# ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP) ASSISTANCE ON PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC NORM

**IN NIGERIA, 2003 -2015**

# BY KAMAR HAMZA

**Ph.D/Soc. Sci/44396/2012-2013**

# DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,

**AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA**

# APRIL 2018

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# IN NIGERIA, 2003 -2015

**BY**

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# A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PhD) DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,**

# AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA

**APRIL 2018**

# DECLARATION

I, Kamar Hamza, hereby declare that the thesis entitled „Assessment of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Assistance on Promotion of Democratic Norm in Nigeria, 2003 -2015‟, is a product of my rigorous intellectual exercise carried out in the Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, under the supervision of Professors Rauf Ayo Dunmoye and Kayode A. Omojuwa and Dr David Omeiza Moveh. The works of other researchers are duly acknowledged. I also declare that no part of this research work to the best of my knowledge has been previously submitted elsewhere for the award of a higher degree.

Kamar Hamza Date

PhD/Soc-Scie/44396/2012-2013

# CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled „Assessment of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Assistance on Promotion of Democratic Norm in Nigeria, 2003 -2015‟ meets the regulations governing the award of PhD degree at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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Dean School of Postgraduate Studies

# DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the memory of my late father, Malam Hamza Adisa, whose dream became my own reality. May Janatul Firdaus be his final home.

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## ABSTRACT

*This study evaluates United Nations Development Programme assistance for the promotion of democratic norm in Nigeria (2003 to 2015) in order to determine its impact on voter registration and confidence in the Election Management Body (EMB), as well as in law making, legislative oversight functions and legislative constituency representation functions of National Assembly. These five items are indicators of democratic norm sub- set in electoral administration and the legislative process respectively. Development partners have always commissioned consultants to assess the impact of their assistance in the strengthening institutions of democracy and these consultants usually give them positive results which some domestic observers query. The assistance of the UNDP are in form of funding of trainings, study visits, design and publication of posters, training manuals, books, supply of ICT equipment and software and other forms of technical support to advancement of democratic institutions in Nigeria. The study adopted the Social Constructivist theory as a theoretical framework. The population of the study was 2238 and 340 were sampled using stratified random sampling technique. 164 and 134 questionnaires were distributed to INEC staff and National Assembly members respectively. UNDP Consultants and staff members, INEC staff members, National Planning Commission staff members and Legislative Aides were interviewed. Secondary data was sourced from cooperation plans and evaluation reports from the UNDP, INEC, National Planning Commission and the National Assembly. Chi-square was used to test the hypotheses. Based on the data analysed, the study concludes that there is significant relationship between UNDPs democracy assistance and improvement in voter registration and confidence in INEC as an Electoral Management Body in Nigeria from 2003 to 2015. This study also concludes that there is relationship between UNDP’s democracy assistance and improvement in law making, oversight functions and constituency representation of National Assembly members in Nigeria from 2003 to 2015. There has been some level of improvement in electoral administration in Nigeria which has enhanced democratic practice. The legislature has also recorded some level of progress in performing its constitutional role. The UNDP has made effort to promote shared (neoliberal philosophy and western values) rules which are directed at the behaviours, expectations and understanding of people in the process of governance in Nigeria with the aim of promoting the well being and freedom of individuals and groups in the society and the state. They have empowered the legislature and the Election Management Body to exercise their powers and specify their limits. This means that Nigeria’s democracy is on a gradual process of consolidation in the three electoral cycles that the UNDP rendered assistance to promote democratic norm in Nigeria. This study recommends that ulterior motives in democratic norm assistance in Nigeria should be scrutinised in the course of design, implementation and evaluation of projects to reduce impact of neo-liberalism and neo-colonialism on Nigeria; that it is recommended that joint donors should set aside their interest and adhere to the standards of the United Nations, except where adhering to such undermines the democratic norm assistance being rendered; and that the National Planning Commission should always delegate high ranking personnel to be involved in planning, monitoring and evaluation of development assistance. This will help consolidate assistance to beneficiary agencies.*

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# LIST OF ACRONYMS

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ACEEEO | Association of European Election Officials |
| AIDS | Acquired Immune Deficiency Sydrome |
| APC | All Progressives Congress |
| APGA | All Progressive Grand Alliance |
| CGP | Capacity for Governance Programme |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| DDIN | Deepening Democracy in Nigeria |
| DGD | Democratic Governance for Development |
| DPL | Donor, Policy and Liaison |
| EGP | Economic Governance Programme |
| EMB | Election Management Body |
| EPM | Election and Party Management |
| EU | European Union |
| FCT | Federal Capital Territory |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HOD | Head of Department |
| ICT | Information Communication Technology |
| INEC | Independent National Electoral Commission |
| JDBF | Joint Donor Basket Fund |
| LAOM | Legislative Arm of Government |
| LP | Labour Party |
| NASC | National Assembly Service Commission |
| NASS | National Assembly |
| NGP | National Governance Programme |
| NILS | National Institute for Legislative Studies |
| NMSDED | National Management of Socio-Economic Development |
| NPC | National Planning Commission |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OSCE | Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| PDP | Peoples Democratic Party |
| PLAC | Policy Advisory Centre |
| PSDP | Private Sector Development Programme |
| PVC | Permanent Voter‟s Card |
| PVT | Parallel Vote Tabulation |
| SPSS | Statistical Package for social Sciences |
| SRMP | Sustainable and Risk Management Programme |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children Fund |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational and Scientific Cooperation |
| UNPF | United Nations Population Fund |
| USD | United States Dollar |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |

# CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

# Background of the Study

Nigeria has benefited from the democratic norm assistance of international organisations. Democratic norm assistance usually promotes shared rules directed at behaviours, expectations and understanding of people in the process of governance which is aimed at enhancing the well being and freedom of individuals and groups in a new democracy. Democratic norm assistance is in form of funding of trainings, study visits, design and publication of poster, training manuals, books, supply of ICT equipment and software and other forms of technical support to democratic institutions of new democracies.

Norm according to Chandler (2013) is a system of shared understanding and behavioural expectation. Bjorkdahl, (2012:225) also defines norm as a „set of inter- subjective understanding and collective expectations regarding the proper behaviour of actors in a given context or certain identity. In other words norm is the understanding and expectation of behaviour outcome that is shared in a temporal and spatial setting. The understanding and expectation of behaviour outcomes are for instance on governance, democracy, human right and other set of understanding and change in behaviour that is being upheld for the freedom and well being of the individual or groups in the society.

Democratic norm sets are embedded in exercise of executive powers, electoral administration, legislative process and judicial process. The rules that empower democratic institutions to exercise their powers and specify their limits are indicators of

norm subset. Democratic norm subset as rules is promoted by international organisations to sustain peace and stability on a global scale.

Adetula, Kew, and Kwaja, (2010 ) had carried out a commissioned research on how development agencies had supported democratic institutions in Nigeria. Adetula, (2011) also carried out a study to measure the success of democratic assistance to Nigeria. These two studies among others studies had established that International Organizations had been interacting with democratic institutions in Nigeria after the May 29th 1999 handing over from a military government to a democratically elected government. With the return to democratically elected government, International governmental and non-governmental organisations came in to support the new democracy to avoid regression.

International Organizations (IOs) do enter into partnership agreements with new democracies in order to promote liberal democratic norms to the donor recipient countries (Bjorkdahl, (2004); Flockhart, (2005); Freyburg, (2009); Beichelt, (2012) and Bjorkdahl, 2012). This involves building and strengthening institutions of democratic governance or re-vitalising political parties, electoral system, legislative process, affirming respect for human rights and the independence of the judiciary with the ultimate goal of strengthening democratic institutions and good governance.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had been serving as one of the socializing agents for the re-construction of the norms of liberal democracy in Nigeria. This is in the area of good governance in its sixth country plan, 2003 to 2007and deepening democracy project which is in the seventh country plan, 2009 – 2012 and extended to 2015. However, studies revealed that,there is still contention that

the projects of the UNDP towards the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria is yet to strengthen key institutions of democracy as expected (UNDP, (2003); UNDP, (2007); UNDP, (2008); Adetula, Kew, and Kwaja, (2010); Glentworth and Afari-Gyan,(2011) and Adetula, 2011). This means that institutions like the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) still have challenges in electoral administration in Nigeria and that there is still the challenge of optimal performance expected from the National Assembly in making laws that will consolidate democracy, thereby improve the quality of lives of citizens in this democratic dispensation.

The interest of development partners and international agencies in democratic norm assistance (in order to help new democracies to consolidate) is tagged by scholars as „democracy promotion‟. Democracy promotion simply means „external relations and development cooperation that contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy in other countries other than the donor country‟ (Beichelt, 2012:2).

Democracy promotion evolved from foreign policy (among other factors) and it is seen as an external project by a body of thought from scholars of countries receiving assistance. Democratic norm assistance gradually finds expression in regional international organisations and then the United Nations Organisations, through the implementation of agreements reached by nation-states. Those agencies like United Nations Children Fund(UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Educational and Scientific Cooperation (UNESCO), United Nations Population Fund (UNPF) among others implement agreements reached with countries receiving development assistance.

According to Beichelt (2012:2), UNDP was investing $1.4 billion every year to support democratic consolidation around the globe. In this light, the UNDP is the major agency of the UN involved in the generation and implementation of policies aimed at promoting democracy norms all over the world. This informs the involvement of UNDP democratic norm assistance through trainings, policies, programmes and projects. From reports compiled by the researcher through data from Eyinla (2015), UNDP DGD project document (January, 2010) Gomez and Jockers (2014), Flores (2010) Ankut (2007) UNDP has spent about 173, 727, 635 US dollars on democratic norm promotion from 2003 to 2015. According to the UNDP, the support given to Nigeria in the Democratic Governance for Development (DGD) “was $80 Million (average of at USD $16 p.a.) .. which is less than 0.015% of all ODA” (UNDP 2010:57). This amount was for 2005 to 2010.

In 2003, the UNDP indicated interest to assist Nigeria to strengthen her democratic institutions that include the executive arm of government, the legislature, and the anti-corruption agencies. This was done with the aim of making these institutions to be proactive in their duties and responsibilities.

There is no doubt UNDP could be pursuing the interest of the great powers that bankrolls it activities because assistance to developing countries have strings attached to projects, but its support to Nigeria will still be examined

This study examined democratic norm promotion carried out by the UNDP in electoral administration (Independent National Electoral Commission - INEC) and the legislative process (National Assembly -NASS). Indicators of norm promoted in electoral administration are new voter registration system and confidence in the Election Management Body (EMB). The norms promoted in the legislative process are law

making, oversight functions and constituency representation. The two institutions were chosen because of their significance in the sphere of participation and representation in democratic governance at both transition and consolidation levels.Theimpact of implementing democratic norm assitance programmes by the UNDP in Nigeria from 2003 to 2015 was examined,to find out whether the norm promotion goals of the UNDP were realised or not.

# Statement of the Research Problem

There are claims of tangible improvement in electoral administration in Nigeria which have been attributed to the enhancement of democratic practice. There are also claims that the legislature (NASS) has also recorded progress performing its constitutional role. This research seeks to investigate the democratic norm promotion activities of the UNDP in Nigeria from 2003 to 2015.

The UNDP had made effort to promote shared rules which were directed at the behaviours, expectations and understanding of people in the process of governance in Nigeria with the aim of promoting the well being and freedom of individuals and groups in the society and the state. It had tried to empower the legislature and the Election Management Body to exercise their powers and specify their limits.

The major aim of the UNDP was to sustain peace and stability on a global scale. The assistance of the UNDP were in form of funding of trainings, study visits, design and publication of posters, training manuals, books, supply of ICT equipment and software and other forms of technical support to advancement of democratic institutions in Nigeria since 1999.

Prior to 1999, UNDP‟s assistance to Nigeria was initially on transition from military dictatorship to democratically elected government. After the 2003 general elections, democracy consolidation process became the goal of the UNDP and its Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF) members which was geared towards the promotion of democratic norms.

There was concern by scholars like Beichelt (2012) that research in international democracy assistance/promotion was insufficient. In response to this observation, there was proliferation of research by Political Science and International Relations scholars in the West, on the nature of democratisation in new democracies and the effect of mechanisms used. Yet, there is still less concentration on the result of international democratic norm assistance (Beichelt, 2012:14).

According to Adetula, Kew, and Kwaja, (2010) and Adetula, 2011, the evaluation of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and the most multilateral/bilateral agencies operating in Africa are mostly led by foreign experts. These foreign experts are usually tempted to borrow from the empirical models/results of regions that they came from to assess the result of the African countries they are assessing. At times, without regard for political and historical context of the non European countries being assessed, they in some instances use European neighbourhood assessment to interpret the African conditions (Chandelier, 2013). This makes their report to be biased.

In relation to the challenges mentioned above, there is concern on expectation of results from the democracy assistance of UNDP to Nigeria, given the magnitude of challenges in the democratic governance compared to the small budget available. This could be seen in UNDP‟s apprehension as expressed in the following submission:

In this oil rich country, total ODA amounts to less than 0.2% of the GDP. In these circumstances, the quantitative value of foreign aid is of virtually no significance, given the scope of the development challenges (such as democratic governance...). DGD‟s total budget envelop of $80 Million (average of at USD $16 p.a.) is less than 0.015% of all ODA. Even with the best qualitative use of ODA in these conditions – targeting it intelligently, with maximum synergy with government‟s own efforts (and harmonisation with other donor programmes) portfolio

–the leverage and potential impact of this investment is marginal (UNDP, 2010:57)

The foregoing submission from the revised 7th mid-term Country Cooperation Plan project document (on Democratic Governance for Development DGD), portrays the support of UNDP and other Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF) members as small compared to the amount needed for improving the performance of democratic institutions in Nigeria. Yet they still went ahead with their democracy norm promotion goal in Nigeria.

The problem of this research is to assess the impact of UNDP assistance on democratic norm promotion in Nigeria. These are the contributions of UNDP to improvement in electoral administration and the legislative process. This is to measure how UNDP had helped these two institutions of democracy to perform their constitutional roles in Nigeria from 2003 to 2015.

# Research Questions

The following served as the research questions that guided the study:

* + 1. What is the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on voter registration in Nigeria?
    2. What is the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on confidence in the Electoral Management Body in Nigeria?
    3. What is the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on law making process in Nigeria?
    4. What is the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on legislative oversight function in Nigeria?
    5. What is the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on legislative constituency representation in Nigeria?

# Objectives of the Study

* + 1. To examine the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on voter registration system in Nigeria.
    2. To find out the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on confidence in the electoral management body in Nigeria.
    3. To assess the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on law making process in Nigeria.
    4. To investigate the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on legislative oversight in Nigeria.
    5. To find out the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on legislative constituency representation in Nigeria.

# Research Hypotheses

This study is based on the following hypotheses:

H o: There is no relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in voter registration in Nigeria.

H o: There is no relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in confidence reposed in the election management body in Nigeria.

H o: There is no relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in law making process in Nigeria.

H o: There is no relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in legislative oversight in Nigeria.

H o: There is no relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in constituency representation in Nigeria.

# Significance of the Study

This study is significant because it made attempt to fill the gap in previous studies on the impact of UNDP democracy assistance on electoral administration (focusing on voter registration and confidence in the Election Management Body as indicators) as well as legislative process (which also has law making, oversight function and constituency representation as indicators).

This study also addressed how UNDP effort to promote shared rules which are directed at the behaviours, expectations and understanding of people in the process of governance in Nigeria with the aim of promoting the well being and freedom of individuals and groups in the society and the state was carried out from 2003 to 2015.

It also looked at how UNDP had empowered the Election Management Body in the electoral administration and the legislature to exercise its powers and respect its limits in the process of democratic governance from 2003 to 2015 which were done through funding of trainings, study visits, training manuals, supply of ICT equipment and software, consultancy services and other forms of technical support.

# The Scope of the Study

The scope of this study is the assessment of the impact of UNDP assistance to

electoral administration and the legislative process in Nigeria. Specific reference was made to the support of the UNDP which was directed at the Independent National Electoral Commission and the National Assembly towards democracy consolidation in Nigeria, from 2003 to 2015.

This period marked the two intervention periods of UNDP Nigeria‟s sixth and seventh country plans (2003 to 2007 and 2009 to 2015 respectively). It was limited to strengthening of electoral administration and the legislative process, even though references were made to previous interventions and after in some instances. The study referred to the Joint Development Basket Fund (JDBF) managed by UNDP in Nigeria on behalf of other international donor agencies. This study concentrated on the impact of intervention programmes and projects of the UNDP in developing the capacity of the Independent National Electoral Commission and the National Assembly in the process of consolidating democracy in Nigeria from 2003 to the end of 2015.

# Limitation of the Study

The challenge of bomb blast at the Nigeria Police and UN Headquarters in Abuja almost served as hindrance to data collection process during the field work. The research team was resisted initially by the security personnel manning the gates at the National Assembly Complex and INEC Headquarters. Personal contacts were made with the security operatives on guard by their superior officers.

Personal contact was used to reach the respondents at the National Planning Commission (NPC) and the UNDP project office at Maitama because the official channel was taking too long a period.

The Bayelsa election of 2015 also led to delay in the retrieval of questionnaires

at INEC Headquarters.

At the proposal defence stage, the document used by the researcher to draw sample was different from what was met in the field. The document categorised the staff of INEC headquarters into electoral staff (that is, staff members involved in election process/voting) and administrative staff (those involved in the administrative running the office), but in actual fact it was the departments that determined the role of the staff members. The sample was redrawn to conform to the role played by the staff members in the departments.

The security protocol at UNDP/DGD Project Office (No.15, Mississippi Street, Maitama, Abuja) was also a challenge initially. The letter introducing this researcher from the HOD of Political Science Department was followed up to three locations before being referred to the Mississippi Street Project Office. When this researcher was allowed access into the building the Acting Project Director said, they were not going to grant interview but they would give all necessary reports, but documents on finances would not be given because there were auditing issues still pending on those documents. Hard and soft copies of reports and minutes of meeting were given to the researcher.

This researcher had to wait for four months to interview a former UNDP consultant attached to INEC as an election expert (a Professor of History and International Studies). He was on long time election observation mission in Guinea from August to November. He eventually granted the oral interview on 16th November, 2015 at his residence when he returned from Guinea.

At the National Institute for Legislative Studies the researcher was referred to the Director General‟s office. The Special Assistant to the Director General of the Institute invited the researcher to a two-day workshop on „National Dialogue on

Economy, Security and Development‟, at NICON HILTON Hotel on 16th and 17th November. Instead of granting interview (directly, telephone, email or via Skype) he gave the researcher reports of UNDP‟s intervention, manuals for training of legislators on procedures and functions of a legislator among other documents.

There were several failed efforts at employing formal procedures in gaining access to staff members of National Planning Commission in order to interview them. On a long run, the Assistant Director in charge of UN systems unit in the Department of International Cooperation was interviewed along with one of the Desk Officers overseeing UNDP assistance. They were scared of granting interview. But the persistence of this researcher made them to grant the interview.

# Organisation of the Study

The study is structured into six chapters. Chapter one constitutes the introductory part of this study where the research problem, the research questions, the objectives of the study, hypothesis and significance of the study as well as scope and limitation are explained along with the outline of the work. Chapter two presents definition of central concepts like democracy, democratic norm assistance and democracy consolidation. Concepts like electoral administration and legislative process, in relation to international organisations and democratic norm promotion were also defined. The chapter also contains review of literature on UNDP democracy assistance to election management and the legislative process in Nigeria as well as review of current literature on democratic norm promotion and theoretical framework.

Chapter three focuses on the methodology of the study through which detailed procedure for carrying out the study and state the justification is provided for some

decisions taken in the course of carrying out this research. This includes sample population, method of data. collection and analysis.

Chapter four explains the background of the study sights, the history, structure and functions of the United Nations Development Programme, the Independent National Electoral Commission and the National Assembly. It also provides an overview on the National Planning Commission as an agency that coordinates development assistance in Nigeria. The chapter also reviews UNDP assistance to electoral administration and the legislative process as contained in country co-operation plans of 2003 to 2007 and the evaluation report of 2006 and 2007. It also contains review of country cooperation plan from 2009 to 2012 and the extended plan from 2010 to 2015.

Chapter five contains data presentation and analysis. The analysis of questionnaire is in simple percentage and frequency table. The socio demographic information of respondents and answers to the five research questions research questions are provided in this same chapter. The hypotheses are analysed using Chi- square test. The text of the responses from the interviews and data from reports and other secondary sources are discussed along with the hypotheses, according to themes as contained in the major finding. The major findings are also reviewed and discussed in this chapter. In chapter six is the summary, conclusion and contribution to research.

# CHAPTER TWO

# LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

# Introduction

This chapter is pre-occupied with the definition of central concepts like democracy, democratic norm, norm assistance, democracy consolidation, electoral administration and legislative process. It also contains review of literature on UNDP‟s democratic norm assistance to electoral administration and the legislative process in Nigeria as well as review of current literature on democratic norm promotion and theoretical framework.

# Literature Review

* + 1. **Definition of Concepts**

# The Concept of Democracy

The concept of democracy is not easy to define like any other concept in the social sciences. Etymologically, it is traced to two Greek words „demon‟ and „critus‟. *Demon* in Greek means people while *critus* means rule or government (Gauba, 2003). Democracy is an all encompassing concept that covers the protection of groups and individuals‟ freedom, including political parties, civil society and institutional framework responsible for making office holders accountable, control of the military by the civil authorities and impartial and independent judiciary that strengthens the rule of law (Jega, 2006). This definition prescribes the ideal that a democratic system is expected to imbibe. This conception is centred on the institutions of government and its interaction with individuals and groups. This definition fits into the conception of the

developed world that has relatively moved pass the rudiments of economic development and with high literacy level of majority of the citizens.

In the developing world, democracy is conceived as a vehicle for human development. It is a process that involves “the creation of conducive conditions for individuals and groups to have their fullest freedom and right, to develop their actual and potential capabilities to realise whatever are their stated goals” (Bako, 1997:227). The presence of some institutional mechanisms that make a political system work should not be conceived as democracy. The conception of democracy as mechanism and values that allow individuals, groups and the nation-state to realise their objectives will be appropriate for developing countries. The conditions for realising objectives of development through set of values, mechanism, as well as, organised institutions and procedures that guarantee individual and group freedom is an apt definition for democracy. The torturous process in arriving at a democratic system is highly desirable in developing countries. To achieve this, the “integrity and efficacy of democratic institutions and processes” must be enhanced (Jega, 2006:17).

Democracy is a system of government where leaders are elected from between or among competing political parties in a free, fair and credible election. The distinguishing democratic institutions and processes are regular elections conducted by an election management body and the presence of a legislative arm of government that makes laws that address the basic needs of citizens. The proper functioning of an Election Management Body and the legislative arm of government is what has made democratic governments of developed countries to be stable. These two institutions cannot exist without each other. The law that guides the framework for election are usually made or amended by the legislature. Members of legislative assembly must pass

through an election process to be elected as legislators who will make laws for the smooth running of a democratic government. Electoral administration and the legislative process are important areas where the democracy norms are by imbibed by new democracies through international organisations.

# The concept of Democratic Norm and Assistance

There is no universal definition for the concept of norm as with any other concept in the social sciences. Norm is a system of shared understanding and behavioural expectation (Chandler 2013). It is a „set of inter-subjective understanding and collective expectations regarding the proper behaviour of actors in a given context or certain identity (Bjorkdahl, 2012:225). Norm is the understanding and expectation of behaviour outcome that is shared in a temporal and spatial setting. It could be on governance, democracy, human right or any other set of understanding and change in behaviour that is being upheld for the freedom and well being of the individual or groups in the society.

From the definition of norm above, democratic norms are shared rules which direct behaviours, expectations and understanding of people in the process of governance in order to promote the well being and freedom of individuals and groups in a society or state. Democratic norm sets are imbedded in exercise of executive powers, electoral administration, legislative process and judicial process. The rules that empower democratic institutions to exercise their powers and specify their limits are indicators of norm subset. Democratic norm subset as rules is promoted by international organisations to sustain peace and stability on a global scale. In this study the democratic norm subset examined are electoral administration and the legislative

process. Voter registration and confidence in Election Management Body as well as law

making, legislative oversight and legislative constituency representation are indicators of the democratic norm subset being studied.

Democratic norm assistance are the support given by an international organisation or an advanced democracy to promote shared rules directed at behaviours, expectations and understanding of people in the process of governance for the promotion of the well being and freedom of individuals and groups in a new democracy. Democratic norm assistance are in form of funding of trainings, study visits, design and publication of poster, training manuals, books, supply of ICT equipment and software and other forms of technical support to democratic institutions of new democracies.

# The Concept of Electoral Administration

Electoral administration is a concept that also evades definition like any other social science concept. It implies “rule application”. It is a process of implementing rules set for the purpose of ensuring credible elections outcome. The process involves stages of preparation, casting ballots and the declaration of election outcome (Omotola 2009:19). This process is again referred to by some scholars as election administration. In this case, it is assumed that it deals with how voting and elections are managed at all levels. It is a process through which an electoral body organises and conducts elections into public office. It includes the set up of an election agency, the features, behaviour pattern of election officials, the conduct, process and implementation of policies that are relevant to elections.

# The Concept of Legislative Process

Conceptual confusion usually arises when writers limit the legislative process to

law making process or passage of bills from the first reading to the final stage. The legislative process is all encompassing. It involves not only law making but also oversight activities of the legislature and the role it plays in the process of ratification of treaties, as well as, constituency representation. The process also involves the executive because, if the executive does not give assent to a bill, it cannot transform into a law.

Legislative process is the process of governance through which bills are given consideration and laws are passed for the benefit and guidance of the society (Ayembe 2016). The National Institute for Legislative Studies in Nigeria posits that, the legislative arm of government is the authority vested with the powers to make laws and to supervise the executive authority and the judiciary. This is the role bestowed on it by the constitution of any country within a limited framework that will not make it infringe on the functions of the other two arms of government. Legislators bring the needs, aspirations and concerns of the people they represent “to the national level where they can be factored into the policy process” (NILS 2015:12). They are involved in law making process, including budget making, oversight activities and play roles in interaction with the state and regional/international groups regarding treaties.

# The Concept of Democracy Consolidation

Democracy consolidation is a phenomenon that describes avoidance of regression from democratic government to authoritarian regime. Finemore (1996), in assessing International norms, posits that, a norm must be accepted to a level it is taken for granted that no matter what happens, the society cannot go back or abandon it again. The acceptance of democratic norm sets to this level connotes that democracy is on its way to consolidation in a fledging democratic state. For a new democracy to

consolidate, people must „hold values and beliefs that assert democracy‟s inherent

superiority and value it for „its own sake‟. People must have the notion that „deeply engrained democratic values would likely lead the elites and ordinary citizens of an established democracy to resist the abandonment of participatory politics‟ (Corbone 2009:135). Electoral administration and the legislative process are the norm subset that are to be examined to confirm whether they could constitute “deeply engrained democratic values accepted by the “elite and the ordinary citizens” of Nigeria as espoused by writers like Carbone (2009:135). These are rules that guide voter registration and confidence in Election Management Body as well as law making, legislative oversight and legislative constituency representation functions promoted by the UNDP in Nigeria from 2003 to 2017.

Democracy consolidation means, if these democratic norm set are accepted to the level that the elite/state and the people/society do not see option in any other system of governance (no matter the extent of challenge encountered), the new democracy will be on its way to consolidation. Consolidation is at the edge of a continuum from authoritarian regime to advanced democracy. The attitude of the elite/people or state/society are the behaviour expectations usually measured to see the extent of consolidation on a continuum.

# 2,1.6 Democratic Norm Assistance Through International Organisations

Democratic norm assistance through international organizations are mechanisms for the consolidation of democracy in most developing countries. It is an established fact that, democracy is an outcome of domestic political process, but it can be influenced by actors from outside the nation-state. This is because, democracy promotion by international organizations is linked to many factors in which the foreign

policy goals of established democracies is a very strong factor. These developed democracies collaborate with International Non-governmental Organizations (INGO) to provide assistance to newly democratised countries, in order to deepen democratic governance. This means that international organizations are important vehicles for establishing outcomes from input made by existing democracies in order to achieve this goal (Pevehouse, (2002), Bjorkdahl 2004).

The argument on external inducement of consolidation of democracy centres on the nature of the international system and the influence of international economics. International security influences states to join international organizations and membership of international organization, could compel a nation-state to obey the norms and rules agreed upon by members. The opportunities that abound in the international financial institutions make states to be committed to change or consolidation of democracy (Pevehouse, 2002).

Democratic norm assistance is grounded on the rationale that it will enhance global prosperity and development, universal peace and social justice. It is assumed that if all countries democratize the threat of international terrorism and uncontrolled migration of people will also be addressed. This postulate emanated from the foreign policy of the United States and the countries of the European Union and found its way into the United Nations (Burnell 2007). Democracy promotion is linked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Freedom, which is a provision in the document that the United Nations operates. The United Nations agencies along with other regional and external development agencies of established democracies now brandish democracy assistance as a delicious cake that must be shared among all nation-states.

Democratic norm assistance is a wide range of activities that involves development cooperation which aimed at developing and consolidating democracy in third world countries. Mechanisms for development cooperation involve a range of things like assistance, diplomatic pressure, threat of sanctions, political conditionality, and (to the extreme) use of force (Burnell, 2007).

Democratic norm assistance serves as catalyst to democratisation which isa process. It is inspired from within and gradually the pressure to democratise builds up on the authoritative regime that tries to resist it, and gradually the people‟s demand for democracy prevails in the face of struggles. On the other hand, the international community assists when the democratisation process is set in motion. In the event of intervention, the method and roles to be played by the international community was a dilemma in the past. In the state of confusion on the major method for democracy promotion, Santiso (2001:5) posits that:

Aid donors use three general approaches to help promote democracy: direct support; indirect support (via, for instance, encouraging economic development); and pressure to encourage policy reform (including the threat of use of sanctions). The promotion of specific policies and policy changes within aid recipient countries can indeed take many forms, ranging from dialogue, persuasion and support to pressure.

Santiso (2001:5) concludes that:

The most common and often most significant tool for promoting democracy is democracy aid. Democracy assistance can be defined narrowly as encompassing “aid specifically designed to foster opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening.

Several approaches are adopted in promoting democracy in a country receiving democracy assistance. The bottom-up and the top-down approaches are the methods of democracy promotion used by international organisations. The top-down approach for

democracy promotion is directed at state institutions, the political sphere and the political elite. The elites have conviction and are trained to imbibe democratic ethos. They in turn make effort to establish institutions of democracy. They negotiate at the international realm with other pro-democracy institutions and groups, to promote democracy*.* “However, democracy promotion strategies face the problem that the transition to democratic regime was a destabilizing period, during which elites were encouraged to balance internal strains” (Göksel and Çepel, 2010: 5).

The second method, the bottom-up approach which involves assistance being directed to the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to serve as socialising agent and watchdog to the institutions of governance. Democratisation takes place from below and targeting socio-economic and cultural associations, organisations and movements to become pro-democracy groups. The condition in which the bottom-up approach works is that pro-democratic civil society (that is dynamic) promotes democracy through political education that induces the values and consciousness, which will make the general populace to imbibe democratic ethos. Weak and non-democratically oriented civil society cannot carry out the task of democracy promotion employing the bottom- up approach(Göksel and Çepel**,** 2010).

Democracy assistance is also viewed from the dual domestic and international levels and vertical and horizontal levels of promotion. The horizontal level explains the consolidation of the norms of democracy at home. The vertical connotes the reinforcement of democracy abroad. The export of democracy to other states is seen as a form of diffusion. Apart from the states, International Organisations are also involved in the promotion of democracy. The United Nations and its agencies like United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union (EU), the Organisation

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) among other international organisations promote democracy across the globe. The involvement of these actors has not only legitimised but also reinforced domestic democratic institutions and values abroad.

Furthermore, democracy promotion as a process involves strategies and instruments designed by a state(s), international organisation(s) or private actor(s), to consolidate democracy through inducement or enforcement in a non-democratic country or a democratic country, in transition in collaboration with domestic actors in a recipient country. The use of instruments for democracy promotion is generally categorised into inducement and enforcement as explained by Knodt and Junemann (2007:261).

Enforcing instruments are applied assuming that the third country is not willing to develop in a democratic direction and, in this, an element of force is required. The political- diplomatic instrument can entail diplomatic non- acknowledgement of the state as such, as well as diplomatic isolation. Political diplomatic pressure could also be administered by any measures which damage the image of the ruling state elites, or which raise the diplomatic costs of their actions.

Economic instruments for the enforcement of democracy promotion include financial aid and support, economic cooperation, technical instruments, trade and visa facilities among other things. The conditionality or sanction enforced by the promoter (state or international organisation) could be linked to non-compliance with the principles of rule of law, human rights or non-compliance with democratic standard. Inducing instruments that belong to the political/diplomatic realm include, multi-lateral regional cooperation promotion, diplomatic recognition, financial support and aid, and capacity building. Inducing instruments are used for a third country that is willing to consolidate its democracy. In this vein, democracy assistance is given in form of grants

and programmes, projects in financial, practical and technical spheres (Knodt and Junemann 2007).Democracy assistance is presented in form of positive and negative measures. The positive measures are reward of good performance while the negative measure is (denial resources due to bad performance). These are forms of political conditionality. “There exists now significant assistance available to transitional countries genuinely committed to and engaged in democratisation, but which lack resources or expertise”*(*Santiso, 2001:5). On the whole, the typology of instruments discussed by Knodt and Junemann (2007) are categorised under instrumental types of conceptualisation of democracy promotion.

Beichelt (2012) reviewed the literature on the contending issues of constructivists and the institutionalism theorists on mode of democracy promotion as against the idea of instruments of coercion and conditionality and singled out Borzel and Risse four modes or social mechanisms of external democracy promotion that they identified. They are coercion, conditionality, persuasion and socialisation. Democratisation by coercion is linked to the military intervention of some great powers in developing countries. For instance, the intervention of the United States under the administration of George W. Bush in Iraq and Afghanistan with the tag, democracy intervention had effect on the perception of scholars on democracy promotion. Democratisation through conditionality is associated with international financial institutions and regional international organisations and developed economies who relate with developing countries using this mechanism. Democracy promotion by persuasion involves communicative action and the civil society in the promotion of democracy. This mechanism centres on democratic norms and values and the link between domestic actors, (the civil society and democratic elites) and the external actor

in the transition process (regime change or consolidation of democracy). They make domestic actors imbibe norms and values. Democracy promotion through socialisation is similar to persuasion. If democracy promoters persuade domestic actors through persuasion, it does not fall within socialisation. Socialisation involves social interaction in which norms and values of democracy are exchanged between domestic actor and external actors and these norms and values are imbibed in an autonomous manner. The democratic norms and values or elements are re-contexualised in the receiver country. This is a form of social learning (Beichelt, 2012). Given this situation, the mechanism for the promotion of the actors that are used as the vehicle for democracy promotion will be discussed.

Pevehouse (2002: 519) argues on the role of international organisations in the assumptions of sociological institutionalism and “Plausible causal mechanisms linking international organisations with domestic outcomes…” This is premised on

... how domestic preferences can actually emanate out of interactions within international institutions and organizations. Some of this research, however, center on international norms rather than formal institutions. Still, many examples in the empirical literature focus on formal IOs such as the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization; the International Labour Organization; or the World Bank. In these works, IOs effectively serve as a conduit of norm diffusion and promotion focused on domestic actors. Thus domestic policies may change, not out of a constraint imposed by the institution, but rather from a fundamental change in a domestic actor‟s preferences.

In view of the assumptions of Pevehouse (2002), an analyst would conclude that the UNDPis backing domestic policies in Nigeria‟s domestic actors‟ preference for fundamental change that is sweeping across the globe. In order to make democracy in Nigeria sustainable, the UNDP, after the 2003 general elections, earmarked a percentage

of its development aid to democracy assistance. This is an effort towards the consolidation of democracy and facilitation of global peace and stability. But the extent of success recorded in the promotion of international norms accepted by those benefitting institutions has to be measured. This is to ascertain the success or failure of democratic norm promotion and the challenges that are likely to serve as obstacles in the process of implementing democracy assitance rendered by UNDP in its component plans under investigation.

Carothers (2009) classified approaches to international democracy assistance into two, namely, political and developmental. The political approach focuses on “the importance of genuine, competitive elections and sufficient respect for political and civic rights to ensure that citizens can participate meaningfully in democratic political process”. It is a process of political struggle where actors identified as democrats contend the activities of non-democrats. The struggle typically depicts moments of “breakthroughs, reversals, crisis and resolutions”. Democracy aid is used to support democrats against non-democrats through funding, training, advice or moral support or through non-governmental organisations with political orientation, politicians or political association/political parties. The support could also be channelled through an independent media, independent judiciary or an independent election management body. This is to create platform for “securing and guaranteeing fair procedures for the democratic actors and by checking the power of the non-democratic actor”. (Carothers 2009:7). The United States of America uses this approach to implement her external democracy assistance.

The developmental approach involves „basic features of democratic governance such as transparency, accountability and responsiveness- contribute to more equitable

socio-economic development overall‟ This approach lays emphasis on economic and social rights while political and civic rights are made to be products of the former. The approach „conceives of democratization as a slow, iterative process, measured in decades and marked by the gradual accumulation of small gains‟. The approach „sees value in promoting social and economic development as a way of supporting democracy‟. They play down openness and political contestation and emphasise capacity building of political institutions of the state and stress good governance. They tie their work on democracy to „human rights and ... cast their efforts to promote democracy as a subset of human rights work‟ (Carothers, 2009:8-9). The European Union and the UNDP use this approach to implement their international democracy assistance. The two approaches discussed by Carothers are not systematic enough. The constructivist norm research theorists have developed more sophisticated instruments for explaining how international democracy assistance has developed into a new research agenda. The agenda is in democracy norm research. Several models have been advanced to explain this phenomenon. This will be discussed in the next segment.

This study will benefit from the assessment of Santiso (2001) and Pevehouse(2002) on the role of international organisations in democracy promotion and the classification of approaches to international democracy assistance of Carothers (2009). But this study differs from the works reviewed because its focus is with particular reference to UNDP Nigeria‟s democracy assisitance to election management body and the legislative arm of government. Khakee (2007) assessed the democracy promotion project of the EU and its member countries focusing on the challenge of conducting free and fair elections in Nigeria. This author noted that the EU was not happy with the conduct of 2007 general elections and however, affirmed that the interest

of the E U and EU countries were more on oil than democracy. It was the politics of oil that made them to fund aspect of governance and elections. Khakee (2007) argued further that the problem of corruption and the looted funds that were saved in banks in Europe showed the inconsistency of EU and EU countries in their efforts at trying to support good governance and democracy. Like many other reports written by scholars from the EU and the US before 2008 (when they write about democracy promotion), their attention was always on election which is not the only important element for the consolidation of democracy and good governance. This fundamental flaw was later realised and then legislative process and other elements in the democratisation process were included in their research and support. They enlarged their coverage to democratic norms transfer systematically through other agencies of government and Non- governmental Organisations/Civil Society Organisations. Models for the assessment of democratic norm promotion by norm researchers will now be reviewed.

* + 1. **Norm Promotion and Consolidation of Democracy: An Assessment of Models** Democratic norm research evolved from the contention that the international system is anarchical, and that it is interest that makes great powers to act in the way they do against the less powerful ones. Norm research challenged this and other assumptions based on the notion that anarchy or interest is what an actor makes it to be. It is in this vein that Martha Finnemore (1996), among other scholars, advanced the importance of norm on the behaviour of states and international organisations. In this tradition, the models developed by norm research scholars like Flockhart (2005), Freyburg (2009) and Bjorkdahl (2012) will be reviewed in order to develop a model for

this research on the impact of promotion of democratic norms, which is likely to lead to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria.

Bjorkhdahl (2004) posits that, norm can be classified into two, processes, namely, socialization, and institutionalization. „Socialization refers to the process in which the imported norm becomes widely accepted and allowed to effect practice. Institutionalisation is considered a process to embed the norm into the normative structure where it gains a taken- for- granted status‟(Bjorkdahl 2004:16). The author described international organisations as norm exporters and importers. Democratic norm transfer could be facilitated by international organisations in many ways. They “facilitate the export of norms by teaching and articulating the norms. With some International Organizations, the member states may come to share some fundamental values and norms, as well as a common identity (Bjorkdahl 2004:11-12). Bjorkdahl discusses normative influence of international organisations on world politics from the perspective of norm exporters. This writer‟s reference to common identity is saliently on liberal norms and western orientation. There is nothing bad with it but, it portrays the same civilisation drive of colonial intervention in the so-called backward societies in the 1900s. If the promotion of norm is successful, this cannot lead to the consolidation of democracy.

Flockhart (2005) led a team of scholars to develop the “complex socialisation model” for explaining the transfer of international norms. The model‟s constituents are social identity, strategy for socialisation, domestic structure and domestic level filter. Social identity is about the concept of “self” and “others” and the process of acceptance by the norm promoters to associate with others. The strategy for socialisation is the second element. It is the process of learning through interaction, social influence and

persuasion. The third element is the domestic structure. The structure is in two levels - elite and masses. The norm transfer must be to the two groups. The last element is the domestic filter. It involves the „political structure‟ and processes at the state/elite level, as well as the political culture and participation tradition at the nation/people level. The models described further the process of diffusion of democratic norm set on how the country being socialised is able to imitate Western Orientation and liberal government. There are two major groups, the in-group and the out-group. The in-group is the country or international organisation that has western orientation and liberal government while the out group is the country being socialised. There are four out-groups and each out- group is classified according to its closeness to Western Orientation and liberal process of governance(Flockhart 2005: 46-61).

Flockhart‟s complex socialisation model is an over glorification of Western orientation and liberal governance process which shows that international democratisation is a process of turning the state/elite and nation/people of the recipient country into appendage of Western nations and governments. The model is too Eurocentric to be used for analysis in this study. In this sense, consolidation of democracy will amount to westernisation and a transplant of European institutions and attitudes.

