# AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONSTO AFRICAN SECURITY:

**CASE STUDY OF DARFUR - SUDAN**

# BY

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i

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**CASE STUDY OF DARFUR - SUDAN**

**BY**

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**JANUARY, 2018**

**DECLARATION**

I declare that this thesis entitled: “An Assessment of the contributions of United Nations Peace Support Operations to African Security: Case Study of Darfur – Sudan” was conducted by me in the Department of Political Science and International Studies,Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. All information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in form of references. No part of this dissertation was previously presented for the award of another degree or diploma at any university.

**Emeka Victor ONUMAJURU Date**

**CERTIFICATION**

This thesis entitled: “AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTRIBUTIONSOF UNITED NATIONS PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS TO AFRICAN SECURITY: CASE STUDY

OF DARFUR – SUDAN” by Emeka Victor ONUMAJURU meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and it approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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**Chairman, Supervisory Committee**

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**ABSTRACT**

This study evaluates African Union -United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) from 2007-2016; with a view to determining how it has contributed to the establishment of enduring peace and security in Darfur. The study is conducted against the backdrop of the fact that most United Nations (UN) Peace Support Operations(PSO) in Africa have not adequately enhanced African security; supposedly arising from their inability to address the root causes of such conflicts and institutional inadequacies. The functionalism theory is adopted as the theoretical framework of the study. The study identified four potential outcome as assumptions. First, enduring and sustainable peace can only be achieved with the full cooperation and willingness of the parties to a conflict to end the crisis. Second, the inability of UN PSO to sufficiently improve Darfur security situation is not unconnected to their inability to address the root causes of conflicts in the region. Third, UNAMID would be more effective in Darfur if it fully collaborates with regional conflict resolution mechanisms in addressing the crisis. Fourth, the full backing of theUN Permanent Members (P5) is necessary likewise the political will of African government to promote durable peace in Darfur. Interviews were utilized as the main primary source of data. Focus Group Discussion as well as documentary evidence werealso used to supplement the data from the interviews. The data gathered were qualitatively analysed, applying logical reasoning based on facts. Findings indicate that there was no peace to keep in Darfur at the early stage as the armed movements and Government of Sudan(GoS) failed to agree to the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 2006 and the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur(DDPD) of 2012. This is partly due to the fact that both agreements did not factor in the root causes of the crisis bothering on the continued marginalisation of the Darfur region of Sudan by the Khartoum based government over the years. Findings indicate that only the first, second and fourth assumptions of this research are valid. Furthermore, evidence presented in this study also indicates that:there is no comprehensive political solution to the problem owing to lack of a free, fair and credible elections that would lay the foundation for meaningful representation of Darfur at the national level andthe lack of force multipliers and enablers undermined the credibility of the mission particularly during the deployment and consolidation phases.Evidence presented also indicate that relative security have being achieved in various sector Headquarters(HQs) and adjourning areas though security in the hinterland remain unstable, improvement in passage and distribution of humanitarian deliveries to people at risk and increased awareness on issues of human rights and rule of law in Darfur. The thesis recommends the generation of niche and specialized capability for UNAMID components, and the development of a clear political strategy towards a comprehensive political solution.

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**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

AHQ - Army Headquarters

AMIS I - African Union Mission in Sudan I AMIS II - African Union Mission in Sudan II ASG - Assistant Secretary General

AU - African Union

BBC - British Broadcasting Cooperation BHT - Boko Haram Terrorist

CEWS- Continental Early Warning System CFC - Ceasefire Commission

CFP - Community Focal Points CLC - Community Liaison Contacts

COE - Contingent Owned Equipment CTOP - Chief of Training and Operation DA - Defence Adviser

DDF - Darfur Development Front

DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DHQ - Defence Headquarters

DPKO - Department of Peacekeeping Operations DRA - Darfur Regional Authority

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States FHQ - Force Headquarters

FPT - Field Protection Teams

HCA - Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement HSP - Heavy Support Package

ICF - Islamic Charter Front ICO - Initial Operating Capacity

IDPs - Internally Displaced Persons

IGAD - Inter Governmental Agency for Development IMPP - Integrated Mission Planning Process

IMPT - Integrated Mission Planning Team IMTF - Integrated Mission Task Force IOT - Integrated Operational Team

JEM - Justice and Equality Movement JPG - Joint Protection Group

JSR - Joint Special Representative JVM - Joint Verification Mechanism LJM - Liberation and Justice Movement LSP - Light Support Package

MI - Military Intelligence MILOB - Military Observers

MPM - Mission Protection Mapping MPMG- Mission Protection Mapping Groups MRU - Mano River Union

NIBATT - Nigerian Battalion NIF - National Islamic Front

NPFL - National Patriotic Front of Liberia NSA - National Security Adviser

OAU - Organisation of African Unity OMA - Office of Military Affairs

OROLSI - Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions OO - Office of Operation

P5 - The 5 Permanent Members of the UN Security Council PDF - Popular Defence Force

PK - Peace Keeping

PKO - Peace Keeping Operation

PMG - Protection of Civilian Management Group POC - Protection of Civilians

PSC - Peace and Security Council PSD - Peace and Security Division

PSO - Peace Support Operation

PSOD - Peace Support Operations Division QRF - Quick Reaction Force

QRT - Quick Reaction Team

RRWG- Return and Reintegration Working Group RUF - Revolutionary United Front

SADC - Southern African Development Cooperation SALW - Small Arms and Light Weapons

SC - Security Council

SJPG - Sector Joint Protection Group SLA/M - Sudan Liberation Army/Movement

SRSG - Special Representative of the Secretary General TCC - Troops Contributing Countries

TNCS - Trans national Corporations

UN P5- Permanent Members of the UNSC UN - United Nations

UNAMID - African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur UNCT- United Nations Country Team.

UNEF - United Nations Emergence Force

UNHCR- United Nations High Commission for Refugee UNMIL - United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMIS - United Nations Mission in Sudan UNOAU- United Nations Office in African Union

UNSAS - United Nations Standby Arrangement System UNSC - United Nations Security Council

USG - Under Secretary General WFP - World Food Program

# CHAPTER 1

**INTRODUCTION**

# BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The Charter of the United Nations (UN) is clear in its commitment to international peace; Chapter I, Article 1, states that it is “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace…” The purpose of the UN therefore,is the maintenance of international peace and security. Michael Howard (1966:149) defines peace as “the maintenance of an orderly and just society: orderly in that man is defended against the violence or extortion of his neighbour, and just in that he is defended against the arbitrary violence or extortion of his rulers.” Applying this definition to the international realm, would imply that international peace and security is dependent on both international order and justice. Certainly, the original conception of international peace and security in 1945, by the founders of the UN as stated in the Charter was “to save future generations from the scourge of war…and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.”

In establishing the Charter, the founders of the UN hoped to avoid the breakdown of international order which led to the two World Wars of the twentieth century and subsequent destructions, death and human suffering. Fundamental in the Charter are the cardinal principles of sovereignty, non- intervention and non-use of force which call for states to respect the sovereignty of other states, refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other states and from the use of force to resolve interstate disputes respectively. The first two principles were not new in 1945; since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, they had been regarded as vital pre-requisites for international peace and security. However, what was new in 1945 was the construct for enforcing these principles, i.e. the UN, and the agreement to “outlaw war as a means of [state] policy” (Prantl and Kranso, 2004:312).

Also, events that preceded the drafting of the UN Chapter, particularly emerging evidence of the Holocaust by the Nazi regime shocked the world. This informed the provisions for the respect of human rights in the Charter, but not without significant debate. The charter was primarily focused on collective action to deter aggression rather than address individual wellbeing and suffering. At the time of its ratification, the UN Charter clearly privileged international order over individual justice and as Prantt and Kranso (2004) observes, “it would seem that the great powers never intended to enforce these moral considerations”.

Since the formation of the UN, the world has witnessedintermittent periods of relative peace without major global conflict though Africa has experienced increase in inter and intra-state wars with high casualty. This led

to several peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in the region. The challenges of these Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa are immense and the UN has not lived up to expectation due to the complex nature of Africa conflicts which are mostly intra state. A key question for the international community therefore, is “can a self-sustaining and lasting peace be constructed in societies torn asunder by war or gross violations of human rights?” (Price and Zacher, 2004:18).

The challenge for the UN as an institutions is how to adapt its roles, functions and structure in a modern society? This is considering the increase in demand for the UN to respond to varied challenges including „failed‟ states, human rights abuses and humanitarian crises. Intervention into such situations raised significant questions not only on the issues of „human security, but also on the „limits of state sovereignty in a “post-Westphalian” order‟ (Price and Zacher, 2004:142). On one hand is the „right‟ that a state can take actions within its own borders without external interference, whilst on the other, is the question of how the UN should “respond” if that state is either unable or unwilling to protect its own people. This question is most apt to the conflicts in Africa particularly the Mano River Union, Horn of Africa, Great Lakes region and the Darfur Crisis.

The prevalence of conflicts in Africa has been on the increase since the end of the Cold War around 1990. This has undermined the quest for sustainable development in the region owing to the widespread destruction of life and property. After the Cold War,conflicts have emerged in Liberia,

Somali, Sierra-Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Rwanda, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea-Ethiopia and Burundi among others. Introducing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU) Mechanism for Preventing, Managing, and Resolving Conflicts to the OAU Council of Ministers at Dakar, Senegal, in 1992, the then General Secretary, Salim Ahmed Salim, emphasized that:

Conflicts have cast a dark shadow over the prospects for a united, secure and prosperous Africa which we seek to create…. Conflicts have caused immense suffering to our people and, in the worst case, death. Men, women and children have been uprooted, dispossessed, deprived of their means of livelihood and thrown into exile as refuges as a result of conflicts. Conflicts have engendered hate and division among our people and undermined the prospects of the long- term stability and unity of our countries and Africa as a whole. Since much energy, time and resources have been devoted to meeting the exigencies of conflict, our countries have been unable to harness the energies of our people and target them to development (OAU, 1992:15).

Similarly, the former AU Chairperson Dlamini Zuma while commenting on conflicts in Africa during the 28th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU (Summit) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 31 January 2017 stated: “we cannot sustain peace without development, and very often poverty and failure to manage the expectations of population is the root cause conflicts in Africa (Zuma, 2017).

These conflicts are driven and underpinned by the proliferation and use small arms and light weapons, which led to increase in organised crime,

banditry and cross-border activities.This is as alluded by President Lungu of Zambia during the AU Peace and Security Council Retreat in Lusaka 2016:

As we all know the growing availability of small arms in post conflict situations has been and still remains a major factor in the rapid upsurge in the number of conflicts. This has had the effect of not only hindering socio-economic development, but creating humanitarian crisis environmental degradation and increased poverty on the African Continent.

Proliferations of small arms have helped create enabling condition for the emergency of religious extremists and terrorism as seen in Somalia and Mali. Though internal, most of these conflicts undermine the security of neighbouring countries and cause regional instability despite the presence of UN Peacekeepers (Mano River Union and Great Lakes Region) while in some cases they undermine border security as seen in Darfur along the borders with Chad, CAR, South Sudan and Libya. This has undermined political and socio-economic development of the region as the quest for enduring peace remains elusive.

The UN is at the apex of institutional frameworks designed for conflict management and resolution aimed at the maintenance of international peace and security. Broadly speaking, the raison d‟être of the UN lies in the minimisation of conflict and maximization of cooperation. This has seen the UN deploy about 100,000 uniformed peacekeepers and 15,000 civilians in 9 peacekeeping mission in Africa as at 2016 (UN HQ, 2016). The mandates of these missions in Africa like in other parts of the

world are very broad as it includes civilian protection, humanitarian operations and counter insurgency operations among others. At the regional level, Inter-Governmental Organisations such as the AUalso have mechanisms for conflict resolution and management. As at 2016, the AU leads a peacekeeping mission of more than 22,000 troops and police in Somalia, known as AMISOM.However, the viciousness of the Darfur conflict has raised vital questions concerning the will, effectiveness and capability of these organisations particularly the UN to deal with armed conflicts in Africa. The Commission for Africa acknowledged that much more must be done to prevent and resolve conflicts in Africa if development in the continent is to accelerate (Grono, 2006). Thus, the on- going conflict in Darfur presents the AU and the UN with a challenge to back their pronouncements with action and demonstrate a resolve to provide enduring solution to enhance African Security.

The conflict in Sudan (south Sudan and Darfur) is complex as the country has been at war since independence in 1955. These wars and open conflict are caused by the lack of development due to historic marginalization. Sudan has been ruled since independence from Khartoum by a small group of predominantly Arab/Muslim elite hailing principally from the Nile River Valley in central Sudan, and successive governments in Khartoum have either ignored the peripheries or sought to suppress them militarily. As a result, Darfur in the West is the, poorest and underdeveloped of the country.(Ihekire, 2007). These conflicts have left several million

people dead anddisplaced as well as the environmental degradation of the region which is of serious concern to the international community.

The conflict in Darfur which is the crux of this thesis has been discussed by several scholars and the background covered in great details by the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Darfur (2005) and Report of the High Level Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur Pursuant to Human Rights Council Decision S4/101 (2007) among others. The roots of the conflict are complex and the belligerents contest the controlling narrative. Regardless of rights and wrongs, questions of the responsibility to protect and proportionality would emerge, however, most would agree with France‟s description of Darfur in the Security Council in July 2007, that it is, or at least was at that time, a “synonym for despair, distress and violence”(UN Doc. S/PV.5727, 31 July 2007,5). The Darfur crisis has led to the death of about 200,000 people and the displacement of about 2,000,000 others. The American Government “concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur....”(Powell,2004). Similarly former President of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo described what happened in Sudan as „genocide‟ (Obasanjo, 2006). The UN called it the world‟s worst humanitarian disaster, even though it failed to intervene in the conflict as quickly as expected.

The rebellion in Darfur against the Government of Sudan began in 2003 with ethnic and tribal overtones. Khartoum, through the use of air

platforms particularly helicopter gunships and Janjaweed militia proxies in the region, has sought the Arabization of the entire Sudan including, predominately black African Darfur. This was opposed by the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The ensuring conflict led to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed in N‟Djamena on 8 April 2004. TheAgreement signed by Sudan, SLA/M and JEM was facilitated by the Chadian President Idriss Derby. It provided for a ceasefire and the obligation of the parties to ensure access for humanitarian purposes, refrain from recruitment, supply of arms and ammunition and violence against civilians(Human Right Watch, 2006). It also called for a ceasefire commission to monitor compliance.

The Ceasefire Commission was subsequently established, with a number of sub bodies, each of which exercise specific functions: the AU Monitoring Mission, a Chief Military observer tasked with exercising command and control, and military observers. The AU Mission in Sudan was thus deployed but found itself overwhelmed with too few personnel and lack of logistics support. This informed the transition from AMIS 1 to AMIS 11 in October 2004 and AU Peace and Security Council request for increased military personnel and a civilian police presence. While these numbers were increased on paper in 2005to 3,320 personnel, implementation on the ground proved to be both slow and stunted as AMIS never reached full operating capacity as at April 2005 as only 2,200 of the full capacity of 3,320 were on the ground (HRW, 2006).

At the same time that AU was renewing its commitment in Darfur, the UNSC began to assert itself more fully in Darfur,in the light of what it described as the “deterioration of the security situation and the negative impact this has had on humanitarian assistance efforts” (SCR 1590,24 March 2005). The SCR 1590 established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) with 10,000 military personnel and 1000 civilian police officers. UNMIS was to coordinate with AMIS towards ensuring peace in Darfur. SCR 1706 significantly expanded UNMIS‟s mandate in 2006 to include deployment in Darfur and increased the strength to 17,300 military personnel and 3,300 police personnel (SCR 1706, 31 August 2006). UNMIS wasalso tasked to support the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, work to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement, monitorthe movement of armed forces in Darfur,investigate ceasefire violations and maintain presence in IDP Camps. SCR 1706 also authorized UNMIS to „use all necessary means‟ thus crossing over to Chapter VII of the UN charter. Despite these efforts by UN and AU, not much was achieved as Darfur was characterized with continual violence and insecurity. Civilians, UNMIS and AMIS personnel were attacked while humanitarian workers were abducted (Report of UNSG on Darfur, 2007).

The situation led to the transition from AMIS, with the assistance of UNMIS to a hybrid peacekeeping force. SCR 1769 established the hybrid force, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), with the consent of Sudan, the same state that has stood accused of having committed genocide in Darfur. SCR 1769 anticipated up to 20,000 military personnel and a few thousand police officers for UNAMID. The

mandate of UNAMID encompassed good offices and support for the peace process, ensuring security, prioritizing the rule of law, human rights and governance and providing humanitarian assistance. Despite the huge resources and chapter VII mandate, not much has been achieved as the security situation remain precarious while the UN considers an exit strategy.

Herein lies the interest of this thesis on Darfur as the concept of a hybrid force as seen in UNAMID is a novel concept in peacekeeping first introduced in Darfur and was expected to achieve immediate results. The workability of the concept thus requires close examination likewise the potential of enhancing African Security through UN PSOs. Also, the interest in Sudan and Darfur particularly is primarily due to the fact that Sudan has been in conflict since independence, defying all conflict resolution mechanism deployed by the UN, AU and the former OAU in the search for solution. The complex nature of the crisis provides a good challenge to peacekeeping and conflict resolution scholars.

# STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The conflict situations in Africa which undermine African security and the inability of PSO to provide enabling environment for enduring solution remain a great challenge to African governments and the UN. Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has become central to the international community‟s response to many violent conflicts including those in Africa. Examples in Africa include UNMIL in Liberia, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNOSOM in Somalia, UNMIR in Rwanda, MUONC in Congo, ONUMOZ

in Mozambique, MINUSMA in Mali and AMIS/UNAMID in Sudan. Peacekeeping is thus seen as an important instrument of positive conflict transformation among scholars and practitioners. This underpins the large deployment of PSOs in Africa as an instrument of conflict resolution. Currently, as at 2017, the UN has 9 peacekeeping mission in Africa, AU has one while ECOWAS has a small UN recognised mission in Guinea Bissau.

UN PKOs have had mixed result in Africa unlike in other parts of the World which have had remarkable successes as in Timor Litse, Haiti and so forth. The few successes recorded in Africa were underpinned by ECOWAS operations as was the case in Liberia and Sierra-Leone. Current missions in DRC, Mali, South Sudan and Darfur have not adequately improve security and socio-political development. This is considering that successful peacekeeping missions are tied to an effective political strategy, clear goals and expectations, well trained and equipped troops as well as adequate funding. According to Gowan, “over the longer term, peace operations tend to succeed where they have clear political strategies for bringing old enemies together without a political strategy even a significant military deployment will lose traction over time” (Gowan, 2008 P.32).

This thesis seeks to analyse the inability of UN PSOs to provide conducive environment to adequately resolve Africa‟s conflicts leading to re- emergence of such conflicts on withdrawal of peacekeepers. The study will therefore determine the efficacy of UN PSOs in resolving contemporary conflicts in Africa using the conflict in Darfur Sudan as case study.

* 1. **RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

In specific, this research will attempt to provide answers to the following research questions:

* + 1. Why did the UN intervene late in Darfur conflict?
    2. What are the challenges to effective and efficient UN PSOs in Darfur-Sudan?
    3. Why has UNAMID not been able to provide enabling environment to ensure enduring solution to Darfur conflict which would positively enhance the security situation.
    4. What are the challenges to the successful execution of UNSC PoC Mandate in Darfur.
    5. Did some P5 oil and other natural resources interest in Sudan hinder effective UN collective action in Darfur conflict?

# OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

There are five specific objectives for this study, viz:

* + 1. To determine why the UN intervened late in Darfur conflict.
    2. To establish the challenges to effective and efficient UN PSOs in Darfur-Sudan.
    3. To examine why UNAMID has not provided an enabling environment to ensure enduring solution to Darfur conflicts.
    4. To establish the challenges to the successful execution of UNSC Mandate on PoC in Darfur.
    5. To examine why some P5 members parochial national interest as regards the need for African natural resources (particularly oil) influenced their position on Darfur conflicts thus frustrating the UN collective effort.

# RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH

Several peacekeeping missions have being deployed in Africa but has however failed to achieve the mandates thus suggesting that peacekeepers need enhanced capabilities, more resources and conflict resolution instruments. Inrelation to this, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (1997) noted that peacekeepers need new capabilities or what he refers to as “positive inducements” to gain the support of the local population in conflict areas and to be able to achieve the mandate of the mission. Similarly, the UN secretary General Ban Ki-moon while addressing the AU summit in Addis Ababa in February 2010 called for African leaders to be committed towards resolving the conflicts in the region and for UN peacekeepers to develop increased capabilities (BBC, 1 February 2010). This informed increased effort at the UN and AU to make peacekeepers promote durable peace and sustainable development.

The study will therefore, examine the efficacy of UN peacekeeping operation in resolving contemporary conflicts in Africa using Darfur as a case study. Darfur was chosen due to the complex and contemporary nature of the crisis and the inherent challenges they pose to UN peacekeeping frameworks.

This is considering that hybrid peacekeeping is a new concept and practice, hence there are limited policy frameworks and procedure to guide the process. The thesis conducts a detailed inquired on UNAMID operation which will provide clarity on hybrid PSO and aid the development of policy frameworks guidelines and procedures to drive future hybrid missions. The study will also examine the mandates in Darfur, particularly on POC, and the operational capability required for success with a view to ensure that UN mandates are supported by appropriate operational resources to achieve success. This will help address issues of mandate – resources mismatch in most PSO. It will also provide an informed basis to improve UN PSOs as a conflict resolution tool in Africa and also contribute to UN search for new capabilities in the maintenance of international peace and security.

# ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY

This study rests upon the following assumptions:

1. That enduring and sustainable peace in Darfur can only be achieved with the full cooperation and willingness of the parties to a conflict to end the crisis.
2. That the inability of UNAMID to sufficiently improve Darfur security situation is not unconnected to their inability to address the root causes of conflicts.
3. That UNAMID would be more effective in Darfur if it fully collaborates with regional and sub regional conflict resolution

mechanisms like those of the AU and IGAD in addressing Darfur crisis.

1. That the full backing of the P5 and the political will of African governments are necessary to promote durable peace in Darfur which would be anchored on post conflict economic, social and political development.

# SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The research particularly focused attention on the UN PSO in Darfur Sudan, UNAMID between 2007 and 2016. This is considering that the UN took over the mission in 2007 and UNAMID remained one of UN largest mission up to 2016. Most of the data used is from 2007 to 2017. However, the analysis of some of the issues will predate 2007 because of the relevance of history in understanding contemporary issues. The content is limited to the conflict in Darfur though the influence of the North-South conflict (Now Sudan and South Sudan) and the conflicts in South Kodorfan and Blue Nile states of Sudan will also be highlighted. Specifically, attention was paid to the genesis of the crisis in Darfur, the role of the UN in the conflict, PSO activities, achievements, problems and lessons, and the implications to Africa considering the inability of the UN to promote enduring solutions to these conflicts while currently pondering over exit strategy. This research also studied the changing nature of UN PSO emanating from the UN Agenda for Peace, Brahimi Report, UN Guidelines for PSO and the High Level Independent Panel on Peace

Operations (HIPPO) while addressing the inherent challenges to change. The research also identified and analysed the level of regional (AU) cooperation and coordination with the UN in conduct of PSOs in Africa particularly the UN/AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur. UNAMID operations was thus analysed leading to specific recommendation on PSOs in Africa in general and Sudan- Darfur in particular towards enhancing Africa security.

On the other hand, this research encountered some limitations some of which include methodological issues like the purposive sample used but this was overcome by ensuring that a large number of diverse stakeholders where interviewed which generated variety of perspectives and credible data. The dearth of relevant information on PSOs in Africa, and security concerns during visit to Darfur were other limitations. In any case, the trip to Darfur was made as a soldier and UN Staff rather than as a student which was most helpful. In spite of the above limitations, the research constitutes a basis for valid generalization since it will involve a single case study, well researched, using all available resource materials at the UN HQ New York and UNAMID Darfur.

# ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS

In order to facilitate this research and for the purpose of logical presentation, this research is organised into eight chapters. Chapter One essentially spells out the general background of the study which comprises of the introduction, statement of the research problem, research questions,

objectives of the study, assumptions, scope, limitations and the organisation of the study. Chapter Two presents a literature review and the theoretical framework of the study. Chapter Three is a detailed presentation of the method of data collection and analysis. Chapter Four presents the evolution and practice of PSOs in the UN. Chapter Five is a presentation on the background of the conflict in Darfur – Sudan and examination of ongoing UN PSO (UNAMID). Chapter Six provides the presentation and analysis of data on UNAMID mandate implementation. Chapter Seven provides a review of the UN‟s ability to meet the challenges of PSOs in Darfur. Chapter Eight provides summary, conclusion and recommendations.

**CHAPTER 2**

**LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

* 1. **UNITED NATIONS PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND AFRICAN SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL EXPLICATION**

There is general consensus amongst observers and in the literature that the problems associated with achieving enduring peace and security in Darfur stems largely from the nature of PSOs conducted by AU and now UN, with UNAMID at the centre. Yet, the nature of these problems is scarcely documented in a comprehensive and systematic manner. Essentially, most of the works examining the implications of various conflict resolution mechanism, including PSO, on ensuring enduring peace and security in Darfur are either based on a poor conceptualisation of the terms involved, or they fail to systematically and empirically establish how the operational and institutional inadequacies of UN PSO frameworks dovetails into the achievement of enduring peace and security in Darfur. Indeed, this gap in research on UN PSO and African security results from a theoretical impasse and the failure of establishing conceptual and empirical context of the terms involved. For example in his study titled "The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution in Africa: Darfur in Perspective" (Yusuf, 2009: 48), identifies the key issues undermining that capability of AU and UN peace operations in Darfur. He notes;

While UNAMID has the power in theory, the capacity to deliver has been a major challenge. Apart from not been able to protect civilians as mandated, personnel of the Mission have been killed by rebels and government troops. The ability to conduct an effective peace enforcement mission is hinged on the availability of sufficient personnel, attack helicopters and APCs among others. These requirements are still inadequate in UNAMID.

While the foregoing issues identified by Yusuf (2009) are not unconnected to the problems of UNAMID, he fails to empirically and systematically determine how these capability gaps undermine the achievement of enduring peace and security in Darfur.

Similarly, the documentation of problems and challenges present in UN PSO in Darfur as a means of ensuring African security (enduring peace and security) have focused mainly on isolated parts of operational challenges like lack of force multipliers and enablers, poor serviceability status of COEs, among others rather than on a comprehensive, holistic and systematic explication of entire UNAMID architecture including the peacekeeping and peace building nexus. In his study of AMIS/UNAMID in Darfur, S Appiah- Mensah noted that issues of operational logistics primarily lift capability, sustainment requirements and operational platforms like APCs were critical to the inability of AMIS to meet set mandate and ultimately the decision to re -hat to UNAMID (Appiah-Mensah, 2005).

The identified problems in UNAMID operations in Darfur may have been real; yet, they are presented in an incomprehensive manner, due to the emphasis on largely operational capability gaps alone. Such studies are not focused on a holistic and comprehensive conceptualization of the concept of PSO. Indeed, peacekeeping alone as a means achieving enduring peace and security in Darfur is fundamentally flawed as peace- building is critical to addressing the root causes of the conflict. Ultimately, an evaluation of the UN PSO as a means of enhancing African security must necessarily begin from a proper conceptualization of the terms: African Security, Conflicts and Peacekeeping.

# CONCEPT OF REGIONAL SECURITY

Scholarship on regional security and indeed African security has developed rather implicitly under the rubric of contemporary security with emphasis on how security is clustered in geographic regions like Africa. The security interdependence within a region is thus obvious likewise linkages to global security. In today‟s globalized world, security is a difficult concept to define. The adoption of any particular definition will depend on one‟s perspective. Security for the US could mean safeguarding its interests

anywhere in the world as expressed in the popular “Carter doctrine” (Rowell, et al, 2005). The security of African countries with strong attachment to sovereignty on the other hand could be viewed from “…the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity” (Fulvio, 2005). The human security perspective argues for “a people centred approach to foreign policy which recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety or lives” as defined by the Canadian Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Axworthy, 2008). These different perspectives make the concept of security both objective and subjective depending on whose security is under consideration or the nature of the threat itself.

The concept of security can be viewed from different approaches. The traditional concept of security or the state-centric approach embraces the two paradigms of international relations: the realist and the liberalist perspectives. In this approach, the object is the state and the nature of threat is usually the military with emphasis on regieme security. The other approach to be considered is the Widened Security Approach; the object here is human- centric instead of state-centric and covers issues of health, food, human rights, environmental security and community security among others. The threats to security in this category are considered to be difficult for states to tackle because of their trans-national nature. These threats could include; immigration problems, trans-national crime, terrorism and human trafficking usually perpetrated by non-state actors. Because of the nature of the threats which may be a mixture of political, economic, societal, environmental and

military, the use of only military force may not necessarily deal with the threats. This does not detract from the fact that the sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from imminent threat. As argued by McSweeney, “It would be absurd to postulate a subject of security other than people …it is from the human need to protect human values that the term „security‟ derives its meaning …security must make sense at the basic level of the individual human being for it to make sense at the [regional] international level” (Mc Sweeney, 2007).

It is a fundamental responsibility of states and governments, to provide peace and security to its people. When states are failing or are deemed incapable of protecting their own citizens, regional groups or indeed the international community has a responsibility to intervene. This is clearly captured in the March 2005 report on United Nations Reform priorities, where former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan urges Heads of State and Government to “embrace the 'responsibility to protect' as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”( UN, 2008).

Baylis (2001:49) contends that the concept of security is a difficult subject to grasp, as it is a “contested concept”. However, he further stresses that there is a consensus that security implies freedom from threats to core values (for both individuals and groups) but there is differences in opinion on whether the main focus of enquiry should be on “individual”, “national” or “international” security. Kofi Annan reflecting upon security wrote “When

the UN Charter speaks of „larger freedom‟, it includes basic political freedoms to which all human beings are entitled ... what President Roosevelt called „freedom from want‟ and „freedom from fear” (Annan, 2005:64). This reflects the concept of human security, seeing the individual rather than the state as the referent object. During the Cold War both academic thought and the behaviour of statesmen were dominated by the concept of national security. The referent for security was not the individual, but the state to which the individual belonged. High politics was dominated by issues of war and peace, nuclear deterrence and arms control among others (Wirtz,2002). The Realist school of thought dominated during this period, concentrating essentially on relative military capabilities. Understanding both realism and liberalism is important as both influences international relations. Since the 1980s neo-realism and neo-liberalism have come into being, each drawing to an extent on the realist and liberalist thought that has gone before.

Running alongside this debate between neo-realists and neo-liberals was a debate widening the referents of security. Traditionally, such subjects as disease, the environment, access to scarce resource, and population growth rates, etc would not have figured on the “high politics” agenda. These would have been considered matters of “low politics”, for discussion at the domestic level, and would certainly not have been viewed as matters of national security. The stimulus of the end of the Cold War provided impetus to those like Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde who during the Cold War had been seeking to broaden the security agenda. The initial source of this debate according to “Buzan aroseout of dissatisfaction with the intense narrowing of the field of

security studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsession of the Cold War” (Buzan, et al, 1998). The broadened agenda has seen issues such as disease, economic stability, population growth, resource scarcity, environmental change, transnational crime, etc, move into the realm of “high politics”. This move has not been without its critics concerned that such a widening of the agenda to include so many and varied topics has the potential to make the issue of security meaningless. Walt comments:

widening the agenda] ... runs the risk of expanding “Security Studies” excessively; by this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all be viewed as threats to security--- defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems (Walt,1991:212).

There is merit in both these arguments, although to dismiss, as Walt does, the concept of widening on grounds of difficulty in reaching solutions misses the point particularly in Africa with limited resources and technical knowhow to deal with these issues.

Security and peace have been and remain, the scarcest commodities in Africa. During the last two decades, several sub-Saharan African countries engaged in violent conflict. For instance, about 1,000,000 lives were lost in just 100 days during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This supports the UN report on Human Security which states that most of the world‟s armed conflicts now take place in sub-Saharan Africa and that the casualty in wars

in Africa in the 21st century is more than that in the rest of the world combined. It is calculated that conflict in Africa since the end of the Cold War up to 2007 cost the continent £150bn (Mc Greal, 2007) while the global cost of conflict in 2014 was $14.3 tn (Global Peace Index, 2015) with Middle East and Africa bearing the highest cost of violence considering the conflicts Darfur, Mali,DRC and BHT activities in Nigeria. Consequently, African States have, on average, become increasingly marginalised from the world economy, with their share of global trade falling from 7% in 1950 to 3% 2010. `Same is also applicable to Africa's share of FDI with Sub-Saharan Africa worst hit as regards influence in world economy as shown in Figure

* 1. using various indices.

# FIGURE 2.1: RELATIVE PROFILES OF AFRICAN STATES IN WORLD ECONOMY

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **FDI INFLOWS BY REGION 2012-2014**  C:\Users\emeka onumajuru\Desktop\600x300[1].jpg | **WORLD GDP DISTRIBUTION 2010**  C:\Users\emeka onumajuru\Desktop\9807945_orig[1].jpg |
| **AFRICA SHARE OF GLOBAL TRADE**  C:\Users\emeka onumajuru\Desktop\gupta1[1].gif | **SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND NORTH AFRICA ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT INDICES 2013**  C:\Users\emeka onumajuru\Desktop\RbJVCsGm1ObgUDcLy1ssZ9zwbfh7rUjQnxWXzClV6zA[1].png |

Source: IMF, Directorate of Trade Statistics, 2015.

Africa‟s wars have killed millions of people, created tens of millions refugees and have sapped Africa‟s already limited human, political, and economic infrastructure which undermined socio-economic development, regional security and create conditions for further conflicts.

Buzan (1991) defines security as simply “freedom from threat” and as such sees security as “survival”. Hisframework of security analysis is focused on political, economic, societal, military and environmental issues.

**FIGURE 2.2: GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION OF SECURITY ANALYSIS MODEL**



SECURITY

Environmenta l Framework

Societal Framework

Military Framework

Economic Framework

Political Framework


Source: Researcher‟s adaption of the Buzan Security Analysis Model, Buzan, 1991.

Buzan model is considered apt for this thesis though the nature of African security means that all five framework of analysis are interwoven. In many ways African politics is still heavily underpinned by pre cold war events. The Cold War encouraged one-party states, either in support of communist ideology or as a means of containing the spread of the ideology. Superpower support was thus aimed at individual regimes survival rather than the benefit of the whole country. It is interesting to note that the countries that received most in financial aid from the former Soviet Union and United States: Sudan, DR Congo, Angola and Somalia have witnessed severe conflicts while some are in conflict situation as is the case in Somalia, Sudan and DRC. Similarly, one party states like Zimbabwe continue to exist to the detriment of its own societies, considering its poor democratic representation and entrenched corrupt practices at government level. Poor governance and corruption has manifested in political instability, military coups and ethnic conflict which undermine the security of African states and culminatively, regional security. The Asian

Development Bank (2013) defines good governance as “having acceptable levels of accountability, participation, predictability and participation”. Using these benchmarks, only Botswana and to some extend South Africa meets these criteria whilst many other African nations fall short. Good governance and political stability is central to African security and development and crucial to addressing socio-economic, military and environmental problems.

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) classifies economic security into five areas as shown in Figure 2.3. These include income security, access to employment training, employment opportunity, health and safety at work and representation. In many cases, Africa is weak in these areas of individual economic security with a GDP per capita of $1871 (Nominal). In 1975, Africa had a GDP twice that of East Asia butby 2016 Asia‟s rose from $800 in 1975 to $6,205 (nominal) according to IMF World Economic Outlook, 2017. This is despite abundant raw materials with Africa having 90% of the world‟s cobalt, 64% of its manganese, 50% of its gold,70% of its cocoa, 60% of coffee and at least 20% of its petroleum culminatively accounting for about 30% of the world mineral resources (Aljazeera, 2016).Why then is Africa continuing to have problems of sustaining itself which ultimately undermines its security. A possible explanation is linked to poor governance and economic challenges caused by restraints such as trade barriers, low investment, debt burden and environmental factors among others.

**FIGURE 2.3: GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION OF ECONOMIC SECURITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK**



ECONOMIC SECURITY

Representation

Health and Safety at work

Access to Employment Training

Access to Employment Opportunity

Income Security

Source: Researcher's adaptationof ILO Economic Security Analysis Model, 2017.

Buzan (1998) argues that the two main issues affecting societal security were migration and the clash of rival civilization identities in addition to the scourge of AIDS/HIV and other diseases like malaria. Malaria killed nearly 400,000 in 2015 while AIDS/HIV killedabout 1 million in 2016with about two-thirds of the people living with HIV worldwide in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO, 2016). These two diseases and sanitation related issues have a significant effect on African security. Issues such as disease, environmental factors and inter or intra-ethnic clashes are major causes of migration. Migration can precipitate, and in the case of DR Congo and Sudan has been the catalyst for unrest, ethnic violence and rebellion. Addressing issues of mass migration by creating the conditions for stability is critical to enhancing African security. The buy in of the UN and regional organisation is therefore important considering that addressing mass migration will help reduce the associated humanitarian and economic challenges.

The consideration of environmental factors is necessary in any discussion on African security due to the environmental disparities in the region. The desert areas have life support issues while the tropical climate in some sub regions adequately sustains life. Africa is however, not as densely populated as Asia and Europe. Why then are environmental factors so prevalent in Africa particularly in the Sahel region? Poor governance and economic mismanagement has meant underdevelopment has impacted heavily on the environment leading to conflicts as in Sudan. The effect of climate change on African security is a key issue as the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change highlighted six areas of concern resulting from climate change:

* + 1. Water resources particularly in shared basins like Lake Chad. This has potential for conflict and demands regional coordination in water management.
    2. Food security due to declines in agricultural production and climatic changes.
    3. Loss of biodiversity.
    4. Vector- and water-borne diseases due to limitedsanitation and health infrastructure.
    5. Coastal zones vulnerable to sea-level rise and infrastructures that are exposed to flooding (bridges, roads and building).
    6. Increase in desertification due to limited rainfall and intensified land use.

**FIGURE 2.4: GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION OF HUMAN SECURITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK**


HUMAN SECURITY

Empowering people and communities to develop the capability of making informed choices.

Protecting Human rights and Rule of Law.

Security of Individuals and Community from harm.

Source: Researcher's adaptation of Mary Kaldor‟s Human Security Analysis Framework, in Kaldor and Beebe, 2010.

In discussing African Security it is important to consider the concept of human security based on framework developed by Kaldor and Beebe (2010) which argues that human security has three components as shown in Figure 2.4. The first is security of individuals and communities in which they live, rather than regime security. This aspect is a key issue in Darfur as the Government of Sudan is more concerned about state and border security than the security of Darfurians and Darfur communities. The second component of human security is about the interrelatedness of security: protecting people from being killed in wars or crime and security in the case of natural disasters like hurricanes and famines. The UNDP which pioneered the term human security sees it as being about development which advance the economic and health status of individuals

while the Canadians (also key pioneers of the concept) see it as a responsibility to protect against ethnic cleansing, genocide and other massive human rights violations as was the case in Rwanda and now Darfur.

