantage because of inadequately trained and less skilled men behind these machines. Indian soldiers could provide a decisive and befitting answer to Pakistani aggressions because of their superior qualities. Kargil Victory was also the outcome of the qualities of discipline, training and dedication of Indians Officers and Jawans (Brown et al, 2004).

Therefore, military preparedness as an element of national power cannot be relegated to only large military and equipment but their quality as well. Military preparedness is also directly dependent upon such factors as technology, industrial capacity, economic development, state of economy, policies of the government, and strategic factors. Hence it is not an independent determinant of national power.

Leadership of a nation is an important human element of national power. The utilization of man power resources, natural resources, raw materials, technology, industrial capacity, military power and ideology for strengthening the national power of a state is dependent upon the qualities of the leadership that runs the government of the state (Nye, 2004).

Civil and military planning is a function of the political leaders. To make and implement foreign policy is the responsibility of the leadership, the decision-makers of the state, in particular. National Power is basically the power of the leaders, statesmen and diplomats of the nation to act strongly in international relations (Nye, 2004; Morgenthau, 1985). The quality of leadership determines the nature and extent of power that a nation can use for securing its national interests. Efficient, devoted and mature leadership can be a source of national power in the sense that a judicious use of power can surely increase the national power and its operational effectiveness. Therefore, national Power means the ability of national leaders and decision-makers. The mere possession of material and human resources cannot lead to national power if the agency for steering and coordination of human efforts, that is, the government of the state is not well organized, efficient and effective. It is the business of government to coordinate direct, control men and material resources for securing power for fulfilling goals of national interest.

Morgenthau (1985) illustrated that for decades China remained a weak power because, among other reasons, the central government lacked effective control over major portions of the country before 1949. He further cited the case of France where political power remained fragmented among a number of political parties until Charles De Gaulle took control in France in1958.

This not only brought repeated crisis to the polity but also made it difficult for the French government to pursue policies on an enduring basis. Such a situation acted as a serious limitation on French power in international relations. As such, effectiveness of governmental organization and administration within the state is very essential for a nation to become powerful.

Diplomacy is another important element of national power. Hans J. Morgenthau regards it as the most important, though unstable element of national power (Morgenthau, 1985). Diplomacy is the means of foreign policy and as such helps it to achieve better results through judicious hard

work and persuasion in international relations. Success of foreign policy of a nation largely depends upon the quality of diplomacy that it takes to foreign capitals. Diplomacy of high quality can bring the ends and means of foreign policy into harmony with the available resources of national power. It can tap the hidden sources of national strength and transform these fully and squarely into political realities (Smith, 2007; Sempa, 2000).

British diplomacy has been instrumental in projecting Britain as a major power in world politics, even after the loss of its status as a mighty imperial power. During the inter-war period, the United States was politically and militarily very strong but it played a minor role in world politics because of its weak diplomacy. At times, weak diplomacy has acted as a source of weakness for India (Smith, 2007).

The role of diplomacy as an element of national power has undergone a big change in contemporary times (Wittkopf, 1994). The emergence of new diplomacy – open and conference diplomacy, has somewhat limited its role as a factor of national power. Therefore, Morgenthau‘s thesis that diplomacy is the most important of all the elements of national power cannot hold in today‘s international environment. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that diplomacy is an important factor of national power. A diplomacy of high quality can effectively contribute towards an effective and successful exercise of national power.

# National Interest

The term ―national interest‖ has been used by statesmen and scholars since the founding the nation-states to describe the aspiration and goals of sovereign entities in the international arena (Neuchterlein, 1976). The history of the concept ‗interest‘, conceived as a diplomatic tool, dates back to sixteenth century European state system. One of the earliest realist thinkers, Nicollo Machiavelli, in his seminal work, *The Prince,* predicted the emergence of interest as an

organizing principle for thought on international relations. He stated that the prince has to know when to not use the power, as well as when to use it (in Clinton, 1994). You may have splendid moral goals, argued Machiavelli, but without sufficient power and the willingness to use it, you will accomplish nothing (Roskin, 1994). Another scholar who contributed to the national interest approach is Clausewitz. According to him, all state behavior is motivated by it needs to survive and prosper. ―To safeguard its interests the states must rationally decide to go to war. Ultimately war, however, if foolish, for it serves no national interest‖ (Clausewitz, 1976).

Many international relations literature treated national interest. Therefore, making a single, universally agreed definition of national interest is difficult. However, national interest can be defined as the perceived needs and desire of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment (Neuchterlein, 1976). Roskin observed of national interest thus: ―It seems crisp, clear, objective: what‘s good for nation as a whole in international affairs. What‘s good for a nation as a whole in domestic affairs is the *public* interest‖ (Roskin, 1994).

# Morgenthau and levels of national interest

Hans J. Morgenthau saw two levels of national interest: *the vital (primary)* and the *secondary*. According to him, to preserve the first, which is concerned with the fundamental physical existence of the state. This is the core or objective interest of the state. A country does not compromise on her primary national interest and it can go to war in order to protect this interest. Nations do what they must do to protect this interest. Vital national interests covering national security, sovereignty, protection of citizens and institutions and fundamental values like democracy, are relatively easy to define. On the other hand, secondary interests are subjective state interests which cover need for economic development and progress, projection of power,

and promotion of international norms such as sports, peace and cultural diplomacy. On these, a states may seek to negotiate or compromise. Typically, they fall outside of the first category and represent no threat to state sovereignty. However, these interests can grow in the minds of statesman until they seem to be vital (Roskin, 1994).

In addition to this, Morgenthau and other realist scholars distinguishes between *temporary* and *permanent* interests (Morgenthau, 1952), *specific* and *general* interests, and *complementary* and *conflicting* interests (Roskin, 1994). Permanent interests are relatively constant over a long period of time. Variable or temporary interests are what a particular nation chooses to regard as its national interest at any particular time. General interests are those that a country applies in a positive manner to a large geographic area, to a large number of nations, or in several specific fields. Specific interests are closely defined in time or space and often are the logical extension of general interests (Nitoiu, 2009).

# War and Diplomacy

Diplomacy and war are both instruments of foreign policy. If world politics is identified as being the interplay between conflict and cooperation, then, war and diplomacy can be said to represent the two defining institutions (Ghosh 2009). Nevertheless in contemporary international system nations politely engage in diplomacy and eschew aggression or outright war on other states as reciprocity is expected. An essential ingredient in international relations is diplomacy. According to Starke J. G. in ―the past, more often than not, disputes led to war but nowadays States shrink from so drastic a culmination of their controversies, and if the dispute cannot be resolved, more usually a rupture of trade or diplomatic relations ensures. The UN Charter directs in Article 33 that parties to a dispute that might endanger peace should first ―seek a resolution through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional

agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice (Umozurike 2001). Brutal force or savage declaration of war is a barbaric act that is alien to the contemporary international order and age of globalization where diplomacy and corporation between nations is the trend. Diplomacy is the underlying word in international relations for friends and adversaries. Therefore, diplomacy is the agency through which foreign policy seeks to attain its purpose by agreement rather than by war. The focal point of diplomacy is the prevention of disputes degenerating into war. This is by negotiation, dialogue and other pacific resolution of dispute methods. Diplomacy entirely involves direct government-to-government interactions so that a particular state can persuade governments in their countries to act in the manner in which it wants them to do (Ghosh 2009). On the other hand, war is one of the perennial proclivities of human existence and international relations. Communities, states and nations have constantly engaged in warfare as an instrument of conducting foreign policy, acquisition of power, imperialism, and control of hegemony. Although there has been the great desire of man to leave peacefully without war and/or limit the extent of war, it inevitably periodically occurs. According to Hunt (2008) war is often regarded as inevitable and many states seem to prefer peace only when it comes from their enemies‘ complete submission. This has been the case from time immemorial and war has continued to be a horrendous genocide to the lives and civilizations of mankind at the expense of peace and collective development. As recorded by Raaflaub (2007) the historian of ancient law Sir Henry Maine, famously remarked that War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention. Karl von Clausewitz is a realist that recognized the use of war to achieve national goals and objectives. According to Clausewitz (1976) war is a continuation of commerce… by other means. He noted that war is an instrument of policy: it must necessarily bear its character, it must measure with its scale; the conduct of

War, in its great features, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws (Clausewitz, 1976). The primary feature of war is that it has a certain state of organized violent conflict that is engaged in between two or more separate social entities. Leaders, sometimes declare war under the impression that their actions are primarily defensive, unfortunately when critically analyzed a disillusionment of unprovoked, unwarranted, or disproportionate aggression emanates and this has been taken place over the years.

War as an instrument of foreign policy has been prohibited by Kellogg-Briand Pact and the United Nations Charter. The Kellogg Briand Pact is a treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of National Policy. The Kellogg Briand Pact was signed on August 27, 1928 and entered into force on July 24 1929… the Kellogg Briand Pact condemn recourse to war for the solution of their international controversies, and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another (Arent and Beck, 1996). It was also agreed in the Kellogg Briand Pact that ―the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by peaceful means.

Enough time would have been given to weigh the success or failure of the normal diplomacy and to progressively intensify intervention through coercive diplomacy if the conventional diplomacy fails. Coercive diplomacy has to do with credible threats that would achieve enumerated goals. According to George (1991) coercive diplomacy is ―persuasion backed with credible threats to achieve set goals. This is buttressed by Art and Cronin (2003) who says that ―Coercive diplomacy has as one of its essential features, and often its only feature, the threat or limited use of force. In a similar vein, Lake (2001) says coercive diplomacy is ―the use of threatened force

to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would. Tarzi (2006) noted that

―ultimately the utility of coercion is embedded in achieving national objectives without coercion actually being used. Coercive diplomacy is different from pure coercion and involves bargains, negotiations, and compromises as well as coercive threats. The summary of it all is that coercive diplomacy is the act of using threats, forceful persuasion and other coercive acts (short of full blown war) to achieve set goals and targets.

Cases abound in international relations where coercive diplomacy is used by nations to achieve or compel a goal or set target. Although recently made more coherent and tangible by Alexander George, the ideas and practice of coercive diplomacy has been known and applied more than two thousand five hundred years ago. As far back as 500BC Sun Tzu declared that ―to subdue the enemy without fighting is the apex of skill (Tsu, 2012). This is inherently referring to coercive diplomacy. Although diplomacy is sometimes ineffective for recalcitrant nations, coercive diplomacy is a more effective tool. More so, in this age when war is no longer an instrument of foreign policy, declaration of war tantamount to two wrongs making a right, which is an anathema. Despite the well-articulated, highly effective and generally accepted treaties regulating the use of force and diplomatic approaches to the settlement of conflicts; some advanced countries are not following the due process but apparently twisting the treaties to achieve their ulterior goals as evident in say Libya and Syria. Every proposal for a negotiated end to the war that has been issued by the African powers, Italy, or Russia has been met with new US-NATO provocations. The allied powers are clearly determined to sabotage any diplomatic man oeuvres that cut across their agenda. They are evidently taking advantage of the weakness of Africa in particular and Third World countries in general to exploit and control resources. This was the case with Congo, Iraq, Syria and Libya.

# 1.9 Taxonomy of Global Power Politics 1.9.1Superpowers

There is no agreed definition of what is a 'superpower'. Instead, there are many different definitions as there are scholars that defined it (Nossal, 2009). However, a fundamental characteristic that is consistent with all definitions of a superpower is a nation or state that has mastered the seven dimensions of state power: geography, population, economy, resources, military, [diplomacy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy) and [national identity.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_identity)

The very term ‗superpower‘ is about global reach. The coining of the term in 1944 by William Fox in his book, *The Superpowers: The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union – Their Responsibility for Peace*, spoke of the global reach of a super-empowered nation. As the Cold War became more entrenched, that which distinguished a nuclear ‗superpower‘ from a 19th century ‗great power‘ was possession of the power of ultimate destruction and the strategic doctrine of nuclear deterrence that emerged from it. The processes of globalization that characterize the present century mean that a great power needs more than nuclear capability (Fox, 1944). There is need to broaden out to the more traditional ‗great power‘ attributes of maintaining sufficient diplomatic, economic, and military resources for preserving the international order in which great powers presume themselves to be the main actors. Beyond being merely ‗great‘, or only ‗super‘, they must now be ‗global‘ and attain transnational competencies that permit interaction with non-state actors, regional forums and the instruments and institutions of global governance. In short, a 21st century superpower needs to be (a) a great power in the traditional sense and (b) a militarily outstanding one, but also (c) a transnational performer.