Freyburg (2009) espouses the linkage and socialisation model of diffusion of democratic governance. She asserts that „democratic socialisation is one of the modes of transferring democratic norms‟. It is a process that involves change in attitude towards “democratic governance, which is a consequence of exposure to democratic rules and decision-making practices‟. The author goes further to say that „democratic governance corresponds to the manifestation of democratic principles in administrative daily

practice”. This applies to collective decision making process in every situation and binding on all members of the democratic institution. Democratic socialisation is registered in the change in attitude of the „socializee‟ to democratic governance. The attitude of the socializee is influenced at both the cognitive and affective levels. Attitude does not necessarily have impact on behaviour. „Behaviour and behavioural intentions are thus treated as potential consequences rather than integral components of attitude change itself”. Freyburg (2009) concludes that linkage is the instrument for the transfer of democratic norms. She discussed two types of linkages, social and communicative linkages. Social linkage is about flow of people across border- state officials influenced by personal experience during their stay abroad. They usually understand appropriate governance process. Communicative linkage is about appropriate governance through the “flow of information across borders”, through Western Media (Freyburg, 2009:6-7). If the social and communicative linkages are successful, the country receiving democracy norm will be on its way to consolidation.

The model of Freyburg (2009) model was designed for the analysis of the influence of European Union or countries in Europe and America. It cannot be used for the analysis of universal international organisation like the United Nations Development Project (UNDP). Her idea of social linkage based on the flow of people across borders also tilts towards imbibing Western orientation. It means that the elite must have either travelled to EU countries or must have been listening to news and programmes in the western media to be able to accept democratic norms sets, and to make it work in their countries.

Moreover, from the background of Freyburg, (2009) the hidden motives of norm transfer (promotion) of Western countries, America and the international organisations

they dominate could be reflected on through the typology of linkage described by Mejidov (undated). They are social, communication, transition, geo-political, economic and trans-national civil society. Another set of categorisation is inter-governmental and trans-governmental linkages (social learning). These linkages are seen as a favour for a country receiving international democracy norm set to be linked to the U S, the West and the multilateral institutions dominated by them. This is also an apologia for explaining the ignorance that causes the backwardness of the country receiving democracy norm set and as such, consolidation of democracy will also amount to westernisation.

Bjorkdahl‟s (2012) model focuses on the relationship between the process of norm diffusion and the consequences, identity (re)construction. She defined norms as

„set of inter-subjective understanding and collective expectations regarding the proper behaviour of actors in a given context or certain identity‟. The author discussed the role of the norm maker and the norm taker in the process of norm diffusion: “often individuals, non-governmental organisations, (NGOs) and transnational advocacy networks take on the role as norm-makers to construct and promote norms they perceived ought to be universal... also International Organisations (IOs) , individual state or collective of states acting as norm makers‟. (Bjorkdahl 2012: 83) emphasised that, the norm taker is also active in the process of adopting norms. The norm taker is

„influential and responsible for selecting the norms and constructing a normative fit between the transferred norms and the local normative context‟. On the export and import of norms, the author affirmed that „Norm diffusion often refers to a process of unconsciously or consciously, active or passive, direct or indirect norm transfer from a norm-maker to a norm taker‟. Bjorkdahl (2012: 83) argued further that, attention is

rarely given to norm import but there are a number of works devoted to norm export. Norms could be diffused through „imitation‟ or „voluntary borrowing‟. Identity, status and legitimacy are the reasons for norm acceptance by norm takers. (Bjorkdahl‟s 2012: 85), concluded that „the actors involved in norm import are often the political elite‟. They are involved in the process of construction of norms –re-interpretation and re- presentation of universal norm to fit into domestic norms and practices. Bjorkdahl‟s (2012:87) however, warned that „often we have only indirect indications of the norm such as rhetoric surrounding the norm.‟ „...the rhetorics of norm acceptance often precede practice. A norm narrative for example, may serve as a carrier of meaning and seeks to justify the norm itself‟. A discourse is created in the process of norm transfer by the norm maker and the norm taker. The study of this process and its outcome will reveal the change in attitude of the norm taker after some years of interaction.

The model of Bjorkdahl (2012) is relevant to this study in its pre-occupation with the process of norm export and import in particular but, illustrations are drawn from the relationship between E U and the Western Balkans. In addition, the author‟s notion that it is the political elite that are involved in norm import is not consistent with an earlier submission by Flockhart (2005). Flockhart included the masses in the process of norm diffusion and that it is when the state/elite and the society/people are involved in the process that the norm will be properly diffused and taken for granted. Given the review of Bjorkdahl (2012) on norm export and import and observations around the lack of attention on norm researchers - norm import/norm-taker, this study will contribute to democratic norm research in Sub-Saharan Africa with reference to Nigeria.

Although, there are studies already on norm promotion through international organizations on the executive arm of government in emergent democracies in North

Africa and Eastern Europe but there is no study carried out on democratic norm promotion on the election management norm sub-set and the legislative norm sub-setby the UNDP in Nigeria.

# Brief Review of UNDP Democratic Norm Promotion Assistance to Nigeria from 2003 to 2015

The United Nations is an institution that has been interacting with the Nigerian government since 1960. It has collaborated with the country in numerous intervention programmes before being involved directly in democracy promotion programmes from 2003. This was based on its election support programme as a result of the challenges noticed in development vision 2020 designed with the government and other international development agencies. In Nigeria‟s long period of transition to a democratically elected leadership, the UNDP was almost the only development partner because, most of the multilateral agencies had left after the execution of Ken Tsaro Wiwa in 1992. During this period, a country cooperation framework was drafted by the UNDP in partnership with the Federal Government of Nigeria. The time span for this plan was 1997 – 2003. The overall objective of the document was how to surmount the challenge of underdevelopment, especially poverty alleviation. It provided support in four major areas: poverty reduction, gender, governance and the environment. After the 1999 handing over by the military regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar, to a democratically elected President Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the framework was adjusted to develop a National Management of Socio-Economic Development (NMSED) in the component. Given the four components in the 1997 – 2003 country co-operation framework, the focus of this study is narrowed down to the aspect of governance. In the governance component, the UNDP developed a smaller framework tagged National

Governance Programme (NGP). This was geared towards building the capacity of the National Assembly, the civil society organisations, business groups and political parties. The specific areas concentrated on were political participation, civil education and conflict management. In implementing the plan, the UNDP appointed a Senior Governance Adviser, to oversee the National Governance Programme activities. The programme was able to support governance interventions and strengthening of democracy, even though there was yet to be in place a systematic approach targeting challenges that could obstruct good governance. The programme enhanced consensus between national and international partners in the promotion of good governance. It promoted anti-corruption initiatives and supported civic education (UNDP 2003).

The low key at which governance component was given attention came to the fore after the 2003 general elections in which there were irregularities. In a report on the performance of the UNDP from 1997 – 2003 (released by the UNDP evaluation office), it was recommended that the UNDP should do more in consolidating democracy in its next country plan. The document was silent on the nature and politics of democracy assistance, how the mode of operation of strategic plans delayed the process of implementation of assistance and why the UNDP was unable to achieve its target of strengthening election administration.

The second country co-operation framework (2003-2007) was designed to take care of three major areas: Governance and Human Right, Poverty Alleviation and HIV/AIDS. The hangover of the authoritarian regime in the period of transition had to be dealt with in order to prepare grounds for the consolidation of the democratic regime. There was the need to create harmony in the new institutions of democracy as such, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The anti-corruption agencies too had to be

strengthened, to be proactive in their duties and responsibilities. The Civil Society also needed to be strengthened to drive the system with well informed democratic agenda, serve as government watchdog and public advocate. In this vein, the UNDP rolled out projects in the following areas:

* + - 1. Promotion of transparency, accountability and integrity in public and private sectors.
      2. Supported Civil Society Organisations, political parties and business communities for civil education, political participation and conflict management.

Under these support initiatives aimed at capacity building, the National Assembly and the elected political office holders participated in the workshops on transparency and accountability while the Civil Society and the Independent Electoral Commission staff were trained on voter education. The Civil Society has been involved in election monitoring since then (UNDP 2003).

UNDP‟s final report published on 8 December 2006, had three major thematic thrust which included improve capacity of Nigeria to develop and implement sustainable development strategies and to introduce sustainable practices in support of good governance and response to HIV and AIDS. The theme, Introducing Sustainable Practices in Support of Good Governance, is related to the theme of this research and as such the finding of the report in this area will be briefly discussed.

Nine indicators for measuring democratic governance were developed. They included, democratic electoral regime, effective separation of powers, institutional resolution of conflict, protection and enforcement of human rights. Other indicators for measuring the level of democratic governance (consolidation) are promotion of gender equity, adequate legislative representation and process, accountable and transparent

administrative systems, autonomy and capacity of state and local government and capacity of public sector for effective development policy. These indicators were used to measure the outcome of activities carried out. The results were mostly positive, but where performance was low, recommendations were made and this gave birth to the new country programme plan for 2009 – 2012. The new document was signed and released on 16 December 2008. The document has four programme components which included, Economic Governance Programme (EGP); Capacity for Governance Programme (CGP); Private Sector Development Programme (PSDP) and Sustainable and Risk Management Programme (SRMP). Again, it is component two, Capacity for Governance Programme, which is relevant to this study. This component also has three subcomponents that include Electoral Reform and Deepening of Democracy, Public Accountability and Local Government administration. The secondsubcomponent, Electoral Reform and Deepening Democracy is relevant to this study.The study will concentrate on the review of assessment of this sub-component in the Country Programme Action Plan. Again, the Electoral Reform and Deepening Democracy has two legs as it appeared in the name of the sub-component. This studydwell much on Electoral Reform and Deepening of Democracy, which are one of the major activities of the UNDP in Nigeria. The main aim of the sub-component is:

...to develop the capacity of national and sub national institutions, networks and processes, whether governmental or non-governmental, as a contribution to the further entrenchment of democratic governance based on the understanding that an effective system of democratic governance is one which is founded upon representative, equitable (across gender and other categories), transparent, accountable and inclusive institutions; a vibrant, responsible and capable media; and a dynamic civil society which is engaged constructively in the political process.

The objectives of component 2 sub-component 1 (2009 – 2012) Country Plan are:

1. To build-up national election management capacity
2. To Promote sustainable electoral process
3. To strengthen technical capabilty of INEC for election administration.

The objectives of component 2 sub-component 2(2009 – 2012) Country Plan are

six:

* 1. To expand capacity in the National Assembly to manage its legislative business (functional organization, awareness and knowledge among members, access to substantive information and analysis and staff skills).
  2. To establish broad consensus around key steps towards improved internal democracy, citizen overreach, transparent financing and gender equity in major political parties.
  3. To put a combination of capacity development and grant facilities in place to enable civil society to do much more in a range of areas such as research, publication and overreach, budget tracking, establishment of platforms for citizen engagement with policy-makers, civic education, community organization and legal aid and advice.
  4. To facilitate the expansion of media engagement in civil awareness- raising and mobilization (community and educational radio)
  5. To facilitate the expansion of innovative media programmes and increased professionalisation of media staff; and
  6. to enhance institutional space expanded for voicing the concerns, needs and contributions of women and youths in the political process based on action by organisations representing their interests and views.

The review of the UNDP‟s Country Plans from 2003 to 2006, 2006 Mid-term Report and the component plan which spans 2009 to 2012 is of benefit to this study. This study differs from these reports in examining UNDP Nigeria‟s democracy assistance extended to INEC and the National Assembly from 2003 to 2015.These documents are silent on the nature and politics of democracy assistance, how the mode of operation of strategic plans delays the process of implementation of assistance and why the UNDP is unable to achieve its target of strengthening election administration and the legislative process up the 2007 in each another electoral circle ended. This is the gap that this study filled.

In assessing activities of International Organisations (IOs), Adetula (2011) contended that, the sources of data for the evaluation and assessment of good governance and democracy carried out by international agencies in Nigeria were not adequate. He argued that, the desk study approach was mostly used by agencies like USAID and other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies assessing the outcome/impact of their democracy promotion activities. In addition, their yardstick for measuring performance does not encompass social economic conditions of the benefiting countries and that their perception of state, based on neo-liberal assumptions will always reduce the outcome expected from the impact of activities being assessed. When the donor agencies used varieties of methods like interview with stakeholders, observations, case studies, field visits, network of personal contacts, opinion surveys and local newspapers to elicit information that are easily accessible. Confidentiality, prejudice and bias of the sources used usually affect their findings. The short time that consultants who are assessors stay does not allow them to have local knowledge of the area of study and as such their findings may not be reliable. He asserted that most of their assessments relied on quantitative survey which is not yet well developed in Africa. The population in Africa is yet to be familiar with survey methods. Respondents will just give answers without knowing the implication of their response. He argued that data and information for the assessment of democracy should rely on direct and first hand observation by unbiased observers.

From the foregoing position on the method of collection of data for evaluation and assessment of democracy promotion activities of donor agencies, Adetula‟s (2011) position is an utopia perception on data collection because getting direct and first hand information by an unbiased respondent could constitute a serious problem. All

respondents have their opinions and bias, as such, mixed methods for data collection from different sources will help confirm bias in data collected in the field in which the process of analysis will aid reliable findings. His study on the pitfall in the method used for assessment and evaluation of democracy promotion activities of donor agencies has the whole of Africa as its area of coverage as such this study will benefit from it by restricting its area of coverage to democracy promotion activities of UNDP Nigeria, focusing on the support given to the Independent National Electoral Commisson and the National Assembly.

In a related study, on the assessment of democracy promotion assistance to Nigeria (under FRIDE report supported by World Movement for Democracy)it was observed that the development agencies did not coordinate their democracy assistance in Nigeria prior to 2003. It was on the eve of 2003 elections that they realized this challenge. They then organised a forum for sharing general information but later resolved that the UNDP should manage a Joint Development Basket Fund (JDBF) in 2005, on realising that there was duplication in areas of support to certain activities/institutions which amounted to waste of insufficient funds made available by donor countries (Adetula, Kew and Kwaja 2010).

Other weaknesses observed in the process of design and implementation of democracy promotion projects of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies are discrimination against Nigerians. International experts were preferred by donor agencies to Nigerian experts. Sometimes they delayed project implementation in the process of searching for international experts. For instance, the Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF) projects could not take off until January 2007. The search for foreign experts took almost two years and the critical period essential for the takeoff was delayed and it

affected performance of the operations of the first round of JDBF at inception (Adetula, Kew and Kwaja, 2010).

Furthermore, Adetula, Kew and Kwaja (2010:17) drew their conclusion based on their findings that

More than 65 percent of Nigerian respondents commented that the design, process and activities of many interventions by donors and their partners did not have a scientific basis for their rationale. Rather, they suspected that many assistance programmes, particularly, those of bilateral donors are designed on the basis of assumptions and stereotypes about the country or to project the interest of their home government, and that some of the results and impacts on democracy in Nigeria were only by default.

The study by Adetula, Kew and Kwaja (2010) under review is relevant to this research in its broad sense, looking at the democracy assistance to Nigeria by both bilateral and multilateral agencies. Although, their study touched on critical institutions like the Independent National Electoral Commission and the Civil Society Organisations, it was silent on democracy assistance targeted at the legislature, with particular reference to the National Assembly in Abuja. It equally touched on UNDP Nigeria, but dwelt more on the perception on bilateral donor agencies like USAID, DFID and the EU.

This study investigated UNDP‟s democracy norms promotion in strengthening electoral administration and legislative process. The norm sub-sets are new voter registration and confidence in the electoral administration, as well as, in law making, oversight function and constituency representation in the legislative process.

To complement the review of UNDP‟s activities in the area under study, chapter four contains a detailed review of country cooperation plans and evaluation reports on UNDPs assistance to electoral administration and the legislative process in Nigeria.

# Factors Responsible for UNDP Democratic Norm Assistance

The overall objective of the 1997 -2003 evaluation report and country cooperation plan was how to surmount the challenge of underdevelopment, especially poverty alleviation. This was to provide support in four major areas: poverty reduction, gender, governance and the environment. In the area of governance, 2003 election was a test of transition in the sense that it was a civilian government that conducted the election. The democratically elected President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo administration worked with the UNDP to develop a framework that addressed National Management of Socio-Economic Development (NMSED) in the component. There was focus in the aspects of governance. In the governance component, the UNDP developed a smaller framework tagged, National Governance Programme (NGP). This was geared towards building the capacity of the National Assembly, the civil society organisations, business groups and political parties. The specific areas concentrated on were political participation, civil education and conflict management. In implementing the plan, the UNDP appointed a Senior Governance Adviser to oversee the National Governance Programme activities. The programme was able to support governance component interventions and strengthening of democracy, even though there was yet to be in place a systematic approach targeting challenges that were likely to obstruct good governance. The programme enhanced consensus between national and international partners in the promotion of good governance. It promoted anti-corruption initiatives and supported civic education (UNDP 2003).

In consonance with the observations of the UNDP (2003), Omotola (2010:72) laments on the perception of the public on lack of confidence in „INECs capacity, independence and impartiality‟ to conduct a free, fair and credible elections during the

build up to 2007 general elections. He argues further that „The presidency wields overbearing influence on INEC, making it impossible for it to exercise independence and provide a level playing field to all political actors‟ (Omotola 2010:76). Steps towards developing good working relationship between an election management body (INEC) and the electorate, political parties/judiciary in achieving credible election management is by building confidence of stakeholdersin the election management body. Confidence in election management body has the following indicators: impartiality, independence, transparency and professionalism (Kerevel, (2009), Fayemi 2010). Zainawa (2014) asserts that the EMB was partial and there was an overbearing influence of the ruling party on the activities of the commission during the 2007 and 2011 general elections.

The independence of an EMB will likely be a subject of contention if the method of appointing or selecting electoral commissioners or executives of EMB by the executive was not a standard practice (Kerevel 2009). An EMB must not allow partisan influence of the body or its officials or that of the executive/political parties to affect its performance. This entails the involvement of political parties and other stakeholders in the decision making process regarding elections and not allowing the executive to have overbearing influence on the electoral process (Kerevel 2009). As at 2003, the EMB could not monitor equal access to state owned media, freedom to campaign and respect for limits of campaign expenses by political parties and candidates (Fayemi 2009).

The EMB in Nigeria had challenges with the performance of electoral officials and poll workers. There were issues with printed ballot papers, delivery of election supplies, provision of correct information to voters and maintenance of voters register (Fayemi 2009).

There were accusations of lack of transparency with regards to steps taken by the EMB in decision making. They were not by consultation with relevant stakeholders. Transparency is one of the major areas where INEC strives for improvement in its strategic plan which was designed in consultation with the UNDP (INEC 2012).

The forgoing claim portrays what was happening in Nigeria that necessitated the assistance of the UNDP. As at 2003, the conditions mentioned above were not on ground due to the long period of military rule. This necessitated the democracy assistance of the UNDP and its JDBF members in electoral administration in Nigeria.

Related to the challenges observed by the UNDP that brought about democracy assistance, Nwanolue and Iwuoha (2012:28) assert that the National Assembly passed 703 bills out of 2,364 brought before it between 1999 and 2011.About 98.2% of the bills did not target the yearnings of the common man. Oyewo (2007:21) contends that the Nigerian legislature is a victim of military dictatorship and this has caused the legislature to be at infancy, as such unable to perform its role of oversight surveillance. Usman (2010) observed that the legislative arm of government failed Nigerians between 1999 and 2009.Gado and Abdulwasiu (2012) observed that, the legislature is unable to channel the aspirations of its constituents(mostly the poor electorates) into the national action plan.

From the foregoing studies carried out on democratic institution (in which electoral administration and the legislative process are isolated) this study is motivated to assess UNDP‟s assistance in the two institutions mentioned above. In the next segment, a review of the performance of these two democratic institutions is discussed in order to explain the variables involved in the study.

# Electoral Administration and Consolidation of Democracy

Electoral administration entails facilitating voting and management of elections at national, regional and local levels. It also entails the organisation of election agencies, characteristics and behaviour of election officials, planning and implementation of election policies and processes involved in conducting elections. It is the process by which Election Management Bodies conduct elections for legitimate candidates into public office (Omotola, 2009).Electoral management bodies have the sole responsibility to conduct, regulate, supervise and adjudicate over all elections in their jurisdiction. They must be impartial, transparent and independent and professional in their role in electoral administration (Kerevel,(2009); Fayemi 2010)

Electoral administration, in order words, entails many variables that include voter registration, regulation of activities of political parties before and after election, as well as, election dispute management.

The activities carried out by the UNDP in assisting the election management body in Nigeria include voter registration system, the election process and the relationship between election management body and Political parties; election dispute resolution and the relationship between election management bodies and the judiciary. UNDP‟s assistance to INEC from 2003 to 2015is one of the major variables analysed in this study.

In UNDP‟s Country Cooperation plan of 2008, it was stated that the output expected from INEC should be to build-up national election management capacity and promote sustainable electoral process through capacity development of INEC, creation of trained staff base that could assist in electoral management, designing and

implementing large multilayer voter advocacy and education campaign (UNDP, 2008:8).

The voter registration system, the confidence of electorate in the election management body will be assessed to ascertain the impact of UNDP‟s democracy assistance to INEC from 2003 to 2015. Voter registration will be defined.

Voter registration is an instrument for the enforcement of universal suffrage. It is a tool for exercising voting right by every eligible citizen. It guarantees equal suffrage for every citizen (ACEEEO, 2009). In order to guarantee equal suffrage for every citizen guidelines are provided to guide elecetoral management bodies. These guidelines include:

* Electoral registers must be permanent.
* There must be regular up-dates, at least once a year. Where voters are not registered

automatically, registration must be possible over a relatively long period.

* Electoral registers must be published.
* There shall be an administrative procedure - subject to judicial control - or a judicial procedure, allowing for the registration of the voter who was not registered; the registration shall not take place at the polling station on election day.
  + A similar procedure shall allow the voter to have incorrect inscriptions amended.
  + A supplementary register may be a means of giving the vote to persons who have

moved or reached statutory voting age since final publication of the register (ACEEEO, 2009:7) .

In addition, voter registration serves as proof of right of citizens to vote and special mechanism in special voting situations for citizens who are not in their resident (for instance Internally Displaced Persons, fishermen, nomads or thoseliving abroad).It confirms the equality of suffrage, meaning that, any citizen who votes has only one vote at a time and to confirm provision in „electoral acts of many countries that candidates

contesting for office must be on the voters‟ register‟ and that they (candidiates) have the right to be elected. It also serves as framework that confirms the list of eligible voters (ACEEEO, 2009).

There is the need to diferentiate between voter registration and voter list. Voter registration is an important element in the electoral procedure. It involves collection of data of citizens that are eligible to vote. Individuals eligible to vote are people who meet the suffrage requirements established by constitution or electoral act. These requirements are usually minimum age, citizenship, and residency. A voter register is generated from this process of data gathering on every eligible voter in a country.

The basis of the voter register is usually civil register, a set of records of all citizens of a municipality or a State. Before the election, the data of voter register are assigned to specific polling districts, which results in voter lists. So while voter register is a total database of voters, voter list is a part of it, which can be used only in one polling district. An election can be conducted without a voter register, but it is rarely conducted without voter lists (ACEEEO, 2009:13)

There are active and passive types of voter registration. They differ in the role that voters play in the process. In passive voter registration system:

Voters have nothing to do, it is electoral management who takes the data of voters from a separate database (usually civil register) without any contact with the voters. Typically, a population registry includes information such as, name, age, gender, marital status and address for every citizen of a country. Births and deaths are also recorded in the registry (ACEEEO, 2009:13)*.*

The process operates in the following ways:

Identifying eligible voters requires searching the existing population registry for those individuals who meet the necessary criteria, as well as noting the names of individuals who shall be removed from the voters list due to death or other reason. However, voter register is only as reliable as the civil register(ACEEEO, 2009:13).

In the active voter registration system:

Election officials get the data direct from the individuals eligible to vote, so it is the voter who decides about inclusion in voter register. There are two forms of active system. Individual-initiated system requires the active cooperation of voters, they must take the initiative to go to registration offices or send a registration form by mail. In state-initiated system, electoral officials have the responsibility of going to the public in order to identify those individuals who are eligible to vote. This is typically done by trained staff canvassing door-to-door (ACEEEO, 2009:13).

The document explains further that:

In some countries, election officials employ a mixture of the two systems. For example, registration centres may be established in some areas that are easy for the public to reach, while in remote areas officials go directly to the residence of potential voters. Mixed system can mean also that voter register is exacted from a state register but legislation enables all voter or some groups of voters (such as voters abroad or citizens of another state) inclusion at their own request(ACEEEO, 2009:13).

Furthermore, active voter registration systems could be compulsory or voluntary. If it is made compulsory it will be an offence if one does not register but if it is voluntary it is not an offence not to register. There are continuous and periodic voter registration systems. The continuous voter registration system is the initial register which is „updated on a regular and ongoing basis, each time an individual civil status event occurs. Voters may inform the authorities about changes in their voter information at any time usually by contacting an administrative office...‟ (ACEEEO, 2009:13). The periodic voter registration system entails that „records are updated (or even compiled) periodically – either prior to an electoral event or once in every certain number of years‟. In this instance electoral officials must always create new voter register at every election period (ACEEEO, 2009:13).

The comparative study conductd by Omotola (2009) on the election management bodies in Ghana and Nigeria election management bodies and the assessement of election management bodies and guidelines outlined and discussed by Association of European Election Officials (ACEEEO, 2009) among other works reviewed have not looked at assessment of democracy assitance of UNDP to Nigeria. However these studies will benefit this study in arriving at major variables for measuring the outcome of UNDP assistance electoral administration in Nigeria.

Omotola (2010:72) laments on the perception of the public on lack of confidence in „INECs capacity, independence and impartiality‟ to conduct a free, fair and credible election during the build up to 2007 general elections. He argues further that, „The presidency wields overbearing influence on INEC, making it impossible for it to exercise independence and provide a level playing field to all political actors‟ (Omotola, 2010:76). Steps towards developing good working relationship between an election management body (INEC) and the electorate, political parties/judiciary in achieving credible election management is by building confidence of stakeholdersin the election management body. Confidence in election management body has the following indicators: impartiality, independence, transparency and professionalism (Kerevel,(2009); Fayemi, 2010). The independence of an EMB can be assessed by the method of appointing or selecting electoral commissioners or executives of EMB by the executive, the legislature or the judiciary. If the judicial arm of government or the civil society groups are the ones involved in the process of selection or appointment, it is the best (Kerevel, 2009). Impartiality of the EMB could be assessed through the presence or absence of partisan influence of the body or its officials. The practice is the involvement of political parties or stakeholders in the decision making process regarding elections

(Kerevel, 2009). This means that an EMB monitors equal access to state owned media, freedom to campaign and respect for limits of campaign expenses by political parties and candidates (Fayemi, 2009).Professionalism of EMB is assessed by the level of training and performance of electoral officials and poll workers, well printed ballot papers, well delivered election supplies, provision of correct information to voters, well maintained registration list which tallies with the result (Kerevel, 2009). Transparency is assessed through the display of openness in all activities and in relationship of EMB with all stakeholders (INEC, 2012). Step taken in decision making are through consultation with relevant stakeholders.

As at 2003, the conditions mentioned above were not on ground due to the long period of military rule. This necessitated the democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and its JDBF members in electoral administration in Nigeria.

# Legislative Process and Consolidation of Democracy

The legislature is an important pillar in democratic consolidation of emergent democracies. The 1999 Constitution confered on the National Assembly of Nigeria its legislative functions in section five.Ogbu and Abdulqadir (2004:76-7) outlined ten roles of the legilative arm of government:

1. Law making
2. Financial appropriation
3. Judicial function – performs quasi-judicial function, like impeacment of top government officials such as president
4. Investigation
5. Constitutional review
6. Representation
7. Interest articulation and aggregation
8. Supervision, scrutiny and surveillance
9. Control of administation –check and balance to public officers
10. Educatiing and informing the public.

Nwanolue and Iwuoha (2012:27) posits that legislators as individuals and asgroup are constitutionally charged with the responsibility of appraising themselves in the area of law-making, representation and oversight functions, aimed at ensuring a virile democracy on ground. More essentially, the legislature plays the role of deepening democracy by ensuring that citizens and the civil society are brought into the mainstream of public policy and are given the fair hands to execute such policies (as and when due). Consolidation of democracy requires the strengthening of democratic infrastructure: subordination of the polity to the rule of law; strengthening of party politics and political education; supporting electoral institutions; Encouraging debate and dialogue in the resolution of disputes; provision of some social services and lliberalised economy.

Nwanolue and Iwuoha (2012:28) observed that,„between 1999 and 2011 legislative years, the National Assembly passed a total of 703 bills out of 2364 bills which it received in the period‟. They observed that:

About 98.2% of the past bills represented the selfish interests of the National Assembly members, executive arm, multi-national co- operations and other major players in the nation‟s economy. The yearnings and aspirations of the down-trodden were swept under the carpet, hence, giving rise to unmanageable situation of unemployment and other forms of socio-economic hardships on the citizenry. With this scenario, would Nigeria still claim that it is democratizing? Would the National Assembly members claim to be representing us selflessly and with profound dedication? How would the working class survive in this era of unconsolidated presidential democracy?

The study carried out by Nwanolue and Iwuoha (2012) shows how the legislature in Nigeria is still struggling with its function as an important institution expected to perform creditably well in the democratic consolidation process. Their study

looked at the legislature as an entity, which is of benefit to this study. Butthe democracy assistance actitivities of the UNDP in Nigeria is the focus of this study.

From another perspective, Oyewo (2007:6) outlined the functions of the legislative arm of government under the 1999 Constitution:

1. Law making and policy formulation functions;
2. Oversight functions;
3. Investigative functions;
4. Watchdog of public funds, derived from the legislative powers and duties with regard to public finance;
5. Representative or constituency responsibilities role.

Oyewo (2007:21) in assessing the oversight functions of the legislature in Africa with particular reference to Nigeria observes that:

...as has been clearly shown by the Nigerian experience, the legislative role and culture is at its infancy, haven been a victim of long period of military interregnum, that took place in Nigeria and other African States, before the present democratization processes of the 90s. Since written Constitutions do not by themselves constitutionalism secure, the legislature‟s oversight function can be enhanced and well articulated under a constitutional democracy to advance the rule of law, good governance and accountability. Unfortunately, the usually unrepresentative judiciary is more commonly seen in this light than the representative legislature, with the attendant weak showing of constitutionalism on the continent.

Oyewo‟s study is on the constitutional role of the legislature in Africa using Nigeria as unit of analysis. The paper however did not touch on the international organisations trying to carry out programmes and projects to build the capacity of the legislature in order for it to perform its role in the process of consolidating democracy in Nigeria as proposed in this study.

Usman (2010), in his essay „A Decade of Legislative Practice in Nigeria, 1999 to 2009‟ observed that, the legislature in Nigeria from 1999 to 2009 failed to keep its

head above the waters in terms of performance of its basic functions as outlined above. Pressure from the executives, lack of experience in law making and placement of higher premium on personal interest at the expense of public interest are the major reasons adduced to the low level of performance of the legislative arm of government (Usman, 2010). The challenge of lack of performance must be surmounted if Nigeria must consolidate her democracy. It is in this light that the agency(UNDP) is making effort at promoting democracy through political and civil societies in Nigeria is assessed with particular reference to the legislature. The legislature is a very important institution in a democratic system and in this regard, it necessitates this study through the assessment of the democracy promotion intervention of UNDP Nigeria and the National Assembly.

Gado and Abdulwasiu (2012) in their study entitled „Assessment of the legislative inputs in Nigeria‟s Democratic Governance for sustainable Development‟ outlined three major roles of the legislature in a democratic government. These are law making, oversight functions and constituency responsibility. They observed that the law making role gives the legislature the foresight to set national agenda and aspirations and that law and legislation are not only important technical rule making but also vital for political and socio-economic development of societies. Secondly, the oversight function of the legislature is exercised to ensure transparency and accountability in the use of public funds and resources for the benefit of all citizens. It helps control the excesses of the executive arm of government and confers the right to investigate or probe suspicious activities of other organs or establishments in the machinery of government. Oversight functions are performed by special, ad-hoc, standing or whole house committees. The constituency responsibilities function is the third function that is related to the constituents (people) that each legislator represents. This is where the legislature as an

institution and each individual member derive their power. The legitimacy of their authority is in the manner in which their role is to advocate for the dreams and aspirations of their constituencies by lobbying their colleagues to incorporate the needs of their constituencies in the national action plan. Towards this end, legislators have constituency offices in their areas, for collecting constituency views for input into national plan. Gado and Abdulwasiu (2012) observed that, most legislators do not visit their constituencies on regular basis, let alone identify their views and aspiration for input into national action plan. They concluded that, the legislature has not met the expectations of Nigerians because, the bills passed so far, are yet to be of immense benefit to the common man, and in proposing bills that will benefit the common man, they usually delay them and in the event heighten the frustration of the common man.

Given the explanation of Gado and Abdulwasiu (2012), their study turned blind eye on the dilemma of legislators, who refused to visit their constituencies (but prefer to keep their aids in those offices to receive complains) in order to avoid huge personal demands from the people in their localities who, instead of presenting issues or demands that will benefit everyone in the constituency prefer to demand for sponsorship of naming and wedding ceremonies among other demands. On a whole, their study is relevant to this study in the area of assessing the input of the legislature in democratic governance for sustainable development in Nigeria which is what UNDP Nigeria has promoted with its programmes within the time frame of this study. The three major roles of the legislature explained in their paper along with others will be used to measure the outcome of democracy promotion activities of UNDP Nigeria in the two country plans, from 2003 to 2007 and 2009 to 2015 respectively.

Agba, Chukwurah and Achimugu (2014) in their paper entitled „Politics and Administrative Responsibility in Nigeria: An Assessment of Legislative Mandate Performance and Executive Implementation of Public Programmes‟ is relevant to this study in assessing the role of legislators as representatives of the people and the importance of committees in the National Assembly. They observed that, the legislature must have high degree of focus, wealth of experience, sense of collective engagement and the required resources to effectively carryout their functions as stated by Gado and Abdulwasiu (2012). This means that the capacity of the members of the legislature must be built to have these outstanding qualities to (make laws) appropriate, supervise and implement public programmes and national budget carried out by the executive.

In line with the submission of Gado and Abdulwasiu (2012) and Agba, Chukwurah and Achimugu (2014), qualities expected from the legislative arm of government are addressed by the report of Deepening Democracy in Nigeria (DDIN) programme, conducted by Glentworth and Afari-Gyan (2011). The document looked at 2010 to 2011 plan and level of implementation. It outlined the areas of intervention that include, funding of Policy Advisory Centre (PLAC); help begin Constitutional Review, to cover vital areas like citizens and indigenes problems, creation of new states, presidential terms and so on. Also advising on the formation new parliamentary committees and defining their agenda; training committee clerks; creating research capacity for committees and organizing induction seminars for new members on committees functions. The report again stated that the expected output from the National Assembly was to develop better relationship with Civil Society. DDIN was able to facilitate the National Assembly to set up civil society liaison office and

facilitate better image to actually represent the interest of their constituency and not millionaire funders of weddings and naming ceremonies. It was observed in the report that, success was yet to be recorded in facilitating better image of the National Assembly members as actual representatives of the interest of their constituencies and not millionaire funders of weddings and naming ceremonies among others because of public awareness on the jumbo pay package that they usually vote and receive for themselves.

The DDIN report (2011) outlined other future priorities for the National Assembly, which include:

* 1. Constitutional review
  2. Holding the executive arm of government to account through finance, appropriation, Millennium Development Goals, poverty alleviation, justice and Human rights, health, education, women and youths, agriculture among other committee works in both chambers. Under this segment, trainings to equip staff of the National Assembly as clerks and researchers in committees, improving the use of ICT, making staff of the National Assembly understand and apply Senate and House rules and procedures, induction training for newly elected members to perform their roles and identify the purpose of committees and their responsibilities in committees and facilitating orientation training to make National Assembly members and staff to work with passion in making committees carryout their duties effectively.
  3. Strengthening the National Assembly to interact with Civil Society Organisations and the public, through meetings, seminars and publicity/interaction in broadcast/social media. To also make National Assembly Liaison office for Civil Society Organisations interaction work effectively and to change the perception of the public on National Assembly members as millionaire funders instead of looking at them as servants of public interest.

The studies conducted by Nwanolue and Iwuoha (2012:27), Oyewo (2007), Usman (2010), Gado and Abdulwasiu (2012), Agba, Chukwurah and Achimugu

(2014)on expections from the legislative arm of government and addressed by the report by the assessors of Deepening Democracy in Nigeria (DDIN, 2011) programme conducted by Glentworth and Afari-Gyan (2011) among other works reviewed have not looked at the assessment of democratic norm assitance of UNDP to Nigeria, using the INEC and National Assembly as unit of analaysis. However, these studies benefits this study in arriving at major variables for measuring the outcome of UNDP assistance to the National Assembly towards the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. The details are discussed in another segment.

Premised on the foregoing variables, this study examined UNDP Nigeria‟s democracy assistance extended to INEC in implementing new voter registration and boosting of confidence of the electorate and political parties in INEC as a credible election management body. It in turn investigated how UNDP Nigeria‟s democracy assistance to the legislative arm of government facilitated proper legislative representation in law making, oversight functions and constituency representation from 2003 to 2015.

# Empirical Review of Democratic Norm Research Models

Given the explanation on the adoption of social constructivist theory which is reviewed below, the study examined the role of the UNDP Nigeria in promoting democracy, looking at the outcome of its assistance to electoral administration and the legislative process. The core component plans of the UNDP that are relevant to this study are activities that target domestic elite, governmental structures and process towards the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria through the proper functioning of the election management body and the legislature. In order to achieve its aim of

consolidation of democracy in Nigeria, two UNDP country plans have targeted INEC

and the National Assembly in promoting and protecting the democratic process (UNDP 2008). The study assessed policy support and co-ordination maximization (strategic work plan) of the UNDP in Nigeria, from 2003 to 2015. It concentrated on the activities of the UNDP assistance in addressing challenges faced in election administration and the legislative process. This led the researcher to investigate the impact of UNDP democratic norm promotion activities on electoral administration and the legislative process.

The norm sub-sets examined are, the relationship between UNDP assistance (through funding of training, publishing of manuals, equipment/software provision and curriculum design for capacity building of participants in the two democratic institutions in this study) and improvement in voter registration and confidence in the electoral management body, as well as, in law making, oversight and constituency representation functions (in the legislative process).

The three models from which this study adapts a model, will also be summarised to link them with the variables of this study.

Complex socialisation model: Flockhart (2005), developed the “complex socialisation model” for explaining the transfer of international norms. The model‟s constituents are social identity, strategy for socialisation, domestic structure and domestic level filter. Complex socialisation model is an over glorification of Western Orientation and liberal governance process which shows that international democratisation is a process of turning the state/elite and nation/people of the recipient country into appendage of Western nations and governments.

Linkage and socialisation model: Freyburg (2009), espouses the linkage and socialisation model of diffusion of democratic governance. Democratic norm is

transferred through social and communicative linkages. It involves change in attitude towards „democratic governance ... a consequence of exposure to democratic rules and decision-making practices‟ (Freyburg, 2009:6-7). Freyburg‟s model was designed for the analysis of the influence of European Union or countries in Europe and America. Freyburg‟s model cannot be used for the analysis of universal international organisation like the United Nations Development Project because it is not a regional organisation like the EU.

Norm diffusion Model: Bjorkdahl‟s (2012) model focuses on the relationship between the process of norm diffusion and the consequences, identity (re)construction. This author defined norm as, „set of inter-subjective understanding and collective expectations regarding the proper behaviour of actors in a given context or certain identity‟ (Bjorkdahl, 2012:16). Attention is rarely given to norm import but there are a number of works devoted to norm export. The model of Bjorkdahl (2012) is relevant to this study in its pre-occupation with the process of norm export and import in particular but illustrations are drawn from the relationship between E U and the Western Balkans.

The three models (Flockhart, (2005); Freyburg, (2009); and Bjorkdahl, 2012) described above are modified for the purpose of analysing democratic norm promotion by a universal international organisation (like the UNDP).Two operational linkages are developed from these three models. They are social and normative linkages. Social linkage is a form of interaction with a norm bearer, (for instance an international organisation), in which social learning takes place. Normative linkage involves interaction between a norm bearer and norm receiver which is training, funding, book publication or curriculum design interaction agreements between them within the country receiving the international norm. The two types of linkages depict processes of

adaptation of norm set. Adaptation of norm set is modified by the receiver, considering the historical and situational context of the interaction.

# Variables for Measuring UNDP Democratic Norm Promotion Assistance in Nigeria

In the light of the foregoing review on the independent variable UNDP democratic norm assistance and the two dependent variables electoral administration and the legislative process, the attributes of the three variables will be explained.

The independent variable UNDP democratic norm assistance involves, funding of trainings, study visits, design and publication of poster, training manuals, books, supply of ICT equipment and software and other forms of technical support given to INEC including the National Assembly. It is measured with the assistance it renders in improving electoral administration and the legislative process in Nigeria (UNDP, (2010); INEC, (2015), NILS, 2015).