This study argues that though people do live in real situation of extreme violence as is the case in Darfur, we also have to recognise the economic and social aspect which incidentally is both visible in Darfur. The third component of human security is the interrelationship between the internal and external, with internal security seen as policing and external security as war and deterrence. In this case protection of human rights and the rule of law is important. According to the co-chair of the Human Security Report, Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, human security means:

protecting vital freedoms - fundamental to human existence and development….. on protecting people from severe and pervasive threats, both natural and societal, and empowering individuals and communities to develop the capabilities of making informed choices and acting on their own behalf…..the safety for people from both violent and nonviolent threats.…It is people centered…it is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, whether they live in conflict or in peace (UNDP 1994:23).

Boyd defined human security as “the ability to pursue those choices in safe environments broadly encompassing seven dimensions of security – economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political” (Boyd, 2005:115). He maintains that without real peace there are no prospects for development or equality. According to Ursula Franklinreal peace, entails “ more than the absence of war, it is the

presence of justice for all respect for all human needs as well as the conditions that force, in all its forms, is not an instrument of national or international policy” (Boyd 2005:119). Peace is thus, not only about ending physical violence.The understanding of peace in the very narrow form of stopping physical violence undermines the ability for long term and broad based recovery plans involving improvements in the incomes and human development indicators of the majority of the people. This leads to half measure interventions do not support enduring solution and sustainable development.

One of these issues is pursuing human security concerns after peace processes have been consummated in countries where atrocities have been committed against civilians. This explains the continued relapse to conflict as is the case in Darfur, South Sudan and DR Congo. In such countries international humanitarian efforts mobilised during conflict quickly dissipate, leaving them distressed and at risk. Based on the concern for the long term post-war reconstructionand sustainable development of post war countries, the International Crisis Group in its report on Liberia and Sierra Leone proposed between 15 - 25 years of sustained international support for post war countries to avoid slide back into crisis (Manning 2002). Similarly, Addison (2003) advanced that the “emphasis should go beyond rebuilding destroyed infrastructure to investing in social capital including the trust that creates informal safety nets and by so doing, altering the behaviour of critical national actors” (Harris 2004: 5-10). This is a key area where the UN has failed in its dealing with Africa, and as such diminishes the impact of UN PSO.

The paradigm shifts in African security is linked to external and internal factors:the processes of colonialism which forcefully absorbed the continent into global capitalism from the mid -1500s and the diminishing strategic relevance of the continent owing to the end of the Cold War.Ihonvbere (2000:3-4) identified some of the African experience to include slavery, the termination of patterns of state and class formation, colonial rule andthe creation of a corrupt and illegitimate state.Others include the undermining of local cultures and values, introduction and promotion of primordial differences and the domination of the African economy by TNCs and its incorporation into the periphery of the global economy and power as a dependent continent. Some post colonial African countries thus, remain vestiges of colonial rule evident in the contradictory manner in which state-society relationships evolved (Fawole, 2004:297-303). The post colonial state therefore survived in Africa by governing by brute force at its disposal (Ihonvbare, 2000). Second, the political elites paid more attention to their personal interest and regime survival than to the welfare and security of their people. This led to increased insecurity by the 1990s excercibated by the inability of the political class to continue to mobilise

domestic support and external patronage. Many of the violent conflicts and civil wars in Africa are not unconnected to this development though the roots of the conflict can be traced to the complexity of colonial and post colonial social, resource, ethnic, class, ideological and religious divisions with Darfur as a classical case (Herbst and Mills, 2003: 7).

The nexus between governance and security is a core question examined in Claude Ake‟s “The feasibility of Democracy in Africa” and remains critical in the discourse on African security. The threats to democracy in Africa also drive political instability and undermine peace and security in the continent. The lack of a credible response to the resurgence of identity- based conflicts in Africa as in Darfur calls for the need to expand the parameters of security from state security to human security concerns (Pettman, 2005; 137-150). Conflict and insecurity promote fragility in state institutions in Africa, their impact on public finance including the trade-off between social and security budgets and the cost of reconstruction and rehabilitation remains critical to African security.

Contemporary international debates including globalisation have created opportunity to rethink and respond to African security challenges in the 21st century. At its core is the gradual removal of traditional boundaries between state and civil society, and among different states.Traditional conceptions of security in Africa would need to be re- examined considering the emergence of non-traditional security threats: population growth, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, resource scarcity, violent extremism and transitional organised crime. This is considering the high case of intra-state conflicts since the end of the cold war. These conflicts are occurring in states with a combination of highpoverty level, an excessive dependence on natural resource exports, poor political and economic governance and ungoverned space as in Sudan and DR Congo (Clover 2004: 8-9). These conflicts are characterised by criminal impunity, human rights violations, humanitarian emergencies and the proliferation and wide use of small

arms and light weapons to mention but a few. Identity and resource based conflict are thus common in the continent and underpin the Darfur crisis.



* 1. **CONCEPT OF CONFLICT**

Conflict is an ambiguous concept and the International Alert see Conflict as “multi dimensional social process which is a common and essential feature of human existence…. when expressed constructively, conflict can act as a catalyst for personal, social and political change and transformation butwhen expressed destructively, conflict fosters violence and damage that is familiar in wars and violent conflicts” (Woodhouse, 2004). This is as illustrated in Figure 2.5.

**FIGURE 2.5: CONFLICT ENERGY**



|  |
| --- |
| CONFLICT ENERGY  NEGATIVE POSITIVE  Expressed Destructivity Expressed Constructively  VIOLENCE / WAR PERSONAL / SOCIAL /  POLITICAL CHANGE   * Deaths   + Better Lives * Wounded   + Better Personal and Social   32 |

Source: International Alert, 2004:88

Tom Woodhouse (2004:22) of Bradford University defines conflict as “the pursuit of incompatible goals by individuals or groups”. Contemporary conflict however, refers to “the prevailing pattern of political and violent conflict in the post cold war world” while contemporary armed conflicts refers “to those that involve the use of force”. Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human life, which Zartman (1996) sees as something that is desirable. Stedman (1996 in Nwolise, 1997) is of the view that; “Conflict stems from the basic fact of human interdependence. Seeking to satisfy their needs, wants and desires, people make demands upon themselves, upon the physical environment, upon other people, and upon whatever organization and institutions that appear to be in a position to help them” (Stedman, 1996:370).

Conflict is intrinsic to human nature and it is the result of human interactions when opposing interests converge. Wright (1983:22) defines conflict as “a particular relationship between states or rival factions within a state which implies subjective hostilities or tension manifested in subversive, economic and military hostilities”. According to Zartman (1989:8) conflict is “an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decision”. Similarly, Deng, Kimaru and Zartman defined conflict as “perceived divergence of interest” or “action seeking inconsistent goals” (Deng, Kimaru and Zartman, 1996). While these definitions remain relevant, they only provide a generic perception of conflict. Weeks definition however remains relevant to this thesis as he conceives conflict as “a relationship between parties that disagree over matters that they value, and thus perceive that their power to attain that which they value is threatened by the other party‟s values, goals, perceptions, behaviour and/or degree of power” (Weeks, 1994:23). Perhaps directly related to this study is Stanger‟s (1967:1)

definition of conflict as: “a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other; but not both,… each party is mobilising energy to obtain a goal or desired object or situation and each party perceives the other as a barrier or threat to that goal”.

This thesis adopts the above definition because it highlights the issues of goal incompatibility and continuous mobilization for struggle which explains the situation between the parties to the Darfur conflict. Of note however, is that not all conflicts are violent in nature. In this regard, Miall‟s (Kumar and Michiko (ed), 1992:65) classification of conflict will be relevant to this study. He classified conflicts into five categories namely, peaceful, minor violence, major violence, resolved and unresolved. This can be conveniently classified into nature of conflict, territorial spared and nature of settlement as shown in Figure 2.6.

# FIGURE2.6: GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICT

Resolved Unresolved

Local Regional

Global

Peaceful Minor Violence

Major Violence

Nature of Settlement

Territorial Spread

Nature of Conflict

Source: Researcher's adaptation of Miall‟s Classification of Conflict, 1992:23

Peaceful conflict is without use of coercion while minor violence is a conflict that involves some coercion or hostilities but devoid of use of major force.Major violence is a conflict which involves major force by at least one of the parties to the conflict. Resolved conflicts are those conflicts in which major parties have accepted that the conflict was over while unresolved are conflicts in which major issues were settled while other issues remain outstanding. This thesis will argue that the Darfur conflict incorporates two of the above classifications. It is a major violence because a significant amount of force is being used by one of the parties namely, the GoS and the conflict remains unresolved. Although technically, the conflict had been

„resolved‟ by the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2005, lack of implementation of provisions of the agreement renders it unresolved. The conflict is local in nature in terms of territorial spread, but it also has regional links considering proxy involvements of neighbouring Chad and South Sudan.

Having examined the concept of conflict, it is imperative to examine the causes of conflicts in Africa. Such an evaluation will provide the basis to evaluate the efficacy of UN PSO as a conflict resolution mechanisms and impact on Africa security. This thesis argues that unless the root causes of a given conflict in Africa are properly diagnosed, an enduring resolution cannot be achieved, thus the genuine identification of the causes of conflict are critical to the solution.


# CAUSES OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

Studies on African conflicts identified it to varying causes. One school of thought has argued that the sources of conflicts in Africa could be attributed to the sweeping tempo of democratization in Africa particularly with the demise of the Cold War (Robert and Nazhi, 1983:445). They argue that the status quo hardly accepts the process, especially of sovereign national conferences which usually impose a transition time table on the incumbent leadership. In an event where the latter reject such an imposition, which usually does not favour it, the opposition do resort to violence (Lakidi, 1992:7). Another source of conflict in Africa is the issue of limited opportunities in obtaining legitimate means of livelihood and survival. Africa‟s poverty coupled with poor economic policies by many countries in post independence Africa, constraints the leadership from providing opportunities to the teeming and aspiring youths. This source of conflict often results in violence as many people struggle for scarce resources. Furthermore, the remoteness of some of the regions coupled with the problem of ungoverned spaces limits capability of African countries to monitor their borders which often strengthens resistance forces and worsens security situation. Other causes of conflict include the high level of corruption, weak political institutions and poor socio-economic infrastructure.

Stedman in discussing African conflict argues that; “Conflicts in Africa arise from problems basic to all populations: the tugs and pulls of different identities, the distribution of resources and access to power, and competing definitions of what is right, fair and just”

(Stedman, 1996:370). Conflicts in Africa are predominantly intra-state rather than interstate. The danger however lies in the spill over effect resulting in cross border actions and refugee situations which undermine socio-economic and political development while creating regional fragilities.

# FIGURE 2.7: CONFLICT MAP OF AFRICA



Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2016.

The causes of conflict in Africa are varied and global trend analysis indicate that conflicts are driven by poverty, underdevelopment, and economic and political marginalization of large parts of the population. African conflicts therefore, are not necessarily caused by ethnic differences despite the Rwandan genocide but by economic and political marginalization‟s that great opportunities for the mobilization of ethnic and religious differences for political gain by political elites. The “root causes”

of conflicts are therefore economic, social or political exclusions while the “aggravating factors” do not directly cause violent conflict but contribute to an environment that breed violent conflict.

Common to many African conflicts is the unsatisfactory nature of inter-state borders inherited from colonial times. The OAU now AU maintained the permanence and sanctity of existing borders to avoid discord between neighbouring states despite the division of tribes like the Kakwa and the Beja between three borders in East Africa. According to Furley (1995:89)“If some new resources like oil are found then war threatens, arms are distributed to these marginalized peoples and this promotes regional conflict”. Ethnicity created fault lines which caused African conflicts as was the case in Rwandan and Burundian as the conflict was motivated by ethnic differences.

A more basic cause of conflict in Africa is poor economic performance and economic inequalities underpinned by debt burdens and corruption. As Neil Macfarlane points out, economic discomfort can boil up into conflict. Similarly, Boutros Ghali stated that the main causes of conflict are economic despair, social injustice and political oppressions and these assertionsremains relevant today (Boutrous Ghali, 1992). Conflict in Africa are thus often struggles for economic resources, distribution and control.

Oliver Furley (1995) summarized and classified the major causes of potential tensions in Africa as follows:

* + - 1. Military Led Operations: This normally leds tointer-state aggression, annexation or support for the rebel groups of other states.
      2. Political/International Issues: This is in form of territorial claims, regional rivalries, terrorism, coercion or discrimination against other states.
      3. Political/Domestic Issues: This includes power struggles, population explusion and youth bulge, demands for democracy and the tenents of liberal democracy, communal or ethnic violence related to socio-economic, religious or ethnic issues.
      4. Persecution: This is in form of violations of human rights, large numbers of IDPs and mass movements of refugees across bordersamong others.

In line with the causes of internal conflicts in Africa, scholar has identified four main clusters of factors: structural factors, political factors, economic/social factors; and cultural/perceptual factors (Brown,1996).

# FIGURE 2.8: GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE MAIN CLUSTERS OF FACTORS THAT CAUSE INTERNAL CONFLICT

Structural Factors

Socio- Economic Factor

Political Factors

Cultural / Perception Factors

political institution strategies

40

* Cultural discrimination against minorities
* Group histories and perception
* Discriminatory Political Institutions
* Strong Sense of Identity and Confrontational
* Economic and development problems
* Discriminatory Economic system

WEAK STATE STRUCTURE

- Lack of Political Legitimacy and ineffective

Source: Researcher‟s adaptation of Brown‟s (1996) Main Clusters of Factor that Cause Internal Conflict.

The main structural factors as identified by Brown (1996) includeweak state structures caused by lack of political legitimacy and poor governance which give rise to ungoverned and undergoverned spaces which drive conflicts. Second is that when states structures are weak, individual groups within these states areforced to provide for their own defense in forms of vigilante groupsconsidering that other groups may pose security threats. Third,is ethnic geography as states with higher concentration of ethnic minorities are more prone to conflict than others, especially when they are marginalized as witnessed in Darfur.

Political factors include discriminatory political institutions andclosed authoritarian systems that generate resentments particularly if some groups lack political access and are politically marginalized. This could led to violence if the groups have ambitious objectives, strong sense of identity and confrontational strategies. Economic and social factors include economic problems like unemployment and inflation mostly created by the transitions from centrally planned to market-based economic system and corruption in government.Also discriminatory economic systems which create inequalities create levels of frustration which could led to violence as was the case during the Arab Spring in North Africa. Cultural and perceptual factors include cultural discrimination against ethnic minorities and restrictions on religions freedom. Perception is also related to how groups see themselves and others

likewise there group histories and grievances against others for several reasons. The Rwandan genocide is a case in point.

Other perspectives on the causes of conflicts in Africa includes those advanced by Okech (2014) during the Regional workshop on combating insecurity and violent extremism in the Sahel. Okech identified three central factors as the root causes of conflict in Africa particularly the Sahel region: the ecosystem, government model (poor governance) and population growth. She also identified sustaining factors as external interest and predatory political elite, role of sub regional and regional actors and securitization of governance. On the ecosystem, the Sahel remains essentially agro-pastoral in terms of the livelihood of the people and the environment is harsh and susceptible to such factors as droughts, desert encroachment, very strong and unbearable heat and storm (Okech,2014:20). The scarcity of water and grazing grounds, led to frequent conflicts between the farmers and the herdsmen resulting in the destruction of many lives and properties. The incident of very high population density in low lying areas that are so fertile to sustain large population is also another element likewise general scarcity in the arid areas which are sparsely populated and often forgotten. This arid regions, are susceptible to drug and human trafficking, illegal arms trafficking and other criminal activities, like insurgency.

High population growth with a corresponding high maternal mortality rate has its socio-economic implications which includes youths bulge, mostly unskilled and unemployed. Governments' inability to manage this huge

population remains of concern as youths are susceptible to being lured into conflicts. About 50% of the populations in most of the Sahelian countries are under the age of 25 years which is a key issue. Conflict sustaining factors include the failure of states to build an all-inclusive strong national cohesive entity. This has led to conflicts, separatism and irredentists movements in the Sahel sub-region. Existing ethnic-based groups across the Sahel seeking autonomy and independence, is a reflection of the crisis in State making/building. Geo-political factors like the role of external or international interests in instigating, influencing and financing conflicts in pursue of their businesses interests is another sustaining factor. Okech (2014) noted that these foreign powers are only interested in extracting available resources like uranium, gold, oil, coal, limestone and phosphate and not socio-economic development. She pointed out that these Western Countries and China by so doing, influence the politics and governance of countries involved. Securitization of governance, as in situations whereby huge investments are made to strengthen and assert military power in the State is also a sustaining factor, as large resources are earmarked for defence and security at the expense of education and health. A balance between defence and security on the one hand, and the welfare of the people on the other, is necessary.

# CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN CONFLICTS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

Contemporary African conflicts have peculiar characteristics which makes it difficult to resolve such conflicts. First is the use of child soldiers which is a key feature of contemporary African conflicts. The use of child soldiers is not a phenomenon neither is it unique to Africa. The French and Germany armies had used child soldiers to recapture the Holy land in 1212. During WW I & II Germany, and their allies used children as the last line of defence (Godwin – Gill, 1994). Countries like Palestine, Burma, Iraq Sri- Lanka, Indonesia, etc have been known to recruit child soldiers. However, the UN office for dealing with “Children and Armed” conflict considers Africa as a region with the most pronounced problem and requiring the most urgent attention in the area. The efforts by the UN and campaigns by bodies like the coalitionto stop the use of Child Soldiers led to the 2000 optional protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the child on the involvement of children in Armed Conflicts (CRC-OP-CAC).

A combination of pull and push factors (Oluwatoyin, 2003) fuelled the recruitment of children. The pull factors include indoctrination, heroism, adventure, breakdown of religious and social structures, abduction and identity issues among others while push factors include lack of access to health, lack of food (malnutrition), poverty, social oppression and political supression. While some children volunteered others were forcefully recruited.About 60% of child soldiers were forcefully recruited, mostly of them abducted from schools, streets, fields and houses. Those who voluntarily recruited did so to avoid their poor socio economic conditions characterized by poverty, poor standard of living, lack of education, etc.

Girls formed a good percentage of child soldiers in Liberia at 18.3% and Sierra-Leone 33.3% (Oluwatoyin, 2003) during the crisis in these countries. BHT have equally made use of young boys and girls as suicide bombers. Irabor (2016), concluded that about 40% of BHT elements are children and mostly used for spying, ambush, patrols, and IED carriers. The girls also served as cooks, sex slaves, “wives” and at times combatants. The activities of child soldiers left them psychologically, socially and physically devasted even after the conflicts.

Second is the use of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) as a common feature of African conflicts is that widespread death and suffering result from the use of SALW. The widespread global diffusion of these weapons has greatly intensified the scale of conflict in African countries and societies. In some areas assault rifles are so prevalent that they are used as barter. The low availability, cost and portability of SALW mean they are the weapon of choice by all combatants (government forces, militias and insurgents)and the cause of too many deaths. Worldwide, there are more than 550 million small arms and light weapons while the annual value of the legal trade in small arms exceeds US $8.5 billion (SIPRI, 2015) The sources of Small Arms in Africa include arms brokers/gunrunners and arms transfer using the four basic types of SALW transfer namely: government to government sales deliveries; government approved commercial scales; covert and grey market operations; black – market transaction and theft.Arms Industries in the region also accounts for proliferation of Small arms. In Africa, as at 2003, 7 countries and 22 firms were producing small arms. By

2015 the number of sub-Saharan African countries producing small arms has increased to 10. Other sources of SALW include local black smiths and stolen arms from Government armoury.

Mobile rebel groups are the third feature of contemporary African conflicts. This was typically the case in the Mano River Union as the RUF operated from Liberia to Sierra-Leone and vice visa depending on the objective. Against Sierra-Leone, they wanted to oust the government while in Liberia they supported Charles Taylor NPFL which resulted in cross border activities. Elements of RUF were equally traced to Cote d‟Ivoire and were alleged to have been involved in the cross border activities and operated up to Guinean border towns. These mobile rebel groups and their cross border activities contributed to the crisis in the MRU. This was also the situation in Great lakes region as rebel groups in DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, etc carried out extensive cross border activities and had bases in other countries. In Sudan-Darfur, the situation is the same as SWALW and JEM operated freely in Sudan, South Sudan, Chad and Uganda. Similarly, BHT also operates in Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon with bases in all 3 countries. The cross border activities and presence of rebel and insurgent groups makes conflict much more complex to resolve.

Fourth is the use of natural resource to buy arms and finance conflict in Africa. According to the former US Ambassador Richard Holbrook, the RUF in Sierra-Leone financed its weapons purchases through the annual sale of an estimated US $30 -50 million in diamonds, with approximately 60% of them

going through Liberia (Small Arms Survey, 2000). In the early 1990s, UNITA arms purchases from Eastern Europe, were financed with diamond sales worth US $4 – 5 million (Small Arms Survey,2001:173). The Niger Delta militants in Nigeria equally financed the purchase of large weapons through oil bunkering. BHT in its own case sold rustled cows to fund arms procurement apart from ransoms from kidnapped victims and bank robberies.

* 1. **CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING**

The UN Blue Helmet defines peacekeeping as “an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict” (UN,1997). Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter but falls between Chapter VI and Chapter VIIand Dag Hammarskjold subsequently defined it as “Chapter 6½ initiatives”. The principles defined by Dag Hammarskjold and, Canadian Lester B. Pearson as stated in UN/A/52/29/2 (1997) were:

1. Consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of mission.
2. Non- use of force by peacekeepers except in self defence.
3. Voluntary contributions of contingents by countries for the peacekeeping force.
4. Impartiality by peacekeepers.
5. Control and management of peacekeeping missions by the UN SG.

The concept of peacekeeping evolved as a child of necessity being an adaptation of the UN Charters Chapters VI and VII for the maintenance of international peace and security. The provision stipulates the need for parties of a dispute to seek solution through negotiation, arbitration and use of regional organisation among others but parties to disputes often do not negotiate because of their belligerent posture. This underpins the relevance of peace-making in creating aconducive environment for the settlement of dispute and forceful intervention if needed. Peacekeeping is the application of non-enforcement military measures that are different from peace enforcement which entails the application of coercive measures. Peacemaking on the other hand entails mediation, reconciliation and arbitration processes to reach agreements among the belligerents in other to limit conflicts and then concentrate on the substantive issues and root causes of the conflict.

Peacekeeping as a concept therefore is the interposition of a neutral international force in a conflict area to create a buffer between warring factions in a conflict. According to Onoja (1996:32), “peacekeeping operations are essentially a practical mechanism developed by the UN to contain and control armed conflicts and to facilitate their resolution by peaceful means…..It is therefore a means to an end, and that end is conflict resolution”. Boutros-Ghali, further defines peace keeping as “the deployment

of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving military or police personnel and frequently civilians as well” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Peacekeeping in this context is about conflict prevention and peace makinghence it is a third contingency approach to conflict management. According to Bassey (1993) peacekeeping is “one of the novel techniques” of “Conflict Diplomacy” which has gained global currency.

Peacekeeping involves the deployment of an international force (which makes it a third party exercise,), the consent of parties to the dispute, cease- fire agreement and non-use of force by the peacekeepers except for self- defencethough these principles are mostly for classical peacekeeping. The encyclopaedia of the UN throws more light thus:

Peacekeeping actions… generally falls into one of two categories depending on the seriousness of the situation. In cases where the dispute is still relatively under control, the UN may undertake observer operations involving the stationing of UN personnel in the area on a Quasi-permanent basis to supervise cease-fire and truce lines and conduct immediately investigations of any complaints of violations. If full-scale hostilities have broken out, military operations may be necessary to bring the fighting to a halt and to maintain the peace until final settlement has been reached (Encyclopaedia of the UN, 1971:46).

The UN encourages regional arrangement to resolve conflicts as enshrined in Article 52 of the UN Charter. Despite the involvement of regional security arrangements in conflict resolution, the Security Council

and General Assembly remains preeminent and reserves the right to mediate in conflicts. Article 52 of the UN Charter explicitly state that:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies from dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and are consistent with the purpose and principle of the United Nations.

Urquhurt (1990) advocates the need to impose robust measures into peacekeeping to safe guard international peace and security.This is most relevant to peacekeeping missions in Africa as seen in the situations in Mali, DR Congo, Somalia and Darfur where criminal elements and spoilers undermine the operations of the missions.

According to Fung (1996), the deployment of PSO in Africa is derived from two sources: internal source from AU effort and external sources from the support of the West towards African initiative. Fung further argues that peacekeeping requires a well-defined focus to ensure greater political sensitivity and an appropriate legal framework to ensure success. This is because the interests of countries tend to affect the perception and attitude of contingents in conflict situation.

Peacekeeping efforts in Africa are not often due to the promptness of the UN. According to Ndiomu:

Before UN sends peacekeeping, it usually waits for an invitation from the government of the host nation in an internal crisis. Where it is an inter-state crisis, party has to raise the matter at the UN through the Secretary General. Situations today seem to have eroded the “wait-for-invitation” posture of the UN over internal crisis (Ndiomu, 1999:15).

UN delay in response to conflict in Africa as is Darfur has awakened the need for sub-regional security bodies to ensure stability. This is in consonant with Zartman‟s view that sub-regional bodies like Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Commission (SADC) could ensure sub-regional security despite the overarching role of AU. This brings into focus the theory of hegemonic stability of states which “assumes that the world as a system requires a dominant leader for all its subsystems to function smoothly and to be stable” (Zartman, 2000). This demands the recognition of some countries in Africa as sub-regional leaders asthese countries will assume leadership roles of shouldering security responsibility within their regions towards the achievement of peace and stability in Africa. This position was exemplified in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Gambia where Nigeria led ECOMOG intervened in the crisis in these countries.

Peacekeeping operations therefore, will often be used in stabilising peace and security in conflicts areas. The use of regional bodies in the conduct of peacekeeping operations partly due to inherent challenges in the UN approach to maintaining international peace and security, introduced a new dimension to global peacekeeping like the current hybrid arrangement in

Darfur. While the future of UN and multinational Peacekeeping approaches has undergone considerable debate during the past decade, there is still a lack of consensus towards an agreed way forward. Failed PSO like in Somalia and those that have left less than workable society even after long deployment periods as in DR Congo continue to suggest that peacekeeping as it is currently defined needs serious conceptual and implementation transformation (Firtz Gerald, 2000).

The past traditional PKO like UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai were underpinned by the UN Charters Chapter VI principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self defence. Chapter VI mandates are mostly used at an early and latter stages of a conflict whileChapter VII mandates which authorizes the use of force by coercive or non-coercive means is evoked if the situation deteriorates to the extent that robust military action is necessary. The ratification process ofChapter VII mandates is difficult particularly if it triggers sensitivities ofUNSC P5 members who have the right to exercise a veto, i.e. China and Russia over deployment of troops to KOSOVO and China over some sections of UNAMID mandate in Darfur.

Peacekeeping Operation can also be conducted by a “Coalition of the willing” or a unilateral single – nation intervention. The US and UK led “Coalition of the willing” in the 1990 and 2003 Gulf wars, are examples. Contemporary conflict intervention can therefore be categorized into three types: UN-sanctioned/UN led operation, UN-sanctioned/regional

organization led operation and the combination of both. The emergency of closely related concepts such as “multidimensional peacekeeping”, “wider peacekeeping” and "complex humanitarian emergencies ” in the mid 1990s are recognition to the multi-agency context of peacekeeping and the important functions of the military, police and civilian components and the need for close coordination (Firtz Gerald, 2000).

Tragic impacts of conflicts and varied initiatives to address them occasioned impressive body of literature by scholars and practitioners. Within UN framework, the whole gamut of state mandate for collective peace and security straddles UN Charter's chapters VI (pacific settlement of disputes) VII (Measures relating to peace, breaches of peace and act of aggression), and VIII (Regional arrangements). These measures provide guidance to institutional response to conflict resolution demands.Peacekeeping, thus, reflects an umbrella term for UN and allied regional intervention aimed at stabilizing and restoring peace and stability to states in conflict. There is evident difficulty in categorizing huge literature on intervention exemplified as peace operations owing mainly to analysis overlap. However, we can identify five possible headings: peacekeeping in international relations theory; evolution of peacekeeping; peace operations capacity, effectiveness; case studies; regional and national perspectives (Center for International Cooperation, 2005).

Some works criticize the predominant focus on operational issues associated with peacekeeping with little reference to its implication for present world order (R Paris, 2000). Such analysts argue that peace interventions examination should transcend operational matters like problem, effectiveness, experience of peacekeepers and reflect on global culture role of norms, power politics, among others salient features of international politics. Alex Bellamy et al in canvassing for extension of analytical scope show seemingly realist/liberal divide in the operationalization of peacekeeping (Bellamy et. al., 2006). Accordingly, the Westphalia diverges from the post Westphalian in its sovereignty

emphasis on host state consent, contrary to the latter which permits intervention in state- building in target states with less recourse to consent. The study, therefore, concludes that peace operations are informed by liberal values. A seemingly nuanced acknowledgement of issues of power mirroring realist interpretation is seen in the work by Norrie MacQueen who observes peacekeeping as an activity undertaken in a system of states composed of competing centres of power in pursuit of their own interests (MacQueen, 2006).

Michael pugh (2004:39) also challenges dominant „problem-solving‟ model which limits discourse to parameters set by current world order rather than „critical perspectives‟ (Pugh, 2004). To him peacekeeping discourse should transcend traditional wisdom and power in the international system and tension between sovereignty and human security. While highlighting emergence of new norms to guide the use of force and protection of human security, he claims that UN should shift from its preoccupation with external aggression to domestic mass atrocities. Therefore UN should consider “elevating the doctrine of preventing mass atrocities against people to the same level of collective responsibility as preventing and repelling armed aggression against states” (Thakur, 2006:18). In locating analysis in international relations theory, some examine how to rebuild post-conflict states in the light of traditional constraints imposed by national sovereignty which conditions current practice. They therefore suggest an accession of some domestic authority („shared sovereignty‟) to supranational bodies with capacity (Krasner, 2005). Also gender related issues like systematic violence to women, women trafficking, role of women in conflict and its resolution have provoked studies (Mazurana, et. al. (eds), 2005).

Another category of literature is on the evolution of peacekeeping which has led some to generate typologies. For example Paul diehl and Alex Bellamy respectively identify twelve and five aspects of peace operations. Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge and Sybert Liebenberg (2004:125) argue that because of the economic agendas which drive African conflicts, „developmental peacekeeping‟ should replace traditional perspective grounded in military solution with less attention to peace building. Highlighting external

domineering power in embattled states, Adekeye Adebajo (2003:62-81) identifies

„hegemonic peacekeeping‟ and its demonstration by US and Nigeria in Somalia and Liberia respectively. The classifications pose analytical problems as they overlap, but point to the broadening of the practice.

Although UN charter makes no reference to peacekeeping, 1956 Suez conflict occasioned its experimentation involving insertion of neutral, lightly armed forces with consent of host parties to monitor ceasefire and create suitable climate for negotiation by belligerent parties. Though the UN had earlier deployed unarmed Military Observers in the Middle East; UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in Kashmir in 1948 and 1949 respectively, UN peacekeeping deployments later extended to intra –state situations exemplified by the 1960s peacekeeping in Congo. With the end of Cold war, traditional mandate limiting its scope to ceasefire and election monitoring was expanded to protection, stabilization, justice, institution- building and development, and at times enforcement functions. Specifically the multinational personnel now beyond observation perform roles like humanitarian assistance, DDR, assistance in peace agreement implementation, human rights protection, security sector reform, support reconciliation measures, reconstruction and institution-building, among others. It is this expanded mandate undertaken by peacekeepers (military, police and civilian partners) that informs its seeming categorization as peace support operations (Fortier, 2003:181-196).

Peacekeeping literature has also paid attention to capacity and effectiveness. Michael O'Hansion and Peter Singer (2006) article on generating capacity for multilateral humanitarian operations argues that based on existing gap between global demand and supply capacities, personnel capacity can be inexpensively boosted by international community‟s commitment. From their analysis, a standby pool of 200,000 and 20,000 military and police personnel respectively can be generated, supported by resource reallocation for engagements in conflict theatres. This will bridge the evident gap. Virginnia Fortna (2004) examines the impact of peacekeeping on attainment of durable

peace in interstate and intra-state conflicts. Her empirical study analyzing factors like death tool, lootable resources available, military outcome of war, conflict nature, parties, duration and issues, and state army size, concludes that peacekeeping contributes significantly to the attainment of durable peace, although some of the accompanying mechanisms may not be expectedly impactful. However, Duane Bratt explain the varied performance of UN peacekeeping which ranges from cautious success to disastrous failure (Bratt, 1997). The study examines the factors of UN peacekeeping principles, roles of conflict parties, UNSC permanent members, among other, in determining outcomes.

Howard identifies the learning curve in the successes and failures of UN peacekeeping particularly in Africa. The central finding of the study is that peacekeepersare more successful when they actively learn from the operating environment rather than from UN headquarters about how best to implement mandates (Howard, 2008). David Carment and Martin Rudner detail the place of accurate and timely information base and specific intelligence products in peacekeeping planning and execution. This is more necessary within wider multidimensional, complex operation in challenging circumstances especially in Africa. Another significant area of discourse is the problem of peacekeeping covering UN and regional peacekeeping. Although, each operation has its own peculiarities, generally issues which impose constraints on operations include funding and equipment, political commitment, troop generation and deployment, troops capacity, belligerent use of force and entrenched positions.

The volumes on case studies affirm frequency and magnitude of, and issues attendant to peacekeeping globally. Arguably, every mission theatre has elicited sizeable literature upon which theatres and practices have been examined (Misra, 2004: 271-288). Expectedly, these studies mainly explore causes and nature of such conflicts, internal and external interests, and effectiveness of such operations among others. These works mainly highlighting lesson learnt are instructive guiding future operations.

Regional and national perspectives are also commonly documented. Regional perspectives embody literature on activities of supranational organizations like AU, NATO, European Union, ECOWAS, among others (Frantzen, 2005). The academic interest in African conflicts and particularly intra-state conflicts has given rise to several publications. The literature address variously the typology, nature, parties, issues, cause and consequences of conflicts as well as success of failure of peace processes (Furley (ed), 1995). Particularly, internal stability of several African states became more threatened following the end of the Cold War era through profusion of „catastrophic wars.‟

Huge body of literature exists on the place of regional organizations in African conflict management (Murithi, 2005). Regarding OAU now AU, the thrust of its examination profiles it as complete failure in mediating internal state combustion owing to institutional incapability, namely in tenacity to the principle of sovereignty, despite its feverish attempts in Chad (1981-1982), Rwanda (1993) Burundi (1994), and Comoros (1997-1999). The process of self-discovery and reformation provoked notably by contemporary challenges necessitated its transformation into AU which midwifed a new African peace and security architecture permitting intervention in member state‟s affairs “in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity,” and exemplified by initiatives in Darfur and Somalia.

Meanwhile, the regional bodies in the 1990s provoked by peculiar challenges and OAU‟s failings mainstreamed variously into conflict management and resolution, despite their original preoccupation with economic (ECOWAS, SADC) and relief (IGAD) concern. Particularly, despite well known challenges in its earlier attempts, ECOWAS role in resolving the conflicts in Liberia (1990-1997) Sierra Leone (1998), Guinea-Bissau (1999), Cote D‟Ivoire (2003), Mali (2013) and now Gambia (2017) tended to provide framework for regional peacekeeping. Some of these operations have featured in several works on the realities and challenges of mediating in African conflicts (Francis, 2001).

In relation to motivation for intervention decisions by contributing countries to regional and UN operations, select literature will be instructive. In explaining US intervention in Third World internal wars, Mi Yoon empirically analyses the motivations behind US role by testing three hypotheses-strategic and economic variables and domestic factors of US foreign policy. While the economic interests received marginal support and the domestic factor had no relevance, the strategic variable received most empirical support. The study notes that US intervention in conflicts reflected largely as Cold War containment reaction to Soviet role in such theatres (Yoon, 1997: 580-602).

The article by Shimizu and Sandler investigates proportionality in peacekeeping costs bearing between 1994 and 2000, and tests the assumption that major states underwrite such burden while small states engage in free riding (Shimizu and Sandler, 2002: 651-668). In an examination of both UN and non-UN-led interventions, the study indicates that in the post Cold War period, the large states disproportionate role in peacekeeping burden sharing engenders purely public goods of global peace and stability, and growing tendency implies the exploitation of the rich by the poor small states.

James Lebovic (2004:910-936) examines the relationship between regime type and contribution to UN peace operation in the post-Cold War era. It observes that despite political, military and economic costs, several states show enthusiasm for UN operations. Testing hypothesis about inclination to peacekeeping and level of democracy in a global set of countries, Lebovic concludes that democracies contributes more than non- democratic states to post-Cold War missions. The capable contributors affording UN requirements in terms of professional manpower, equipment, communication, logistics, and heavy weaponry are among the world‟s democracies, it notes. Also the article explains that the decision to contribute troops is influenced primarily by the democratic character of a country and attendant recognition to inalienability of human rights which necessitate its promotion and defence (Lebovic, 2004:910-936).

John Fishel and Andres Seanz in their edited work on peacekeeping operation in Haiti, discussed the strategic-level lessons in capacity building by contributing states, namely Argentina, Canada, Guatemala, Peru, US, Uruguay and Brazil. It found prestige, international obligation, hemispheric solidarity, and economic and military incentives as core states objectives. The study also assessed the national interagency capacity for peace operations by contributing countries with recommendations to enhance regional capacity for managing such conflicts.

In the politics of peacekeeping in the post- Cold War Era edited by D.S. Sorensen and P.C. Wood, the authors identify varied national level motivations and domestic factors in the decision making process for involvement in peace operations (Sorensen and Woods (eds), 2005). The motives ranged from relevance, prestige, aspiration for permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, power demonstration, economic gains, to troops capacity building experience. The powers like US, France, Britain, and Germany, had as core incentives, response to humanitarian concerns and justification of international rank and relevance. The US was singled out as motivated largely by advancement of national interests rather than collective interests. Canada and the Nordic states were mainly inspired by ambition to act as neutrals and international influence, while other participants sought to forestall regional consequences, fulfil treaty obligations, and realize economic and capacity enhancement objectives.

The protracted conflict in Sudan elicited academic attention also. Its earlier North/South wars attracted publications which highlighted several aspects of the conflict (Johnson, 2003). With the emergence of Darfur conflict in 2003 and subsequent international response to it, studies focused analytical attention to the theatre. Expectedly various titles reflect aptly the focus and arguments of existing literature: Seth Appiah- Mensah‟s insider account of AMIS challenges (Appiah-Mensah, 2005: 7-21), Alex de Wall‟s examination of ongoing conflict‟s history, parties and peace process (deWaal, 2005), Luke Patey‟s contribution on relational effect of issues surrounding resources on Sudan conflicts (Patey, 2005: 997-1016) and Max Plessis and Christopher Gevers‟

optimism about criminal accountability by leaders in the conflict, particularly President al- Bashir, following the conclusions of International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur ( DuPlassis and Gevers, 2005: 23-34).Other perspectives include Paul Williams and Alex Bellamy‟s analysis of the gap between professions of commitment to norm of humanitarian intervention and the reluctance to robustly engage the conflict, a demonstration of major powers failure to apply the responsibility to protect principle (Williams and Ballamy, 2005: 27-47) and Don Cheadle and John Prendergast‟s advocacy for humanitarian intervention in the light of evidently mass atrocity crimes in Darfur (Cheadle and Prendergast, 2007). From Nigerian perspective modest attempts have been made, particularly by Alex Ogomudia‟s edited panoramic view of sundry military engagements by Nigeria with a scant reference to Darfur (Ogomudia: 2000).