# Great Powers

A great power is a [sovereign state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state) that is recognized as having the ability and expertise to exert its influence on a global scale. Great powers characteristically possess [military](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military) and [economic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy)

strength, as well as diplomatic and [soft power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soft_power) influence, which may cause [middle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_power) or [small](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_power)

[powers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_power) to consider the great powers' opinions before taking actions of their own. [International](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_relations_theory)

[relations theorists](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_relations_theory) have posited that great power status can be characterized into power capabilities, spatial aspects, and status dimensions (Howard, 2008). While some nations are widely considered to be great powers, there is no definitive list of them. The status of great powers is recognized in conferences such as the [Congress of Vienna](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_Vienna) (Louden, 2007; Paul et al, 2005) or the [United Nations Security Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council) ([China,](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China) [France,](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/France) [Russia,](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia) the [United Kingdom,](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom) and the [United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) serve as the body's [five permanent members](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_members_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council)). The status of great powers has also been formally and informally recognized in forums such as the [Group of Seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_of_Seven), G7 (Penttila, 2013).

The term "great power" was first used to represent the most important powers in Europe during the post-[Napoleonic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon_I_of_France) era. The "Great Powers" constituted the "[Concert of Europe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concert_of_Europe)" and claimed the right to joint enforcement of the postwar treaties. The formalization of the division between [small powers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_powers) (Waltz, 1979) and great powers came about with the signing of the [Treaty of](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Chaumont)

[Chaumont](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Chaumont) in 1814. Since then, the international [balance of power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balance_of_power_in_international_relations) has shifted numerous times, most dramatically during [World War I](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I) and [World War II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II). In literature, alternative terms for great power are often world power (Waltz, 1993) but these terms can also be interchangeable with [superpower](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superpower).

# Characteristics of Super or Great Powers

There are no set or defined characteristics of a great power. These characteristics have often been treated as empirical, self-evident to the assessor (Waltz, 1993). However, this approach has the disadvantage of subjectivity. As a result, there have been attempts to derive some common criteria and to treat these as essential elements of great power status.

[Kenneth Waltz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth_Waltz) uses a set of five criteria to determine great power: population and territory; resource endowment; economic capability; political stability and competence; and military strength (Waltz, 1979) which we have treated elsewhere.

# Emerging powers

With continuing [European integration,](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_integration) the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union) is increasingly being seen as a great power in its own right (Holbraad, 1984), with representation at the [WTO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Organization) and at [G7](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7) and [G-20](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G-20_major_economies)

summits. This is most notable in areas where the European Union has exclusive competence (i.e. economic affairs). It also reflects a non-traditional conception of Europe's world role as a global "civilian power", exercising collective influence in the functional spheres of trade and diplomacy, as an alternative to military dominance (Wendt, 2004). The European Union is a [supranational union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supranational_union) and not a [sovereign state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state) and has its own foreign affairs and defense policy. However, these remain largely with the [member states of the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_states_of_the_European_Union) (Wendt, 2004).

[Brazil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazil) and India are widely regarded as emerging powers with the potential to be great powers. [Stephen P. Cohen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_P._Cohen) (2001) asserts that India is an emerging power, but highlights that some strategists consider India to be already a great power. Additionally, permanent membership of the UN Security Council is widely regarded as being a central tenet of great power status in the

modern world; Brazil, Germany, India and Japan form the Group of Four ([G4) nations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G4_nations) which support one another (and have varying degrees of support from the existing permanent members) in becoming permanent members. The G4 is opposed by the Italian-led [Uniting for Consensus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniting_for_Consensus)

group while Nigeria sticks to the African Ezulwini Consensus. There are however few signs that [reform of the Security Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council) will happen in the near future.

# Small powers

The [international system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_%28international_relations%29) is for the most part made up by small powers or small states. While a small power in the international system may never equal or surpass the effect of larger powers, they can nevertheless influence the workings of the international system together with others. The formalization of the division between small and great powers came about with the signing of the [Treaty of Chaumont](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Chaumont) in 1814. Before that the assumption had been that all independent states were in theory equal regardless of actual strength and responsibilities. From the second half of the twentieth century, the bipolar power blocs decreased the strategic room for maneuver for smaller actors.

Small states generally prefer multilateralism as both a path to influence and a means to restrain larger states (Toje, 2010). Studies of influential small states indicate that they are able to develop issue-specific power to make up for what they lack in aggregate structural power. Small states can, therefore, develop power disproportionate relative to their size on the few issues of utmost importance to them. In addition to prioritization, small states have successfully employed the strategies of coalition-building and image-building. Even though small state administrations lack the resources of their larger counterparts, their informality, flexibility, and the autonomy of their diplomats can prove advantageous in negotiations and within institutional settings.

Most of the small-state studies that make up the backbone of the small power research tradition were carried out in the heyday of non-alignment by scholars such as David Vital (1967), Robert Rothstein (1968), Maurice East (1973) and Robert Keohane (1969).

The weakening of the non-alignment movement during the 1970s coincided with a gradual decline in small-state studies. Smallness became more useful framework for analysis and the small-power category was first taken into serious account. [Asle Toje](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asle_Toje) takes a view where great powers and small powers distinguish themselves through patterns of behavior. Small powers are not down scaled great powers – or oversized microstates (Toje, 2010). As pointed out by Toje (2010), shortage of the resources and capabilities that determine power and influence are central to most definitions of small powers. The most common factor for defining state size, however, is population size. Besides the size of population, other variables such as territory, economy, and military capabilities are also used.

Even though the most common factor for defining small powers is the size of the population, there is not an agreement of how populous states should be to be defined as small or middle powers. Although states with less than 10 or 15 million inhabitants are regarded as small by most academics, states with up to 30 million inhabitants are sometimes considered small (Sens, 1996). Others (Morgenthau, 1972; Rothstein, 1968), however, think of size as a relative concept where the influence of great powers is seen as far greater and the influence of middle powers moderately greater than those of small powers. Additionally, small states barely have the capabilities to influence the international system (Keohane, 1969).

Instead of focusing solely on one factor, a framework that intertwines multiple factors was proposed by Archer and Neill (2002). In this regard, factors such as fixed size (population and territory), sovereignty size (the degree to which a state controls its internal affairs and borders

and is recognized), political size (military and administrative capabilities, domestic cohesion, and foreign policy consensus), economic size (GDP, market size, and development), perceptual size (how a state is perceived by internal or external actors), and preference size (the ideas, ambitions, and priorities of domestic elites regarding their role in the international system) are given equal value as opposed to just a single factor (Archer and Neill, 2002).

# Characteristics of small powers

Though a single definition has proved elusive due to the number of potential variables and their particular interpretation under given conditions, [Asle Toje](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asle_Toje) (2010) claims to have found recurring traits in the research literature regarding the behavioural patterns of small powers on the international stage:

The strategic behavior of small powers is characterized by dependence. A small power recognizes that it cannot obtain security by relying solely on its own capabilities. They cannot affect the international system alone but with some concerted effort they can affect the way the system works. A small power plays a dispensable and non-decisive part in a great power‘s array of political and military resources. Small powers therefore tend towards a policy of either strict neutrality or alliance. Those ‗located in geopolitical regions critical to maintaining a great power‘s position in the international system tend to opt for alliance‘. In an alliance, small powers tend to follow the alliance leader closely, lend it what support they can and avoid antagonizing it. Under regional hegemony with a low probability of punishment, small powers tend to adopt neutrality (Toje, 2010).

Small powers display variable geometry. In terms of military capabilities there is no ability to project power on a global scale. They are forced by their limited resources, by their location and by the international system itself to establish clear priorities (Toje, 2010).They identify a

hierarchy of risks and attempt to internationalize those considered to be most serious. Small power policies, argues David Vital (1967), are aimed at altering the external environment by

‗reducing an unfavorable discrepancy in strength, broadening the field of maneuver and choice, and increasing the total resources on which the state can count in times of stress‘ (Laidi, 2010). Small powers are therefore status quo oriented. They work within the established order rather than attempting to revise the order itself.

Small powers are the primary beneficiaries of international institutions and are, by necessity, lovers of the law (Laidi, 2010). A small power will often seek to minimize the costs of conducting foreign policy and will increase the weight behind its policies by engaging in concerted efforts with other actors. Generally, this leads to a high degree of participation in and support for international organizations, which leads to a tendency to adopt ‗moral‘ or ‗normative‘ policy positions. Formal rules are actively encouraged in order to curb the great powers and strengthen their own position.

Small powers are risk averse. They see more dangers than opportunities in international politics, which leads them both to shun system-upholding tasks and to display a penchant for token participation in such endeavors. [Zaki Laidi](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Zaki_Laidi&action=edit&redlink=1) (2010) sees a risk averse power as an international actor that ‗defines and responds to the political states of a given identified risk in terms of a will to reduce its uncertainties and uncontrollable effects‘.

# Small powers in international organizations

Small states can under some circumstances have a disproportionately great influence. According to Diana Panke, "Small states tend to be most likely to punch above their weight if the negotiations take place in an institutionalized arena with majority-based decision-making rules in which each state has one vote or in contexts in which decisions are made unanimously, if they

are selective in negotiations and concentrate their capacities on the most important issues, engage in capacity-building activities to maximize their ideational resources, if they make use of institutional opportunity structures such as chairing meetings and engaging in agenda-setting, and if they individually or collectively apply persuasion strategies from early on (Panke, 2012).

The majority of the states in the world can be considered small states, but somehow there is less than ideal information about the activities of small states within international organizations particularly when it comes to influencing policy outcomes. Small states encounter size-related obstacles in different negotiation settings (the negotiation settings ranging between everything from the UN and the EU to the WTO) as well as in capacity-building and shaping strategies used to influence negotiation outcomes.

A size-related obstacle would for example be the EU which uses a system of weighted voting, which gives bigger states a greater political leverage than smaller states. On the other and a lot of International Organizations use a ―one state, one vote‖ principle which may appear to secure equality between states of various sizes. However, even if the formal voting itself is equal what happens in the background is not. Small states face size-related difficulties during negotiation processes in IO‘s such as the UN because they often possess fewer administrative, financial and economic resources, which hinders them in participating in the negotiation process at the same level as the larger states. They are simply spread too thin across various issues and therefore resort to concentrating all their resources towards the issue of highest significance. Therefore, small states are forced to choose between their interests in negotiations. They also produce better results if they use persuasion based strategies rather than bargaining ones because they lack bargaining leverage (Toje, 2010). In addition, delegates from smaller states tend to have speaking points for fewer issues and smaller budgets than the delegates from the larger nations;

This gives the larger states a better position to influence outcomes both in weighted and equal weight voting systems.

# 2.10 Theoretical Framework

The significance of theory or a framework for analyses in any social sciences study cannot be overemphasized. In order to situate this work in perspective, the realist theory of national power is adopted. This theory was developed by the international relations scholar Han Morgenthau in his book, *Politics Among Nations,* published in 1948. Hans Morgenthau is perhaps the most systematic of all modern theorists in this respect, and his theory has been followed by numerous other theorists since his work *Politics Among Nations* was first published. Other scholars that developed this theory include German (1960), Cline (1975,) and Waltz (1979).

In describing his theory, the ―elements of national power,‖ Hans Morgenthau systematically includes and assesses geography, natural resources, especially food and raw materials, industrial capacity, military preparedness, especially technology, leadership, and quantity and quality of the armed forces, population, especially the distribution and trends, national character, national morale, and the quality of diplomacy and government, while warning against, among other things, efforts to attribute ―to a single factor an overriding importance‖ in the measurement of power. In simple terms, the elements or attributes of a nation‘s power should encompass the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.

This tradition of attempting to systematically assess the national power of countries continued after Morgenthau, though the difficulty of comprehensively assessing power in the manner he believed necessary has resulted in a widespread violation of his stipulation that single-factor approaches are to be avoided. In their work on traditional approaches to measuring power,

Merritt and Zinnes (1988) describe several distinctive attempts to measure power that have sought to avoid the complexity of the problem by simply focusing on a single aggregate variable. These single variables are usually intended primarily as proxies for overall national power, and their users make no effort to pretend that the variables chosen are in fact comprehensive indicators of national power. In most cases, the variables chosen have been primarily a function of convenience or because of the easy availability of data.

Among the more widely recognized theories of national power was the one devised by Ray Cline in 1975. This theory uses the nonlinear, multivariable index in its attempt to integrate both capabilities and commitment to create a formula that would rank order the perceived power of states. Cline‘s formula was

*Pp* = (*C* + *E* + *M*) (*S* + *W*),

where *C* is critical mass, including population and territory, *E* is economic capacity, including income plus energy plus nonfuel minerals plus manufacturing plus food plus trade, *M* is military capacity, including the strategic balance plus combat capabilities plus a bonus for effort, *S* is the national strategy coefficient, and *W* is national will, including the level of national integration, the strength of leadership, and the relevance of strategy to the national interest.