The first attribute of the first dependent variable is voter registration system. Voter registration system is a mechanism that establishes the list of eligible voters and their proof of right to vote. The names of eligible voters must be on the voter‟s list, to enable them to vote. If an individual‟s name is not on the list, he/she cannot vote, as such, the voter registration has not achieved its aim(ACEEEO, 2009). The voter register has always been a subject of controversy in Nigeria. It is the major instrument used by political parties to rig elections in their stronghold (Flores, 2010:12)

Steps towards developing good working relationship between an election management body (INEC) and the electorate, political parties/judiciary in achieving credible election management is by building confidence of stakeholdersin the election management body. The second attribute of the dependent variable is confidence in

election management body. This variable has the following indicators: impartiality, independence, transparency and professionalism (Kerevel,(2009), Fayemi, 2010). This study adopts the four attributes as measures of confidence. Independence can be measured by the appointment or selection of commissioners or executives of EMB made by the executive or the legislature which is not seen as the best practice. But, if the judicial arm of government or the civil society groups are the ones involved in the process of selection or appointment, it is the best (Kerevel, 2009). Impartiality of the EMB is measured by the presence or absence of partisan influence of the body or its officials. This is evident in the involvement of political parties or stakeholders in the decision making process (Kerevel, 2009). In this vain, EMB ensures equal access to state owned media, freedom to campaign and respect for limits of campaign expenses by political parties and candidates (Fayemi, 2009).Professionalism of EMB is measured by assessing the level of training and performance of electoral officials and poll workers, well printed ballot papers, well delivered election supplies, provision of correct information to voters, well maintained registration list which tallies with the result (Kerevel, 2009).Transparency is measured by the display of openness in all activities and in relationship of EMB with all stakeholders (INEC, 2012). Step taken in decision making are by consultation with relevant stakeholders.

The first attribute of the second dependent variable is law making function of the National Assembly. It is measured through assessment of the bills that set agenda for the strengthening of democracy and socio economic development for the nation (Gado and Abdulwasiu, 2012).

Oversight functions is one of the attributes of the second dependent variable, which measures legislative powers exercised to ensure transparency and accountability

in the use of public funds and resources and to control the excesses of the executive arm of government and investigation carried out on suspicious activities of other organs or establishment of government, through special, ad-hoc, standing or whole house committees (Gado and Abdulwasiu, 2012).

Constituency representation is the third attribute of the second dependent variable. It is measured in legislators‟ advocacy on the dreams and aspirations of their constituencies by lobbying their colleagues to incorporate the needs of their constituencies in the national action plan (Gado and Abdulwasiu, 2012).

Social linkage is a form of interaction with a norm bearer (the UNDP) through which social learning took place, from 2003 to 2015.Normative linkage involves interaction between a norm bearer (the UNDP) and norm receiver (Nigeria -INEC and NASS) in which funding of training, book publication and curriculum design interaction agreements took place from 2003 to 2015. The two types of linkages will be used to depict processes of adaptation of norm set. Adaptation of norm set is modified by the receiver, considering historical and situational context. Thus, the relationship between UNDP‟s democratic norm assistance on improvement in voter registration system, sustaining confidence in the election management body, improvement in law making, legislative oversight and constituency representation in Nigeria will be examined.

In the next segment, three theories for assessing democratic norm assistance of the UNDP in Nigeria were discussed and the most appropriate one adopted for the purpose of analysis.

# Theoretical Framework

# Functionalism and Democratic Socialisation

Functionalist theory is a framework used by scholars to analyse the functions of regional grouping like the European Union or universal agencies like the United Nations Agencies in new democracies. The anarchy that prevailed in the world system during the period of the first and the second World Wars prompted scholars like David Mitrany to espouse the theory of functionalism, in which there will be integration of societies and institutions instead of states that engage in war. Then, regional integration was given prominence (Johari, 2012). However, the emergence of the United Nations from the Defunct League of Nations made the functionalist approach universal. The neo-functionalist school helped in creating assumptions that gave the theory its place in contemporary time. Against the idealists‟ assumptions that the global system anarchical because there is no central authority that will regulate international security, the functionalists looked at the roles of international institutions in keeping the world peaceful through international cooperation. The United Nations with its agencies, promotes peace through development programmes in which democracy promotion is one of them. The UNDP in this sense promotes democracy in Nigeria by interacting with individuals in institutions having something to do with democracy. Although, it signed agreement with the state, the institutions interacted with them in order to promote democratic norms in Nigeria. This is aimed at the consolidation of democracy. The political society and the civil society represented by political parties, the executive, the legislature, Civil Society Organisations and the media have individuals who are socialized in order to transfer norms to the society at large. This explains the promotion

of democratic norms in which democratic elites in the political and civil societies

imbibe the norms.The problem of the study is used to examine how the United Nation Development Programme provides assistance in strengthening the institutions of democracy like the legislative arm of government. This is to make it to be more open to the people, help in developing policies aimed at making public institutions more responsive to the people, make Nigerian citizens to be more engaged in the political process through legislation.

The process of accepting democratic norm through international organizations is expressed in theoretical terms as democratic socialization. The use of this instrument implies that, link to external actors could make domestic actors to imbibe democratic norms and values, which will in turn make democratic institutions more functional. In this instance, norm dynamics are the driving force for political change (Beichelt, 2012). Democratic socialization has to do with functional cooperation in which an international organization promoting democracy could have access to a country‟s governmental and informal institutions. This interaction will create avenue for social learning involving democratic elite and the civil society (Beichelt, (2012), Freyburg (2010). Trans- governmental interaction invests in principles such as accountability, transparency and popular participation beyond the demand for success in electoral democracy institutions, concentrated upon in the past by international organisations, as well as, other international democracy promotion actors (Beichelt, 2012:8).

It is in the light of the foregoing argument that, policy network in democracy promotion came up as a group of stake holders who have interest in the policy sector and use their capacity to make the policy succeed (Freyburg, 2010:59). Democratic socialization and functional cooperation looks at the international organization, their substance and their target.It also involves norm promoters and sites

of socialization at the macro and micro levels of interaction. Norm promoters are actors who try to influence attitudes and preference of actors with the aid of strategies and instruments. Site of socialization (structural perspective) is a platform for participating actors to internalize transnational norms through cooperation and social interaction. The macro level involves state-to-state government interaction while the micro level is the level of individuals. For instance, representatives of international organisations (like the UNDP) could interact with members of parliament at the levels of organisations and as individuals. Democratic socialization and functional cooperation looks at the identity transformation of individuals delegated to international organizations (Freyburg, 2010).

Functionalism as a theory does not explain very well the role of the UNDP Nigeria in promoting democracy through building capacity of the National Assembly because it is mostly used for analysis of regional organization like the EU in neighbourhood policy of democratic socialization and cooption of emergent democracies into their economic bloc. As a result of this, system theory will be reviewed to assess its suitability as framework for analysis in this study.

# Systems Theory

Systems theory as a framework for analysis is premised on the assumption that a system is an interrelated set of entities that are connected by history and behaviours that are specific. The history or behaviours include, set of identifiable elements and relationships that are complex (Fisher, 2010). Systems entail classification of relationships which are governed by natural law observed in the environment. They maintain a state that is steady. They serve a purpose and have mechanism for restoring equilibrium in the case of activities or events that try to alter the regularity of the

purpose and function.

System theory grew out of theories developed in sociology and communication studies. David Easton (1995) Karl W Deutsch, Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell (1966) espoused the ideas which evolved as systems theory from cybernetics model of analysis and traditional political theory. The work of Almond dovetailed from structural functionalism to systems theory. These scholars created assumptions that generated the idea of political system (Fisher, 2010).

Systems theory engages the internal structure of the political system. Structure implies that the pattern of political power and authority is characterized by set of relationships observed between the ruler and the ruled. In looking at power relations, the roles of these two set of actors are usually observed to bring out a pattern of behaviour. From Talcott Persons‟ perspective, there are pattern variables. Almond and Coleman also created their own structures based on differentiation between structures, according to their degree of involvement in the political system. In the roles that structures play, William Mitchell (1968), added to the sustainability of roles. David Easton in amending the weakness of identifying boundaries in the political system, espoused the concept of input and output in which, input are in form of demand and support and output decisions made as a result of input into the political system(Fisher, 2010).

Systems are interdependent, as such, they couple together the various behaviours in the society as a complex whole and in this instance, Easton holds that, environmental influences are transmitted across boundary of a system. The output of the first system creates an input in the second system and the process is reversible and the linkages/exchange creates the input – output relationship. Some scholars are critical about the application of systems theory in the analysis of political phenomenon due to

perceived weakness in methodology, excessive emphasis on stability in empirical research and its political bias for stability. Social constructivist theory will also be reviewed to assess whether it will be suitable for analysis in this study.

# Social Constructivist Theory

The constructivist‟s theory is preoccupied with influence, interests and identities or strategies of international institutions in the course of interactions in which set of rules are adhered to overtime. The school espouses ideas on norm promotion and how institutions could disperse standards of behaviour and beliefs. The theory is preoccupied with how international organizations encourage political actors to imbibe new policy, ratify international treaty and monitor compliance to international standards. They emphasize the importance of social meanings in the analysis of institutions. They assert the constructive nature of institutions and interests (Simons and Martin, 2001). The proponents of the theory are Alexander Wendt, (1992); Friedrich Kratochwil, (1991); Martha Finnemore, (1996); John Ruggie, (1998) and Nicholas Onuf, (2002).

Three generations of constructivist democratic norm theories are identified. The first generation scholars were preoccupied with two major assumptions:

* + - 1. Global social environment that influences attitude of states towards imbibing democratic norms is on the increase.
      2. Norm diffusion could be interpreted through inter-subjective engagement and interaction within the global social environment.

These two assumptions led to emphasis on norm and identity conservation as tool for analysing the flare for liberal democratic norm, which might not fit into interest or traditional power-based understanding of existing government‟s interest or rationality of

non-western states. Liberal democratic norms are being homogenized as global norms.

This is the implication of explosion in transportation links and the spread of communication on a global scale. Global inter-connectedness and increase in inter- dependence became more pronounced. The state is now challenged by the international society, non-state actors and policy experts, who assumed the role of transformative agency. They communicate norms to the state/elites and society/citizen and raise moral (rational) capabilities to sell liberal democratic norms to their countries. Using the global communicative realm, the legion of state elites who want to block democratic reforms are criminalized, delegitimized and ostracized for their self interest for holding on to traditional norms at variance with global norms (Chandler, 2013).

The second generation of constructivist assumption was built on the weakness of the first generation. They asserted that, communicative interactive was not enough to diffuse democratic norms. Norm-takers must collectively identify and decipher global norm and imbibe it adequately. External pressure has to be mounted to expect change in norms or behaviour. Those who violate the global norms must be made to adjust, to retain power, receive aid and other forms of support or be flushed out. The focus is also on social ideational transformation from the top to the bottom of the society. The mindset of the population is targeted for transformation. Coercive intervention will transform the behaviour of elites who would effect changes in state policy and in turn, change the expectations of the populace. The idea of communicative reasoning shifted to external intervention which is aimed at emancipating the subjects of non-liberal democracies. Non-western subjects are being enlightened to be placed on the pedestal of „Self Liberation‟. The challenge encountered is the lack of cultural and right ideational pre-condition for liberal freedom which draws back the process of consolidation of democracy. Attitudinal and behavioural changes had to have firm root

before political, economic and social freedoms enshrined in democratic norms are enforced. Initially, those three spheres have to be regulated(Chandler, 2013).

The third generation of democratic norm constructivist theorists holds that norm promoters had to be constituted externally before democratizing states / societies could adopt liberal values. There is evidence in the fact that democratic institutions in Africa, Middle East and Balkans have „too much democracy‟ because there are particular cultural institutions that serve as barrier to the diffusion of liberal norms. External interveners now pursue international state building and peace building agendas embedded in ideational and behavioural change through societal intervention. These international agendas are pursued rigorously in order to diffuse liberal democratic norms. The agendas are tied to the entrenchment of good governance at domestic level of the democratizing state/society and the citizens are expected to be transformed through participation in policy and decision making process (Chandler, 2013).

One of the major contributions of social constructivist theory is their research focus on the role of international organisations in the process of social construction, the perception of actors and their interests. Their position on the interest and behaviour of states is that the structure of the international system is not of power as realist have espoused, it is not of war of markets as liberal intuitionalists have argued. It is not of the exploiter and the exploited, it is of meaning and social values and that interests are constructed in the course of social interaction (Finnemore (1996) a; Finnemore (1996) b and Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). International peace and order are the reasons for espousing ideas on international state–building for promoting democratic norms. Effecting changes in state institutions will enable mediation between domestic and

international systems and that democratising states could benefit from the global norms so that they would not threaten international peace and order.

International institutions serve as global norm promoters who pursue world peace and order. They interact with democratic institutions of democratising states through the elite and the society to create behavioural and attitudinal change which will do away with cultural and ideational barriers blocking global liberal norms from diffusing. The proper enforcement of norms will likely lead to the consolidation of democracy thereby improve the lives of citizens of the democratizing country. The elite and members of the society would have held liberal norms at high esteem (Chandler 2013). The UNDP in Nigeria which is a liberal democratic norm promoter tries to effect ideational and behavioural change in state institutions and the society through the elite and populace at large. This is with the intention of strengthening the state institutions for political, social and economic freedom, thereby promoting international peace.

Critics of social constructivist theory argued that the importance attached to norms construction in the international environment could exist in its real sense but powerful states could disregard those norms if they have very strong interest about certain issue. This makes the core assumptions of the constructivist theory to be on a

„weak foundation‟. Neo-realists disagreed that states could become friends as a result of social interaction because the goal of friendship could be a desire but not in reality. In the long run, interests of great powers usually prevail. Aggressive competition is driven by the structure of the international system and not communitarian norms as assumed by social constructivist theory. Deception among states in the course of interaction also creates uncertainty because states may not always be honest. They hide their motives and intentions to create impression that will favour them in the long run and other actors

would always decipher these intentions and motives (Robert and George 2006). Furthermore, their assumptions are based on the promotion of liberal democracy brand and not any other strand of democracy.

Given the criticism on constructivist theory above, constructivist theorists maintain that anarchy is more complex than the way neo-realists see it. There isn‟t any need for it to always lead to risk of violent conflict, mutual aggression or self help (Robert and George 2006). This theory has been used again and again by scholars to analyse the influence of international institutions in the promotion of not only democracy norms for the purpose of consolidation but also the use of science bureaucracy by UNESCO to transfer scientific knowledge at country as well as international levels. This study affirms the utility of social constructivist theory as the most suitable theory for the analysis of UNDP‟s democratic norms promotion through governmental institutions (the election management body and the legislature) towards the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria from 2003 to 2015. The UNDP is an external norm promotion (transfer) agent that is making efforts to strengthen the internal process of Nigeria‟s political system (comprising domestic elite, the political structure and process.

In this chapter, central concepts like democracy, democratic nor assistance democratic norm promotion and consolidation, electoral administration, legislative process were defined. Literature was also reviewed to have an in-dept view of UNDP‟s democratic norm assistance to electoral administration and the legislative process in Nigeria. The chapter was also preoccupied with review of current literature on democratic norm promotion models and theoretical framework.

# CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

* 1. **Research Methodology**

This chapter focuses on the methodology used to generate data for this study.

# Research Design

The research design for this study is survey design. This involves the collection of data on UNDP‟s democratic norm assistance in Nigeria with focus on electoral administration and the legislative process. Exploratory field research was conducted at four major sites in Abuja.

# Population of the Study

The total population of the study is 2,283 as stated in table 3.1. The data for identifying the target population was collected at INEC and the National Assembly. The Human Resource Department of the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), gave the number of its staff members at the headquarters in Abuja as 1345. The members of the National Assembly members are 469.But this number constitutes just a single term and this study spans three tenures. From 2007, almost half of them could not return and the same happened in 2011 (Hamalai, 2009). If we add the percentage of those who joined the old members of the National Assembly they will be 938. The total population of INEC Headquarters staff and the National Assembly if added together is 2,283. It is from this number the sample was calculated as indicated in the table below.

# Table 3.1 Distribution of Population

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Place** | **Total Population** |
| INEC | 1345\* |
| NASS | 938\*\* |
| Total | 2 283 |

Source: \*INEC Human Resource Department & \*\*The law makers 2011-2015 (2011)

# Sample and Sampling Technique

This study used stratified random sampling. This technique of sampling is adopted in order to ensure the representation of the identified groups whose peculiar characteristics are of interest to this study. One of the groups under study are beneficiaries of UNDP‟s democracy assistance, the Independent National Electoral Commission Staff. The staff members of INEC were classified into three sub-groups.

They are

* + 1. non-permanent management staff
    2. permanent management staff
    3. permanent non-management staff

The group of staff members were sampled from the various departments.

The second group in this study are also in two sub-groups. They are the elected members in the

1. Senate and
2. House of Representatives (National Assembly).

These respondents were selected from the six geopolitical zones. The breakdown of the sample is in table 3.2

# Table 3.2 Distribution of Population and Sample Size

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Organisation | Total population | Sample |
| INEC | 1345 | 192 |
| NASS | 938 | 164 |
| **TOTAL** | **2283** | **340** |

Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016.

Taro Yamani‟s formula n= 𝑁

1+𝑁(𝑒) 2

was adopted for arriving at sample size. The

sample size is 340 for 2283 with 95% confidence level and +-5% precision (Yamani, 1967:886). In the sample, the House of Representatives members are 108, Senate 53, and INEC 192 as indicated in the table above.

At INEC 22 questionnaires were distributed to the 9 departments (ICT, Human Resources, Legal Services, Voter Education and Publicity, Election and Party Management, Electoral Operations, Planning and Monitoring, Training, as well as, Voter Registry). A total of 198 questionnaires were thus distributed at INEC to make room for those that may not be returned (that is, sampling error). The departments at INEC were equally represented.

At NASS, 18 questionnaires were served to House of Representatives members from the six geopolitical zones and 9 questionnaires each were served to Senators as well. The geopolitical zones were used in order to have equall representation in the distribution and response to the questionnaire.

# Recruitment and Training of Research Assistants

Four research assistants were recruited and trained on how to administer questionnaires. The research assistants are students of FUT, Minna and IBB University,

Lapai, who are members of the Association of Nigerian Authors in Niger State. The choice of undergraduates and members of the association of Nigerian authors was because they are freelance journalists. They usually contribute articles to newspapers on national issues. This quality makes them to know the significance of research, particularly data collection. They were trained for two days before the assignment commenced. They were shown the questionnaire and informed about the objectives of the research. They were trained on the implication of the use of Likert Scale, what each set of questions were designed to test, as well as, the importance of each item in the questionnaire. This was to equip them with the tools for administering questionnaire and the attitude they were supposed to build in the face of resistance posed by the potential respondents.

# 1. Structured Questionnaire

Questionnaire is the basic instrument for gathering data in this study. It helps refine description assertions about the population study in a population that is relatively large. It also provides accuracy (Babbie, 2007). It is excellent for measuring orientation and attitudes which are the pre-occupation of this study. It has the capacity to provide data in the same form from all respondents.

The first part of the questionnaire, items (B1 to B8 and C1 to C22) were used to elicit information on the relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and improvement in electoral administration. The two major items under this variable are assessing the relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and improvement in voters‟ registration system (B1- B8) and the relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and improvement in confidence in electoral management body (C1 to C22).

The second part of the questionnaire, items (D1 to D12 E1 to E7 and F1 F8) were also used to gather data on the relationship between UNDP democracy assistance in Nigeria and improvement in the legislative process. The attributes are, law making (D1 to D12, oversight functions (E1 to E7), and constituency representation (F1 to F9). Items A1 to A7 elicit information on personal data of the respondents.

The questionnaire was designed using 6-point Likert scale. It helped in simplifying responses to identifiable agree/disagree expression –this is from, Strongly Disagree, Disagree to Slightly Disagree (1 to 3) and Slightly Agree, Agree to Strongly Agree (from 4 to 6).

# 3.5.2 Semi Structured Interview

The second instrument used is semi structured interview. It is a very reliable method of collecting information from the respondents on the subject of study. It has similar patterns that are in the questionnaire.

Items (B1 to B8 and C1 to C22) were used to elicit information on the relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and improvement in electoral administration. The two major items under this variable were used to assess the relationship between UNDP‟s democracy assistance and improvement in voters‟ registration system (B1- B8) and the relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and improvement in confidence in electoral management body (C1 to C22).

The second part of the interview items, (D1 to D12 E1 to E7 and F1 F8) were also used to gather data on the relationship between UNDP democracy assistance in Nigeria and improvement in the legislative process. The attributes are, law making (D1

to D12, oversight functions (E1 to E7) and constituency representation (F1 to F9). Items A1 to A 7 elicit information on personal data of the respondents.

Interview was chosen for the purpose of gathering more information and validating the information gathered from questionnaires. The use of interview is to get information from the source which will help clarify issues and confirm attitudes and perception of the subject of the study. The use of interview as data collection instrument is reliable and consistent with the best practices in data gathering technique that is relevant to the study (Barbbie, 2007). It assisted in throwing more light and minimising error of interpretation that was likely to occur in the questionnaires administered at INEC and in the National Assembly. Similarly, the interview created room for follow- up questions, extensive probing, as well as, observation of emotional reaction that are not likely to be noticed in the quantitative technique for the collection of data (Barbbie, 2007).

# 3.53.Data from Documents

Data from secondary sources that include evaluation reports of the JDBF managed by the UNDP (on behalf of other international donor agencies like USAID, DFID and the EU in Nigeria) evaluation reports, country plans and manuals of international donor agencies like USAID, DFID and the EU in Nigeria, from 2003 to 2015 and publications of the National Assembly and its committees, from 2003 to 2015 were scrutinised to check the validity of responses from interviews and results from analysis of the questionnaire. Country programme plans and assessment reports of International Non- governmental Organisations and local civil society organizations were also used to cross check the responses. Items (B1 to B8 and C1 to C22) were used to elicit information on

the relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and improvement in electoral

administration. The two major items under this variable are assessing the relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and improvement in voters‟ registration system (B1- B8) and the relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and improvement in confidence in electoral management body (C1 to C22).

The second part of the questionnaire items (D1 to D12 E1 to E7 and F1 F8) were also used to gather data on the relationship between UNDP‟s democracy assistance in Nigeria and improvement in the legislative process. The attributes are, law making (D1 to D12, oversight functions (E1 to E7) and constituency representation (F1 to F9). Items A1 to A 7 elicit information on personal data of the respondents.

Multiple sources were used to cross check and confirm the adequacy of data and check possibilities of bias in the response of any of the groups in the process of analysis and interpretation. The use of multiple sources and instruments facilitated sufficiency and adequacy of data, as well as, accuracy and validity of data that was assessed.

# Administration and Retrieval of Questionnaire (Quantitative Data)

From table 3.3 below, a total of 351 questionnaires were distributed and 309 were retrieved. 298 were valid while 11 questionnaires were invalid. 198 questionnaires were distributed at INEC Headquarters as against 187 sampled. This is to take care of sampling error. 170 were retrieved at INEC.

There were 164 valid questionnaires from INEC. 51 questionnaires were distributed at the Senate wing while 45 were returned, 43 were valid. 102 questionnaires were distributed at the House of Representatives wing while 94 were retrieved, 91 were valid.

# Table 3.3 Administration and Retrieval of Questionnaires

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Name of organisation | Number of  questionnaires administered | Number of  questionnaires returned | Valid questionnaires |
| INEC | 198 | 170 | 164 |
| Senate | 51 | 45 | 43 |
| House of Rep | 102 | 94 | 91 |
| **Total** | **351** | **309** | **298** |

Source: Field Survey (November, 2015 to March, 2016).

# Qualitative Data from Interviews

Sixteen respondents were interviewed. Four principal officers of the UNDP were interviewed. A principal officer who served as UNDP consultant to INEC was interviewed on what he observed in the change in attitude of electoral officials in the areas of UNDP‟s support to INEC. Two UNDP consultants were also interviewed. An election observer (the National Secretary of Campaign for Democracy was also interviewed on the change in attitude that he observed in the areas of UNDP support to INEC. Three principal officers of INEC (Assistant Director, ICT and Senior Administrative Officer, Human Resource Department and a legal officer in the legal department) were interviewed on the same issues. Four legislative aides were interviewed on the change in organisational attitude that they observed in the areas of UNDP support to the legislators. Staff members of National Planning Commission were also interviewed. The Assistant Director in charge of UN systems unit in the Department of International Cooperation was interviewed along with one of the Desk

Officers overseeing UNDP assistance. This was to find out how the UNDP developed

and implemented its intervention plan along with the commission that it served as a supervisor of international organisations in Nigeria. This feat was achieved after several efforts were made to follow formal procedure failed to yield the required result. After the interview, the desk officer begged the researcher not to allow the audio interview to leak, even after assuring her of the confidentiality of the response. A journalist who chairs voice accountability in governance was also interviewed.

# Qualitative Data from Official Documents

Country plan documents of 2003 to 2006, 2009 to 2010, 2011 to 2012 and 2012 to 2015 were used as sources of data to ascertain the areas of UNDP intervention in the period under review. Research reports of UNDP from 2003 to 2006, 2007 final report, 2009 to 2010, 2010 to 2011 mid-term report 2010 to 2012 were also used to source information on the impact of UNDP intervention to electoral administration and legislative process. INEC‟s 2015 general elections report, 2015 technical report and some election training manuals also served as sources of data. Reports from The National Assembly, the National Institute for Legislative Studies and UNDP report on Democratic Government for Development (DGD I and II) also served as sources of data.

# Challenges Experienced During Field Work

The security situation in Abuja (in the Northern parts of Nigeria in general) almost served as hindrance at the beginning of the field work. The research team was resisted initially by the security personnel manning the gates. The team leader was turned down. He was told that the National Assembly was not a place for anyone to conduct research. The letter signed by the Head of Department of Political Science,

introducing the researcher made the security personnel to give audience to this researcher. Each time the research team was at the National Assembly Complex entrance, they were usually challenged, even after booking for appointment a day before. Later, the faces of the research team became familiar with the Security Personnel in-charge of bookings of appointments into the National Assembly Complex and the INEC Headquarters. Phones of visitors were collected at the security post after they were cleared and given tag to either the Senate or House of Representatives wing. The phones must not be switched off. The researcher supervised the research assistants while they administered questionnaires before proceeding to administer the questionnaire to those he assigned to himself. The large area of coverage and the nature of the activities of National Assembly members and INEC staff made the recruitment of research assistants necessary. During the presentation of 2016 budget by the President to the National Assembly, visitors were barred from gaining access into the complex. Committee sittings and the Code of Conduct Tribunal challenge that the Senate President faced also hindered the access of the team to the respondents in some instances. National assembly members were not on seat due to solidarity with the embattled principal officer in the legislative arm. The research team had to attach letters of request to some members sampled, to please allow their Senior Legislative aide to fill the questionnaire with their consent and supervision. Political party affiliation and constituency represented by the NASS members were some of the reasons given by respondents for abstaining from filling the questionnaire. When the members of the National Assembly complained that they could be traced through their party affiliation and the constituency they represent if they fill the questionnaire, in order not to reveal their identity, they were asked not to fill the column indicating those items that could

reveal their identity. In some instances, few legislative aides denied that they were given questionnaire to deliver to their principals but those who thought they would like to give their principals were given again. One female Senator who lost to court ruling went away with the questionnaire given to her.

At the INEC, the security situation was also tensed. A tag must be given to the team (visitors) to a particular floor. When going to another floor, they had to be booked and given tags to another floor so as to be allowed in by the security personnel manning the entrance of each floor. It was a challenge initially but the security personnel became familiar with the research team. They were give new dispatch tag which gives them the leverage to move around without restrictions to any floor and it eased the job towards the end of the field work. The researcher took the letter of introduction to the office of the Chairman on 15th December, 2015. He had to follow up the letter for some weeks before it finally got to the Director of Donor, Policy and Liaison (DPL). The DPL gave evaluation reports and documents to the researcher thinking that, it was a desk top research, but he was told that it was an empirical research. The DPL then minuted on the letter on 2nd March, 2016 and referred the researcher to the office of the secretary of the commission for support in the distribution of the questionnaires. They turned down the request in the secretary‟s office. He was referred to the Human Resource Department. The Assistant Director said that, the department did not have the mandate to distribute questionnaires. He was later referred to the Director Election and Political Party Management (EPM). The Director EPM suggested that the letter of introduction endorsed by the Director DPL should be attached to a number of questionnaires for onward distribution to the Director of each department. The researcher followed this guide. Each Director asked the researcher to give the questionnaire to a representative in

their department. Assistant Directors were in-charge of collection of the questionnaires. The researcher was just going to their office on appointment to retrieve the questionnaires. Although there were several call back when INEC staff were in Bayelsa during the Governorship Election, an appreciable number of questionnaires were returned.

During the proposal defence, the document used by the researcher to draw sample differs from what was met in the field. The document categorised the staff of INEC headquarters into electoral staff and administrative staff, but in actual fact it‟s the departments that determine the role of the staff members. The sample was redrawn to conform with the realities on the ground. The questionnaires were distributed according to the departments as mentioned earlier.

The UNDP was the most difficult premises to have access to. The researcher was initially at the House No. 19, T.Y Danjuma Street, office of the UNDP at Asokoro, Abuja, in August 2015. The security personnel turned down the request of this researcher from gaining access to any official. The researcher had to submit the letter of introduction signed by the HOD of Political Science Department. The Chief Security Officer promised to call the researcher the following day, but did not. After a week of promises, the researcher went back to the T.Y. Danjuma Street, but found out that the then Chief Security Officer was already on transfer. The researcher had to insist that he must gain access into the building of the Desk Officer in charge of Democratic Governance for Development (DGD). Then, the new Chief Security Officer went into the office and was informed that the letter of introduction had been sent to UNDP/DGD Project Office at No.15, Mississippi Street, Maitama, Abuja. At the Mississippi Street Project Office, the researcher showed the photocopy of the document sent from the

Asokoro, office and student Identity card. Then, the researcher was allowed access into the building. There, the researcher was asked to call the Acting Project Director. While waiting for the Acting Project Director, she directed her assistant to render all necessary assistance needed. While discussing with the Assistant Project Director, she said, they were not going to grant interview but they will give all necessary documents except on finances because, there were issues with auditing of documents and that it was yet to be addressed.

The former UNDP consultant attached to INEC as an election expert (a Professor of History and International Studies) was contacted for interview in August and he said he was on long time election observation mission in Guinea but would return in November. He later granted an oral interview on 16th November, 2015 at his residence when he returned from Guinea.

The researcher also went to the National Institute for Legislative Studies to collect data on UNDP assistance to the legislative process. The researcher was directed to the library and the study centre. He was later referred to the Director General‟s office. The Consultant of UNDP at the National Institute for Legislative Studies (a PhD holder in Development Studies) and Special Assistant to the DG was contacted to attend to this researcher. He was also out of town because he was bereaved. He was later met in November when the researcher was invited to participate in a two-day workshop on

„National Dialogue on Economy, Security and Development‟, at NICON HILTON Hotel on 16th and 17th November. After the event, the consultant of UNDP at the National Legislative Institute invited this researcher to his office. He gave the researcher reports of UNDP‟s intervention, manuals for training of legislators on procedures and functions of a legislator among other documents. He refused to grant interview. The

researcher tried all channels to interview him including telephone, email or via Skype but he declined the request. The researcher had waited for him on several occasions on appointment but he would say he was busy in the Director General‟s office. But the DGD reports, questionnaires administered at the National Assembly and interviews conducted with legislative aides and transcription of discussions at the National Dialogue are comprehensive sources of data for this research.

Some members of the National Assembly, officials of INEC and the UNDP might have left the institutions after 2003 or 2007 or thereabout, but all efforts were made to reach them to respond to the benefits they derived from UNDP democracy assistance (that is to assess their attitude to UNDP‟s democracy norm promotion) towards the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria.

The staff members of National Planning Commission were also interviewed. The Assistant Director in charge of UN systems unit in the Department of International Cooperation was interviewed along with one of the Desk Officers overseeing UNDP assistance. This was after several failed efforts at following formal procedures.

# Methods of Data Analysis

The data collected through structured questionnaire were quantitatively presented and analysed using SPSS 23. The socio-demographic information of respondents are analysed using simple percentage and frequency table. Chi-squire was computed to test hypotheses one to five. On the other hand, the data generated through interviews and secondary sources are analysed in thematic form to complement the quantitative data. The data gathered from documents helped in detecting bias and confirmed authenticity in response to questionnaires and interviews.

This chapter focused on the methodology of the study with the following items sample, sampling technique, sample population, method of data collection and analysis. Stratified sampling was used to arrive at the sample size. Structured questionnaire and semi-structured interview were used for data collection. Secondary data was also collected from cooperation plans and evaluation reports on UNDP democracy assistance to electoral administration and the legislative process.

# CHAPTER FOUR

**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LOCATIONS OF THE STUDY/UNDP COOPERATION PLANS AND REPORTS**

# Introduction

This chapter contains a review of history, structure and functions of the locations of the study. The first segment contains brief history of Abuja (the Federal Capital Territory) as well as the history, structure and functions of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the National Assembly (NASS) and the National Planning Commission (NPC). The second segment contains brief review on UNDP country plans and evaluation reports from 2003 to 2015 and review of reports on INEC activities, National Assemly, National Institute for Legislative studies and National Planning Commission.

# Historical Background of the Location of the Study

# 4.1 .1 Historical Background of Abuja:

The field research was conducted in Abuja. The four study sites were in Abuja. Therefore, it will not be out of place to do provide background information on Abuja in order to facilitate understanding on the study site.

Abuja is the Federal Capital Territory and Nigeria‟s capital city. It has Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC) with other area councils. According to historians the first settlement in Abuja was in 1828. It was incorporated into the national plan 1 October 1984 and declared capital on 12th December 1991. It is a planned city and was built mainly in the 1980s.It replaced the country's former capital city of Lagos. Aso

Rock, is a relief that defines Abuja‟s beauty. It is about 400-metre (1,300 ft) monolith.

Inside Abuja are, the Presidential Villa, National Assembly Complex and the Supreme Court. The city extends to the south of the rock. At the outskirt, is the Zuma Rock, another 792-metre (2,598 ft) monolith, north of the city along Abuja-Kaduna road, precisely situated at Madalla, Zuba near Suleja in Niger State.

The city of Abuja had a population of 776,298, from the result of 2006 census. It is among the ten most populous cities in Nigeria. The United Nations observed that, Abuja grew by 139.7% from 2000 to 2010. It became the fastest growing city in the world. It has an annual growth of about 35%, retaining the status of the fastest-growing city in Africa. It has satellite towns like Suleja, Karu, Gwagwalada, Kuje, Kubwa, and Lugbe among other smaller settlements.

The three arms of government are in Abuja. They are within Asokoro and Maitama Districts. Almost all Federal Government Ministries have their headquarters in Abuja. International Organisations and embassies of many countries are represented in Abuja. The United Nation Systems has an office complex in Abuja. The study sites are United Nations Development Programme, the National Assembly, INEC and National Planning Commission. They have their headquarters in Abuja.

# Historical Background and Profile of United Nations Development Programme

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was established in 1965. It is an agency of the United Nations Organisation (UN). As part of the UN systems its partnership with the Federal government of Nigeria began in the 1960s.

The activities of the UN systems in Nigeria are centred on development assistance as contained in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Although, there were programmes implemented by the UNDP prior to 1999, but major

activities on good governance were initiated in 1999 when Nigeria returned to democracy. At that time, the UNDP initiated public reform programmes.

In 2003, the UNDP initiated the 6th Country Cooperation Programme (CCP) from 2003 to 2007. In the document, the Federal Government of Nigeria agreed to carry out activities aimed at bringing about good governance and respect for fundamental human rights. The goal of the project as stated in the document was to facilitate transition to democracy and then the consolidation of democratic governance in Nigeria through reforms in key institutions of democratic government. The key institution targeted earlier was the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), because it plays major role in any democratic governance. The democratic electoral regime gained attention again, due to the weakness noticed in INEC‟s performance at the 2003 general elections. The sixth CCP targeted the 2007 general elections. The plan also included improvement in legislative representation and process (UNDP 2006:52). In the External midterm outcome evaluation final report released on 8th December, 2008, it could be observed that the Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF) which the UNDP started managing commenced during the 6th component plan. UNDP, EC, DFID, and CIDA were the JDBF members. The Federal Government of Nigeria represented by the National Planning Commission‟s Secretary signed the document on 8th June, 2006. The initial programme of the UNDP managed JDBF was centred mostly on electoral governance, but in subsequent plans, it was realised that other institutions/components of democratic governance should be carried along if democracy was to be consolidated.

The seventh Country Cooperation Plan -2009 to 2012 was signed by the Minister supervising the National Planning Commission on 8th December, 2008.The document has four programme components which included Economic Governance

Programme (EGP), Capacity for Governance Programme (CGP), Private Sector Development Programme (PSDP) and Sustainable and Risk Management Programme (SRMP). Capacity for Governance Programme (CGP) has sub-components whose impact is assessed in this study.

In 2010, the plan was reviewed and final document for the project from 2010 to 2012 was released in January 2010. Details of the cooperation plan are second segment of this chapter. Another major review of the project was done and the revised document was signed in 2012. This document extended the 2012 activities to 2015 which was an election year. This document completes the electoral circle project, that is, from 2012 to 2015. The details of this cooperation plan have also been explained in the second segment of this chapter.

# Historical Background and Profile of Independent National Electoral Commission

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established in accordance with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. There were six other election management bodies established and dissolved by subsequent regime that inherited them from 1959 to 1998. They are Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN 1959 to 1964); Federal Electoral Commission (FEC 1964 to 1966); Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO 1979 to 1983); National Electoral Commission (NEC 1987 to 1993); National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON 1995 to 1988) and the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC1998 to date).

The Chairman is the overall head of the agency. There are 12 National Electoral Commissioners and 37 Resident Electoral Commissioners who are the heads of the commission in each state (including the FCT). The commission has financial autonomy.

The departments in INEC are ICT, electoral operations, election and party monitoring, human resource, legal, planning and monitoring, voter education and publicity, finance and accounts and International cooperation and protocol.

The functions of INEC are contained in Section 15, part I of the schedule of 1999 constitution (as amended) and Section 2 of Electoral act 2010 (as amended) The functions include:

* + - 1. To organise elections into political offices in Nigeria,
      2. To register, organise and monitor the operations of political parties,
      3. To register citizens qualified to vote,
      4. To conduct voter and civic education, and
      5. To conduct referendum.

The vision of INEC is to become „one of the best Election Management Bodies (EMB) in the world‟ and to meet „the aspirations of the Nigerian people‟. Its mission is

„to serve as an independent and effective EMB committed to the conduct of free, fair and credible elections for sustainable democracy in Nigeria‟ (INEC 2012:13) it is guided by the following values:

* + - * 1. Transparency
        2. Autonomy
        3. Integrity
        4. Credibility
        5. Impartiality
        6. Dedication
        7. Equity
        8. Excellence and
        9. Team work

The strategic objectives of INEC are:

1. To provide electoral operations, systems and infrastructure to support delivery of free and fair elections.
2. To improve voter education, training and research.
3. To register political parties, and monitor their operations.
4. To interact nationally and internationally with relevant stakeholders. And
5. To re-organise and reposition INEC for sustained conduct of free, fair and credible elections.

INEC has conducted five general elections 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. It has offices in all states of the federation including, the FCT. Its headquarters is in Abuja.

Given the review of study site of this study, electoral administration is one of the dependent variables in this study. Premised on this variable, this research examines the relationship between UNDPs democracy assistance and improvement in voter registration and confidence in Election Management Body on electoral administration.

# Historical Background and Profile of National Assembly

The National Assembly was inaugurated in June 1999. It derives its powers under the 1999 Constitution. It is a bi-cameral legislature that consists of a Senate and House of Representatives, in accordance with the provisions of Section 47 of the 1999 Constitution (NILS 2015). There are three Senators from each state and one representing the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. The Senate has109 members as provided for in Section 48 of the 1999 Constitution. House of Representatives has 360members as provided for in Section 49 of the 1999 Constitution.

The political heads of the two chambers are the Senate President and his Deputy and the Speaker of and his Deputy as contained in Section 50 of the 1999 Constitution (NILS 2015). The Senate is considered as a senior partner in principle but both Houses are the same in terms of the power to make laws. The National Assembly has a Clerk and other supporting administrative staff. Their method of appointment, duties and procedure of work are also stated in Section of the 1999 Constitution. The Senate has a Clerk, as well as, the House of Representatives. Each Deputy Clerk services each Chamber. They carry out legislative work of the two chambers and implement political decisions as directed by the Clerk. The principal officers of the National Assembly are Senate and House leaders, Chief Whip and Party Leaders and their Deputies. They form the Committee that select members, who serve on Special and Standing Committees. These Committees too have Chairmen and Deputies (Induction training manual for legislators 2015:50)

Powers of the legislature are classified into three. The first one is expressed powers. The provisions are expressed directly in the constitution. The second one is implied. The implied powers arise from extension of the constitution. Assumed powers are assumed as a result of lacunae in the constitutional provisions (NILS 2015:51).

This is the summary of expressed powers of the legislature in the 1999 Constitution:

1. General law making powers of the legislature -Section 4.
2. Powers over public funds -Section 80 - 83, 120 – 123.
3. Powers to alter the constitution -Section 8 – 9.
4. Creation of new state -Section 8 (1) (a).
5. Ratification of treaties -Section 21 (1).
6. Powers to checkmate the executive -Section 143 – 188.
7. Oversight powers of the legislature -Section 88, 89, 128 and 129.
8. Powers to regulate its procedure -Section 60 and 101.
9. Provisions on the appointment of judicial officers -Section 230 (2) (b), 237 (2) (b), 249 (2) (b), 255 (2) (b), 260 (1) and 265 (1).
10. Provisions for the appointment of Nigeria Police Force and Armed Forces -Section 214 (2) (a), 217 (2), 218 (4).
11. Removal of the president –Section 143.
12. Confirmation of Ministerial appointments –Sections 147 (2) and 171(4)
13. Confirmation of appointment of Judicial officers –Sections 231 (1)(2), 238 (1), 250 (1), 256 (1) 261(1) and 266 (1).
14. Removal of Judicial officers –Section 293 (1) (a) (i).
15. Confirmation of appointment and removal of Auditor General –Section 86 (1) (2) and 87 (1) respectively.
16. Resignation of the president and the vice president –Section 306 (3).
17. Appointment and removal of chairmen and members of executive bodies

–Section 154 (1) and 157 (1) respectively.