Largely missing in the literature is an examination of UNAMID operation in the Darfur crisis and how it has influenced the security situation. The Darfur conflict presented opportunity for experimentation of hybrid peace operation between UN and AU with varied lessons for future undertakings. Darfur is an opportunity to assess the impact of such lessons, particularly in perspective and interest, and to determine if the concept of hybrid peace operations represents the future of peacekeeping in Africa. How does this compare with the classical UN PSO in Africa like in DRC? Do they have similarities in methodology and agenda? By providing answers to these questions, the research adds to knowledge on the continued suitability of the hybrid arrangement as a model for PSO and the extent to which UN PSO enhanced African security. By investigating the role of UN through PSO to manage conflicts in Africa, the research shows the impact of presence or absence of credibility and motivations on the prospects of involvement in conflicts.

# PEACEKEEPING AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM TO ENHANCE AFRICAN SECURITY

The aim of conflict resolution is to transform actual or potential violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political changes. Conflict resolution addresses the fundamental causes of conflicts with the aims of producing a solutions acceptable to all parties.This involves the use of several mechanisms including mediation, reconciliation, negotiation and problem solving. According to Wallensteen, conflict resolution:

implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed,…changing behaviours so they are no longer violent, attitudes so they are no longer hostile, and structures so they are no longer exploitative. The term is used to refer both to the process (or the intention) to bring about these changes and to the completion of the processof conflict diagnosing and applying appropriate methods which address the root cause of the conflict(Wallensteen, 2002:8).

Conflict resolution involves parties to a conflict reaching an agreement that solves their incompatibilities and leads to the termination of violent action against each other. Traditionally,assumed that with good will, belligerents can settle their differences by negotiation and compromise; however in certain cases third party involvement may be required in form of peace support operation. Third party intervention as a method of conflict resolution helps to change the structure of conflict and pattern of communications which enables the third party to filter back the messages and behaviour of the parties in conflict towards finding a solution. Third party intervention may use both coercive hard power and soft power and it is therefore important to distinguish between powerful mediators and powerless mediators whose role is confined to communication and facilitation

(Ramsbotham, et al 2011:98). In contemporary interventions, a third party may need to have some coercive powers to effectively handle the mediation process. This can be achieved by the use of „carrot and stick‟. A third party should not be an interested party and is one that will not be affected by the outcome that stands on a different base. (James, 1990:287) The third party should be an enforcer and superior force characterizes parties who can play this role as in UN peace enforcement mission. However, it is increasingly becoming evident that some complex conflicts have not been contained even when coercive power is used.

Walleenten (2002:203) posits that it is common to find conflicts going on in two different areas but in the same geographical location which he refers to as regional conflict complexes. Resolving regional conflict complexes may require removing one conflict in one country which creates a momentum to resolve the next conflict. However, the interconnection of the conflict makes it difficult to implement an isolated agreement which undermines sustainable progress. Another method of resolving such complex conflicts will be resolving the most difficult conflict first with a hope to remove the regional conflict complex in a short span of time. This requires a shared analysis of what the central issues are and highly concerted efforts to tackle them. The Darfur conflict falls within the regional conflict complex considering the regional dynamics at play in the conflict.

The concept of conflict resolution involves the resolution of conflictby addressing the root causesand includes instituting socio-economic and political changes that will ensure that the values and needs of all parties to the

conflict are met. Kevin Avruch highlights the importance of cultural settings and the need to place conflict resolution processes in a larger “socio-cultural context and not isolate them from the encompassing worlds-of-meaning in which, in ongoing ways, they remain embedded” (Avruch, 1991:15). The Darfur conflict is a good example of where cultural appreciation of the history of African Arabs (Abbala tribe) is required for an enduring resolution to be achieved. Understanding the cultural context of conflict is therefore a key part of finding an enduring and holistic solution.

Conflict resolution in Africa needs to consider the resolution of manifest conflict and the institutionalisation of sustainable ways of preventing conflict (Stedman, 1996:383). This is better understood within the four existing theories on peace and conflict resolution:the relationship between force and conflict resolution, justice and conflict resolution, community and conflict resolution as well as understanding and conflict resolution. Zartman in the concept of ripeness highlighted the relationship between force and conflict resolution. He contends that specific conflicts can be resolved when the parties reach mutually hurting stalemate(Zartman, 1996:120). Thisis when the actors know that the cost of conflict are likely to escalate and further escalation will be at a high cost to all, thus favouring settlement. The resolution however must meet the minimal needs of the parties to be enduring (Stedman, 1996:383).

The second theory on peace and conflict resolution is justice and conflict resolution which looks at the importance of justice in conflict

resolution. In this theory, the issues of exploitation and the inherent danger as the “uneven distribution of income and wealth in developing countries, poverty, famine and exploitation as well as horrendous gap between rich and poor . . . are explosive factors”. Obasanjo sees justice, peace and stability as indivisible and places the achievement of justice at the forefront of conflict resolution in Africa (Obasanjo, 2006).Thus, ensuring a sense of fairness is critical in conflict resolution particularly in the Darfur conflict.

The involvement of the community is also important in conflict resolution.Community in this case entails values, cultures, norms and institutions as a sense of shared fate prevents ethnic differences from becoming completely debilitating. The theory is reinforced by Ali Mazrui when he said: „the future of Africa depends on the extent to which it develops its own capacities to manage conflict with the support of international community and particularly, the UN‟ (Mazrui,2001). The above comment emphasises the institutional aspect of community in conflict resolution and the AU-UN mechanisms for conflict resolution is a practical application of this theory. The final theory is that of mutual understanding by parties to the conflict. Zartman posits that “parties in conflict must find formulas that satisfy their basic needs, thus parties in conflict need to „identify and acknowledge the needs of their antagonists and to see how unilateral actions affect the other while reducing differences and divergence position among them” (Steadman, 1996:384). Burton John believes that “once each side is accurately informed of the perceptions of the other, of the alternative values and goals, of the alternative means and cost of achieving them, the possible

outcomes acceptable to the parties are revealed” (Burton: 1982:122). While each of the theories discussed can be used independently in resolving a conflict, the combination of the four theories (force, justice, community and understanding) present the best solution particularly for complex and deep noted conflicts like the Darfur conflict.

There is considerable logic and linkage inherent in treating peacekeeping as a conflict resolution mechanism as argued by Fetherston(1994), Fetherston, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1994), Mandell (1996). A key benefit of understanding peacekeeping from conflict resolution perspective is in the difference between first and second generation peacekeeping missions which reflect a change in the character of international peacekeeping. Diehl (1998) contends that the second generation peacekeeping are more complex and involved in conflict resolutions as peacemaking and peace building functions involve use of negotiation, mediation and consultation among other conflict resolution mechanisms.

Other advantages from conceptualizing peacekeeping in terms of conflict resolution include the large empirical literature on these issues and conceptual distinctions that have been made among types of processes and structures (Diehl, 1998). The last benefit is in training, particularly operational and strategic level training on PSO which is viewed as a critical link between theory and practice. These levels of training on PSO are anchored and developed from conflict management research which focuses on the relationship and linkages among conditions, processes, and outcomes.

Peace enforcement missions for instance, emphasises primarily combat skills while peacekeeping missions depend on consent and non use of force except in selve defence. PKO whose primary purpose are monitoringuse observational and analytical skills. Conversely, those that attempt to restore countries to functioning civil societies as is the case in Darfur region of Sudan require broader range of skills (interpersonal and intergroup relations, communication, negotiation, and in the case of military operations, a mix of combat and political skills). Another training implication for peacekeeping include cultural training and orientation to mitigate cultural shock and different normative orientations that could undermine the effectiveness of peacekeepers in resolving conflict in mission areas.

Conflict management and resolution literature on PSO are basically focused on two issues: first is what role do peacekeepers assume in conflict and what is their bargaining orientation, second is weather peacekeepers have a distributive or integrative orientation to conflict management. Distributive bargaining entails attempt by parties to increase their own outcomes (usually money, territory, positions or power) while integrative bargaining favours achieving mutually beneficial solutions to a problem. As against distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining promote believe among warring parties that cooperation is possible and that one party‟s gain is not equal to the other‟s loss. Therefore, conflict management can reconcile the parties‟ interest and thus provide benefit to all ensuring a win- win situation.

Conflict is inherent in human nature and this study argues that the establishment and development of international organisations like the UN is critical in any campaign for conflict management and resolution. The conflict resolution mechanism of UN and AU indicate the willingness of states to reduce disturbances which informs deployment of UN PSO.KJ Holsti (2001) contends that incompatible objectives (interest) and policy actions are the root causes of conflicts between contending parties. He argued that sources of most conflicts are easy to identify as it could be the demand by one political group for territorial right and resources controlled by another or the effort by one group to impose politico – military or economic control over alien population. These demands however cannot be met except at the sacrifice of the other state core values and interest which often led to conflicts which may require third party interventions for the maintenance of international peace and security. Vital national interest is therefore at play in most conflicts and once the sources of conflict are clearly identified it is relatively easy to manage particularly by a third party like the UN that can balance the power play by states. This is considering that the UN charter specify acceptable behaviour by member states to meet the purpose of international peace and security by settling disputes through peaceful means.

Professor Tom Woodhouse (2004) contend that peacekeeping operations entails promoting durable peace and a sustainable solution. This brings peacekeeping squarely into the realm of conflict resolution. Peacekeeping normallypresuppose the existence of a pre-determined ceasefire agreement, involve a clear and practical mandate, support of the

mandating authority and willingness of the TCCs to contributetroops, funds and logistics support for the operation among others. This issues raised by Woodhouse are critical, and underpin, the challenges UNAMID has in ensuring security in Darfur.

# THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

The conditions for the maintenance of international peace and security are hardly espoused in a single universal theory. However, the linear relationship between international organisations and maintenance of peace and security is implied in the functionalist theory. The research is thus situated within the rubric of the framework provided by the functionalist theory and reference will be made to the seminal work of theorist David Mitrany. It is noteworthy to emphasize however, that this study is not in any way part of the debate on countries in the unions between the global North and South. While its benefits for Africa has severally been challenged, 'Functionalist Theory', in spite of any shortcomings, remains relevant in discussing the workings of international organisations. Functionalism refers to “that policy of shifting responsibility for resolving problems from the nation-state to international bodies indirectly” (Banyan, 2005:1). The role of states and governments under functionalism is increasingly reduced by indirect methods while integration is encouraged through functionally based cross-national ties. Neo functionalism furthers the functionalist perspective on integration as it calls for the development of official supranational organizations such as the European Union, that acquire the sovereignty and

the status, in many different areas, normally reserved to the exercise of the nation state. It reintroduced territorialism in the functional theory and down played its global dimension though it is simultaneously a theory and a strategy of regional integration building on the work of David Mitrany. Neofunctionalists thus focused their attention in the process of integration among states, i.e regional integration.

Functionalism developed during the inter war period due to concern about the obsolescence of the state as a form of social organisation. Functionalists focus on common interests and needs shared by states (but also by non-state actors) in a process of global integration triggered by the erosion of state sovereignty and the increasing weight of knowledge and hence of scientists and experts in the process of policy making (Rosamond, 2000). This is against realist who focus on the self interest of states. The roots of functionalism is based on the liberal/idealist tradition. Mitrany (1943) argues that “functionalism is not a promise to act in a crisis but itself the action that will avoid crisis” (Mitrany 1943). Functionalism is not a prescriptive theory and its agenda is focused on public welfare and human needs rather than the sanctity of nation states. This is best achieved in a world where transitional organizations control specific „functions‟ of human life.

Functionalism is a pioneer in globalization theory and strategy and proposed to build a form of authority based in functions and needs which linked authority with needs, scientific knowledge, expertise and technology as against states that had built authority structures on a principle of

territorialism (Held 1996, Scholte, 2000). Functionalism therefore provides for a supraterritorial concept of authority. It argues that international integration (the collective governance and material interdependence between states) develops its own internal dynamic as states integrate in limited functional, technical, and/or economic areas (Miltrany, 1933: 101). International organisations like the UN would meet human needs through use of knowledge and expertise and this would attract the loyalty of the population and inform there desire for integration. Functionalism is underpinned by the assumption that integration takes place within a framework of human freedom, that knowledge and expertise are currently available to meet the needs for which the functional agencies are built and that states will not sabotage the process.

The fundamental principles of functionalism are peace and prosperity which is the dominant goal of actors and can be achieved through collaboration while the instruments of state policy are economic instruments and political acts of will achieved through negotiation. Other principles include initial emphasis on low politics, such as economic and social issues achieved by reaching consensus as the forces behind agenda formation. Functionalist see the role of international organisation as substantial, as functional international organizations will formulate policy and become increasingly responsible for implementation (McCormick, 2006). Functionalism approaches issues of international relations and integration from a liberal/idealist perspective as against the traditional state-centric theories of realism.


Critics of functionalism argue that it assumes that the determination of needs is an objective and technocratic exercise, however, today it is widely recognized that this is fundamentally political. Needs are not simply a given and determining them is inherently a political process. Also the logic of functionalism does not work well in areas of production, trade and distribution due to their competitive nature as against area of administration of railways and shipping. Rosamond contends that “the application of a functionalist template to systems of production, finance and trade would be a task requiring fundamental alterations to the behavioural logic of firms, markets and finances” (Rosamond, 2000).

Functionalism relies heavily on the rationality of all people particularly a government based on the primacy of human needs but in focusing on rational and objective decisions functionalism ignores that administration is inherently political. Similarly, Mitrany is often criticised for being unscientific in his work partly because of the audience of his work which were politicians and the public requiring a less technical approach rather than scholars and academics. Ultimately, functionalism is clearly not a perfect idea hence its further refinements by neofunctionalist to allow its application to European integration. Currently, the Brexit questions the functionalist theory particularly as regards the continued utility of supranational organisations and their involvement in the areas of production, trade and distribution.

By way of summary, functionalism theory according to its own precepts, involves the theory and practice of indirect shifting of responsibility

for resolving problems from nation states to international bodies towards the maintenance of peace and prosperity. As such, the actual condition and performance of international organisations like the UN overtime can help us to gauge the extent to which global peace and prosperity is being realized. This theoretical premise is graphically illustrated in Figure: 2.9.

# FIGURE 2.9: A GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE THEORETICAL PREMISE OF THE STUDY



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International Security / Sustainment of Peace and Prosperity

Increasing effectiveness and capability in conduct

Constant Deployment of PSO Overtime e.g.

Source: Researcher's adapted Model, 2017.

The Functionalist Theory notwithstanding its limitations and weaknesses adequately explain the role of international organisations like the

UN in maintaining peace and security in the world and in particular ensuring peace and security in Darfur Sudan. Peace and security is not just about the absence of conflicts and crisis in the society, it also involves enabling sustainable development and empowering people and communities to develop the capability of making informed choices. The protection of the vital freedoms fundamental to human existence and development thus, remains crucial to the maintenance of African security.

Peace support operations evolved from Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter with emphasis on ensuring a conducive environment for international peace and security. It is designed to achieve humanitarian goals and long term political settlement towards transforming war torn societies like Darfur

* Sudan into liberal democratic societies. This in effect reflects the end state of UNAMID operations in Darfur aimed at achieving durable peace, security and stability in Darfur necessary for regional stability. This is in line with functionalist emphasis on public welfare and human needs which deemphasise sanctity of nation states. The UN search for peace and prosperity in Darfur through UNAMID in collaboration with AU thus reflects the fundamental principles of functionalism.

UN operations in Darfur is based on functionalist principles as specialized agencies of the UN such as the WHO, UNICEF, UNDP and WFP among other agencies which make up the UN Country Team Sudan collaborate with UNAMID towards achieving peace and sustainable development in Darfur. This collaboration is mostly in the achievement of the protection of civilians‟ task which is the core mandate of UNAMID. The

strategy to achieve the PoC core mandate is divided into five clusters of physical protection, humanitarian assistance, early recovery and social empowerment, protection through access to rights and protection through political engagement. This is in line with the functionalist framework which uses technical and scientific agencies to conduct specific reconstruction programs which are coordinated by the UN. Ultimately the transfer of various clusters of the POC mandate to functional agencies including the force elements and the network of interdependent relationships that these agencies would come to manage would seek to create „a working peace system‟ as espoused by David Mitrany. This whole process is underpinned by Article 55 of the UN Charter which seeks to promote conditions of stability and the promotion of higher living standard, economic and social progress and development.

Given the explanation on functionalist theory, the study examined the contribution of United Nations PSos to African security, particularly in Darfur Sudan. The core areas that are relevant to this study are the provision of security, PoC and creation of conditions for sustainable development. The study will assess the four priority areas of achievement of a comprehensive political solution; secure and stable environment; enhancement of rule of law, strengthened governance and human rights; and the achievement of a stabilized humanitarian situation. This led the researcher to investigate the impact of UNAMID operation on achievement of enduring security in Darfur.

# CHAPTER 3

**METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS**

The methodology of this Research is as follows:

# OBJECT OF THE STUDY

Decision on method is largely a function of issues and context of the study. The object of this research is African security and UN Peace Support Operations using UNAMID as a case study. According to an academic research expert, Yin (2003), the „strength of the case study method is its ability to examine, in depth, a “case” within its “real-life” context‟.The research is thus, particularly concerned with the extent to which UN PSO in African countries have enhanced sustainable security in these countries. The study, therefore, was based on anti-foundationalist ontology which assumes that `social reality is within us (J Collis and R Hussey, 2003), that is the world is socially constructed, rather than objective and existing independent of actors knowledge of it as posited by positivists (Marsh and Stocker (eds), 2002). In epistemological terms, it adopted interpretivist position, following from the socially constructed assumption of reality, that meanings and understandings of the world can be better drawn through interpretation. Interpretivist epistemology assumes that people experiences and practices can be accurately understood from their frame of reference (Davine, 2002).

Within the interpretivisittradition, social phenomenon or specifically UN peace support operations does not exist independently of the stakeholder‟s interpretation but their meanings and constructions of their experience and practice which affect outcome. This approach assumes that it is the perspective of participants that is paramount, hence the need to explore their subjective experiences and resultant meanings or interpretations they attach to the experiences.

The research design involved historical, interpretative of current empirical data from key stakeholders. What the study sought to understand as reflected in the research questions necessitated employment of qualitative technique to generate data which aligned with an interpretivist epistemologically constructed, dynamic social reality. Qualitative research methodology makes typically the most of myriad of specific useful information that can be obtained from and about particular contexts, through selecting purposely settings and informants that differ from one another (E Babbie and J Mouton, 2003).

# POPULATION SAMPLE FOR THE STUDY

The population sample selection is core consideration for embarking on any research. Such decision is critical as its hinges on issues of knowledge and consideration of setting of the study, access, collection of data, relationship with respondents, ethics, and validity (B Maxwell, 2010) Therefore, reasonable time frame was devoted to the generation of population

sample and identification of prospective interviewees‟ characteristics. The research objectives and assumptions necessitated selection criterion that was not based on quantitative population representation, gender or demographic reflection of subject population, rather than respondents who were relevantly informative as experts, opinion leaders, privileged witnesses, and central participants in the issue under study.

The adoption of purposive (incidental or opportunistic) sampling strategy was guided by the need to select appropriate informants who not only possessed requisite knowledge and experience, but also time, expressive ability and willingness to participate in the exercise. Aware of small population sample usually accommodated in qualitative intensive interview instrument unlike huge sample size of quantitative method aiming at typically numeric, generalizable, explanatory and predictive data, the researcher ensured variety of perspectives to generate credible data by approaching and interviewing relevantly diverse stakeholders. The respondents included scholars, civil society leaders, military and police personnel, diplomats, present and past government functionaries and leaders, and some Sudanese (Appendix C - notes on respondents). The field research was emic as the researcher‟s military background, experience as a UN Headquarters DPKO Staff, service in several peacekeeping operations, and also coordinationof the deployment of Nigerian Army troops for peacekeeping operation as Military Assistant to Chief of Army Staff (2006-2007) and Chief of Defence Staff (2007-2008) was most helpful in identification of respondents. Similarly, the researcher's knowledge of PKO and Darfur environment, also enhanced

identification of prospective respondents.The researcher's personal experience through involvement in Nigerian Army operations in Darfur and visit to Sudan several times as Military Assistant to Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Staff from 2006 to 2008 was also useful. He was also in Sudan for Armed Forces Command and Staff College African Study tour to that country in 2005 and visited Darfur severally as MLO-Darfur UN HQ from 2010-2014.

In order to have an objective and balanced appraisal of UN PSO in Darfur, six key stakeholders in the operation were identified as the sources of data for this research. These are UN HQ New York, AU HQ Addis Ababa, UNAMID-Darfur, Government of Sudan, TCCs and Local Darfurians. Past commanders of UNAMID and personnel who served there were also sampled. However, due to the technical complexities inherent in accessing the entire population of all these stakeholders, the determination of a sample from each of these stakeholders becomes imperative as shown in Table 3.1. A total of 75 respondents were interviewed as follows: UN HQ New York 12, AU HQ 5, UNAMID Darfur 17, GOS Darfur 3, TCC/PCC 36, and Local Darfurians 2. The 75 respondents were arrived at based on the need to get the perspectives of personnel in the various cells and branches of the six key stakeholders in the operation in order to ensure a holistic approach to the research. The UNDPKO which is the UN department in charge of PSO was selected to represent the UN HQ. UNDPKO is headed by USG and comprises of the Office of Operations (which is the political arm and overall lead), Office of Military Affairs, Department of Field Support and Office of Rule of

Law which includes the Police Division. At the UN HQ for instance, 12 respondents were interviewed based on the need to interview the DPKO leadership made up of the USG DPKO, ASG OO, ASG OMA (military Adviser) and the Director Africa 1, OO. The Darfur IOT which runs UNAMID has four key cells: Political Affairs, Military liaison, Police Liaison and Support Services Liaison. Similarly, OMA has three key cells among others (Military Planning Service, Force Generation Service and Current Military Operations Service) hence the interview of respondents representing the cells. One respondent from OROLSI provided the rule of law and police perspectives on UNAMID as OROLSI is in charge of UN Police and rule of law activities. Ultimately, the 12 respondents ensured that the involvement and perspectives of all UN HQs elements in UNAMID where captured. The same process was used in determining the number of respondents for the other stakeholders.

# TABLE 3.1: CATEGORIES AND SAMPLE OF RESPONDENTS

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Seri al | Categories of Respondent  s | Sample of Respondents | Samplin g Techniq  ue | Number of Responde  nts | Remarks |
| 1. | A. UN HQ | 🗸 USG DPKO, UN | Purposi | 12 |  |
|  | New | HQ | ve |  |
|  | York | 🗸 ASG, OO, DPKO | Samplin |  |
|  |  | UN HQ | g |  |
|  |  | 🗸 Military Adviser, |  |  |
|  |  | OMA, |  |  |
|  |  | DPKO, UN HQ |  |  |
|  |  | 🗸 Director Africa 1, |  |  |
|  |  | OO, DPKO, |  |  |
|  |  | UN HQ |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | 🗸 4 Officers, Darfur IOT, OO,  DPKO, UN HQ  🗸3 Officers, OMA, DPKO, UN  HQ  🗸1 Officers, OROLSI, DPKO,  UN HQ |  |  |  |
| 2. | B. AU HQ Addis  Ababa& AU  permanent Mission  UN,  New York | 🗸 Director, PSOD, AU HQ  🗸Officer, UNOAU, AU HQ  🗸 Senior Adviser, Peace and Security, AU UN  🗸 2 AU Desk Officers, AU HQ | Purposi ve Samplin g | 5 |  |
| 3. | C. UNAMID  Darfur | 🗸 JSR, UNAMID HQ,  El Fasher  🗸 FC, UNAMID HQ,  El Fasher  🗸 3 Sector Commanders  🗸 5 Branch Chiefs, UNAMID,  FHQ  🗸3 Staff Officers at different  Sectors HQs   * 3 MilObs   🗸 1 UNCT Officer | Purposi ve Samplin g | 17 | Including one from UNCT (to  highlight views of NGOsand civil society group) |
| 4. | D. GoS Darfur | 🗸 1 DRA Officer, El Fasher,  Darfur  🗸 1 Sudan Embassy Officer,  New York  🗸 1 North Darfur Government Official | Purposi ve Samplin g | 3 |  |
| 5. | E. TCC/PCC  (Nigeria) | 🗸 NSA  🗸2 CTOP - AHQ  🗸2 CTOP – DHQ | Purposi  ve and Snowba | 36 | Including 2  other TCCs represented |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | 🗸 PM, Nigeria PM, New York  🗸2 DA UN, New York  🗸 Director, DPKO, AHQ  🗸 Director, DPKO, DHQ  🗸 Coordinator, DPKO   * Min of Defence   + Senior   Counsellor, C34, PM of Nigeria  🗸 DA - AU HQ,  Addis Ababa  🗸 1 Staff Officers DPKO, DHQ  🗸 3 Staff Officers AHQ, DPKO  🗸 4 NIBATT  Commanders  🗸 2 UNAMID & AMIS  Commanders  🗸 10 Officers and Soldiers that participated in the mission | ll Samplin g |  | by:  DA UK  (perspective of UK as a member UNSC)  DA Rwanda |
| 6. | F. Local Darfurians | 🗸 1 Locals from North Darfur  🗸 1 West Local from Darfur | Purposi ve and Snowba ll  Samplin g | 2 |  |
|  | TOTAL |  |  | 75 |  |

In AU, the Peace and Security Department which is in charge of PSO was selected to represent the AU commission. The AU PSD includes the Peace Support Operations Division which is directly in charge of PSO. The UN

Office in AU, was also noted considering its interface with AU over the hybrid mission likewise the AU-UN Joint Mediation Support Team for Darfur domiciled at the AU Commission.

All the major branches of UNAMID were also selected as sources of data for this research. This includes the UNAMID FHQ, UNAMID Sector HQs, Police, Rule of Law, DFS and Political Affairs. The visit to UNAMID- Darfur provided an opportunity to understand the environment and associated challenges on the ground, operational planning for both current and future operations, logistics issues and the overall political and socio-economic dynamics that underpin operational activities and how it interacts with the security situation.

The interview discussions with FC and FCOS focused on overall operational guidance of the military component as regards the achievement of the mandate, review process, interaction and liaison with other components of the mission and CFC activities towards the implementation of the DDPD. Interview of FHQ branch chiefs (J1, J2, J3, J4, J5, J6, J7 and J9) were on various issues concerning their branches particularly with the Chief J3 on operational tasking and future operations, Chief J2 on current and projected security situation with emphasis on JEM and SRF post Khalil Ibrahim outlook, Chief J7 on CIMIC and QIP activities considering the critical nature of the humanitarian line of operation towards enhancing security and Chief J4 on military logistics issue with emphasis on COE. Interview with JOC focused on the achievement of Darfur wide security needed for the

implementation of the DDPD while the meeting with JMAC provided a holistic security assessment of current and projected situation. Interviews in Sectors North, South and West provided an opportunity to understand sector specific issues from the sector commanders and troops on the ground considering the diverse nature of Darfur and to observe troops activities. Most importantly, the opportunity was used to gauge the mood of local Darfurians,observed activities of the troops on the ground,and visit some QIP undertaken by some units to assess how it is contributing to peace building. On the political side, I interviewed the COS on issues of political direction towards political initiatives to resolve the conflict.

From GoS as an institution, the Darfur Regional Administration and the Government of North and South Darfur States were chosen as the conflict in Darfur is located in these areas. The officials of the Permanent Representative of Sudan to the UN and Sudan Embassy in Abuja were also interviewed as they represent the GoS in UN and Nigeria. For TCCs, Nigeria was chosen for ease of proximity and most importantly, Nigeria was the largest TCC in Darfur with over 4 Inf Bns, one Recce Unit and one Field Hospital as at 2012. Nigeria is also the longest TCC in Darfur having deployed to Darfur in 2003 during the first wave of AMIS deployment. Considering the large number of Nigerian units that have deployed in Darfur since 2003, efforts were made to ensure time spread by seeking out units and personnel that served in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. The units that served in Darfur during these periods are as indicated in Table 3.2 and efforts were made to interview some of their personnel who took part in the

mission. This ensured that there was no gap in the thesis considering that the perspectives of peace keepers who served in the mission from 2006 – 2016 were captured.

# TABLE 3.2: NIGERIAN TROOPS DEPLOYMENT IN UNAMID

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Serial | UNIT/  NIBATT | Time  Deployed | Unit Location in  Darfur | Peace Time  Location in Nigeria | Remark |
| 1. | 244 Bn | 2006 | El Genina | Shaki | Lt Col FO Ali now Maj Gen  FO Ali (Rtd) was the CO |
| 2. | 195 Bn | 2008 | El-Genina | Agene bode | Col MM Ndache (Rtd) was  the CO |
| 3. | 26 Bn | 2010 | Kutum | Sokoto |  |
| 4. | 341 Bn | 2012 | Nyala | Ogoja |  |
| 5. | 65 Bn | 2014 | Nyala | Lagos | Col MS Dasuki - CO |
| 6. | 244 Bn | 2016 | Nyala | Shaki |  |

Source: Compiled by Researcher from Units End of Mission Reports, AHQ, Abuja, 2017.

African DA's community accredited to UN HQ New York particularly DA Rwanda and Ethiopia were also selected as they had large contingents in UNAMID. Local Darfurians in El-Fashir, Darfur North were chosen due to proximity to UNAMID HQ and for security reasons.

Appreciation of issues pertaining to access to key respondents and institutions is an important part of research process. In the study, accessing many of the personalities and institutions was quite challenging, typically due to their varied geographical location and busy schedules. Institutional bureaucracy was also evident in securing management approval; for access to official documents and interview conversations with relevant staff. However, my personal involvement and working experience in UN HQ New York as Force Generation Desk Officer UNAMID, Office of Military Affairs, UNDPKO and later as MLO-Darfur IOT, Office of operations, UNDPKO made it easy, as I was already part of the UN HQ System and a key part of

UNAMID Desk in UN HQ. I thus had direct contact with all the key actors in UN HQ, AU HQ and UNAMID, El-Fashir. The associated challenge of accessing such high profile individuals was thus relatively handled.

Within the purposive sampling strategy, the researcher found snowball sampling also useful in dealing with past personnel who served in the Mission primarily from Nigeria. In snowball (referral) technique, participants are required to nominate or recommend prospective respondents. The strategy provides access to network of people, friends, colleagues who might ordinarily be difficult to reach. Characteristically, such nominations were based on relevance to required experience and the privilege of approaching respondents as a senior military officer, supported by introduction letters, telephone calls, email messages, and personal visits for purpose of introduction and follow-up made it easier. Equally, personal contacts in UNAMID and Nigerian Army were instrumental in quickening interview opportunities. My initial communication with potential respondents included explanation of research topic, objectives or purposes, and rationale for their selection. While most respondents proved comparatively receptive considering logistics for setting up interviews and actual interviews owing to their interest in the research subject, some required several calls and efforts to arrange an interview.

Ethical consideration was also factored into the research. This necessitated that before every interview, agreement on confidentiality/anonymity, research rationale, boundary, feedback, usage of

tape recorder and photograph during the interviews were cleared with the respondents. Regarding feedback, only a few demanded a replay of the recordings, while one read through the transcribed text. Some participants accepted photo sessions with researcher during interviews, and permitted usage in the work while some did not. In fact, some respondents believed the photo sessions were necessary part of such exercise, as further confirmation that the interviews were conducted. Meanwhile, two Sudanese participants comprising Northerners and Darfurians pleaded anonymity; hence the attribution of their views to such unrelated initials as Mr A. or Mr B.

# SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION

1. **Primary Data**. The study adopted unstructured face -to- face interview strategy. The strength of qualitative interviewing is evident in its naturalistic, autobiographical, in-depth, interactive, open-ended, non-directive and narrative properties (J Moson, 2002) which are compatible with revelatory understanding and insights that the research sought to highlight. As the study was particularly interested in exploring or understanding participants subjective meanings and interpretation of actors – UN peace support operation engagements – rather than frequency of particular views or opinions associated with quantitative techniques, open – ended interview protocol became necessary. The researcher initially produced an interview guide, as a checklist of topics to be covered. Reflection of the levels /status of potential interviewees occasioned creation of separate but

related interview guides developed from relevant literature, discussions with supervisor and other academics and personal knowledge of the subject.

The unstructured interview instrument in its flexibility allowed more reflection, nuanced, context, depth, and interpretation from the respondents. The qualitative interviewing method enabled respondents to be more open, and therefore enhanced obtaining of arguably accurate and greater depth of information about respondents feelings and opinions. The exercise also enabled development of the researcher‟s ideas through respondents‟ opinions which yielded new ideas and insights. During interview sessions, the use of probes helped to follow up points of interest, to explore respondents‟ views and experiences in more depth, and in some cases necessitated reformulation or modification of the topics. The sessions held in the locations chosen by the participants, mainly in their offices, and based on their consent, the interviews were tape-recorded and involved note taking as a back-up.

As usually associated with elite interviewing (C Marshall and G Rossman, 2004), considering respondents standing, where they might tend to dominate the process due to perceived expertise and influential positions and expressive abilities, researcher well aware of the possibility was prepared and always creatively maintained control of the process, helped by his familiarities with the subject and focus on research questions. The interviewees‟ status was instructive in eliminating interview bias as researcher‟s presence did not influence respondents‟ responses with their preconceived expertise and authority on the subject matter. Throughout the interview sessions, the researcher maintained polite indifference to participants‟ opinions to avoid seeming being judgemental. Also, the researcher noted conversations prior and after interviews as in certain cases helped provide further clarification or relevant information, equally a raw material for subsequent interview sessions.

The interviews were from USG DPKO and team, Darfur IOT Office of Operation, AU PSD and team, UNAMID HQ elements, local Darfurians and past

commanders officers and men of the Mission. However, in the course of the research, the researcher was not able to make it to Sector East and Central (Eastern Darfur and Central Darfur) due to local UN transport issues. However, the other 3 sectors of the mission North, West and South were fully covered. Similarly, previous contingents members of the mission who served from 2007-2015 interviewed were only Nigerians as it was not possible to travel to other countries and locate them. Indeed all past contingent members interviewed were of the opinion that past Nigerian Contingent members would suffice as Nigeria had the largest troops in the mission at a stage plus support elements, thus, Nigerian troops were deployed in each of the sectors. This provided first hand information on the situation throughout Darfur.

Focused Group Discussion was also held amongst Darfur IOT, UN HQ who were researcher's professional colleagues in UN on strategic level issues like political support of UN Security Council and UN member states for the mission, sustainment issues and interface with AU. Focused Group Discussion was also held amongst NA officers who served in the mission as Military observers and Staff Officers. Discussions with Military observers were key as they were opportuned to deploy to remote Darfur villages due to their terms of reference. Questions raised in the discussion and interview were structured as to capture the extent to which each specific goals in UNAMID mandate was achieved and how it translated to improve security in Darfur. The research also probed as to why certain objectives and tasks in the mandate were not achieved. The details of the focus group discussion are at Appendix B.

1. **Secondary Data**. The secondary data used in the research included journals, books, newspapers, magazines, unpublished papers as well as internet, official publications and documents of the UN. Reports, journals, memoirs, magazines, books written by participants in PSO were consulted for first hand information on the problems experienced by UN in Darfur. *The UN Review*, *The UN Chronicles*

and *the UN General Assembly Official Records*, Security Council Resolutions, UN DPKO official reports and Nigerian Army reports on this operation were used as they contained valuable information on PSO and the problems associated with it. The official publications and documents of the UN provided insights into the conduct of UN PSO from the UN perspective while the reports, journals and memoirs by participants in UNAMID provided information as to how UN PSO are conducted on the ground in mission areas.

Other sources of primary data used include Nigerian Army reports on UNAMID from a TCC point of view especially as regards issues bordering on equipment leasing, COE, strategic transport and funding. End of mission reports of Nigerian Battalions and military observers deployed all over Sudan which provided information on political, military and socio-economic conditions on the ground in very remote villages were also used. It also provided insight on the perception of local Darfurians and Sudanese on the presence and activities of UN. This ensured that events all over Darfur and Sudan were collated and brought to bear in the study. The researcher benefitted from official documents, UN Security Council Resolutions and AU summit communiqués and press releases.

The Libraries of Ministry of Defence, Abuja, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Jos, the National Defence College Abuja, the International Institute of Strategic Studies online library UK, the Joint Services Command and Staff College online Library, UK andDag Hammarskjold Library UN HQ, among others were used. The UN HQ in New York contained a lot of primary and secondary data likewise the field mission in Darfur. This was sifted to provide enough evidence to determine the nature of the operations on the ground and problems faced by peacekeepers which corroborated information from field study in Sudan. Data from UN DPKO New York was also used to compare between UN PSO in Africa and those in other parts of the world. This was particularly in areas of funding, logistics back up, mission setup and administration, and P5 political

support. This helped establish the influence of geo-strategic significance of host country/region in deployment and administration of UN PSO.

# DATA ANALYSIS

The data analysis is based on qualitative methods which applied logical reasoning based on facts. In data analysis, transcripts were read severally until different themes emerged and synthesized to generate explanations and understandings for conclusions. Qualitative research does not aim to quantify phenomena, therefore, data generated were not reflected, or frequency of responses counted. Data collected from primary and secondary sources were thus analyzed qualitatively and reported in descriptive forms. The descriptive format enabled juxtaposition, conversation and interaction between both key data sources to generate understanding for the research questions.

In the presentation, relevant maps, UNAMID incidents statistics, charts and graphs, tables from literature and photographs were used to add illuminating effects to narratives, thereby revealing what words alone could not. The fundamental feature of writing up interview data is to weave a narrative which is interpolated with illustrative quotesto allow interviewees to speak for themselves (Graham, 2000). Therefore, citation of exact words of respondents in the text was reasonably made as it partly decentred the researcher from the narratives by highlighting directly respondents‟ verbal construct or interpretations.

# METHODOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS

Typically,time-cost and logistical requirements for setting up interview, making trips to and from it, conducting interviews, transcription, preparing and analyzing transcripts among others, were evident constraints of engaging in the process. The researcher while on post in New York held several interviews and used his position as a military liaison officer, Darfur IOT, DPKO to overcome challenges associated with setting up interviews with key respondents. He also visited Darfur, Addis Ababa and Nigeria to access respondents‟ locations. The challenges of logistics, security in Darfur, travel visa to Sudan and GoS permit to visit Darfur inherent in these travels where overcome through the combination of the research trips with official UN functions and visits to these areas, thus security of the researcher was guaranteed. However, considering that Sudan is a closed society and police state, local Darfurians who work for UNAMID were mostly interviewed within the security of UNAMID camps. Location of Nigerian Army officers who served in UNAMID was also difficult because of the spread of the Nigerian Army nationwide. The constraint was overcome by the use of National Defence College Abuja and Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji due to large concentration of military officers on courses in these areas. Nonetheless, these constraints did not arguably affect number of respondents involved in the study as from the list,key actors and sectors were reasonably covered. The researcher benefited from experiences and contributions of UN USG for PKO who played key roles in Darfur, and Sudanese Ambassadors to UN. An attempt for one on one with UNSG was

not possible though the gap was adequately filled by involvement of ASG Mullet and USG Ladsous and other senior officials in UN HQ New York.