Another complex nonlinear multivariable theory that attempts to both identify discrete variables and specify their interrelationships is the one developed by Clifford German, who produced a world power index that took the following form:

*G* = national power = *N*(*L* + *P* + *I* + *M*),

where *N* is nuclear capability, *L* is land, *P* is population, *I* is the industrial base, and *M* is military size. Each of these variables was further broken down into a series of factors, each of which was scored by a variety of criteria pertinent to the factor concerned. After reviewing this model,

Merritt and Zinnes concluded that ―of all the power indexes considered, the German index is the most complex. It consists of a multitude of variables, a series of scoring schemes, and several instances in which judgments must be made.‖

The complexity and strict attachment of Cline (1975) and German (1960) formulae made them cumbersome and therefore Hans Morgenthau theory is adopted for its clarity, simplicity and prominence. Further, his theory better explains Nigeria‘s medium power role in global affairs.

Nigeria is the tenth largest state of the continent, with a landmass of 924,000 square kilometers and a 853 km long coastline. Nigeria‘s population, officially estimated at 170 million, makes it the most populous country in Africa, and one of those in which the rate of urbanization is at its highest. Nigeria is also Africa‘s first oil producer and, with an army of about 120,000 (Nigerian Army, 2014), the second most important military power in sub-Saharan Africa. In West Africa, an estimated 60% of the population and over 50% of the potential for primary and manufacturing production are located in Nigeria. Such a combination of human and natural resources, dominance over neighboring states and the diplomatic and military engagement of successive regimes in the affairs of the continent helps to explain the perception of the country by its elites as a regional power and a leader in African continental affairs.

Nigeria, with a population of 170 Million (World Bank, 2014), is the most populous country in Africa and the Black world. It has close to 200 billion Dollars Gross National Income (GNI) and a GNI Per Capita of 1, 453 Dollars (World Bank, 2014). Nigeria‘s Defense budget is almost 2 Billion Dollars (Stockholm International Peace Institute, 2014) and the size of her Armed forces is 130,000 active frontline personnel and 30, 000 active reserve personnel (Nigerian Army, 2014; US State Department, 2014). Nigeria Human Development Index profile (based on life

expectancyat birth; adult literacy; gross primary, secondary, and tertiary school enrollment; and purchasing power parity in U.S. dollars) is 0.456 (UNDP, 2014).

Secondly, the theory was used to illustrate Nigeria‘s functional role in African peace and security, politics and economy through the various international, regional and continental initiatives on peace building and peacemaking, regional integration in West Africa including technical and financial aid to weak African and Caribbean nations.

Thirdly, the theory helped analyze the motives of Nigeria‘s international behavior as a state that owes a responsibility to stand and respond to Africa‘s economic, political and security dilemma and also a state that sees itself as an important partner in international issues, especially peace and development, and her bid Nigeria‘s bid for a ‗permanent seat‘ in a reformed United Nations Security Council.

# CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

# Introduction

This chapter focuses on the methodology used to conduct this study. It covers the type of data collection used and the method of analysis employed. It also includes the boundary lines against which the research is based and what challenges were encountered in the course of the work.

# Research Design

This research uses the historical design to collect and synthesize existing works and materials in order to establish, defend and or refute our assumptions. Hence, the use of secondary materials such as official records, books, newspaper and journal articles and even digital contents in addition to the interviews conducted.

# Sources of Data

This research uses both primary and secondary sources of data. For the primary data, in-depth interviews (IDI) were conducted. Though interviews ―do not sometimes give truthful responses‖ (Kvale, 1996), it is still a method that aims to probe deep under the surface of superficial responses to obtain true meanings that individuals assign to events and the complexity of their attitudes, behaviors and experiences (Foddy, 1994; Izah, unpublished).

One strength of the interview as a research method is that it can yield unexpected or open ended information if the questions are not too rigid (Foddy, 1994). Therefore, the unstructured interview method was employed. The unstructured interviews will give individual interviewees the chance to freely express their opinions on the subject of this research, and from these, we will draw helpful insights to our research (Gubrium and Holstein, 2001). This is because, if we structured the interview questions, it is very probable we may not get the desired response due to

the nature and secrecy which characterize foreign policy making. However, in order to avoid the interviewee‘s feelings of being exposed (in particular on sensitive topics such as Nigeria‘s defense) and in order for the interviewees not to present themselves in a specific way in order to fit in their perception with this researcher, this researcher tried to build rapport with the interviewees so they will feel at ease to express their views.

Other scholars such as McCracken (1988) suggest that the interviewer should appear dumb so that the interviewees do not feel defenseless or exposed in the interview. This researcher does not advise this because it can put a researcher in jeopardy, especially when dealing with highly educated and highly placed individuals. This researcher used this technique during his interview with Ambassador (Professor) Laraba Abdullahi, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs. She felt she was wasting her time and therefore started treating other matters and finally asked this researcher to go back to his proposal and come back the next day.

In subsequent interviews, this researcher appeared to be proficient, but less informed than the interviewees on the topic. This researcher therefore used his knowledge of the history of Nigerian foreign policy to create a rapport, at the same time presenting himself as having little or uninformed about what happened behind the scenes.

The secondary data cover existing relevant works written on similar topics. Therefore, documentary method was used in this research. This entails drawing insights from books, magazines and newspapers, procedural documents (minutes from meeting, formal letters), personal documents (diaries, letters), including published and unpublished materials on the subject of this study. Journals and publications like the publication of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA).

Library and resource centers in Nigeria and abroad have been be used. The African Union Resource Center in Addis Ababa, the ECOWAS Library in Abuja, Center for Democracy and Training, Mambayya House, Kano, and especially, the library of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) have source of the largest part of the literature used in this research.

# Study Population

The target group for the interview included Nigerian leaders, diplomats and Foreign Service officials. It also included foreign policy analysts, scholars, politicians and members of the business community.

Some of the personalities selected for interview include the former Presidents, Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Olusegun Obasanjo, and General Yakubu Gowon. But only President Obasanjo responded to this researcher with a short notice of appointment. By the time this researcher reached the Obasanjo Library Complex in Otta, the former President had left for UK.

Among the Ministers of Foreign Affairs slated for interview, only Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, former Nigeria‘s External Affairs minister who introduced and promoted the concept of medium power in Nigeria‘s foreign policy, and Mrs. Salamatu Suleiman, former State Minister of Foreign Affairs and past ECOWAS Political Affairs chief, were interviewed. Professor Akinyemi granted this researcher two interviews. The first interview was granted at his office in Ikeja, Lagos, and the second was recorded on phone two months later. This researcher could not get an appointment with Ambassador Aminu Wali, the former Foreign Affairs Minister (See Appendix II, p. 122).

This researcher sought to interview Professor Shuaibu Ahmed Danfulani, a former Director- General of the Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) Kuru. This researcher‘s contacts in Ile-Ife could not get an appointment with him and therefore he was not interviewed.

Therefore this researcher interviewed Ambassador Shuaibu Othman Yola, senior Nigerian diplomat that was High Commissioner in United Kingdom and Tanzania, and also briefly served as Acting Secretary-General of the OAU and as an UN Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs at different times. He was also an Instructor at the NIPSS, Kuru. Even though he had difficulty recollecting some events, his views were highly instructive and informative (See Appendix II, p. 122).

Another person interviewed by this researcher was Ambassador Ado Sanusi. He was stationed in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Malaysia at different times. Though the interview with him was shifted three times (due to his health condition), his responses were measured and investigative. For example, he started by asking this researcher if Nigeria had optimally utilized its ―golden diplomatic team‖ of the 1970s and 1980s to secure a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (See Appendix II, p. 122).

Ambassador Bulus Lolo was interviewed by this researcher in Addis Ababa. He is a Nigerian career diplomat who rose through the ranks until his appointment as a representative to Ethiopia, with concurrent accreditation to African Union (AU), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the State of Djibouti. He is currently the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His responses were more of an academic than a diplomat because he was candid.

Ambassador Laraba Abdullahi, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, was also interviewed. She was Nigeria‘s Ambassador to Guinea Conakry. Her choice was made because she is a Nigerian diplomat occupying an executive position in the AU. Her views on Nigeria‘s influence within the AU are very important to this research (See Appendix II, p. 122).

Ambassador Bunu Sheriff Musa was Nigeria‘s ambassador to France as well as a former minister of Solid Minerals and Internal Affairs. His views are very important to this work especially with regards to Nigeria‘s economic endowments vis-à-vis her vision internationally (See Appendix II, p. 122).

This researcher engaged Ambassador Danjuma Nanpon Sheni, the former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a conversation during lunch break at the African Conference on post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace in Abuja.

Finally, Ambassador Adegboyega Christopher Ariyo was interviewed. He was Nigeria‘s High Commissioner to Namibia and currently actively engaged in civil society (See Appendix II, p. 122).

# Sampling Technique

The utilized the Purposive Sampling method. This is a sampling technique whereby this researcher relied on his own judgment when choosing members of population to participate in the study. This researcher applied certain criteria such as service in Nigeria‘s diplomatic corps in making the selection for the population.

Purposive sampling is a [non-probability](https://research-methodology.net/sampling/non-probability-sampling/) sampling method and it occurs when elements selected for the sample are chosen by the judgment of the researcher. Researchers often believe that they can obtain a representative sample by using a sound judgment, which will result in saving time and money.

# Techniques of Data Analysis

The qualitative analysis is used to analyze the data collected for this research. The qualitative analysis can be used in either inductive or deductive way. But for the purpose of this research,

the deductive analysis, where the researcher reasons and interprets data from the pool of data gathered, was used.

There are three approaches to making a qualitative analysis of data–the Interpretive Approach, the Social Anthropological Approach and the Collaborative Social Research Approach.

This researcher opts for the Interpretive Approach which allows the researcher to transcribe the interviews into written texts for analysis. The researcher, then, analyzed the interview texts based on the framework of analysis of the research. This approach provides a means for discovering the practical understandings of meanings from the texts.

# CHAPTER FOUR

# HISTORY OF NIGERIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WORLD

# Introduction

This chapter summarizes Nigeria‘s middle power engagement with the rest of the world since 1960. Because Africa has been very important to Nigeria‘s foreign leaders since independence, this chapter looks particularly at Nigeria‘s role in African peace, security and development agenda, the decolonization of Africa and South-South cooperation.

# Nigeria’s Attempt at Medium Power Role in Global Affairs

For the purpose of this review, the above heading will be split into three segments. The first section will review Nigeria‘s unofficial attempt at such global role from the 1960s to 1985 when the country engaged in several international initiatives ranging from the decolonization process and Black liberation to South-South cooperation. The second section will deal with Nigeria‘s conscious attempt at medium power role in global affairs during the 1986-1987 tenure of Bolaji Akinyemi as Nigeria‘s External Affairs Minister. This was the period when Nigeria officially professed to be a ―Medium Power‖ and thus convened the ―Concert of Medium Powers‖, a group of middle ranking nations and regional leaders. And, finally, the third section will review Nigeria‘s status in world affairs during the post-Concert period in 1990s.

But before doing so, this researcher shall quickly visit some profile of Nigeria‘s foreign policy. Based on its population size, relative natural resources and her international behavior since independence, Nigeria presents to be a middle-ranking nation in international life (Ojigbo, 1982). In his Independence Declaration speech (Balewa, 1960), Nigeria‘s first Prime Minister, late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, enunciated Nigeria‘s foreign policy and the directions of its behavior which included – non-aggression to its neighbors, non-interference in other nations‘ internal

affairs, economic development and advancement, commitment to African liberation and the pursuit of international peace (Yakubu, 2012; Garuba, 2007; Garba, 1987; Akinyemi, 1978).

Nigeria‘s behavior during crises situations in Africa, especially the ECOWAS region, highlights the fact that Nigeria is ―an indispensable factor to the success of any future regional initiatives‖ (Adebajo, 2002).

# Nigeria’s Entry into and her Medium Power Role in Global Affairs

So far I have concentrated on the problems of Africa. Please do not think that we are not interested on the problems of the rest of the world; we are intensely interested in them and hope to be allowed to assist in finding solutions to them through this organization (the United Nations), but being human we are naturally concerned first with what affects our immediate neighborhood (Balewa, 1960 brackets mine).

Nigeria‘s foreign policy during the Balewa regime period was characterized by consultation with the British government and domestic party politics (Yakubu, 2011). Therefore, the country had little initiative that portrayed its middle power diplomacy. The Ironsi regime did not make any serious foreign policy improvement due to the short span of his government. However, he recalled all Nigeria‘s ambassadors ―for briefing with the intention of reviewing Nigeria‘s foreign policy‖ (Institute of Army Education, 1977).