1. Deployment of Armed Forces –Section 5(4) (a) (b).

The implied powers of the legislature in Nigeria are „not expressly contained in the constitution‟ but „are necessary or ancillary to the effective implementation of its express powers under the constitution.‟ They are contained in section 189, item 68 on

exclusive legislative list, paragraph 2 of part II of the second schedule of the constitution and section 88 and 128 of the constitution (NILS 2015:62)

The assumed powers of the legislature “are rights claimed by the legislature, which, though not tenable as rights, are not unconstitutional, since there is no provision in them”(NILS 2015:63). For instance the Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission had the powers to fix salaries and wages of legislature at the initial period, but the legislature also has the powers to fix their salaries and wages when they were inaugurated. The power in this provision is still in doubt so it is not tenable (NILS 2015:64).

The present National Assembly is in the fifth session -2015 to 2019. The other previous sessions are 1999 to 2003 (first session), 2003 to 2007 (second session), 2007 to 2011 (third session), and 2011 to 2015 (fourth session).

Given the review of study site of this study, the legislative process is one of the dependent variables in this study. This research examines the relationship between UNDPs democracy assistance and improvement in law making, oversight and constituency representation functions in the legislative process.

# Historical Background and Profile of National Planning Commission

National Planning Commission was established by Decree No 12 of 1992 and later amended as Act 71 of 1993. The functions structure and powers and of the Commission are stated in sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Act establishing the Commission. The vision of the commission is „to be the most efficient planning institution that guides the growth and development of Nigerian economy to be and among the leading economies in the world‟. The mission of the commission is „to pro-actively determine

and efficiently advise on matters relating to national development and overall management of the economy for positive growth; and to ensure that plans and policies are properly implemented by all relevant stakeholders‟ (NPC 2016).

The National Planning Commission has the following departments, International Cooperation, Economic Growth, Social development, Monitoring and evaluation, Infrastructure deliver Unit, Legal, Finance and accounts, ICT, Information, Protocol and Special duties. The department relevant to this study is the International Cooperation department. The department manages multilateral and bilateral economic co-operation, as well as, development aid and technical assistance programmes. The department has Bilateral Economic Cooperation and Multilateral Divisions. The multilateral division comprises of three units, namely: United Nations Development System (UNDS); European Union and Commonwealth Desk. The unit relevant to this study is the United Nation Development System (UNDS) Unit. The unit collaborates with the United Nations Development Systems which are UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA and other UN agencies. United Nations Development Assistance Framework I and II (UNDAF II) 2003 -2007 and 2009 – 2012, are instruments of programme implementation for Nigeria were developed in conjunction with the UN agencies. The major objective was to promote good governance among other objectives (NPC 2016).

The functions of the commission are:

* + - 1. To provide policy advice to the President in particular and Nigeria in general in all spheres of national life
      2. To set national priorities and goals and engender consensus among government agencies and undertake periodic review and appraisal of the human and material resource capabilities of Nigeria, with a view to advancing their development, efficiency and effective utilization;
      3. To formulate and prepare long-term, medium-term and short-term national development plans and to co-ordinate such plans at the Federal, State and Local government levels.
      4. To monitor projects and progress relating to plan implementation and advise on changes and adjustments in institutions and management techniques as well as attitudes necessary for the alignment of actions with plan targets and goals;
      5. To conduct research into various aspects of national interest and public policy and ensure that the implications and results of the findings in such research are geared towards the enhancement of national, economic, social, technological defence and security capabilities and management.
      6. To mobilize popular group and institutional consensus in support of government policies and programmes and manage multilateral and bilateral economic co- operation, including development aid and technical assistance, deal with matters relating to regional economic co-operation, including the Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS) the African Common Market (ACM), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the South-south co- operation.
      7. To carry out such other duties as are necessary or expedient for the full discharge of all or any of the functions conferred on the Commission under the Act (Ministry of Budget and National Planning 2016).

Given the explanation above, the United Nation Development System (UNDS) of the National Planning Commission is responsible for overseeing the policy design, implementation and evaluation of democracy promotion activities of the UNDP in Nigeria. It serves as interface between UNDP (the aid donor) and INEC and NASS (the beneficiary). The assistance examined in this study are broken down into two major periods of country cooperation plans (encompassing three circles of election in which elections are held for ushering in new democratically elected officials).

# Review of Cooperation Plans and Evaluation Reports on UNDP Democratic Norm Assistance in Nigeria (2003 to 2015)

This segment contains a brief on UNDP assistance to electoral administration and the legislative process, as reviewed from country co-operation plans of 2003 to

2007 and the evaluation report of 2006 and 2007. It also contains country plan of 2009 to 2012 and the extended plan from 2010 to 2015. Other evaluations reports reviewed are:

# UNDP Country Evaluation: Assessment of Development Results in Nigeria – 2003

This report assessed the contribution of UNDP support to Nigeria from 1997 – 2002. It also recommended strategies for strengthening the performance of the organization. This is a Country Cooperation Framework (CCF – 1) and subsequent 2002

– 2007 CCF2.

* + - 1. Country Cooperation Framework (CCF 1)

The CCF has the following thematic areas:

1. National management of socio-economic development and policy support for sustainable human development (SHD).
2. Job creation and sustainable livelihoods.
3. Social development.
4. Sustainable agriculture, environment and rural development.

Although, this period is outside the scope of this study, it is reviewed to provide a basis for the 2003 – 2007 CCF2.

* + - 1. The CCF 2 2003 – 2007

The CCF 2 2003 – 2007 is within the scope of this study. It has three major thematic areas which include:

1. Governance and Human Rights.
2. Poverty Eradication.
3. HIV/AIDS.

Poverty eradication and HIV/AID are not part of the preoccupation of this study as such, they will not be reviewed. The only component relevant to this study is Governance and Human Rights. It has five sub-components. And in the subcomponent the theme relevant to our study is support to capacity building for civic education, including voter education (P.30).

The CCF also looked at intervention in key governance institutions like the parliament, focusing on „increased effectiveness of parliament to perform its legislative and oversight functions‟ (P.68). The programme elaborated on electoral systems (SASN2). It objective was to „improve conformity of the legal and electoral framework with international standards‟ (P.68).

# UNDP- External Mid-term Outcome Evaluation, Nigeria – Final Report (8th December, 2006)

The Project document was signed in 2003, but, its implementation commenced in mid 2004 to 2006. The component under this study is the democratic governance, which has ten sub-components .Democratic electoral regime and sub-component, adequate legislative representative and process are the two out of the ten components relevant to this study.

Sub-component one (Democratic electoral regime) has the following indicators:

1. Right of eligible adults to vote.
2. Non constraints of voters due to irregularities in the electoral process.
3. Access of election winners to public position that they won as prescribed

Sub-component two (Adequate legislative representative and process) has the following:

1. Capacity of legislative power for making laws.
2. Capacity of legislature to exercise power of oversight functions as evidence in the law.

The following are activities carried out by the UNDP:

1. The UNDP contributed to political conference convened by the Executive Arm of Government in March, 2005. The National Assembly was able to oppose the 3rd Term Agenda of President Olusegun Obasanjo.
2. UNDP helped facilitate dialogue with key stakeholders to determine support for smooth conduct of 2007 election.
3. UNDP provided I.T. equipment for INEC in 2005.
4. UNDP provided technical advice.
5. UNDP, in collaboration with the Center for Democracy and Development (CDC) and African Leadership Forum (ALF) formulated and financed voter education and campaign project.
6. UNDP helped INEC to finalize its strategic plan, from 2005 to its take off date in 2006.
7. UNDP helped in supporting training of NASS members on oversight functions, policy analysis and constituency building in year 2005.
8. UNDP helped organize two annual fora for executive and legislative dialogue in 2005 – UNDP, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) USAID, the World Bank and DFID were more involved.

# UNDP/Joint Donor Basket Fund Support to Nigeria’s 2007 Elections Report (31st August 2007)

Federal Government of Nigeria, the UNDP and European commission entered into agreement to support INEC on 16th October, 2006, DFID and CIDA joined them on

14thJune, 2006 and January 2007 respectively. The group constituted what is referred to as, Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF). The total amount is US $ 30,302,902. This group of donors supported the democratic process in the following areas:

* + - 1. Offered INEC technical and advisory support in voter registration, ICT, election operations, media, communication and logistics.
      2. Provided support for INEC to organize two conferences.
      3. Supported operational human resources capacity building, technical operation of direct data capture machines for voter registration, assemble and installation of servers, printing of voter registers, web-management and installation and operation of VSATS.
      4. Development training materials and software.
      5. Printed and supplied 75,000 copies manual for voter registration officials 1,400 copies for election trainers and 450,000 copies for election officials.
      6. Conducted training programme for security personnel, printed and supplied 300,000 copies of „guidelines and code of conduct for the police‟.
      7. Provided technical input in developing material for voters‟ information and education, printed 1,110,000 copies of voter information poster, 120,000 copies each of the electoral act booklet containing electoral provisions of the constitution, booklet detailing symbols of various political parties and 120,00CDs having lists of the polling stations.
      8. Supported publicity for voter‟s registration exercise in electronic and print media, and publicity for presidential debate.
      9. Helped INEC develop kits for observers – 120,000 copies of election observation guidelines and supported 20,000 sets of bags and caps for observers.

The Project Monitory Unit (PMU) oversees the activities of the Joint Donor Basket Fund. The PMU office served as secretariat for JDBF steering committee and Donor

Subcommittee, pool for common information point, signatories – functions – revise work plan ever month and present it along with progress report.

# Cooperation Programme Action Plan – 2008

This action plan agreement was for 2009 – 2012.The area relevant to this research is capacity for governance programme. Electoral Reform and Deepening Democracy are part of the area under investigation in this study. The Electoral Reform subcomponent include:

1. Building-up national election management capacity.
2. Promoting sustainable electoral process.
3. Strengthening technical capacity for election administration.

Deepening Democracy has to do with the expansion of capacity of National Assembly members to manage legislative business (as a functional organization, awareness and knowledge among members, access to substantive information and analysis and staff skills).

# DDIN 2010 - 2015 Annual review 2010 – 2011 and Suggestions on Priorities and Programmes for 2012 – 2015

The review was conducted from 16th to 27th September 2011. It was done by Glenthworth, Garth and Afari-Gyan, Kwadko and made public on 20th December, 2011. The relevant area of DDIN 2010 – 2011 report is on UNDP Joint Donor Basket Fund. In the report, it was observed that in the run – up to 2011 election JDBF was used as vehicle for delivery of donor support to elections in Nigeria. Although the report pointed out some weakness of the UNDP in coordinating the JDBF, the political

neutrality of UNDP and its relative flexibility made it attractive to donors who channelled their activities through the fund. DDIN was able to partner with JDBF to support the run-up to the election.

# The European Union’s EVA Programme Assessment of United Nations Organization in Selected Countries: The Case of Nigeria – Final Report

This report was sponsored by the EU, conducted by Constantine Sokoloff and published in 2000**.** The report observed that the JDBF was created in March 2006 in order to support 2007 General elections. The initial sum contributed by the EU was 20 Million Euros. DFID, CIDA and UNDP also contributed. The intervention plan was for 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to 2011. This report covered up to 2007 election.

The report pointed out that the UNDP was „criticised as too passive and neutral in the face of government, but this neutrality gives it the authority and legislation required to continue working in the Nigeria political environment‟ (P.13).

In the five focal activities for support, only elections and human rights are relevant to this study. However, it was pointed out that partnership with the EU – UNDP in the JDBF „could be enhanced further through better neutral understanding of each other‟s procedures, rules, regulations and actual constrained. To this end, it might be worthwhile to consider organizing training and structured knowledge sharing for managers of both parties. This could be conceived as periodical joint seminars or retreats increase to feedback from PMU.

# Report on UNDP’s Strategic Work Plan: Nigeria 2011 Election

This report was written by Flores, F.C and published on 31st May, 2010. The projects plan commenced in October, 2009 and terminated in June, 2010 with an extended plan from 2010 – 2014 project. In the report, the problems highlighted are

1. The National Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives) were to harmonise their proposals to clarify election dates and the conduct of voter registration.
2. Reconstitution of INEC.
3. Constitutional changes foreseen include funding of INEC from regular budget and holding of elections six or three months before the mandate of the elected officials expire.

Major areas of support relevant to this study are:

1. Capacity building - Undertake institutional assessment and training in election administration.
2. Voter registration - Non adequate electoral data base and update to prevent malpractice and to achieve sound data base. “Voter roll for 2007 election contained 61.5 million voters – but on Election Day and subsequent electioneering, it was observed that there was missing details, wrong or missing pictures, fake finger prints, fake entries etc‟ (P.12). The UNDP provide advice to INEC in aspects of informatics of the voter registration process in the assessment of available voter registration equipment (direct data capture, software issues, security of data, equipment and facilities (P.13).
3. Voter education and information -Provide accurate official information, promote the electuary management administration.
4. Training of voter registration and poll staff. Support to TEI, to design curriculum, manuals and planning of training of voter registration and polling officials.

# FRN/DGD-DFID-UNDP) Partnership for Support to the Electoral Cycle and the Deepening of Democracy in Nigeria 2010 – 2015: DGD Final Project Document, 25th January, (2010 Version 4)

The programme component is capacity for governance. The project title is Democratic Governance for Development in Nigeria. The project duration was 5 years (2010 to 2015). A total of $80 million US Dollars was budgeted for the execution of the project.

The objectives of this component are:

1. Improving policy area outcomes by making NASS an effective avenue for the articulation and passage of reform policies and an access point for the operations of the executive branch through greater use of NASS oversight powers.
2. Enhancing NASS knowledge and influence over the raising, appropriating and spending of Nigeria money.

The improvement of the electoral process is the second major component relevant to this study. The object of this component is consideration of the rule and organizational competences required in the EMB to deliver a free, fair and credible election. The technical area of support is training aimed at developing election administration skills of permanent and ad-hoc election administrations staff through The Electoral Institute. Among the activities carried out was the first JDBF Retreat in May, 2007, which reviewed 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections and came up with the following relevant suggestions:

1. Establishment of a permanent voter register.
2. Counting, tabulation, aggregation, reconciliation, declaration of results within a short time frame, among others.

# UNDP/Nigeria Country Programme Performance Report Summary, 2009 – 2012

In this project performance report ,it was observed that “under governance, major success was achieved in strengthening the electoral democratic process in the country. The UNDP successfully managed the multi- donor democratic governance for development (DGD) project‟ (P.1).

The five year project plan had a budget of$90 Million US Dollars. It combined electoral cycle approach with deepening democracy. It attributed the success of the 2011 elections to UNDP/DGD coordination support, because the project did recognise independent review and post election support that studied the deficiencies in Nigeria‟s democracy project. It set in motion, modalities for addressing the challenges. The document also spelt out the technical assistance of the UNDP that led to its success. These are:

1. Provision of technical assistance efforts of democratic insurance process.
2. Capacity building support efforts of document institutions and process.
3. Supported the procurement of sensitive materials and equipment for the voter registration process, for instance, data centre tallying equipment, voter registration kits, voter registration training and forms.

# Federal Republic of Nigeria/UNDP - Democratic Governance for Development Project in Nigeria- Phase II Revised Project Document, (April, 2012)

This revised (DGD II) document was designed through consultation with development partners and stakeholders to redefine the strategy, provide clear understanding of the project scope and re-prioritise intervention areas for optional performance.

DGD II has 4 components, the two components relevant to this study are:

1. Promoting, credible, transparent and sustainable electoral process, and
2. Improving the democratic quality of political engagement.

The project was patterned along the electoral cycle approach to pre-voting (June, 2012 and December, 2013) voting period (January, 2014 – July, 2015). The pre-voting period activities are: to support institution and legal reforms, conduct, capacity enhancement through training and professional development for the key institution and process identified. The voting period activities are: contributions that have direct bearing on credibility, transparency and peaceful conduct of elections in 2015.

The budget for this (2012 – 2015) revised project period is $40 Million US Dollars. The following is the breakdown:

1. UNDP – $10,300,000 US Dollars
2. EU – $ 26,700,000 US Dollars
3. CIDA – $ 3,000,000 US Dollars
4. DFID – Not provided

The expected result framework in component one,(Promoting credible, transparent and sustainable electoral process) are:

1. Development of strategic plan INEC
2. Development of electoral processes manual
3. Change in the number of voter registration card issued
4. Develop functional INEC website

The expected result framework in component two(Improving the democratic quality of political engagement), is to improve effectiveness of targeted national assembly committees‟ process.

# INEC Strategic Plan (2012 – 2015) Abuja, Nigeria (December, 2012)

INEC‟s strategic plan is a blueprint which served as master plan for the organisation‟s five years operation as an election management body. This document acknowledged the input of UNDP UNDP/DGD and listed the activities supported by the UNDP:

1. Produced the first strategic plan and strategic programme action plan, against previous production of only operational plan.
2. Carried along broad range of staff of the commission at the headquarters and state offices, which gave it ownership outlook.
3. Involved key stakeholders to make input into such documents for the first time, which created the quest for credible election process among INEC staff and key stakeholders.
4. Implanted the process of strategic planning and strategic programme of action in the preparation of important document.
5. Eased the process of implementation and evaluation for staff of INEC and stakeholders.
6. Build capacity of INEC‟s staff to draw out strategic plan in future.

The mandate of INEC as specified in the document are:

1. Registration of political parties
2. Monitoring of the organization and operation of political parties
3. Registration of persons qualified to vote
4. Voter and civic education
5. Conducting referendum

The document asserts the effort of INEC towards keeping to standards, which will contribute to uniform, reliable, consistent, accurate and professional conducts of INEC in electoral administration.

# UNDP Democratic Governance for Development (DGD II) Project, Annual Report July 2012 – June 2013 (2013)

This report is for DGD II which commenced in July, 2012. It has 4 components as observed in the component plan reviewed earlier. Two components are relevant to this study. They are:

1. Promoting credible, transparent and sustainable electoral process.
2. Improving the democratic quality of political.

The report explained four output indicators used to measure the performance of the project. The three areas that are relevant to the study are:

1. Strategic planning, policy and operational capacities of INEC was strengthened. INEC began implementing the strategic plan supported by DGD in February, 2013. It enhanced the professional outlook of INEC as an election management body.
2. The enhancement of INEC‟s capacity to use ICT through DGD‟s support was moved to the next phase, 2014 to 2015.
3. DGD was able to enhance the capacity of INEC staff‟s professional capacity through training. This was able to increase confidence of their staff members and those who implement policy in the commission.

The second component „improving the democratic quality of political engagement‟ is also relevant to this study. The report explained that there was improvement in the effectiveness of targeted NASS committees and processes. The DGD supported NASS Ad Hoc committees on constitutional review to carry out public hearings at national and zonal levels. DGD/II consistent helped the committee of the two chambers to produce a draft constitutional reform bills in the middle of 2013.

# Mid-term Evaluation of the Support to the Nigeria’s Electoral cycle 2012

**– 2015 -European Union’s Programme for Nigeria, (April 2014)**

This is an EU sponsored report written by Gomez, C. and Jockers. This report is an outcome of evaluation of DGD II mid-term 2012 to 2014 which held an estimated budget of $53Million US Dollars. The report mentioned the JDBF partners and the four components involved as observed in the previous documents reviewed earlier. The main objective of the report is „to undertake a critical assessment of the relevance effectiveness and efficiency, as well as, the sustainability and impact so far achieved in the implementation of DGD II‟ (P.7).

According to the report, DGD II was able to achieve the following;

1. Strengthened INEC‟s strategic plan, policy and operational capabilities.
2. Improved the electoral system (voter registration) and processes (tallying and transmission) through ICT.
3. Improved the legal framework of elections.
4. Improved professional capacity of INEC to collaborate with SIEC and the electoral institute.
5. Strengthened relevant committees of NASS to enhance law making process. Recommendations in the report are:
6. DGD should continue to support INEC to implement its strategic plan and devise monitoring and evaluation strategy.
7. Ensure voter education is strengthened by INEC for 2015 election.
8. Increase support to the assembly by signing agreement with the National Institute for Legislative Studies to train them on legal and budgeting oversight and support the process of introducing curriculum for new comers to NASS because of the of expiration of tenure of the legislative session in 2015.

# NILS/DGDII Annual Report from March 2014 to June 2015: Strengthening Key Committees and Process in the National Assembly, (2015)

This report is restricted to strengthening key committees and processes in the National Assembly from March, 2014 to June, 2015. DGD II worked with the National Institute for Legislative Studies. The key components of this project are four but three of them are relevant to this study. They are:

1. Strengthening the work of the committees in the parliament, particularly public expenditure and accounts.
2. Reviewing the rules of practice and procedure of the National Assembly in line with international best practices.
3. Developing a strong code of ethics for the National Assembly which is critical in raising legislators‟ ethical standards and improving the public image of their conduct.

Other technical support areas are:

* 1. Reviewing of existing parliamentary information sharing mechanism for dynamic, robust engagement, and
  2. Provide support to in coming parliamentarians and review of capacity needs of parliamentarian and how to meet them.

Achievement of DGD II project in strengthening NASS

1. Reviewed oversight guide and production of final clean document code of ethics and oversight guide.
2. Strengthened rules on legislative practice and procedure, strengthened the capacity of legislators and legislative staff through training, study visits and disseminated knowledge and experience at law conference. All these could not be adopted before the end of the 7th assembly. House of Representatives produced their own but the Senate had major corrections to make.

The following challenges were encountered in the process of implementing the project:

* 1. Some activities were not completed before the 7th Assembly‟s tenure expiration. Some activities were merged while some were rushed.
  2. Access to legislators and retrieving information from the National Assembly was a major challenge. Information management and record keeping in the National Assembly is poor.
  3. Campaign and election year activities affected training and some activities. There were too many breaks (recess) in the 4th quarter and 1st quarter of 2015.
  4. Submissions of consultants were turned down at times, and they were made to tailor them to the objectives and targets of the project. In-house experts of NILS and technical committees were sometimes utilized to maintain the quality, objectives and targets of the project.

# Independent National Electoral Commission 2015 General Elections Report

This report is on the 2015 General Elections. It contains how INEC used modern election management tools, electronic voter identification and authentication systems to conduct presidential, and parliamentary elections.

In this report, the chairman of the report committee Dr Chris Iyimoga acknowledge the contributions of the United Nations Development Programme UNDP (Democratic Governance for Development) for providing logistics and support to the report committee. The director of UNDP/DGD II (Dr. Mourade Deme) and the election expert (Prof. Bolade Eyinla) were pointed out as one of the major contributors to the production of the report.

The following are areas where UNDP/DGD II assisted INEC along with international agencies.

1. Technical and financial assistance,
2. Strengthening institutional memory,
3. Capacity development,
4. Retreats and experience sharing – TEI etc.,
5. Stakeholder engagement, and
6. Electoral research and documentation (P52 – 54)

The following are the financial contribution of the UNDP/DGD II to 2015 General Elections as contained in the report:

1. EMS and training for security officials USD $177,045,935.55
2. Voter education and enlightenment with EU USD $1,525,129,488.00
3. Pre-election and post election workshop/accreditation USD $10,000,000.00
4. INEC engagement with relevant/strategic stakeholders USD $264,000,000.00

# Report of the UNDP/DGD II Project Stakeholders Reviews Meeting on Media and 2015 Election

The EU Sponsored the 2 day UNDP/DGD project stakeholders review meeting.

The objectives of the meeting are to:

1. Review performance of the media in the 2015 electoral process,
2. Document lessons.
3. Document best practices,
4. Get a unique point of entry for future inference

Achievements of DGD II

1. The use of card readers and permanent voters cards (PVCS) contributed to the integrity of 2015 General Elections.
2. Voter education efforts recorded success but, it concentrated in urban centers to the negligence of rural areas.
3. Social media had positive impact on the 2015 General Elections. It contributed to the integrity of election on a global scale.
4. 2015 General Elections was free and fair while rigging and other election irregularities were minimal.

There are 25 point recommendations but few relevant areas are:

1. INEC should continually update the voter registrar and PVC production/distribution to avoid last minute rush

.

1. Digitize election result and improve on logistics management and contingency plan ahead of new elections.
2. Better funding of voter education should be secured by all stakeholders.
3. Voter education should begin early. Efforts should be made to reach out to rural areas.
4. All major stakeholders should be involved in voters‟ education.

The country cooperation plans and evaluation reports reviewed are policy documents that guided the intention, plans and implementation process and overall assessment of the activities carried out by the UNDP and the Joint Donor Basket Fund members in the process of promoting democratic norms in Nigeria from 2003 to 2015. The plans and reports are not theory inclined. They are public policy documents meant for ordinary assessment of activities targeted at improving the some aspects of democratic governance.

This study is however, both theoretical and empirical assessment of UNDP democratic norm promotion activities in Nigeria from the view point of the social constructivist theory and using social and normative linkages to analyse the phenomenon under focus from 2003 to 2015. The linkage model developed is used to assess subset of democratic norm in electoral administration and the legislative process. **Summary**

In this chapter, is a review of history, structure and functions of the study area/sites. They are Abuja, United Nations Development Programme, the Independent National Electoral Commission, the National Assembly and the National Planning

Commission. These were the places where questionnaires were distributed and

interviews conducted, during the field work. Country cooperation plans, evaluation reports and training manuals (which served as qualitative secondary data) were also collected at the sites. This chapter also contains a brief on UNDPs‟ assistance to electoral administration and the legislative process as reviewed from country co- operation plans of 2003 to 2007 and the evaluation report of 2006 and 2007. It also contains country plan of 2009 to 2012 and the extended plan from 2010 to 2015.

# CHAPTER FIVE

**DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALSIS: ASSESSMENT OF UNDP DEMOCRACTIC NORM ASSISTANCE TO**

# NIGERIA

* 1. **Introduction**

This chapter presents and analyses the data collected during field work. Socio- demographic information of respondents is analysed using simple percentage and frequency tables. Data collected through respondents are also used to discuss the research questions using simple percentage and frequency tables. The hypotheses are analysed using Chi-square test. The findings are discussed along with text of the responses from the interviews and data from reports and secondary sources.

# Description of Socio-Demographic Data of Respondents

Response on demographic information and social status among other characteristics are also analysed using simple percentage and frequency table. These tables are generated using SPSS 23.

# Table 5.1 Gender of Respondents at the INEC

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Gender | Frequency | Percentage | Valid  percentage | Cumulative  percentage |
| Male | 86 | 52.4 | 52.4 | 52.4 |
| Female | 78 | 47.6 | 47.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.1 above as earlier indicated, 192 questionnaires were served, 170 were returned out of which 164 were valid. Out of this number, 86respondents (52.4%) were male, while 78respondents (47.6%) were female. It means that the male members of staff were more than the female.

# Table 5.21 Employment Status of Respondents at the INEC

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Employment  Status | Frequency | Percentage | Valid percentage | Cumulative  percentage |
| NPMS | 4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| PMS | 71 | 43.3 | 43.3 | 45.7 |
| PNMS | 89 | 54.3 | 54.3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

Table 5.2 spells out the employment status of respondents at the INEC and out of the 164 valid questionnaires returned, 4(2.4%) were non-permanent management staff (NPMS), 71respondents (43.3%) were permanent management staff (NPMS) and 89respondents (54.3%) were permanent non-management staff (PNMS). It means that the dominant employment status of respondents at the INEC was permanent management staff and permanent non-management staff members (PNMS).

# Table 5.3: Age of Respondents at the INEC

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Age | Frequency | Percentage | Valid  percentage | Cumulative  percentage |
| 25 – 34 | 58 | 35.4 | 35.4 | 35.4 |
| 35 – 44 | 78 | 47.6 | 47.6 | 82.9 |
| 45 and above | 28 | 17.1 | 17.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

Table 5.3 summarises the ages of respondents at the INEC. Out of the 164 valid questionnaires, 58respondents(35.4%) were between the ages of 25 and 34 years , 78respondents(47.6%) were between the ages of 35 and 44 years , and28respondents (17.1%) were 45 and above. This means that most of the respondents were between the ages of 25 and 44 years.

# Table 5.4: Years of Experience of Respondents at the INEC

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Years of  experience | Frequency | Percentage | Valid  percentage | Cumulative  percentage |
| 5 – 9 | 77 | 47.0 | 47.0 | 47.0 |
| 10 – 19 | 64 | 39.0 | 39.0 | 86.0 |
| 20 above | 23 | 14.0 | 14.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November 2015 to March 2016)

Table 5.4 outlines the years of experience of respondents at the INEC. Out of the 164 valid questionnaires returned,77respondents (47%) had between 5 and 9 years of experience,64 respondents (39%) had between 10 and 19 years of experience and 23respondents (14%) had 20 years or more years of experience at the INEC.This means that most of the respondents had between 5 to 9 and 10 to 19 years of experience at INEC. The respondents have witnessed a few general elections and can express genuine opinion on what they had observed on improvement or otherwise of the election management body in Nigeria within the time frame of this research. The will go a long way to provide credible data through which inference would made to arrive at conclusion and implementable recommendations to the UNDP and other joint donor basket fund members in future assistance to INEC,

# Table 5.5: Educational Qualification of Respondents at the INEC

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Educational  qualification | Frequency | Percentage | Valid  Percentage | Cumulative  Percentage |
| School cert | 2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| Diploma | 30 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 19.5 |
| Degree | 86 | 52.4 | 52.4 | 72.0 |
| Masters | 42 | 25.6 | 25.6 | 97.6 |
| Doctorate | 4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

Table 5.5summarises the educational qualifications of respondents at INEC. Out of 164 valid questionnaires 2 respondents (1.2%) had secondary school certificates, 30 (18.3%) respondents had diploma certificate, 86 respondents(52,4%) had First Degrees Certificates, 42 respondents(25.6%) had Masters Degrees Certificates while 4respondents (2.4%) had PhD Certificates. Majority of the respondents had between First Degree Certificates and Masters Degree Certificates.

# Table 5.6: Gender of Respondents at the NASS

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Gender | Frequency | Percentage | Valid  Percentage | Cumulative  Percentage |
| Male | 99 | 73.9 | 73.9 | 73.9 |
| Female | 35 | 26.1 | 26.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

Table 5.6 is a summary of gender of respondents at the NASS. In the table above, 161 questionnaires were served, 139 were returned, while 134 were valid. Out of this number 99 respondents (73.9%) were male, while 35 respondents (26.1%) were female. There were more male respondents than female respondents.

# Table 5.7: Status of Respondents at the NASS

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Status | Frequency | Percentage | Valid  Percentage | Cumulative  Percentage |
| Senate | 43 | 32.1 | 32.1 | 32.1 |
| Reps. | 91 | 67.9 | 67.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

Table 5.7outlines the status of respondents at NASS. Out of the 134 valid responses 43respondents (32.1%) were Senators, while 91 respondents (67.9%) were House of Representatives members. The members of the House of Representatives were more than the Senators in the National Assembly.

# Table 5.8: Age of Respondents at the NASS

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Age | Frequency | Percentage | Valid  Percentage | Cumulative  Percentage |
| 25 – 34 | 4 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| 35 – 44 | 47 | 35.1 | 35.1 | 38.1 |
| 45 and above | 83 | 61.9 | 61.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

Table 5.8 summarises the age of respondents at NASS. Out of the 134 valid responses, 4 (3%)were in the age bracket of between 25 and 34, 47 respondents (35.1%)

were between the ages of 35 and 44, while 83 respondents (61.9%) were 41 years and

above. This means that majority of the respondents were in the age bracket of 35 and 45, and above.

# Table 5.9: Tenure of Respondents at the NASS

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Tenure | Frequency | Percentage | Valid  Percentage | Cumulative  Percentage |
| 1 Tenure | 55 | 41.0 | 41.0 | 41.0 |
| 2 Tenures | 71 | 53.0 | 53.0 | 94.0 |
| 3 Tenures | 8 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

Table 5.9 is an outline of the tenure of respondents at the NASS. Out of the 134 valid questionnaires, 55 respondents (41%) had served only one tenure, 71respondents (53%) served two tenures and 8 respondents (6%) served three tenures. Most of the respondents hadone or two or tenures as legislators.

# Table 5.10: Educational Qualification of Respondents at the NASS

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Educational  qualification | | Frequency | Percentage | Valid  Percentage | Cumulative  Percentage |
| First | Degree | 76 | 56.7 | 56.7 | 56.7 |
|  | Masters | 57 | 42.5 | 42.5 | 99.3 |
|  | PhD | 1 | .7 | .7 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

Table 5.10 summarises the educational qualification of respondents at the NASS. Out of the 134 valid questionnaires, 76respondents (56%) had First Degree Certificate, 57 respondents (42.5%) had Masters Degree Certificate and1respondent (7%) had PhD (7%). Majority of the respondents had First Degree or Masters Degree Certificates.

* 1. **Description of Quantitative and Qualitative Data**

Responses on assessment of UNDP democratic norm assistance on consolidation of democracy in Nigeria were also analysed using simple percentage and frequency table. These tables were generated using SPSS 23.0. This presentation represents responses to the research questions of this study and serves as a prelude to the chi- square interpretation that follows in the subsequent segment.

# Research Question one: What is the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on voter registration in Nigeria?

To answer this question, the indicators of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP to voter registration in Nigeria were assessed through respondents as presented in tables 5.11 to 5.17 on 6 scale point of Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Slightly Disagree, on one hand and Slightly Agree, Agree and Strongly Agree on the other hand.

# Table 5.11: Indicating Respondents’ assessment of wether eligible and willing voters registered in the new voter registration exercise

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 13 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 7.9 |
| DA | 15 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 17.1 |
| SLD | 16 | 9.8 | 9.8 | 26.8 |
| SLA | 48 | 29.3 | 29.3 | 56.1 |
| A | 52 | 31.7 | 31.7 | 87.8 |
| STA | 20 | 12.2 | 12.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.11 above, 13 respondents (7.9%) strongly disagreed, 15 (9.1%) respondents disagreed and 16 respondents (9.8%) slightly disagreed that eligible and willing voters registered in the new voter registration exercise. This means that 44 respondents (26.8%) disagreed that all eligible and willing voters registered in the new voter registration exercise. On the other hand, 48 respondents (29.3%) slightly agreed, 52(31.7%) agreed and 20 respondents (12.2%) strongly agreed that that all eligible and willing voters registered in the new voter registration exercise. This means that 120 respondents (73.9%) agreed that eligible and willing voters registered in the new voter registration exercise.

# Table 5.12: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether all registered voters were able to see their names on the voters’ registration list during the 2015 general elections

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 7 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 |
| DA | 33 | 20.1 | 20.1 | 24.4 |
| SLD | 26 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 40.2 |
| SLA | 61 | 37.2 | 37.2 | 77.4 |
| A | 23 | 14.0 | 14.0 | 91.5 |
| STA | 14 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.12 above, 7 respondents (4.3%) strongly disagreed, 33 respondents (20.1%) disagreed and 26 respondents (15.9%) slightly disagreed thatall registered voters were able to see their names on the voters‟ registration list during the 2015 general elections. This means that 66 respondents (40.2%) disagreed that all registered voters were able to see their names on the voters‟ registration list during the 2015 general elections. On the other hand, 61 respondents (37.2%) slightly agreed, 23 (14.0%) agreed and 14(8.50%) strongly agreed that that all registered voters were able to see their names on the voters‟ registration list during the 2015 general elections. This means that 98 respondents (59.7%) agreed that all registered voters were able to see their names on the voters‟ registration list during the 2015 general elections.

# Table 5.13: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether all registered voters were accredited at the polling units during the 2015 general elections

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 18 | 11.0 | 11.0 | 11.0 |
| DA | 35 | 21.3 | 21.3 | 32.3 |
| SLD | 26 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 48.2 |
| SLA | 32 | 19.5 | 19.5 | 67.7 |
| A | 30 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 86.0 |
| STA | 23 | 14.0 | 14.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.13 above, 18 respondents (11.0%) strongly disagreed, 35 respondents (21.3%) disagreed and 26 respondents (15.9%) slightly disagreed that all registered voters were accredited at the polling units during the 2015 general elections. This means that 79 respondents (48.2%) disagreed that all registered voters were accredited at the polling units during the 2015 general elections. On the other hand, 32 respondents (19.5.2%) slightly agreed, 30 (18.3%) agreed and 23 respondents (14.0%) strongly agreed that that all registered voters were accredited at the polling units during the 2015 general elections. This means that 85 respondents (59.7%) agreed that all registered voters were accredited at the polling units during the 2015 general elections.

# Table 5.14: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether all registered voters at the polling units were able to vote during the 2015 general elections

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 11 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 |
| DA | 43 | 26.2 | 26.2 | 32.9 |
| SLD | 32 | 19.5 | 19.5 | 52.4 |
| SLA | 26 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 68.3 |
| A | 32 | 19.5 | 19.5 | 87.8 |
| STA | 20 | 12.2 | 12.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.14 above, 11 respondents (46.7%) strongly disagreed, 43 respondents (26.2%) disagreed and 32 respondents (19.5%) slightly disagreed that all registered voters at the polling units were able to vote during the 2015 general elections. This means that 86 respondents (52.4%) disagreed that all registered voters at the polling units were able to vote during the 2015 general elections. On the other hand, 26 respondents (15.9%) slightly agreed, 32(19.5%) agreed and 20 respondents (12.2%) strongly agreed that that all registered voters at the polling units were able to vote during the 2015 general elections. This means that 78 respondents (47.6%) agreed that all registered voters at the polling units were able to vote during the 2015 general elections.

# Table 5.15: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC had challenges in maintaining voter register prior to 2015 elections

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 9 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| DA | 31 | 18.9 | 18.9 | 24.4 |
| SLD | 20 | 12.2 | 12.2 | 36.6 |
| SLA | 29 | 17.7 | 17.7 | 54.3 |
| A | 54 | 32.9 | 32.9 | 87.2 |
| STA | 21 | 12.8 | 12.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.15 above, 9 respondents (5.5%) strongly disagreed, 31 respondents (18.9%) disagreed and 20 respondents (12.2%) slightly disagreed that INEC had challenges in maintaining voter register prior to 2015 elections. This means that 60 respondents (36.6%) disagreed that INEC had challenges in maintaining voter register prior to 2015 elections. On the other hand, 29 respondents (17.7%) slightly agreed, 54 (32.9%) agreed and 21 respondents (12.8%) strongly agreed that that INEC had challenges in maintaining voter register prior to 2015 elections. This means that 104 respondents (63.4%) agreed that INEC had challenges in maintaining voter register prior to 2015 General Elections.

# Table 5.16: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC had challenges in sorting out voter register on time

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 18 | 11.0 | 11.0 | 11.0 |
| DA | 50 | 30.5 | 30.5 | 41.5 |
| SLD | 19 | 11.6 | 11.6 | 53.0 |
| SLA | 31 | 18.9 | 18.9 | 72.0 |
| A | 34 | 20.7 | 20.7 | 92.7 |
| STA | 12 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.16 above, 18 (11.0%) respondents strongly disagreed, 50 (30.5%) respondents disagree and 19 (11.6%) respondents slightly disagreed that INEC had challenges in sorting out voter register on time. This means that 87 (53.0%) of the respondents disagreed that INEC had challenges in sorting out voter register on time. On the other hand, 31 (18.9%) of respondents slightly agreed, 34 (20.7%) agreed and 12 (7.3%) of respondents strongly agreed that that INEC had challenges in sorting out voter register on time. This means that 77 (47.0%) respondents agreed that INEC had challenges in sorting out voter register on time.

# Table 5.17: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether challenges with ICT driven voter registration, tallying and transmission impeded the improvement expected at the 2015 general election

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 17 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 10.4 |
| DA | 30 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 28.7 |
| SLD | 39 | 23.8 | 23.8 | 52.4 |
| SLA | 17 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 62.8 |
| A | 54 | 32.9 | 32.9 | 95.7 |
| STA | 7 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.17 above, 17 (10.4%) respondents strongly disagreed, 30 (18.3%) respondents disagreed and 39 (23.8%) respondents slightly disagreed that challenges with ICT driven voter registration, tallying and transmission impeded the improvement expected at the 2015 general election. This means that 86 (52.4%) respondents disagreed that challenges with ICT driven voter registration, tallying and transmission impeded the improvement expected at the 2015 general election. On the other hand, 17 (10.4%) of respondents slightly agreed, 54 (32.9%) agreed and 7 (4.3%) of respondents strongly agreed that challenges with ICT driven voter registration, tallying and transmission impeded the improvement expected at the 2015 general election. This means that 78 (47.6%) respondents agreed that challenges with ICT driven voter

registration, tallying and transmission impeded the improvement expected at the 2015 general election.

The indicators of impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on voter registration in Nigeria assessed through respondents as presented in tables 5.11 to 5.17 above show that there is improvement in voter registration system from 2003 to 2015. Further discussion will be carried out in the test of hypothesis on this item in the next segment.

# Summary of interview on Research Question one (Theme 1):

**Impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on improvement in voter registration in Nigeria**

Subtheme: Voter registration, accreditation and voting

B1. Interviewees were asked to comment on what they observed as eye witnesses regarding the success of new voter registration exercise, that is where registered voters able to see their names on the voters‟ registration list, accredited at the polling units and able to vote during the 2015 general elections?

Their cumulative response was that the registration process was perfect. Accreditation also went on well. Although there were late commencements of voting in some parts of the country, they were isolated cases. These isolated cases were as a result of late arrival of sensitive material. INEC tried to avoid playing into the hands of desperate politicians who would either want to bribe their way or short-change the system by hook or crook (DU 1, DU 6 and DU 7).

Subtheme: ICT driven registration and accreditation

B2. Those interviewed were asked to comment onwhether they noticed that INEC had challenges with ICT driven voter registration, tallying, sorting and

transmission which slightly impeded the improvement expected at the 2015 general elections?

The response was that INEC had little or no challenges with ICT driven voter registration, tallying, sorting and transmission. It contributed to the improvement observed during the 2015 general elections. Those desperate politicians thought they could use the registration system to inflate registered voters but they were shocked at the way ICT was employed. The multiple registration were detected and cleaned up before the commencement of election. The use of the card reader became a good mechanism for check and balance. It saved the time an energy of electoral personnel at the polling stations (DU 1, DU 6, and DU 7).