Some of the issues that were investigated drew answers from historical data provided by Nigerian participants who had completed their services in Darfur. Instructive responses on the conflict were evident also in interviews with some Sudanese in New York. Their views and those of Nigerian troops who participated in the mission and information from literature provided arguably reliable data for the study. It would be the challenge of future researchers interested in the subject to undertake the study using quantitative methods.

# CHAPTER 4

**THE EVOLUTION AND PRATICE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS**

# INCEPTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING AND REFORM PROCESS

“Today, we have more than 110,000 men and women deployed in conflict zones around the world. They come from nearly 120 countries -- an all-time high, reflecting confidence in United Nations peacekeeping. They come from nations large and small, rich and poor -- some of them countries recently afflicted by war themselves. They bring different cultures and experiences to the job, but they are united in their determination to foster peace. Some are in uniform, but many are civilians and their activities go far beyond monitoring. They train police, disarm ex-combatants, support elections and help build State institutions. They build bridges, repair schools, assist flood victims and protect women from sexual violence. They uphold human rights and promote gender equality. Thanks to their efforts, life-saving humanitarian assistance can be delivered and economic development can begin”.


- [Ban Ki-Moon](http://www.doonething.org/heroes/ban.htm)**,** 2013

The United Nations was founded in order “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”(UN Charter: Preamble). Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization and is an important yardstick with which the Organization is judged by the world. Maintenance of peace and security is at the heart of the UN and peacekeeping is one of the central tools at the disposal of the UN in response to threats to international peace and security. Peacekeeping operation is used by the SC to deliver complex and integrated response in support of countries‟ transition from conflict to peace, prevent the escalation or relapse into conflict and the emergence of lawless regions where insecurity, transnational crime and

extremism can flourish. Peacekeeping is an investment in global peace, security and prosperity since inception.

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) formed in May 1948 in the Middle East to observe and maintain the ceasefire during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War is the first ever UN peacekeeping operation. The mission is still ongoing likewise UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan formed in Jan 1949. Currently there are 17peacekeeping operations but since peacekeeping started in 1948 there have been 67 peacekeeping operations. Within the periods, the structure and concept of UN peacekeeping has undergone several changes primarily to enhance credibility and capability. The key reform initiative include the 1992 Agenda for Peace, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000 (Brahimi Report), the New Horizon Initiative 2009, and High Level Independent Panel of Peace Operations (HLPPO) 2015. The UN PSO in its current form, represent the outcome of these processes.

# FIGURE 4.1:UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING MAP



Source: United Nations Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, New York, 2016.

The planning and deployment of UN PSO have undergone several reforms process since UNTSO was mounted in 1948, aimed at improving credibility and capability of peacekeeping and UNDPKO. The key reforms which will be discussed include the Agenda for peace, Brahimi report, New Horizon Initiative and HIPPO.

# AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace- keeping, more commonly known simply as “An Agenda for Peace”, is a report written by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. In it, Boutros-Ghali responded to a request by the UNSC for an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping." It was thus driven by UN SG effort to enhance the UN's capacity to conduct PKO and the UN Security Council reliazation that:

“The absence of war and military conflict amongst states does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non – military sources of instability in the economic, social and humanitarian fields have become threats to peace and security. The UN membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters” (UN Yearbook, 1992:34).

The Agenda recognized that future peacekeeping is multi-dimensional in nature and should support preventive diplomacy and peacemaking (Agenda for Peace, 1992). It reaffirmed, that security and stability should be achieved with peaceful means and the use of force should be considered only, if… “all peaceful means have failed” and in order “to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual”.

Boutros-Ghali also outlined a number of additional processes of preventive diplomacy the international community could use before

peacekeeping or simultaneously. The Agenda for Peace provided a distinct definition for peacemaking and peacekeeping, as both were concepts that the UN had not addressed. Most significantly, it also introduced the concept of “post-conflict peacebuilding” which is very critical to achieving sustainable security and development in Africa. He defined “post-conflict peace- building” as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros – Ghali, 1992:21). The concept of post-conflict peacebuilding is critical and entails a process that considers all forms of physical violence and aspects of a society that are structurally violent and could lead to relapse into conflict. The Agenda for Peace did not achieve much in reshaping UN PK as the UN grappled with the PK challenges of the mid 1990s, particularly, the failures in Rwanda and Somalia. However, it proved important for its definitions of UN peacekeeping and eventually gave rise to other reform particularly the Brahimi Report.

# THE REPORT OF THE PANEL ON UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS (BRAHIMI REPORT)

In trying to meet challenges of the mid-1990s, the United Nations experienced setbacks in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia, though the demand for peace operations remained high at the end of the decade. The investigation of these set-backs by the GA and SC revealed that the lack of political will by the UN and member states, the limited resources available to missions to purse broad mandates, the inability to use force in furtherance of the mandate and poor communication between UN HQ and field missions were

responsible for the failures (Bellamy, Williams, Griffin:2004:166-168). The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked a high-level group of experts on March 7, 2000, ahead of the Millennium Summit, to assess the UN system‟s shortcomings and to make recommendations for change. The Report of thePanel on United Nations Peace Operations (known as the “Brahimi Report” after the Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi) offered a critique of the conduct of UN operations and made specific recommendations for change. The Panel argued that the changes are necessary to meet the 21st century peacekeeping and peace building challenges (Brahimi Report: 2000). The report was published on August 17, 2000 and Annan called the Panel's recommendations “essential to make the United Nations truly credible as a force for peace” (Annan, 2000).

The Brahimi report made wide ranging recommendations on politics, strategy operations and organizations. These recommendations were designed to address strategic direction, decision-making, rapid deployment, operational planning and support, and the use of modern information technology (Brahimi Report, 2000). The report recommendations can be grouped into development of strategy,the need for robust doctrine and a realistic mandate, the development of rapid deployment capabilities and “integrated capabilities”.

The first recommendation was the development of a strategy for UN peacebuilding and for the SG to frequently use fact-finding mission in support of short-term crisis prevention. It also restated the multi-dimensional

nature of peacekeeping operations leading to the DPKO been tasked to develop a “Strategic Manual for Multidimensional Peacekeeping”. The second recommendation focused on a robust military components in a peacekeeping operation and the political will to use force. In the case of UNOSOM (Somalia), the special commission had concluded that “the UN should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states” and “force would be applied as the ultimate means after all peaceful remedies have been exhausted.” Thus, on consent, impartiality and self-defence the report states that:

... in the context of intra-state/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated …where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the UN can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil (Brahimi Report, 2000).

The report continues to stress, that UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate and that military component should be able to defend themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate. This underlined the need for robust rule of engagement,structure and equipment, and ability to use enforcement techniques including war fighting skills in order to create stable environment. It also stated that UN PSO for complex operations need field intelligence and other capabilities to counter violent challenges.

The deployment of robust forces would need to be backed by the political and military will to use it. For instance, the fall of the UN safe area of Srebrenica was due to the inability of the mission to use deployed military capabilities.The mission leadership did not approve air strikes to stop attacking Serbs in former Yugoslaviadue to political consideration, despite UNSCR 836 which resulted in the fall of Srebrenica and the massacre on 7500 civilians. This incident and the failure to protect population at riskundermined confidence in UN peacekeeping operations. However, there is no agreement in the GA about what constitutes "self-defence". Some states argue that it includes the defence of the mandate, while others argue that it should remain limited to defence of peacekeepers and should continue to guide rules of engagement. The issue of realistic mandate still remained as the panel recommended the need for PK to be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully.

The panel recognised the importance of timely deployment of new mission and demanded the enhancement of UN's rapid deployment standards and capacities. This called for improvement of UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) as regard availability of qualified leaders; enhanced military capability and reduction of deployment time to 30 days for traditional and 90 days for complex operations, increase in strength of DPKO planning staff; the development of civilian police officers pool and central roster of pre-selected civilians specialised in post-conflict peace- building.(Brahimi Report, 2000). The UNSAS was to include multinational brigade-size forces and the enabling capabilities. This informed the

establishment of the Danish lead UN High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). The panel also recommended that the secretariat change the procedures for peacekeeping procurement in order to facilitate rapid deployment. It thus recommended that responsibilities for peacekeeping budgeting and procurement be moved from Department of Management to DPKO (Brahimi Report, 2000).

Finally, the Panel did highlight the need for enhanced headquarters capacity, increased support to the field missions and a more "integrated" approach by bringing together personnel responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, logistics and finance. The outcome was structural changes in the DPKO and the introduction of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) which provides guidance on operational review and transition planning. The IMPP includes theestablishment of an Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) at headquarters level responsible for the strategic planning and guidance and an Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) which acts as the link between UN HQ and the SRSG at the country and mission level. Brahimi report is largely responsible for the new UN DPKO structure.

In theory Brahimi-recommendations to enhance integration at mission level is a sound approach but unity of command remains a problem in the field. Though missions are "integrated" in nature but the SRSG only has a coordinating function over the Heads of Agencies represented in the field as the agencies first loyalty is to their respective superior headquarters. This and

interagency rivalries affect the efficiency of the missions likewise the overstretch of DPKO at the headquarters and in the field which undermine operational management and planning. Despite the broad implementation of the Brahimi Report at mission and UN HQ levels, PSO continued to encounter new challenges. This led to further reforms including the New Horizon Initiative.

# NEW HORIZON INITIATIVE

Building on the recommendations of Brahimi Report and the whole sale implementation in some areas, the New Horizon reform initiative was launched in July 2009. It was aimed at strengthening UN Peacekeeping to meet current and future demands by identifying challenges and opportunities facing UN Peacekeeping. As part of this process, a non-paper was issued on 17 July 2009, entitled “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping”. It “seeks in depth engagement with all peacekeeping stakeholders with a view to enhance peacekeeping”. (New Horizon, 2009:5) sThe initiative made some key proposal to the SC, Secretariat and T/PCC aimed at strengthening this global partnership. Some of which include that: Peacekeeping operation should be accompanied by an active political strategy, increased and sustained dialogue between UN HQ and member states and the field missions and headquarters in other to enhance planning and mission management (New Horizon, 2009).

Others include rapid deployment and a “capability driven approach” which will lead to moving from a quantitative focus to a qualitative approach emphasizing the generation of niche capabilities, expanding the base of TCC and PCC countries to enhance collective burden sharing and to meet the future requirements of UN peacekeeping(New Horizon, 2009). Some of these recommendations have been endorsed by the Security Council. On-going efforts are focused on strategic and institutional reforms. On strategic reforms increasing the pool of TCCs and PCCs are on by encouraging member states apart from the traditional troop contributing countries to contribute troops and capabilities for UN operations. On institutional reforms, formal and informal consultation among all stakeholders: SC, T/PCCs and Secretariat on mandates and operations have become common. UN Peacekeeping as it is now is in a phase of consolidation and the implementation of the New Horizon Initiative is driving the quest for improvement.

# THEHIGH LEVEL INDEPENDENT PANEL ON PEACE OPERATIONS 2015

The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report was underpinned by the need “to take stock of evolving expectations of UN peacekeeping and how the Organization can work toward a shared view of the way forward” (HIPPO Report, 2015). This was borne out of the various challenges to UN operations and the changing operational environment since the Brahimi Report in 2000. UNSG Ban Ki-moon appointed the HIPPO in October 2014 to “review the current state of UN

peace operations”HIPPO Report 2015) The 16 members panel chaired by former President of Timor-Leste Jose Ramos-Horta worked primarily through consultations, thematic workshops, review of submissions,visits and targeted interviews. Consultations with Member States, civil society and academia were held in several countries while over 80 written submissions were received from Member States, regional organizations, UN partner entities and civil society groups (Arnault, 2016).

The panel report was presented to the Secretary General on 16 June 2015. The key recommendations constitute four shifts in the way the UN thinks and acts in connection to peace operations (HIPPO Report, 2015 ). First is the primacy of politics. This is based on the fact that lasting peace is achieved through political solutions and not through military and technical engagements alone. Political solutions thus need to guide and drive all UN peace operations, with emphasis on the particular political situation of the country of deployment in the planning and configuration of peace operations. The report envisages “a spectrum of responses, from light teams of country experts as a preventive measure in emerging conflicts to continued political presence after exist in addition to a development-focused country team” (HIPPO Report, 2015). The use of light teams in the aftermath of conflict in order to prevent relapse and increase in peace and development advisors in the UN country teams was also recommended. The report also noted issue of exist strategy as regards conditions for the UN to scale-down or withdraw its presence in a countryand the need for a new system which secures funding for political missions (HIPPO Report, 2015).

Second is responsive operations. UN missions need to be tailored towards achieving the flexibility to quickly respond to changes on the ground. To achieve such flexibility, the mandate design-system would need to change, so that the mandate process becomes sequenced and adaptive to the context on the ground. A two-stage mandate process was thus recommended, in which there is an initial interim deployment for the first six months (stage one), to enable detailed assessment of the conflict dynamics and logistics needs, before an appropriatemission is deployed at the second stage (HIPPO Report, 2015). The interim deployment is aimed at stabilising the situation,allow time to ensure ownership by the host country through the drafting of a compact between it and the UN and consultations with the troop contributing countries. The report also advised that UN should embrace the term „peace operations‟ to reflex the full spectrum of responses.

Third is stronger partnerships through a global and regional architecture which will reduce tension between member states, particularly members that contribute funds and those that contribute troops. There is also friction between the SC and the TCCs, as the SC are seen to be pushing for operations that the TCCs feel are too high-risk. Additionally, the lack of P5 troop contributions also undermines the success of operations (Arnault, 2016). The report also noted that UN peacekeeping missions are not suited to engage in certain type of missions like military counter-terrorism operations.

Fourth is field-focused and people-centered strategy to enable more focus on enabling field missions and for UN personnel to renew their resolve

to serve and protect the people. This entails more consultative processes by UN staff and mission leadership with the host society on both a governmental level and broader societal level. This is a key reform as it requires “a change of mind-set and system for the UN to move from the state-centric and technically oriented approach of peace operation to a field- and people- oriented approach”. In line with this, a new recruitment process that is fast and geared toward identifying the right person for the job in terms of relevant expertise, with less emphasises on rank and hierarchy is needed. The report suggests moving the responsibility for recruitment for field positions from DPKO to the DFS in other to achieve a field and people oriented approach.

The Report also made some other recommendations on various issues as stated below:

* Conflict prevention: The need for the establishment of an international forum on prevention drawing on external resources and knowledge. This will also entail the use of UN expert resources early, to support national and regional prevention and mediation efforts and reinforcement of UN Secretariat‟s prevention and mediation capabilities.
* Protection of civilians: The need to address shortfalls in resources available to missions to execute the mandates and for peacekeepers to prioritize civilians who are under imminent threat.
* Use of force: The need for extreme caution in deciding if missions are to undertake enforcement tasks while declining engagement in military counter-terrorism operations.
* Rapid deployment, capabilities and performance: The establishment of a UN rapid deployment capability and strong SC support to the UN‟s force generation process. The involvement of developed countries in UN peacekeeping, including the Security Council members was also recommended.
* Sustaining peace: Establishment of pooled country-level UN funds linked to a political roadmap and the review of the current capacities of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to assist in sustaining peace.
* Funding of AU peace support operations: The report called for funding support for Security Council-authorized AU peace support operations and establishment of frameworks to ensure accountability in such operations.

The HIPPO and Brahimi report are similar in several ways particularly in areas of mediation, peacekeeping and peace consolidation, leading to similar recommendations in various areas including the protection of civilians and use of force. Brahimi report noted “political support” as a key condition for the success of complex operations (Brahimi Report, 2000). This was also emphasized in HIIPPO report which emphasizes the critical need for every stakeholder at the UN to provide missions with the capacity to act as a credible deterrent to threats against civilians. HIPPO further highlighted the need for the SC to bring its political leverage to bear as a pre-condition for success and the importance of negotiated political solutions to internal conflict. It further stresses the critical need for promotion of human rights and search for political solutions that address the interest of all groups.

The HIPPO also agreed with the view of the World Bank, the G7+ and others that improvement in the field of justice, security, inclusive politics and jobs are generally positively correlated with peace consolidation while the protection of civilians in armed conflict is a moral responsibility for the United Nations. Missions thus have the obligation, and must be given the means, to protect civilians from armed attack. It also noted that while UN multilateral peacekeeping can play a part in the management of today‟s violent environments, it will always critically depend on others – national or regional contributors

* as “first responders”, as “parallel forces” or as the primary protagonists in the control of conflict.

# THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The normative framework for UNPSO is based on four issues: the Charter of the UN, Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and Security Council Mandates. These issues provide the overarching framework that drives UN PSO.

The UN Charter is the foundation document for all United Nations PSO. The Charter gives the UNSC primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and peacekeeping is one of the tools. The legal basis for PKO is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. While Chapter VI deals with the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, Chapter VII contains provisions related to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”. Chapter VIII of the Charter also provides for “the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security, provided such activities

are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in the Charter” (General Guideline for PKO, 2008).

International human rights is an integral part of the normative framework for UN PKO. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which sets the cornerstone of international human rights standards, emphasizes that human rights and fundamental freedoms are universal and guaranteed to everybody, as such UN peacekeeping operations respect and advance human rights through the implementation of their mandates (General Guideline for PKO, 1995).Peacekeeping personnel thus operate in accordance with international human rights law and strive to “ensure that they do not become perpetrators of human rights abuses, recognize human rights violations or abuse, and are prepared to respond appropriately within the limits of their mandate and their competence.”UNpeacekeepers also respect human rights in all their dealings and are held accountable for any case of human rights abuse. (General Guideline for PKO, 2008).

International humanitarian law also known as “the law of war” or “the law of armed conflict” is another normative framework as it restricts the means and methods of armed conflict. It is contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as in rules regulating the means and methods of combat. United Nations deployment into post-conflict environments with potential for violence and the presence of large civilian populations and vulnerable groups underpins its importance. (General Guidelines for PKO, 2008).

United Nations Security Council Mandate, another normative frameworks, is the basis of deployment and sets out the task to be performed(General Guidelines for PKO, 2000). Security Council mandates differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature and dynamics of the conflict. The nature of the agreement reached by the parties to the conflict are taken into consideration in crafting a mandate. Also,cross-cutting and thematic tasks which are the basis of landmark Security Council resolutions are usually part of UN missions mandate. For instance SCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, SCR 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict and SCR 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict are core parts of UN mandates.

# UN PROCESS FOR ADMINISTRATION OF PSO AND SPECTRUM OF PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES

The UN process for administration of PSO is anchored by the DPKO. The DPKO was established in 1992 and provides direction for UN PSOs to: plan, prepare, manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations so that they can effectively fulfill their mandates.This is done under the overall authority of the Security Council and General Assembly, and under the command vested in the Secretary General. Furthermore, the DPKO provides crucial support of all strands to field operations. However, it has inadequate doctrine, planning capabilities and only basic operating procedures (Ingrid, 2003).

Under the UN Charter, the Security Council is mandated to uphold international peace and security. The SC also provides overall guidance for administration of PSO and uses varied instruments including resolution, cease-fire directives and direct action in order to maintain peace and security. The Council generally establishes the mandates for PSOs with a majority of nine, although any member of the P5 can have the power of veto. The exclusively of the P5 and allegations of following national agenda underpins the demand for more balance through expansion of the membership (Okwudili, 2017).

The Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General who in turn is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council for a five year tenure. The Secretariat is responsible for the management and finance of peacekeeping operations. In 2006, the peacekeeping budget was $5bn, which accounted for nearly half of the total UN budget. This increased to nearly $8b in 2016 where as it was only

$1.25bn in 1997 (UNGA/11794, 2016). The increase in the number of PSOs has incurred significant costs and the UN is subservient to the purse of the international community as regards funding PKOs.

Peacekeeping is one of a range of peace and security options available to Member States in addressing conflicts, one of a set of tools that include conflict prevention, mediation and peace building – all of which can be strengthened and better linked. UN peacekeeping is a unique global partnership. It draws together the legal and political authority of the security

Council, diverse member states who contribute the police, troops, personnel, and finances necessary for success, the host countries and the secretariat(General Guideline for PKO, 2008). It is this partnership that gives UN Peacekeeping its legitimacy, its sustainability and global reach. Peacekeeping has evolved over the years from observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after interstate wars, to laying the foundations for sustainable peace.

Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force to maintain international peace and security. Peace building on the other hand “involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development”. Peace building is a long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. The key elements of peace building includes demilitarisation, institutional reforms, improved police and judicial system, electoral reforms, social and economic development which target not only causes of violent conflict but help build the capacity of states to function effectively.

The boundaries between peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building and peace enforcement is thin as peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity.Peacekeeping operations are often involved in peacemaking efforts and early peace building activities. Thus, peacemaking, peacekeeping

and peace enforcement rarely occur in a linear way as they are better in mutually reinforcing manner which provides a holistic approach to achieving enduring peace. However, combining these activities is difficult and is partly responsible for critical gaps in international response to conflict situations as seen in the Darfur crisis. The current effort at the UN HQ reflects a growing recognition within the international community of the linkages between UN peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building roles (Carey, 2013).

Within this broader context, the core functions of a UN PSO are to:

* + - 1. Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State‟s ability to provide securityin line with the rule of law. This includes protection of civilians which is at the core of UN PSO.
      2. Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance. Dialogue could be promoted through negotiations and meeting with regional interlocutors.
      3. Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country- level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

# PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES OF UN PSO

The principles and guidelines for UN PSO can be divided into two: the basic principles and others success factors.Three basic principles are critical to the success of United Nations peacekeeping operations: Consent of the

parties, Impartiality and Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

**Consent of the parties**. United Nations PKOare deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. This requires “a commitment by the parties to a political process and their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation mandated to support that process”. The consent of the main parties provides peacekeepers freedom of action to operate. In the absence of such consent, peacekeepers risks becoming a party to the conflict and being drawn towards enforcement action, away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace (General Guideline for PKO, 2008). UN peacekeepers continuously strive to maintain the consent of all parties as consent may be withdrawn through the restriction of freedom of action amongst other ways. This is the case in Darfur as the Government of Sudan restricted its movement. Thus consent may be given at the strategic level but limited at the local level, particularly if the main parties are internally divided or have weak command and control systems. The presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties,also undermines consent as is the case in Darfur.

**Impartiality.**This entailsimplementing mandate without favour or prejudice to any party. Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity (General Guideline for PKO, 2008). Impartiality however, does not include inaction in the face of behavior that clearly works against the peace process. The UN noted in its guideline for PKO (2008) that “just as a good

referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds”. Impartiality is critical as it is linked to credibility and legitimacy, and its compromise may undermine the consent by one or more of the parties. Impartiality and consent are therefore complementary.

**Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.**The principle of non-use of force except in self-defense dates back to UNEF in 1956.Self-defense includes resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeeping operation from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. The Security Council thus has given United Nations peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates authorizing them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack (General Guideline for PKO, 2008). Force is however used as a measure of last resort, with utmost restraint and primarily to influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process or seeking to harm civilians; and not to seek their military defeat. The level of force would need to be proportional and appropriate within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect as clarified in mission-wide ROE. In the volatile environments into which contemporary peacekeeping operations are often deployed, ROE would need to be sufficiently robust to ensure that the mission retains its credibility and freedom of action to implement its

mandate. It remains questionable if this is the case in UNAMID and MONUSCO. The above mentioned principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force form what Griffin calls the "holy trinity" of traditional peacekeeping (Bellamy, J Alex, Williams, Paul and Griffin 2004:95-96).

**Other successes factors.**Apart from the three key principles, other success factors include legitimacy, credibility and promotion of national and local ownership.International legitimacy is critical to success and is established once the SC gives a mandate. The broad representation of Member States of the UN who fund the operation and the international stature of the UNSG who run the mission strengthens the legitimacy. Legitimacy is also enhanced by the firmness and fairness in which a mission conducts its operations. Legitimacy can be eroded if the mission becomes a source of local resentment or is not sufficiently responsive as the situation stabilizes. Another success factor is the credibility of the mission. Credibility is a direct reflection of the international and local communities belief in the mission‟s ability to achieve its mandate. It is thus linked to the missions capability and effectiveness as well as ability to manage and meet expectations (General Guidelines on PKO, 2008). The last success factor is the promotion of national and local ownership. This is achieved through wide representation, inclusiveness and gender consideration. It reinforce legitimacy and ensures the sustainability of developed national capacity on withdrawal of peacekeepers.

# CHALLENGES OF UN PSO

The first challenges faced by UN PSO, as far as the maintenance of international peace and security is concerned, is that most international structures, including the UN, were set up in the aftermath of World War II to deal with interstate conflict and not intrastate conflict. Therefore, the international community is in fact still trying to grapple with the new situation using, the old tools by making some adjustments and modifications to the manner in which they were earlier used. Thus, getting to groups with improving the conduct of PSO remains a work in progress.

The next is environmental factors as the global context for peacekeeping has changed significantly considering the global financial crisis which put pressure on peacekeeping budget among other issues (Obiakor, 2017). The principal financing member states for UN peacekeeping are those most affected by the global financial down turn, which undermined there contribution hence the need for the UN to do more with less. The consensus for peacekeeping also looks uncertain at all levels. At the strategic level, the partnership between the finance contributing countries and TCCs is fragile due to issues related to reimbursement cost and their needed review demanded by TCC (Obiakor, 2017). Similarly, political divisions within the Security Council also create difficulties as seen in managing missions in Darfur and Syria. At the operational level, host nation‟s consent for the presence of the peacekeeping mission is eroding, particularly in Darfur and DR Congo due to restrictions on freedom of movement, flight clearance and movement of operational equipments into the theatre. Also, donorare

reluctant to write blank cheques for development projects without measurable progress in governance and the rule of law.

Further developments is that the paradigm of conflict is changing like the nature of conflict changed in the 1990s from inter-state to intra-state conflict requiring a major conceptual and operational re-think of peacekeeping leading to multi-dimensional peacekeeping. Monguno (2016) argues thatcurrent conflict where peacekeepers are deployed are driven by criminal groups and organized criminal violence in pursuit of and in competition for economic rents as seen in Afghanistan, Somalia, DRC and Darfur. This violence and conflict thrives in an environment where there are weak institutions, poor governance and the absence of the rule of law hence it is difficult to manage.

Changesat operational and tactical level environment imposed a variety of challenges driven by asymmetric situations and new forms of warfare. Hoffman calls the new form of warfare "Hybrid War":

the new form of opponent uses state-like capabilities and selected conventional military tactics in combination with irregular/guerrilla tactics. Highly trained combatants in traditional conventional and irregular/guerrilla modes will operate modern and sophisticated weapon systems. Operational characteristics are close encounters in urban warfare, the complexity of societal and cultural environments and the use of asymmetric means. These could include the use of Cyberspace to attack C2 structures and the info domain in order to gain public opinion. The operational activities will be

strategically coordinated, but geographically separated and are designed to achieve decisive effects (Hoffman, 2006).

This new operational and tactical environment, where most of the effects are delivered on section or platoon level, is becoming very challenging for PSO and can be described at its best with the words of General Charles Krulak, USMC:

On the first block of the three-block war, we will deliver humanitarian aid or assist others in doing that. On the second, we will conduct stabilization or peace support operations. On the third, we will be engaged in a high-intensity fight. We must be ready to conduct these operations simultaneously and very close to one another. We must be prepared to conduct them in large urban centers and complex terrain (Krulak, 2006)

Changes in the world security architecture owing to changing global threat also present challenges. Challenges in the sense that the UN is not keeping pace with the asymmetrical nature of new threats as they emerge (Mulet, 2013). Peacekeeping missions thus face asymmetric tactical threats from terrorist and other armed groups. The high casualty figure in Mali is a stark reminder as peace keepers are being specifically targeted by violent extremists and terrorist ( Awog-Badek, 2017). To be effective, PSO will need to adapt, foot prints will need to be lighter and more nimble with a more flexible support arrangement. Missions will also need more sophisticated uniform capabilities to enable mobility, responsiveness and a deeper understanding of the operating environment (Awog-Badek, 2017). Therefore, the requirement to continuously anticipate new challenges that may require

new studies and strategic recommendations remains a recurring theme. Another key challenge is the absence of developed countries from PK activities, particularly troops contribution. The current challenges will remain unless the more powerful countries, particularly those in the developed world, re-engage in the vital activity of UN peacekeeping. Gaye (2013) argues that these countries are the ones that have the political clout that will make the difference in the effective application of force, and the trained manpower which, together with others from the developing world, will be able to convey to the belligerents in mission areas that the international community will not tolerate any activity that places innocent civilian populations at risk.

Troops and niche capability contributions from the credible and experienced nations are vital for credibility of missions. This is especially as it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain some of the critical peacekeeping capacities, ranging from helicopters to hospitals, and specialists in areas of policing, justice, institution-building and so on (Carey, 2013). UN have a high capability gap in military helicopters in UNAMID, MONUSCO, UNMISS and all other missions. Military helicopter units, for instance, are force multiplier and enablers for operations conducted in vast and remote locations. According to Erik Lin Greenberg (2011) SG Ban Kimoon (2013) stated that "...peacekeepers need the power and mobility that helicopters offer in remote, rough places…". The lack of these critical capabilities is down to lack of political will by western developed countries to get involved.According to Gowan (2013), “Is there a real lack of helicopters, or

just too little political will?,”. Trying to bring the most-needed capacities into play in mission remains a critical challenge.

Related to need of credible and experienced nations are the challenges of shortages of women peacekeepers and also maintenance of COEs. The opportunities to increase female peacekeepers remain a challenge likewise creating conditions for more women to play an active role in peacekeeping and to contribute their perspectives and capabilities. On COEs some contingents have serious deficiencies in COEs and in servicing the available ones. The shortages in COE undermine mission operational capability and ultimately ability to execute the mandate. According to Adeyinka (2016), the COE of most African TCC are below the required standard basically due to poor serviceability rate, particularly in UNAMID. This though, affects the rate of reimbursement to African TCCs. Training is also another issue as ability to execute robustness also depends on a high level of training, which is lacking at times. While most troops perform in a commendable manner, at times, force commanders are confronted with troops that are not adequately trained, both in basic military skills and UN specific requirements (London Defence Ministerial Conference on UN Peace Keeping, 2016).

The share scales of the operations are also challenges. The UNDPKO and DFS are managing sixteen field missions, fifteen peacekeeping operations and one special political mission. The UN has a peacekeeping strength of 122,294 personnel, comprising nearly 80,067 military, 11,982 police and 15,153 civilian personnel deployed in the field (UN Peace

Keeping Fact Sheet, 2017). One hundred and twenty seven countries contribute personnel to UN missions and many are contributing generously through financial contributions assessed in other ways. The DPKO and DFS also manage over 270 aircraft, almost 17,350 vehicles and move approximately one million passengers each year, which is huge by all scale (UN DPKO&DFS, 2009). This is despite the fact that some missions are downsizing and even closing in the near future, such as operation in DRC and Kosovo.The complexity of running sixteen major operations puts considerable pressure on both DPKO and DFS and the entire UN system. Over stretched resources has generated increased pressure from some Member States for mission drawdown and eventual closure. Withdrawal of peacekeepers could contain rising costs with the peacekeeping budget up above $8 billion in 2014, through it had slightly declined with draw down in some missions to US$7.87b in 2016/2017.


# TABLE 4.1 ANNUAL PEACEKEEPING BUDGET FROM 2010– 2017

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Year** | **Amount (US$)** | **Remark** |
| 1. | July 2010 - June 2011 | 6,832,474,600 |  |
| 2. | July 2011 - June 2012 | 7,428,454,077 |  |
| 3. | July 2012 - June 2013 | 7,149,317,600 |  |
| 4. | July 2013 - June 2014 | 7,831,650,000 |  |
| 5. | July 2014 - June 2015 | 8,070,391,480 |  |
| 6. | July 2015 - June 2016 | 8,275,565,500 |  |
| 7. | July 2016 - June 2017 | 7,870,000,000 |  |

**FIGURE 4.2 ANNUAL PEACEKEEPING BUDGET FROM 2010 - 2017**

**AMOUNT IN BILLION US$**

Source: UN HQ, New York, 2017.



**9,000**

**7,831**

**8,070**

**8,275**

**8,000**

**7,000**

**6,000**

**5,000**

**4,000**

**3,000**

**2,000**

**1,000**

**0**

**7,428**

**7,870**

**6,832**

**7,149**

**July 2010 - July 2011 - July 2012 - July 2013 - July 2014 - July 2015 - July 2016 -**

**June 2011 June 2012 June 2013 June 2014 June 2015 June 2016 June 2017**

**MONTHS/YEARS**

Transition to peace building in some missions presents its own challenges. In South Sudan and Durfur, efforts to build local capacity for protection responsibility, good governance and the rule of law and to advance the political process face a lot of challenges. In support of camps in Darfur,UNAMID is working very closely with humanitarian agencies to provide protection but the humanitarian space is diminishing. This is due to GoS restrictive policies and GoS forces clashes with armed movements. In the DRC, MONUC is having challenges with the absence of a developed security sector and enabling rule of law to address the protection of civilians, which is the core mandate. Despite the challenges, progress has been made in peace building (good governance, respect for human rights, institution- building and security sector reforms)in some mission like UN Mission in

Liberia (UNMIL).These challenges have however focused attention on the linkages between peace keeping and pace building.

Integrating peace keeping as a part of a wide political strategy remains paramount. Deploying uniformed UN personnel is always vital, but is not necessarily the only, or a sufficient response. Peacekeeping will be successful if it is underpinned by a wider political strategy to end the conflict and one that draws on the will and generates the support of all parties involved (Ihekire, 2017). This includes the support of TCCs and donor countries toward the overall delivery of the strategy: mandates, integration of all components and deployment of trained and equipment troops. Similarly, greater clarity on critical roles particularly as relates to protection of civilians and on peace-building tasks is essential (Matt, 2013). Peacekeepers also require clarity regarding the limits of peacekeeping and the use of force as part of the equation in confronting asymmetric challenges.

Weak or non-existent peace agreements (i.e. Darfur) and minimal consent is another key challenge which is faced by some missions. Gradual reduction in host country consent is a challenge facing contemporary PSO with implications for operations in the field. In Darfur restrictions and denial of access by GoS is rampant. Non existence peace agreement is also an issue as there is virtually no peace to keep.

Finally, changes at the strategic level present challenges. The UN SC identified terrorism, the lack of rule of law, the proliferation of small arms and transnational crime as critical threats to peace and security. Similarly, the

European Union (EU) identified in its European Security Strategy (ESS) similar challenges including terrorism, organised crime, poverty, the spread of infectious diseases and environmental degradation as threats that affect the environment in which peace keepers are expected to operate though peacekeeping is not an ideal mechanism to address these issues.

# EVOLUATION FROM TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The evolution of UN peacekeeping from 1948 to date can be clearly distinguished into four phases; traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement and PSO.

# TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING

What constitutes peacekeeping remains debatable though the principles and objectives however, are reasonably clear (Diehl 1994: 13; Durch 1994: 1- 3; Goulding 1993: 452). Traditional peacekeeping is guided by the „holy trinity‟ of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force (Bellamy ***et. al.***, 2008) and is “intended to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to long-term conflict resolution by the parties themselves, often in conjunction with international mediation”(Bellamy ***et. al.***, 2008:96). Thus, it depends on consent-based activities to support a peace process and establish a stable peace.

# FIGURE 4.3: THE „HOLY TRINITY‟ OF TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Traditional

Peacekeeping

Consent

Impartiality

Minimum

Use of Force

Source: The “holy trinity” of Traditional Peacekeeping, Bellamy et al, 2008.

Alan James (1990:1) argues that traditional peacekeeping is neither proactive as a creative force in wider conflict resolution processes nor as a coercive instrument in defence of such processes. It seeks to establish a process of political dialogue and is based on three assumptions: that the belligerents are states, the combatant units are hierarchically organized and the belligerents want a political resolution. Key activities include observation and fact-finding, monitoring compliance with the conditions of ceaseﬁres, physical interposition between belligerents and creating enabling condition for peaceful resolution of the conflict (Bellamy et al, 2008: 97).

The major problems of traditional peacekeeping which created the need for other peacekeeping modalities include: the inability of traditional peace-keeping to accomplish its own goals and to accomplish wider tasks or actively promote conflict resolution (Bellamy ***et. al.***, 2008:109). They appear incapable of conducting duties beyond monitoring ceasefire which undermines the achievement of enduring peace as seen in UNTSO and UNFICYP. Traditional peacekeeping operations have thus, often been

accused of entrenching conflicts as it tends to remove the imperative to pursue a quick resolution as seen in UNTSO (Ratner 1996: 10; MacGinty and Robinson 2001: 30). Despite the shortcomings, it may help prevent further bloodshed in circumstances where a dispute appears intractable and may facilitate confidence-building measures between belligerents. Traditional peacekeeping adherence to the „holy trinity‟ of traditional peacekeeping has frequently restricted imaginative responses when peacekeepers have been deployed in asymmetric environments as is the case in most African conflicts. This led to the evolution of wider peacekeeping.

# WIDER PEACEKEEPING

The British military doctrine refers to wider peacekeeping as “operations carried outwith the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict” (HMSO 1995: 2-1). Wider peacekeeping is also sometimes referred to as „second generation peacekeeping‟ as distinct from the first generation of traditional peacekeeping(Bellamy ***et. al.***, 2008: 129). Some scholars also refer to wider peacekeeping as „strategic peacekeeping‟ (Olonisakin 2000), which emphasize the growing gap between mandates and resources to achieve them.

Bellamy ***et. al.***, (2008: 129) identified six key characteristics of wider peacekeeping: First, they occur within a context of ongoing violence considering the absence of ceaseﬁre agreement or when present are fragile

and prone to collapse like in UN missions in both Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Second, wider peacekeeping operations mostly take place in intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts. Third, soldiers engaged in wider peacekeeping are given more tasks thanin traditional peacekeeping. This includes elections duties, humanitarian supportand guaranteeing freedom of movement among others. Fourth, wider peacekeeping operations coordinate their activities with humanitarian agencies unlike traditional peacekeepers like UNEF missions that had very few outside agencies to deal with. For example, in Rwanda UNAMIR dealt with over 200 NGOs which created problems of coherence and coordination (Slim 1997).

Fifth, mandates changes frequently due to constant changes in the asymmetric environments which peacekeepers operate. For instance in Bosnia, the mandate changed several times from a humanitarian role to use force, to assist the delivery of humanitarian supplies, protecting „safe areas‟, and, finally, to support a NATO-led peace enforcement mission (Bellamy ***et. al.***, 2008). Finally, there is a gap and mismatch between means and ends which hinders the accomplishment of given task. Wider peacekeeping operations often face critical capability gaps including funds. This caused practical difficulties in Rwanda as communication between HQ and outlaying units was difficult due to inadequate communication equipment.

Wider peacekeeping guiding principles relieson the „holy trinity‟ of consent, impartiality and minimum force. It takes place in an asymmetric environment with “numerous parties to the conflict, undisciplined

belligerents, the absence of law and order, gross violations of human rights, the active involvement of large numbers of NGOs, the collapse of civil infrastructure, large numbers of refugees and an undefined area of operations” (HMSO 1995: 1-7). The British doctrine identified five typical tasks in particular: conflict prevention, demobilization of belligerents, military assistance to civilian agencies, humanitarian relief and the guarantee of movement. These takes place within „new war‟ environments which present peacekeepers with a distinct set of challenges.