The Gowon regime inherited a divided country which soon plunged into a Civil War, which positively and negatively affected Nigeria‘s foreign policy. Then Oil Boom and domestic politics also shaped the country‘s foreign policy at this time. Though short-lived, the Murtala/Obasanjo regime pursued Nigeria‘s foreign policy with vigor and clarity. A foreign policy review panel headed by Adebajo Adedeji was constituted. African liberation, super power blockade and the

―Africa has come of Age‖ speech crystallized Nigeria‘s image during this period (Kamil, 1996). The Shagari regime inherited a sound foreign policy base. The main focus areas of Nigeria‘s policy were African liberation, African security, national security and the territorial skirmishes

with Chad and Cameroun. The Buhari regime pursued an ―isolationist‖ foreign policy which looked inward to settle the domestic problems of the time (Gambari, 1989).

# Nigeria and Maintenance of International Peace

Nigeria started to show its ―enterprise‖ (Ojigbo, 1982) in world affairs by sending troops to the United Nations Peace-keeping operations in the Congo in 1961. According Yakubu (2011), this action tested Nigeria‘s military capabilities and also serves as foundation stone for her expertise in peace-keeping operations around the world.

Nigeria‘s major initiative during this period that depicted *middlepowermanship* was the African peace project. Her involvement in the Zimbabwean independence, which would have resulted into a full scale war and also the break it put to Libya on the Chadian crisis are cases in point. Nigeria‘s diplomatic, financial and military support to these African peace projects during Shagari regime cannot be overemphasized, although many analysts criticize Shagari‘s stance on the Chadian crisis as pro-West (Ojigbo, 1982).

According to Gambari (1991) ―Nigeria also stepped-up its mediation efforts in the Tanzania- Uganda conflict, the Western Sahara dispute, and the Ethiopia-Somalia war‖. In the Tanzania- Uganda conflict, Nigeria did not dispatch a delegation but used the UN and OAU framework to bring the warring nations to table. Though Nigeria mediated briefly in the Western Sahara dispute, it gave it passive attention by recognizing the rights of the Polisario Front to self- determination. Nigeria did not take this to debates in the UN or the OAU.

# Nigeria and Campaign for African Liberation

Perhaps Omojuwa (1995) saw Nigeria‘s spearheading the decolonization process of Africa as a middle power initiative which later (after 1994) almost became an obsession for her foreign policy. But during the period under review, Nigeria‘s commitment to decolonization was restricted to speeches and diplomatic support within international organizations and forums. By 1963 when it became a Republic, Nigeria‘s foreign policy started to change as there was clear shift from declarations to forming organizations and coalition building (Monguno, 1963). According him,

Nigeria‘s moral and financial support to the creation of the Organization of African Unity and her power of diplomacy and mobilization at the United Nations, the Commonwealth and her various stints in African and international peace-keeping, including the recent fact-finding mission to Oman, befit a regional power. We must therefore consolidate these gains (Monguno, 1963).

However, other scholars are of the view that Nigeria had no foreign policy of its own under the Balewa regime. In a word, Nigeria consulted Britain when taking a particular stance in international issues. This is the view of Garuba (2007), where he argued that Nigeria under Prime Minister Balewa

…did not demonstrate any true and positive interests in African liberation, except on paper. At a time when Ghana was the reference point for liberation movement in Africa, Nigeria barked in the background with her role restricted to mere verbal assurances that could not give relevant direction to liberation movements in Africa. It is also believed in some quarters that the then OAU almost got killed in its infancy as a result of unguided utterances of Nigerian leaders; thus betraying the extra-African links of the Balewa government. For instance, Jaja Nwachukwu (the then Minister for External Affairs) was reported to have called for the establishment of a rival, purely black African organization in place of the OAU; and this call was in the view of many both divisive and unproductive (Garuba, 2007).

Some scholars (Ploch, 2010) also charged that even within the West African sub region, Nigeria showed less interest in regional integration. For example, it did not pay attention to strengthening regional organizations like the West African Currency Board (Garuba, 2007; Phillips, 1964).

However, Nigeria‘s international behavior during the First Republic was not that of a complete

―toothless dog‖ (Ojigbo, 1982). It severed diplomatic relations with France when the latter tested its nuclear weapon in the Sahara Desert in absolute disrespect for Nigeria‘s stance (Nwokedi, 1985).

The 1965 Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference in Wellington, New Zealand saw Nigeria‘s delegation as a forthright and formidable one. The leader of the delegation, MP Shehu Shagari, blasted Great Britain‘s policy as regards the Rhodesian Independence. Referring to the Great Britain, Shehu Shagari said: ―the lion can roar and bite, but perhaps it is too careful not to hurt its curbs, even when the curbs appear naughty and disobedient (Shagari, 1965)‖.

The New Zealand *Christchurch Star* of December 4, 1965 observed that:

the Africans spoke with urbanity and pointed but good-humored wit. Delegates and journalists both agree that the speech of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Nigeria‘s Head of Delegation, was one of the most impressive they have heard from the Chambers of the New Zealand House of Representatives (Christchurch, 1965).

According to the *Morning Post* of Wellington of December 4, 1965, Nigeria moved ―a motion to expel Rhodesia from the association‖.

Not only liberation movements, but most African countries unilaterally and multilaterally (within the OAU framework) recognized Nigeria‘s leadership in African affairs and started to cultivate relations with Nigeria‘s leadership. Under General Murtala, Lagos became a ―pilgrimage center‖ for independence nationalists as well as foreign dignitaries (Ardo, 2003; Adamu, 1999; Kamil, 1996) or as Garuba (2007) puts, ―the Mecca of Liberation Movements‖. One of such incidents was when General Joseph Mobuto expressed the desire for closer relations with Nigeria‘s

regime. In response, Murtala dispatched a delegation, headed by Major-General Ora Obadia, to General Joseph Mobuto‘s anniversary celebrations (Kamil, 1996).

The Shagari regime threatened the USA that an American diplomat was quoted as saying that it was ―incredible that a superpower (referring to his country, the USA) should feel these foreign policy constraints from Nigeria‖ (Newsweek, 1980). The London *Economist* (1980) concurred on the above that ―a world outside the Euro-American heartland has developed with its own centres of power: its Arabias, Brazils, and Nigerias‖.

President Shehu Shagari stated:

In the area of foreign policy, as your president, I will continue to advance and defend the cause of our great country before the world community. It is our national will that Africa shall remain the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Also it is our national will that Africa shall be free, free of racial bigotry, free of oppression, and free from the vestiges of colonialism. My government is determined to see the cause of justice and human decency prevail in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. We shall continue to support all forces of progress and oppose all forces of oppression in Africa and elsewhere. Our watchword shall always be the advancement of mankind and the enhancement of the cause of peace, prosperity and progress through mutual respect and co-operation between nations (Shagari, 1979).

This declaration was matched with action and Nigeria‘s influence was felt around Africa. Zimbabwe became independent although Cameroon and the French West African states schemed against Nigeria.

* 1. **Nigeria and Regional Integration, South-South Cooperation and Global Multilateralism** Nigeria pushed vigorously for regional integration and Global South cooperation through ECOWAS and other institutional frameworks like the United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment (UNCTAD) and the Group of 77 (G-77).,

There was a ‗new Nigeria‘ that recognized its role in West Africa and realized that the gigantic task of economic and political regeneration in which it is engaged will be of little avail unless it was attuned to the requirements of the economy of the rest of Africa particularly West Africa (General Gowon, 1975, cited in Nwanolue and Iwuoha, 2012).

The oil boom of the 1970s brought Nigeria to the limelight of international politics because Nigeria led the charge to increase oil prices in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973, when Shettima Ali Monguno was Nigeria‘s Federal Commissioner for Petroleum. Under same Minister, Nigeria led the revolution to take over controlling shares in national oil corporations by OPEC member states (Suleiman, 2009).

Suleiman (2009) further stated that Nigeria together with Brazil and India led the establishment of the G-77 which is a group of less developed nations grappling in their bid to check the unequal relations between them and the advanced capitalist nations. This led to the formation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I and II) in 1969.

In 1975 Nigeria spearheaded the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), whose mandate was the reduction of trade barriers among countries in the region (Ezirim, 2010; Akintola, 2007; Olusanya and Akindele, 1986; Gambari, 1978). Other scholars maintain that ECOWAS is a product of Nigeria‘s foreign policy initiative to strengthen regional economic cooperation and integration (Garuba, 2007).

Nigeria under General Buhari pushed for ―collective and individual security‖ framework in West Africa in which free transfer of criminals between West African nations was made possible. This was signed by four ECOWAS Heads of States in Lagos in December, 1984 (West Africa, 1984). Middle powers are known to exhibit the behavior of mobilizing opinions and creating coalitions, frameworks or forums in order to create a new international order thereby carving itself a leadership position in world affairs. In attesting to Nigeria‘s status as global influential nation, Joshua Nkomo, one of Africa‘s leading nationalists, described Nigeria ―as the heartland of Africa, her pulse and Africa‘s dynamo‖ (Nkomo, 1977). Robert Mugabe also made similar remark: ―Africa, without Nigeria, is hollow‖ (Mugabe, 1980).

# The Concert of Medium Powers (Lagos Forum) and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Bolaji Akinyemi first proposed the Concert of Medium Powers (CMP) during an address at the University of Ilorin in January 1978, and further developed these propositions at the inauguration of the Nigeria-India Association on November of the same year, as a response to the international balance of power at the time.

According to Bolaji Akinyemi,

A middle power is an under-developed country which is at the stage of industrial or technical take-off or has just passed that stage. It can also be a developed country that is technologically or industrially advanced but whose size, geography and population, has put it outside the mainstream of the conflicts raging in the international system (Akinyemi, 1989).

Though the Non-Aligned Movement considered the Concert of Medium Powers as a direct threat to its existence (Agbese, 2012; Akinyemi: 2012; Agwu, 2012), Akinyemi argued for the need for a group of truly non-aligned nations to moderate schisms between the superpowers and search for new values and norms in the international system. The criteria for membership of the Concert of Medium Powers are population, economy and sufficient credibility to command attention of the big powers (Akinyemi, 1989).

The salient principles upon which Bolaji Akinyemi proposed the Concert of Medium Powers were to strengthen industrial and technological exchange, to increase economic relations, political contact and solidarity, and to remove domination complex among members of the group (Akinyemi, 1989).

Akinyemi (1989) posited that Nigeria convened the Concert so as to widen the scope of her role from African affairs to the global theater. He also promoted the idea that Nigeria should attempt to obtain nuclear power because, according to him, ―it will be a big mistake for Nigeria to wait until it is threatened‖ before doing so. He then argued that India and Pakistan acquired the

technology despite their country‘s domestic realities at the time, and therefore, Nigeria must not raise the excuse for settling domestic socioeconomics first.

Practically, Nigeria convened the Concert of Medium Power during Bolaji Akinyemi‘s tenure as Nigeria‘s External Affairs Minister under the Babangida administration. The name was changed from Concert of Medium Powers (CMP) to the Lagos Forum (LF) in order to reduce the feeling by the superpowers that the Concert formed a direct threat to them.

As a prelude to convening the Concert, Akinyemi (1986) stated that ―the general parameters of Nigeria‘s foreign policy hinge on the perception of the status of Nigeria as being that of an activist in the international system, an activist that is seeking respect rather than love‖. According to Agbese (2012), this gave impetus to Akinyemi‘s Kissinger-style shuttle diplomacy in order to gather support for the Concert.

The Concert of Medium Powers had only two conferences and it was dumped after the exit of Bolaji Akinyemi as External Affairs Minister. The objectives of the Concert had glaring similarities with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and this formed some of its drawbacks. Other criticisms by officials of the Ministry of External Affairs and academics argued that the Concert of Medium Power was controversial and will put Nigeria into economic imbalance, especially as regards acquiring nuclear power (Thisweek Magazine, 1987). Internationally, there was no clarity as to what the Concert of Medium Powers sought to achieve differently from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and as a result, its member states were not keen to sending delegations headed by their Foreign Ministers. Instead, their diplomatic missions in Lagos attended the meetings in order not to ―dull‖ the efforts of Nigeria. During this period, Nigeria initiated the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) as a foreign policy tool through which Nigeria could enhance her status internationally by sending interested young professionals to needy African,

Caribbean and Pacific nations for a two-year period to assist these countries in developing key areas such as education, health, judiciary, etc (Agbese, 2012; Akinyemi, 2012).

# The post-Concert Period, 1988-1998

Under this theme, review of unilateral and multilateral initiatives pursued by Nigeria which depict *middle powermanship* will be made. It will also look at Nigeria‘s utilization of institutional frameworks, as in the case of ECOMOG and the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, in order to maximize its influence on regional and global affairs.