# Research question 2: What is the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on confidence in the Electoral Management Body in Nigeria?

To answer this question, the indicators of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP on confidence in Electoral Management Body in Nigeria were assessed through respondents as presented from table 5.18 to 5.39 on 6 scales of strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, on one hand and slightly agree, agree and strongly agree on the other hand.

# Table 5.18: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the appointment of INEC chairman and commissioners followed due process and all stake holders have confidence in INEC

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 7 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 |
| DA | 11 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 11.0 |
| SLD | 13 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 18.9 |
| SLA | 29 | 17.7 | 17.7 | 36.6 |
| A | 69 | 42.1 | 42.1 | 78.7 |
| STA | 35 | 21.3 | 21.3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.18 above, 7 (4.3%) respondents strongly disagreed, 11 (6.7%) respondents disagreed and 13 (7.9%) respondents slightly disagreed that he appointment of INEC chairman and commissioners followed due process and all stake holders have confidence in INEC. This means that 31 (18.9%) of the respondents disagreed that the appointment of INEC chairman and commissioners followed due process and all stake holders have confidence in INEC. On the other hand, 29 (17.7%) respondents slightly agreed, 69 (42.1%) agreed and 35 (21.3%) of respondents strongly agreed that the appointment of INEC chairman and commissioners followed due process and all stake holders have confidence in INEC. This means that 133 (81.1%) respondents agreed that

the appointment of INEC chairman and commissioners followed due process and all stake holders have confidence in INEC.

# Table 5.19: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC got adequate funding at the time the funds were needed and stakeholders have confidence that INEC is independent.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 10 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.1 |
| DA | 6 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 9.8 |
| SLD | 18 | 11.0 | 11.0 | 20.7 |
| SLA | 21 | 12.8 | 12.8 | 33.5 |
| A | 69 | 42.1 | 42.1 | 75.6 |
| STA | 40 | 24.4 | 24.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.19 above, 10 (6.1%) respondents strongly disagree, 6 (3.7%) respondents disagreed and 18 (11.0%) respondents slightly disagreed that the appointment of INEC chairman and commissioners followed due process and all stake holders have confidence in INEC. This means that 34 (20.7%) of the respondents disagreed that the appointment of INEC chairman and commissioners followed due process and all stake holders have confidence in INEC. On the other hand, 21 (12.8%) of respondents slightly agreed, 69 (42.1%) agreed and 40 24.4%) of respondents

strongly agreed thatthe appointment of INEC chairman and commissioners followed due process and all stake holders have confidence in INEC. This means that 130 (79.3%) respondents agreed that the appointment of INEC chairman and commissioners followed due process and all stake holders have confidence in INEC.

# Table 5.20: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC got adequate funding and whether this strengthened the confidence of stakeholders in the system

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 11 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 |
| DA | 32 | 19.5 | 19.5 | 26.2 |
| SLD | 16 | 9.8 | 9.8 | 36.0 |
| SLA | 34 | 20.7 | 20.7 | 56.7 |
| A | 45 | 27.4 | 27.4 | 84.1 |
| STA | 26 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016).

In table 5.20 above, 11 (6.7%) respondents strongly disagreed, 32 (19.5%) respondents disagreed and 16 (9.8%) respondents slightly disagree that INEC got adequate and whether this strengthened the confidence of stakeholders in the system. This means that 59 (36.0%) respondents disagreed that INEC got adequate funding and whether this strengthened the confidence of stakeholders in the system. On the other

hand, 34 (20.7%) respondents slightly agreed, 45 (27.4%) agreed and 26 (15.9%) of respondents strongly agreed that INEC got adequate funding from independent sources and whether this strengthened the confidence of stakeholders in the system. This means that 105 (64.0%) respondents agreed that INEC got adequate funding and whether this strengthened the confidence of stakeholders in the system.

# Table 5.21: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether constitutional provisions and omissions prevented some INEC officials from discharging their duties

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 15 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 9.1 |
| DA | 37 | 22.6 | 22.6 | 31.7 |
| SLD | 25 | 15.2 | 15.2 | 47.0 |
| SLA | 22 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 60.4 |
| A | 40 | 24.4 | 24.4 | 84.8 |
| STA | 25 | 15.2 | 15.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.21 above, 15 (9.1%) respondents strongly disagreed, 37 (22.6%) respondents disagreed and 25 (15.2%) respondents slightly disagreed, that constitutional provision and omissions prevented some INEC officials from discharging their duties. This means that 77 (47.0%) respondents disagreed, that constitutional provisions and omissions prevented some INEC officials from discharging their duties. On the other

hand, 22 (13.4%) respondents slightly agreed, 40 (24.4%) agreed and 25 (15.2%) of respondents strongly agreed that constitutional provisions and omissions prevented some INEC officials from discharging their duties. This means that 87 (53.0%) respondents agreed that constitutional provisions and omissions prevented some INEC officials from discharging their duties during the 2015 general elections.

# Table 5.22: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether staff of INEC showed non- partisan interest in dealing with any political party before, during and after elections 2015

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| Valid | STD | 9 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
|  | DA | 6 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 9.1 |
|  | SLD | 22 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 22.6 |
|  | SLA | 27 | 16.5 | 16.5 | 39.0 |
|  | A | 50 | 30.5 | 30.5 | 69.5 |
|  | STA | 50 | 30.5 | 30.5 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.22 above, 9 (5.5%) respondents strongly disagreed, 6 (3.7%) respondents disagreed and 22 (13.4%) respondents slightly disagreed that INEC showed non- partisan interest in dealing with any political party before, during and after elections 2015. This means that 37 (22.6%) of the respondents disagreed that INEC showed non- partisan interest in dealing with any political party before, during and after

elections 2015. On the other hand, 27 (16.5%) respondents slightly agreed, 50 (30.5%) agreed and 50 (30.5%) of respondents strongly agreed that INEC showed non- partisan interest in dealing with any political party before, during and after elections 2015. This means that 127 (77.4%) respondents agreed that INEC showed non- partisan interest in dealing with any political party before, during and after elections 2015.

# Table 5.23: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether staff of INEC showed non- partisan influence in dealing with any political party before, during and after 2015 elections

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 9 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| DA | 5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 8.5 |
| SLD | 21 | 12.8 | 12.8 | 21.3 |
| SLA | 24 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 36.0 |
| A | 64 | 39.0 | 39.0 | 75.0 |
| STA | 41 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.23 above, 9 (5.5%) respondents strongly disagreed, 5 (3.0%) respondents disagreed and 21 (12.8%) respondents slightly disagreed that staff of INEC showed non- partisan influence in dealing with any political party before, during and after 2015 elections. This means that 35 (21.3%) respondents disagreed that staff of INEC showed non- partisan influence in dealing with any political party before, during

and after 2015 elections. On the other hand, 24 (14.6%) respondents slightly agreed, 64 (39.0%) agreed and 41 (25.0%) of respondents strongly agree that staff of INEC showed non- partisan influence in dealing with any political party before, during and after 2015 elections. This means that 89 (78.7%) respondents agreed that staff of INEC showed non- partisan influence in dealing with any political party before, during and after 2015 elections.

# Table 5.24: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC monitored freedom of all political parties’ equal access to state owned media during campaign

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 10 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.1 |
| DA | 14 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 14.6 |
| SLD | 11 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 21.3 |
| SLA | 30 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 39.6 |
| A | 73 | 44.5 | 44.5 | 84.1 |
| STA | 26 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.24 above, 10 (6.1%) respondents strongly disagreed, 14 (8.5%) respondents disagreed and 11 (6.7%) respondents slightly disagree that INEC monitored freedom of all political parties‟ equal access to state owned media during campaign. This means that 35 (21.3%) respondents disagreed that INEC monitored freedom of all political parties‟ equal access to state owned media during campaign. On the other hand,

30 (18.3%) of respondents slightly agreed, 73 (44.5%) agreed and 26 (15.9%) of respondents strongly agreed that INEC monitored freedom of all political parties‟ equal access to state owned media during campaign. This means that 129 (78.7%) respondents agreed that INEC monitored freedom of all political parties‟ equal access to state owned media during campaign.

# Table 5.25: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC ensured that all political parties/candidates had the freedom to campaign without fear or threat

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| DA | 10 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 9.1 |
| SLD | 9 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 14.6 |
| SLA | 24 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 29.3 |
| A | 49 | 29.9 | 29.9 | 59.1 |
| STA | 67 | 40.9 | 40.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.25 above, 5 (3.0%) respondents strongly disagreed, 10 (6.1%) respondents disagreed and 9 (5.5%) respondents slightly disagreed that INEC ensured that all political parties/candidates had the freedom to campaign without fear or threat. This means that 24 (14.6%) of the respondents disagreed that INEC ensured that all political parties/candidates had the freedom to campaign without fear or threat. On the other hand, 24 (14.6%) of respondents slightly agreed, 49 (29.9%) agreed and 67

(40.9%) of respondents strongly agreed that INEC ensured that all political parties/candidates had the freedom to campaign without fear or threat. This means that 140 (85.4%) respondents agreed that INEC ensured that all political parties/candidates had the freedom to campaign without fear or threat.

# Table 5.26: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC ensured respect for limits of campaign expenses by all political parties and candidates during campaign

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 20 | 12.2 | 12.2 | 12.2 |
| DA | 16 | 9.8 | 9.8 | 22.0 |
| SLD | 20 | 12.2 | 12.2 | 34.1 |
| SLA | 24 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 48.8 |
| A | 67 | 40.9 | 40.9 | 89.6 |
| STA | 17 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.26 above, 20 (12.2%) respondents strongly disagreed, 16 (9.8%) respondents disagreed and 20 (12.2%) respondents slightly disagreed that INEC ensured respect for limits of campaign expenses by all political parties and candidates during campaign. This means that 56 (34.1%) of the respondents disagreed that INEC ensured respect for limits of campaign expenses by all political parties and candidates during campaign. On the other hand, 24 (14.6%) of respondents slightly agreed, 67 (40.9%)

agreed and 17 (10.4%) of respondents strongly agree that INEC ensured respect for limits of campaign expenses by all political parties and candidates during campaign. This means that 108 (65.9%) respondents agreed that INEC ensured respect for limits of campaign expenses by all political parties and candidates during campaign.

# Table 5.27: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether they were satisfied with the level of training received for coordinating poll workers in discharging their electoral duties

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 9 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| DA | 12 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 12.8 |
| SLD | 28 | 17.1 | 17.1 | 29.9 |
| SLA | 35 | 21.3 | 21.3 | 51.2 |
| A | 56 | 34.1 | 34.1 | 85.4 |
| STA | 24 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.27 above, 9 (5.5%) respondents strongly disagreed, 12 (7.3%) respondents disagreed and 28 (17.1%) respondents slightly disagree that they were satisfied with the level of training received for coordinating poll workers in discharging their electoral duties. This means that 49 (29.9%) of the respondents disagreed that they were satisfied with the level of training received for coordinating poll workers in discharging their electoral duties. On the other hand, 35 (21.3%) of respondents slightly

agreed, 56 (34.1%) agreed and 24 (14.6%) of respondents strongly agreed that they were satisfied with the level of training received for coordinating poll workers in discharging their electoral duties. This means that 115 (70.1%) respondents agreed that they were satisfied with the level of training received for coordinating poll workers in discharging their electoral duties.

# Table 5.28: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC provided well printed ballot papers for the general elections

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| DA | 8 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.9 |
| SLD | 7 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 9.1 |
| SLA | 15 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 18.3 |
| A | 69 | 42.1 | 42.1 | 60.4 |
| STA | 65 | 39.6 | 39.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.28 above, there was no respondent that strongly disagreed, 8 (4.9%) respondents disagreed and 7 (4.3%) respondents slightly disagreed that INEC provided well printed ballot papers for the general elections. This means that 15 (9.1%) of the respondents disagreed that INEC provided well printed ballot papers for the general elections. On the other hand, 15 (9.1%) of respondents slightly agreed, 69 (42.1%) agree and 65 (39.6%) of respondents strongly agreed that INEC provided well printed

ballot papers for the general election. This means that 149 (90.9%) respondents agreed that INEC provided well printed ballot papers for the 2015 general elections.

# Table 5.29: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC delivered election supplies to polling units at the right time

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 1 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| DA | 4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 3.0 |
| SLD | 9 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 8.5 |
| SLA | 51 | 31.1 | 31.1 | 39.6 |
| A | 56 | 34.1 | 34.1 | 73.8 |
| STA | 43 | 26.2 | 26.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.29 above, 1 respondent(0.6%) strongly disagreed, 4 (2.4%) respondents disagreed and 9 (5.5%) respondents slightly disagreed that INEC delivered election supplies to polling units at the right time. This means that 14 (8.5%) of the respondents disagreed that INEC delivered election supplies to polling units at the right time. On the other hand, 51 (31.1%) of respondents slightly agreed, 56 (34.1%) agreed and 43 (26.2%) of respondents strongly agreed that INEC delivered election supplies to polling units at the right time. This means that 150 (91.5%) respondents agreed that INEC delivered election supplies to polling units at the right time.

# Table 5.30: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC provided correct information to voters at the polling units

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Cale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| DA | 3 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| SLD | 8 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 6.7 |
| SLA | 49 | 29.9 | 29.9 | 36.6 |
| A | 72 | 43.9 | 43.9 | 80.5 |
| STA | 32 | 19.5 | 19.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.30 above, there was no response on strongly disagree, 3 (1.8%) respondents disagreed and 8 (4.9%) respondents slightly disagreed that INEC provided correct information to voters at the polling units. This means that 11 (6.7%) respondents disagreed that INEC provided correct information to voters at the polling units. On the other hand, 49 (29.9%) respondents slightly agreed, 72 (43.9%) agreed and 32 (19.5%) of respondents strongly agreed that INEC provided correct information to voters at the polling units. This means that 153 (93.3%) respondents agreed that INEC provided correct information to voters at the polling units.

# Table 5.31: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC maintained good voters’ registration list which tallied with results

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 1 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| DA | 1 | .06 | 0.6 | 1.2 |
| SLD | 4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 3.7 |
| SLA | 40 | 24.4 | 24.4 | 28.0 |
| A | 67 | 40.9 | 40.9 | 68.9 |
| STA | 51 | 31.1 | 31.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.31 above, 1 respondent (0.6%) strongly disagreed, 1 respondent(0.6%) disagreed and 4 respondents (2.4%) slightly disagreed that INEC maintained good voters‟ registration list which tallied with results. This means that 6 (3.7%) respondents disagreed that INEC maintained good voters‟ registration list which tallied with results. On the other hand, 40 respondents (24.4%) slightly agreed, 67 (40.9%) agreed and 51 respondents (31.1%) strongly agreed that INEC maintained good voters‟ registration list which tallied with results. This means that an aggregate of 158 respondents (96.3%) agreed that INEC maintained good voters‟ registration list which tallied with results.

# Table 5.32: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether INEC was open in all its activities before, during and after the election

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| Valid | DA | 1 | .6 | .6 | .6 |
|  | SLD | 5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.7 |
|  | SLA | 30 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 22.0 |
|  | A | 78 | 47.6 | 47.6 | 69.5 |
|  | STA | 50 | 30.5 | 30.5 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.32 above, there was no response on strongly disagreed, 1 respondent(0.6%) disagreed and 5 (3%) respondents slightly disagreed that INEC was open in all its activities before, during and after the election. This means that 6 (3.7%) of the respondents disagreed that INEC was open in all its activities before, during and after the election. On the other hand, 30 (18.3%) of respondents slightly agreed, 78 (47.6%) agreed and 50 (30.5%) of respondents strongly agreed that INEC was open in all its activities before, during and after the election. This means that 158 respondents (96.3%) agreed that INEC was open in all its activities before, during and after the election.

# Table 5.33: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether steps taken by INEC in the decision making process were by consultations with relevant stakeholders

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| DA | 3 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 3.0 |
| SLD | 12 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 10.4 |
| SLA | 29 | 17.7 | 17.7 | 28.0 |
| A | 86 | 52.4 | 52.4 | 80.5 |
| STA | 32 | 19.5 | 19.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.33 above 2, (1.2%) respondents strongly disagreed, 3 (1.8%) respondents disagreed and 12 (7.3%) respondents slightly disagreed that steps taken by INEC in the decision making process were by consultations with relevant stakeholders. This means that 17 (10.4%) respondents disagreed that steps taken by INEC in the decision making process were by consultations with relevant stakeholders. On the other hand, 29 (17.7%) respondents slightly agreed, 86 (52.4%) agreed and 32 (19.5%) respondents strongly agreed that steps taken by INEC in the decision making process were by consultations with relevant stakeholders. This means that 147 (89.6%) respondents agreed that steps taken by INEC in the decision making process were by consultations with relevant stakeholders.

# Table 5.34: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether collaboration with security agencies helped monitor, coordinate and track risks related to elections

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 1 | .6 | .6 | .6 |
| DA | 2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.8 |
| SLD | 8 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 6.7 |
| SLA | 33 | 20.1 | 20.1 | 26.8 |
| A | 77 | 47.0 | 47.0 | 73.8 |
| STA | 43 | 26.2 | 26.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.34 above, 1 respondent (0.6%) strongly disagreed, 2 (1.2%) respondents disagreed and 8 (4.9%) respondents slightly disagreed, that collaboration with security agencies helped monitor, coordinate and track risks related to elections. This means that 10 (6.7%) of the respondents disagreed that collaboration with security agencies helped monitor, coordinate and track risks related to elections. On the other hand, 33 (20.1%) of respondents slightly agreed, 77 (47.0%) agreed and 43 (26.2%) of respondents strongly agreed that collaboration with security agencies helped monitor, coordinate and track risks related to elections. This means that 153 (93.3%) respondents agreed that collaboration with security agencies helped monitor, coordinate and track risks related to elections.

# Table 5.35: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether security personnel are only assigned to escort sensitive election materials, than providing security at polling units

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 67 | 40.9 | 40.9 | 40.9 |
| DA | 42 | 25.6 | 25.6 | 66.5 |
| SLD | 22 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 79.9 |
| SLA | 5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 82.9 |
| A | 10 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 89.0 |
| STA | 18 | 11.0 | 11.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.35 above, 67 (40.9%) respondents strongly disagreed, 42 (25.6%) respondents disagreed and 22 (13.4%) respondents slightly disagreed that security personnel are only assigned to escort sensitive election materials, than providing security at polling units. This means that 131 (79.9%) of the respondents disagreed that security personnel are only assigned to escort sensitive election materials, than providing security at polling units. On the other hand, 5 (3.0%) of respondents slightly agreed, 10 (11.0%) agreed and 18 (11.0%) of respondents strongly agreed that security personnel are only assigned to escort sensitive election materials, than providing security at polling units. This means that 33 (21.1%) respondents agreed that security

personnel were only assigned to escort sensitive election materials, than providing security at polling units.

# Table 5.36: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether very few INEC officials were involved in electoral malpractices

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 9 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| DA | 2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 6.7 |
| SLD | 6 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 10.4 |
| SLA | 36 | 22.0 | 22.0 | 32.3 |
| A | 61 | 37.2 | 37.2 | 69.5 |
| STA | 50 | 30.5 | 30.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.36 above, 9 (5.5%) respondents strongly disagreed, 2 (1.2%) respondents disagreed and 6 (3.7%) respondents slightly disagree that very few INEC officials were involved in electoral malpractices. This means that 17 (10.4%) respondents disagreed that very few INEC officials were involved in electoral malpractices. On the other hand, 36 (22.0%) respondents slightly agreed, 61 (37.2%) agreed and 50 (30.5%) respondents strongly agreed that very few INEC officials were involved in electoral malpractices. This means that 147 (89.6%) respondents agreed that very few INEC officials were involved in electoral malpractices.

# Table 5.37: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the Electoral Institute has been able to build the capacity of staff of the commission to improve its professional conduct

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 12 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 7.3 |
| DA | 22 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 20.7 |
| SLD | 17 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 31.1 |
| SLA | 30 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 49.4 |
| A | 59 | 36.0 | 36.0 | 85.4 |
| STA | 24 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.37 above, 12 (7.3%) respondents strongly disagreed, 22 (13.4%) respondents disagreed and 17 (10.4%) respondents slightly disagreed that the Electoral Institute has been able to build the capacity of staff of the commission to improve its professional conduct. This means that 51 (31.1%) respondents disagreed that the Electoral Institute has been able to build the capacity of staff of the commission to improve its professional conduct. On the other hand, 30 (18.3%) of respondents slightly agreed, 59 (36.0%) agreed and 24 (14.6%) of respondents strongly agreed that the Electoral Institute has been able to build the capacity of staff of the commission to improve its professional conduct. This means that 113 (68.9%) respondents agreed that

the Electoral Institute was able to build the capacity of staff of the commission to improve its professional conduct.

# Table 5.38: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the presence of the Commission on social media in responding to queries enhanced the confidence of voters in the Commission

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 6 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
| DA | 5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 6.7 |
| SLD | 10 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 12.8 |
| SLA | 28 | 17.1 | 17.1 | 29.9 |
| A | 67 | 40.9 | 40.9 | 70.7 |
| STA | 48 | 29.3 | 29.3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.38 above, 6 (3.7%) respondents strongly disagreed, 5 (3.0%) respondents disagreed and 10 (6.1%) respondents slightly disagreed that the presence of the Commission on social media in responding to queries enhanced the confidence of voters in the Commission. This means that 21 (12.8%) respondents disagreed that the presence of the Commission on social media in responding to queries enhanced the confidence of voters in the Commission. On the other hand, 28 (17.1%) respondents slightly agreed, 67 (40.9%) agreed and 48 (29.3%) of respondents strongly agreed that the presence of the Commission on social media in responding to queries enhanced the

confidence of voters in the Commission. This means that 143 (87.2%) respondents agreed that the presence of the Commission on social media in responding to queries enhanced the confidence of voters in the Commission.

The indicators of impact of UNDP democracy norm assistance in building confidence in Electoral Management Body in Nigeria assessed through respondents as presented in tables 5.18 to 5.38 show that there is improvement in confidence of the electorate in INEC as against the low level of confidence in the Election Management Body in 2003. Further proof will be affirmed in the test of hypothesis on this item in the next segment.

# Summary of interview on Research Question Two (Theme 2):

**Impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in Confidence in Electoral Management Body (EMB) in Nigeria**

Subtheme Independence of EMB

C1.Interviewees were asked to comment on constitutional provisions and omissions that were preventing some INEC officials from discharging their duties which is in turn diminishing confidence of stakeholders in the electoral system?

Their response was that there were Issues of security of INEC staff and the ruling by the Supreme Court on the use of card reader. The Supreme Court turned down the use of card reader as evidence saying it was not in the constitution. It is the voters register that was mentioned in the electoral act 2010. This poses challenge to INEC and is likely to erode confidence in the electoral management system, especially the innovative use of card reader (DU 1, DU 6 and DU 7).

Subtheme: Impartiality of EMB

C2. Interviewees were asked to comment on the accusation that the staff of INEC showed partisan interest in dealing with one or two political parties or candidate before, during and after elections 2015?

Their response was that there were no such cases. Even where there were they were isolated. INEC staff members are well trained and have been warned not to be partisan. They were neutral. Those that were cut were being investigated and they would be prosecuted as affirmed by the chairman of the commission (DU 1, DU 6, DU 7, DU 16).

Subtheme: Professional conduct of EMB

C3. Interviewees were asked whether INEC staff (permanent and ad-hoc) were able to discharge their electoral duties professionally (as expected) before, during and after elections 2015?

The interviewees said, yes. They said the training and commitment shown by the staff was seen in the confidence that the chairman of the commission had in them. He trusted their ability and capacity to deliver. That was why the election was adjudged to be free and fair by local and foreign observers (DU 1, DU 6, DU 7, DU 10).

Subtheme: Transparent conduct of EMB

C5. Interviewees were asked whether they observed that the steps taken by INEC in the decision making process were through consultations with relevant stakeholders.

Their response was in the affirmative. Steps taken by INEC in the decision making process are by consultations with relevant stakeholders like the political party executive, the Civil Society Organisations, International Agencies, the military, the police and other security agencies. The meeting contributed immensely to the succe3ss

of the general elections because there was free flow of information between INEC and major stakeholder, including the media. There was no room for rumour or unconfirmed stories by the media. There were press briefings immediately after most of the meetings (DU 6).

# Research question 3: What is the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on law making process in Nigeria?

To answer this question, the indicators of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP on law making process in Nigeria were assessed through respondents as presented in table 5.40 to 5.50 on 6 scales of strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, on one hand and slightly agree, agree and strongly agree on the other hand.

# Table 5.39: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether bills that address basic needs of citizens are frequently passed by NASS

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| DA | 12 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 11.2 |
| SLD | 4 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 14.2 |
| SLA | 28 | 20.9 | 20.9 | 35.1 |
| A | 66 | 49.3 | 49.3 | 84.3 |
| STA | 21 | 15.7 | 15.7 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.39 above, 3 (2.2%) respondents strongly disagreed, 12 (9.0%) respondents disagreed and 4 (3.0%) respondents slightly disagreed that bills that address basic needs of citizens are frequently passed by NASS. This means that 19 (14.2%) of the respondents disagreed that bills that address basic needs of citizens are frequently passed by NASS. On the other hand, 28 (20.9%) of respondents slightly agreed, 66 (49.3%) agreed and 21 (15.7%) of respondents strongly agreed that bills that address basic needs of citizens were frequently passed by NASS. This means that 115 (85.8%) respondents agreed that bills that address basic needs of citizens were frequently passed by NASS.

**Table 5.40: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the public is well sensitized on bills at public hearing before being passed**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 2 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| DA | 7 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 6.7 |
| SLD | 5 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 10.4 |
| SLA | 43 | 32.1 | 32.1 | 42.5 |
| A | 55 | 41.0 | 41.0 | 83.6 |
| STA | 22 | 16.4 | 16.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.40 above, 2 (1.5%) respondents strongly disagreed, 7 (5.2%) respondents disagreed and 7 (3.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that the public is

well sensitized on bills at public hearing before being passed. This means that 14 (10.4%) of the respondents disagreed that the public is well sensitized on bills at public hearing before being passed. On the other hand, 43(32.1%) of respondents slightly agreed, 55 (41.0%) agreed and 22 (16.4%) of respondents strongly agreed that the public is well sensitized on bills at public hearing before being passed. This means that 120 (89.6%) respondents agreed that the public was usually well sensitized on bills at public hearing before being passed.

**Table 5.41: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether bills are passed within an expected time frame**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| DA | 21 | 15.7 | 15.7 | 17.9 |
| SLD | 11 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 26.1 |
| SLA | 36 | 26.9 | 26.9 | 53.0 |
| A | 51 | 38.1 | 38.1 | 91.0 |
| STA | 12 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.41 above, 3 (2.2%) respondents strongly disagreed, 21 (15.7%) respondents disagreed and 11 (8.2%) respondents slightly disagreed that bills are passed within an expected time frame. This means that 36 (26.1%) of the respondents disagreed

that bills are passed within an expected time frame. On the other hand, 36 (26.9%) of

respondents slightly agreed, 51 (38.1%) agreed and 12 (9.0%) of respondents strongly agreed that bills are passed within an expected time frame. This means that 99 (73.9%) respondents agreed that bills were passed within an expected time frame.

**Table 5.42: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether bills passed have positive impact on citizens**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 1 | .7 | .7 | .7 |
| DA | 6 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 5.2 |
| SLD | 14 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 15.7 |
| SLA | 39 | 29.1 | 29.1 | 44.8 |
| A | 63 | 47.0 | 47.0 | 91.8 |
| STA | 11 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.42 above, 1 respondent (.7%) strongly disagreed, 6 (4.5%) respondents disagreed and 14 (10.4%) respondents slightly disagreed that bills passed ha positive impact on citizens. This means that 21 (15.7%) respondents disagreed that bills passed have positive impact on citizens. On the other hand, 39 (29.1%) respondents slightly agreed, 63 (47.0%) agreed and 11 (8.2%) of respondents strongly agreed that bills passed have positive impact on citizens. This means that 113 (84.3%) respondents agreed that bills passed had positive impact on citizens.

# Table 5.43: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the tension between the House and Senate usually lead to delays in bill passage

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 10 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 7.5 |
| DA | 54 | 40.3 | 40.3 | 47.8 |
| SLD | 20 | 14.9 | 14.9 | 62.7 |
| SLA | 17 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 75.4 |
| A | 29 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 97.0 |
| STA | 4 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.43 above, 10 respondents (7.5%) strongly disagreed, 54 (40.3%) respondents disagreed and 20 (14.9%) respondents slightly disagreed that the tension between the House and Senate usually lead to delays in bill passage. This means that 84 (62.7%) respondents disagreed that the tension between the House and Senate usually lead to delays in bill passage. On the other hand, 17 (12.7%) respondents slightly agreed, 29 (21.6%) agreed and 4 (3.0%) respondents strongly agreed that the tension between the House and Senate usually lead to delays in bill passage. This means that 50 (37.3%) respondents agreed that the tension between the House and Senate usually led to delay in bill passage.

# Table 5.44: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether UNDP is a formidable partner of the National Assembly

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 1 | .7 | .7 | .7 |
| DA | 9 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 7.5 |
| SLD | 13 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 17.2 |
| SLA | 40 | 29.9 | 29.9 | 47.0 |
| A | 56 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 88.8 |
| STA | 15 | 11.2 | 11.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.44 above, 1 respondent (0.7%) strongly disagreed, 9 (6.7%) respondents disagreed and 13 (9.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that UNDP is a formidable partner of the National Assembly. This means that 23 (17.2%) of the respondents disagreed that UNDP is a formidable partner of the National Assembly. On the other hand, 40 (29.9%) of respondents slightly agreed, 56 (41.8%) agree and 15 (11.2%) of respondents strongly agreed that UNDP is a formidable partner of the National Assembly. This means that 111 (82.2%) respondents agreed that UNDP is a formidable partner of the National Assembly.

# Table 5.45: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether meetings conducted with INEC led to the passage of bills that enhance policy framework for election

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| DA | 10 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 8.2 |
| SLD | 13 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 17.9 |
| SLA | 38 | 28.4 | 28.4 | 46.3 |
| A | 57 | 42.5 | 42.5 | 88.8 |
| STA | 15 | 11.2 | 11.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.45 above, 1 respondent (0.7%) strongly disagreed, 10 (7.5%) respondents disagreed and 13 (9.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that meetings conducted with INEC led to the passage of bills that enhance policy framework for election. This means that 24 (17.9%) of the respondents disagreed that meetings conducted with INEC led to the passage of bills that enhance policy framework for election. On the other hand, 38 (28.4%) of respondents slightly agreed, 57 (42.5%) agree and 15 respondents (11.2%) strongly agreed that meetings conducted with INEC led to the passage of bills that enhance policy framework for election. This means that 110 (82.1%) respondents agreed that meetings conducted with INEC led to the passage of bills that enhanced policy framework for elections.

# Table 5.46: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether National Assembly committees benefited from training on how to make legislative committee fast track the process of law making

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| DA | 5 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 4.5 |
| SLD | 10 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 11.9 |
| SLA | 13 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 21.6 |
| A | 74 | 55.2 | 55.2 | 76.9 |
| STA | 31 | 23.1 | 23.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016

In table 5.46 above, 1 respondent (0.7%) strongly disagreed, 5 (3.7%) respondents disagreed and 10 (7.5%) respondents slightly disagreed that National Assembly committees benefited from training on how to make legislative committee fast track the process of law making. This means that 16 (11.9%) the respondents disagreed that National Assembly committees benefited from training on how to make legislative committee fast track the process of law making. On the other hand, 13 (9.7%) respondents slightly agreed, 74 (55.2%) agreed and 31 (23.1%) respondents strongly agreed that National Assembly committees benefited from training on how to make legislative committee fast track the process of law making. This means that 118

(88.1%) respondents agreed that National Assembly committees benefited from training on how to make legislative committee fast track the process of law making.

# Table 5.47: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the legislative arm makes law to favour the powerful in the society

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 19 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 14.2 |
| DA | 58 | 43.3 | 43.3 | 57.5 |
| SLD | 39 | 29.1 | 29.1 | 86.6 |
| SLA | 10 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 94.0 |
| A | 5 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 97.8 |
| STA | 3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.47 above, 19 (14.2%) respondents strongly disagreed, 58 (43.3%) respondents disagreed and 39 (29.1%) respondents slightly disagreed that the legislative arm makes law to favour the powerful in the society. On the other hand, 10 (7.5%) of respondents slightly agreed, 5 (3.7%) agreed and 3 (2.2%) of respondents strongly agreed that the legislative arm makes law to favour the powerful in the society. 18 respondents (13.4%) agreed that the legislative arm makes law to favour the powerful in the society. On the aggregate 116 (86.6%) of the respondents disagreed that the legislative arm makes law to favour the powerful in the society.

# Table 5.48: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the members of the National Assembly have in some instances supported the arbitrariness of the executive arm of government

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 19 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 14.2 |
| DA | 36 | 26.9 | 26.9 | 41.0 |
| SLD | 33 | 24.6 | 24.6 | 65.7 |
| SLA | 20 | 14.9 | 14.9 | 80.6 |
| A | 23 | 17.2 | 17.2 | 97.8 |
| STA | 3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.48 above, 19 (14.2%) respondents strongly disagreed, 36 (26.9%) respondents disagreed and 33 (24.6%) respondents slightly disagreed that the members of the National Assembly have in some instances supported the arbitrariness of the executive arm of government. On the other hand, 20 (14.9%) of respondents slightly agreed, 23 (17.2%) agree and 3 (2.2%) of respondents strongly agreed that the members of the National Assembly have in some instances supported the arbitrariness of the executive arm of government. 46 respondents (34.3%) agreed that the members of the National Assembly have in some instances supported the arbitrariness of the executive arm of government. On a whole, 88 (65.7%) of the respondents disagreed that the

pmembers of the National Assembly have in some instances supported the arbitrariness of the executive arm of government.

# Table 5.49: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the legislators sometimes amend or delay bills that could facilitate the activities of anti-corruption agencies to favour the executive or themselves

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| Valid | STD | 15 | 11.2 | 11.2 | 11.2 |
|  | DA | 35 | 26.1 | 26.1 | 37.3 |
|  | SLD | 25 | 18.7 | 18.7 | 56.0 |
|  | SLA | 23 | 17.2 | 17.2 | 73.1 |
|  | A | 27 | 20.1 | 20.1 | 93.3 |
|  | STA | 9 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.49 above, 15 (11.2%) respondents strongly disagreed, 35 (26.1%) respondents disagreed and 25 (18.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that the legislators sometimes amend or delay bills that could facilitate the activities of anti-corruption agencies to favour the executive or themselves. This means that 75 (56.0%) respondents disagreed that the legislators sometimes amend or delay bills that could facilitate the activities of anti-corruption agencies to favour the executive or themselves. On the other hand, 23 (17.2%) respondents slightly agreed, 27 (20.1%) agreed and 9 (6.7%) respondents strongly agreed that the legislators sometimes amend or delay bills that

could facilitate the activities of anti-corruption agencies to favour the executive or themselves. This means that 59 (44%) respondents agreed that the legislators sometimes amend or delay bills that could facilitate the activities of anti-corruption agencies to favour the executive or themselves.

The indicators of impact of UNDP democracy norm assistance on law making process in Nigeria assessed through respondents as presented in table 5.39 to 5.49show that there is improvement in law making process as against low level of performance of the National Assembly in 2003. Further explanation will be affirmed in the test of hypothesis on the law making process in the next segment.

# Summary of interview on Research Question Three (Theme 3):

**Impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on improvement in Law making in Nigeria**

Subtheme: Bills that address basic needs

D1. Interviewees were asked whether bills that address basic needs of citizens were frequently passed by the NASS?

The response was in the affirmative. But they confessed that it was not usually as frequent as people would expect. Budget appropriation process or other important events usually cause delay in the passage of bill. Interest of legislators could also be for the delay. Most bill that address their needs were usually given speedy reading than the ones that address basic needs (DU 10 and DU 11).

Subtheme: Sensitisation on bills at public hearing

D2. Interviewees were asked whether the public were usually well sensitized on bills at public hearing before being passed.

The response was also in the affirmative. They argued that the public were usually sensitized on bills at public hearing before being passed. No bill could be passed without public hearing. It would amount to dictatorship. Public hearing is a normal activity in the legislative process (DU 10 and DU 11).

Subtheme: UNDP as a formidable partner of the National Assembly.

D3. Interviewees were asked whether UNDP was a formidable partner of the National Assembly.

The response was that the training activities of the National Legislative Institute were carried out in collaboration with the UNDP. UNDP had other collaborative efforts with NASS through consultants who usually work with committees on some bills like that of amendment of the electoral act. This means they are formidable partners (DU 10 and DU 11).

Subtheme: Training for enhancing law making process

D4. Interviewees were asked whether National Assembly Committees benefited from training on how to make legislative committee fast track the process of law making?

In their response they argued that training activities of the National Legislative Institute were carried out in collaboration with the UNDP. They were usually involved in funding training manual at the level of curriculum development to even publication of the manuals and reports. This is evident in the project carried out with the National Legislative Institute through UNDP lead Democratic Governance for Development (DGD II) (DU 10 and DU 11).

# Research question 4: What is the impact of UNDP democracy norm assistance on legislative oversight in Nigeria?

To answer this question, the indicators of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP to legislative oversight in Nigeria were assessed through respondents as presented in table 5.50 to 5.56 on 6 scales of strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, on one hand and slightly agree, agree and strongly agree on the other hand.

# Table 5.50: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether appointments forwarded by the executive are well scrutinized before confirmation

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| DA | 4 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 5.2 |
| SLD | 9 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 11.9 |
| SLA | 22 | 16.4 | 16.4 | 28.4 |
| A | 81 | 60.4 | 60.4 | 88.8 |
| STA | 15 | 11.2 | 11.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.50 above, 3 (2.2%) respondents strongly disagreed, 4 (3.0%) respondents disagreed and 9 (6.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that appointments forwarded by the executive are well scrutinized before confirmation. 16 respondents (11.9%) disagreed that appointments forwarded by the executive are well scrutinized

before confirmation. On the other hand, 22 (16.4%) respondents slightly agreed, 81 (60.4%) agree and 15 (11.2%) of respondents strongly agreed that appointments forwarded by the executive were usually well scrutinized before confirmation. This means that 118 (88.1%) respondents agreed that appointments forwarded by the executive were usually well scrutinized before confirmation.

# Table 5.51: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether suspicious activities of the executive and other arms of government are investigated

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| DA | 12 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 11.2 |
| SLD | 6 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 15.7 |
| SLA | 22 | 16.4 | 16.4 | 32.1 |
| A | 77 | 57.5 | 57.5 | 89.6 |
| STA | 14 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.51 above, 3 (2.2%) respondents strongly disagreed, 12 (9.0%) respondents disagreed and 6 (4.5%) respondents slightly disagreed that suspicious activities of the executive and other arms of government are investigated. 21 (15.7%) of the respondents disagreed that suspicious activities of the executive and other arms of government are investigated. On the other hand, 22 (16.4%) of respondents slightly

agreed, 77 (57.5%) agree and 14 (10.4%) of respondents strongly agreed that suspicious activities of the executive and other arms of government are investigated. On this item, 113 (84.3%) respondents agreed that suspicious activities of the executive and other arms of government were usually investigated.

# Table 5.52: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the legislative arm of government effectively prioritizes expenditure within annual national budget before its passage

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 6 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 |
| DA | 14 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 14.9 |
| SLD | 19 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 29.1 |
| SLA | 26 | 19.4 | 19.4 | 48.5 |
| A | 53 | 39.6 | 39.6 | 88.1 |
| STA | 16 | 11.9 | 11.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.52 above, 6 (4.5%) respondents strongly disagreed, 14 (10.4%) respondents disagreed and 19 (14.2%) respondents slightly disagreed that the legislative arm of government effectively prioritizes expenditure within annual national budget before its passage. 39 (29.1%) of the respondents disagreed that the legislative arm of government effectively prioritizes expenditure within annual national budget before its passage. On the other hand, 26 (19.4%) of respondents slightly agreed, 53 (39.6%)

agreed and 16 (11.9%) of respondents strongly agreed that the legislative arm of government effectively prioritizes expenditure within annual national budget before its passage. This means that 95 (70.9%) respondents agreed that the legislative arm of government effectively prioritized expenditure within annual national budget before its passage.

# Table 5.53: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the legislative arm of government monitors expenditure and outcome of monies appropriated within a financial year

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| DA | 7 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 |
| SLD | 8 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 11.2 |
| SLA | 40 | 29.9 | 29.9 | 41.0 |
| A | 53 | 39.6 | 39.6 | 80.6 |
| STA | 26 | 19.4 | 19.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.53 above, 7 (5.2%) respondents strongly disagreed, 8 (6.0%) respondents disagreed and 40 (29.9%) respondents slightly disagreed that the legislative arm of government monitors expenditure and outcome of monies appropriated within a financial year. This means that 55 (41.0%) respondents disagreed that the legislative arm of government monitors expenditure and outcome of monies appropriated within a financial year. On the other hand, 53 (39.6%) respondents slightly agreed, 26 (19.4%)

agreed and 26 (19.4%) respondents strongly agreed that the legislative arm of government monitors expenditure and outcome of monies appropriated within a financial year. This means that 119 (59%) respondents agreed that the legislative arm of government monitored expenditure and outcome of monies appropriated within a financial year in annual budgets.