# FIGURE 4.4: CENTRAL ROLE OF CONSENT IN WIDER PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE



Wider Peacekeeping Tasks

CO NS EN

T

Peace Enforcement

Source: Bellamy ***et. al.***, 2008.

Wider peacekeeping doctrine thus retained traditional peacekeeping‟s

„holy trinity‟ including the need to ensure consent at all times. As Figure 4.4 shows, wider peace-keeping doctrine viewed the issue of consent as marking a fundamental distinction between wider peacekeeping and peace

enforcement. A Wider peacekeeping mission that inadvertently crossed the consent line (Rose, 1998) into peace enforcement would always fail to achieve its goals. A mission could not, it argued, move from wider peacekeeping to peace enforcement and back again (Bellamy ***et. al.***, 2008).

The major problems with wider peacekeeping include clarity ofmandate as UNAMIR, UNPROFOR and UNAMISIL mandates were worded vaguely as to whopeacekeepers should assist and in what form. The lack of clarity undermined rules of engagement leading to constant changes in ROE (Bellamy et al 2008). Capability gap was also a problem as inadequate resources and logistics undermined fulfilment of the mandate. The failure of political will is also an issue as member states of the UN were reluctance to give the UN the means to successfully fulﬁl these tasks. For instance in Rwanda and Bosnia memberswere not willing to contribute the number of troops required for the mission and establishments of safe areas respectively.

It was thus inevitable that wider peacekeeping operations were plagued by the gap between means and ends as peacekeepers needed to take on wider tasks but lacked the means to do so. This reluctance prompted states to retain what they believed were tried-and-tested peacekeeping techniques in inappropriate conditions. Thus, consent was placed at the conceptual heart of wider peacekeeping and its maintenance understood as being the most important aspect of the operation. The breakdown of consent and the upsurge in violence remained a recurring theme.

# FIGURE 4.5: CONSENT AND CAPABILITY: THE UNENVIABLE POSITION OF WIDER PEACEKEEPING

Traditional PK

Peace

Wider PK Enforcement

High

L

ev el of C

on se

Low

Low High

Capabilities of Peacekeepers

Source: Bellamy ***et. al.***, 2008.

The arrows in Figure 4.5 represent the preferred operational direction of a peacekeeping operation. In terms of its practical experiences, wider peacekeeping sits in the bottom left-hand corner, low in consent and capability as was the case in Rwanda and MONUC DRC where they lacked the consent of the parties and the capability to enforce the mandate. The challenges of wider peacekeeping led to peace enforcement operations.

# PEACE ENFORCEMENT

These are activities that fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Enacting Chapter VII gives the Security Council the authority to determine when a threat of international peace and security has occurred and to order provisionalenforcement measures to restore peace. The use of military force can be authorized by the UNSC to maintain international peace and security, enforce sanctionsand protect civilians among others. (Goulding 1996).The idea of collective security provides the intellectual basis for the UN‟s conception of peace enforcement. According to Boutros-Ghali (1992):

it is the essence of the concept of collective security as contained in the Charter that if peaceful means fail, the measures provided in Chapter VII should be used, on the decision of the Security Council, to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.

The UN‟s involvement in the Persian Gulf Wars remain key examples including the international interventions in Somalia and Haiti during the l990s.

Peace enforcement raises four key problems and dilemmas(Bellamy ***et. al.***, 2008:162). First, is wording of mandates which generate questions of interpretation, particularly as to what constitute success and when to terminate enforcement measures as was the case in Somalia. Second, is concerns about whether enforcement measures can be conducted effectively considering that contributing states may not sustain the political will to proceed with enforcement measures when faced with rising costs and

casualties as was the case in UNOSOM II. Third is the issue of whether the UN should be engaged in war-fighting at all. Finally, is the possibility of enforcement measures being counter-productive to the goal of peace building. It was at least partly in an attempt to provide more coherent answers to these difficult questions that led to the Brahimi Report and subsequent development of PSO.

# PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS


Peace-support operations are multifaceted missions that combine a robust military force with a signiﬁcant civilian component appropriate for a given mandate (BDD,2000). Their aim is to transform war-torn societies into stable democratic societies. The typical functions include civilian policing, institution building, infrastructure reconstruction and national reconciliation (Hansen, 2000). Once democratic institutions and state capacities have been established, administration is handed over to local democratically elected leaders. To date, however, only UNTAET in East Timor has completed this transition successfully.

The concept of peace-support operations is seen as a “multifunctional operations involving military forces, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies,…. are designed to achieve humanitarian goals or a long-term political settlement and are conducted impartially in support of a UN mandate. These include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace-making, peace building and humanitarian operations” (BDD,2000:32).The ideas is

derived from wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement with troops capable of defending themselves and the mission‟s mandate‟ (Brahimi, 2000). The Brahimi Report made three speciﬁc recommendations that provided a framework for thinking about peace-support operations. First, is the need for the military component of a peacekeeping mission to be „robust‟ second is that in order to close the gap between mandate and resource allocation, the Security Council should not formally pass a resolution until it secures the forces needed to fulﬁl it. The third is for greater consultation between UNSC and TCCs and also horizontally among TCCs (Brahimi, 2000).

The PSOs concept refers to peace-keeping, peace enforcement and war-fighting which allows the consent line to be drawn more flexibly, as indicated in Figure 4.6 unlike wider peacekeeping which speaks to only peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Thus, whereas wider peacekeeping conceptualized consent in absolute terms, peace-support operations doctrine recognizes that consent may be variable and that you can use force without losing impartiality. Thus, there may be consent at the strategic level but it may be withdrawn at the tactical levels through restrictions of movement as is the case with UNAMID in Darfur.

# FIGURE 4.6: CONSENT AND IMPARTIALITY IN PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS



**Non-Co**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **mbat Prepared for Combat War**  C C | | |
| O |  | O |
| N |  | N |
| PK S | PE | S Wa |

E

**Self-defence** N

**consent** T

**promotion**

134

**Variable Consent:**

**Enforcement, Consent promotion**

E

N **War**

T **Fighting**

Source: Bellamy ***et. al.***, 2008.

The concept of PSOs therefore focuses on the need to match mandate and means. It also recognises that the military component is only one element of a broader multi-agency engagement aimed at creating a sustainable solution, within the overall political framework. The three key ideas underpinning peace-support operations were thus developed as a response to the perceived lessons learned from Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda (Bellamy et al, 2008). First is the need to be robust, second is to match mandate and capability andthirdis use of military, police and civilian components with the civilian component providing the political direction.

Despite the clear conceptualization, peace-support operations have experienced difficulties as aptly identified by Bellamy et al (2008). First, closing the mandate-means gap is not always easy due to inherent resources allocation challenges among PK financiers, particularly since the 2008 global economic crisis. Second, although a clear objective is desirable it is not always possible. Third, horizontal and vertical cooperation involving lead organisation or nation and UNSC is a useful practical way of closing the mandate-means gap but it takes peacekeeping away from the original notion of collective action pursued by the Security Council. It raises important issues about the accountability of TCCs and about the relationship between the UN and regional organizations.

# FIGURE 4.7: HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL COOPERATION IN PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS

**Security Council**

**Pivotal State or**

**p**

**p**

**p**

**Troo**

**Troo**

**Troo**

Source: Bellamy et al, 2008.

The peace-support operations concept despite its shortcoming is more universally applied in current missions.The evolution of peacekeeping operation is thus best encapsulated in Table 4.2. Having discussed PSO in detail, the thesis will now examine the application in Darfur.

# TABLE 4.2:THE EVALUATION OF PEACE SUPPORT ROLES AND PRINCIPLES

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **COIN (1950s)** | **Traditional Peacekeeping (1950s)** | **Wider Peacekeeping (1994)** | **Peace Enforcement (1998)** | **PSO (2000)** |
| **Operational Role Conceptions** | | | | |
| - Countering Insurgency | - Peacekeeping | * Peacekeeping * Wider Peacekeeping | * Peace enforcement * Peace keeping * Humanitarian operations | * Peacekeeping * Peacemaking * Peace building * Humanitarian Operations |
| **Required UN Mandate** | | | | |
| - Chapter VI & VII Mandate needed | - Chapter VI Mandate | - Chapter VI/VI 1/2  Mandate | - Chapter VII | - Chapter Vi & VII Mandate |
| **Principle Applied** | | | | |
| - Political primacy | - Consent | **Consent Principles:** | **Consent Principle:** | - Consent |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| * Political Aim * Co-ordinated Government mechanism * Separating Insurgent from support * Neutralizing the Insurgent * Popular Support * Long-term post- insurgency planning | * Use of force in Self- Defence * Voluntary neutral participation * Impartiality * Control by UNSG | * Impartiality * Minimum Force * Legitimacy * Credibility * Mutual Respect * Transparency **Management Principles:** * Coherence * Core & Liaison * Flexibility * Security * Concentration of Force * Freedom of movement | * Impartiality * Minimum Force * Credibility * Legitimacy | * Impartiality * Minimum Necessary Force   **The Principles of War:**   * Selection & maintenance of Aim * Offensive action * Surprise * Concentration of Force * Economy of Effort * Security * Sustainability |

Source: UN HQ, New York, 2016.

# CHAPTER 5

**UN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION IN DARFUR**

# BACKGROUND TO THE DARFUR CONFLICT

The Sudan is a microcosmic expression of Africa with its ethnic, geographic, cultural, religious linguistic and conflictual identities. Its size, covering 2.5 million square kilometres, makes the Sudan, Africa‟s largest state, (before the independence of Southern Sudan in 2011) and roughly Western Europe‟s size (Mamdani, 2008:8). With about 39 million population of mainly pastoral and sedentary farmers, constituted by two broad racial groups, over 300 indigenous peoples, practicing variously, Islam, Christianity and animism, the Sudan is notably rich in oil, copper, steel, livestock, agriculture, and has the Nile River straddling its territory (Beshir, 1991:1). Unlike the North which occupies the semi-desert zones, Southern Sudan is culturally heterogeneous, largely a location of the nation‟s resources, and falls within the belt of rainfall savannah. On the Western frontier is Darfur composed of predominantly Muslim Arabs and black African tribes. Reflecting its huge size, Sudan is bordered by Egypt, Libya and Red Sea on the North, by Ethiopia and Eritrea on the East, by Chad and Central African Republic on the West, and by South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda on the south. The country is apparently infected with endemic conflict like the rest of the horn of Africa.

# FIGURE 5.1: MAP OF SUDAN



Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies September 2016.

The Sudan has unique attribute of being the only state in the world that is both Arab and African, owing to Arab and black African population. However, this distinction instrumentalized its notoriety for endemic conflicts. Its long history of violent conflicts rooted in divisive nationalism is a product of polarizing strategies and effects of Turko-Egyptian, the Mahdiya, Anglo- Egyptian, and the post-independence Northern regimes. Establishing Arabian supremacy through political and economic hegemonic practices as well as policy of nationalized Arabization and Islamisation, successive administrations marginalized the indigenous groups. Reluctantly, the imperative of ethnic nationalism provoked armed rebellious for political, economic and cultural accommodation. This typifies earlier Southern struggles and current imbroglio in Darfur. The AU spearheaded the Darfur conflict‟s resolution initiatives and owing to challenging circumstances collaborated with UN through UNAMID. This chapter examines the historical context of the Darfur conflict, causes, AU Peace process, AMIS and importantly UNAMID.

The Darfur conflict, a manifestation of the trans-Saharan division in Africa, cannot be assessed in isolation of development prior and subsequent to it. Historically, the conquest of Byzantine Egypt by the Arabs from 640- 42AD subsequently extended to Sudan (Land of the Black People), culminated in formal occupation benefitting from centuries long trade in ivory, timber, gold, and chiefly slaves. The Arabs settled in the north and later spread westwards to Darfur, but found penetration of the animist south difficult. The initial formal occupation of Sudan was executed by the Turko- Egyptian rule from 1821, later overcome by the 1882 Mohammed Ahmed-led indigenous revolution. Unlike its predecessor, Mohammed‟s regime made abortive attempts at establishing control over Southern Sudan through policies of Arabization and Islamisation, until its overthrow by Britain with the support of South Sudan in the 1898 Battle of Ombursman, leading to the establishment of Anglo-Egypt condominium in 1899, bringing all regions under its control (Kebbede, 1997:11).

Subsequently, events leading to independence clearly excluded southern interests. The perceived centrality of the Arab stock to Sudan underpinned their receipt of authority at independence in 1956. The southern proposal for federal arrangement, an understanding that informed its acceptance of independence, was jettisoned. With economic and political power centralized in Khartoum, the Arab dynasty of domination of the

indigenous population was institutionalized manifesting in the marginalization of the eastern, western and southern regions.

Early symbolism of black marginalization emerged in the September 1956 Congressional National Committee comprising 43 Northerners and 3 Southerners. Hence successive administration sustained policy of exclusion and repression. General Ibrahim Abbound‟s November 1958 coup terminating the first independence administration ushered in a brutal national policy of Arabization and Islamisation despite south‟s animist and Christian dispositions. The consciousness of shared experience of marginalization among southerners triggered and sustained the Ethiopia, Israeli, and Ugandan-backed Anyanya (snake poison) military campaigns against Khartoum (Johnson, 1998:54-56). The rebels‟ self-determination agenda ostensibly converged with the statement by first internal affairs minister indicating Arab ownership of the Sudan: „Sudan is an Arab country and whoever does not feel Arab should quit‟(F Dang and Gifford, 1987:38). Series of events on the Southern problem marked by October 1957 Revolution led to the fall of Abbound‟s dictatorship and its replacement by the 1964 provisional government headed by Al-Khatim al-khakifa. Prime Minister Mohammed Mahgoub‟s government disowned the African and Arab states meditated conference on Southern Sudan problem, preferring instead a military solution orchestrating assassination and massacre of southern leaders and communities in counter insurgency.

On 25 May 1969, Mahgoub was overthrown by Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri whose regime flirted with the Southern regional autonomy idea negotiated and ratified at the Addis Ababa peace accord in March 1972, thereby ending Joseph Lagu-led Anyanya insurrection. However, following Chevron‟s 1978 oil discovery in the south, Nimeiri contravened the accord by carving out the oil areas from the south, and later, among other infractions re-imposed Sharia laws and Arabic national language. The policy reversal resurrected the Anyanya militancy in July 1983 under Colonel John Garang-led Southern People‟s Liberation Movement Army (SPLM/A), an amalgam of army defectors, remnants of the Anyanya dissidents and other disaffected groups with Ethiopia and Libyan support seeking southern liberation. By 1989, SPLA had grown significantly in strength occupying most of Sudan‟s border with Ethiopia, Kenya, Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, and rural Southern Sudan. The crisis of identity spurred by Arabization agenda was restated by Garang that „past and present governments in the Sudan have insisted that ours is an Arab country, and this flies in the face of reality. This is because Sudan is not a mono-ethnic society, it is a multi-ethnic society.

General Omar al-Bashir took over government in 1989 forming alliance with Hassan al-Turabi-led National Islamic Front, and pursued vigorously similar programmes like his predecessors, declaring equally a jihad against the south (Kebbede, 1997:86). Entrenchment of Arab interest inspired Sudan‟s membership of various Arab organizations – Arab League, Arab Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, Council for Arab Economic Unity, and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development

(Lakemfa, 1998:64). The Sudan conflicts typified resource wars, driven and sustained by issues of ownership and control of resources. With the economy drained by civil war which gulped $2m daily (Kebbede, 1993:3), corruption, growing external isolation, mounting external debt, staggering trade deficit, food shortages and 163 per cent inflation rate, Khartoum seemed desperately in need of the oil revenues. The contracted economic situation reflected in the downward spiral of standard of living and inflationary prices of goods. Its oil sector‟s expansion provided the Government of Sudan (GoS) with domestic source for financing the war, thereby lessening dependence on Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria for support.


Generally, al-Bashir‟s regime was marked by repression of opponents, fundamental human rights censures, hounding of civil society, summary executions, and so on. The north-south wars spawned estimated 4 million IDPs and 2 million fatalities, a casuality figure far exceeding those of similar conflicts in Angola, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Rwanda. Except for occasional humanitarian supplies to the IDPs, the international community was largely indifferent to the conflict. Subsequent mediation by external parties included the Cockadam talks in Ethiopia, the Belgium Symposium, the Nairobi talks, the Jimmy Carter and Herman Cohen Initiatives, Nigeria peace meetings, and Machako-Kenya talks resulted in the 9 January 2005 landmark Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPA). This notably encapsulated a mutually satisfying power as well as wealth sharing and security arrangements, administration of three

disputed areas, and provision of referendum on southern independence after a six-year interim period (CPA, 2005).With the CPA, Darfur was completely left out of the equation.

# THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

The Darfur region which is in the western part of the Sudan is an area approximately 250,000 square kilometres with an estimated population of 8 million persons. Darfur borders with Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan. The Darfur conflict can be traced to 1917; however, the recent violence that caught the attention of the international community began in 2003. Darfur was a sultanate that emerged in 1650 but was incorporated into the Sudan proper by the British in 1917 and was administered through the native administration system in order to reduce cost (Report of UNSG, 2005:20). During the colonial era, the Darfur region suffered from lack of development such that by the independence of Sudan in 1956, Darfur had the „lowest number of hospital beds of any Sudanese province‟. The neglect of the Darfur region continued in the post colonial era and the Darfurians complained that they were not being treated as full citizens of the Sudanese State. Darfur region continued to be ignored by the GoS and Darfurains received „less education, less health care, less development assistance and fewer government posts than any other region‟ (Mwalulu, 2004:22).

# FIGURE 5.2: MAP OF DARFUR



Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies September 2016.

Both the CAR and Chad have a history of internal conflicts and therefore considering the geographical position of Darfur these conflicts must have had an impact on Darfur. It was a centre of activities during the Chad- Libya crisis, serving as supply route to Chad, and various leadership contests by Chadian Presidents Hissene Habre and Idris Derby tapped support from transnational ethnic ties with Darfur tribes (African Security: International and Regional Problems, 2006:118). The connection to regional conflicts and its uncontrolled borders contributed in militarizing Darfur with small arms.

The economy of Darfur is based mainly on subsistence and limited industrial farming, as well as cattle herding. The region is inhabited by tribal groups whose distinctions are not clear and tend to sharpen when conflicts

erupt however; individual allegiances are still heavily determined by tribal affiliations. Some of the tribes are predominantly agriculturalist and sedentary, living mainly from crop production and cattle herders. In addition, a number of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes can also be traditionally found in Darfur herding cattle and camels. It should be pointed out that all the tribes of Darfur share the same religion (Islam).

Land-ownership has been traditionally communal, therefore considering the social nature of the inhabitants, the issue of land has for long been at the centre of politics. The traditional division of the land into homelands called “dar”, which are essentially areas to which individual tribes can be said to have a historical claim, is crucial in the local self-perception of the population. While the name Darfur would mean the homeland of the tribe of Fur, the actual area where this tribe has its homeland, is located in the centre of the Darfur region, covering an area where the borders of the former three states of Darfur meet. Nevertheless, the self-perception of people as members of tribes and the social networks connected to the tribal structures remain a central feature of the demographics of Darfur.

The causes of the conflict in Darfur are mainly economic and social, though later there were political reasons that exacerbated the conflict. Its origin could be traced to a myriad of tribal/ethnic conflicts, resulting from the lack of recognition of collective grazing rights of people and access to ground water resources, drought, desertification, banditry/rebellion activities, the struggle for political recognition and the meagre government socio-economic

activities available. The region was hit by a severe drought in the early 1980s which forced the Arab herdsmen to migrate in search of water and pasture for their animals. In the process, the herdsmen ventured into areas already occupied by the farming non-Arab communities thereby triggering series of complicated conflicts, leading to the current situation. Essentially, the parties to the conflict are the Janjawiid, a militia group recruited from the tribes of the Abbala (Camel-herding Arabs), and the non Baggara people (mostly land- tilling tribes of Africa namely; Masalit, Zaghawa and Fur tribes). The Mahdist (UMMA) party that won the first post-independence elections in 1958 had most of its support from this region, however, this party gave no political clout to the region. The region remained under-developed and even as governments changed in Sudan none of them showed much interest in the region.

Though the region remained underdeveloped, violent conflict was mostly confined among the tribal groupings not against the government. The turning point however was in 1965 when the government proposed constitutional changes. The three propositions were; an Islamic constitution, supported by the ICF (Islamic Charter Front, later NIF), the secular one supported by the southerners and some non-secular-minded northerners, and the „Islamic orientated constitution‟ supported by the Unionists (Prunier, 2005:37). Surprisingly the Darfur populace, though mostly Muslims, rejected the Islamic constitution. This was an early indication that the population in Darfur did not want an Islamic government marking the beginning of resentment of the government and ethnic divisions. The party

politics further exacerbated the situation following the breakup of the most popular UMMA party in Darfur. It is important to note that the „fur‟ had initially identified themselves politically to a regional organization, the Darfur Development Front (DDF) which was formed in 1963. The division of the UMMA party in 1968 due to leadership wrangles led to one faction of Sadiqi al Mahdi being supported by DDF which was predominantly „African tribes‟ and the other faction by „Arab‟ tribes.

The „African tribes‟ support of the UMMA party was to be a source of continued segregation following the 1969 coup that brought Jafar al-Nimeiry to power (Prunier, 2005:37). Darfur over the next years became a battleground between Nimeiry and the Mahdists. This marked the division of Sudan along regional lines and the emergence of ethnic semantics of „tribal Arabs‟ and native Arabs. In order to control the „African‟ tribes the government sought to abolish the tribal leadership system. President Nimeiry introduced new structures of local administration who were appointed by the central Government and had executive and judicial powers thereby formally abolishing the tribal system. Although the tribes continued to informally use the tribal system, this system was significantly weakened.


Another dimension of the conflict stems from the sub-regional power politics of dominance between Libya, Egypt and Sudan and the ideology of Arabisation. Darfur people have been victims of proxy wars between Chad and Libya in which Khartoum‟s policies demonstrated the government‟s priority to be that of Arabisation as fronted by Libya (Iyob and Khadiagala,

2006:136). Darfur has been used by both the government of Sudan and Libya in order to fulfil their political ambitions and it can therefore be argued that it has been the epicentre of the ethnic conflict in that region. For example, the Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT), a guerrilla movement formed in Darfur in 1966 was supported by Sudan and Libya to overthrow the government of the then President Tombalbaye in Chad. Libya had its own plans of annexing Chad as a prelude to establishing a vast Sahelian empire and „Arabisation‟ of the region. Libya aspired to have friendly rule in Chad and the attempts to contain Libya‟s ambitions in the region, led to proliferation of arms in the region. Darfur was thus used as a staging ground.

The conflict in the South of the Sudan also had its impact on the region through easier access to weapons and militarization of the society. As a consequence, each major tribe as well as some villages began to organize militias and village defence groups, essentially a group of armed men ready to defend and promote the interests of the tribe or the village. The Fur tribe, that had created a group called the African Belt, were thought to be sympathetic to the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement (SPLM) cause thus found themselves in conflict with a number of Arab nomadic tribes, which had organized themselves in a sort of alliance named the Arab Gathering. While the government of Sudan was struggling to defeat the SPLM, it was forced to seek aid, which Libya was very willing to provide albeit with conditions. These were to allow them use Darfur as a staging ground for its activities against Chad.

This thesis argues that the neglect of Darfur over the years and the marginalization of non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur led to a growing dissatisfaction amongst the people. In May 2000, copies of a document titled: „The Black Book - Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan‟ was circulated in Khartoum ( Flint and de Waal Alex, 2005:17).

# TABLE 5.1: EXTRACT TABLE OF THE BLACK BOOK



Source: **Anonymous (2004a), collated from various tables, except population data from World Bank.**

The document highlighted this marginalization and sensitized the Darfurians because of its revolutionary content which showed that political and economic power in Sudan lay in the hands of northern Arabs. Also circulated widely, was a document which originated from an Arab organisation in Sudan titled: „Change the Demography of Darfur and Empty

it of African Tribes‟ (Flint Julie and de Waal Alex, 2005). These two documents thus contributed to the development of open hostilities.

Alex de Waal has argued that the background to the conflict began in 1999 with a split in the Congress Party in which President Omar al Bashir ousted Dr Hassan al Turabi, a Darfurian. Subsequently, the ruling party security officers began replacing local officials within the Darfurian chapter of the party with handpicked loyalists who will not be loyal to Turabi. New leaders were brought from the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) which, prior to that time, had been the local militia and was relatively unpoliticised. Thereafter, the PDF continued to support certain ethnic groups against others especially Darfur‟s indigenous Arabs against groups such Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa. This led to a resistance in February 2003 when a large group of farmers turned guerrillas, attacked the police station at Golo in Jebel Marra to seize weapons and „this was the spark that began the conflagration‟. Prior to this time, weapons had been flowing into Darfur through Muammar Ghaddafi‟s support to various Arab groups across the Sahel in an attempt to create an „Arab belt‟. As guns flowed through Darfur to Chad with some of the guns left in Darfur, so also was an increasing racist ideology of Arab supremacy. This further reinforced the racial/ethnic dimension of one where

„Arab‟ and „Africa‟ assumed a new mutually exclusive and mutually antagonistic meaning. Therefore, the Darfur conflict is ethnically/racially based, that is, of “Arabs” against “Africans”.

The current conflict can directly be linked with the emergence of rebel movements that sought to demand for the rights of the Darfur people and to resist existential threats. The militarisation of Darfur from within and outside during the late 1980s until the early 2000 resulted in the emergence of two political streams: the secular multi ethnic movement espousing Sudanism and advocating restructuring of the architecture of the Sudan state to facilitate equitable sharing of power and wealth and a neo-Islamist revival and redefinition of Darfur‟s role in a sharia ruled unified Sudan state (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:136). Two main groups emerged: Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) which was later renamed the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) linked to disparate anti-Khartoum forces in N‟Djamena, Asmara and Tripoli and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The members of the rebel movements were mainly drawn from local village defence groups from particular tribes, which had been formed as a response to increases in attacks by other tribes. However, while only loosely connected, the two rebel groups cited similar reasons for the rebellion, including socio-economic and political marginalization of Darfur and its people. It is noteworthy that the two movements did not argue their case from a tribal point of view, but rather spoke on behalf of all Darfurians, and mainly directed their attacks at Government installations.

Darfur Arabs had always espoused supremacist ideology in local interactions and traditionally leveraged racial links with Khartoum to manipulate the black population (De Waal, 2005:197-198). Taking a cue from SPLM/A, Darfur rebels-led Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice

and Equity Movement (JEM) attacked state institutions in 2003.The influence of John Garang was evident in the SLA and adoption of his movement‟s “New Sudan Philosophy‟ espousing united, secular state with equal rights and opportunity for all. Apparently taking Khartoum by surprise, the initial successful attacks in April 2003 by SLM/A and JEM involved destruction of government installations and military aircraft, abduction of an air force General and death of 75 Sudanese soldiers (De Waal, 2005:197-198).This marked the beginning of a violent and complex conflict as Darfur had been a victim of state neglect lacking basic infrastructure and excluded from economic and political processes and institution of state.This was worsened by increasing population pressures, environmental degradation and consequential maniacal struggle for arable land and water.

The conflict appeared racialized from domestic and international perspectives. Uganda President Yoweri Museveni expressed radically that‟ Africans are being displaced from their land, „hence called for international community‟s intervention to end Arab chauvinism against African sovereignty in Sudan (Museveni, 2009). As the conflict raged, fatalities and displacements mounted. The pitiable condition was succinctly captured in the 2005 International Commission of Inquiry (ICI) Report:

The people of Darfur have suffered enormously during the last few years. Their ordeal must remain at the centre of international attention. They have been living a nightmare of violence and abuse that has stripped them of the very little they had. Thousands were killed, women raped, villages burned, homes destroyed, and belongings looted. About 1.8

million were forcibly displaced and became refugees or internally-displaced persons.

The key grievances of SLM/A were based on uneven development and marginalization of the region. Their aim was that development be brought to the same level as that of the ruling minority (Collins, 2006:3). Interestingly JEM also sought to prove that there were disparities in the distribution of power and wealth, by noting that Darfur and its populations, as well as some populations of other regions, have been consistently marginalized and not included in influential positions in the central Government in Khartoum held by only three tribes. This was a clear indication that the root causes of the conflict were the denial of their inherent needs. It has been argued that the Government was apparently in no position to retaliate, nor did it initially consider the rebellion a serious military matter. The inability of the government to react to this conflict at these early stages was due to the fact that it was in the process of intense peace negotiations with the SPLM/A. The timing of the rebel assault was critical to the Government which apparently was not in possession of sufficient military resources, as many of its forces were still located in the South, and those present in Darfur were mainly located in the major urban centres. The Government was also faced with an additional challenge since the rank and file of the Sudanese armed forces was largely composed of Darfurians, who were probably reluctant to fight “their own” people.

Indeed faced with the two rebel groups, the Government called upon local tribes to assist in the fighting against the rebels. In this way, it exploited the existing tensions between different tribes. In response to the Government‟s call, mostly Arab nomadic tribes without a traditional homeland and wishing to settle and given the encroaching desertification, responded to the call. These new “recruits” were to become what the civilian population and others would refer to as the “Janjaweed”, a traditional Darfurian term denoting an armed bandit or outlaw on a horse or camel. There was also credible evidence that among the ranks of the Janjaweed included fighters from neighbouring countries, primarily Chad and Libya. The continued conflict in Darfur also increased instability in Chad since several Chadian ethnic militias are involved on both sides of the conflict. These activities led to accusations by Khartoum that Chad was covertly supporting Arab militias and want to use Darfur as a springboard for takeover power.

Though the causes of the present conflict in Darfur are complex, the root causes can be traced from marginalisation, poor governance, lack of security, underdevelopment and ethnic discrimination. All these can be defined as that of basic needs which were further acerbated by the emergence of armed rebel movements which enjoyed popular support amongst certain tribes. Over time the conflict had been contained by previous regimes in Sudan by a combination of coercive and accommodative policies which in most cases were in favour of the ruling elite. The fundamental reason for fragile governance in Darfur remains that of resources and political

leadership by those in authority in Khartoum that have adopted a policy of benign neglect.

A combination of the geographical location and the existing conflicts in the region has formed a regional conflict complex. Darfur was at the border of both internal and external conflicts. Conflicts in the neighbouring Chad and the conflict between the north and the South (South Sudan) complicated the Darfur conflict. External regional interests of Countries like Libya further exacerbated the problem. The conflicts in Darfur also provided the Islamist regime with new opportunities of preservation as the GoS was able to exploit the ethnic divisions branding the insurgency as an African revolt. The militarisation of the society by the government in the name of fighting the rebels further divided the ethnic groups leading to a long protracted and complex conflict, pitting the „African tribes‟ and the „Arab‟ Janjaweed militia which complicated the humanitarian situation. It has been argued that the origins of the crisis therefore can be traced to its forceful incorporation and the marginalisation of its inhabitants since 1956 when Sudan gained independence.

The SLM/A andthe Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacks against government installations particularly the El Fasher Airport in North Darfur in 2003 intensified the conflict. Violence escalated further when in response to the attack, the Bashir‟s government decided to arm the Janjawiid and other government allied tribes against the SLM/A and JEM. The resort to the use of Janjawiid is consistent with the government‟s use of proxies to

fight its battle as seen during its 21 years war with the South Sudan. Again, since most of the Sudanese military are from Darfur, the GoS could not count on their loyalty hence their resort to the Janjawiid. By the middle of 2003 the rebels were winning 34 out of 38 encounters and the government began to fear that it may lose the whole of Darfur. Subsequently, the Janjawiid and government forces began to operate jointly and attacked African tribes including civilians, raped women and began to destroy „everything that made life possible‟. Therefore, in September 2003 President Idriss Derby of Chad brokered negotiations in N‟djamena between the GoS, SLM/A andJEM. It called for a 45-day humanitarian ceasefire which unfortunately, was not respected by all the parties.

# APPLICATION OF AU CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM

Having highlighted the nature and causes of the Darfur conflict this thesis will now examine how the AU applied its conflict resolution mechanisms in the Darfur situation as the AU efforts were the prelude to the involvement of the UN. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal have argued that the AU became involved in the Darfur conflict by default. Peacekeepers were required to monitor the ceasefire brokered by Idriss Derby and the AU was tasked to provide them. However, the AU invoked Article 4 of its Constitutive Act and adopted a combination of dialogue and military approach to the management of the Darfur conflict. The AU formed the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) on 28 May 2004. The CFC was composed of

about 60 AU military observers (MILOBS), representatives of the various parties to the conflict and observers from the EU and USA with about 300 soldiers of the AMIS to protect them.

The formation of the CFC was in accordance with articles 3 & 4 of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCA) signed in N‟djamena. The Ceasefire Commission was to monitor and report to a joint commission, Chadian mediation and international community. The decision to form a ceasefire commission was informed by the fact that large numbers of people in Darfur were in dire need of humanitarian aid and thus the parties to the conflict were to provide unrestricted access. It was also to create a conducive environment for negotiations and cessation of all hostile campaigns. The operational arm of the CFC was the AU Monitoring Mission composed of observers from the parties, the Chadian mediation, the AU member states and other representatives of the international community. The parties to the conflict were given the responsibility of protecting the observers; however the CFC was only empowered to request the deployment of an AU protection force of between 100-300.

It is necessary to state that the application of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) at this stage of the conflict failed. This mechanism was aimed at early detection of potentially dangerous situation leading to immediate action. However, Darfur was first discussed at PSC in May 2004 which means that the CEWS mechanism was not utilised. Had it identified

the conflict which effectively became overt in 2003, then an emergency session of the PSC ought to have been held. In either case, the delay in AU‟s initial response demonstrates a weakness not of the mechanism but the decision making process of the PSC.

Despite the initial delayed response, the AU under auspices of former President Olusegun Obansanjo of Nigeria (then Chairman of AU) held a series of meetings with a view to resolving the crisis. This led to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja on May 2006, after seven rounds of negotiation in Abuja.The DPA outlining security, power and wealth sharing arrangements was accepted by the GoS and Minni Minawi-led SLM/A faction but rejected by JEM and SLM/A-Abdel-Wahid for its limited Darfur autonomy provisions, among others (D Iriekpen, 2006:15). The DPA received critical appraisal highlighting inherent flaws. While some commentary claimed it was an imposition on the parties and patronizing to GoS, International Crisis Group (ICG) faulted it for lacking effective guarantees on implementation, and that power and wealth sharing arrangements were less substantive and unfavorable to the rebels. However, incremental implementation of the DPA occasioning Minawi‟s appointment as special Assistant to the President and Transitional Darfur Regional Authority Chairman did not improve the situation, as security reports reflected attacks, notably looting, killings, abductions, and consequential increase in number of IDPs, and incessant acts of banditry against peacekeepers, NGOs, and their infrastructure. With widespread violence between signatory and non-signatory groups peace remained a forlorn hope.

The process leading to theDPA lasted for two years but Julie Flint argues that the first four rounds of the seven-round talks where dominated by numerous violations on the part of GoS and the failure of the international community to check the wanton carnage in Darfur. She observed that AU mediation was as problematic as the rebel negotiators themselves and that the 30 April deadline set by the PSC was unrealistic. She identified some of the flaws in the process that could possibly hinder its implementation. First, the draft DPA was presented to the parties on 25 April and had only five days to endorse or discard the agreement. Meanwhile, the Arabic version was not ready until 28 April – less than 48 hours before the date line. Second, the people of Darfur were not party to the talks nor were the contents explained to them. Third, there was no provision for individual compensation and no timetable for the disarmament of the Janjawiid militias. Finally, the GoS which is party to the conflict was expected to supervise the implementation. She contends that it was an imposed and partial agreement which favoured the GoS to the exclusion of majority of the people of the Darfur. Although Julie herself was invited to advise the AU during the DPA talks, she noted that the mediators never listened to her advice as the GoS rather than disarm the Janjawiid, continued to support it.

The AU conflict resolution mechanisms failed because it was not based on the combination of the four theories of conflict resolution namely: justice, community, understanding and force, as the DPA ignored all these. First, there can be no justice in the resolution of a conflict where a party to the

conflict is also charged with the supervision of the implementation process. Second, the community, in this case the people of Darfur were not involved in the peace talks that would affect their future even though they are the victims of the conflict. The pastoralists were not represented at the negotiating table hence their concerns were not addressed in the DPA. Third, there appears to be no sufficient level of understanding and compromise by the signatories to the Agreement beyond their personal desires and the pressure from the AU mediators. To this extent, this thesis contends that the AU‟s violations of these vital theories of conflict resolution undermine its ability to address the root causes of the conflict. However, the AU itself was constrained by the fact that it is not possible to secure any agreement without the active involvement of the GoS which is a state actor and a member of the AU while the SLM/A and JEM are non-state actors. Furthermore, despite the provision for the Panel of the Wise, there is no indication that the AU utilised this mechanism. Considering the racial/ethnic nature of the conflict, it would have been useful if the Panel of the Wise, made up of respected personalities of both Arab and African descent, were involved prior to, or during the talks leading to the DPA. Similarly, the DPA did not address the root causes of the Darfur conflict which include poverty and socio-economic neglect among others. A comprehensive peace agreement with potential development programmes for the Darfur region would have been ideal.

# AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR (AMIS)

The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) represents the AU‟s use of force to resolve the conflict. The mandate given to AMIS by AU was to provide secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and return of Internally Displaced Persons and to monitor and observe the compliance of the parties to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. It was also mandated to assist in the process of confidence building; all in order to assist in increasing the level of compliance of all parties to the HCFA and enhance the process of political settlement necessary for peace and security in Darfur. The mandate was drafted based on the assumption that parties will respect the N‟djamena Agreement of 8 April 2004. This was the mandate given to the 60 monitors and 300 troops assigned to protect them but the force later expanded to about 7,000 troops in January 2007 without a review of its mandate.

The incremental deployment of 80 AU Military Observers (MILOB) and 300-strong infantry force from Nigeria and Rwanda to protect observers from June 2004 marked commencement of AU initiatives termed African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), with Nigeria‟s Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (erstwhile Special envoy to the North-South Dialogue in Kenya) as AU Chairperson‟s Special Representative on Darfur as mission head; Nigeria‟s General Festus Okonkwo, force commander and CFC chairman; Rwanda Brigadier-General Jean Kazura, deputy force commander; while South Africa and Ghana led AMIS police unit. (Report of the Chairperson of the PSC, 2005:50) Quite early, AMIS was bedeviled by logistics and operational difficulties indicating pre-deployment planning inadequacies.

The force size and mandate were later enhanced by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) in July 2004 and April 2005 to 6171 military and 1560 police personnel, marking AMIS transformation to a peacekeeping force despite Khartoum‟s objections. The mandate included observance of ceasefire compliance, security for humanitarian supplies, assisting in confidence building among parties,support displaced population‟s return to their homes and Darfur security situation improvement (AU PSC, 2004). Considering Darfur‟s dire humanitarian and security situation, AMIS mandate was highly restrictive, lacking traditional peacekeeping taskslike overseeing ceasefire, law and order maintenance, civilian protection, combatants disarmament, among others. Khartoum warned against AMIS transformation to a peacekeeping role but accepted its expansion.