# Nigeria and African Peace and Security- Sierra Leone, Liberia, others

Nigeria during Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha had an assertive foreign policy befitting that of a middle power. Therefore, subsequent actions and counteractions taken by the regime in the sphere of foreign relations were in tandem with the above.

President Babangida made a case for Africa to take charge of its security concerns squarely in its hands rather than leaving it to external actors. He proposed the ECOWAS standing mediation committee on Liberian crisis and later backed up with a military force, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which intervened in Liberia as peacemakers.

Despite criticisms of varying degrees laid on the Abacha foreign policy (Folarin, 2013; Yakubu, 201; Mazrui, 2006), Abacha restored Nigeria‘s standing as a ―functional‖ middle power in peacekeeping and peacemaking, and also, as a regional military power by intervening and restoring political order in Liberia and Sierra Leone, both West African nations (Garuba, 2007: Ani 1997: 44; Nwachukwu 1997).

The Abacha regime used the ECOMOG forces to intervene and reinstate the democratic government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to power in Sierra Leone after a coup by Major Johnny

Paul Koroma. Although international community acknowledged this initiative, Nigeria was tagged ‗a country that imports what it has in excess and exports what it lacks‘ which pointed to the importation of petroleum products and restoring democracy in Sierra Leone (Nwanolue and Iwuoha, 2012).

Nwachukwu (1997) argued that Nigeria‘s initiative in Liberia and Sierra Leone has expanded the role of the ECOWAS from that of a regional economic body to a regional security organization. He futher states

Nigeria is the regional police of West Africa, and by extension, the rest of Africa. This is in view of its role in these two West African nations peace process, despite international condemnations (Nwachukwu, 1997).

Supporting the above is General Abacha‘s declaration at the Swearing-in Ceremony of the then new Nigerian Ambassador to Liberia where he stated that:

*The issue of peace in the West African sub region should supersede the economic interest of individual states as there cannot be economic progress without peace in the sub region (Abacha, 1995).*

This captures the mindset of Nigerian foreign policy decision-making body at that time as progressive and adventurous, signifying leadership in the sub region.

Although its presence in international activities became reclusive during this period (Yakubu, 2011; Osuntokun, 2011), Nigeria was not altogether dormant as it engaged in cross regional coalition with Libya and Nigeria as financiers (Ani, 1997). According to, Nigeria succeeded at linking North Africa and West Africa by road. Therefore, despite her image problem during this period, Nigeria‘s behavior and international role spoke that of a ―regional heavyweight‖ (Ani, 1997).

Some scholars argue that General Abdussalami Abubakar‘s policy of recalling Nigerian troops from various peace missions around the world was a signal to international community of

Nigeria not living up to its commitments to world peace and therefore her leadership position sinking (Adebajo, 2000).

Nigeria under Obasanjo brokered internal peace between the governments of several African nations – Cote d‘Ivoire, Togo, Mauritania, Senegal, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Sudan and the Western Sahara (Ploch, 2010).

Nigeria under President Obasanjo opposed the United States idea of locating the US-African Command (AFRICOM) which would have made vulnerable the African continent to global terrorism. Further in the area of peace and security, Nigeria deployed troops to the Congo and Sudan Darfur region. Nigeria also sponsored the ―peace talks‖ that led to Liberia‘s democratic elections as well as supported Sierra Leone (Garuba, 2007).

According Johnnie Carson, US Assistant Secretary of State, ―Nigeria is the most important country in sub-Saharan Africa‖ (Carson, 2009) while President Obama complemented this statement when he acknowledged Nigeria‘s leadership role in regional security. In her words, Lauren Ploch had observed that:

In 2005, the United States, Nigeria, and other interested partners initiated the ―Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy,‖ a forum through which participants work to address the challenges of oil production in the Niger Delta (Ploch, 2010).

This was in order to fight the challenge of the region‘s maritime crimes and make stable energy supply to the world. However, this is a cozy plot of the United States to smuggle its US African Command (AFRICOM) as this combatant command of the United States Navy is expected to monitor the waters. Pham (2007) has a similar view but differs on the likelihood of Nigeria‘s continuous economic, political and military assistance to security issues due to various ―internal‖ security challenges.

The joint AU and ECOWAS request on Nigeria to intervene in the Malian crisis came due to Nigeria‘s vast experience in international peacekeeping operations and her oil wealth (Okereke, 2012).

# Nigeria’s Bid for the Permanent Seat in the UN Security Council

Nigeria aspires to the permanent membership of a ―reformed UN Security Council‖ (Gambari, 2004: 73). He stated that Nigeria‘s aptitude and skills in international peacekeeping, commitment to the United Nations‘ values and financial contributions to the UN are important factors to obtain this permanent seat. According to Gambari (2004), Nigeria‘s level of participation in UN peacekeeping operations (in Lebanon, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, Western Sahara, Mozambique and the Iran-Iraq UN-military observer mission, among others) during this period underscores its capacity and willingness to contribute to the promotion of international peace and security (Gambari, 2004).

Agbese (2012) stated that Nigeria formally presented the proposal for the enlargement of the United Nations Security Council size and working procedure in which it indicated that Africa and Asia be given two seats each, and Latin America one. Nigeria charged that the time to remove the ―representational inequality‖ (Mbu, 1993) of the Security Council was ripe.

Major General Lawrence Onoja took on the United Nations that: ―there is no point paying lip service to democracy if the UN is not democratized by expanding the Security Council to give new members veto power‖ (Onoja, 1997). Only ―great and middle powers‖ practically push for such membership (Holbraad, 1971) as Nigeria did under Abacha.

Among the five likely candidates from Africa – Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa – Nigeria and South Africa are the major contenders ([www.afriknews.com](http://www.afriknews.com/)). However, looking at the criteria for selection – economic size, population, military capacity, commitment

to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the UN, contributions to UN peacekeeping, and record on counterterrorism and nonproliferation – Nigeria has higher chances of grabbing the seat.

# CHAPTER FIVE

**DATA PRESENATION AND ANALYSIS**

# Introduction

This Chapter presents and analyzes the data collected for this research which includes interviews as well as books, newspapers, magazines, internet materials, journals reviews. Therefore, its objective is to look at middle power traits in Nigeria‘s engagement with the globe from 1999- 2013. In doing so, this research will advance by assessing whether Nigeria is a medium power. The following will be looked at i) Nigeria‘s economy and the influence it has on her role globally; ii) Nigeria‘s military capabilities the influence it has on her role globally; iii) Nigeria‘s activism on international and regional issues; iv) the Technical Aid Corps (TAC); V) the NEPAD Business Group.

A total of 7 interviews were conducted. This was due to the inaccessibility of the other personalities this research intended to interview. As mentioned above, this research work bases its analysis on the seven interviews conducted which, to a great extent, provides a representation of the various opinion on Nigeria‘s middle power status.

# Nigeria’s Middle Power Role in Global Affairs, 1999-2015

Nigeria is a middle power by virtue of her economy, population, military strength and her strategic location in West Africa. Nigeria is middle power that is regionally and internationally active in peacekeeping and conflict mediation, decolonization, South-South cooperation, and North-South Dialogue. According to Bolaji Akinyemi,

The Concert of Medium Powers, which later became the Lagos Forum, was the first official declaration by the government of Nigeria indicating that Nigeria is a medium power (Interview with Akinyemi, January 30, 2015).

However, policy experts have referred to Nigeria as a middle power given her activism within international institutional frameworks on prevailing topical issues of the 1960s through the 1970s.

Under the Babangida regime, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi coined the ―Concert of Medium Powers‖ and Nigeria convened meetings of this group of countries in order to create a New World Political and Economic Order (Interview with Akinyemi, January 30, 2015). There were few meetings and this group disappeared from international stage, only to be re-convened as Developing-8 with the same objectives in Turkey with new members.

# Nigerian Economy and her Medium Power Role in West Africa

Nigeria is a middle power when her GDP is considered alongside the country‘s territory, population, share of global trade, participation in international organizations and the extent to which other nations consider Nigeria‘s interests in their own foreign policies. This has made Nigeria to take a more assertive stance towards African affairs, to the effect that African and international analysts forecast Nigeria to be one of the top global players (First Interview with Akinyemi, August 22, 2013).

Nigeria‘s endowments of human and natural resources, interactions with neighboring states and the energetic engagement of successive regimes in the affairs of the continent have called for the country‘s treatment as a middle power (Interview with Amb. Salamatu Suleiman January 15, 2015). However, these remain more about influence than power.

The favorable combination of Nigeria‘s resource endowments only establishes the fact that potentials for growth and development are tremendous. We use our strength to support a United Nations system, the African Union and ECOWAS, in order to improve the position of those less well-equipped to help themselves. Take the Technical Aids Corps as one ambitious project of

Nigeria‘s foreign policy, ―to a significant degree, it has assisted many countries‖ (Interview with Sheriff, December 14, 2014).

Based on this and other economic indicators, Nigeria can be said to be a middle power.

―Recently, Nigeria‘s economy has overtaken that of South Africa‖, even though these figures face various criticisms, but the fact that the South African government acknowledges this and has declared to regain their lost position, is enough to show that Nigerian economy is the largest in Africa (Interview with Ambassador Salamatu Suleiman January 15, 2015).

According to Ambassador Ado Sanusi: ―Nigeria is a middle power; with potential for becoming a great power. But this is a function of how our economy is managed. A Nigeria with sound economy, like the Nigeria of the 1970s, could be called a great power.‖ He points that Nigeria, with a large population and a resourced economy, despite the challenges, is still a very influential state in Africa. In a very boastful tone, Ambassador Sanusi stated that ―In Africa, no country is comparable to Nigeria based on economy, resources and population‖ (Interview with Ambassador Ado Sanusi, December 6, 2014).

However, this growth in Nigeria‘s economy has no substance on its domestic socioeconomic indicators – unemployment rate is still very high, power and energy supplies are decimal, poverty level is unbecoming, and the spate of violent insurgency has given rise to the number of internally displaced persons. Official corruption and outright stealing by public officials has never been this high. This sends a very wrong perception of Nigeria abroad, and the countries located in West Africa, the natural sphere of Nigeria influence, are reluctant and indisposed to follow Nigeria‘s leadership. The Malian crisis is a case in point, where Ghana was the major voice in the mediation process.

# Nigeria’s Role in West African Peace, Security and Conflict Mediation

Nigeria has deep concerns in African, particularly, West African peace, security and integration. Without peace and security, the cooperation needed for regional integration and development cannot be achieved. During the period under study, Nigeria showed enterprise in tackling i) regional instability; and ii) policing the Gulf of Guinea security area.

The security boundaries of a country do not end from the borders of that country. Nigeria appreciates this fact and therefore puts great interest in West African regional security which was beleaguered by various conflicts, wars, succession problems and dissention.

Nigeria devoted time, energy and resources towards solving these problems, working in cooperation with other African countries, the ECOWAS and the United Nations. For example, Nigeria played a key role in ending the Liberian conflict including extending political asylum to Charles Taylor. In order not to derail the peace process in Liberia, Nigerian government refused to hand Charles Taylor to International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes.

In Ivory Coast, Nigeria, under President Obasanjo, pursued a mediation policy in which it dispatched Ambassador Ralph Uwechue in order to mediate the severe dissent in the country (Obasanjo, 2014).

Following a military in Sao Tome and Principe, Nigeria intervened and restored to power President Fradrique de Menedez. President Obasanjo accompanied the president to his country to get him re-instated (Obasanjo, 2014).

Nigeria posted former President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida as an envoy to Guinea to help mediate in the ensuing political conflicts which killed several people. Lansana Conte eventually appointed a Prime Minister from the opposition.

While it is true that the solution to all these problems were not due to Nigeria alone but a product of a combination of regional, continental and global efforts, the very pivotal function Nigeria played in solving these conflicts demonstrate Nigeria‘s grip of the region and the belief that peace and development cannot be secured unless there is regional stability.

Further in the area of peace and security, Nigeria deployed troops to the Congo and Sudan Darfur region. Nigeria also sponsored the ―peace talks‖ that led to Liberia‘s democratic elections as well as supported the on Sierra Leone peace building (Garuba, 2007).

Nigeria under Obasanjo brokered internal peace between the governments of nine African nations – Cote d‘Ivoire, Togo, Mauritania, Senegal, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Sudan and the Western Sahara (Ploch, 2010).