# Table 5.54: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the legislature ensures the availability of adequate resources on projects that are of benefit to the general public

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| DA | 18 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 13.4 |
| SLD | 13 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 23.1 |
| SLA | 32 | 23.9 | 23.9 | 47.0 |
| A | 51 | 38.1 | 38.1 | 85.1 |
| STA | 20 | 14.9 | 14.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.54 above, There was no response on strongly disagree, 18 (13.4%) respondents disagreed and 13 (9.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that the legislature ensures the availability of adequate resources on projects that are of benefit to the general public. This means that 31 (23.1%) respondents disagreed that the legislature ensures the availability of adequate resources on projects that are of benefit to the general public. On the other hand, 32 (23.9%) respondents slightly agreed, 51 (38.1%)

agreed and 20 (14.9%) of respondents strongly agreed that the legislature ensures the availability of adequate resources on projects that are of benefit to the general public. This means that 103 (76.9%) respondents agreed that the legislature ensured the availability of adequate resources on projects that were of benefit to the general public.

# Table 5.55: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the legislature reviews its budgets prudently and in a transparent way ensures the availability of adequate resources on projects that are of benefit to the general public

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 2 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| DA | 12 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 10.4 |
| SLD | 14 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 20.9 |
| SLA | 25 | 18.7 | 18.7 | 39.6 |
| A | 63 | 47.0 | 47.0 | 86.6 |
| STA | 18 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.55 above, 2 (1.5%) respondents strongly disagreed, 12 (9.0%) respondents disagreed and 14 (10.4%) respondents slightly disagreed that the legislature reviews its budgets prudently and in a transparent way ensures the availability of adequate resources on projects that are of benefit to the general public. This means that 28 (20.9%) respondents disagreed that the legislature reviews its budgets prudently and

in a transparent way ensures the availability of adequate resources on projects that are of benefit to the general public. On the other hand, 25 (18.7%) respondents slightly agreed, 63 (47.0%) agreed and 18 (13.4%) respondents strongly agreed that the legislature reviews its budgets prudently and in a transparent way ensures the availability of adequate resources on projects that are of benefit to the general public. This means that 106 (79.1%) respondents agreed that the legislature reviews its budgets prudently and in a transparent way ensured the availability of adequate resources on projects that were of benefit to the general public.

# Table 5.56: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the legislative arm’s adoption of ‘e-parliament’ has enhanced its capacity to involve the public in the legislative process

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 1 | .7 | .7 | .7 |
| DA | 12 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 9.7 |
| SLD | 14 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 20.1 |
| SLA | 36 | 26.9 | 26.9 | 47.0 |
| A | 54 | 40.3 | 40.3 | 87.3 |
| STA | 17 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.56 above, 1 respondent (.7%) strongly disagreed, 12 (9.0%) respondents disagreed and 14 (10.4%) respondents slightly disagreed that the legislative

arm‟s adoption of „e-parliament‟ has enhanced its capacity to involve the public in the legislative process. This means that 27 (20.1%) respondents disagreed that bills that addressthe legislative arm‟s adoption of „e-parliament‟ has enhanced its capacity to involve the public in the legislative process. On the other hand, 36 (26.9%) respondents slightly agreed, 54 (40.3%) agree and 17 (12.7%) respondents strongly agreed that the legislative arm‟s adoption of „e-parliament‟ had enhanced its capacity to involve the public in the legislative process. This means that 107 (79.9%) respondents agreed thatthe legislative arm‟s adoption of „e-parliament‟ had enhanced its capacity to involve the public in the legislative process.

The indicators of impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on legislative oversight in Nigeria were assessed through respondents as presented in table 6.50 to

6.56 show that there was improvement in legislative oversight of the National Assembly in Nigeria as against the low level of performance in 2003.The hypothesis on UNDP to legislative oversight in Nigeria will be used to confirm this in the next segment.

# Summary of interview on Research Question Four (Theme 4):

**Impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on improvement in oversight function of the legislature in Nigeria**

Subtheme: Investigation and confirmation of appointment

E1. Interviewees were asked whether it was true that appointments forwarded by the executive were not well scrutinized before confirmation and those suspicious activities of the executive and other arms of government were never investigated.

The response was that appointments forwarded by the executive were usually well scrutinized before confirmation and those suspicious activities of the executive and

other arms of government were usually investigated. But this oversight function had always created tension between the executive and legislative arm of government. The executive always want to show its might and the legislative arm would always query suspicious activities. In this regard the legislature was usually criminalised by the media who usually magnify the strained relationship between the two. The media is usually on the side of the executive, especially the social media (where people practice what is called citizen journalism)(DU 10 and DU 11).

E2. Interviewees were asked the extent at which the legislative arm of government monitors expenditure and outcome of monies appropriated within a financial year?

The response was that, the legislative arm of government monitors expenditure and outcome of monies appropriated within a financial year, but not very well, due to poor state of logistics. Notwithstanding, the executive arm of government had been indicted by the legislature on several occasions but they still get away with it. There were several reports on this. Almost all committees of the House and the Senate had observed cases of financial impropriety, wasteful use of government property. For instance, it was discovered that the National Independent Power Projects probe in 2009 that incompetent contractors were awarded contracts, they collected money and most of them did not even know where the sites were when the House of Representative investigated the project(DU 10 and DU 11).

# Research question 5: What is the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on legislative constituency representation in Nigeria?

To answer this question, the indicators of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP to legislative constituency representation in Nigeria were assessed through

respondents as presented in table 6.57 to 6.64 on 6 scales of strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, on one hand and slightly agree, agree and strongly agree on the other hand.

# Table 5.57: Indicating respondents’ assessment whether agenda of constituency of each legislator is channelled into the national plan

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| DA | 9 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 7.5 |
| SLD | 5 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 11.2 |
| SLA | 19 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 25.4 |
| A | 71 | 53.0 | 53.0 | 78.4 |
| STA | 29 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.57 above, 1 respondent (.7%) strongly disagreed, 9 (6.7%) respondents disagreed and 5 (3.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that agenda of constituency of each legislator is channelled into the national plan. This means that 15 (11.2%) respondents disagree that agenda of constituency of each legislator is channelled into the national plan. On the other hand, 19 (14.2%) respondents slightly agreed, 71 (53.0%) agreed and 29 (21.6%) respondents strongly agreed that agenda of constituency of each legislator is channelled into the national plan. This means that 119

(88.8%) respondents agreed that agenda of constituency of each legislator was channelled into the national plan.

# Table 5.58: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether committees serve as arena for influencing outcome in our democratic system

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 2 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| DA | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 2.2 |
| SLD | 16 | 11.9 | 11.9 | 14.2 |
| SLA | 27 | 20.1 | 20.1 | 34.3 |
| A | 65 | 48.5 | 48.5 | 82.8 |
| STA | 23 | 17.2 | 17.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.58 above, 2 (1.5%) respondents strongly disagreed, 1 respondent (0.7%) disagreed and 16 (11.9%) respondents slightly disagreed that committees serve as arena for influencing outcome in our democratic system. This means that 19 (14.2%) respondents disagreed that committees serve as arena for influencing outcome in our democratic system. On the other hand, 27 (20.1%) respondents slightly agreed, 65 (48.5%) agreed and 23 (17.2%) respondents strongly agreed that committees serve as arena for influencing outcome in our democratic system. This means that 115 (85.8%) respondents agreed that committees served as arena for influencing outcome in our democratic system

# Table 5.59: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the political leadership in the National Assembly resists capacity building of committee members and secretariat staff due to pressure of work

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 17 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 12.7 |
| DA | 21 | 15.7 | 15.7 | 28.4 |
| SLD | 30 | 22.4 | 22.4 | 50.7 |
| SLA | 25 | 18.7 | 18.7 | 69.4 |
| A | 31 | 23.1 | 23.1 | 92.5 |
| STA | 10 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.59 above, 17 (12.7%) respondents strongly disagreed, 21 (15.7%) respondents disagreed and 30 (22.4%) respondents slightly disagreed that the political leadership in the National Assembly resists capacity building of committee members and secretariat staff due to pressure of work. On the other hand, 25 (18.7%) respondents slightly agreed, 31 (23.1%) agreed and 10 (7.5%) of respondents strongly agreed that the political leadership in the National Assembly resists capacity building of committee members and secretariat staff due to pressure of work. 66 respondents (49.3%) agreed that political leadership in the National Assembly resists capacity building of committee members and secretariat staff due to pressure of work. This means that 68 (50.7%)

respondents disagreed that the political leadership in the National Assembly resisted capacity building of committee members and secretariat staff due to pressure of work.

# Table 5.60: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether lack of access to training hinders the effective performance of committees and secretariat staff

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| DA | 17 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 12.7 |
| SLD | 14 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 23.1 |
| SLA | 29 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 44.8 |
| A | 49 | 36.6 | 36.6 | 81.3 |
| STA | 25 | 18.7 | 18.7 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.60 above, there was no response on strongly disagree, 17 (12.7%) respondents disagreed and 14 (10.4%) respondents slightly disagreed that lack of access to training hinders the effective performance of committees and secretariat staff. 31 respondents (23.1%) disagreed that lack of access to training hinders the effective performance of committees and secretariat staff. On the other hand, 29 (21.6%) respondents slightly agreed, 49 (36.6%) agreed and 25 (18.7%) of respondents strongly agreed that lack of access to training hinders the effective performance of committees and secretariat staff. This means that 103 (76.9%) respondents agreed that lack of access to training hindered the effective performance of committees and secretariat staff in carrying out their duties effectively.

# Table 5.61: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether the legislature structures its management/committees to improve productivity

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| DA | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| SLD | 5 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 4.5 |
| SLA | 35 | 26.1 | 26.1 | 30.6 |
| A | 79 | 59.0 | 59.0 | 89.6 |
| STA | 14 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.61 above, There was no response on strongly disagree, 1 respondent (0.7%) disagreed and 5 (3.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that the legislature structures its management/committees to improve productivity. 6 (4.5%) respondents disagreed thatthe legislature structures its management/committees to improve productivity. On the other hand, 35 (26.1%) respondents slightly agreed, 79 (59.0%) agreed and 14 (10.4%) respondents strongly agreed that the legislature structures its management/committees to improve productivity. This means that 128 (95.5%) respondents agreed that the legislature structured its management/committees to improve productivity.

# Table 5.62: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether low attendance recorded at committee meetings is responsible for low level of performance of committees and this delays the passage of important bills

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 6 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 |
| DA | 36 | 26.9 | 26.9 | 31.3 |
| SLD | 17 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 44.0 |
| SLA | 30 | 22.4 | 22.4 | 66.4 |
| A | 37 | 27.6 | 27.6 | 94.0 |
| STA | 8 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.62 above, 6 (4.5%) respondents strongly disagreed, 36 (26.9%) respondents disagreed and 17 (12.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that low attendance recorded at committee meetings was responsible for low level of performance of committees and which usually led to delay in the passage of important bills. 59 (44.0%) respondents disagreed that low attendance recorded at committee meetings was responsible for low level of performance of committees and which usually led to delay the passage of important bills. On the other hand, 30 (22.4%) of respondents slightly agreed, 37 (27.6%) agreed and 8 (6.0%) respondents strongly agreed that low attendance recorded at committee meetings was responsible for low level of performance of committees which usually led to delay the passage of important

bills. This means that 75 (56%) respondents agreed that low attendance recorded at committee meetings was responsible for low level of performance of committees which usually led to delay the passage of important bills.

# Table 5.63: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether large numbers of committees make members to be too busy, and this makes members to be absent at other committees sittings

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 5 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
| DA | 26 | 19.4 | 19.4 | 23.1 |
| SLD | 6 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 27.6 |
| SLA | 32 | 23.9 | 23.9 | 51.5 |
| A | 46 | 34.3 | 34.3 | 85.8 |
| STA | 19 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.63 above, 5 (3.7%) respondents strongly disagreed, 26 (19.4%) respondents disagreed and 6 (4.5%) respondents slightly disagreed that large numbers of committees make members to be too busy, and this makes members to be absent at other committees sittings. 37 (27.6%) of the respondents disagreed that large numbers of committees make members to be too busy, and this makes members to be absent at other committees sittings. On the other hand, 32 (23.9%) respondents slightly agreed, 46 (34.3%) agreed and 19 (14.2%) respondents strongly agreed that large numbers of

committees make members to be too busy, and this makes members to be absent at other committees sittings. This means that 97 (72.4%) respondents agreed that large numbers of committees made members to be too busy, and this made members to be absent at other committees sittings due to the likelihood clash in time of meetings.

# Table 5.64: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether each member of the National Assembly has been involved in interaction with Civil Society Organizations and members of the public through meetings, seminars and the media at committee level

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 5 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
| DA | 15 | 11.2 | 11.2 | 14.9 |
| SLD | 9 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 21.6 |
| SLA | 17 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 34.3 |
| A | 61 | 45.5 | 45.5 | 79.9 |
| STA | 27 | 20.1 | 20.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.64 above, 5 (3.7%) respondents strongly disagreed, 15 (11.2%) respondents disagreed and 9 (6.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that each member of the National Assembly has been involved in interaction with Civil Society Organizations and members of the public through meetings, seminars and the media at committee level. 29 (21.6%) respondents disagreed thateach member of the National

Assembly has been involved in interaction with Civil Society Organizations and members of the public through meetings, seminars and the media at committee level. On the other hand, 17 (12.7%) respondents slightly agreed, 61 (45.5%) agreed and 27 (20.1%) respondents strongly agreed that each member of the National Assembly has been involved in interaction with Civil Society Organizations and members of the public through meetings, seminars and the media at committee level. This means that 105 (78.4%) respondents agreed that each member of the National Assembly had been involved in interaction with Civil Society Organizations and members of the public through meetings, seminars and the media at committee level.

The indicators of impact of UNDP democracy norm assistance on legislative constituency representation in Nigeria assessed through respondents as presented in table 5.57 to 5.64 show that there is improvement in the legislative constituency representation of the National Assembly in Nigeria as against the low level of performance of this functions in 2003.

# Summary of interview on Research Question Five (Theme 5):

**Impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on improvement in constituency representation in Nigeria**

Subtheme: Agenda of constituency

F1. Interviewees were asked whether it was true that the agenda of constituency of each legislator was not really channelled into the national plan.

Their response was that, the agenda of constituency of each legislator was usually channelled into the national plan. They do it through constituency projects. The idea of a national budget also addresses the channelling of the project of constituencies

into the national plan. Budgetary allocation is the major national plan (DU 10 and DU 11).

Subtheme: Structures of management, committees and improve in productivity F2. Interviewees were asked the extent at which the legislature structured its

management or committees to improve productivity.

The response was that, the legislature structured its management and committees to improve productivity. This is evident in management style that emphasised delegation of responsibility. This is responsible for the numerous committees at both the House and Senate. The committee of the House or Senate approves what were being done at the smaller committee levels after scrutinising them.

Subtheme: NASS interaction with the public

F3. Interviewees were asked the extent at which they observed that each member of the National Assembly had been involved in interaction with Civil Society Organizations and members of the public through meetings, seminars and the media at committee level.

The response was that members of the National Assembly had always been involved in interaction with Civil Society Organizations and members of the public through meetings, seminars and the media at committee levels. They usually interact with the public and Civil Society Organisations at public hearings, through the media and at seminars and workshops on issues that have to do with their constituencies, committees or areas of personal interest (DU 10 and DU 11).

Subtheme: Legislative Institute improved skills of legislative committees

F4. Interviewees were asked whether it was true that training provided by the Legislative Institute had helped improved the skills of legislative committee members to enhance the process of legislation.

The response was in the affirmative. It was argued that trainings provided by the National Institute for Legislative Studies had helped improved the skills of legislative committee members and also enhanced the process of legislation. The manuals and books provided by the National Institute for Legislative Studies had helped simplify the process of learning the ropes of legislation to new comers (DU 10 and DU 11).

# 5.2.6 Linkage Instrument

**Table 5.65: Indicating respondents’ (INEC) assessment of whether they benefitted in training provided by the UNDP**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percent | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 41 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 25.0 |
| DA | 36 | 22.0 | 22.0 | 47.0 |
| SLD | 10 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 53.0 |
| SLA | 17 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 63.4 |
| A | 38 | 23.2 | 23.2 | 86.6 |
| STA | 22 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.65 above, 41 (25.0%) respondents strongly disagreed, 36 (22.0%) respondents disagreed and 10 (6.1%) respondents slightly disagreed that whether they

benefitted in training provided by the UNDP. On the other hand, 17 (10.4%) respondents slightly agreed, 38 (23.2%) agreed and 22 (13.4%) of respondents strongly agreed that whether they benefitted in training provided by the UNDP. 62 respondents (47%) agreed that whether they benefitted in training provided by the UNDP. This means that 87 (53.0%) of the respondents disagreed that they benefitted in training provided by the UNDP.

# Table 5.66: Indicating respondents’ (INEC) assessment of whether they benefitted from training provided by the Electoral Institute

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percent | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 12 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 7.3 |
| DA | 22 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 20.7 |
| SLD | 17 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 31.1 |
| SLA | 30 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 49.4 |
| A | 59 | 36.0 | 36.0 | 85.4 |
| STA | 24 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 164 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.66 above, 12 (7.3%) respondents strongly disagreed, 22 (13.4%) respondents disagreed and 17 (10.4%) respondents slightly disagreed that they benefitted from training provided by the Electoral Institute. This means that 51 (31.1%) of the respondents disagreed that they benefitted from training provided by the Electoral

Institute. On the other hand, 30 (18.3%) of respondents slightly agreed, 59 (36.0%) agreed and 24 (14.6%) respondents strongly agreed that they benefitted from training provided by the Electoral Institute. This means that 110 (68.9%) respondents agreed that they benefitted from training provided by the Electoral Institute.

# Table 5.67: Indicating respondents’ (NASS) assessment of whether they benefitted in training provided by the UNDP

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percent | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 21 | 15.7 | 15.7 | 15.7 |
| DA | 21 | 15.7 | 15.7 | 31.3 |
| SLD | 13 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 41.0 |
| SLA | 21 | 15.7 | 15.7 | 56.7 |
| A | 44 | 32.8 | 32.8 | 89.6 |
| STA | 14 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.67 above, 21 (15.7%) respondents strongly disagreed, 21 (15.7%) respondents disagreed and 13 (9.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that they benefitted in training provided by the UNDP. This means that 55 (41.0%) of the respondents disagree that they benefitted in training provided by the UNDP. On the other hand, 21 (15.7%) respondents slightly agreed, 44 (32.8%) agreed and 14 (10.4%) respondents strongly agreed that they benefitted in training provided by the UNDP. This means that

79 (59%) respondents agreed that they benefitted in training provided by the UNDP**.**

# Table 5.68: Indicating respondents’ assessment of whether training provided by National Institute for Legislative Studies has helped improved the skills of legislative committee members to enhance the process of legislation

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scale | Frequency | Percenta  ge | Valid  Percent | Cumulative  Percent |
| STD | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| DA | 4 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.7 |
| SLD | 9 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 10.4 |
| SLA | 28 | 20.9 | 20.9 | 31.3 |
| A | 80 | 59.7 | 59.7 | 91.0 |
| STA | 12 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 134 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November, 2015 to March, 2016)

In table 5.68 above, 1 respondent(0.7%) strongly disagreed, 4 (3.0%) respondents disagreed and 9 (6.7%) respondents slightly disagreed that training provided by The Legislative Institute has helped improved the skills of legislative committee members to enhance the process of legislation. This means that 14 (10.4%) respondents disagreed that training provided by The Legislative Institute has helped improved the skills of legislative committee members to enhance the process of legislation. On the other hand, 28 (20.9%) respondents slightly agreed, 80 (59.7%) agreed and 12 (9.0%) respondents strongly agreed that training provided by The Legislative Institute has helped improved the skills of legislative committee members to enhance the process of legislation. This means that 120 (89.6%) respondents agreed that

training provided by The Legislative Institute has helped improved the skills of legislative committee members to enhance the process of legislation.

# 5.2.6 Summary of interview on Linkage Instrument

Subtheme: Relevance of the UNDP democratic norm assistance

Interviewees were asked to identify the relevance of UNDP democracy norm assistance to Nigeria because the country had the financial muscle to sponsor its elections and maintain all institutions of democracy.

The response was that Nigeria is a rich country. It is rich enough to fund its elections and maintain other institutions of democratic governance, be it Federal or State. However, there were gaps and challenges of prompt release of funds which could obstruct the smooth running of the electoral process. There could also be issues of some items not budgeted for or under-budgeted which could be taken care of through the UNDP managed Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF).For instance, when the 2015 General Elections were postponed, INEC had exhausted its voter education funds. But the UNDP provided funds for voter education on radio in March 2015. That served as one of the confidence building mechanism that improved the credibility of INEC before the 2015 General Elections.

Subtheme: National Planning Commission and UNDP assistance

Interviewees were asked whether about the role of National Planning Commission in UNDP Democracy norm assistance to Nigeria.

The response was that the National planning Commission was in-charge of overseeing the activities of the UNDP and the UNDP reports to the Commission and the agencies involved in a project. The UNDP works directly with the agency that it

supports, for instance the INEC and NASS. The Commission recruits very inexperienced young personnel to represent it in the process of designing and implementation of donor assistance, while the UNDP brings in highly technical personnel like professors (DU5). The negotiation power of Nigeria is weakened because the right calibre of personnel is not usually nominated to engage the donor in an agreement. Another way Nigeria is put to disadvantage in the negotiation process is in for instance, one of the Ministers in charge of the Commission asked the UNDP for fund for the payment of the salaries of his advisers.

Subtheme: UNDP and challenges in implementing country cooperation plans Interviewees were asked whether the UNDP usually addressed the challenges in

the country cooperation plans at the level of implementation.

The response was that work plans were usually activity based. They usually indicate monitoring mechanism and when certain challenges were noticed the design had elastic parameters for solving those problems. The most critical challenge was in dealing with funds to Civil Society Organisations. Some were not neutral, they were sponsored by politicians. Corruption issues were also noticed. There were issues of interest, oversight, monitoring and audit among the UNDP led JDBF members.

Subtheme: UNDP and transparency and accountability in handling funds Interviewees were asked whether on their take on audit issues regarding

transparency and accountability in the implementation of UNDP project in DGD.

The response was that the payment due to a firm running into few millions of Naira was not made up to the expiration of the 2015 project duration. UNDP staff could deliberately do that at time. Another response was that the researcher would be given all

documents except on finances, because there were audit issues with the finances. The auditor queried some expenses and lack of clarity in the narration.

Subtheme: UNDP and tension among JDBD members

An Interviewee was asked whether there tension among JDBF members which were likely to affect the implementation of projects.

The response was that there were no tension, but there were priorities and demands and UNDP had issues with some donors because each donor had issues it gave more priority to. Those issues could be viewed by outsiders as tension. But they were resolved amicably.

Sub theme: UNDP inflexible personal recruitment and rigid procurement rules Interviewees were asked whether there were complaints of delay by the UNDP

in commencement of projects despite challenge of personal recruitment and rigid procurement rules.

The response was there were delays in the implementation of project due to strict rules governing procurement. In one case, adverts had to be placed in a national medium. For obvious reasons, only the Nigeria Television Authority (NTA), could provide that kind of coverage. Despite the requirement, they had to provide quotes from alternative TV stations that did not have NTA‟s breadth of terrestrial coverage. UNDP asked that they should make the stations to commit it into writing that they would not be able to provide such coverage. The process took over a year.

Another response was that the management and financial system were very rigid. It is inflexible and it made on-boarding of new staff last for more than a year, from application to actual receipt of a letter of offer and settling in. Another response was that often times there were delays in ensuring all stakeholders were ready, the human

capacity was also not available sometimes and they had to rely on expatriates. This had led to delay in the process. Nigerian service providers were not conversant with the procurement rules, this had led to delay in the manner goods and services were provided to UNDP. Another respondent affirmed that UNDP‟s management and financial system is in conformity with that of the UN System standard. They work on the same platforms that ensured due diligence and integrity. He added that recruitments were also adequately advertised on the pages of newspaper, so also procurement were made to conform to the standard UN Procurement rules and standard.

Interviewees were asked whether there were evidence to show that UNDP‟s intervention was able to make operational the management of election results, tallying and transmission on a timely basis.

The response was that all forms of development assistance, including democratic norm assistance are demand driven support. For instance, INEC asked the UNDP to support Ekiti and Osun Elections as such training of INEC officials were carried out to familiarisation with the process of using the data capturing machine for accreditation of voters. This was the litmus test before the 2015 General Elections.

Interviewees were asked on their take on the notion that democracy assistance by international organizations usually had ulterior motive in form of bias in support of great powers that provide funds for them.

The response was that assistance to developing countries was not without strings. When anyone talks about democracy, first of all, what was often being described would be western liberal democracy. Even then, no one had addressed the fact that after the resignation of David Cameron, for instance, Theresa May‟s emergence as

his successor did not follow any election. Neither was there an objective discourse

around the Electoral College in the United States, (who are like the „godfathers‟ in Nigeria‟s politics). The UNDP ought to ensure that election monitors from developing countries supervise the elections in these great developed democracies. Election violence had trailed electioneering in the US elections, but organisations like the UNDP were yet to speak up on them. So, for sure, implicit in democracy assistance to developing countries like Nigeria there could be the element of slavery and colonialism. Another contrary opinion expressed by one of the interviewees was that a foreign diplomat once said to this respondent, that the disintegration of Nigeria would lead to the destabilization of the West African sub-region; this would in turn become an international migration issue with Nigerians flooding Western Countries. This was the reason why International donor organizations support democratic norm promotion in Nigeria. Democratic governance leads to stability as such the ulterior motive is that democratic norm assistance also leads to mutual collaboration and peace on a global scale. Expending funds to promote democracy norms would be more satisfying to the UNDP and other donors than budgeting to carter for refugees in Nigeria and beyond. Therefore as a proactive measure the UNDP and other donor agencies would be satisfied to promote democratic norm and in-turn promote good governance, peace and

stability in Nigeria and the West African sub-region.

On a whole, the indicators of how UNDP assisted in promoting democratic norm in Nigeria were assessed through respondents as presented from table 6.58 to 6.65. The instruments used are sponsorship of training, study visit, curriculum design, training manual development, publishing and consultancy work for the improvement of electoral administration and the legislative process in Nigeria. The foregoing responses to the research questions is followed by the test of hypotheses where the final decision on the

impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance to Nigeria is affirmed through the computation and analysis of data collected from the field.

# 5.3 Test of hypotheses and discussion of findings

* + 1. **Hypothesis One: UNDP democratic norm assistance and voter registration Table 5.69: Contingency table on UNDP democratic norm assistance and voter registration**

***CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS ON VOTER REGISTRATION***

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Scale** | **Frequency** | **Percentage** | **Cumulative Frequency** | **Cumulative Percentage** |
| **1** | 134 | 10.21 | 134 | 10.21 |
| **2** | 273 | 20.81 | 407 | 31.02 |
| **3** | 188 | 14.33 | 595 | 45.35 |
| **4** | 261 | 19.89 | 856 | 65.24 |
| **5** | 317 | 24.16 | 1173 | 89.41 |
| **6** | 139 | 10.59 | 1312 | 100.00 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Chi-Square Test for Equal Proportions** | |
| **Chi-Square** | 132.0244 |
| **DF** | 5 |
| **Pr > ChiSq** | <.0001 |

H o: There is no relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in voter registration in Nigeria.

To test the hypothesis above table 5.69, contains a summary of the indicators of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP to voter registration in Nigeria which were assessed through respondents as presented on 6 scales points of Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Slightly Disagree, on one hand and Slightly Agree, Agree and Strongly Agree on the other hand. The frequency of question items on scale one is 134 (10.21%) responses (strong disagreement), frequency of question items on scale two is 273 (20.18%) responses(disagreement) and frequency of question items on scale three is 188 (14.33%) responses (slight disagreement) on the hypothesis that UNDP democratic norm assistance impacted on voter registration in Nigeria. This means that 595 (45.35%) of the responses affirm disagreement with the assertion that UNDP democratic norm assistance impacted on voter registration in Nigeria. On the other hand, 261 (19.89%) of responses affirm slight agreement, 371 (24.16%) confirm agreement and 139 (10.59%) of responses affirm strong agreement that that UNDP democratic norm assistance impacted on voter registration in Nigeria. This means that 717 (54.65%) responses affirm agreement that that UNDP democratic norm assistance impacted on voter registration in Nigeria. To confirm the assertion above, chi-square was computed and the result is contained in table 5.70.2 as presented below.

Table 5.69, shows that calculated chi-square of 132.0244 which is greater than the critical chi-square value of 15.086 at 0.01 alpha level for 5 degree of freedom. Therefore, since the calculated value of chi-square is greater than the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. Hence, there is significant relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance with improvement in voter registration. The evidence of this is indicated in the p-value of the chi-square test of this relationship. At .0001 the p-

value indicates the relationship is significant at 1% significant level of 99% confidence interval.

The result of the study shows that there is significant relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and improvement in voter registration. According to the annual report of Democratic Government for Development (DGD) II Project for July 2012 to June 2013, component 1 „Promoting Credible, Transparent Electoral Process‟, the UNDP gave technical assistance to the Independent Electoral National Commission (INEC) and was able to achieve its objectives of strengthening INEC‟s strategic planning policy and operational capacity (as spelt out in the outcome of component 1.1); strengthening electoral system (voter registration) and progress (tallying and transmission), improved voter registration process through ICT (as spelt out in the outcome of component output 1.2) and enhanced professional capacity of INEC.

Related to the above, flawed voter registration was one of the major challenges that made the 2003 General Elections to be viewed as not being free, fair or credible. The data of voters register in 2003 was 57,938,945; in 2007, it was 60,823,022; in 2011, it was 73,528.040; and in 2015, it was 68,833,476. The number of registered voters dropped in 2015 because of the improvement recorded through the proper deployment of ICT in detecting multiple registration of intending voters. In 2011, temporary voters cards were issued, but in 2015 permanent voters cards were issued. From 2003 to 2015 the voter registration process was transformed due to the assistance received by INEC in its effort at improving one of the most important functions that always lead to free, fair and credible elections. Improvement in the voter registration process is a pointer to gradual process of consolidation of democracy. In an interview with the Assistant Director of Information and Communication Technology (ICT)

Department at INEC headquarters reported that the deployment of ICT (and the use of card reader) helped in cleaning up the voters register. The Assistant Director observed that the none acceptance of evidence regarding the usage of card reader by the Supreme Court was responsible for the set back suffered at Bayelsa and Rivers States reruns in 2015. Accreditation of voters register using card reader is a key to the avoidance of multiple voting which guarantees free, fair and credible elections. INEC was able to secure the buy-in of critical stakeholders before deploying ICT for the smooth conduct of the 2015 General Elections (Eyinla, ND).

# Hypothesis Two: UNDP democratic norm assistance and confidence in EMB Table 5.70: Contingency table on UNDP democratic norm assistance and confidence in EMB

***CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF CONFIDENCE IN EMB***

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Scale** | **Frequency** | **Percentage** | **Cumulative Frequency** | **Cumulative Percentage** |
| **1** | 204 | 5.65 | 204 | 5.65 |
| **2** | 245 | 6.79 | 449 | 12.44 |
| **3** | 303 | 8.39 | 752 | 20.83 |
| **4** | 660 | 18.28 | 1412 | 39.11 |
| **5** | 1349 | 37.37 | 2761 | 76.48 |
| **6** | 849 | 23.52 | 3610 | 100.00 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Chi-Square Test for Equal Proportions** | |
| **Chi-Square** | 1658.1197 |
| **DF** | 5 |
| **Pr > ChiSq** | <.0001 |

H o: There is no relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in confidence reposed in the Election Management Body in Nigeria.

To test the hypothesis above, table 5.70, contains a summary of the indicators of democratic norm promotion of the UNDP and improvement in confidence reposed in Election Management Body in Nigeria which were assessed through respondents as presented on 6 scales points of strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, on one

hand and slightly agree, agree and strongly agree on the other hand. The frequency of

question items on scale one is 204 (5.65%) responses (strong disagreement), frequency of question items on scale two is 245 (6.79%) responses (disagreement) and frequency of question items on scale three is 303 (8.39%) responses (slight disagreement) on the hypothesis that democratic norm assistance of the UNDP impacted on confidence reposed in the Election Management Body in Nigeria. This means that 752 (20.83%) of the responses affirm disagreement with the assertion that democratic norm assistance of the UNDP impacted on confidence reposed in the Election Management Body in Nigeria. On the other hand, 660 (18.28%) of responses affirm slight agreement, 1349 (37.37%) confirm agreement and 849 (23.52%) of responses affirm strong agreement that democracy norm promotion of the UNDP impacted on confidence reposed in the Election Management Body in Nigeria. This means that 2858 (79.17%) responses affirm agreement that democratic norm assistance of the UNDP impacted on confidence reposed in the Election Management Body in Nigeria. To confirm the assertion above chi-square was computed and the result is contained in table 5.70, as presented below.

Table 5.70, shows that calculated chi-square of 1658.1197 which is greater than the critical chi-square value of 15.086 at 0.01 alpha level for 5 degree of freedom. Therefore, since the calculated value of chi-square is greater than the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. Hence, there is significant relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance with improvement in confidence in the Election Management Body. The evidence of this is indicated in the p-value of the chi-square test of this relationship. At .0001 the p-value indicates the relationship is significant at 1% significant level of 99% confidence interval. The degree of freedom is 5 so we do not accept the null hypothesis of the study.

Again, in assessing the significant relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and increased confidence in the Election Management Body (EMB), the result of the study shows that there is significant relationship. In 2003 there were accusations over the credibility of INEC as an EMB. There were claims that INEC had challenges of impartiality, independence, transparency and professionalism. The presidency (and the party in power) had strong influence on the EMB and that made it impossible for the body to be independent and fair to every political actor (Omotola 2010:76). INEC, backed by the UNDP (along with JDBF members) took steps towards beefing up the credibility gap that it had as a credible EMB so as to build confidence of stakeholders in the electoral process. The independence of an EMB like INEC could be determined by the method of appointing or selecting electoral commissioners or officials of EMB by the executive, the legislature or the judiciary. The international standard is that the judicial arm of government and the civil society groups are the ones that are to be involved in the process of selection or appointment of the overall head of an Election Management Body (Kerevel, 2009).

In adhering to the principle of impartiality as an EMB, INEC was able to monitor equal access to state owned media, freedom to campaign and respect for limits of campaign expenses by political parties and candidates. Although campaign commenced before the timeline set by INEC, its officials said it was third party campaigners that did it on behalf of the candidates and that was not part of their mandate. Their mandate, in the electoral act 2010 was the control of political parties.

As a professional EMB, INEC was able to beef up its level of training and performance of electoral officials and poll workers. Well printed ballot papers, timely delivered election supplies, provision of correct information to voters, well maintained

registration list which tallied with the result were feats that INEC was able to achieve. The strategic plan of INEC, supported by the UNDP, was a tool that helped in achieving these objectives.

In adhering to transparent mode of operation, INEC was able to display openness in all activities as an EMB with its major stakeholders. Steps taken in decision making were by consultation with relevant stakeholders. The UNDP also supported meetings with stakeholders on 2015 General elections.

As an impartial, professional and transparent in carrying out its activities as an Election Management Body, was affirmed in the interview conducted with the Assistant Director (ICT) at INEC who said that the process of registration was perfect. The accreditation of voters was also a huge success despite isolated cases of commencement of voting behind schedule in some areas. She observed that the staff members of INEC were always under pressure because politicians in Nigeria see election as a do or die affair. In one of the countries that they went for election observation, the practice was for the electoral officials to look at the register and pick a name and the person whose name was picked would handle the voting process and the EMB official will just supervise the person. Equally, in Sierra Leone voter education was very adequate. Citizens listened to adverts on voter education on radio (DU 7). This shows the challenges that INEC/election officials grabbled with during the 2015 General Elections. From INEC‟s 2015 General Elections report, the UNDP supported training of permanent and ad hoc staff of INEC in the use of card reader for accreditation of voters. The training and equipment support were important elements that led to the building of

confidence of the electorates in the Election Management Body. INEC Strategic Plan (2012 – 2015) Abuja, Nigeria (December, 2012).

The hypotheses on improvement in voter registration process and confidence in the Election Management Body are affirmed by INEC Strategic Plan for 2012 – 2015 which (published in December, 2012) acknowledged the input of UNDP UNDP/DGD and listed the activities supported by the UNDP that helped strengthen voter registration and confidence in INEC. The support among others led to the:

* Production of the first strategic plan and strategic programme action plan, against previous production of only operational plan.
* Facilitated INEC to carry along broad range of staff of the commission at the headquarters and state offices, which gave it ownership outlook.
* Helped in involving key stakeholders to make input into such documents for the first time, which created the quest for credible election process among INEC staff and key stakeholders.
* Helped in implanting process of strategic planning and strategic programming of action in the preparation of important documents.
* Enhanced the process of implementation and evaluation for INEC staff and stakeholders.
* Helped build the capacity of INEC‟s staff to design strategic plan for the future.

Other contributions of UNDP in an effort at promoting democratic norm in the electoral administration realm as spelt out in the UNDP Final Evaluation Report of 2007 are:

* Support to operational human resources capacity building of INEC staff
* Support to technical operation of direct data capture machines for voter registration,
* Assemblage and installation of servers, printing of voter registers, web- management and installation and operation of VSATS,
* Development of training materials and software for INEC‟s usage
* Printed and supplied 75,000 copies of manual for voter registration officials 1,400 copies for election trainers and 450,000 copies for election officials.
* Conducted training programme for security personnel, printed and supplied 300,000 copies of „guidelines and code of conduct for the police‟.
* Provided technical input in developing material for voters‟ information and education, printed 1,110,000 copies of voter information poster, 120,000 copies each of the electoral act booklet containing electoral provisions of the constitution, booklet detailing symbols of various political parties and 120,00 CDs having lists of the polling stations.
* Supported publicity for voter‟s registration exercise in electronic and print media, and publicity for presidential debate
* Helped INEC develop kits for observers – 120,000 copies of election observation guidelines and supported 20,000 sets of bags and caps for observers (UNDP, 2007:19).

Improvement in voter registration process and confidence in Election Management Body were partly achieved due to the assistance received by INEC in its effort at

improving its functions that would always lead to free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria.

# Hypothesis Three: UNDP democratic norm assistance and law making

**Table 5.71: Contingency table on UNDP democratic norm assistance and law making**

***CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF LAW MAKING FUNCTION***

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Scale** | **Frequency** | **Percentage** | **Cumulative Frequency** | **Cumulative Percentage** |
| **1** | 96 | 5.96 | 96 | 5.96 |
| **2** | 274 | 17.00 | 370 | 22.95 |
| **3** | 200 | 12.41 | 570 | 35.36 |
| **4** | 332 | 20.60 | 902 | 55.96 |
| **5** | 550 | 34.12 | 1452 | 90.07 |
| **6** | 160 | 9.93 | 1612 | 100.00 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Chi-Square Test for Equal Proportions** | |
| **Chi-Square** | 482.1042 |
| **DF** | 5 |
| **Pr > ChiSq** | <.0001 |

H o: There is no relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in law making process in Nigeria.

To test the hypothesis above, table 5.71 contains a summary of the indicators of impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in law making process in Nigeria which were assessed through respondents as presented on 6 scales

points of strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, on one hand and slightly agree, agree and strongly agree on the other hand. The frequency of question items on scale one is 96 (5.96%) responses (strong disagreement), frequency of question items on scale two is 274 (17.00%) responses (disagreement) and frequency of question items on scale three is 200 (12.14%) responses (slight disagreement) on the hypothesis that impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in law making process in Nigeria. This means that 570 (35.65%) of the responses affirm disagreement with the assertion that impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in law making process in Nigeria. On the other hand, 332 (20.60%) of responses affirm slight agreement, 550 (34.12%) confirm agreement and 160 (9.93%) of responses affirm strong agreement that impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in law making process in Nigeria. This means that 1042 (64.64%) responses affirm agreement that impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in law making process in Nigeria. To confirm the assertion above chi- square was computed and the result is contained in table 5.71 as presented below.

Table 5.71, shows that calculated chi-square of 482.1042 which is greater than the critical chi-square value of 15.086 at 0.01 alpha level for 5 degree of freedom. Therefore, since the calculated value of chi-square is greater than the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. Hence, there is significant relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance with improvement in law making. The evidence of this is indicated in the p-value of the chi-square test of this relationship. At .0001 the p-value indicates the relationship is significant at 1% significant level of 99% confidence interval. The degree of freedom is 5 so we do not accept the null hypothesis of the study.

In hypothesis three, this study established that the relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in NASS‟s capacity to make laws is significant. From the data analysed in the previous section (when the hypothesis was tested), the result of the investigation on relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and improvement in NASS‟s capacity to make laws is significant. The interviews conducted with legislative aides and extract from evaluation report of UNDP/NILS DGD II (2015) also confirm this. Interviews conducted with Legislative Aides show Bills passed between 1999 and 2015 legislative years by the National Assembly are 826 bills out of the 2,955 bills that were received in the period. Nwanolue and Iwuoha, (2012:28) argued that the bills passed were passed to favour major players like the executive, legislature and the judiciary in government as well as, multinational corporations, and key players in the economy. Usman (2010), posits that the legislature in Nigeria from 1999, failed to keep its head above waters in terms of performance of its basic functions due to pressure from the executives, lack of experience in law making and placement of higher premium on personal interest at the expense of public interest are the major reasons adduced to the low level of performance of the legislative arm of government to the detriment of the common man. This study has confirmed that there is improvement in the performance of the legislature due to the training it received from the National Institute for Legislative Studies which has given NASS members more knowledge and experience to keep their head above waters. It now asserts its independence, which is registered in the way it checks the excesses of the executive. Although there are still accusations of high level of self-interest instead of placing public interest to be paramount, there is better performance than from 1999 to 2003. There are also accusations of corruption against

the principal officers in the Legislative Arm of Government. Again, the National Assembly is so assertive that it confronts the executive arm of government to the detriment of their mandates as law makers and as representatives of the electorate.