The deployment of 300 troops based on any assessment was an obvious underassessment by AU. It may be argued that from the onset the AU and the Chadian mediation team had underestimated the gravity of the conflict and it may have acted due to external pressure for the AU to take action. The size and mandate of the force was not based on the task but on the acceptable size and scope of the GoS and after a series of negotiations the government only conceded to a team of 305 troops (Iyob, 2006:154). It was thus too small to influence the dynamics of the conflict. The Peace and Security Council later resolved that its mandate was to protect not only the monitors but also the protection, within the capacity of the Force, of the civilian population (AU PSC, 2004. The UNSCR 1556 also endorsed the AU

initiative on the deployment of international monitors, including the protection force to Darfur under the leadership of the African Union and urged the international community to continue to support these efforts (UNSCR, 2004).

AU peacekeeping in Darfur did not succeed because of the limitations of the AU‟s mandate. The mandate failed to appreciate the violent situation in Darfur hence the AU force cannot protect the innocent civilians in refugee camps. The mandate permits AMIS to protect civilians only if they were being attacked in their presence and only if it feels it has sufficient troops to intervene. The mandate was restrictive and the then AMIS Force Commander (FC) said he would have preferred a mandate that „permits the peacekeepers to bite when the need arises‟ (Ihekirei, 2017). He however pointed out that AMIS cannot enforce compliance with limited equipment, finance and logistics. Although, a more robust mandate would require more force on the ground, the AU mediators should have sought for such a mandate so that as AU‟s force began to increase, the force should have been able to establish at least safe havens around refugee camps. This limited mandate was due to the lack of cooperation of the GoS and consent which AU felt were prerequisites. The restrictive mandate therefore denied AMIS the ability to stop the ethnic cleansing. It has been suggested that the PSC should have coerced Sudan to allow greater freedom of action for AMIS. It should be noted however, that some African countries were not comfortable with the restrictive nature of AMIS mandate. For example, the Rwandan President Paul Kagame asserted that: „our forces will not standby and watch

innocent civilians being hacked to death like was [done] here [Rwanda] in 1994‟ (O‟Neill, et. al., 2005:25). Similarly, the then FC said that: „We cannot sit down and watch civilians being killed while we are around‟. This was however, a significant difference between intentions and capabilities. AMIS lacked the capability to react with force due to its limited strength and the GoS has insisted that increase in troop numbers will be allowed if the mandate does not change.

The AU had an ambitious plan to resolve the conflict, however the transformationof the CFC into a fully-fledged peacekeeping mission was poorly done. The transformation to a peacekeeping mission was also in contravention of the basic principles of peacekeeping asthere was no peace to keep and the parties to the conflict did not give full consent. AU also had a constrained mandate and scarce resources. The basic principles of peacekeeping operations require that the parties to the conflict fully consent to the presence of peacekeepers; however in Darfur there was no peace agreement to implement. A successful intervention must have a political mandate not merely among the peacekeepers but also an acceptable mandate among the people and major political groupings in that state. It is interesting to note that the AU‟s predecessor the OAU deployed peacekeeping forces in Chad in 1980 but failed because of poor planning, coordination and lack of a peace to keep,the AU, thus learnt nothing from the Chad episode.

Based on its limited mandate and in line with the guidance from the AU Head of Mission (HOM), AMIS developed its concept of operations (CONOPS). The CONOPS made the following assumptions:

* + - 1. All parties will comply with the HCFA.
      2. The parties will agree to the strengthening of AMIS as given in the AMIS plan of action.
      3. Donors will fund the necessary expenses to allow the execution of the given plan.
      4. Protection of civilians is the responsibility of the GoS.
      5. The parties will work toward a comprehensive peace agreement.

These assumptions did not hold as the parties violated the HCFA and other protocols.

The FC‟s intent was to create a secure environment that will lead to the return of IDPs to their villages thereby creating conditions that will ultimately lead to a political settlement of the crisis. The Main Effort of the FC was „to degrade the ability of the parties from acting with impunity, as well as enforce compliance with HCFA and this lies with the pro-active monitoring by the MILOBs‟. The FC‟s intention was not achieved because of the inadequacy of his mandate and the limitations of his force size and structure.

The force structure of AMIS included the Force Headquarters, one Airmobile Special Forces Company (reserve), Force Headquarters Company,

one Explosive Ordinance Disposal/De-mining Section, one Light Field Engineer Company, one Military Police Platoon and a pool of military interpreters. It had eight Sector Headquarters with one infantry battalion in each sector as well as an aviation unit of civil helicopters. Considering the size of Darfur which is 256,000 sq km, the strength of about 7,000 personnel (literarily one soldier per 36.6 sq km) and with the above structure, the implementation of even the restrictive mandate wouldn‟t have been possible.

Where there is no real peace to keep, peace enforcement is necessary but the AU did not have the means for peace enforcement. It is also in the public domain that the GoS rejected UNSCR 1556 (2004) on enforcement of sanctions yet no measures were taken against it. Although the UNSCR 1556 passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which enables a full range of enforcement measures, including military action, in the event of non- compliance, it only threatened to take unspecified "measures", a signal which the government correctly interpreted as a general lack of will by the international community to take serious action. However, the international community was divided and resisted robust military action because they still needed the cooperation of GoS in the North South negotiations. When the North-South peace deal was signed, the international community pressure on Khartoum with regard to the humanitarian situation yielded some profits. The AU passed a resolution to increase its forces to 7000 in 2006, while it was yet to have a peace agreement to implement. The signing of the peace agreement in May 2006 led to the acceptance by the GoS of the deployment

of a UN force. It is on this basis that this thesis will briefly highlight some of the successes and shortcomings of AMIS in Darfur prior to rehatting to UN.

AMIS recorded some successes despite certain constraints. First, the deployment of AMIS troops in certain areas in South Darfur considered risky and contrary to its mandate, deterred attacks against the civilians. Examples include the AMIS deployment in the town of Labado and other villages in South Darfur in late 2004 and 2005 (Nicholas, 2016). Second, AMIS personnel succeeded in the mediation and resolution of local conflicts within their localities where the customary dispute resolution mechanisms have been disrupted by the conflict. AMIS soldiers, most of whom share similar traditions and values with these communities found it easy to mediate and resolve conflicts through meetings with the Sheikhs in their sectors to resolve disputes. Third, AMIS patrolled all the sectors to enhance security and responded to requests from humanitarian agencies to patrol certain areas where civilians are under threats. In addition, AMIS expanded its eight sectors through the opening of „Group Sites‟ which are small camps opened 24 hour/7 days a week presence in order to protect more civilians. On the whole, AMIS soldiers „demonstrated adaptability, trying to turn deficiencies into positives‟.

Notwithstanding these successes, AMIS had key weaknesses which undermined the operation leading to the rehatt to UNAMID. First, the capacity to undertake the required task within PSO spectrum was lacking as logistic and financial capacity was absent. It has always been assumed that

due to the fact that Africa is one of the highest contributors of forces in UN peacekeeping operations they would also volunteer in large numbers in AU led missions. The African continent contribution to UN peace operations has been increasing steadily since 1994.

# TABLE 5.2: TABLES SHOWING MILITARY AND POLICE CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES TO UN PSO AS AT DECEMBER 2016

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Country** | **Uniformed Personnel Contributed** | **Remarks** |
| 1. | Bangladesh | 9,307 |  |
| 2. | Pakistan | 8,163 |  |
| 3. | India | 8,112 |  |
| 4. | Ethiopia | 7,864 |  |
| 5. | Rwanda | 5,575 |  |
| 6. | Nepal | 5,316 |  |
| 7. | Senegal | 3,570 |  |
| 8. | Ghana | 3,053 |  |
| 9. | Nigeria | 2,975 |  |
| 10. | Egypt | 2,937 |  |

Source: African Council on Foreign Relations, 2016.

It is important to understand that the African states contribution to UN missions has at times been encouraged by the negotiation of lease agreements that compensate the forces financially thus reducing the burden to some states. The new contingent-owned equipment (COE) procedures ("wet lease" agreements) adopted by the General Assembly, commits the UN to reimburse troop contributors for use of their equipment and to provide those services and support not covered under the new COE procedures. In the case of AU missions like AMIS states were required to deploy with their state

resources which in most cases were few and not adequate for the mission. African countries may be misunderstood as having more advanced capacity for peace keeping missions than they do actually posses. The reality is the AU relies on external support to led peace operations and cannot sustain them on its own.

Second, there was no strategic guidance and according to the first AMIS FC, „the strategic directive arrived the mission when I have started arranging for my rotation [almost a year]‟ (Okonkwo, 2013).Third, the command and control structure was cumbersome. The FC reported to the Chairman of AU PSC through the Deputy Head of Mission (DHOM) and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of AU Commission (SRCC). This arrangement was further complicated by the unwieldy bureaucracy at AU Headquarters. Fourth, although the Head of Mission (HOM) dealed with the political groups in the Darfur conflict, there was no political advisors to assist Sector Commanders in developing effective relationship with the parties in the conflict within their sectors. Though, Major General Okonkwo observed that there was no need to deploy political advisers on a permanent basis but an occasional visits to sectors by political advisers would have helped the situation. Fifth, there was serious logistical gap due to the absence of a logistics plan at the inception of the operation. This gap was further complicated by AU‟s poor coordination of outside assistance from NATO, EU and other bilateral offers of assistance to address the logistics problem of AMIS. For example, at one point, three different countries offered helicopter support but could not get a response from the AU on when, where and how to

deliver them. This led the EU to establish a technical support group in Addis Ababa to process and streamline support from NATO and individual states. Closely related to the above was the incapacity of AU to handle the logistics requirement of the AMIS. For example, some troops contributing countries could not supply their countries with basic military equipment at the outset of the mission and key mobility assets were either ineffective or unavailable. The AU also lacked the staff capacity and experience to handle key logistics issues such as contract letting and monitoring, fuel provision, storage and maintenance amongst others. It also had a weak financial oversight thus making donors particularly the EU to demand greater transparency and accountability.

Another major shortcoming was the insufficient impact of the ceasefire monitoring mechanisms which was not timely and lacked adequate description of the extent of violations. This was a deficiency of the HCFA which did not prescribe punishment for parties that violated its provisions. Similarly, the inclusion of the representatives of the GoS and the rebel groups in AMIS investigations frightened witnesses and victims from testifying and also allowed for manipulation of evidence. For example, even where forensic evidence shows that helicopter gunship attacked a village, the government official would refuse to endorse the report because the joint investigation team had not seen the gun ships‟ attack, thus leading to lose of evidence.

However, despite the shortcomings of AU in Darfur, its involvement was an indication of Africa‟s resolve to solve its own problems. As noted by

the then AU SRCC Baba Gana Kingibe: „We stand or fall in Darfur. If we fail here, nobody is going to look to the AU for a solution to other conflicts in the continent‟. Similarly, Obasanjo observed that: „it is not in the interest of Sudan nor Africa, nor indeed the whole world, for us to stand by, fold our hands and see genocide in Darfur‟. Given the deteriorated security situation which was described as „genocide‟, why was it that the UN and other major state actors were reluctant to get decisively involved early?

This thesis contends that the conflict in Darfur required enormous logistics far beyond what the AU could handle hence rehatting to UNAMID. According to the then AMIS FC, while the supports from US, UK and EU were appreciated, they were not enough to meet the operational requirements of AMIS and that despite AU‟s requests, „no country or organisation provided the highly needed Attack Helicopters‟. The Darfur experience tested AU‟s conflict management capacity, converging with its objectivity to: enable Africans build their capacity to solve their own problems in their own way. The AU engaged the Darfur conflict attempting to privilege African responsibility for its resolution. Similarly, President Thabo Mbeki stated in 2005 that the Darfur conflict resolution was African‟s responsibility (S. Rice, 2005:B4). This belief was echoed at the Tripoli Summit involving President of Chad, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan rejecting any foreign intervention by any country, whatsoever in this pure African issue. The summit could not have spoken differently considering its attendees, particularly Sudan. However, such declaration of self capacity for regional problems provided excuse for western reluctance to commit troops to Darfur (Williams and

Bellamy, 2005:35). AU‟s inadequacies made dependence on external sources inevitable.

# UN INITIATIVES ON DARFUR

Can the international community having not done enough for the people of Rwanda in their time of need, just watch as this tragedy [in Darfur] deepens having finally agreed… that there is a responsibility to protect, can we contemplate failing yet another test.

# - UNSG Kofi Annan

**(2006)**

The UN had been involved in the resolution of North/South conflict, mounting subsequently 10,000 UNMIS troops to support peace building efforts (UNSC Resolution 1590 (2005), 2005:1).When the Darfur region erupted in conflict, its agencies and NGOs were deployed for humanitarian assistance (Secretary-General Report, 2006:12). The operations were regularly hamstrung by lack of access to camps resulting from GoS restrictive travel permits policy. UN Security Council encouraged AU mediation, supported AMIS expansion, assisted the pledging conferences and established UN technical assistance cell in Darfur. In pursuance of its responsibility towards global peace and security, UNSC adopted several resolutions to regulate the situation and directed UN Secretary-General (UNSG) to coordinate its activities on Darfur. Then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, constructively engaged the situation through commentaries highlighting deteriorating humanitarian and security situation, despatched

envoys to talks, consulted with stakeholders, reported it findings regularly to UNSC, mobilized international community‟s support, and made diplomatic visits to Sudan.

The UNSC, 18 September 2004, Resolution 1564 (2004) reiterated earlier mandates, notably, threatened Khartoum with sanctions and directed UNSG to establish an International Commission Inquiry (ICI) to investigate international law and human rights violations, determine occurrence of genocide, and identify violators and possible sanctions. President al-Bashir showed readiness for adversarial relationship with UN, responding that: „We are neither afraid, neither of the UN nor of its resolution. Apparently, GoS Arab solidarity and primary commercial relationships with China and Russia could explicate al-Bashir‟s confidence.

The ICC panel was necessitated by growing reports of mass atrocity crimes in Darfur by GoS. Initially, UN officials variously described it: UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, declared the situation as one of the worst and most neglected humanitarian crisis in the world characterized by ethnic cleansing‟ orchestrated by scorched-earth tactics‟ by Janjaweed militias against black communities; UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) termed it invisible emergency‟, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, compared it to Rwanda genocide; Kofi Annan described the disturbing events “unacceptable, Bertrand Ramcharan, Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights, viewed it as "alarming”.

The then US Secretary of State, Collin Powel, described the Khartoum/ Janjaweed atrocities in Darfur as genocide and the congress unanimously urged the (US) Administrator to seriously consider multilateral or even unilateral intervention to stop genocide in Darfur, Sudan, should the United Nations Security Council fail to act. Subsequently, President Bush on 9 September 2004 corroborated his compatriots position asserting that we urge the international community to work with us to prevent and suppress acts of genocide. The word suppress implied Washington‟s readiness to adopt decisive measures. Similarly, UN human rights panel reported systemic reign of terror by Khartoum and its allied militia amounted largely to crimes against humanity and war crimes. Khartoum sympathizer, Arab League‟s fact-finding mission in May 2004 observed massive violations of human rights [had been] committed by pro-government militias. AU leaders while deploring the worrisome situation rejected its categorization as genocide.

Unimpressed by debate about state of atrocities while the imperiled Darfur population‟s condition worsened, Kofi Annan asserted that:

But let me say that the issue is not to discuss what name to give it. We all agree that serious crimes are being committed. International humanitarian law is being broken, and there are very serious human rights violations – grave ones – that we need to act on. We don‟t need to label to propel us to act, and so I think we should act now and stop arguing about which label to put on it. (Bellamy, 2005:41)

Meanwhile, Darfur situation unfolding during 2004 UN commemoration of a decade of Rwanda genocide, eliciting global resolve to forestall reoccurrence of international community‟s indifference to incident of a 100-day massacre of over 800 000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus by extremist Hutus in 1994. The event enabled Darfur conflict to gain global visibility with characteristic genocidal imagery (Brunk, 2008:25,44). Submitting its report on 25 January 2005, ICI noted particularly Khartoum‟s complicity in acts that amounted to war crimes, crimes against humanity, while exempting it from pursuit of „a policy of genocide (ICI Report, 2005:626-640). It therefore recommended Darfur situation‟s referral to International Criminal Court (ICC), pursuant to ICCs Statute, Article 13(b) for prosecution of crimes perpetrators. Subsequently, UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) on 31 March 2005 gave force to ICI recommendations. As UNSC referred the matter to ICC, it drew varied reactions from belligerents and international community alike. While the rebels welcomed it, President al- Bashir reportedly vowed thrice in the name of Almighty Allah that [he] shall never hand any Sudanese national to a foreign court.

AU‟s obvious weakness in resolving the conflict warranted AMIS transition to AU-UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) embodying projected 26,000-strong force with the following mandate:Contribute to restoration of necessary security conditions for provision of humanitarian assistance and full humanitarian access throughout Darfur; contributing to protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians in its areas of deployment, without prejudice to GoS

responsibility; monitoring, observing and verifying compliance with implementation of various agreements; assisting the political process to ensure inclusiveness and supporting AU-UN joint mediation to broaden and deepen stakeholders commitment to the peace process; contributing to secure environment for economic reconstruction and development and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs to their homes; contributing to promotion and protection of rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms in Darfur ; and, monitoring security situation at the Sudan‟s borders with Chad and Central African Republic.

China did not veto UNAMID resolution due to activists‟ threat to orchestrate a boycott of 2008 Beijing Olympics. While welcoming the initiatives, GoS predictably objected, threatening war against such force as it viewed it as an infringement on its sovereignty and feared that UN peacekeepers could create room for Darfur secession (De Waal, 2005:32).Darfur movements, SPLM, and some northern opposition elements warmly received UNSC resolution authorizing UNAMID, with anti- and pro- UNAMID demonstrations witnessed across Darfur. However, Khartoum‟s wish for UNAMID‟s predominantly African composition and command was granted (PSC Communiqué, 2007:4).

* 1. **UNAMID OPERATIONS**

On 31 Dec 2007, AMIS successfully re-hatted as UNAMID. UNAMID is currently at about 19000 from the original 2008 strength of 25,987 personnel. The Hybrid Operation is defined in the Communiqué of the

African Union Peace and Security Council of 22 June 2007 and the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1769, dated 31 July 2007. This subsumed the Light Support Package (LSP) and Heavy Support Package (HSP) in line with the Communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 30 November 2006 and the UNSC Presidential Statement of 19 December 2006 supported by the Conclusions of the Addis Ababa High Level Consultations, dated 16 November 2006.

The transition to UNAMID was necessary due to the inability of the international community to bring the non-signatory factions to conform to the DPA, as well as delays in the implementation of key aspects of the agreement, resulted in renewed violence and fragmentation of the rebel movements in Darfur. The resulting deterioration of the security situation, and the growing complexity of the conflict, funding and logistics constraints, as well as the regional dimension, inspired the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) decision for a transition to a UN Peacekeeping Operation. Based on consultation in Addis Ababa on 16 November 2006, a three phased approach to enhance peacekeeping in Darfur and as a viable framework for resolution of the conflict was agreed on. This conclusion was subsequently endorsed by the AU PSC Communiqué‟ of 30 November 2006, and the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of 19 December 2006.

The three-phase approach involved first the provision of two distinct UN support packages to AMIS which culminated in an AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur. Phase I was the UN Light Support Package (LSP) to

AMIS as recommended in the UN Secretary-General‟s 28 July 2006 Report on Darfur. The LSP, enhanced the AMIS command and control structure, supported the Ceasefire Commission (CFC), and assisted in liaison and monitoring. This took place from September 2006 to October 2007. Phase II was the UN Heavy Support Package (HSP) designed to complement the LSP. This include UN deployment of military enabling units, military force multipliers, police and civilian personnel to AMIS, as well as the provision of substantial aviation and logistical assets to enhance AMIS‟s efficiency and effectiveness in its Area of Responsibility (AOR). The HSP package was deployed from October 2007 to December 2007 and saw units from Nigeria and Rwandaarrives Darfur in line with the preference of Government of Sudan for UNAMID to be mostly populated by African TCCs (Ahmed, 2017). This was in line with AU mantra for Africans to take responsibility to find solution to African problems as is the case in Darfur. Phase III was the actual transition to UNAMID on December 2007, deployment of additional operational elements and enabling units to enhance operational effectiveness and strengthen the command and control structure of the mission. The establishment of UNAMID in Darfur followed on from the successful implementation of the LSP and HSP and the integration of the AU and UN command structures.

The transition to UNAMID was based on several planned assumptions:

1. The Tripartite Mechanism will facilitate the implementation of UNAMID.
2. Contributions from African Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) will be given priority over contributions from other geographical areas, provided that those African TCCs possess the required capabilities.
3. AU-UN personnel and assets will be guaranteed free and unhindered movement in Darfur.
4. A headquarters structure based on three regional sectors is fully established.
5. Adequate air and sealift capacity is available to deploy additional troops to Darfur in a timely manner.
6. UNAMID will be logistically and financially sustainable and the UN will assume financial responsibility.

# STRATEGIC END STATE AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION

The desired strategic end state was to achieve durable peace, security and stability in Darfur necessary for regional stability (UNAMID CONOPS, 2008). This was based on Security Council Resolution 1768 of 31 July 2007 which authorised the establishment of UNAMID to assist the Parties in implementing the DPA or any subsequent agreement, through contributing to the protection of civilians and creation of security conditions that allows unhindered access for the delivery of humanitarian aid and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their homes thus enabling reconciliation and confidence building necessary for durable peace, security and stability in

Darfur.The intent of UNAMID is to contribute to the provision of a secure environment throughout the entire Darfur through the rapid deployment of a capable, impartial and credible military peacekeeping force (UNAMID, 2008). The force was to deliver quick and tangible efforts in order to demonstrate the positive benefits of the peace process to those Parties engaged in the conflict and will stimulate a wider acceptance of the peacekeepers‟ presence in Darfur.

The concept of operation is based on UNAMID deploying throughout Northern, Southern and Western Darfur in line with the three sector structure (UNAMID CONOPS, 2008). This also based on significant increase in the total number of infantry battalions available to UNAMID. This included an increased in the size and capabilities of the AMIS Infantry battalions as they are gradually brought up to UN standards. In addition to these battalions, force multipliers and mission enablers, a Special Forces Company wasto be deployed to the Force Headquarters (FHQ) and act as Force Reserves. Also, each sector will have one Infantry Company as a Sector Reserve or Quick response Force (QRF). These assets was to provide the Force Commander and Sector Commanders with adequate forces held in reserve to be able to respond swiftly and effectively to any threat throughout the entire AOR. UNAMID was to impact significantly on the security situation and an “Early Effect” was required to meet the high expectations in Darfur. This will be achieved through the combined efforts of military and police units in order to display the intent and commitment on behalf of the AU and UN.

The General Core Capabilities of UNAMID is based on the core functions of protection, monitoring and verification and liaison as detailed in Table 5:10.

# TABLE 5.3: UNAMID GENERAL CORE CAPABILITY

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Core Capability** | **Detailed Activities** | **Remarks** |
| 1. | Protection | 1. Contribute to the protection of the civilian population. This will be provided through vigorous and highly visible patrol in problem areas including, but not limited to, IDP camps, population centres, return sites and transhumance routes, especially when and where Government police are incapable of fulﬁlling this function. 2. Facilitating the safe and timely provision of humanitarian aid in the Darfur region. Robust security presence in previously inaccessible or unsafe areas will be established to promote return of refugees/IDPs and wider access to humanitarian relief for the population. This will be achieved by the creation of secure areas routes through patrolling, surveillance and military escort where necessary. 3. Information sharing at all levels among military and police components of UNAMID necessary to ensure common objectives are met; avoid duplication; and facilitate synergy to the best extent possible. Establishment of joint planning and operational mechanisms, as well as Joint Military - Police Operation   Centres at Team Site Level. |  |
| 2. | Monitoring and Verification | 1. Military Observers (MILOBs) monitor and report incidents of conﬂict; gather and report early warning information related to imminent conﬂict or threats to the of civilians; liaise with local interlocutors; provide situational awareness to the military component; and where necessary, verify compliance of the parties in accordance with the agreements. 2. Infantry units deployed in the three sectors provide overt military presence on the ground at all times. Their interaction with local population is critical in providing the FHQ with up-to-date situational awareness (SA). Information gathering through vigorous patrolling and   surveillance from the air and on the ground enhance situational awareness. |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 3. | Liaison | 1. The Liaison capability (LOs, UNMOs, SOs, deployed units) focuses on the establishment and maintenance of a local network of contacts incorporating all parties, including local authorities and the general population. 2. Liaison teams visit IDP camps and other centres of population to gauge the current security situation and to bolster public conﬁdence in the peacekeeping process and the implementation of political initiatives. |  |

Source: UNAMID CONOPS, 2008, OMA-DPKO, UN HQ, New York.

The deployment of UNAMID was based on 4 phases transitions, stabilization, consolidation and draw down. Phase 1 which is the transition phase commenced with the adoption of the AU PSC Decision of 22 June 2007 and the UNSCR 1769 of 31 July 2007. It covered UNAMID planning activities and was completed on the full deployment of an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) on 1 Nov 2008. This included the establishment of the Mission, Force Headquarters (HQ) and Sector HQs; two additional Infantry battalions deployed; HSP units sufficiently deployed; and Hybrid units sufficiently and timely deployed to achieve an early effect on Transfer of Authority (TOA).

Phase 2 – Stabilizationcommenced upon the establishment of an IOC and was to be completed when the security situation has stabilized sufficiently to allow for the return of displaced persons and for the reconciliation process to begin. Key benchmarks are: deployment throughout this phase of the full UNAMID military and police force; formed Police Units (FPUs) and Police Stations sufficiently established and operational in IDP camps and elsewhere; satisfactory implementation of and compliance by

all Parties with the DPA or any subsequent agreements and commencement of the DDR process of combatants.

Phase 3 - Consolidation was to commence upon entering steady state military and police operations. It is complete when security tasks can begin to be handed over to national security forces. Key benchmarks are:Continued compliance of the Parties with all ceasefire agreements; Stable security environment; DDR near completion; IDP and refugees largely returned to their areas of origin and Security Sector Reform in an advanced stage.

Phase 4 - Drawdown begins when security tasks can begin to be handed over to national security forces. During the phased withdrawal, a reserve capability will be maintained throughout the region. It is complete when all UNAMID Forces have returned to their home countries. Key benchmarks are:Transfer of UNAMID security tasks in Darfur to the Government of Sudan; Transfer of UNAMID infrastructure to the Government of Sudan. However, as June 2012 UNAMID was still in Phase II, leading to the 2012 review of the entire operation. This was to ensure a more effective utilization of UNAMID resources towards the achievement of the mandate. The situation was informed by lack of progress towards achieving Darfur wide security which would drive a political solution to the problem. The force composition table and the deployment map as at 2008 is as shown below.


# TABLE 5.4: UNAMID STRENGTH COMPOSITION TABLE

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Type of Personnel** | **Number** | **Remarks** |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Military Personnel | 19,555 | Including 360 MilObs  and Staff Officers |
| 2 | Police Personnel | 3,772 |  |
| 3 | Formed Police Units (FPU) | 2,660 | 19 FPU @ 140  persons each |
| 4 | Civilian Staff | - | As appropriate |
|  | TOTAL | 25,987 |  |

**Source: UNAMID CONOPS, 2008.**

# FIGURE 5.3: DEPLOYMENT MAP OF UNAMID 2008



Source: UN HQ, New York, 2016.

As at 2011, the number and type of UNAMID personnel in Darfur viz- a-viz population of Darfur and strength of IDPs is as stated in Table 5.5. The overall estimated population of Darfur is 7,515,445 while the total number of IDPs was estimated to be 1.9 million (UNCT Estimated Figure). A total of 17,929 UNAMID military (UNAMID 2011), 2,705 UNAMID Police

(Deployment Report, 2011) and 2,237 FPU (FPU Deployment) were deployed in FHQ, MHQ, Sector HQs and 38 Team Sites (Police are deployed in 13 Team Sites) 3,749 UNAMID civilian staff and 1,591 UN agency/INGO staff were equally deployed in the mission. UNAMID was thus almost at full authorized strength yet the capability to successfully execute the mandate remained doubtful (Carey, 2013).

# TABLE 5.5: NUMBER AND TYPE OF UNAMID PERSONNEL IN SECTORS VIS-À-VIS LOCATIONS AND POPULATIONS IN IDPS CAMPS

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Estimated Population | IDPs (all Darfur) | Returnees (verified) | UN Military | UN Police | FPU | UNAMID  Civilians | Agency / INGO Staff | TS\*\*\* | CP |
| Sector North | 2,113,626 | 1.9  Million | 1867 HH &  740 HH\* | 5,645 | 957 | 700 | 2,005 | 563 | 12 | 15 |
| Sector South | 4,093,595 | 123 HH\*\*  (540  individuals) | 6,385 | 961 | 699 | 814 | 421 | 14 | 19 |
| Sector West | 1,308,255 | 43,180  IDPs 30,665  Refugees | 5,899 | 787 | 838 | 930 | 607 | 12 | 15 |

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2013,

# UNAMID WORKPLAN ON MANDATE IMPLEMENTATION

Based on Security Council Resolution 1881 (2009), UNAMID developed a strategic workplan in consultation with the African Union that contains benchmarks to measure and track progress made in implementing the mandate of UNAMID. Four priority areas were developed for concerted action required to realize the overall goal of achieving a political solution and sustained stability in Darfur (Hayden, 2013). The four areas are: (a) the achievement of a comprehensive political solution; (b) the achievement of a secure and stable environment; (c) the enhancement of the rule of law, strengthened governance and human rights; and (d) the achievement of a stabilized humanitarian situation (Heyden, 2013).

The achievement of a comprehensive political solution entails the continuation of the peace process under the leadership of the Joint Chief Mediator, as well as the holding of free, fair and credible elections that would lay the foundation for meaningful representation of Darfur at the national level. UNAMID focused on substantial support and facilitation of the work of the Joint Chief Mediator and intensified its engagement and involvement with all Darfur stakeholders, including civil society, to ensure that their views are represented in negotiations going forward. The identified benchmark is the achievement of a comprehensive political solution to the conflict, through the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and/or the conclusion of a subsequent comprehensive peace agreement that will ensure that Darfur is adequately represented and participating in the national political process. Progress would include a willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage

in substantive negotiations and make the compromises necessary for an inclusive peace agreement, improvement in relations between Chad and the Sudan, and strong international support for the negotiations. Others include key relevant stakeholders in the Darfur conflict are represented in substantive negotiations on a peace agreement, fair representation of Darfurians in national decision-making and progress made towards the establishment of effective mechanisms and institutions promoting reconciliation between communities (Shitaka, UN DPKO, 2013).

The next priority area is a secure and stable environment which includes the safety and security and the achievement of a stable environment in Darfur through absence of military activity, a significant reduction in criminal activities, and the re-establishment of the freedom of movement for civilians. To ensure a secure and stable environment, UNAMID was to continue to conduct patrols, including enhancing and increasing integrated long-range and night patrols; increase its mine risk education through Darfur; retain 24/7presence in IDP camps and reinforce its community policing activities, as well as expansion of the scale and scope of training and capacity-building of Government police and movements' police liaison officers (Kentaro, OMA, 2014). UNAMID was to also report on major instances of violence, including all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, engage with local, regional and international partners towards easing the tensions between Chad and the Sudan, and conduct quick-impact projects to enhance socio-economic development.

The identified benchmark for a secure and stable environment is for UNAMID to contribute to the restoration and upholding of a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur, in which civilians, in particular vulnerable groups, are protected and the displaced population return to places of origin. Indicators include: Ceasefire in place, reduction in outbreaks of violence among Government forces, armed movement and communities in Darfur; reduction in crime activity against civilians, including banditry, hijacking and kidnapping and decrease in attacks on humanitarian convoys. Others include enhanced capacity of security institutions to manage violence against civilians, including prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, including arrest and prosecution according to international standards; and implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme throughout Darfur (UN DPKO, 2013).

The third priority area is the enhancement of the rule of law which encompasses the ability of State institutions to enforce the rule of law, work in accordance with principles of good governance, and guarantee human rights and freedoms to the population. This also includes socio-economic development in Darfur, including improvements in the education and health sector, infrastructures, and expansion of social services and livelihood opportunities. UNAMID was to work closely with the local institutions, with a view to providing advice and training, and to advocate for an inclusive, transparent and accountable administration in accordance with principles of good governance.UNAMID was also to work closely with security and justice institutions, as well as with prison management structures to improve

conditions in prisons and detention facilities, monitor and report violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and follow up on the implementation of Security Council resolutions on children and armed conflict, and on acts of violence against civilians in armed conflict.

The identified benchmarks to measure progress in rule of law is for UNAMID to contribute to the functioning of effective and efficient State institutions, including national and local authorities and security and justice institutions, to enforce and maintain the rule of law and govern on a non- discriminatory basis in accordance with international human rights standards and principles of good governance throughout Darfur. Progress would include a willingness of the Government of the Sudan at both the national and local levels to undertake significant reform of its security and judicial institutions and willingness of the Government of the Sudan to implement legislative reforms towards international human rights standards. Others include continual reduction in violations of international humanitarian and human rights law; Local police force receives training on international policing standards and human rights; and implementation of measures by national authorities to improve standards of criminal prosecution and reduce impunity in Darfur (UN DPKO, 2013).

The last area of priority is the stabilization of humanitarian situation through the establishment of unhindered humanitarian access. This is towards enhancing efforts to find long-term, sustainable solutions to the situation of vulnerable communities. In cooperation with the UN team, UNAMID was to

work towards establishing mechanisms to facilitate the opening and expansion of humanitarian space. The bench marks includes UNAMID contribution to a stabilized humanitarian situation in which the humanitarian community has free and unhindered access to population in need of assistance, and which enables Darfurias to live in dignity, gradually reducing their reliance on humanitarian aid through gradually increasing engagement in sustainable livelihood activities. UNAMID is also to support the lead agencies with respect to internally displaced persons to allow them to integrate fully into a community of their choice, including through voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return. Progress would include a willingness of the parties to the conflict to permit unrestricted humanitarian access, strong support by the international donor community for humanitarian activities in Darfur, and a willingness of local actors to permit safe, voluntary and sustainable returns. Other indicators of progress include that state institutions have adopted policies that promote socio-economic development, including through access to basic social service, improving livelihood and infrastructure; reduction in mortality rates for vulnerable populations, especially internally displaced persons; and increased numbers of displaced persons return to their homes in a sustainable, voluntary manner. The lack of progress in four areas of priority particularly as regards a comprehensive political solution and secure and stable environment underpinned the review of UNAMID concept of operations in 2012 (Ladsous, 2013). This is with a view to improve operational capability and execution of the mandate.

# UNAMID 2012 REVIEW OF CONCEPT OF OPERATION

# BACKGROUND TO THE REVIEW

The AU-UN mediation efforts in Darfur were revived in Doha in February 2009 in an attempt to secure an inclusive peace for Darfur and re- engage the non-signatory factions of the DPA. The parties to these renewed negotiations included the Government of Sudan, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Liberation and Justice Movement while SLA/AW remained outside of the process. However, amid continuing hostilities between the GoS and armed movements in Darfur, in 2010, the JEM withdrew from the peace talks, returning briefly to the table in early 2011 only to finally reject the peace agreement know as the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). Additionally, SLA/MM, the only armed movement signatory to the DPA withdrew from the Agreement, due in part to the slow implementation of the DPA and deterioration in its relationship with the GoS (Gaye, 2013). As a result, intense fighting erupted between SLA/MM and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in areas where SLA-Minni Minawi forces held territory.

On 14 July 2011, the GoS and the LJM signed the Agreement for the Adoption of the DDPD. The document is recognized as an important step forward in the peace process and is viewed as a basis for a comprehensive and inclusive peace settlement for Darfur (Agalawata, 2014). However, a shift in rebel alliances opened new dimensions to the conflict in Darfur as on 7 August 2011, SLA-Abdul Wahid, SLA-Minni Minawi and the Sudanese

People‟s Liberation Movement (SPLM)-North signed an alliance agreement (Sudan Revolutionary Front) in Kaoda, South Kordofan; essentially advocating for the overthrow of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Forces led by Khalil Ibrahim also joined the Sudan Revolutionary Front on

11 November 2011 (Agalawata, 2014). To contain these factional developments, SAF adopted pre-emptive deployments, and reinforcements to location in the strongholds of armed movements using combined aerial and ground attacks. Similarly, tensions between GoS and the newly independent South Sudan also raised security concerns to UNAMID operations its AOR.

Under UNSCR 2003 (2011) of 29 July 2011, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to review the uniformed personnel requirement for UNAMID to ensure that UNAMID resources could be used optimally in carrying out its mandate. This was especially in light of the humanitarian, security and political environment on the ground which was deteriorating by the day despite the deployment of UNAMID since 2008. Based on the conduct of an integrated conflict analysis, the review found that the situation in Darfur has evolved since the establishment of UNAMID in 2008 (Undiandeye, 2016). Insecurity related to clashes between armed groups has slightly subsided to a certain extent, but localised, sporadic clashes between the GoS and the armed movements was on the increase. In addition, issues related to violent crimes and harassment, including those in IDP camps, resource-based conflicts and politically motivated violence emerged as the main challenge to the protection of civilians (Undiandeye, 2016). These developments demanded a review of UNAMID military and police

personnel to enhance operational efficiency towards the achievement of the mandate. The review was preceded by several mandates as seen in Table 5.6 Summary of Mandate Leading to 2012 Review.


# TABLE 5.6: SUMMARY OF MANDATE LEADING TO 2012 REVIEW

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Date** | **Mandate** | **Provisions** | **Remarks** |
| 1. | 31 | SCR | Authorized the establishment of |  |
|  | July | 1769 | UNAMID, and to take the necessary |
|  | 2007 | (2007) | action, in the areas of deployment of |
|  |  |  | its forces and as it deemed |
|  |  |  | appropriate within its capabilities in |
|  |  |  | order to: (i) Protect its personnel, |
|  |  |  | facilities, installations and |
|  |  |  | equipment, and to ensure the security |
|  |  |  | and freedom of movement of its own |
|  |  |  | personnel and humanitarian workers, |
|  |  |  | (ii) support early and effective |
|  |  |  | implementation of the Darfur Peace |
|  |  |  | Agreement, prevent the disruption of |
|  |  |  | its implementation and protect |
|  |  |  | civilians, without prejudice to the |
|  |  |  | responsibility of the Government of |
|  |  |  | Sudan. |
| 2. | 29 | SCR | Extended the mandate of UNAMID |  |
|  | July | 2003 | set out in resolution 1769 (2007) for |
|  | 2011 | (2011) | a further 12 months to 31 July 2012. |
|  |  |  | Security Council underlined the need |
|  |  |  | for UNAMID to make full use of its |
|  |  |  | capabilities and prioritize the |
|  |  |  | protection of civilians; safe, timely |
|  |  |  | and unhindered humanitarian access; |
|  |  |  | and to complement efforts to |
|  |  |  | promote the peace as well as the |
|  |  |  | political process negotiate in Doha. It |
|  |  |  | demanded that all parties to the |
|  |  |  | conﬂict, including all armed |
|  |  |  | movements, immediately end the |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | violence and make every effort to reach a permanent cease ﬁre and a comprehensive settlement under the  Doha Document. |  |
| 3. | 31 | SCR | Extended the mandate of UNAMID |  |
|  | July | 2063 | set out in resolution 2003 (2011) for |
|  | 2012 | (2012) | further 12 months to 31 2013. In the |
|  |  |  | resolution SC underlines the need for |
|  |  |  | UNAMID to make full use of its |
|  |  |  | mandate and capabilities, giving |
|  |  |  | priority in decisions about the use of |
|  |  |  | available capacity and resources to: |
|  |  |  | (i) the protection of civilians across |
|  |  |  | Darfur, including the implementation |
|  |  |  | of a mission-wide early warning |
|  |  |  | system strategy; proactive military |
|  |  |  | deployment and increased patrols in |
|  |  |  | areas of high risk of conﬂict; |
|  |  |  | securing, through increased police |
|  |  |  | patrols, IDP camps, adjacent areas |
|  |  |  | and areas of return; and supporting |
|  |  |  | the development and training of |
|  |  |  | community policing for IDP camps |
|  |  |  | and areas of return; and (ii) ensuring |
|  |  |  | safe, timely and unhindered |
|  |  |  | humanitarian access, and the safety |
|  |  |  | and security of humanitarian |
|  |  |  | assistance throughout Darfur. It |
|  |  |  | further demanded that all parties to |
|  |  |  | the conflict, including in particular |
|  |  |  | all the non-signatory armed groups |
|  |  |  | engage immediately and without |
|  |  |  | preconditions to make every effort to |
|  |  |  | reach a permanent ceaseﬁre and |
|  |  |  | comprehensive peace settlement on |
|  |  |  | the basis of the Doha Document for |
|  |  |  | Peace in Darfur (DDPD), in order to |
|  |  |  | bring stable and durable peace to the |
|  |  |  | region. |

Source: Compiled by the author based on research, 2016.