After his inauguration in 1999, President Obasanjo wanted to scale down Nigerian‘s commitment and burden in sub-regional military engagements. In his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 1999, Obasanjo noted that:

For too long, the burden of preserving international peace and security in West Africa has been left almost entirely to a few states in the sub region. Nigeria‘s continued burden in Sierra Leone is unacceptably draining Nigeria financially. For our economy to take off, this bleeding has to stop (Obasanjo, 1999)*.*

Nigeria spent on the ECOMOG operation about one million US dollars daily (George; 2012). However, rather than withdraw all of the 12,000 troops from Sierra Leone under the pressure from the UN, Nigeria decided to leave some 3500 troops to serve under UNOMSIL‘s ―Operation Sandstorm‖ and ―Operation Save Freetown‖ to pacify country‘s capital. The Nigerian Contingent (NIGCON) to the UN mission at November, 1999, included 8 staff officers, 4 military observers and was the largest troop from all the troop contributing countries. However, this scaling down was just a temporary adjustment as the pressure on Nigeria to remain became stronger and because of the president who was to become more active in sub-regional security management.

General Abubakar, former military Head of State, noted that Nigeria can claim a fair share of the glory for peace that is enjoyed in Sierra Leone today (2009).

Nigeria again participated from 2003 in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). In this operation, according to General Bamali, Nigeria was left to lift its own troop and those of Gambia and Guinea for the ECOMOG operation in Monrovia (Bamali; 2009).

The Côte d‘Ivoire crisis was a particularly unpleasant experience for West African leaders because the country was regarded as one of the most stable in the sub-region. The crisis was to present a different kind of security challenge to ECOWAS. The keenly contested elections in October 2000 followed an intense power struggle between Laurent Gbagbo and his allies on the one hand and Alassane Ouattara and his supporters on the other hand in the light of an intense debate over ―Ivorite‖ or ―Ivorianness‖ about who is truly an Ivorian. This put the country into turmoil and President Obasanjo helped to foil a military coup d‘état in 2006 (Obasanjo, 2014).

Finally, a rebellion led by disgruntled soldiers under the name of Movement Patriotique du Côte d‘Ivoire, made the situation worse, breaking the country into two parts. Nigeria was to provide buffer troops to separate the two warring groups, identified as the Northern and Southern forces. This early intervention helped to dictate the direction of ECOWAS policy on that very complicated crisis.

Chief Ojo Maduekwe affirmed that Nigeria will not rest until the new waves of military coups and undemocratic rule in the West African sub region were addressed. At the United Nation 64th General Assembly, he explained Nigeria‘s commitment to entrenching democracy in Niger, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea Conakry transition politics, which Nigeria follows closely through Special Envoys President Yaradua dispatched (Maduekwe, 2009). However, it is instructive to

know that Nigeria was rebuffed by President Tandja Mammadou of Niger Republic telling Nigeria‘s Envoy, General Abdussalami Abubakar, that ―Nigeria should mind her business‖.

But Nigeria‘s performance internationally during the period under study has been below par, according to Ambassador Ariyo, who stated that one former African leader once mentioned.

―Nigeria is just not at the table. And if Nigeria is neither seen nor heard, what can the rest do?‖ This is similar statement Obasanjo (2014) that one ―African Head of Government to me if Nigeria is neither seen nor heard, what can the rest do‖?

According to Ambassador Ariyo (Interview with Ambassador Ariyo, September 4, 2016)

―Nigeria is the only regional power in West Africa. Its economy is the biggest in Africa, and with population of over 160 million, is also the most populous state on the continent‖. Further, Ariyo stated that Nigerian army has around 88,000 active servicemen. This has placed Nigeria as the first military power in West Africa.

At the return of Nigeria to civilian rule in 1999, the political class saw the downsizing of the military as a panacea to military intercession in political authority. They therefore campaigned for the reduction of the size of the military.

Nigeria has about 120,000 military today which is inadequate to satisfy the aspirations of Nigerians, domestically where there is the dire need for civil police attention. The experience of Boko Haram is a point case. Militarily, a large conventional force is needed in order to tackle insurgency or guerilla army.

Moreover, such reduction in size left out considerations of Nigeria‘s regional power role as well as her population and territorial size. The de-politicization of the military led to compulsory retirement of very intelligent officers from the Nigerian military, especially the Army.

Further, the Nigerian military was refurbished – the army revamped its light armored and personnel carriers at the Special Vehicle Plant in Bauchi; the Navy refurbished its NNS ARADU stationed at Lagos; and the Air Force refurbished its Donnier facility at Kaduna.

There have been various funding and training programs since 1999 that have been initiated to re- vitalize the capacity of the Nigerian military to serve domestic as well as regional needs.

Only the Nigerian military repelled the Boko Haram terrorism. Looking elsewhere, USA, France and UK, have been fighting for years in Somalia, Iraq, Syria, to repel insurgency and terrorism. Our experience in Sierra Leone and Liberia was used to cut Boko Haram to size (Interview with Ambassador Ariyo, September 4, 2016).

However, Nigeria was missing in action. Although Nigeria pledged the largest troops to the ECOWAS multinational force, it could not mobilize its military assets and those of ECOWAS to lead the assault against the Tuaregs and Al Qaeeda fighters in northern Mali. This vacuum was filled by France, one of Nigeria‘s rivals in African affairs. The French Forces pushed the rebels out of the areas they occupied in less than one month. One important note is that Malian women and children in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu hailed French army, while mocking Nigeria and other ECOWAS states for their ineffective leadership in the crisis. Further, Nigerian President Jonathan was also unnoticeable on the negotiating table as Ghana‘s President Mahama took the lead in the discussion on the Malian crisis.

Similarly in the 2011 crisis in Ivory Coast which also saw another intervention by France, Nigeria‘s leadership was clearly absent. Though Nigeria supported a military action against Gbagbo, it could not translate the expression into effective action.

The Gulf of Guinea area has been under the operation of West African criminal gangs, Asian and South American drug cartels and al Qaeda backed militants. This made the area into a haven for international narcotics, piracy and other transnational criminal activities. However, this growing

economic and security importance of the Gulf of Guinea, coupled with US and western interest over this southern Atlantic region increased Nigeria‘s appetite to take the security of the region. According Johnnie Carson, US Assistant Secretary of State, ―Nigeria is the most important country in sub-Saharan Africa‖ (Carson, 2009) while President Obama complemented this statement when he acknowledged Nigeria‘s leadership role in regional security. In her words, Lauren Ploch

In 2005, the United States, Nigeria, and other interested partners initiated the ―Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy,‖ a forum through which participants work to address the challenges of oil production in the Niger Delta (Ploch, 2010).

This was in order to fight the region‘s maritime crimes and make stable energy supply to the world. However, this is a cozy plot of the United States to smuggle its US African Command (AFRICOM) as this combatant command of the United States Navy is expected to monitor the waters. Pham (2007) has a similar view but differs on the likelihood of Nigeria‘s continuous economic, political and military assistance to security issues due to various ―internal‖ security challenges.

Further still, Nigeria under President Yaradua opposed the relocation of the AFRICOM from its temporary base in Stuttgart, Germany to the continent. He however welcome partnership in, especially, military training and logistics, to actualize Africa‘s peace and security initiative (Adeniyi, 2012).

A shift occurred in Nigerian foreign policy under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. ―Nigeria, rather than Africa, is the centerpiece of Nigerian foreign policy‖ (Nwankwo, 2013). This is a major shift in line with the doctrine of foreign policy reciprocity of Bolaji Akinyemi.

Consequently, Nigeria‘s inability to solve its internal problems or provide leadership in the sub region has stalled Nigeria‘s medium power role in making the political and economic integration

of ECOWAS a success as the ASEAN or the EU. Nigeria‘s decline has also led to greater instability and insecurity in the region as can be seen in Ivory Coast, Mali, Guinea and the state of Guinea Bissau. A power vacuum has been created which is increasingly filled by criminal gangs and hegemonic external powers like France.

# Social and Economic Initiatives - The Technical Aids Corps (TAC)

Nigeria has provided socio-economic and technical aid to needy countries around the world. This study will look at are the Technical Aids Corps as a foreign policy instrument Nigeria uses to project its medium power role in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific nations.

The Technical Aid Corps (TAC) scheme is Nigerian foreign policy tool established by Federal Government in 1987 to serve specific national interests. This program substitutes ―express financial aid‖ (Interview with Ambassador Ariyo) to African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations. It is intended to give manpower assistance in all fields of human endeavor and also to be a practical demonstration of Nigeria‘s commitment to South-South Cooperation.

Its objectives include sharing Nigeria‘s know-how and expertise with other ACP countries; giving assistance on the basis of assessed and perceived needs of recipient countries; promoting cooperation and understanding between Nigeria and recipient countries; facilitating meaningful contact between Nigerian and those of recipient countries; complementing other forms of assistance of ACP countries; ensuring a streamlined program of assistance to other developing countries; acting as a channel through which South-South collaboration is enhanced; establishing a presence in countries which, for economic reasons, Nigeria has no resident diplomatic mission. Technical Aids Corps has recorded substantial progress in the following areas: i) increase in the number of recipient countries from Africa, Caribbean and Pacific regions; ii) increase in the

number of Volunteers deployed abroad iii) overwhelming interest from both Nigerian Volunteers and recipient countries under the biennium TAC scheme.

The implementation of the scheme has endeared Nigeria to many countries as a facilitator of effective cooperation in socio-economic development among ACP countries. Ultimately, Nigeria stands to gain enormously, both politically and economically, from recipient countries. In 2003, the Commonwealth signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Nigerian Government for the provision of Nigerian expertise to needy member states under the Commonwealth Assistance Programme (CAP) to be managed by the Director of TAC in Nigeria. Similar deals are signed between Nigerian Government and the United Nations (UN) Volunteer Service, ECOWAS Volunteers Program, and the Japanese Agency for International Cooperation (JAIC). The effectiveness and viability of TAC as a foreign policy instrument is demonstrated in the commendation it receives from recipient countries and other members of the International community (Interview with Amb. Abdullahi, August 19, 2013).

Technical Aids Corps has played a cardinal role in cementing existing relations between Nigeria and beneficiary countries, and, on a wider scale, in creating an atmosphere of partnership where it otherwise would not exist. In Guinea, where I was Ambassador before coming to the AU Political Affairs, the country kept sending requests after requests for volunteers. The program is also a deliberate policy option for the consolidation of Nigeria‘s role in the independence struggles of some African countries. It is a catalyst for peace, progress and development among both beneficiary and non-beneficiary countries (Interview with Amb. Abdullahi, August 19, 2013).

The scheme is currently one of the viable volunteer services program operated by an African country which has been refocused to advance South-South cooperation towards achieving the objectives of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

# Challenges to Nigeria’s Middle Power Role

Nigeria foreign policy has been marred by fellow African countries that voted against us on the international scene. We have got to have a foreign policy, which

penalizes countries that vote against us (Interview with Professor Akinyemi, January, 2015).

Four important internal and external problems affect Nigeria‘s middle power role in global affairs. They are internal insurgency, domestic politics, dwindling economy and external threats.

# Internal Insurgency, Kidnapping, Robbery and Oil Bunkering

Internal Insurgency is posing a threat to Nigeria‘s middle power foreign policy. Most threatening is the Boko Haram menace that erupted in Nigeria in late-2007. This has put a sort of paradox on the capacity of the Nigerian Armed Forces; where they intervened and restored peace in several war-ridden countries but are incapable of containing such internal threat. In fact, a large part of Nigeria‘s territory was under the control of Boko Haram which continue to terrorize Nigerians and foreign workers with impunity.

In the middle-belt, South-West and South-East regions of Nigeria, robbery, kidnappings, hostage taking, and communal and tribal tensions and conflict continue to make life difficult for Nigerian citizens, foreigners and businesses. In December 2012, the kidnapping of the mother of then Nigeria‘s minister for Finance showed the extent of this menace. In February 2013, seven foreigners working in a Lebanese firm were kidnapped from Republic of Cameroon and brought to Nigeria for ransom. A former deputy Governor of Anambra State, Dr Chudi Nwike, was also kidnapped and killed in 2013.

This indicates how Nigeria‘s internal security challenges are undermining its status as a middle power and how its weakness and fragility is affecting the security of her neighbors.

According to Professor Ibrahim Gambari

That has dented our image and it has even more seriously devalued the peacekeeping currency which we use to advance our country‘s claim for a

permanent seat in a reformed and expanded security council (Gambari, 2015).

The Nigerian military has been placed 4th or 5th in contribution to UN peace support operations within and outside Africa. It should be observed, however, that the failure of Nigerian military to contain the scourge of the Boko Haram is inconsistent with the international profile made by the Nigerian military from 1960-2010. But Ambassador Ariyo (Interview with Ambassador Ariyo, 4 September, 2016) mentioned to this researcher that a change of leadership in Nigeria and the leadership of the military has made Nigeria to have the upper hand in the fight against internal insurgency in the North-East.

# Dwindling Economy

Nigeria‘s economy is the largest in Africa yet Nigeria contains some of the poorest people on the continent. Youth unemployment, poverty, energy crisis and food insecurity permanently feature on every discourse on Nigeria economy.