On a positive note, in the interviews conducted with Legislative Aides at the National Assembly, they affirmed that, to a certain extent, the National Assembly has been passing bills within timeframe. Three months is the ideal timeframe for passing bills, if given special attention. However, bureaucracy and heavy work load usually interfere with the rate at which sittings would hold (DU 11). Budget and other important events usually cause delay in the passage of bills (DU 12). Some other issues are centred on what a bill addresses. If a bill seems to interfere with welfare of the elite, they make effort to kill it on arrival (DU 11). Part of the improvements in the process of law making is the sensitisation of the public on bills at public hearings in which stakeholders are invited to make inputs before passage (DU 11 and 12). According to DGD II July 2012 – June 2013 Annual Report, the UNDP supported 47 Senators who were members of Ad hoc Committee on Constitutional Review in July 2012 at a retreat to prioritise and identify critical issues to be addressed in memoranda submitted by various stakeholders and interest groups. It also supported House of Representatives members of Ad hoc Committees on Constitutional Review during public hearing sessions at all the 360 federal constituencies in November 2012. Television, radio and newspaper adverts in English and local languages were used to reach out to Nigerians about the public hearings and the constitution review process. DGD II also supported the National Institute for Legislative Studies to convene an international conference on law reform and law making process in July 2012. The conference addressed the

challenges in law reform and oversight functions. DGD II also engaged consultants to support Senate Committees on bill drafting and on technicalities for developing draft constitutional amendment bill.

There are evidences of training of the legislators and their aides by the National Institute for Legislative Studies (DU 11). During field work, the researcher collected some training manuals designed to train the legislators, their aides and clerks of the house. The researcher witnessed a National Dialogue on the Role of the Legislature in Security and Development. He was invited along with other stakeholders to make their needs and aspirations known to the legislators. Senator Teslim Folarin, representing Oyo Central, said people should bring ideas to them on their needs in order to fashion them into bills and pass them into law. He said they were not magicians to know the needs and aspirations of all the citizens. In order to improve the process of law making, the UNDP had supported the printing of training manuals like Rules and Procedures of the National Assembly among other manuals; and facilitated the process of constitutional review for the National Assembly through the National Institute for Legislative Studies (DU11 and DU12). In order to speed the passage of important bills, committees usually involve Legislative Aides to work in committees with the clerks of committees or secretaries. They represent their principals. They work more and their principals (Senator or House member) sign when the draft is concluded and accepted (DU11). This process serves as catalyst for the legislature to carry out its law making function better than it used to be. In the UNDP „External Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation Report‟ published on 8th December 2006, it was observed that National Assembly members had to assert their independence (law making function) by opposing the extension of the President‟s mandate for a third term contravening over 100 Political

Conference recommendations. The conference was convened by the Executive under former President Olusegun Obasanjo.

The DGD/NILS 2015 reported that the UNDP gave support to the National Assembly and the it was able to „strengthened rules on legislative practice and procedure, strengthened the capacity of legislators and legislative staff through training, study visits and disseminated knowledge and experience at law conference. All these could not be adopted before the end of the 7th assembly. House of Representatives produced their own‟ (UNDP/NILS DGD II (2015).

# Hypothesis Four: UNDP democratic norm assistance and oversight function of the National Assembly

**Table 5.72: Contingency table on UNDP democratic norm assistance and oversight function of the National Assembly**

***CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF OVERSIGHT FUNCTION***

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Scale** | **Frequency** | **Percentage** | **Cumulative Frequency** | **Cumulative Percentage** |
| **1** | 15 | 1.60 | 15 | 1.60 |
| **2** | 79 | 8.42 | 94 | 10.02 |
| **3** | 83 | 8.85 | 177 | 18.87 |
| **4** | 203 | 21.64 | 380 | 40.51 |
| **5** | 432 | 46.06 | 812 | 86.57 |
| **6** | 126 | 13.43 | 938 | 100.00 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Chi-Square Test for Equal Proportions** | |
| **Chi-Square** | 706.3326 |
| **DF** | 5 |
| **Pr > ChiSq** | <.0001 |

H o: There is no relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in legislative oversight in Nigeria.

To test the hypothesis above, table 5.72, contains a summary of the indicators of

impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in legislative oversight in Nigeria which were assessed through respondents as presented on 6 scales

points of strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, on one hand and slightly agree, agree and strongly agree on the other hand. The frequency of question items on scale one is 15 (1.6%) responses (strong disagreement), frequency of question items on scale two is 79 (8.42%) responses (disagreement) and frequency of question items on scale three is 83 (8.85%) responses (slight disagreement) on the hypothesis that impact of democracy norm promotion of the UNDP and improvement in legislative oversight process in Nigeria. This means that177 (18.87%) of the responses affirm disagreement with the assertion that impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in legislative oversight in Nigeria. On the other hand, 203 (21.64%) of responses affirm slight agreement, 432 (46.06%) confirm agreement and 126 (13.43%) of responses affirm strong agreement that impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in legislative oversight in Nigeria. This means that 761 (81.13%) responses affirm agreement that impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in legislative oversight. To confirm the assertion above chi- square was computed and the result is contained in table 5.72 as discussed below.

Table 5.72, shows that calculated chi-square of 706.3326 which is greater than the critical chi-square value of 15.086 at 0.01 alpha level for 5 degree of freedom. Therefore, since the calculated value of chi-square is greater than the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. Hence, there is significant relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance with improvement in oversight functions. The evidence of this is indicated in the p-value of the chi-square test of this relationship. At .0001 the p- value indicates the relationship is significant at 1% significant level of 99% confidence interval. The degree of freedom is 5 so we do not accept the null hypothesis of the study.

The relationship between UNDP democracy assistance and improvement in NASS‟s performance in oversight functions is significant. The result is in consonance with the interview conducted with Legislative Aides and extract from evaluation report of UNDP/NILS DGD II (2015). An interviewee explained that, any appointment forwarded by the executive arm of government its usually scrutinized before being confirmed. Anytime the suspicious activities of the executive and other arms of government are investigated, there are cries of tension between the executive and legislature, mostly through the media (DU12). Another interviewee said that the legislature monitors expenditure and outcome of funds appropriated to all arms of government within a financial year, but not without some impediments. One of the major challenges is that agency to be supervised has to provide logistics for the legislative committee that will carry out the oversight function, because the budgetary allocation for oversight functions is inadequate. The National Assembly has very few vehicles for such activities (DU12).

In a related development, an interviewee also asserts that, there are evidences of clash of interests between the executive arm of government and the legislature during the process of scrutiny and approval. The executive would always want its interest to prevail as such, the powers of the legislature to check the excesses of the executive arm is usually weakened (DU 13). The UNDP/NILS report (2015) shows that there were tool kits that served as key resources developed through DGD II support to equip legislators with the knowledge needed to carry out their assignment very well. On the list of the tool kits is the oversight functions manual. The training received through this manual also strengthened the capacity of the legislature to assert its powers to carry out oversight function as confirmed by the findings of this study. In the UNDP „External

Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation Report‟ published on 8th December 2006, it was observed that National Assembly members demonstrated oversight through the budget process. It established the National Assembly Budget Research Office. The „Midterm report of the Legislative Agenda: 7th House of Representatives‟ (published by Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre in 2013) affirmed that the House was able to expose corruption and waste of public funds by the government. Huge sum of money running into trillions of Naira had been saved. In exercising its oversight powers the House, in its investigative hearing had been able to probe fuel subsidy regime, non- implementation of budget, non-remittance of budget by MDAs, Aviation, Capital market, Agriculture subsidy, education, banking and labour and productivity. Each committee was directed to watch closely the activities of the agencies under its supervision. These are the areas of improvement in the oversight functions of the National Assembly.

The 2015 UNDP report on DGD II democratic norm assistance to the National assembly reports that the „support reviewed oversight guide and production of final clean document code of ethics and oversight guide among others (UNDP/NILS DGD II (2015).

# Hypothesis Five: UNDP democratic norm assistance and constituency representation function of the National Assembly

**Table 5.73: Contingency table on UNDP democratic norm assistance and constituency representation function of the National Assembly**

***CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUENCY REP***

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Scale** | **Frequency** | **Percentage** | **Cumulative Frequency** | **Cumulative Percentage** |
| **1** | 37 | 3.07 | 37 | 3.07 |
| **2** | 130 | 10.78 | 167 | 13.85 |
| **3** | 111 | 9.20 | 278 | 23.05 |
| **4** | 242 | 20.07 | 520 | 43.12 |
| **5** | 519 | 43.03 | 1039 | 86.15 |
| **6** | 167 | 13.85 | 1206 | 100.00 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Chi-Square Test for Equal Proportions** | |
| **Chi-Square** | 716.4080 |
| **DF** | 5 |
| **Pr > ChiSq** | <.0001 |

H o: There is no relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance and improvement in constituency representation in Nigeria.

To test the hypothesis above, table 5.73, contains a summary of the indicators of impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in constituency representation in Nigeria which were assessed through respondents as presented on 6 scales points of strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, on one hand and slightly

agree, agree and strongly agree on the other hand. The frequency of question items on scale one is 37 (3.07%) responses (strong disagreement), frequency of question items on scale two is 130 (10.78%) responses (disagreement) and frequency of question items on scale three is 111 (9.20%) responses (slight disagreement) on the hypothesis that impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in legislative oversight process in Nigeria. This means that278 (23.05%) of the responses affirm disagreement with the assertion that impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in constituency representation in Nigeria. On the other hand, 242 (20.07%) of responses affirm slight agreement, 519 (43.03%) confirm agreement and 167 (13.85%) of responses affirm strong agreement that impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in constituency representation in Nigeria. This means that 928 (76.95%) responses affirm agreement that impact of democratic norm assistance of the UNDP and improvement in constituency representation in Nigeria. To confirm the assertion above chi-square was computed and the result is contained in table 5.73 as discussed below.

Table 5.73, shows that calculated chi-square of 716.4080 which is greater than the critical chi-square value of 15.086 at 0.01 alpha level for 5 degree of freedom. Therefore, since the calculated value of chi-square is greater than the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. Hence, there is significant relationship between UNDP democratic norm assistance with improvement in constituency representation function of the legislature. The evidence of this is indicated in the p-value of the chi-square test of this relationship. At .0001 the p-value indicates the relationship is significant at 1% significant level of 99% confidence interval. The degree of freedom is 5 so we do not accept the null hypothesis of the study.

The Relationship between UNDP democracy assistance with improvement in constituency representation functions is significant. Contrary to the findings of this study, Gado and Abdulwasiu (2012), argued that constituency representation function of legislators is about advocating for the dreams and aspirations of their constituencies by lobbying their colleagues to incorporate the needs of their constituencies in the national action plan. This is why each legislator has constituency office in his/her area, for the collation of needs of the constituency for input into national plan. And that, most legislators do not visit their constituencies on regular basis, let alone identify and aggregate the views and aspirations of the constituency for input into national action plan. The legislature, by implication has not met the expectations of Nigerians (from 1999 to 2011) because, the bills passed within that timeframe were yet to be of immense benefit to the common man who constitutes the majority in these constituencies. The response of interview conducted with Legislative Aides and extract from evaluation report of UNDP/NILS DGD II (2015) affirms the findings of this study. A Legislative Aide observed that the legislative Arm of Government invented constituency project in order to channel the needs of their constituencies into the national plan. This has helped the constituencies to enjoy the dividends of democracy. If there were no constituency projects, some constituencies will never be included in the annual national budget of the Federal Government (DU13). The UNDP/NILS report (2015) also shows that Constituency Office Management document (one of the tool kits that served as key resources developed through DGD II support) equips legislators with the knowledge needed to carry out their assignments. The legislators were able to carry out their constituency representation functions, given the knowledge derived from this document along with other trainings received from National Institute for Legislative Studies.

There are other findings in the field on the mode of UNDP operation. The UNDP Consultant to INEC said that, UNDP does not do direct implementation of its projects. It designs and carries out how things should be planned. It facilitates and sponsors trainings, but the actual training is usually conducted by implementing partners (DU1). The Consultant added that the support given to INEC could be justified with the performance observed and that the outcome of support given to NASS was disappointing up till 2007. He said during the amendment of the Electoral Act by the National Assembly, some committees were very sensitive to UNDP‟s support. For this reason, from DGD II, most of the UNDP/DGD II supports to National Assembly were handled by the National Legislative Institute (DU1).

In an effort at improving the legislative process in Nigeria, the UNDP democratic norm assistance led to the production of the following manuals for the legislative arm of government

* Induction manual for legislators
* Hand book on legislative practice and procedures
* Constituency office management
* Committee manual
* Drafting legislation and amendment
* Oversight manual
* Public hearing manual
* Immunity and privilege of Nigeria legislature
* Legislative aides in parliament
* Needs assessment of the National assembly
* Official reporting manual (UNDP/NILS DGD II, 2015:22).

In consonance with the findings of this study, the INEC report on 2015 General Elections spelt out the areas where UNDP/DGD II assisted INEC along with other international agencies.

* Technical and financial assistance,
* Strengthening institutional memory,
* Capacity development,
* Retreats and experience sharing with The Electoral Institute and other relevant agencies.
* Stakeholder engagement, and
* Electoral research and documentation (UNDP DGD II, 2015: 52 – 54).

The UNDP Consultant to INEC said, the entire money spent by the Joint Donor Basket Fund was about 50 Million Dollars. The European Union made additional contributions of 20Million Dollars targeted at civic and voter education for the purpose of publicising the new voter registration. Support was also given to media organisations to build confidence of stakeholders in the electoral system. The ICT driven registration process was also supported.

Another observation by the UNDP Consultant to INEC is that Nigeria is a rich country. It is rich enough to fund its elections, be it Federal or State. However, there were gaps and challenges of prompt release of funds which could obstruct the smooth running of the electoral process. There could also be issues with items not budgeted or under-budgeted which could be taken care of through the JDBF managed fund. For instance, when the election was postponed, INEC had exhausted its voter education funds, later on, some amount was provided by the UNDP led JDBF for voter education

on radio in March 2015. This is one of the confidence building mechanism that improved the credibility of elections.

An interviewee said that the National planning Commission oversees the activities of the UNDP and that the UNDP reports to the Commission and the agencies involved in a project. The UNDP works directly with the agency that is being supported. The Commission recruits very inexperienced young personnel to represent it in the process of designing and implementation of donor assistance, while the UNDP brings in highly technical personnel like professors (DU5). The negotiation power of Nigeria is weakened because the right calibre of personnel is not usually nominated to engage the donor in an agreement.

On how the UNDP usually address the challenges in the country cooperation plans at the level of implementation, the UNDP consultant to INEC said work plans are usually activity based. They usually indicate monitoring mechanism and when certain challenges are noticed the design has elastic parameters for solving those problems. Most critical challenges of the UNDP were dealing with funds to civil society organisations. Some were not neutral, they were sponsored. There were also issues of interest, oversight, monitoring.

There were doubts in appropriation of project funds. The financial report was not balanced. The financial report audited by an external firm was queried. The UNDP DGD II project rejected the report of the auditor. A consultant to the UNDP said payment due to their firm running into few millions of Naira was not made up to the expiration of the 2015 project duration. He said UNDP staff could deliberately do that at time. A respondents at the UNDP/DGD project office said, all documents would be given to the researcher except on finances, because there were audit issues with the

finances. The auditor queried some expenses and lack of clarity in the narration on how certain category of funds was used.

On whether, there were tension among JDBF members which affected the implementation of projects, the UNDP Consultant to INEC said, there were no tension, but priorities and demands and UNDP had issues with some donors because each donor had issues it gave more priority to.

On the accusations of delay by the UNDP in commencement of projects despite challenge of personal recruitment and rigid procurement rules, a UNDP consultant confirmed experiencing delays in the implementation of project due to strict rules governing procurement. In one case, they had to place adverts in a national medium. For obvious reasons, only the Nigeria Television Authority (NTA), could provide that kind of coverage. Despite the requirement that they had to provide quotes from alternative TV stations that did not have NTA‟s breadth of terrestrial coverage, UNDP asked that they should make the stations to commit it into writing that they would not be able to provide such coverage. The process took over a year.

On the contrary, another respondent said, often times there were delays in ensuring that all stakeholders were ready, the human capacity was also not available sometimes and they had to rely on the expatriates. This led to delay in the process. Nigerian service providers were not conversant with the procurement rules, it led to delay in the manner goods and services were provided to UNDP. UNDP‟s management and financial system was usually in conformity with that of the UN System standard. They work on platforms that ensure due diligence and integrity. Recruitments of funds were also adequately advertised on the pages of newspaper, so also procurements were made to conform to the standard UN Procurement rules.

There UNDP Consultant to INEC was asked whether there were evidence to show that UNDP‟s intervention was able to make operational the management of election results, tallying and transmission on a timely basis, he said all forms of democratic norm assistance are demand driven support. He said for when INEC asked the UNDP to support Ekiti and Osun Elections, training of INEC officials was carried out to familiarise with the process of using the data capturing machine for accreditation of voters. This was the litmus test before the 2015 General Elections and evidence to show that democratic norm assistance made operational the management of election results, tallying and transmission on a timely basis.

A respondent was asked on the notion that democratic norm assistance by an international organization like the UNDP had ulterior motive in form of bias in support of great powers that provide funds for them. The response was that assistance to developing countries were not without strings. When anyone talked about democracy, first all, what is often being described is western liberal democracy. Even then, nobody addresses the fact that after the resignation of David Cameron, for instance, Theresa May‟s emergence as his successor did not follow any election. Neither was there an objective discourse around the Electoral College in the United States, who were like the

„godfathers‟ in Nigeria‟s politics. The UNDP ought to ensure that election monitors from developing countries supervise the elections in these developed countries. Election violence had trailed electioneering in the US elections, but organisations like the UNDP are yet to speak up on them. So, for sure, implicit in democracy assistance to developing countries like Nigeria is the concept of slavery and colonialism.

On the contrary another respondent contend that a foreign diplomat once said to him, that the disintegration of Nigeria would likely lead to the destabilization of the

West African sub-region; this would in turn become an international migration issue with Nigerians flooding Western Countries. This he said was the reason why international donor organizations support democratic norm promotion in Nigeria. Democratic governance would always lead to stability as such the ulterior motive is that democratic norm assistance would always lead to mutual collaboration and peace in Nigeria, the West Africa sub-region and on a global scale.

In this chapter, the data collected were presented and analysed. The analysis of questionnaire was done using simple percentage and frequency table to present socio- demographic information. The responses to the five research questions were also done using simple percentage and frequency tables on each item on the questionnaires. The hypotheses were analysed using Chi-square test, preceded by contingency table used for computing the Chi-square values. The responses to interview questions relevant to the five research questions were also done according to themes and sub-themes.

The results of analysis of quantitative and qualitative data from both primary and secondary sources were discussed along with the hypotheses as contained in the major findings of this study.

# CHAPTER SIX

**SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLWEDGE**

# Summary of Findings

This study is an assessment of UNDP democratic norm assistance in Nigeria. It made an attempt to assess the impact of UNDP democratic norm assistance on the following indicators of democratic norm subset:

1. Voter registration
2. Confidence in the Election Management Body (EMB)
3. Law making,
4. Legislative oversight functions and
5. Legislative constituency representation functions

The first two indicators items „a‟ and „b‟ are under electoral administration norm subset, while the last three items „c‟, „d‟ and „e‟ are indicators of legislative norm subset. The first two indicators show that there has been some level of improvement in the new voter registration system and confidence in Election Management Body in electoral administration in Nigeria, which means that democratic practice, has been enhanced. The last three indicators also show there has been some level of improvement in the law making, legislative oversight functional and constituency representation functions in the legislative process. The level of progress made in these two major democratic institutions show that democracy is enhanced. The progress of these institutions is determined by their compliance with their constitutional role. It is these constitutional roles which empowers or limits them that the UNDP has made effort to promote. These roles are embedded in shared rules which are directed at the

behaviours, expectations and understanding of people in the process of governance in Nigeria. Shared rules usually promote the well being and freedom of individuals and groups in the society and the state. The democratic norm assistance in form of sponsorship of trainings, development of manuals, study visits and technical inputs into rules and procedures are the process of empowering the legislature and the Election Management Body to exercise their powers and specify their limits in order to sustain peace and stability in Nigeria and on a global scale.

This is the mandate that UNDP‟s assistance to Nigeria‟s democratic process has been doing from 2003 general elections with the aim of consolidation of democracy in Nigeria along with its Joint Donor Basket Fund members.

The summary of major findings affirms that:

* + Ensuring international peace and order is the major reasons why exponents of social constructivist theory espouse ideas on international norm promotion on a global scale.
  + Democracy norm assistance will always lead to international state–building and minimise or totally prevent war. This means that effecting changes in state institutions will enhance mediation between domestic and international system. Democratising states would benefit from the global norms being promoted and in this instance would not threaten international peace and order.
  + The UNDP serves as global norm promoter that pursues world peace and order.

It interacts with democratic institutions of a democratising state like Nigeria through the state and the elite to create behavioural and attitudinal change in the area of electoral administration and legislative process. The proper enforcement

of democratic norms would lead to the consolidation of democracy thereby improve the lives of citizens of the democratising country.

* + That the UNDP as an external norm promoter made efforts to strengthen the internal process of Nigeria‟s political system through the domestic elite, the political structure and process. It funded trainings, publishing of manuals, equipment/software provision, and curriculum design for capacity building of participants and consultancy services among other technical assistance to INEC to improve the voter registration system and build confidence of election stakeholders in the Election Management Body. It equally funded trainings, publishing of manuals, equipment/software provision and curriculum design for capacity building of participants and consultancy services among other technical assistance to those who are National Assembly members and legislative aides in law making, in carrying out oversight and constituency representation functions in the legislative process.
  + That the complex socialisation model developed by Flockhart (2005), used instruments that promote change in social identity and socialisation strategies that involve domestic structures and that the complex socialisation model is an over glorification of Western Orientation and liberal governance process which shows that international democratisation is a process of turning the (state/elite and nation/people of the) recipient country into appendage of Western nations and governments.
  + That the linkage and socialisation model of Freyburg (2009), espoused ideas on

diffusion of democratic governance in which democratic norm is transferred through social and communicative linkages. It involves change in attitude

towards governance and the consequence of exposing participants in the democratising state to rules of democracy in the decision-making practices. Freyburg‟s model was influenced by the European Union and other countries in Europe and who were trying to join regional organisation in the EU. It is a model that could only be used to analyse and interpret democratic norm promotion activities of a regional international organisation.

* + And that this study however agreed with Bjorkdahl‟s (2012) model, which focused on the relationship between the process of norm diffusion and the consequences, identity (re)construction. The author‟s definition of norm as a collection of understanding and set of expectations that are geared towards good behaviour of actor within a context and identity captures the central theme of this study but with some modifications. This is because the author gave attention to norm import which has always been ignored by the social constructivist theorists. However, a number of works are devoted to norm export because, it is the major concern of the democratic norm promoter. Bjorkdahl‟s model like that of Freyburg is also skewed for analysis and interpretation of democratic norm promotion activities of a regional international organisation.
  + Two operational linkages, social and normative linkages were developed from the review of the three models. Social linkage, which is a form of interaction with a norm bearer (the UNDP), in which social learning takes place. Normative linkage also involves interaction between a norm bearer and norm receiver which is training, funding, book publication or curriculum design interaction agreements between them within the country receiving the international norm.

These two types of linkages depict processes of adaptation of norm set by the

two institutions (INEC and NASS) of democracy under the focus of this study. The adaptation of these norm sets is modified by the receiver (INEC and NASS) considering the historical and situational context of the interaction.

* + The Election Management Body had been constitutionally empowered to oversee electoral administration. It had challenges with how voting and elections were managed at all levels. From 2003, INEC struggled with the process of organising and conducting elections into public office. In this vain, the electoral law was reviewed to include broader perspectives on how to strengthen the electoral administration system as an agency. The features, behaviour pattern of election officials, the conduct, process and implementation of policies were reviewed in the electoral law. The intervention helped in improving the voter registration system from manual to digital. The confidence of stakeholders in the Election Management Body has improved.
  + The legislature on the other hand, in its mandate made laws, performed oversight functions, ratified international treaties and performs constituency representation functions. The legislature in 2003 made so many mistakes that the excuses given by the leadership then was that they were in a learning process. It was on the premise that Nigeria‟s democracy was just coming up, that the UNDP came up with its democratic norm assistance by signing agreements with Nigeria through the National Planning Commission. In the process of improving the law making process the legislators had passed through series of training on rules and procedures of the National Assembly in order to enhance their capacity as law makers and to improve their output in democratic governance. The capacity building trainings had also enhanced their roles in checking the

excesses of the executive and other arms of government. They also received training on how to represent their constituencies in a democratic government.

* + The UNDP‟s adoption of the developmental approach to democratic norm promotion informed its focus on democratic governance that pursued equitable socio-economic development. It laid emphasis on economic and social rights. Democratisation process using developmental approach was slow, gradual but it reduced the risk of confrontation usually employed by great powers like the USA that use the political approach to promote democratic norm (Carothers 2009). However there is contention that whichever approach is employed by the UNDP, it could pursue the interest of the great powers that usually bankrolls it activities. Sometimes assistance to developing countries were not without strings. Implicit in democracy assistance to developing countries like Nigeria is the notion of neo-liberalism and neo-colonialism penetrating Nigeria from the back door. But it could be argued that there might be no ulterior motives to democratic norm assistance of the UNDP in Nigeria. If democracy norm assistance was not rendered activities of centrifugal forces could have led to the disintegration of Nigeria. This would likely lead to the destabilization of the West African sub-region and would in turn become an international migration issue with Nigerians seeking refuge in Western Countries. This among other reasons was why international governmental organizations like the UNDP supported democratic norm promotion in Nigeria which is the scope of this study.
  + This study affirms that democratic governance would always lead to

collaboration, stability and peace on a global scale. Funding democratic norms

promotion would be more gratifying for the UNDP than soliciting for funds to help refugees after the break down of law and order in the absence of democratic governance. It is also important to note that, democratic norm promotion was derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Freedom, which is a provision in the document that the United Nations Organisation operates.

* + And that, democratic norm assistance serves as catalyst to democratisation process. The elite and masses were inspired by their conditions and steadily the pressure built up and then the international community lend in a supporting hand to play role of a norm bearer. This is grounded on the rationale that democracy norm assistance to new democracies would enhance international security, development, universal peace and social justice. The thesis is that if all countries democratise the threat of international terrorism and uncontrolled migration of people would also be addressed.

# Conclusion

From the analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data from the field, it is evident that democratic norm assistance of the UNDP targeted at improving new voter registration process was successful. Majority of registered voters were able to see their names on the voters‟ registration list, accredited at the polling units and able to vote during the 2015 general elections. Although there were late commencements of voting in the country, they were isolated cases. INEC had little or no challenges with ICT driven voter registration, tallying, sorting and transmission. In cases where the card readers did not work during accreditation, the election officials reverted to the manual voter register. It contributed to the improvement observed during the 2015 general

elections. The constitutional provisions and omissions that almost prevented some INEC officials from discharging their duties which in turn almost caused setback in confidence of stakeholders in the electoral system was the issues of security of INEC staff and the ruling by the Supreme Court on the use of card reader that posed challenge to INEC. This is a setback that is likely to erode confidence in INEC as an Election Management Body.

It is also evident that from the analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data from field that the democratic norm assistance of the UNDP targeted at building the confidence of the electorate in the Election Management Body was successful. The staff of INEC showed non- partisan interest in dealing with any political party or candidate before, during and after elections 2015. INEC staff members were well trained and had been warned not to be partisan. There were very few cases of sharp practices displayed by a couple of INEC staff members and INEC did not shield them. They were handed over to the police for investigation and prosecution. The fact that majority of electoral officials were non-partisan and neutral, the confidence of stakeholder in INEC as an Election Management Body improved. INEC staff members (permanent and ad-hoc) were also able to discharge their electoral duties professionally (as expected) before, during and after elections 2015. Most of the steps taken by INEC in the decision making process were by consultations with relevant stakeholders. There were several workshops and seminars where issue were discussed with stakeholder and the best decisions were arrived at. This is a good attribute of a transparent EMB. That was why the 2015 General Elections were adjudged to be free, fair and credible.

Given the evidence collected during the field work, the analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data point to the fact that democratic norm assistance of the

UNDP targeted at the law making process in the National Assembly was improved upon. Bills that address basic needs of citizens were passed by the NASS, (but not as frequent as people will expect). Budget appropriation process and other important events usually cause delay in the passage of these bills. The public were usually sensitized on bills at public hearing before being passed. The UNDP is a formidable partner of the National Assembly that collaborated with the National Institute for Legislative Studies to design, publish manuals and funded training for Legislators and their aides towards improving the law making process in Nigeria.

The result of analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data shows that democratic norm assistance of the UNDP targeted at improvement in oversight functions of the legislature was successful. Appointments forwarded by the executive were well scrutinized before confirmation and those suspicious activities of the executive and other arms of government were investigated. The legislators were at times accused of creating tension in the polity whenever they investigate the activities of the executive arm of government. The legislative arm of government also monitors expenditure and outcome of monies appropriated within a financial year but not to the best of their ability due to poor state of logistics. The government agency being investigated had to provide vehicle and other logistics to the legislative committee to carry out their over sight function. On a whole, there was improvement in oversight functions of the legislature.

It is also evident that from the analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data from the field that democratic norm assistance of the UNDP targeted at constituency representation functions of the legislative arm of government had been improved upon. The agenda of constituency of each legislator was really channelled into the national

plan (indirectly through) the annual budgetary allocation (and directly) through constituency projects among other activities. Committee works were also part of constituency representation activities that benefit sectors allocated funds in the national budget. Committee also served as an arena where constituency needs were channelled into the national plan.

Evident in the data gathered from the field, Nigeria had the wherewithal to sponsor its elections and maintain all institutions of democracy. However, the democratic norm assistance of the UNDP were used to fill the gaps and challenges of lack of prompt release of funds by the Nigerian Government which would have obstruct the smooth running of the electoral process. At times there were items or important activities that were omitted in the budget for INEC or under-budgeted, the UNDP came to the rescue of INEC through the DGD project.

Evident in the data collected from the field, the National planning Commission was in-charge of the activities of the UNDP, but the UNDP worked directly with the agencies that benefitted in democratic norm assistance. The Commission at times delegated very inexperienced young personnel to represent it in the process of designing and implementation of donor assistance plans, while the UNDP were used to delegating technically qualified personnel to negotiate with Nigeria. The negotiation power of Nigeria was usually weakened because the right calibre of personnel were not usually nominated to engage donor in agreements.

The UNDP sometimes does encounter critical challenges in dealing with funds to civil society organisations while implementing country cooperation plans. Issues of interest, oversight, monitoring and audit by the members do occur, but they were usually resolved. The researcher was denied documents on how project funds were

handled because auditors queried some expenses and lack of clarity in the narration on how funds were used. There were interests among JDBF members which were translated to be ulterior motive of donors. This is usual with bilateral supports but mild in multilateral supports.

There were evidence of delay in the implementation of UNDP democratic norm assistance projects as a result of to strict rules governing procurement and recruitment of personnel. There were also delays in the implementation of projects for the purpose of ensuring all stakeholders were ready and available before the commencement of projects. Sometimes they over relied on the expatriates. In some instances, Nigerian service providers were not conversant with the procurement rules and this had lead to delay in the manner goods and services were provided to UNDP. All these were associated with management and financial systems that conform to the UN Systems standards for diligence and integrity.

It is evident in the analysis of data collected from the field that, all forms of development assistance, including democratic norm assistance were demand driven. Countries that needed support had to forward their demand to the UNDP before cooperation agreements were drawn.

It is implicit that democratic norm assistance to developing countries like Nigeria is a form of ne-colonial intervention. Learning from history, advanced democracies had in one time or the other pushed forward their interests as assistance to new democracies. Conditions were usually attached to most assistance.

It is also explicit that democracy norm assistance to Nigeria would lead to continued stability, collaboration and peace not only in the West Africa sub-region but also in Africa. Funding democratic norm promotion is a more satisfying exercise than

allowing crisis to brood to the level of raising fund for the rehabilitation of insurgents and rescue of refugees.

# Recommendations

From the analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data from the field, it is evident that democratic norm promotion of the UNDP targeted at improving electoral administration and legislative process has impact and on this basis the study recommends the following in area where further work is desired.

First, the instance in which the UNDP DGD II project rejected the audit report of the external audit firm shows that the over glorification of procurement rules and standards of the United Nations that the UNDP claims to adhere to leaves much to be desired. Since UNDP‟s management and financial system conforms to the UN System standard that works on platforms which ensures due diligence and integrity, agencies receiving assistance should be carried along in the disbursement and retirement of funds according to the rules. The cases reported should be examined to find out what actually happened. Those found wanting should sanctioned by the UNDP team of assessors.

Second, it is important to note that ulterior motives in form of bias for the old democracies that support UNDP with funds to carry out its development activities could not be ruled out. To guide against usual ulterior motive (in form of bias) in support of great powers that provide funds for the UNDP, such ulterior motives in democratic norm assistance on Nigeria should be scrutinised in the course of design, implementation and evaluation of projects to reduce impact of neo-liberalism and neo- colonialism on Nigeria.

Third, there were clash of interest in the priority areas that UNDP and other JDBF partners prefer to support. There were also of clash of interest on the mechanism for oversight, monitoring of project activities. These were also resolved at the JDBF meetings. Although most of the issues were resolved but it affected the commencement of some items in the process of implementation of projects and the expected output of the projects implemented. It is recommended that all JDBF members should set aside their interest and adhere to the standards of the United Nations, except where adhering to such undermines the democratic norm assistance being rendered.

Fourth, the National Planning Commission, which is the agency that coordinates activities of international donors involved in assistance to Nigeria seem not to be very active in the day to day implementation of donor assistance. It is the agency that benefits in the donor projects that UNDP interacts with. It only reports to the Project Monitoring Unit to show pace of work and write monthly, quarterly and annual reports. This seems to be a ritual for the purpose of documentation. The National Planning Commission was also accused of sending inexperienced personnel to the UNDP during negotiations and in the course of implementation of projects. The National Planning Commission should always delegate high ranking personnel to be involved in planning, monitoring and evaluation of development assistance. This will help consolidate assistance to beneficiary agencies.

Fifth, the use of card reader was a very good innovation that helped minimise electoral malpractices in the 2015 General Elections. The card reader was used for authentication and accreditation of voters before casting their ballot. The progress made through the use of this instrument would have been built upon. However, the Supreme Court of Nigeria dismissed the use of card reader as evidence in court, stating that it was

not in the constitution. In its place, the evidence admissible in the Supreme Court was the manual voter register. On this note the study recommends that the Legal Department at INEC along with stakeholders should consider including a clause in the Electoral Act and forward it to the National Assembly whenever it is being considered for review.

Sixth, Voter education is another important instrument for building the confidence of voters in the electoral management system. INEC‟s effort in this area is very little and the consequence is that the electorate will be ignorant of their roles in the process of electing leaders at intervals. There is overwhelming evidence that voter education in Nigeria is usually intensified during elections and the concentration is usually in urban centres. The rural setting has been neglected to politicians who usually take advantage of this weakness to manipulate the choice of illiterate voters in the rural areas. Most of the voter education activities before and after the 2015 General Elections were concentrated in the urban centres. It is recommended that INEC and Civil Society Organisations should be involved in proper voter education in the rural areas as well as urban centres in order to sensitise the electorates properly on their civic rights and how to exercise it. UNDP democratic norm assistance should concentrate more in this area.

Seventh, the way the management of an independent Election Management Body is appointed, goes a long way to build the confidence of the electorate, political parties and other stakeholders in the electoral administration system. In Nigeria the executive is vested with the power to appoint the principal officers of the Election Management Body. The opposition would always doubt non-partisanship of those principal officers because they might likely be from the political party in power. They would assume that the EMB management would dance to the tune of those who appointed them. To clear the doubt of partisanship from the minds of the opposition, the

appointment of the principal electoral officers of the Election Management Body (INEC) should be through the judiciary council and the civil society as recommended in the Uwais Panel Report.

Eighth, members of committees in the National Assembly have challenges with logistics in the course of carrying out legislative oversight. They have to rely on agencies under the jurisdiction of their committees to provide logistics for them to carry out their assignments, either for the purpose of appropriation or budget implementation assessment. Sometimes the failure of the National Assembly to carry out this function thoroughly had slowed down the level of implementation of the annual national budget plans. The leadership of the National Assembly should provide proper logistics for committee members to carry out oversight functions on the other arms of government at intervals. The national assembly should have a well planned schedule for monitoring government agencies at intervals. Funds budgeted for personal luxury vehicles by National Assembly members should be converted to customised vehicles for national assignments. The leadership of the National Assembly should also focus on the logistics for committees in order to carry out their duties within and outside the National Assembly Complex instead of affluence being displayed.

Ninth, there are many avenues through which National Assembly members channel the needs of their constituencies into the annual national plan. But in a large country like Nigeria most constituencies are usually neglected. The National Assembly through the guide of the National Institute for Legislative Studies coordinate a research survey on the needs of constituency of each National Assembly member in order to have priorities on what to be included in the annual national budget within short and long term plans. They should organise regular sessions with stakeholders in the geo-

political zones (and possibly at each member‟s constituency), in order to have relevant inputs on channelling needs and aspirations of citizens into the national plan. They should be made to account for the funds given to them for the maintenance of their constituency offices which they visit once in a blue moon. Those whose constituency offices (outreach channel) are not functional should be made to refund the funds meant for the maintaining the outreach channel.

* 1. **Contribution to Knowledge**

This study confirmed that the UNDP saliently pursues the interest of the great powers that usually bankrolls it activities. Assistance to developing countries are not without strings. Donors in the JDBF all have their ulterior motives for development aids and that was why they initially designed and implement their project away from the visibility of other donors. But when implementing partners in Nigeria were securing funding from more than one donor to carry out a single project they had to come together.

This study also confirmed that implicit in democracy assistance to developing countries like Nigeria is the notion of neo-liberal and Western values (neo-colonialism) penetrating Nigeria‟s democratic institutions through democratic norm promotion from 1999 to 2015. Democratic institutions in Nigeria would not be allowed to evolve their own norms and values if these kinds of development aids continue.

This study also confirmed that about eighty percent (80%) of funds meant for the development aid is of direct benefit to the expatriates recruited to implement the projects through huge salaries and wages and most of the materials for logistics are purchased from the donor countries.

Most development aids are usually assessed from the perspective of development financing. Donors have always measured the amount of moneys spent from their own perspective. This study assessed UNDP‟s development aid from the

perspective of democratic norm promotion in Nigeria. Although, donors usually assess the effect development intervention from their own perspective, this work looked at development aid from dual perspectives; that is both the donor and recipient‟s perspectives.

The models developed by scholars for assessing democratic norm promotion are mostly Eurocentric. Therefore two operational linkages were developed. They are social and normative linkages. Social linkage is a form of interaction with a norm bearer (for instance an international organisation) in which social learning takes place. Normative linkage involves interaction between a norm bearer and norm receiver which is training, funding, book publication or curriculum design interaction agreements between them within the country receiving the international norm. The two types of linkages depict processes of adaptation of norm set. Adaptation of norm set is modified by the receiver considering the historical and situational context.

The study also explored understanding and expectation of behaviour outcomes that were shared in temporal (2003 to 2015) and spatial settings (INEC and NASS) which are (democratic governance) changes in behaviour that were being upheld for the freedom and well being of the individual or groups in the Nigerian society.