# IGURE 5.4: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT MAP IN 2012 PRIOR TO REVIEW OF PERSONNEL



Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fashir, 2013.

The review of Uniformed and Civilian Personnel strength was conducted in May 2012 and the primary focus of the exercise was placed on ensuring that UNAMID resources could be used optimally in carrying out its

mandate, especially in light of the changes in the humanitarian, security and political conditions on the ground since the establishment of UNAMID on 1 January 2008 (Mulet, 2013). Therealignment of forces was required in the review process due to the following factors : improved security situation in the Sudan/Chad/CAR border area in Sector West requiring reduction in size of troops in the sector, the increased security threat at the eastern corridor based on fighting between SAF and armed groups in South Kordofan and Blue Nile State in Sector South requiring deployment of additional troops and the need to swap units location as some units are not in very good relation with their local host community and as such do not have the enabling environment to perform at optimal level. UNAMID according to the then FC favored a light and highly mobile force in other to cover entire Darfur (Nyavumba, 2013). This would require capabilities suited for this configuration which includes force multipliers - air asserts and reconnaissance units which UNAMID lacked.

# CONCEPT OF OPERATION

The mission concept of operation during the 2012 review was based on the need to:

* + - 1. Contribute to the restoration of necessary security conditions for the Safe provision of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate full humanitarian access throughout Darfur;
      2. Contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians,
      3. Assist the political process in order to ensure that it is inclusive, and to support the African Union-United Nations joint mediation in its efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process;
      4. Contribute to a secure environment for economic reconstruction and development, as well as the sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees;
      5. Contribute to the promotion of respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Darfur;
      6. Assist in the promotion of the rule of law, strengthening an independent judiciary and the prison system, and assisting in the development and consolidation of the legal framework;

Essentially, it was based on the interdependence of the three tracks, namely, the political process, protection of civilians and the provision of humanitarian assistance (Ataguba, 2015). Success in Darfur requires progress on these three fronts in the context of a comprehensive international strategy, which would also address rehabilitation and economic development.

The strategic issue includes the political objective which is to reach a comprehensive and inclusive settlement to the conflict while the military

strategic objective was to contribute to a secure and stable environment in which other activities (political dialogue, the protection-of civilians, prevention of armed conflict, safe and timely delivery of humanitarian assistance, early recovery „development, and rule of law) can be conducted. The military strategic end-state is thus to achieve a durable peace, security and stability for the civilian population in Darfur necessary for regional stability, in which the local security institutions will be able to provide the necessary safety and security to all Darfuris. UNAMID centers of gravity and critical vulnerability analysis was carried out in other to enhance the operational capability of the force. The analysis in Table 5.7 showed that UNAMID CoG is "it capability to deter any threat to the implementation of its mandate and especially against the civilian population", which in essence is its quick reaction and response capability. Identified critical vulnerabilities include lack of progress on the political track, lack of air assets and restrictions and limitations of movements imposed by SAF. This CoG analysis thus underpinned the review process.

# TABLE 5.7:UNAMID CENTERS OF GRAVITY AND CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES ANALYSIS

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **UNAMID CoG** | **UNAMID Critical Vulnerability** | **Remark** |
| 1. | The operational CoG assessed for the  UNAMID military  component is its “capability to deter any threat to the implementation of its mandate, and especially against the civilian  population” making it a credible and reassuring | The critical vulnerabilities currently identiﬁed as potentially affecting the UNAMID Military Operational CoG are:   1. Lack of progress on the political track. Different approaches or withdrawal from talks from different armed groups. 2. Violence and armed clashed from rebel militia groups. 3. Lack of air assets and obstacles imposed by the |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Force including its quick reaction and response capacity. | GoS to their use.   1. Limitations and restrictions of movement imposed by the SAF or armed groups. 2. Lack of infrastructure, in particular the limited road network in comparison with the size of the AOR. 3. The rainy season that affects the deployment plan and response capability 4. The problems related with the issuance of visas. 5. Aerial bombardments and armed actions by the GoS 6. Restriction of humanitarian access to conflict areas. 7. Displacement of large numbers of civil population 8. Incompliance by the GoS of the signed SOFA. 9. Long and vulnerable supply lines that can be disrupted. |  |

**Source**: UNAMID HQ, El Fashir, 2013.

The Military Component was structured along a FHQ and three sectors, although with a revised numbers of military units and enablers. 16 infantry battalions (4 to 6 per sector) based in different TS, 4 Reserve Companies one each at the FHQ and the SHQs, and a balanced engineer support and force enablers. JOC was also to be established at all team sites (Lar, 2015). The authorised reconfiguration of UNAMID including 16,200 military personnel, 2,310 police personnel and 17 formed police units of a maximum of 140 persons each as per UNSCR 2063. The detail force structure for military component is as shown below.

# TABLE 5.8: UNAMID FORCE STRUCTURE 2012

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Unit Description** | **Numbers** | **Total** | **Remarks** |
|  | | | |
| Infantry Battalion | 16 | 12,872 + (4 x  12x signal) + (1 x 24x WDU) | Based on 800 personnel per Battalion plus 4 x 12 man signal elements and 1 well drilling unit of 24 pers in one  Bn. |
| Force Reserve  Company | 4 | 700 | 175 personnel per  Coy |
| FHQ Company | 1 | 196 | Tasks: Guard, Clarks  etc |
| Mission Enablers – Force Multipliers | | | |
| Heavy Transport Unit | 1 | 155 |  |
| Medium Rotary Wing Aviation | 2 | 280 | 2 units with 4 a/c  and max personnel of 140 each |
| Well Drilling Unit | 1 | 125 | Specific WDU with 125 pers and an additional well  drilling (24 pax) in one Battalion |
| Level II Hospital | 2 | 188 | 2 AMET per unit |
| Level III Hospital | 1 | 156 |  |
| Engineer Capability | 1 | 560 | 2 companies, of 280  pers each |
| Military Police | 1 | 70 |  |
| Staff Officers – Military Observers – Liaison Officers | | | |
| Staff Officers FHQ |  | 225 |  |
| Staff Officers SHQs |  | 120 |  |
| UNMOs and Liaisons  Officers |  | 345 |  |

**Source**: UNAMID HQ, El Fashir, 2013.

The intent is to contribute to the protection of civilians and facilitate the safe and timely delivery of humanitarian assistance by contributing to the provision of a secure environment throughout Darfur through ﬂexible deployment of a capable, impartial and credible military peacekeeping force.

To accomplish this, the UNAMID force, under unified leadership, utilizing agreed and endorsed command and control structures, conducts robust patrols and escort activities complemented by proactive liaison with parties to the conflict at all levels. The main effort of UNAMID‟s Military Component is the protection of civilians with the infantry battalions as the leading element.

The phases of the operation was also restructured as shown below, with the aim of fast tracking the achievement of the mandate and a draw down thereafter. The Phases was thus reduced from a four Phase operation to a three Phase operation.

# TABLE 5.9: PHASES OF UNAMID MILITARY OPERATIONS DRAWING FROM 2012 REVIEW

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Phase** | **Activity** | **Key Bench Marks** | **Remarks** |
| 1. | Reconfiguration  - Phase 1 | This phase is the continuation of the existing operational configuration which is a component of the on-going stabilization phase. | 1. Identified units are gradually adjusted over a period of up to eighteen  (18) months and adequate force strength is deployed at flashpoints to ensure the security of civilians.   1. Acceptable compliance and implementation by all DDPD any subsequent agreements signed in future. Joint Commission, the CFC and sub- commissions are fully established up to the Sector Level. 2. Establishment of   military and police Joint Operations Centres (JOC) |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | in all sites that both component are deployed, and development of joint  military and police SOPs. |  |
| 2. | Consolidation  - Phase 2 | This phase commences upon entering steady- state military and police operations. It is completed when security  tasks can be handed over to national security forces. | 1. The reconfigured military component is in Full Operational Capability with all its units and equipment in the planned deployment locations. 2. Ceasefire agreements are reached and the parties comply with them. 3. Establishment of stable security environment. 4. IDP/refugees are largely returned to their areas of origin or resettled, or camps are integrated into   surrounding urban or peri- urban areas. |  |
| 3. | Drawdown - Phase 3 | Clear political direction confirming that security tasks can commence to be gradually handed over to Sudan security forces. During the phased withdrawal, a reserve capability will be  maintained throughout Darfur. It will be completed, when | 1. Transfer of UNAMID security tasks, including the protection of civilians, in Darfur to GoS is completed and no military tasks are being undertaken by the military component; 2. Liquidation of UNAMID military assets; 3. Transfer of United Nations owned equipment (UNOE) to regional logistic hubs; and |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | all UNAMID forces have  ceased its operational mission and are  returning to their home countries. | 4. Transition to a different UN follow-on presence (i.e. political Mission) is completed. |  |

Source: UN DPKO, UN HQ, New York, 2013.

# GENERAL CORE CAPABILITIES

The mechanisms described in Chapter VI of the DDPD addressed the security threats and form the conceptual basis of how the force will monitor and verify DDPD implementation. This was through the application of three core capabilities, namely protection, monitoring and verification, and liaison with military personnel prepared to operate across full spectrum of military operations.

# TABLE 5.10:UNAMID GENERAL CORE CAPABILITY

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Core capability** | **Detailed Activities** | **Remarks** |
| 1. | Protection | 1. Contribute to the protection of the civilian population through highly visible patrol in problem areas including, but not limited to, IDP camps, population centres, return sites and transhumance routes. 2. Facilitating the safe and timely provision of humanitarian aid. Robust security presence in previously inaccessible or unsafe areas established to promote return of refugees/IDPs and wider access to humanitarian relief for the population. Achieved by the creation of secure areas routes through patrolling, surveillance and military escort. |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | c. Information sharing at all levels among military and police components of UNAMID to facilitate synergy to the best extent possible. Establishment of joint planning and operational mechanisms, as well as Joint Military - Police Operation  Centres at Team Site Level. |  |
| 2. | Monitoring and Verification | 1. Military Observers (MILOBs) to monitor and report incidents of conﬂict; early warning information related to imminent conﬂict or threats to the of civilians; liaise with local interlocutors and provide situational awareness to the military component. 2. Infantry units to provide overt military presence on the ground at all times, and up- to-date situational awareness (SA). Patrolling and surveillance from the air and on the ground to enhance situational   awareness. |  |
| 3. | Liaison | 1. The Liaison capability (LOs, UNMOs, SOs, deployed units) focused on the establishment and maintenance of a local network of contacts incorporating all parties, including local authorities and the general population. 2. Liaison teams to gauge the current security situation and to bolster public   confidence in the peacekeeping process. |  |

Source: DPKO, UN HQ, New York, 2013.

Based on the new concept of operation, changes were made in UNAMID organogram with the establishment of specialist cells like the Child Protection Unit, Protection of Civilian Section and Gender Advisory Units as shown in Figure 5.4. It was envisaged that the establishment of

specialist cell in the organogram would enhance mandate implementation particularly, protection of civilians (Matt, 2013).

# FIGURE 5.5: ORGANIZATION CHART OF

Joint Mission Analysis Centre

Office of the Joint Special Representative

 Joint Support Coordination Mechanisms, Addis Ababa



Office of the Mission Chief of Staff



Joint Operations Centre

Security and Safety

Section

Khartoum Liaison Officer

Conduct and Discipline Team

Office of the Deputy Joint Special Reps (Political)

Office of the Force Commander

Police Division

Mission Support Division

Office of the Deputy Joint Special Reps (Protection)

Civil Affairs Section

Political Affairs Section

Protection of Civilians Section

Child Protection Unit

Human Rights Section

Communications and Public Info Division

HIV/AIDS Unit

Community Stabilization Section (Ex. DDR)

Office of Legal Affairs


Gender Advisory Unit

Rule of Law, Judicial System& Prison Advisory Section



Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2014.

# FIGURE 5.7: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT MAP 2017



Source: UN HQ, New York, 2016.

# UNAMID POLICE

The 2012 review also included the police component with a view to make it more effective. The Police Adviser‟s Strategic intent focused on supporting, creating and maintaining a secure and stable environment to enhance humanitarian activities and resettlement of IDPs andassist the Government of Sudan in enhancing the institutional capacity of its Police and other law enforcement agencies (Police SMLO, Darfur IOT, 2013). This was to be achieved through coordination with the hosts, donors and stakeholders to ensure balanced progress and coordinated approach in addressing the mandate. The police was to undertake capacity development of host state police and other law enforcement agencies through design, delivery and facilitation of training, mentoring and advising of Local Police, enhancing its adherence to protection of civilians standards, human rights, and tenets of Community Policing in ensuring safety and security of IDPs and other communities in Darfur, others include toSupport promotion of the re- establishment of confidence and deter violence against the civilians, particularly the IDPs and vulnerable persons, by actively providing robust patrolling and assistance to develop a credible environment;Contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate the voluntary and unhindered return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their home andassist the development and implementation of programs and activities, including training in protection of the vulnerable groups and sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) and HIV/AIDS ( DPKO, 2013).

Based on the intent of the Police Adviser, the police component prioritized its activities in order to ensure maximum use of available resources. The priority list as shown in Table 5.11 shows that PoC and engagement with the local police toward capacity building were paramount tasks. PoC activities focused on IDPs camps, areas of return, villages and communities through proactive patrols.

# TABLE 5.11: PRIORITY OF UNAMID POLICE DRAWING FROM 2012 REVIEW

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Area of Priority** | **Detail Task** | **Remarks** |
| 1. | Protection of Civilians | 1. Assist in the operation of Team Sites with an outreach to the IDP camps, areas of return, villages and communities through proactive patrolling and where possible on a 24/7 basis. 2. Involve the officers of the host state police and other law enforcement agencies and Community Policing Volunteers in joint patrols, where possible. 3. Conduct targeted patrols to enable IDPs to access their needs i.e firewood, grass, water, farms etc. |  |
| 2. | Engagement with the Local Police | 1. Establish Police Development Coordination Committees at central and state levels. 2. Organizing more joint security coordination committees at state and team site levels. 3. Supporting closer cooperation in operational response through Joint Security Operation Centers in all states. |  |
| 3. | Implementation of Community Policing | 1. Support the design and implementation of a framework for a sustainable community policing program. 2. Support embedding of community policing principles and activities in the IDP camps, potential areas of return and other jurisdictions in Darfur. |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | 1. Recruit and train community policing volunteers including women. 2. Conduct outreach programs in order to sensitize the masses on importance of community policing. |  |
| 4. | Protection of Women and Children | 1. Reorganization of the UNAMID Police Gender desks at all levels to focus on crime prevention and capacity building. 2. Following-up the investigation of cases involving child and woman victims by local police. 3. Conducting outreach programs through sensitization activities on gender and child protection matters, and promotion of victim support. 4. Support local Police in Darfur in mainstreaming gender into their structures, policies and processes. |  |
| 5. | Training of the Local Police | 1. Conduct proper Training Need Analyses and learning and development strategy for host state police. 2. Assisting in improving the policing skill sets of individual local police ofﬁcers through on-the-job training, mentoring, advising and co-locating. 3. Dedicate UNAMID Police trainers to co-locate with host state police and other law enforcement agencies trainers to enhance training. 4. Develop general and specialized training programmes. 5. Emphasize specialized training to enhance investigation capacity especially, in |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | SGBV, human rights, and women and child abuse. |  |
| 6. | Institutional Development of the Local Police | 1. Deploy officers to collaboratively work with the local police in conducting various assessments to identify developmental needs of the local police. 2. Develop project proposals to support the local police in the mobilization of donors‟ resources to address the various identified needs and police related programs. 3. Promote and facilitate development of Model Police Stations. 4. Provision of necessary technological and logistical equipment and expertise through donor support in order to develop the functional capacity of the Local and Local police. 5. Advocate for increased transparency and accountability in the Local Police systems in Darfur. |  |
| 7. | Co-location  Programs | 1. Integrate its activities with that of Local Police through adoption of a generalized  approach and mentor the Local Police officers. |  |
| 8. | Support to DDPD and Peace Process | 1. Identify and conduct programs and activities that could advance implementation of the DDPD. 2. Develop and execute plan for patrolling and monitoring the DMZs around IDP camps through joint patrols by units of UNAMID and the Local Police. |  |
| 9. | Monitoring and Evaluation of UNPOL  Mandate | 1. The monitoring and evaluation of the UNAMID Police mandate implementation through the development of a result-based management system and the submission of special and regular accomplishment reports. |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Implementation | 1. Performance agreement for senior managers; 2. Individual officer work plan, including periodic review based on changes of work; |  |
| 10. | Administrative and reporting Guideline | 1. Established Mission Reporting Guidelines will be followed including those related to Performance Reporting Guidelines as laid down in the United Nations Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation ST/SGB/2000/8, Article VI, Regulation 6.1, Rule 106.1 a (ii). 2. All relevant SOPs regarding Submission of Situation and Special Incident Reports to be followed. |  |
| 11. | Integration / Coordination Issues | 1. Coordination, cooperation and communication of UNAMID police activities internally within the mission, with the Local police and other UN agencies for synergy 2. Integration and coordination with UN Agencies, Donors and other partners will be conducted in accordance with the SG‟s principles on integration and guidelines on Integrated Mission Planning, and Integrated Strategic Framework. |  |

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fashir, 2014.

The UN police organizational structure was modified during the 2012 review as shown in Figure 5.7. Sectors East and Central to cover East Darfur and Central Darfur was created to align with the five sectors organogram of the civilian component. This was to enhance synergy with other UNAMID elements and to also facilitate interaction with the state government of East Darfur and Central Darfur States (UNAMID HQ, 2014). Similarly, the Police Sector HQ's were also restructured with the establishment of a community policing unit and a training unit as showing in Figures 5.8 likewise the police team site organisation as shown in Figure 5.9 which also have a community policing officer. This is in line with the priority of UNAMID police focused on PoC, engagement with local police and implementation of community policing.

Despite the emphasis on PoC and community policing, the actual strength of UNAMID police at the various team sites in Figure 5.12 show that the bulk of police personnel and FPUs were located at the sector HQs at El Fasher, Nyala and El Genenia which are all major towns. The rural areas were violations and violence against civilians are rampant had few officers with some of the officers waiting for the security situation to improve before deploying to the team sites. These contributed to UNAMID inability to successfully execute the PoC mandate (Fashina, 2016).

# FIGURE 5:8 UN POLICE ORGANISATION STRUCTURE

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Special Assistant P/C P4 Professional Standard**  **Unit Auditing & Internal Best Practice Officer Public Information Unit** |  | **POLICE COMMISSIONER D2** |
|  |

**DPC POLICY & PLANNING D1**

**CHIEF OF STAFF P5**

**DPC OPERATIONS**

**Liaison Cell Khartom Officer P3**

**JSCM Liaison Officer P4 “Addis Ababa”**

**JSCM Liaison Officer P4 “Addis Ababa”**

**Chief Planning & Budget Dept**

**Chief Reforms & Restructuring Dept**

**Project & Donor Liaison Officer P4**

**Chief Training Department**

**Human Resource Unit Rotation Unit**

**Central Database Unit MOVCON Liaison Officer JILOC Liaison Officer Transport Unit**

**Welfare Officer Internal Investigation Personnel Unit**

**FPU Coordinator**

**Operation Cell**

**JMAC Liaison Offr**

**JOC**

**SECTOR**

**Commander/North**

**SECTOR**

**Commander/West P5**

**SECTOR**

**Commander/South P5**

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**Protocol Officr**

**Logistics Unit Commander/New Sector**

**SECTOR**

**SECTOR**

**Commander/ New Sector**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

# FIGURE 5.9: UNAMID POLICE SECTOR HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE

**SECTOR COMMANDER**

**P - 5**

**SPECIAL ASSISTANT PUBLIC Information Officer**

**DSC/CHIEF DPA SECTOR POLICY & PLANNING P-$**

# OPERATION

**ADMINISTRATI**

**PLANNING**

**REFORMS & RESTRUCTURING**

**Family & Child Protection Unit**

**Community Policing**

**GOS/ MOVEMENT**

**TRAINING UNIT**

**Mandated Trainings**

**In-Service Trainings**

**TEAS SITES**

**TEAS SITES**

**Operations**

**JOC Officer**

**Crime Prevention Advisory**

**FPU Coordination Office**

**Personnel Unit**

**Transport & Logistics Unit**

**TEAS SITES**

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# FIGURE 5.10: UNAMID POLICE TEAM SITE ORGANISATION

**PATROL**

**JOC**

**RECEPTION/ INTERVIEW RM**

**ADMINISTRATION**

**REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING**

**DTS/OPERATIONS OFFICER**

**TEAM SITE COMMANDER**

**Operations / Reporting**

**Community Policing Officer**

**Family and Child Protection**

**GoS/Mov Advisory Officer**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fashr, 2016.

# TABLE 5.12: UNAMID POLICE TEAM SITE STRENGTH AND STATUS OF CAMPS

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Location** | | **No of Personnel** | **On-hold Pending Enhanced**  **Security** | **Security Provided by** | **GoS Police Station** | **MSA**  **Accommodation** | **Operation Status** |
| **MHQ** |  | **168** |  |  |  | **MSA/Economy** |  |
| **SNHQ** |  | **67** |  |  | **Y** | **MSA Economy** |  |
| **NORTH** | **El Fasher (Zam Zam)** | **88** |  | **2 FPU /**  **Military** | **Y** | **Economy/MSA** | **Op** |
| **Umkadada** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **U/C** | **Op** |
| **Shangi Tobayi** | **53** |  | **1 FPU /**  **Military** | **N** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Tawila** | **41** |  | **1 FPU /**  **Military** | **N** | **U/C** | **Op** |
| **Kabi Kabiya** | **41** |  | **1 FPU /**  **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Sartoni** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **N** | **None** | **Op** |
| **Saraf Umra** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Kutum** | **40** |  | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Koroma** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **None** | **None/Op** |
| **Malha** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **None** | **Op** |
| **El Tawisha** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **None** | **None/Op** |
| **Mellit** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **SSHQ** |  | **67** |  |  | **Y** | **MSA/Economy** | **Op** |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Nyala 1 (Kalma)** | **100** |  | **2 FPU/**  **Military** | **Y** | **MSA/Economy** | **Op** |
| **SOUTH** | **Nyala 2 (Otash)** | **88** |  | **1 FPU/**  **Military** | **Y** | **MSA/Economy** | **Op** |
| **Menaashi** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Khorabeche** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Kass** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Graida** | **35** |  | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **El Dein** | **41** |  | **1 FPU/**  **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Muhajeria** | **41** |  | **1 FPU/**  **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Labado** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Sheria** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Buram** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **None/Op** |
| **Tulus** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **None/Op** |
|  | **El Al Fursan** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **None/Op** |
| **SWHQ** |  | **67** |  |  | **Y** | **MSA/Economy** | **Op** |
|  | **El Genenia** | **100** |  | **3 FPU/**  **Military** | **Y** | **MSA/Economy** | **Op** |
| **WEST** | **Masteri** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Mournei** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Kulbus** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Umbaro** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **None** | **Op** |
| **Forabaranga** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Habila** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **None/Op** |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Zalinge** | **108** |  | **2 FPU/**  **Military** | **Y** | **MSA/Economy** | **Op** |
| **Nertiti** | **51** |  | **Military** | **Y** | **U/C** | **Op** |
| **Mukjar** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **MSA** | **Op** |
| **Tine** | **34** | **8** | **Military** | **Y** | **None** | **Op** |
| **(Zalinge) Central** | | **67** |  |  |  | **None** | **TBD** |
| **(Elden) East** | | **67** |  |  |  | **None** | **TBD** |
| **10% Reserve for Capacity**  **Building** | | **200** |  |  |  |  |  |

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fashr, 2016.

# UNAMID PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS MANDATE

Protection of civilians is a key part of UNAMID Mandate and is derived from UN SCR 1769 (2007), later confirmed in SCRs 1881 (2009),

1894 (2009) on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 1820 (2008) on Women and Peace and Security, and 1889 on Women, Peace and Security. The PoC mandate restricts protection action to two closely connected activities; physical protection and protection of humanitarian space.

The UNAMID humanitarian protection action in Darfur commenced in January 2008 through the Humanitarian, Recovery and Development Unit (HRDU) which has offices, staff and operational capacity in El Fasher, Nyala, El Geneina and Zalingei (Osemwegie, 2016). This is through the active engagement of UNAMID Military, Police, civil affairs, rule of law and other components. UNAMID through HRDU provide protection assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and local communities in major localities of Darfur. While the entire 8 million population of Darfur are of concern only about half are accessible due sporadic violence and geographical difficulties.Apart from armed conflict which is politically-based, UNAMID is also challenged by the impediments and constraints associated with working in Darfur.These includes the climatic and geographical extremes, seasonal isolation in rain affected areas, tribal clashes over land, water and cattle migration routes and displacement-related loss of livelihoods (Osemwegie, 2016).

The UNAMID Protection operation is guided by the UNAMID Mission Directive on Protection of Civilians endorsed by the JSR in February 2009 and the UNAMID Force Commander‟s Directive (February 2010) which aims to enhance security on the ground in Darfur not only for humanitarian personnel of UNbut also for the civilian population at large. Key protection goals identified by UNAMID/HRDU in 2009 include intensive PoC training activities, advocacy services and a roll-out of the MissionDirective on PoC for UNAMID Military and Police as well as for GoS officials and representatives of armed movements. Others include threat/early warning analysis (incoordination with JMAC) and early reaction system (in coordination with JOC), coordination of the UNAMID Internal Protection Working Group; and assist once in the delivery of humanitarian aids.Furthermore, ensuring protection of humanitarian space; the physical protection of civilians under imminent threat through the active and robust engagement of UNAMID military and police, development of stabilization programs and ensuring a safe environment for early recoveryactivities with the aim of moving towards a transition from emergency relief and humanitarian assistance to recovery and development throughout Darfur were also identified (UNAMID, 2015).

The attainment of these protection objectives was based on the application of the following strategies (UNAMID Police CONOPS, 2013):

1. Active monitoring, documenting and addressing developing situations in linewith the mandate, and through active engagement with the local authorities to ensure adequate response to the situation;
2. Ensuring the civilian and humanitarian character of IDPs camps and the physicalprotection of impacted populations, area and route security, demilitarization, patrolling of humanitarian supply routes, nomadic migration routes and escort for humanitarian convoys.
3. Humanitarian assistance through the provision of humanitarian assistance in extremis.
4. Protection of personnel, installations and property of the UN family and other humanitarian bodies.
5. Capacity building and institutional support to government authorities so as toachieve greater access to and improved performance of police, judicial,reconciliations mechanisms and other national protection services;
6. Assisting in areas of actual and potential returns of IDPs or their integrationinto host communities through improving social infrastructure and introduction of a recovery and development project based on a partnership with Darfur authorities, private sector and international financial institutions centred on use of technology, innovation and 'modernization' in line with and beyond the Millennium Development Goals.

The 2009 approach to PoC however, did not achieve the intended result due to threats to civilians based on: i) Continued clashed between SAF and armed movement; ii) Inter-tribal clashes including those over scarce resources such as water; iii) Sexual violence and iv) increased criminality including in areas of return (Bindel, 2015). This led to development of new principles in 2012 to guide the implementation of the PoC strategy. The new principles emphasised a multidimensional approach along five priority pillars of physical protection, humanitarian assistance, protection through access to rights, early recovery and social empowerment cluster, and protection through political engagement cluster. The cluster based approach for each priority pillar was used to ensure horizontal integration across the civilian, military and police components. The protection of human rights and women from gender based violence remains a key objective. Detail of UNAMID PoC clusters is at Table 5.13.

# TABLE 5.13: UNAMID PoC CLUSTERS

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Clusters** | **Key Issues** | **Objectives** | **Lead** | **Support** |
| 1. | Physical Protection Cluster | 1.1 Physical protection | 1.1a Enhanced military presence at areas where civilians are most at risk of violence, 24/7 presence at IDP camps and increased extensive patrolling on main areas and  known risks areas | Military | Police, JOC, LMAC, HPS, HRS, DDR,  CPU and ODO |
|  | 1.1b Targeted patrols to at-risk civilian activities such as firewood collection, market activities and grass cutting  providing immediate-term protection |
| 1.2 Prevention | 1.2a Establishment of Sector Joint Protection Groups, Field Protection Teams, Community Liaison Contacts, Community Focal Points, Mission Protection Map and  Community-based Early Warning Mechanism |
|  | 1.2b Public awareness campaigns at all communities to ensure community members are aware of any imminent  danger and take proper individual actions to reduce their exposure to threat |
| 1.3 Robust response | 1.3a Quick Reaction Teams, consisting of civilian substantive staff ready to be deployed by SJPGs at any  time to areas where the mission lacks permanent presence. |
| 2. | Humanitarian Assistance Cluster | 2.1  Humanitarian assistance  delivery | 2.1a Continued provision of escorts and support to UNCT and NGO humanitarian convoys in Darfur. | HPS | Military/Police Components, JOC, JMAC,  HRS, PAD |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | 2.1b Mission‟s strong synergy with the UNCT,  humanitarian community and national and state administrations in delivering humanitarian assistance |  |  |
| 3. | Early Recovery and Social Empowerment Cluster | 3.1 Early recovery and social  empowerment | 3.1a Increased self-sufficiency of communities and assistance in building sustainable livelihood | HPS | Military/Police Components, HRS, GAS, PAD, DDR, RoL, DDOC, CPU, GAU, HAU |
|  | 3.1.b Strong synergy among the Mission, UNCT, INGOs  and national stakeholders engaged with early recovery efforts in Darfur |
| 3.2 QIPs | 3.2. The Mission‟s QIPs aimed at meeting POC priorities, helping vulnerable communities including IDP camps and return areas and addressing their economic  challenges and their lack of basic services |
| 4. | Protection through Access to Rights Cluster | 4.1 Protection and conducive environment for human  rights | 4.1 Creation of a protective and conducive environment for cultural, social, economic, political and other human rights; advancement of needed programmatic activities and political engagement to this end | HPS | RoL, GAU, HPS, CPU |
| 4.2 Capacity and institution building | 4.2a Capacity and institution building initiatives to advance the rule of law and establish strong judicial institutions and prison system in Darfur through training and programme implementation in the areas of human  rights, rule of law enforcement, judicial reforms, child protection and women empowerment |
|  | 4.2b Coordinated engagement with relevant external |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | stakeholders, particularly the UNCT and civil society actors and empowerment of relevant national and local institutions including the new National Human Rights  Commission |  |  |
| 5. | Protection through Political Engagement Cluster | 5.1 Political engagement | 5.1a Continuous political engagement of the Mission  with all concerned to advance peace and prosperity in Darfur through the political process | CAS  and PAD | HRS, HPS,  Military/Police Components, DDOC, JOC, JMAC |
|  | 5.1b Engagement of the Government of Sudan to ensure  it is committed to fulfilling its responsibility to protect all people of Darfur |
| 5.2 Preventive engagement  and mediation | 5.2a Preventive engagement and mediation to proactively lower tensions and address root causes of conflict before  they evolve into serious conflicts |
|  | 5.2b Strengthening and reinvigoration of traditional community mediation and conflict resolution  mechanisms |

Source: UNAMID Protection of Civilians Strategy, June 2013.

The review also established a new UNAMID PoC implementation organogram to enhance command and coordination chain and a new implementation architecture for seamless integration. At the head of the organogram in Figure 5.10 is the PoC management group made up of JSR, FC, PC and DJSR among other cluster managers. A key part of the organogram is the early warming groups and teams at mission and sector HQs respectively. Figure 5.12 highlights the detailed task of the various groups that form the organogram with the PoC management group in-charge of approval for cluster programmes and initiatives, mission early warning group in-charge of early warning and risk analysis while the sector early warming team ensures 24/7 call coverage throughout each sector.

# FIGURE 5.11: UNAMID PoC IMPLEMENTATION ORGANOGRAM

POC Management Group

Clusters

Joint Protection Group

Mission Early Warming Group Mission Protection Mapping Group

Sector Joint Protection Group

Sector Early Warming Team

Field Protection Team

Early Warning Network

Community Liaisons Contacts



Community Focal Points

UNCT INGOs

Local Actors

# TABLE 5.14: UNAMID PoC IMPLEMENTATION ARCHITECTURE

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Organization** | **Key Issues** | **Objectives** | **Lead** | **Support** |
| 1. | POC  Management Group (PMG) | 1.1 Review/approval of cluster programmes and initiatives | 1.1a Monthly review and approval of programmes and activities  submitted by the clusters | DJSR(P) | FC, PC, all clusters managers, HoOs, HPS  (Secretariat) |
| 1.1b Review of implementation of approved program and action plans and addressing the issues raised by the Joint Protection Group (JPG) |
| 2. | Joint Protection Group (JPG) | 2.1 Operationalization  of PMG directives | 2.1 Effective and efficient operationalization of PMG directives on  POC programs and activities | HPS | All substantive Sectors, O/D JSP- P, O/FC. O/PC, O/DMS, O/DJSR- OM, LMAC, JOC,  Sector Heads of Offices |
| 2.2 Review of SJPGs and MPM | 2.2 Weekly review of reports from SJPGs and updates to the MPM,  review and monitor progress of implementation of POC action plans developed by SJPGs |
| 2.3 Effective deployment of  uniformed personnel | 2.3 Engagement of UNAMID Forces and Police leadership to ensure that uniformed personnel and deployed most effectively |
| 2.4 External  coordination | 2.4a Engagement of UNCT counterparts and coordination between the  activities of the Mission, UNCT, and other protection actors. |
|  | 2.4b Liaising and gathering of information with UN and non-UN protection partners, through coordination mechanisms such as the  UNHCR-Chaired protection cluster |
| 3. | Mission Early Warning Group | 3.1 Early Warning | 3.1 Processing of information received from the Sector Early Warning  Teams and the Early Warning Network, informing the JPG and the PMG through Protection Updates when necessary | JOC | All substantive Sectors, O/D JSP-P, O/FC. O/PC, O/DMS, O/DJSR-OM, LMAC,  JOC, Sector Heads of Offices |
| 3.2 Risk analysis and  protection trends | 3.2 Analysis of risk and protection trends by JMAC to support this  Group |
| 4. | Mission Protection Mapping  Groups (MPMG) | 4.1 Weekly MPM Update | 4.1 Operation of color-coded map of the Mission area, using green, yellow and red to highlight the level of risk to vulnerable areas in each Sector | JMAC | HPS |
| 5. | Sector Joint Protection Group (SJPGs) | 5.1 Guidance of Field Protection Teams (FPTs) | 5.1a Provision of guideline to the FPTs | Sector Heads of Offices | FPTs, all substantive representatives, |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | 5.1b Analysis of information received from the FPTs to identify areas  and levels of risk |  | QRT, QRF, Sector Early Warning Network |
| 5.2 QRTs and QRFs | 5.2 Recommendations regarding the deployment of QRTs and  military/police Quick Reaction Forces |
| 5.3 Weekly POC Action Plans | 5.3 Weekly action plans outlying actions for addressing short-term  challenges to POC and implementing programmes and activities developed by the clusters. |
| 6. | Sector Early warning Team | 6.1 27/7 call coverage throughout each Sector | 6.1a 24/7 call coverage: Receive information from FPTs, CLC and CFPs, and when necessary rapidly mobilize adequate military response at the Sector level | Sector Military/ Police | FPTs, CLCs, CFPs |
|  |  | 6.1b Formed Police Units and Community Police Centres serving as a source of actionable information given their regular patrols in close  proximity to and often the communities that they protect |
| 7. | Field Protection Teams (FPTs) | 7.1 Integrated civilians,  military and police teams at team site level | 7.1 FPTs combined with civilian, police and military staff to interact with vulnerable communities and liaise with the UNAMID Force | SJPGs | Military and Police relevant substantive representatives |
|  | 7.2 CLC and CFP  guidance | 7.2 Provision of guideline to CLCs and CFPs who will report to the  FPTs |
| 8. | Early Warning Network | 8.1 Early Warning Network | 8.1 Early warning network managed by SJPGs and comprised of CLCs, CFPs, INGOs, the UNCT and community, tribal and religious  representatives | SJPGs | FPTs, CLCs, CFPs |
| 9. | Community Liaison  Contacts (CLCs) | 9.1 Community Liaising | 9.1a National staff of the Mission who are embedded with FPTs and assist the FPTs and military/police officers-in-charge liaise with their  assigned communities | FPTs | SJPGs, CFPs |
|  |  | 9.1b Close monitoring and reporting of POC needs of assigned  communities |
| 10. | Community  Focal Points (CFPs) | 10.1 Early Warning | 10.1a Provision of necessary communication and other equipment to  ensure timely information sharing as part of early warning and quick reaction to threats | FPTs | SJPGs |
|  |  | 10.1b Identification of areas requiring immediate-term protection, but are not easily covered by the FPTs (beginning with Sharatais and  Umdas) |

Source: UNAMID Protection of Civilians Strategy, June 2013.

# ASSESSMENT OF UNAMID PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN STRATEGY

The new strategy represented an important step for the mission in conceptualizing its protection activities. UNAMID actually developed a novel structures, such as the Mission Early Warning Group and Mission Protection Mapping Group, along with its adoption of other good practices, such as the PoC-Specific coordination bodies in addressing PoC issues in Darfur. However, the strategy takes a broad view of PoC, something that UN generally support, but at the same time an important part of developing a PoC strategy is drawing some lines around activities that directly contribute to the protection of civilians from physical violence. An outcome is that “everything becomes PoC, nothing is PoC” (Darfur IOT, OO, DPKO, 2015). Allowing PoC to cover all aspects of a component work provides no particular guideline or prioritization and this undermined the effectiveness of the strategy on the ground in Darfur.