What has made China a global player? Her population! What qualified China to the United Nations permanent Security Council membership? Population! What has made China pivotal in Asian as well as world politics? China‘s military might and economy! (Interview with Ambassador Ado Sanusi, December 6, 2014).

According to Ambassador Sanusi, if we apply these to Nigeria at the level of Africa, it will be clear that Nigeria is a middle power ―though with challenges of mismanagement and misappropriation of resources, and lack of credible individuals in leadership positions‖ (Interview with Ambassador Ado Sanusi, December 6, 2014).

Nigerian economy has kept sinking since 2008, but has never been worse than from 2010 to date due to ―official corruption‖ (Gambari, 2015) and FDI withdrawals from the Nigerian economy. The economic structures of the Obasanjo administration almost totally collapsed. According to Ambassador Bulus Lolo ―When others are busy trying to consolidate, we are busy scattering‖ (Interview with Amb. Lolo, August 22, 2013).

By looking at the level of per capita, countries like Botswana, Namibia, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Cape Verde rank higher and are richer than Nigeria. Nigeria does not exploit, maximally, the ECOWAS free market (Interview with Ambassador Bulus Lolo, 2013).

# Domestic Politics – Constitutional crisis, corruption and mismanagement

―Domestic squabbling‖ (Interview with Akinyemi, January 20, 2014) or ―internal contradictions‖ as Ambassador Lolo (Interview August 22, 2013) refers it to, have marred Nigeria‘s image abroad.

Nigeria has always claimed the leadership of Africa, as of right. But Nigeria‘s domestic politics is doing great harm to this claim. This is a factor of how we govern ourselves. In all fairness, the constitutional crisis that set in during Presidents Obasanjo and Yaradua regimes, more than any domestic issue, negatively affected our image abroad. It made Nigerian leaders not credible within international circles.

Under President Jonathan, corruption and mismanagement reached an advanced peak during the period under study. Billions of dollars have been spent on projects that have no important future economic objectives and senselessly squandered during political campaigns and rallies. This period saw Nigeria‘s foreign reserves, saved for the rainy day, being depleted without any meaningful turnaround in the lives of Nigerians.

Nigeria was absent at many very important forums during the Presidents Yaradua and Jonathan. While President Yaradua‘s ill health was the reason for such absence, he could not delegate his Vice President, Jonathan, to attend. Rather he dispatched his Foreign Minister, Ojo Maduekwe, whom according to Sanusi (Interview December 6, 2014) ―is beginner in foreign affairs‖. Therefore, Nigerian delegation had little clout during UN General Assembly, Commonwealth Conferences and other global gatherings.

It is on record that under President Jonathan Nigeria was absent in two crucial gatherings: the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Sydney, Australia, October, 2010; and the Extraordinary AU Summit on African Renaissance marking the 50th Anniversary of the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2013. In both cases, there are indications that the President ―was badly managed so as to not being able to attend the meetings‖ (Interview with Ambassador Yola, 2015). Further according to Ambassador Shuaibu Othman Yola (Interview 2015) the President arrived both capitals and observed the protocol formalities of a visiting Head of State, but some obscure reasons were officially given as to what made the President absent. Ambassador Bulus Lolo declined to comment on this question. However, we take his silence to be the best position any serving ambassador would have taken on such serious subject on a state‘s foreign affairs.

Important brilliant government policies are not carried-on by successive government. In certain instances they are reversed. Such policies as the River Niger dredging and our LNG projects that would have attracted Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and create several thousands of jobs for Nigerians were either reversed or left unattended (Interview with Ambassador Sheriff, December 14, 2014). This is also a problem of leadership because such policy reversals scare away foreign direct investments (FDIs).

With largest population in Africa, investments in manpower and technical skills development are either engrossed in deep corruption or other ethical misconduct. The SURE-P program, which many international organizations hope to spread across Africa as a youth empowerment program has been compromised.

# Professionalism and Nigeria’s Diplomatic Corps

Nigeria‘s domestic power struggle has affected the quality of Nigerian diplomatic corps. Nigeria rather than Ghana would have been the first Black Country to produce the Secretary-General of the United Nations. But the fact is that Nigeria has failed to recognize that in the diplomatic corps, one country is competing with the best of the best from other countries. Bi-lingualism, for instance, is not considered when Nigeria nominates its citizens for international positions and these candidates will compete with others who are bi-lingual.

In other countries, according to Professor Bolaji Akinyemi

…entrance into their Foreign Service would be a First Class in Political Science, Economics, History and Geography. Probably, the time this was observed was on the eve of independence to 1963/64. After this period, we started to fade off with the qualifications needed to join the diplomatic corps (Interview with Akinyemi, January 20, 2015).

It should be noted that this research is not against reflecting plurality in the governance of Nigeria. We must reflect our plurality. But in doing so, we must challenge that plurality to put forward its best men and women when they are competing for posts internationally. Domestically, we can observe this but not in the diplomatic corps because you are competing with the best abroad.

Take for instance the Indians who make sure they occupy very strategic posts at the UN in such a way that at all times they have a crucial role to play in that body. Looking at Nigeria, we take our differences even to the UN. The Nigerians at the United Nations are people that got to the UN on their own accord and not through nomination by the home government. The two Nigerians nominated and supported for posts are Ambassador Shuaibu Othman Yola, who was Under Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs during the General Babangida regime, and soldier- diplomat, General Joseph Garba, who was Chairman of the United Nations Decolonization Committee (UNDC) for many years since 1979, and also was twice the President of the United

Nations General Assembly (UNGA) during that period. Apart from these two individuals, Nigeria has not been able to effectively mobilize support for her candidates within the United Nations system.

Therefore, to this extent, they do not have that feeling of commitment to advancing Nigeria‘s national interests as, say, an Indian or a German or Russian or even an American will do. For example, General Obasanjo got to the headship of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on his own accord rather than Nigeria‘s backing. However, Nigeria supported his bid to become the Secretary-General of the UN, he lost because Nigeria failed in mobilizing support from sister members of the UN.

Further still, since Professor Gambari left as Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations in 2013 and was not replaced by a Nigerian. The reason is because Nigerians within the system do not fight to bring in other Nigerians. To that extent, it will be right to say that the way in which we allowed our domestic politics to impact on the quality of our diplomatic corps has helped in shortchanging Nigeria internationally.

# External Constraints – South Africa

According to Omojuwa (1995) the Apartheid regime of South Africa

embarked on certain actions to unsettle Nigeria politically, and security- wise. For example, it gave military and material support to the secessionist during the Civil War and allegedly tried to build a satellite tracking station and military facilities on the Island of Equatorial Guinea, few kilometers away from Nigeria, in 1988 (Omojuwa, 1995).

Omojuwa (1995) further stated that these activities by South Africa were clearly threatening, and made Nigeria to declare an arms race with that country should it continue its arms build-up. Although South Africa is no longer under the Apartheid regime, its many actions in diplomatic circles appear to be antagonistic to Nigeria. The emergence of the current African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson, Madam Nkosazanna Dlamini-Zuma, against the Dr Jean Ping,

who Nigeria had supported can be seen as a direct diplomatic assault on Nigeria (Interview with Ambassador Ariyo, May 14, 2015).

In his interview with this researcher, Ambassador Adegboyega Christopher Ariyo further validated this opinion when he argues that it is:

the culture of diplomatic restraint in Nigeria‘s foreign policy that sometimes makes South Africa to take advantage of Nigeria. Nigeria must pursue her strategic interests with vigor, especially in cases where a clash with other African states is at stake. Otherwise, this will keep presenting Nigeria as a leader without followers in Africa. The South Africans (South African diplomats) know the Nigerians (Nigerian diplomats). It is not for nothing that the candidate supported by Nigeria was defeated in the AU Chairmanship Elections but for the fact that South Africa fielded a female candidate. No more! And even at that, I sought audience with Mr President (former President Jonathan) to explain to him that Nigeria can still assault Mrs Zuma‘s candidature diplomatically by mobilizing the conservative Africanists, but that time was too late‖ (Interview with Ambassador Ariyo, May 14, 2015).

Therefore, South Africa is making profile because it takes advantage of Nigeria‘s moderation in international affairs. But the desire of South Africa for a regional as well as international role is what has constituted a threat for Nigeria. According to Evans (1991) South Africa will seek to play a ―prominent role‖ in regional and global affairs as against pursuing an ―isolationist‖ policy. Today, South Africa constitutes a part of several international forums (IBSA, BRICS) which analysts have projected will take over both economic and political power by 2050. But Omojuwa (1999), using World Bank data, inferred that Nigeria, with her ―weak, uni-commodity (oil) economy‖ may not be able to face-up to the challenges poised to it by South Africa, a country

―with a strong mineral and industrial economy‖.

Nigeria has subdued South Africa as the biggest economy in Africa (CIA, 2015), although in per capita terms, South Africa is still the leading economy in Africa. Culture and ethnicity link the Nigeria and South Africa with all of their neighbors. Furthermore, Nigeria and South Africa are very important investors and key trading partners for almost all of the African states especially

with the ECOWAS and SADC. The two countries are major promoters of various continental as well as regional initiatives. They also have good bilateral relations with the most important African states.

Like Nigeria, serious social predicaments confront South Africa. Life expectancy is on descending, socio-economic inequality has risen, allegations of corruption are ripe, extra-judicial killings (police brutal killings of protesting mine workers), and also drug trafficking and its attendant consequences on the population.

In recent years, however, Nigeria has seen its role as regional power and global champion for Africa eclipsed by the rise of post-apartheid South Africa. With a larger and better diversified economy, South Africa would understandably have attracted more attention from foreign investors in any case, but it certainly did not help that, during the economic boom of the 1990s the charismatic Nelson Mandela was president in Pretoria while the universally despised Sani Abacha held court in Abuja. More recently the South Africa-led Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) have proven to be more successful economic integrators than the Nigerian-led ECOWAS. Put bluntly, multiracial, democratic South Africa, with its strong infrastructure and vibrant economy, appears to many to advance a better claim to the mantle of African leadership than conflict-plagued, corruption-ridden Nigeria (Pham, 2007).

Nigerian leadership will remain essential if regional and pan-African initiatives like the ECOWAS, the NEPAD and the AU‘s Peace and Security Council are to succeed. But, given the realities of current balances of power, Nigeria‘s leadership must be applied in a concert with other economic and political regional powers on the continent, including South Africa, Algeria and Ethiopia. Yaradua diplomacy has been consistent in plotting against of the trio of Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Yar‘adua to checkmate‖ (Adeniyi, 2011) the antics of Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya, who calls for a central African government.

South Africa is a major competitor with Nigeria for recognition within the international community as regards leadership in Africa, and also in terms of the capability to advance her interests versus Nigeria‘s.

Finally, Ambassador Bulus Lolo stated that ―I know that Nigeria can lead Africa to the United Nations Security Council. We have all it takes.‖ But according to him, Nigerians must remain focused and serious, and also stay put with the goals we set ourselves.

# CHAPTER SIX

**SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

# Introduction

This is the last Chapter of this research. It goes over the findings of the research and gives a conclusion based on these findings. And finally, it provides recommendations.

# Summary of the Research Findings

Relevant materials regarding this topic were consulted and accordingly, some Nigerian diplomats were interviewed. At the beginning of this research, we assumed that: i) Nigeria fulfills the criteria for a middle power by virtue of its elements of national power as well as the role it plays in world affairs. Based on Nigeria‘s power constituents, at the level of Africa and particularly West Africa, Nigeria can be said to be a pivotal state that is regionally influential. Nigeria‘s economy is the largest in Africa as well as its military. Its population is also the leading. Further, the role Nigeria has been playing in tackling conflicts and instability in West Africa, especially, an area Nigeria has carved itself a position, can be pointed to as regional power.

1. Secondly, the internal and external challenges to Nigeria‘s national power diminish its middle power status and credibility in international politics. These threats have been seen to be internal insurgency where the Nigerian military is unable to contain successfully; despite being the largest economy in Africa, lack of energy for industries has stagnated the economic growth rate. Corruption and mismanagement has robbed Nigeria several billions which if otherwise invested in the economy will have gone to a great extent in propelling industrialization. This has also presented the country in bad picture to the international community.
2. Finally we assumed that only a re-building of Nigeria‘s national power will restore its middle power status and credibility in international politics. Unless Nigeria adopts a rationalist foreign

policy decision making style, which will look at the benefit every foreign policy decision brings to Nigeria, there will always be contradictions in Nigeria‘s position as a middle power. For example, Nigeria‘s peacekeeping credentials must be used to push for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). At the level of Africa, Nigeria must make sure that every country that receives any form of aid from her is tied to some obligations.