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# APPENDIX 1

**LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| S/No | Name of  respondent | Date of  Interview | Place of  interview | Position |
| DU 1 | Professor Bolade Eyinla | 16th November, 2015. | No 15 Copa Cabana Estate, Shoprite Area,  Apo 2 Abuja. | Former Election Expert, UNDP/DGD II/Consultant to  INEC |
| DU 2 | Toyin Adewale Gabriel | 16th November 2015. | UNDP (DGD II)  project Office, No. 15 Mississipi Street Maitama,  Abuja. | Media Expert/assistant coordinator, DGD project office |
| DU 3 | Anonymous | 18th August, 2016 | e-mail interview | UNDP CSO  legislative advocacy consultant |
| DU 4 | Anonymous | 19th August  2016 | e-mail interview | UNDP media  consultant |
| DU 5 | Dr Sanjo Faniran | 5th September 2016 | National Planning Commission, Constitution Road, Abuja. | Ass. Director International C- operation Depart. Multilateral Economic Cooperation Div., United Nations Dev.  Systems unit |
| DU 6 | Anonymous | 5th September 2016 | National Planning Commission, Constitution  Road, Abuja. | Desk officer DGD II PMU office |
| DU 7 | Abimbola Oladunjoye (Mrs) | 23rd March, 2016. | INEC  Headquarters.  Zambezi Street, Maitama, Abuja. | Ass. Director ICT Dept. |
| DU 8 | Dayyabu A Zakari | 23rd March, 2016. | INEC  Headquarters,  Zambezi Street, Maitama, Abuja. | Admin. Officer, Human Resource Dept. |
| DU 9 | Anonymous | 23rd March, 2016. | INEC  Headquarters,  Zambezi Street, Maitama, Abuja. | Lega Officer, Legal Dept. |
| DU 10 | Anonymous | 9th March 2016 | House of Representatives  wing National | Formers House of Representatives  member |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | Assembly  Complex Asokoro Abuja |  |
| DU 11 | Dele Oni | 9th March, 2016. | Senate Wing, National Assembly Complex,  Asokoro Abuja. | Senior Legislative Aide |
| DU 12 | Barr. Azubuike Oko | 4th March, 2016. | Senate Wing, National Assembly  Complex, Asokoro Abuja. | Senior Legislative Aide |
| DU  13 | Muhammad  Kudu | 4th December,  2015. | NEPC Office  Maitama, Abuja. | Former Legislative  Aide |
| DU  14 | Alkasim  AbdulKadir | 15th August  2016 | Kubwa, Abuja. | BBC correspondent |
| DU 15 | Abdullahi Muhammed Jabi | 22nd November, 2015. | INEC  Headquarters Zambezi Street, Maitama Abuja. | National Secretary Campaign for Democracy/Election Observation  Coordinator FCT |
| DU 16 | Siraja Uthman | 15th August 2016 | e-mail interview | Chairman of Voice Initiative Civil  Society watchdog |

# APPENDIX II

**SUMMARY OF THEMATIC INTERVIEW**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| S/N  o | Interview question | Discourse unit response | Theme | Subtheme |
| Q1 | B1. What are your observation regarding the new voter registration exercise? Where registered voters able to see their names on the voters‟ registration list, accredited at the polling units and able to vote during the 2015  general elections? | The registration process was perfect. Accreditation also  went on well. Although there were late commencement of voting in the country, they are isolated cases. DU 1, DU 6 and 7 | Improvement in voter registration Process. | Registration, accreditation and voting. |
|  | B2. Did you noticed that | INEC had little or no |  | ICT driven registration and accreditation. |
| INEC had challenges with | challenges with ICT |
| ICT driven voter | driven voter |
| registration, tallying, | registration, tallying, |
| sorting and transmission | sorting and |
| which slightly impeded the | transmission. It |
| improvement expected at | contributed to the |
| the 2015 general elections? | improvement observed |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | during the 2015  general elections. (DU 1, DU 6, and DU 7) |  |  |
| Q2 | C1. Can you mention constitutional provisions and omissions that are  preventing some INEC | Issues of security of INEC staff and the ruling by the Supreme  Court on the use of | Confidence in Electoral Management Body (EMB) | Independence of EMB |
|  | officials from discharging | card reader posing |  |  |
|  | their duties which is in turn | challenge to INEC and |  |  |
|  | diminishing confidence of | are likely to erode |  |  |
|  | stakeholders in the electoral | confidence in the |  |  |
|  | system? | electoral management |  |  |
|  |  | system (DU 1, DU 6 |  |  |
|  |  | and DU 7). |  |  |
|  | C2. Can we say that the  staff of INEC showed non- | No. INEC staff  members are well |  | Impartiality of  EMB |
| partisan interest in dealing | trained and have been |  |
| with any political party or | warned not to be |  |
| candidate before, during | partisan. They were |  |
| and after elections 2015? | neutral (DU 1, DU 6, |  |
|  | DU 7, DU 16). |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | C3. In your opinion do you think INEC staff (permanent and ad-hoc) were able to discharge their electoral duties professionally (as expected) before, during and after  elections 2015? | Yes. That was why the election was adjudged to be free and fair (DU 1, DU 6, DU 7, DU  10). |  | Professional conduct of EMB |
|  | C4. From your observation were the steps taken by INEC in the decision making process by consultations with  relevant stakeholders? | Steps taken by INEC in the decision making process by consultations with relevant  stakeholders (DU 6) |  | Transparent conduct of EMB |
| Q3 | D1. Are bills that address basic needs of citizens frequently passed by the NASS? | Yes but not as frequent as one will expect. Budget or other important events usually cause delay in the passage of bill.  (DU 10 and DU 11) | Law making | Bills that address basic needs |
|  | D2. Is the public well  sensitized on bills at public | Yes the public usually  sensitized on bills at |  | Sensitisation  on bills at |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | hearing before being passed? | public hearing before being passed. This is a normal activity in the legislative process (DU  10 and DU 11). |  | public hearing. |
|  | Do you agree that the UNDP is a formidable partner of the National Assembly? | The training activities of the National Legislative Institute are carried out in collaboration with the UNDP. This means they are formidable partners (DU 10 and  DU 11). |  | UNDP as a formidable partner of the National Assembly. |
| Q3 | Do National Assembly committees benefited from training on how to make legislative committee fast track the process of law making? | Training activities of the National  Legislative Institute are Carried out in collaboration with the UNDP. This means they are formidable  partners(DU 10 and |  | Training for enhancing law making process |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | DU 11). |  |  |
| Q4 | E1. Is it true that appointments forwarded by the executive are not well scrutinized before confirmation and those suspicious activities of the executive and other arms of government are  investigated? | Yes and this create tension between the executive and legislative arm of government (DU 10  and DU 11). | Oversight function | Investigation and confirmation of appointment |
|  | E2. To what extent does the legislative arm of government monitors expenditure and outcome of monies appropriated within  a financial year? | Not very well due to poor state of logistics (DU 10 and DU 11). |  |  |
| Q5 | F1. Is it true that the agenda of constituency of each legislator is really channelled into the national  plan? | They do it through constituency projects (DU 10 and DU 11). | Constituency representatio n |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | F2. To what extent does the legislature structures its management or committees to improve productivity? | The legislature structures its management or committees to improve productivity(DU 10  and DU 11) |  |  |
|  | F3. To what extent have you observed that each member of the National Assembly has been involved in interaction with Civil Society Organizations and members of the public through meetings, seminars and the media at committee level? | Members of the National Assembly have always been involved in interaction with Civil Society Organizations and members of the public through meetings, seminars and the media at committee levels(DU  10 and DU 11). |  |  |
|  | F4. Is it true that training provided by The Legislative Institute has helped improved the skills of legislative committee members to enhance the process of legislation. | Yes training provided by The Legislative Institute has helped improved the skills of legislative committee members to enhance the process of legislation (DU 10 and  DU 11). |  |  |

(Source: Field Survey, November 2015 to March 2015).

# APPENDIX III

**SUMMARY OF QUALITATIVE DATA FROM COOPERATION PLANS AND EVALUATION REPORTS**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| S/No | Theme | Component | Sub-component | Nature of assistance |
| RQ1 | New voter registration system as indicator of positive impact to democracy consolidations  process | The seventh country plan, 2009 – 2012  (extended to 2015) | UNDP/INEC/DGD I  and II | Training support for the design of strategic plan, training support for ICT driven voter registration, printing of manuals |
| RQ2 | Confidence in electoral management Body as indicator of positive impact to democracy consolidations  process | The sixth country programme, 2003 to  2007 brought about the deepening democracy project; seventh country plan, 2009 – 2012  (extended to 2015) | UNDP/INEC/DGD I  and II | Training support the design of strategic plan, training support for ICT driven voter registration, printing of manuals and guidelines for distribution to various  stakeholders |
| RQ3 | Law making as indicator of  positive impact to | Sixth country programme, 2003 to  2007 brought about | UNDP, DGD I, DGD II and NILS | Study visits, Training support for committee  members and staff of |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | democracy consolidations process | the deepening democracy project which is in the seventh country plan, 2009 – 2012  (extended to 2015 |  | NASS printing of manuals and guidelines for distribution to various stakeholders |
| RQ 3 | Oversight function as indicator of positive impact to democracy consolidations  process | The seventh country plan, 2009 – 2012  (extended to 2015 | UNDP/DGDI, DGD II/NILS | Study visits Training support for committee printing of manuals and guidelines for distribution to various stakeholders members  and staff of NASS |
| RQ 5 | Constituency representation as indicator of positive impact to democracy consolidations  process | The seventh country plan, 2009 – 2012  (extended to 2015 | UNDP/DGDI, DGD II/NILS | Printing of manuals and guidelines for distribution to various stakeholders. study visits, Training support for committee members  and staff of NASS |

Compiled by the researcher through data extracted from Eyinla (2015), UNDP/DGD project document (January, 2010) Gomez and Jockers (2014) NILS and DGD II (June 2015) House of Representative Mid-term Report (2013) Flores UNDP strategic work plan, Nigeria 2011 (May 2010).

# APPENDIX IV

**SUMMARY OF UNDP/JDBF BUDGET AND COMMITMENT**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Funds disbursed  (in USD) | Expenses /Balance (in USD) | Year | Remark |
| \* | \* | 2003-2005 | Election/post  election phase |
| 30, 302, 902 | 19, 969,086/10, 333,816 | 2006-2007 | Election period |
| 20,000,000 E |  | 2008-2010 | Post election phase |
| 70, 000, 000 |  | 2011 | Election period |
| 12, 983, 753 |  | 2012 | Post election phase |
| 14, 273, 843 |  | 2013 | Post election phase |
| 26, 167, 137 |  | 2014-2015 | Election period |

(Source: Compiled by the researcher through data from Eyinla (2015), UNDP DGD project document (January, 2010) Gomez and Jockers (2014), Flores (2010) Ankut (2007).

\*No access to document on budget for 2003 to 2005.

# APPENDIX V

**UNDP JOINT DONOR BASKET FUND IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS’ COMMITMENT**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| S/No | Donor agency | Commitment | Total disbursed | Year |
| 1 | UNDP | 12, 603,562 | 4,529,182 | 2012-2014 |
| 2 | EU | 25,131,579 | 16,823,341 | 2012-2014 |
| 3 | DFID | 9,345,795 | 3,182,762 | 2012-2014 |
| 4 | CIDA | 5,899,705 | 3,992,311 | 2012-2014 |
| 5 | KOICA | 230,000 | 230,000 | 2012-2014 |

Source: Gomez and Jockers (2014)

# APPENDIX VI

**2007 ELECTIONS JDBF FINAL REPORT: AREAS OF COMMITMENT**

**(** Except Report of UNDP-led Joint Donor Basket Fund to Support Nigeria‟s 2007 Elections: Final Report up to 31st August, 2007).

# Advisory and Technical services to INEC

The project will be in a position to provide the additional advisory and technical services to INEC if such requests are received before 15.2.2007.

# Stakeholders Forums

The project will continue to provide support for the stakeholders‟ forums as and when requested by INEC. This support can be provided, only if, project receives information at least three weeks in advance.

# Election Training

The project can support election training – training of trainers, training of staff at zonal levels – by hiring of the venues, providing meals / tea / refreshments (information to be provided at least three weeks in advance) and printing of training materials. The travelling allowance / daily subsistence allowance will have to be paid by INEC. The project can also support election related trainings, like training of candidates / political parties.

# ICT support

The project will be to provide training to INEC staff in web- site development, database management, net-working and server assembly.

INEC has indicated that JDBF may provide support for linking the main building with the public affairs building with fibre cables as per budget line item - link and network INEC, and also set up an Election Management System. **A** comprehensive proposal will be required from INEC immediately including a clear articulation on what this support contributes to in output terms.

# Police Sensitisation and Human Rights training

JDBF will support the police sensitisation and human rights trainings as per the agreed programme between INEC and the project, provided the training is linked to the election events and programme is finalised by 15.2.2007.

# Providing advice on E-day planning

JDBF can provide support to INEC for E- day planning if requested. The support will be for E-day planning which will include expertise in communication, logistics, operations, man-power deployment etc. INEC to send a request by 15.2.2007.

The project can also help INEC in setting up a Media Centre to ensure that timely information is given to the media and in turn to various stakeholders. INEC to send a proposal by 15.2.2007

1. **Additional Options for the April Elections**

The following proposals are placed for their consideration (beyond confirmed assistance for Stakeholder Forums, Police Sensitisation, Link and Network INEC and E-Day Planning):

# Support for Ad- hoc Staff

Under the Activity 3.2 Electoral Staffing Support provisions have been made for

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| i. Facilitating hiring /payment of ad-hoc staff | - | $ 750,000 |
| ii. Develop training packages | - | $3,000,000 |
| iii. Training Sessions | - | $1,000,000 |
| iv. Records and accountability (for recruitment) | - | $ 37,000 |
| v. Support to payment of ad-hoc staff | - | $8,620,000 |

The following option may be considered for support for payment to the following categories of ad-hoc staff covering both the elections:

Collation Officers (officers responsible for collating the results at the ward level) N 25,000\*2\*9610 /126 = $ 3,813,492

Supervisory Polling Officers (officers in-charge of supervising ten polling stations on the poll day) N 25,000\*2\*12000 /126 = $ 4,761,904

Total = $ 8,575,396 Including Bank and monitoring charges **$ 9,000,000**

This support can be provided on the following basis.

* The payment system will be set up by UNDP following its own procedures building on the experience and lessons learned from the payment processes

related to the 2006 Census exercise. Payments will be made directly to the beneficiaries through bank(s) pre-selected by UNDP. No proxy payments.

* The payments will be made only at the state level.
* UNDP will indicate timelines for setting up the payment system and getting information from INEC regarding the lists of people engaged.
* Identity cards to be issued to ad- hoc staff under these two categories by INEC in advance.
* INEC to certify the work done before the payment day.
* No advance payment will be made to any of the two categories selected.
* All payments will be made after the end of 2nd election so that on any account the election process is not jeopardized.
* The criteria and established procedures for the recruitment of staff under the two categories should be transparent and shared by INEC with donors.

The value proposition for the JDBF is six-fold: (a) taking an action that would reinforce rather than detract from the political momentum towards holding the elections in April;

(b) increasing but not guaranteeing the likelihood that key elections staff will perform their responsibilities effectively; (c) gaining an opening to press INEC to adopt a transparent and credible recruitment and payments system for ad hoc staff generally; (d) reducing the scope of operational challenges facing INEC in the organisation of the elections; (e) removing an ambiguity in the understanding between development partners and INEC which has proven to be a source of on-going debate; and (f) generating goodwill towards forging a strategic and long-term partnership with INEC to address weaknesses in Nigeria‟s electoral system before the next elections in 2011.

# The payment system to be set up is being discussed with the operations wing of UNDP and will be share with donors detailing the associated risks by 6.2.2007.

* 1. **Information/Education and Publicity for Elections**

## Multi-Media

1. Awareness campaign – (when to vote, = $1,000,000 how to vote, importance of voting –

through TV, Radio and Newspapers)

1. 500,000 posters for voters information

for polling day = $ 150,000

1. Other posters for voter education 774\*1000\*3 = $ 600,000

iv. Bill boards / banners 774\*10\*8000 / 126 = $ 500,000

# Total = $2,250,000

## Printing of Materials

* 1. Electoral copies with constitutional provisions (150,000 copies)

= $ 150,000

Observation guidelines with the list of

* 1. Political parties list (120,000 copies) = $ 50,000
  2. List of polling stations (120,000 copies) = $ 120,000

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | |
| **JDBF REVISED BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR INEC SUPPORT** | | | | | |
| Type of contract | Activity | Original  budget | Total sub  activity | Expenditure  tentative | Revised  budget |
| **2. Providing advisory and technical services to**  **INEC** | |  |  |  |  |
| **2.1 Advisory and technical services** | |  | 2 077 000 | 293,821 | 1,000,000 |
| International  Consultant | Voter Registration  Consultant | 117 000 |  |  | 000,000 |
| International  Consultant | Short-term consultants | 900 000 |  |  | 420,000 |
| International  Consultant | Resident advisers | 780 000 |  |  | 300,000 |
| Local Consultant | Short-term consultants | 90 000 |  |  | 90,000 |
| Travel | Air ticket | 190 000 |  |  | 190,000 |
| **2.2 Stakeholders**  **Forum** |  |  | 1 734 280 | 228,467 | 1,734,280 |
| Contractual services –  indiv | Review/mapping/agenda  /requirements SF | 60 000 |  | - | 000,000 |
| Supplies | Prepare briefing & info  packages | 264 360 |  | - | 000,000 |
| Contractual services –  comp | Direct support | 1 321 800 |  | 228,467 | 1,700,000 |
| Contractual services –  comp | Monitoring | 44 060 |  | - | 34,280 |
| Contractual services –  comp | Review performance | 44 060 |  | - | 000,000 |
| **Sub-total output 2** |  |  | **3811280** | **522,288** | **2,734,280** |
| **3. Mobilizing operational human resource**  **capacities** | |  |  |  |  |
| **3.1 Election training** |  |  | 2 953 500 | 700,000 | 700,000 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Contractual services –  comp | Training Leadership  Programme | 36 000 |  |  | 000,000 |
| Contractual services –  comp | Voter Registration  training / publicity | 1 125 000 |  |  | 575,000 |
| Contractual services –  comp | Training Electoral  Officers | 1 500 000 |  |  | 000,000 |
| Contractual services –  comp | Training Admin/Finance  staff | 75 000 |  |  | 000,000 |
| Contractual services –  comp | ICT training | 75 000 |  |  | 75,000 |
| Contractual services –  comp | Workshop on election  management | 92 500 |  |  | 000,000 |
| Contractual services –  comp | Link and Network INEC | 50 000 |  |  | 50,000 |
| **3.2 Electoral staffing support (ad hoc staff)** | |  | 13  ,407,000 | - | 13,250,000 |
| Contractual services – comp | Facilitate hiring/payment /  training sessions | 750 000 |  |  | 750,000 |
| Contractual services – comp | Develop training  package / election material | 3 000 000 |  |  | 1,250,000 |
| Contractual services –  comp | Training sessions | 1 000 000 |  |  | 000,000 |
| Equipment &  Furniture | Records &  accountability | $37 000 |  |  | 000,000 |
| Contractual services –  indiv | Support to payment of  ad hoc staff | 8 620 000 |  |  | 9,000,000 |
| Contractual services –  comp | voter information and  education | 90,000 |  |  | 2,250,000 |
| **3.3 Police** |  |  | $587 000 | - | 587,000 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **sensitization** |  |  |  |  |  |
| International  Consultant | Police trainer | 30 000 |  |  | 30,000 |
| Local Consultant | Police Trainer Assistant | 3 000 |  |  | 3,000 |
| Contractual services –  comp | Human Rights Training | 480 000 |  |  | 480,000 |
| Contractual services –  indiv | Advice on E-day  development plan | 74 000 |  |  | 74,000 |
| **Sub-total output 3** |  |  | **16947500** | **700,000** | **14,537,000** |
| **TOTAL INEC**  **SUPPORT** |  |  | **20,758,780** | **1,222,228** | **17,271,280** |
| **BALANCE**  **AVAILABLE** |  |  |  |  | **3,487,500** |
| **4.2 Voter**  **Information** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Contractual services – indiv | Strategy / Focus | $90 000 | $90 000 | Budget line shifted to activity  3.2 |  |

**(**Source: Report of UNDP-led Joint Donor Basket Fund to Support Nigeria‟s 2007 Elections: Final Report up to 31st August, 2007).

# APPENDIX VII

**LIST OF ACTIVITIES AND BUDGET FOR JDBF SUPPORT TO NIGERIA 2011 ELECTIONS**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Task**  **Nr.** | **Task Name** | **Costs in**  **USD** |
|  |  |  |
| **1.** | **INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL**  **COMMISSION (INEC)** | **5830000** |
|  |  |  |
| **1.1.** | **Institutional assessment** | 30000 |
|  |  |  |
| **1.2.** | **Voter education and information** | 1500000 |
|  |  |  |
| **1.3.** | **Training of election officials** | 1500000 |
|  |  |  |
| **1.4.** | **Voter registration** | 1000000 |
|  |  |  |
| **1.5.** | **Elections complains** | 300000 |
|  |  |  |
| **1.6.** | **Results management** | 1000000 |
|  |  |  |
| **1.7.** | **Political parties** | 300000 |
|  |  |  |
| **1.8.** | **Lessons learned and Strategic Plan for 2011-2014** | 200000 |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| **2.** | **GENDER** | **3000000** |
|  |  |  |
| **2.1.** | **Promote women voters** | 1000000 |
|  |  |  |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **2.2.** | **Promote women candidates** | 1000000 |
|  |  |  |
| **2.3.** | **Facilitate access of women candidates to media** | 1000000 |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| **3.** | **CSO/CBO** | **6400000** |
|  |  |  |
| **3.1.** | **Voter education (special emphasis on youth and**  **disabled)** | 2000000 |
|  |  |  |
| **3.2.** | **Conflict mitigation** | 600000 |
|  |  |  |
| **3.3.** | **Legal advice** | 300000 |
|  |  |  |
| **3.4.** | **Elections observation** | 2000000 |
|  |  |  |
| **3.5.** | **Training of security forces and judiciary** | 500000 |
|  |  |  |
| **3.6.** | **Political parties** | 500000 |
|  |  |  |
| **3.7.** | **National surveys on electoral issues** | 500000 |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| **4.** | **MEDIA** | **1700000** |
|  |  |  |
| **4.2.** | **Training of journalists** | 500000 |
|  |  |  |
| **4.3.** | **Editors forum** | 300000 |
|  |  |  |
| **4.4.** | **Establish media center/s** | 600000 |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |
| **4.5.** | **Facilitate conduct of media debates** | 300000 |
|  |  |  |
| **5.** | **POLITICAL PARTIES** | **500000** |
| **5.1.** | **Inter-party platform** |  |
|  |  |  |
| **6.** | **NATIONAL ASSSEMBLY** | **500000** |
| **6.1.** | **Committee for INEC oversight** |  |
|  |  |  |
|  | **GRAND TOTAL** | **17930000** |

# Training, Voter education and information Training support to INEC

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Basic assumption |  |
| Target registered voters | 70 million |
| Registration teams | 30,000 |
| Registration staff | 120,000 |
| Registration period | 4 \* 1 week |
| Polling Stations | 120,000 |
| Polling Staff | 500,000 |
| Polling | 2 days |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **INEC Training Activities** | | | | |
| **Description** | **Unit/**  **Person** | **Unit**  **Cost** | **Month/**  **Unit** | **Total US$** |
| **Training Materials** | | | | |
| Registration Manual | 6000 | 3 | 1 | $18,000 |
| Training Manual | 150000 | 3 | 1 | $450,000 |
| Polling Manual | 600000 | 1 | 1 | $600,000 |
| Booklet Election procedures | 200000 | 0.30 | 1 | $60,000 |
| Flip Chart Registration | 10000 | 3 | 1 | $30,000 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Flip Chart Elections | 10000 | 3 | | | 1 | $30,000 |
| **Sub Total Training Materials** | | | **USD1,188,000** | | | |
| Support | | | | | | |
| Meeting room hire | 1 | 500 | | | 37 | $18,500 |
| Materials | 1 | 500 | | | 37 | $18,500 |
| Workstation | 1 | 5,000 | | 1 | | $5,000 |
| **Sub Total Support Training** | | **$42,000** | | | | |
| **Total Training support** | | | **USD1,230,000** | | | |

**Voter information through INEC Electronic and Print Media**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Registrati**  **on** | **Women**  **empowerment** | **Disabled** | **Polling** | **Total** | **Unit**  **$** | **Total**  **$** |
| Posters | 150000 | 30000 | 15000 | 150000 | 345000 | 0,2 | 69000 |
| Leaflets | 150000 | 30000 | 15000 | 150000 | 345000 | 0,2 | 69000 |
| Booklet  s | 150000 | 30000 | 15000 | 150000 | 345000 | 0,2 | 69000 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Banners | 1000 | 300 | 300 | 1000 | 2600 | 50 | **13000**  **0** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Comics | 35000 | 35000 | 35000 | 35000 | 140000 | 1,5 | **21000**  **0** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Stickers | 35000 | 35000 | 35000 | 35000 | 140000 | 0,3 | **42000** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Adds in newspa  pers | 100 | 50 | 25 | 100 | 275 | 50 | 13750 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Radio  spots | 500 | 250 | 150 | 500 | 1400 | 50 | 70000 |
| TV  Spots | 100 | 50 | 25 | 100 | 275 | 1000 | 27500  0 |
| Product |  |  |  |  |  |  | 30000 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ion radio/tv  spots |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Grand**  **total** |  |  |  |  |  |  | **$977,5**  **00** |
| **Calls** | | | | | | | |
|  | Units | # units/months | Unit cost | Total $ |  | | |
| Comput  ers | 12 | 1 | 2500 | 30000 |
| Server | 1 | 1 | 10000 | 10000 |
| Staffing | 24 | 8 | 500 | 96000 |
| Databas  e | 1 | 1 | 5000 | 5000 |
| **Total** |  |  |  | **141.000** |
| **Websit e** | | | | | | | |
|  | Units | # units/months | Unit costs | Total $ |  | | |
| Creatio  n of site | 1 | 1 | 10000 | 10000 |
| Mainte  nance | 1 | 8 | 1000 | 8000 |
| **Total** |  |  |  | **$18.000** |
| **SMS** | | | | | | | |
|  | **Units** | **#units (1%)** | **Unit cost** | **Total $** |  | | |
| Voter registrat  ion | 1 | 700000 | 0,015 | 10500 |
| Women | 1 | 700000 | 0,015 | 10500 |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| empow  erment |  |  |  |  |
| Polling | 1 | 700000 | 0,015 | 10500 |
| **Total** |  |  |  | **$31,500** |

# Grand Total Voter Information USD1,168,000

(Source: Flores, C.F. (2010). UNDP Strategic Work Plan-Nigeria 2011 elections. 2010- 2015 Project Document Support to Democratic Governance for Development, 31st May 2010).

affirmative and women’s 63

# APPENDIX VIII

**OVERALL BUDGET FOR PHASE I AND II OF DGD II**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Output** | **Phase I Budget** | **Spent to date** | **Phase II Budget (Original)** | **Phase II Budget (As per New Work Plan**  **2014/2105)** |
| **Pillar O / DGD Project** | | | | |
| 01. Project Management | 1,650,231.80 |  | 1,836,023.06 | 1,549,839.00 |
| 02. Missions and Monitoring | 158,684.21 |  | 158,684.21 | 143,888.00 |
| 03. DGD Communications, Website, Publications, International Days:  Documentary | 211,578.94 |  | 52,894.73 | 357,991.00 |
| 04. Staff Learning, seminar  etc | 137,526.31 |  | 137,526.31 | 45,239.00 |
| 0.5 Rent, Utilities and  overheads | 476,052.63 |  | 476,052.63 | 304,566.00 |
| **Total** | **2,634,073.90** | **2,944,818.00** | **2,661,180.96** | **2,401,523.00** |
| **Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent Electoral Processes** | | | | |
| 1.0 Technical Assistance | 1,385,553.71 |  | 1,576,337.05 |  |
| 1.1 Strategic Planning, Policy  and Operational Capacities of INEC and SIECs strengthened | 2,115,789.47 |  | 1,576,337.05 | 4,160,634.00 |
| 1.2. Electoral Systems (Voter registration) and Processes (tallying and transmission)  improved voter through ICT | 1,057,894.73 |  | 6,347,368.42 | 1,693,600.00 |
| 1.3. Legal and Policy Framework for Elections  Improved | 2,115,789.47 |  | 1,057,894.73 | 169,334.00 |
| 1.4. Professional Capacity of  INEC and SIECs enhanced | 4,231,578.94 |  | 5,289,473.68 | 2,641,722.00 |
| **Total:** | **10,906,606.34** | **3,609,918.00** | **16,915,810.73** | **10,195,290.00** |
| **Component 2: Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement** | | | | |
| 2.0 Technical Assistance | 514,617.80 |  | 514,617.80 |  |
| 2.1 Capacity of Political  Parties Strengthened | 1,798,421.05 |  | 1,586,842.10 | 2,956,515.00 |
| 2.2 Improved Effectiveness of Targeted National Assembly  Committees/Processes | 1,798,421.05 |  | 1,111,052.63 | 1,159,127.00 |
| **Total:** | **4,111,459.90** | **3,801,414.00** | **3,212,512.53** | **4,115,642.00** |
| **Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and other Marginalised Groups** | | | | |
| 3.0 Technical Assistance | 211,575.06 |  | 211,575.06 |  |
| 3.1. Legal Reforms and  Women’s empowerment initiatives to promote |  |  | 4,231,578.94 | 1,940,181.00 |
| 4,736.84 | |
| empowerment in politics and elections undertaken |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 3.2 Pool of women aspirants  for elective offices at various levels enlarged | 846,315.78 |  | 740,526.31 | 900,891.00 |
| 3.3 CSOs capacity to advocate affirmative action  enhanced | 528,947.36 |  | 528,947.36 | 634,800.00 |
| 3.4. Capacity of women holding elected public office  enhanced | 740,526.31 |  | 740,526.31 | 1,533,215.00 |
| **Total** | **2,962,101.38** | **2,687,237.00** | **6,453,154.01** | **5,009,087.00** |
| **Component 4: Strengthening Channels of Civic Engagement** | | | | |
| 4.0 Technical Assistance | 329,160.06 |  | 329,160.06 |  |
| 4.1.1. Zonal Networks and  individual CSOs strengthened | 1,798,421.05 |  | 793,421.05 | 1,044,608.00 |
| 4.1.2. Civil Society engagement in Democratic Reforms and Monitoring Supported | 370,263.15 |  | 264,473.68 | 628,936.00 |
| 4.1.3. Public awareness and implementation of Freedom of  Information Act facilitated | 1,057,894.73 |  | 317,368.42 | 964,076.00 |
| 4.1.4. Civil Society capacity to  carry out election observation enhanced | 0,00 |  | 528,947.36 | 1,470,790.00 |
| 4.1.5. Civil Society capacity to carry out civic education  enhanced | 740,526.31 |  | 634,736.84 | 1,360,808.00 |
| 4.2.1. Capacity of the Media to monitor and report on democracy and election  related issues strengthened | 740,526.31 |  | 740,526.31 | 2,886,724.00 |
| 4.2.2. Capacity for Media  Monitoring Strengthened | 634,736.84 |  | 846,315.78 | 1,269,600.00 |
| **Total:** | **5,671,528.48** | **4,969,220.00** | **4,454,949.53** | **9,625,542.00** |
| **Overall Total:** | **26,285,770.01** | **18,921,607.00** | **33,750,239.35** | **34,347,004.00** |

(Source: Gomez C. and Jockers, H. (2014). Midterm Evaluation of the Support to the Nigerian Electoral Cycle, 2012-2015).

From the table above, one will note that Output 1.2 has been reduced by more than USD$5million, which accounts for the shift in focus on voter education on the voter registration process rather than provision of services to the voter registration and provision of transmission of results. It is felt by the team that more funds could be funnelled through this output or the component as a whole, as INEC will need vital support in assuring that the voter education is as comprehensive as possible.

With regards to component three, there is a reduction of approximately USD$1 million to gender, however this could be attributed to the fact that funds were spent on advocating for the affirmative action

last year, however as this particular action has not yet had the desired results and given its importance to aiding the progress of women in Nigeria, extra funds could be used to carry this initiative, especially at

the local level, to ensure that political parties at least incorporate affirmative action into their manifestos. Finally, it will be noted that component four has additional funds of approximately USD$5million2 whereby most outputs have an increase in their budget. Nevertheless, given the proximity of the elections and the essential role that CSOs play in disseminating information, further funds could be attributed to voter education to ensure a better coverage across the country as well as ensuring that different types of activities can be implemented in order to reach out to as broad an audience as possible.

The allocation of the rest of funds appear to be proportionate to the ends required, With over 46% of the committed funds still to be paid to the project, it is essential that international partners disburse the funds as soon as possible so that there are no unforeseen delays in implementation should the project want to work within the budget of committed funds.

# APPENDIX IX LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

# AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, NIGERIA.

**SURVEY ON UNDP’S DEMOCRATIC NORM PROMOTION IN NIGERIA FROM 2003 TO 2015**

Dear Respondent,

# LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

I am a student of the above named Institution. I am conducting a research on “Assessment of the United Nations Development Programe (UNDP) Democratic Norm Promotion in Nigeria, 2003 to 2015.”

Please kindly respond to the questions that follow based on your experience. Be assured of absolute confidentiality because your response will be used purely for academic purposes.

Your maximum cooperation will be highly appreciated. Yours faithfully,

# KAMAR HAMZA

PhD/SOC – SCI/44396/12 – 13 08028408885

[Kamarhamza01@gmail.com](mailto:Kamarhamza01@gmail.com)

# APPENDIX X

**QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE INEC STAFF MEMBERS**

**SECTION 1:** Strengthening Electoral Administration

***Direction:*** The following statements set to assess the performance of UNDP‟S Assistance in Strengthening Electoral Administration in Nigeria. Please rate the level of your agreement or disagreement as provided below.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Strongly disagree | Disagree | Slightly disagree | Slightly agreed | Agree | Strongly agree |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Statement | Level of Agreement | | | | | |
| B1 | I benefited immensely in the training, sponsored or  facilitated by UNDP between 2003 and 2015. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| B2 | I am satisfied that all eligible and willing voters  registered in the new voter registration exercise. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| B3 | I am satisfied that all registered voters were able to see their names on the voters‟ registration list during the  2015 general elections. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| B4 | I am satisfied that all registered voters were accredited  at the polling units during the 2015 general elections. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| B5 | I am satisfied that all registered voters at the polling  units were able to vote during the 2015 general elections. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| B6 | I observed that INEC had challenges in maintaining  voter register prior to 2015 elections. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| B7 | I noticed that INEC had challenges in sorting out voter  register on time. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| B8 | I observed that challenges with ICT driven voter registration, tallying and transmission impeded the  improvement expected at the 2015 general election. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C1 | I am satisfied that the appointment of INEC chairman and commissioners followed due process and all stake  holders have confidence in INEC. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C2 | I am satisfied that INEC got adequate funding at the time the funds were needed and stakeholders have  confidence that INEC is independent. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C3 | I am satisfied that INEC got adequate funding from independent sources and this strengthened the  confidence of stakeholders in the system. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C4 | I noticed that there were constitutional provisions and omissions that prevented some INEC officials from  discharging their duties. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C5 | I am satisfied that the staff of INEC showed non- partisan interest in dealing with any political party  before, during and after elections 2015. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C6 | I am satisfied that the staff of INEC showed non- partisan influence in dealing with any political party  before, during and after 2015 elections. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C7 | I am satisfied that INEC monitored freedom of all  political parties‟ equal access to state owned media during campaign. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C8 | I am satisfied that INEC ensured that all political  parties/candidates had the freedom to campaign without fear or threat. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C9 | I am satisfied that INEC ensured respect for limits of  campaign expenses by all political parties and candidates during campaign. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C10 | I am satisfied with the level of training received for  coordinating poll workers in discharging their electoral duties. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C11 | I am satisfied that INEC provided well printed ballot  papers for the general elections. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C12 | I am satisfied that INEC delivered election supplies to  polling units at the right time. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C13 | I am satisfied that INEC provided correct information  to voters at the polling units. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C14 | I am satisfied that INEC maintained good voters  registration list which tallied with results. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C15 | I am satisfied that INEC was open in all its activities  before, during and after the election. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C16 | I am satisfied that INEC was open in its relationship | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | with all stakeholders. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C17 | I am satisfied that steps taken by INEC in the decision making process were by consultations with relevant  stakeholders. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C18 | I am satisfied that collaboration with security agencies helped monitor, coordinate and track risks related to  elections. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C19 | I will be glad if security personnel are only assigned to escort sensitive election materials, than providing  security at polling units. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C20 | I am aware that very few INEC officials were involved  in electoral malpractices. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C21 | I am satisfied that the Electoral Institute has been able  to build the capacity of staff of the commission to improve its professional conduct. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| C22 | I am aware that the presence of the Commission on  social media in responding to queries enhanced the confidence of voters in the Commission. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **SECTION 3**: Profile and Background information  ***Direction:*** Please kindly tick ( ) in the appropriate box. | |
| A1 Gender: male Female A2 Which of the following describes your status? | |
| Non Permanent Management staff Permanent Management Staff |  |
| Permanent Non Management Staff | |
| A3 Which of the following describes your age bracket?  25 – 34yrs 35 – 45 45 and above | |
| A4 Which of the following describes your years of experience as INEC Staff?  5 years 10 years 20 years and above | |
| B5 Educational qualification  School Cert National Diploma Degree Master Degree PhD  ` | |

**APPENDIX XI QUESTIONNAIRE TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS SECTION 2**: LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

***Direction:*** The following statements set to assess the performance of UNDP‟S Assistance to the Legislative Process You are required to rate your organization‟s performance in the process of law making, oversight and constituency representation functions. Please rate the level of your agreement or disagreement as provided below.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Strongly  disagree | Disagree | Slightly  disagree | Slightly  agreed | Agree | Strongly  agree |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Statement | Level of Agreement | | | | | |
| D1 | I benefitted immensely in the training and other forms  of support coordinated by the UNDP. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| D2 | I am satisfied that bills that address basic needs of  citizens are frequently passed by the NASS. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| D3 | I am satisfied that the public is well sensitized on bills  at public hearing before being passed. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| D4 | I am satisfied that bills are passed within an expected  time frame. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| D5 | I am satisfied that bills passed have positive impact on  citizens. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| D6 | I noticed that the tension between the House and  Senate usually lead to delays in bill passage. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| D7 | I am satisfied that UNDP is a formidable partner of the  National Assembly. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

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| D8 | I observed that meetings conducted with INEC led to  the passage of bills that enhance policy framework for elections. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| D9 | I am aware that National Assembly committees  benefited from training on how to make legislative committee fast track the process of law making. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| D10 | I noticed that the legislative arm makes law to favour  the powerful in the society. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| D11 | I observed that the members of the National Assembly have in some instances supported the arbitrariness of  the executive arm of government. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| D12 | I noticed that the legislators sometimes amend or delay bills that could facilitate the activities of anti- corruption agencies to favour the executive or  themselves. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| E1 | I am satisfied that appointments forwarded by the  executive are well scrutinized before confirmation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| E2 | I am aware that suspicious activities of the executive  and other arms of government are investigated. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| E3 | I am satisfied that the legislative arm of government effectively prioritizes expenditure within annual  national budget before its passage. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| E4 | I am satisfied that the legislative arm of government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

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|  | monitors expenditure and outcome of monies  appropriated within a financial year. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E5 | I am satisfied that the legislature ensures the availability of adequate resources on projects that are  of benefit to the general public. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| E6 | I am satisfied that the legislature reviews its budgets  prudently and in a transparent way. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| E7 | I am satisfied that the legislative arm‟s adoption of „e- parliament‟ has enhanced its capacity to involve the  public in the legislative process. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| F1 | I am satisfied that agenda of constituency of each  legislator is channelled into the national plan. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| F2 | I am satisfied that committees serve as arena for  influencing outcome in our democratic system. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| F3 | I am aware that the political leadership in the National Assembly resists capacity building of committee  members and secretariat staff due to pressure of work. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| F4 | I observed that lack of access to training hinders the effective performance of committees and secretariat  staff. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| F5 | I am satisfied that the legislature structures its  management/committees to improve productivity. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| F6 | I observed that low attendance recorded at committee | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

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|  | meetings is responsible for low level of performance  of committees and this delays the passage of important bills. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| F7 | I observed that large numbers of committees make  members to be too busy, and this makes members to be absent at other committees sittings. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| F8 | I am satisfied that each member of the National Assembly has been involved in interaction with Civil Society Organizations and members of the public through meetings, seminars and the media at  committee level. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| F9 | I am satisfied that training provided by The Legislative Institute has helped improved the skills of legislative committee members to enhance the process  of legislation. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

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| **SECTION 3**: Profile and Background information  ***Direction:*** Please kindly tick ( ) in the appropriate box. | | | | | | | | |
| A1 Gender: male female  A2 Which of the following describes your statues? | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | Senator | | | |  | | Reps member |
| A3 Which of the following describes your age bracket? | | | | | | | | |
| 24 – 34yrs | | |  | 35 – 45 |  | | 45 and above | |
| A4 Which of the following describes the number of time you were elected?  1 tenure 2 tenure three tenure and above | | | | | | | | |
| A5 Educational qualification  School Cert ND Degree Master Degree PhD  Party Affiliation: Constituency: Committee Membership: | | | | | | | | |

# APPENDIX XII INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

**SURVEY ON UNDP’S ASSISTANCE TO ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATIONAND LEGISLATIVE PROCESS**

1. What were the observable challenges that made the intervention in the electoral administration (Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and Legislative process (National Assembly) from 2003 and 2015 important?
2. What are the trainings carried out by the UNDP/JDBF at the INEC and National Assembly from 2003 to 2015?
3. What other assistance were included in the democracy intervention of UNDP/JDBF at INEC and the National Assembly?
4. Who are the members of Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF)
5. What are the programs of JDBF?
6. What is the estimate of the amount spent by JDBF from 2006 to 2015?
7. Do you think the resources expended on INEC and the National Assembly is justified?
8. What is your assessment of the progress made so far by INEC and the National Assembly since the commencement of the intervention?
9. What is the difference between Deepening Democracy in Nigeria (DDIN) and Democratic Government for Development (DGN)?
10. What were the challenges encountered in the course of designing, implementing and evaluation of 2003- 2007 and 2009 – 2012 and the extended plan to 2015?
11. How were the challenges in these country plans addressed?
12. Do these challenges affect the expected outcome of the planned interventions at INEC and the National Assembly?
13. What are the mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of the country plans?
14. Do all members of JDBF able to contribute meaningfully to the project?
15. Who are the new members of JDBF after 2012?
16. Were the UNDP/JDBF able to monitor properly the implementation of DGD I and DGD II Project objectives and how did they do it?
17. What are the possible areas of improvement, both technical and financial aspects of the intervention?
18. Were there tension among JDBF members? And did it affect the implementation of projects?
19. Approaches among donors on elections support are not harmonized and did it affect expected outcome?
20. Were there conflicting framework and priorities among donors that affected expected outcome?
21. Were there competing interests among JDBF partners on activity priorities and at the implementation stage of the projects?
22. Does UNDP delay commencement of projects because of challenge of personal recruitment due to rigid procurement rules?
23. Is UNDP‟s management and financial system flexible?
24. Is UNDP‟s intervention able to enhance regular validation of electronic voter registration?
25. Are there evidence to show that UNDP‟s intervention was able to make operational the management of election results, tallying and transmission on a timely basis?
26. Were there improvement in allegations of irregularities, violence/conflict before during and after elections?

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| **SECTION 3**: Profile and Background information  ***Direction:*** Please kindly tick ( ) in the appropriate box. |
| A1 Gender: Male Female  A2 Which of the following describes your status?  Non Permanent Management staff Permanent Management Staff  Permanent Non Management Staff |
| A3 Which of the following describes your age bracket?  25 – 34yrs 35 – 45 45 and above |
| A4 Which of the following describes your years of experience as INEC Staff?  5 years 10 years 20 years and above |
| B5 Educational qualification  School Cert National Diploma Degree Master Degree PhD  Affiliation:  Position |