# Conclusion

From the materials consulted and the data collected during our fieldwork, it is the opinion of this researcher to maintain that Nigeria is still a medium power that is pivotal in world as well as African continental affairs, especially the West African sub region. The voice of Nigeria sounds heavy for other African nations at the level of international organizations like the United Nations, the Commonwealth and other forums. That is, Nigeria is still able to mobilize African nations under one umbrella when it comes to issues facing Africa and command respect from fellow states. This is not limited to African countries, but also extends to Caribbean nations.

At the level of African continental politics and economy, Nigeria can thus be seen as a pivotal state as well as regional stabilizer in West Africa. Nigeria is still very active in pursuing African peace, security, integration and development. In the African Union, Nigeria‘s support for various initiatives such as the African Shared Values, the African Standing Force, Human Rights, the question of youth and so on, show important areas that Nigeria leads. Though many observers hold that Nigeria cannot entirely take credit for this strides in the African Union, but in concert with the Algeria, Ethiopia and South Africa, Nigeria‘s following in the organization speak in favor of Nigeria.

A country cannot be a middle power without regional followership, for this is the pointer that that country is a regional leader. In Africa during the period under study, Nigeria has shown to

be a regional leader in African continental affairs and of mobilizing most African nations under one umbrella. One case in point is Nigeria/Africa bid for UN Security Council permanent membership for Africa. While Nigeria has been able to put 46 African nations under the Ezulwini Consensus for a single African candidate for that seat, countries like South Africa, Kenya and even Senegal are campaigning for a different arrangement. For example South Africa entered into a alliance with the G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan) nations and thus changed its name to G4+1. Other African nations are skeptical about South Africa and they have stayed within the Ezulwini Consensus which is mobilized by Nigeria and supported by African Union. Kenya and Senegal are against the Ezulwini Consensus which Nigeria supported because they want a permanent seat with veto power. Nigeria was able to mobilize the most of the nations to accept the permanent seat first and veto power comes next. Nigeria is most likely going to get the permanent membership of the UN Security Council and this is a testimony that her leadership of the continental is strong.

Coming to West Africa and ECOWAS, Nigeria is all over the ground like ocean waves. If not for Nigeria‘s diplomatic decorum, it will diplomatically strangle the remaining ECOWAS nations in appointments and recruitment within the sub regional body. Nigeria still pays more than half of the ECOWAS budget. It is a senior partner in most ECOWAS infrastructural and developmental projects. On a bilateral basis, Nigeria still gives financial grants to the governments of Chad, Niger, Benin, Gambia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Yet, Nigeria does not bully these nations on bilateral as well as under institutional frameworks. This makes this researcher to conclude that if General Gowon was referred to as a benevolent dictator, Nigeria is a benevolent power in Africa. Though Nigeria has scaled back in certain areas and issues due to domestic political and economic crisis, this was in order for her to put the domestic front in order. The entire ECOWAS

nations still look up to Nigeria for leadership of the security, political and economic agendas of the sub region.Therefore, Nigeria must establish clearly areas for its global engagement – from peace and security, and fight of internal insurgency and transnational terrorism, to poverty eradication and food security in West Africa, the African continent and the world at large. And part of this is the current series of meetings Nigeria and her neighbors are having that will lead to organizing a Multinational Joint Task Force in order to respond the Boko Haram problem in the Lake Chad region. As a senior member of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Nigeria has never used her economic and military strength to force her agenda through the organization. However, South Africa‘s escapades in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) are what make other states skeptical of her leadership of Africa.

Taking ECOWAS success in economic development of the region and also its achievements in the region‘s security, one cannot but hail Nigeria for her good leadership. ECOWAS security initiative came as a result of Nigerian leaders‘ initiative to take the region‘s security in their hands and stop foreign intervention in West Africa. Despite all the criticisms leveled against it, ECOWAS Monitoring Group operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia are the first of their kinds by an Economic Community the world over and the best so far. The ECOMOG intervened in these two countries that the rest of the world thought to leave like they have done to Rwanda. But Nigeria to the charge, despite many diplomatic salvos by Ivory Coast, Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal. Nigeria mobilized the resources and ECOMOG went in to stabilize the situation.

This shows, instructively, Nigeria‘s leadership in Africa and the fact that other African leaders follow Nigeria‘s leadership is enough to make Nigeria a middle power and a regional leader. With these statements by important African leaders, Nigeria is very important nation in African

peace, security, integration and development. This demonstrates that, for Nigeria to be so regarded, it must have been conscious of the unique African situation.

For Nigeria to keep her middle power role in Africa intact, it must be better organized and more competitive than the rest of the region. To do this, Nigeria must have a united and determined group of leaders, backed by hardworking people who trusted them. This is a question of our national morale. Nigerian leaders must device new ways to engage Nigerians in more positive ways that will boost their morale.

The future is as full of promise as is also fraught with uncertainty. The coming April 2015 General Elections will be very decisive factor in putting Nigeria‘s middle power role on a sound track or otherwise. This will be a factor of good governance, internal security, industrial consolidation and the development of a knowledge economy. That Nigeria has challenges in these areas in the last two decades does not mean she will remain so in the future. In fact, Nigeria stands a better chance of not failing if successive governments and Nigerians abide by the basic principles that helped project Nigeria‘s medium power role which is principled leadership, vibrant economy and concern for African affairs.

In addition, social cohesion through sharing of national advantages, equal opportunities for all Nigerians, and meritocracy, with the best man or woman for the job, especially as leaders in government.

# Recommendations

In line with Nigeria‘s medium power role that is unique in peace and security support operations, size of her economy and military capacity, this research recommends that Nigeria must reorganize and refocus her foreign policy in order to serve her interests. This will establish for Nigeria a pragmatist foreign policy that will affirm the shared beliefs concerning her status in

Africa, especially West Africa. As a leading economy on the continent, Nigeria has to live up to expectation by consistently pursuing her foreign policy thrust within the four ‗concentric circles‘ of her immediate neighborhood, West African sub region, Africa and the world. A fifth circle, the domestic or base, is required in order for the four circles to work properly.

* + 1. Nigeria must reconcile its domestic realities with her aspirations internationally.

Most important for Nigeria is to squeeze-out the threat of Boko Haram and other national security intimidations. A stick, carrot and cheque diplomacy must be employed in doing this. This will create free atmosphere for business and open the floodgates of foreign direct investments (FDIs) into the country. FDIs will propel Nigeria‘s industrialization and also provide employment opportunities for the teaming Nigerian youths. Nigeria must push for the industrialization of her economy, particularly, import substitution industries. The Nigerian Defense Industry must be overhauled so as to maximize its capability to manufacture weapons. Therefore, Nigeria must now, more than ever, appreciate the linkage between the domestic interests - the economic and defense needs – and our objectives internationally. With these, the international community will start to take us seriously. The Minister of Foreign Affairs must be made a member of the National Security Council. This membership is not for the minister to warm his seat, but to advocate such intelligent policies that have linkages with every aspect of the national life of Nigeria. The Minister of Foreign Affairs must become involved in determining the objectives of Nigeria‘s Defense Policy – defeating internal insurgency, having secured borders and so on. A good aircraft must be put at the disposal of the Minister so he will not have to go borrowing or chartering aircraft for international travels.

* + 1. Nigeria must conduct a massive military recruitment so as to have a large armed forces of around 500, 000 capacity, without sacrificing equipment and training. One fifth of these should be reservists. Trainings and workshops, and simulation exercises must be regular and qualitative. This is because, a large troop body, highly trained, highly equipped and highly mobile, is needed to deal with internal insurgency and to confront and tackle external threats.
		2. The Nigerian Foreign Service must be revamped by funding its training center, the Foreign Service Academy. Instructors at this academy must come from a wide background covering the military, academics, journalists, economists, scientists and even artists. The fact that most of its instructors are career diplomats makes output narrow and outcome slim. Further still, ambassadorial nominations must be strictly on merit even where political exigencies are considered. The Senate screening must be made to be rigorous and transparent so that only the best will scale through.
		3. The Nigeria Institute of International Affairs must increase the pulse of Nigeria‘s image and expand its programs and activities – conferences, lectures, workshops, publications – especially image-making for Nigeria. In doing this, it can establish grant program for research on Nigeria‘s role in regional as well as international politics. We suggest that such programs should be conducted at least five times a year.
		4. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Ministry of Information and Communications must urgently mount image and reputation management campaigns in the international media and project the good works, achievements and humanitarian efforts Nigeria has been giving to international community. The

National Rebranding Campaign of Professor Dora Akunyili should be revisited. This is in order to change the perception abroad that ‗anything Nigerian is synonymous with bad‘. The Nigerian Institute of Public Relations and the National Orientation Agency should develop attitudinal re-orientation programs for especially the Nigerian public and for those in the Diaspora.

* + 1. With the forgoing done, Nigeria must put a lot more of resources and energy to its bid for a permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations. This should be Nigeria‘s priority within the United Nations system. Although it is more difficult now than in the 1980s or 1990s, it is still not late for Nigeria to grab that seat by renewing its credentials at the UN peace operations and carrying the interests of Africa to the UN. Getting this position will automatically upgrade Nigeria‘s class in Africa, which is the natural theater of her influence, and the world at large. Though a fairly well held area, the regional status in the AU and the ECOWAS must also be protected with rational obsession.

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# APPENDIX I

**INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

1. Nigeria has been referred to as ―a middle ranking nation‖ that performs stabilizing role in global affairs since the 1970s. How true is this statement?
2. Given Nigeria‘s national power constituents (the size of her economy and military), do you think we can call Nigeria a military power in Africa?
3. As a medium power, Nigeria has been faced with several challenges. What can you ascribe as the cause of these constraints?
4. Since the 1970s, Nigeria‘s medium power role has been a topic in peace keeping, development assistance and cooperation building. According to some, these credentials have not yielded the desired outcome for the country, which is ―respect‖. Now, as a stakeholder in Nigeria‘s foreign policy decision making, what, in your opinion, do you think should form an agenda for a new foreign policy that will make best use of Nigeria‘s regional and international stature in the modern world system under the current presidential democracy?

# APPENDIX II

**LIST OF PERSONALITIES INTERVIEWED, PLACE OF INTERVIEW AND DATES**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Personality** | **Status** | **Place and Date** |
| 1. Ambassador Bulus Lolo | Nigeria‘s Ambassador to | Addis Ababa |
|  | Ethiopia, African Union, | August 22, 2013. |
|  | UNECA and the State of Djibouti |  |
| 2. Ambassador Ado Sanusi | Former Nigeria‘s Ambassador to | Maitama, Abuja |
|  | Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Iran | December 6, 2014 |
| 3. Amb. Christopher Ariyo | Former Nigeria‘s High | Ikoyi, Lagos |
|  | Commissioner to Namibia | September 4, 2015 |
| 4. Amb. Salamatu Suleiman | ECOWAS Commissioner for | ECOWAS ANNEX |
|  | Political Affairs and former | Pol. Affairs Dept |
|  | Minister of State Foreign Affairs | Asokoro, Abuja |
|  |  | January 14, 2015 |
| 5. Professor Bolaji Akinyemi | Former Minister for External | Ikeja, Lagos |
|  | Affairs, D.G. Nigeria Instituteof International Affairs, Professor | March 22, 20152nd Interview |
|  | of Political Science | (on Phone) January |
|  |  | 30, 2015. |

1. Ambassador Laraba Abdullahi African Union Commissioner 16TH Floor, AU

for Political Affairs and former Commission, Addis AUC, Addis Ababa. Nigeria‘s Ababa, Ethiopia, Ambassador to Guinea Conakry August 19, 2013.

1. Amb. Bunu Sheriff Musa Former Nigeria‘s Ambassador to Maitama, Abuja

France and former Minister of December 14, 2014 Steel Development and Internal Affairs.

1. Amb. Shuaibu Othman Yola Former Nigeria‘s High Kano

Commissioner to UK, December 15,

Tanzania, and former 2015.

Under-Secretary General of the

United Nations for Economic and Social Council.

# LIST OF ACRONYMS

* 1. African Union AU
	2. Association of South East Asian Nations ASEAN
	3. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa BRICS
	4. Concert of Medium Powers CMP
	5. Developing-8 D-8
	6. Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS
	7. ECOWAS Monitoring Group ECOMOG
	8. European Union EU
	9. Gross Domestic Product GDP
	10. Gross National Product GNP
	11. Group of 4 G4
	12. Group of 4+1 G4+1
	13. Group of 77 G-77
	14. India, Brazil and South Africa IBSA
	15. Lagos Forum LF
	16. Lake Chad Basin Commission LCBC
	17. Non-Aligned Movement NAM
	18. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC
	19. Purchasing Power Parity PPP
	20. Southern Africa Development Community SADC
	21. Technical Aids Corps TAC
	22. United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment UNCTAD
	23. United Nations UN