The humanitarian assistance and early recovery for instance are very broad areas that share some common elements with other humanitarian activities, they do not concern protection from physical violence. The Access of Rights Cluster also appears broadly drawn, potentially covering every activity carried out by the Human Rights, Rule of Law and Child Protection Sections. The outcome was that the physical protection of people was not given the priority it deserves leading to failure. Similarly, a strong and well- consulted protection of civilians risk assessment for the mission area was not

done. The risk assessment is the center of gravity around which the mission should identify and prioritize risks to the civilian population. A risk assessment also provides a foundation upon which the mission can report progress it has made in mitigating them. These shortfalls further undermined effectiveness in the field.

The cluster system which appeared good as a strategy is also encumbered on the ground. Placing different sections in charge of different work plans or elements of PoC resulted in a fracturing rather than more cohesive approach. For example, the coordination of the Mission‟s PoC activities was hampered by a divided structure. According to Ugiagbe (2016) concerns over the cluster approach arise in part because it is unclear how the cluster operates in practice. Will cluster members meet on a regular basis? Will they meet at the sector level as sections? Human Rights and HPSCD are members of many if not all clusters; thus they had five or more meetings each week just on PoC. The net effect was absence from meetings due to fatigue and other commitments which undermined PoC activities.

The bench marking also provided challenges though the PoC architecture potentially set up a very strong system for monitoring and evaluating PoC, with benchmarks established for the clusters. Cluster activities are reviewed by the PMG, while operationalization of PMG directives on PoC, and external coordination is done by the JPG. The challenges in the mission however is that reliance on evaluation systems benchmarks and indicators resulted in a PoC system that focused more on

numbers than on qualitative achievements. The focus on indicators contributed to lack of concrete achievement on the ground.

The physical protection cluster however recorded some success due to military presence through the construction of some TS around IDP camps. The presence of TC close to IDP camps enhanced military patrol around the IDP camps which deterred armed militia‟s from entering those camps (Atolagbe, 2017). This model however is yet to be replicated in Darfur side as only few IDPs camps are located very close to TS.

# CHAPTER 6

**AN ASSESSMENT OF UNAMID: MANDATE, STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY**

# OVERVIEW OF UNAMID YEARLY INCIDENT STATISTICS FROM 2010 -2016

As revealed in Chapter 5, the causes of the Darfur conflict are mainly economic, social and political though the current conflict is linked with the emergence of rebel movements that sought to demand for the rights of the Darfur people and to resist existential threats. The intervention of the AU through AMIS did not solve the problem hence UN initiatives that culminated in the deployment of UNAMID on 31 Dec 2017. UNAMID strategic end state was to achieve durable peace, security and stability in Darfur necessary for regional stability while the concept of operation was based on deploying throughout Northern, Southern and Western Darfur in line with the three sector structure. The priority areas are the achievement of a comprehensive political solution, the achievement of a secure and stable environment, enhancement of rule of law and human rights and the achievement of a stabilized humanitarian situation. The inability to achieve the mandate led to review of the concept of operation in 2012. This led to emphasis on the protection of civilians, inclusive political process and humanitarian assistance.

The conflict has evolved from high intensity hostilities (2003-2009) to the current situation of intermittent clashes, lingering tensions and instability

whereby conflict intensity ranges from low to moderate. UNAMID mandate enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 2003 (2011) as highlighted in Chapter 5 stands as:

* Make full use of its Chapter VII mandate and capabilities, particularly with regards to the protection of civilians across Darfur, including through proactive deployment and patrols in the areas at high risk of conflict and implementation of early warning;
* Establish a conducive security environment for a safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access, as well as the safety and security of humanitarian personnel so as to facilitate unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Darfur;
* Continue supporting AU-UN led peace and political process for Darfur;
* Contribute to efforts to protect and promote human rights in Darfur, with particular attention to vulnerable groups and to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to respect for human rights and the rule of law, in which all are ensured effective protection


In implementing the mandate, UNAMID military have focused on protection of civilians and creation of secure conditions that allow unhindered access for the delivery of humanitarian aid and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their homes, with a view to enabling reconciliation and confidence building required for durable peace, security and stability in Darfur. UNAMID Police on the other hand prioritize improving the service

delivery of policing, building confidence among the population, establishing community policing, improving reporting and investigation of gender based violence, facilitating the return of IDPs and refugees and contributing to the protection of civilians.

The UNAMID Yearly Incident Statistics from 2010 – 2016 and Patrol/Escort Activities Report provides a prism for holistic assessment of security situation in Darfur and level of mandate implementation and would be used as part of this analysis.


# TABLE 6.1: UNAMID YEARLY INCIDENT

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **FATALITIES** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | **By Sectors** | | |  |  |  |  |  | **Type of Victims** | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | **Cases** |  |  | International/Nationals | | |  | Civilians |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | ***Caused by*** | **North** | **South** | **West** | **Central** | **East** | **TOTAL** | **UNAMID** | **UN Agc** | **NGOs** | **Civilians (non- IDPs)** | **IDPs** | **Tribesmen** | |  | **GoS** | **Armed Movts** | **TOTAL** |  |
| **FATALITIES** | Criminality | 450 | 120 | 110 | 30 | 90 | 160 | 510 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 350 | 110 | 10 |  |  | 3 | 0 | 510 |  |
| Belligerence | 30 | 215 | 528 | 296 | 0 | 80 | 1039 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1039 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | 1039 |  |
| Clashes over Resources | 20 | 200 | 180 | 220 | 100 | 152 | 882 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 882 |  |  | 0 | 0 | 882 |  |
| Accidents/Others | 46 | 30 | 15 | 20 | 25 | 0 | 90 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 57 | 27 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | 90 |  |
| SUB-TOTAL | 546 | 565 | 833 | 566 | 215 | 392 | 2521 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 1476 | 137 | 892 |  |  | 3 | 0 | 2521 |  |
|  |  |  |  | | | |  |  | Total Staff | | **13** | Total Civilians | **2505** | Gos/Armed Movts | | | | **3** |  |  |
|  |  |  | Cases by Sectors | | | |  |  |  |  |  |  | GRAND TOTAL (Victims) | | | | |  | **2521** |  |
|  | ***Type of Event*** | North | South | West | Central | East | TOTAL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | *By Sector* | | |  |  |
|  | IDP Issues | 90 | 80 | 77 | 46 | 60 | 347 |  |  |  |  |  | North | South | |  | West | Central | East | TOTAL |
|  | Banditry | 700 | 380 | 400 | 480 | 170 | 2130 |  |  | SGBV (Victims) \*all reported cases | | | 65 | 38 |  |  | 41 | 28 | 29 | 201 |
|  | SGBV (Number of Cases) | 28 | 36 | 19 | 40 | 21 | 144 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **INCIDENTS** | GoS Activity | 130 | 160 | 130 | 201 | 110 | 731 |  |  |  |  | UNAMID | UN Contr | UN Agc | |  | INGO | TOTAL |  |  |
| Restriction of Movements\*\*\* | 60 | 36 | 80 | 90 | 12 | 278 |  | Carjacking (vehs) | |  | 3 | 8 | 36 |  |  | 0 | 47 |  |  |
| Livestock Theft | 54 | 70 | 18 | 0 | 21 | 163 |  | Carjacking Attempted (vehs) | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Carjacking/Attempt\*\* | 18 | 14 | 6 | 3 | 6 | 47 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 47 |  |  |
|  | Clashes over Resources | 10 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 6 | 47 |  |  | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | Faction/Armed Movt/Border issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 29 | 61 |  | Excluding GoS and Civilian Vehicles  \*\*\*Does not include flight cancellations recorded by AIROPS as below: | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | *SUB-TOTAL* | 1090 | 787 | 740 | 896 | 435 | 3903 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  | Sectors |  | Cancelled by | North | South | Centra |  | West | East | Khartoum | TOTAL |
|  | **GRAND TOTAL**  **(Cases)**  ce: Joint Mission Analysis Ce |  |  | **3,948**  AMID HQ, | |  |  |  | Flight cancellations  . | | | MI/NS | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | **0** |
| Sour | ntre, | UN | El Fas | her, | 2016 | Other Factors | 400 | 420 | 0 |  | 190 | 0 | 0 | **1010** |

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


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **FATALITIES** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | **By Sectors** | | |  |  |  |  |  | **Type of Victims** | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | **Cases** |  |  | International/Nationals | | |  | Civilians |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | ***Caused by*** | **North** | **South** | **West** | **Central** | **East** | **TOTAL** | **UNAMID** | **UN Agc** | **NGOs** | **Civilians (non- IDPs)** | **IDPs** | **Tribesmen** | |  | **GoS** | **Armed Movts** | **TOTAL** |  |
| **FATALITIES** | Criminality | 390 | 161 | 95 | 28 | 80 | 150 | 514 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 415 | 90 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | 514 |  |
| Belligerence | 25 | 236 | 63 | 58 | 13 | 10 | 380 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 380 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | 380 |  |
| Clashes over Resources | 18 | 14 | 68 | 8 | 15 | 0 | 105 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 105 |  |  | 0 | 0 | 105 |  |
| Accidents/Others | 43 | 15 | 10 | 18 | 18 | 0 | 61 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 27 | 1 |  |  | 0 | 0 | 61 |  |
| SUB-TOTAL | 476 | 375 | 236 | 102 | 126 | 250 | 1060 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 826 | 117 | 106 |  |  | 0 | 0 | 1060 |  |
|  |  |  |  | | | |  |  | Total Staff | | **11** | Total Civilians | **1049** | Gos/Armed Movts | | | | **0** |  |  |
|  |  |  | Cases by Sectors | | | |  |  |  |  |  |  | GRAND TOTAL (Victims) | | | | |  | **1060** |  |
|  | ***Type of Event*** | North | South | West | Central | East | TOTAL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | *By Sector* | | |  |  |
|  | IDP Issues | 170 | 140 | 70 | 110 | 21 | 511 |  |  |  |  |  | North | South | |  | West | Central | East | TOTAL |
|  | Banditry | 380 | 250 | 300 | 250 | 280 | 1460 |  |  | SGBV (Victims) \*all reported cases | | | 70 | 49 |  |  | 33 | 25 | 26 | 203 |
|  | SGBV (Number of Cases) | 19 | 31 | 13 | 32 | 19 | 114 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **INCIDENTS** | GoS Activity | 140 | 150 | 140 | 190 | 105 | 725 |  |  |  |  | UNAMID | UN Contr | UN Agc | |  | INGO | TOTAL |  |  |
| Restriction of Movements\*\*\* | 70 | 28 | 70 | 80 | 15 | 263 |  | Carjacking (vehs) | |  | 2 | 13 | 25 |  |  | 0 | 40 |  |  |
| Livestock Theft | 38 | 60 | 15 | 20 | 18 | 151 |  | Carjacking Attempted (vehs) | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Carjacking/Attempt\*\* | 16 | 12 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 40 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 40 |  |  |
|  | Clashes over Resources | 10 | 9 | 12 | 8 | 0 | 39 |  |  | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | Faction/Armed Movt/Border issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 34 | 28 | 62 |  | Excluding GoS and Civilian Vehicles  \*\*\*Does not include flight cancellations recorded by AIROPS as below: | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | *SUB-TOTAL* | 843 | 680 | 624 | 723 | 492 | 3365 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  | Sectors |  | Cancelled by | North | South | Centra |  | West | East | Khartoum | TOTAL |
|  | **GRAND TOTAL**  **(Cases)**  ce: Joint Mission Analysis Ce |  |  | **3,365**  AMID HQ, | |  |  |  | Flight cancellations  . | | | MI/NS | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | **0** |
| Sour | ntre, | UN | El Fas | her, | 2016 | Other Factors | 330 | 360 | 0 |  | 185 | 0 | 0 | **872** |

# TABLE 6.2: UNAMID YEARLY INCIDENT

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


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **FATALITIES** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | **By Sectors** | | |  |  |  |  |  | **Type of Victims** | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | **Cases** |  |  | International/Nationals | | |  | Civilians |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | ***Caused by*** | **North** | **South** | **West** | **Central** | **East** | **TOTAL** | **UNAMID** | **UN Agc** | **NGOs** | **Civilians (non- IDPs)** | **IDPs** | **Tribesmen** | |  | **GoS** | **Armed Movts** | **TOTAL** |  |
| **FATALITIES** | Criminality | 400 | 180 | 100 | 150 | 110 | 170 | 710 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 565 | 100 | 35 |  |  | 10 | 0 | **710** |  |
| Belligerence | 20 | 0 | - | 20 | 0 | 90 | 110 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 110 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **110** |  |
| Clashes over Resources | 56 | 50 | 40 | 42 | 117 | 0 | 291 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 291 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **291** |  |
| Accidents/Others | 62 | 43 | 15 | 20 | 14 | 0 | 92 | 10 | 8 | 0 | 50 | 24 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **92** |  |
| SUB-TOTAL | 538 | 273 | 155 | 232 | 241 | 260 | 1203 | 18 | 8 | 0 | 615 | 124 | 326 |  |  | 120 | 0 | **1203** |  |
|  |  |  |  | | | |  |  | Total Staff | | **18** | Total Civilians | **1065** | Gos/Armed Movts | | | | **120** |  |  |
|  |  |  | Cases by Sectors | | | |  |  |  |  |  |  | GRAND TOTAL (Victims) | | | | |  | **1060** |  |
|  | ***Type of Event*** | North | South | West | Central | East | TOTAL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | *By Sector* | | |  |  |
|  | IDP Issues | 105 | 140 | 125 | 111 | 28 | 509 |  |  |  |  |  | North | South | |  | West | Central | East | TOTAL |
|  | Banditry | 810 | 320 | 400 | 550 | 350 | 2430 |  |  | SGBV (Victims) \*all reported cases | | | 55 | 48 |  |  | 40 | 70 | 0 | **213** |
|  | SGBV (Number of Cases) | 30 | 29 | 4 | 60 | 7 | 130 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **INCIDENTS** | GoS Activity | 101 | 140 | 215 | 180 | 90 | 726 |  |  |  |  | UNAMID | UN Contr | UN Agc | |  | INGO | TOTAL |  |  |
| Restriction of Movements\*\*\* | 32 | 16 | 64 | 70 | 0 | 182 |  | Carjacking (vehs) | |  | 0 | 0 | 28 |  |  | 0 | **28** |  |  |
| Livestock Theft | 50 | 72 | 10 | 0 | 18 | 150 |  | Carjacking Attempted (vehs) | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | **0** |  |  |
| Carjacking/Attempt\*\* | 16 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **28** |  |  |
|  | Clashes over Resources | 20 | 14 | 5 | 20 | 0 | 59 |  |  | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | Faction/Armed Movt/Border issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 38 | 40 | 78 |  | Excluding GoS and Civilian Vehicles  \*\*\*Does not include flight cancellations recorded by AIROPS as below: | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | *SUB-TOTAL* | 1164 | 743 | 823 | 1029 | 633 | 4292 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  | Sectors |  | Cancelled by | North | South | Centra |  | West | East | Khartoum | TOTAL |
|  | **GRAND TOTAL**  **(Cases)**  ce: Joint Mission Analysis Ce |  |  | **4292**  AMID HQ, | |  |  |  | Flight cancellations  . | | | MI/NS | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | **0** |
| Sour | ntre, | UN | El Fas | her, | 2016 | Other Factors | 380 | 430 | 0 |  | 180 | 0 | 0 | **990** |

# TABLE 6.3: UNAMID YEARLY INCIDENT

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|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **FATALITIES** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | **By Sectors** | | |  |  |  |  |  | **Type of Victims** | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | **Cases** |  |  | International/Nationals | | |  | Civilians |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | ***Caused by*** | **North** | **South** | **West** | **Central** | **East** | **TOTAL** | **UNAMID** | **UN Agc** | **NGOs** | **Civilians (non- IDPs)** | **IDPs** | **Tribesmen** | |  | **GoS** | **Armed Movts** | **TOTAL** |  |
| **FATALITIES** | Criminality | 480 | 220 | 105 | 170 | 132 | 198 | 825 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 630 | 130 | 45 |  |  | 20 | 0 | **825** |  |
| Belligerence | 40 | 10 | 0 | 140 | 0 | 85 | 235 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 235 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **235** |  |
| Clashes over Resources | 70 | 55 | 250 | 70 | 124 | 0 | 499 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 499 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **499** |  |
| Accidents/Others | 80 | 48 | 30 | 36 | 23 | 0 | 217 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 140 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **217** |  |
| SUB-TOTAL | 670 | 333 | 385 | 416 | 279 | 283 | 1696 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 680 | 270 | 544 |  |  | 255 | 0 | **1696** |  |
|  |  |  |  | | | |  |  | Total Staff | | **27** | Total Civilians | **1494** | Gos/Armed Movts | | | | **255** |  |  |
|  |  |  | Cases by Sectors | | | |  |  |  |  |  |  | GRAND TOTAL (Victims) | | | | |  | **1696** |  |
|  | ***Type of Event*** | North | South | West | Central | East | TOTAL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | *By Sector* | | |  |  |
|  | IDP Issues | 130 | 155 | 135 | 125 | 28 | 573 |  |  |  |  |  | North | South | |  | West | Central | East | TOTAL |
|  | Banditry | 820 | 480 | 510 | 530 | 360 | 2700 |  |  | SGBV (Victims) \*all reported cases | | | 45 | 75 |  |  | 5 | 75 | 0 | **200** |
|  | SGBV (Number of Cases) | 45 | 30 | 5 | 70 | 10 | 160 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **INCIDENTS** | GoS Activity | 120 | 160 | 240 | 200 | 120 | 840 |  |  |  |  | UNAMID | UN Contr | UN Agc | |  | INGO | TOTAL |  |  |
| Restriction of Movements\*\*\* | 40 | 20 | 70 | 75 | 0 | 205 |  | Carjacking (vehs) | |  | 2 | 5 | 31 |  |  | - | **38** |  |  |
| Livestock Theft | 65 | 90 | 3 | 0 | 30 | 188 |  | Carjacking Attempted (vehs) | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | **0** |  |  |
| Carjacking/Attempt\*\* | 18 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 38 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **38** |  |  |
|  | Clashes over Resources | 20 | 21 | 9 | 28 | 0 | 78 |  |  | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | Faction/Armed Movt/Border issues | 0 | 0 | 1 | 42 | 45 | 88 |  | Excluding GoS and Civilian Vehicles  \*\*\*Does not include flight cancellations recorded by AIROPS as below: | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | *SUB-TOTAL* | 1258 | 976 | 973 | 1070 | 593 | 4870 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  | Sectors |  | Cancelled by | North | South | Centra |  | West | East | Khartoum | TOTAL |
|  | **GRAND TOTAL**  **(Cases)**  ce: Joint Mission Analysis Ce |  |  | **4870**  AMID HQ, | |  |  |  | Flight cancellations  . | | | MI/NS | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | **0** |
| Sour | ntre, | UN | El Fas | her, | 2016 | Other Factors | 480 | 490 | 0 |  | 210 | 0 | 0 | **1180** |

# TABLE 6.4: UNAMID YEARLY INCIDENT

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# TABLE 6.5: UNAMID YEARLY INCIDENT

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **FATALITIES** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | **By Sectors** | | |  |  |  |  |  | **Type of Victims** | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | **Cases** |  |  | International/Nationals | | |  | Civilians |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | ***Caused by*** | **North** | **South** | **West** | **Central** | **East** | **TOTAL** | **UNAMID** | **UN Agc** | **NGOs** | **Civilians (non- IDPs)** | **IDPs** | **Tribesmen** | |  | **GoS** | **Armed Movts** | **TOTAL** |  |
| **FATALITIES** | Criminality | 420 | 200 | 96 | 164 | 128 | 192 | 780 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 600 | 120 | 28 |  |  | 32 | 0 | **780** |  |
| Belligerence | 25 | 0 | 0 | 130 | 0 | 70 | 200 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 200 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **200** |  |
| Clashes over Resources | 60 | 48 | 238 | 50 | 18 | 0 | 406 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 406 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **406** |  |
| Accidents/Others | 70 | 40 | 28 | 24 | 20 | 0 | 112 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 50 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **112** |  |
| SUB-TOTAL | 575 | 294 | 367 | 245 | 269 | 196 | 1498 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 640 | 170 | 434 |  |  | 232 | 0 | **1498** |  |
|  |  |  |  | | | |  |  | Total Staff | | **22** | Total Civilians | **1244** | Gos/Armed Movts | | | | **234** |  |  |
|  |  |  | Cases by Sectors | | | |  |  |  |  |  |  | GRAND TOTAL (Victims) | | | | |  | **1498** |  |
|  | ***Type of Event*** | North | South | West | Central | East | TOTAL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | *By Sector* | | |  |  |
|  | IDP Issues | 120 | 150 | 130 | 120 | 38 | 550 |  |  |  |  |  | North | South | |  | West | Central | East | TOTAL |
|  | Banditry | 800 | 470 | 500 | 510 | 370 | 2650 |  |  | SGBV (Victims) \*all reported cases | | | 40 | 70 |  |  | 0 | 80 | 0 | **190** |
|  | SGBV (Number of Cases) | 40 | 33 | 5 | 65 | 8 | 151 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **INCIDENTS** | GoS Activity | 110 | 150 | 230 | 190 | 101 | 781 |  |  |  |  | UNAMID | UN Contr | UN Agc | |  | INGO | TOTAL |  |  |
| Restriction of Movements\*\*\* | 33 | 12 | 65 | 71 | 0 | 181 |  | Carjacking (vehs) | |  | 0 | 3 | 30 |  |  | 0 | **33** |  |  |
| Livestock Theft | 60 | 84 | 5 | 0 | 28 | 177 |  | Carjacking Attempted (vehs) | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | **0** |  |  |
| Carjacking/Attempt\*\* | 15 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **33** |  |  |
|  | Clashes over Resources | 18 | 16 | 8 | 26 | 0 | 68 |  |  | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | Faction/Armed Movt/Border issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 44 | 84 |  | Excluding GoS and Civilian Vehicles  \*\*\*Does not include flight cancellations recorded by AIROPS as below: | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | *SUB-TOTAL* | 119 | 933 | 943 | 1022 | 518 | 4675 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  | Sectors |  | Cancelled by | North | South | Centra |  | West | East | Khartoum | TOTAL |
|  | **GRAND TOTAL**  **(Cases)**  ce: Joint Mission Analysis Ce |  |  | **4674**  AMID HQ, | |  |  |  | Flight cancellations  . | | | MI/NS | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | **0** |
| Sour | ntre, | UN | El Fas | her, | 2016 | Other Factors | 420 | 450 | 0 |  | 200 | 0 | 0 | **1070** |

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
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# TABLE 6.6: UNAMID YEARLY INCIDENT

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **FATALITIES** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | **By Sectors** | | |  |  |  |  |  | **Type of Victims** | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | **Cases** |  |  | International/Nationals | | |  | Civilians |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | ***Caused by*** | **North** | **South** | **West** | **Central** | **East** | **TOTAL** | **UNAMID** | **UN Agc** | **NGOs** | **Civilians (non- IDPs)** | **IDPs** | **Tribesmen** | |  | **GoS** | **Armed Movts** | **TOTAL** |  |
| **FATALITIES** | Criminality | 420 | 240 | 96 | 144 | 108 | 192 | 780 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 612 | 108 | 24 |  |  | 36 | 0 | **780** |  |
| Belligerence | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 108 | 108 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 108 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **108** |  |
| Clashes over Resources | 60 | 24 | 228 | 36 | 108 | 0 | 396 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 396 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **396** |  |
| Accidents/Others | 72 | 36 | 24 | 12 | 12 | 0 | 84 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 36 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **84** |  |
| SUB-TOTAL | 564 | 300 | 348 | 192 | 228 | 300 | 1368 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 612 | 144 | 420 |  |  | 144 | 0 | **1368** |  |
|  |  |  |  | | | |  |  | Total Staff | | **12** | Total Civilians | **1212** | Gos/Armed Movts | | | | **144** |  |  |
|  |  |  | Cases by Sectors | | | |  |  |  |  |  |  | GRAND TOTAL (Victims) | | | | |  | **1368** |  |
|  | ***Type of Event*** | North | South | West | Central | East | TOTAL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | *By Sector* | | |  |  |
|  | IDP Issues | 108 | 144 | 108 | 108 | 12 | 480 |  |  |  |  |  | North | South | |  | West | Central | East | TOTAL |
|  | Banditry | 780 | 432 | 584 | 428 | 260 | 2484 |  |  | SGBV (Victims) \*all reported cases | | | 36 | 60 |  |  | 0 | 84 | 0 | **180** |
|  | SGBV (Number of Cases) | 36 | 24 | 0 | 60 | 0 | 120 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **INCIDENTS** | GoS Activity | 84 | 132 | 204 | 192 | 108 | 720 |  |  |  |  | UNAMID | UN Contr | UN Agc | |  | INGO | TOTAL |  |  |
| Restriction of Movements\*\*\* | 0 | 0 | 12 | 12 | 0 | 24 |  | Carjacking (vehs) | |  | 0 | 0 | 24 |  |  | 0 | **24** |  |  |
| Livestock Theft | 48 | 48 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 120 |  | Carjacking Attempted (vehs) | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | **0** |  |  |
| Carjacking/Attempt\*\* | 12 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **24** |  |  |
|  | Clashes over Resources | 12 | 12 | 12 | 24 | 0 | 60 |  |  | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | Faction/Armed Movt/Border issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 24 | 60 |  | Excluding GoS and Civilian Vehicles  \*\*\*Does not include flight cancellations recorded by AIROPS as below: | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | *SUB-TOTAL* | 1080 | 804 | 920 | 860 | 428 | 4092 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  | Sectors |  | Cancelled by | North | South | Centra |  | West | East | Khartoum | TOTAL |
|  | **GRAND TOTAL**  **(Cases)**  ce: Joint Mission Analysis Ce |  |  | **4092**  AMID HQ, | |  |  |  | Flight cancellations  . | | | MI/NS | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | **0** |
| Sour | ntre, | UN | El Fas | her, | 2016 | Other Factors | 396 | 312 | 36 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | **744** |

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **FATALITIES** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | **By Sectors** | | |  |  |  |  |  | **Type of Victims** | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | **Cases** |  |  | International/Nationals | | |  | Civilians |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | ***Caused by*** | **North** | **South** | **West** | **Central** | **East** | **TOTAL** | **UNAMID** | **UN Agc** | **NGOs** | **Civilians (non- IDPs)** | **IDPs** | **Tribesmen** | |  | **GoS** | **Armed Movts** | **TOTAL** |  |
| **FATALITIES** | Criminality | 372 | 144 | 156 | 108 | 48 | 12 | 468 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 276 | 144 | 0 |  |  | 48 | 0 | **468** |  |
| Belligerence | 36 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 120 | 0 | 120 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 120 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **120** |  |
| Clashes over Resources | 24 | 0 | 420 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 444 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 444 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **444** |  |
| Accidents/Others | 48 | 12 | 24 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 48 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 24 | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 | **60** |  |
| SUB-TOTAL | 480 | 156 | 600 | 144 | 168 | 1 | 1080 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 420 | 168 | 444 |  |  | 48 | 0 | **1080** |  |
|  |  |  |  | | | |  |  | Total Staff | | **0** | Total Civilians | **1032** | Gos/Armed Movts | | | | **48** |  |  |
|  |  |  | Cases by Sectors | | | |  |  |  |  |  |  | GRAND TOTAL (Victims) | | | | |  | **1080** |  |
|  | ***Type of Event*** | North | South | West | Central | East | TOTAL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | *By Sector* | | |  |  |
|  | IDP Issues | 252 | 68 | 52 | 80 | 0 | 452 |  |  |  |  |  | North | South | |  | West | Central | East | TOTAL |
|  | Banditry | 864 | 444 | 596 | 308 | 260 | 2472 |  |  | SGBV (Victims) \*all reported cases | | | 120 | 72 |  |  | 24 | 24 | 0 | **240** |
|  | SGBV (Number of Cases) | 48 | 36 | 12 | 24 | 0 | 120 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **INCIDENTS** | GoS Activity | 288 | 168 | 120 | 144 | 0 | 720 |  |  |  |  | UNAMID | UN Contr | UN Agc | |  | INGO | TOTAL |  |  |
| Restriction of Movements\*\*\* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 12 |  | Carjacking (vehs) | |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 0 | **0** |  |  |
| Livestock Theft | 12 | 12 | 38 | 0 | 0 | 60 |  | Carjacking Attempted (vehs) | | | 0 | 0 | 12 |  |  | 0 | **12** |  |  |
| Carjacking/Attempt\*\* | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **12** |  |  |
|  | Clashes over Resources | 12 | 12 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 36 |  |  | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | Faction/Armed Movt/Border issues | 0 | 0 | 36 | 3 | 0 | 72 |  | Excluding GoS and Civilian Vehicles  \*\*\*Does not include flight cancellations recorded by AIROPS as below: | | | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | *SUB-TOTAL* | 1476 | 752 | 864 | 604 | 260 | 3944 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  | Sectors |  | Cancelled by | North | South | Centra |  | West | East | Khartoum | TOTAL |
|  | **GRAND TOTAL**  **(Cases)**  ce: Joint Mission Analysis Ce |  |  | **3944**  AMID HQ, | |  |  |  | Flight cancellations  . | | | MI/NS | 384 | 24 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | **1116** |
| Sour | ntre, | UN | El Fas | her, | 2016 | Other Factors | 504 | 168 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 36 |  |

# TABLE 6.7: UNAMID YEARLY INCIDENT

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The period from 2003-2009 witnessed intense open hostilities in Darfur leading to several deaths with an estimated 1.9 million IDPs and 3 million people living on food aids. While the number of IDPs remains at about 1.9 million going forward, there was slight reduction in number of deaths and acts of criminality in recent times.

# ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTATION BENCHMARKS

The mandate implementation analysis will be based on the 4 key pillars of UNAMID Bench Marks highlighted in Chapter 5. These are Comprehensive Political Solution, Secure and Stable Environment, Stabilized Humanitarian Situation and Rule of Law. UNAMID yearly incident statistics at Tables 6.1 to 6.7 would be partly used, particularly as regards the security environment, humanitarian access and rule of law.

# COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SOLUTION

The Doha peace process reached an important milestone with the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) on 14 July 2011 by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), SLA/AW and SLA/MM refused to join this agreement (Ingrid, 2013). Thus, while the peace process had made a major step forward, it stopped short of achieving a comprehensive and inclusive settlement of the conflict, hence the current lack of progress on the political front in Darfur (Gambari, 2013). UNAMID efforts towards the continuation of the peace process to its logical conclusion have at best stalled.

The continuation of the peace process and achievement of a comprehensive peace process would mean bringing the hold-out movements to the negotiation table (Gambari, 2013). This presents security challenges given that the hold out movements and the SPLM-North formedthe Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) with the stated objective of overthrowing the GoS “by all means necessary”. JEM has been weakened as the movement lost vital support from Chad and Libya, followed by a series of internal splits and the death of its leader, Khalil Ibrahim, in December 2011. However, this has not undermined the resolve of the SRF for regime change in Sudan and a holistic approach to addressing the conflicts in Sudan and not just Darfur.

The people of Darfur are exhausted by the prolonged conflict and look forward to peace, stability and an improvement in their general social- economic condition. The entire peace process, including DDPD implementation, did not bring dividends of peace while the good faith and political will of the parties to the DDPD to fully implement the provisions of the agreement remain doubtful (Chambas, 2013). The commitment of the belligerent parties, including the hold out movements and GoS, to seriously engage in meaningful dialogue to achieve a comprehensive resolution of the conflict also remains doubtful, thus making it difficult to advance mandate implementation.

The Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) was created by a presidential decree as part of the political solution to the crisis. The DRA under the chairmanship of LJM leader Tigani Sessi is expected to oversee the development projects and programmes, designed to improve living conditions

of the Darfur populations. Progress in this area is very slow as Ingrid (2013) states that;

DRA have not been able to operationalize its mandate on the ground due to lack of finances from the government while UNAMID and the UN are also unable to effectively attract funding to the DRA to enable it perform its function... An effective and functioning DRA will aid the political solution as it is meant to bring governance closer to Darfurians, but this have not happened. Ingrid (2013).

The lack of progress in conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile are further issues that affect political solution, as the SRF tend to push for a holistic solution to Sudan's problems rather than treating the Darfur and Kodofan Blue Nile conflicts separately. Undiandeye observed that:

conflicts in South Kodofan and Blue Nile between the SAF and Sudan People‟s liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) need to be resolved along with the Darfur conflict considering the involvement of SRF in both Darfur and South Kodofan. Sudan will benefit if all the issues relating to the various conflicts are addressed at once, though it will be very difficult as various splinter groups holding different territories with different intentions.Undiandeye (2016).

The inability of the UN to push towards these area, which are also part of the root causes of Darfur conflict as all the conflicts are underpinned by access to power and marginalisation, underlines UNAMID's inability to develop a workable framework for a comprehensive political solution. Despite the difficulties, the utility of the DDPD negotiations is that it has kept

some of the parties to the conflict on the negotiation table. According to Okwudili (2017) “to keep the parties talking with each other is key, as there is room for continued negotiation towards finding a solution and that is the biggest political achievement of UNAMID”.

# SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT


The achievement of a secure and stable environment in Darfur remains a difficult challenge to UNAMID. Key issues are armed confrontation between SAF and holdout movement, resource based clashes, criminality, banditry and tribal clashes.

# BELLIGERENCE (ARMED CONFRONTATION)

The armed confrontation between SAF and armed movements is a major cause of insecurity and violent deaths in Darfur.Tribal clashes have also caused considerable number of fatalities. As shown on the graph below, compared with 2010 with 2,521 fatalities, there has been a slight reduction in the number of fatalities at 1,696 in 2013 and 1,080 in 2016 but the numbers are still very high. Of note is that armed conflict data base classifies conflicts with over 1,000 death as major armed conflict.

# FIGURE 6.1: TOTAL NUMBER OF FATALITIES 2010-2016

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.



**2521**

**1696**

**1498**

**1368**

**1060**

**1060**

**1080**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**

**2016**

**NUMBER OF CAUSALITY**

Major incidents since deployment of UNAMID was in 2008, when JEM attacked Omdurman on 10 May with the alleged support of Chad. Similarly, in February 2009, SAF captured Muhajeria from JEM after three weeks of fighting. In May 2013, JEM clashed with GoS and SLA/MM in a series of engagements in Um Bani/Komoi area, and in Korma (Matts, 2013). The rapprochement between Sudan and Chad meant the end to the proxy war between the two countries, and JEM‟s privileged ties with Chad, dramatically changing the dynamics of the Darfur conflict. This was followed by JEM‟s loss of its main stronghold of Jebel Moon (West Darfur) in March 2013 which resulted in the highest number of fatalities in one month (about 440) since UNAMID deployment to date (Atolegbe, 2016). The intensification of fighting, especially in the Shangil Tobaya general area which began with the joint attack by the armed movements (SLA/MM, JEM and LJM - Karbino faction) around Dar al Salam led to increased death toll.


The GoS responded to the attack by targeting the area around Sortony where SLA/Justice members had retreatedthrough intensive airstrikes. According to Fashina:

Shangil Tobaya is a big flash point in the conflict and these accounts to high casualties in the area. The area and adjoining villages are often attacked by militia‟s supported by SAF troops aimed at flushing out SLA/MM and JEM from the area. Clashes between farmers and pastoralists also led to casualties and displacement. As long as it remains a strong hold of SLA/MM and JEM, it will continue to attract SAF offensive with attendant consequences. Fashina (2016)

GoS use of air strike continued up to Operation Decisive Summer in 2015 with increased displacement of local and casualties. Of note is that the formation of the SRF on 11 November 2011 when JEM ﬁnally joined that alliance (SLA/MM, SLA/AW, SLA/Abu Al-Gasim, SLA/MM and SPLAN), increased armed movements attack in Jebral Marra areas, Kutuum and Kabkabiya leading to increase military engagement with SAF (Gaje, 2015). This has led to increased restriction of movement and fatalities.

# FIGURE 6.2: NUMBER OF FATALITIES RELATED TO BELLIGERENCE 2010-2016

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.



**1039**

**380**

**235**

**110**

**200**

**108**

**120**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**


**2016**

**NUMBER OF CAUSALITY**

# RESOURCE-BASED CLASHES

Resource-based clashes have remained one of the main causes of violent deaths. This is because competition over natural resources is a root cause of the Darfur conflict. Compared to 2009 when a total of 134 resource- related fatalities were recorded (16 percent of the total fatalities), the year 2010 witnessed a sharp increase in the number of deaths (882) resulting from resource-based clashes which constituted 38 percent of the overall fatalities (2321), and in 2016 it reduced to 444 as shown in Figure 6.3.

# FIGURE 6.3: NUMBER OF FATALITIES RELATED TO CLASHES OVER RESOURCES 2010-2016



**882**

**499**

**406**

**396**

**444**

**291**

**105**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**

**2016**

**NUMBER OF CAUSALITY**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.


In 2010 and 2013 clashes took place mainly between Rizeigat and Misseriya in Kass, Zalingei and Nertiti, not only because of the fierce competition over resources, but also because of possible political manipulation of the Misseriya against the Rizeigat‟s political dominance (Onilenla, 2014). In addition, there were also resource based clashes between Zaghawa and Birgid in North Darfur, Fallata and Habbaniya, Salamat and Habbaniya, Rizeigat and Dinka in South Darfur, Misseriya and Nawaiba, Rizeigat and Nawaiba in West Darfur. Incidents of clashes have however decreased from 78 in 2013

to 36 in 2016 as shown in Figure 6.4.

In a bid to solve the problem, a new Strategy for Peace in Darfur was espoused by GoS by undertaking reconciliation initiatives and providing financial incentives especially with regards to the payment of Diyah (blood money) (Onilenla, 2014). Whilefatalities fell slightly as a result, sharp

increases/decreases in inter-tribal tension may be politically driven as there are instances of GoS intervention and political manipulation to increase its support base. In fact, there was strong suspicion of GoS supporting the Birgid against the Zaghawa during the ﬁghting between GoS and SLA/MM in Dar al Salam, Khor Abeche and Shaeria in late 2010 and 2013 (Onilenla, 2014). In Sector North, tension between farmers and nomads is high especially in the areas of Um and Kabkabiya where there is notable presence of armed nomad group predominantly from the Northern Rizeigat. This has the potential of developing into clashes with resultant loss of lives and property.

# FIGURE 6.4: NUMBER OF INCIDENTS RELATED TO CLASHES OVER RESOURCES 2010-2016



**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**

**2016**

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS**


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **78** | | | |  | | | |
|  | | | | **68** |  | | |
| **59** | | |  |  | **60** |  | |
| **47** |  | |  |  |  |  | |
|  | **39** |  |  |  |  |  | |
| **36** |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

Clashes over migration routes are also part of the larger resource based conflicts. Recurrent drought and desertification, expansion of farmland corresponding to the population growth of Darfur as well as conflict-related insecurity severely affect the livelihood of an approximately 1.5 million

nomadic population in Darfur, as well as their seasonal migration routes. In North Darfur, migration routes from the areas west of Wakheim below Wadi Hawar to Jebel Marra and South Darfur were blocked by farmers in 2012. In South Darfur, migration routes to the border area between Darfur and South Sudan were blocked by local farmers from east of Kass and from north of Nyala down to north of Tullus due to crop damage during migration (Lar, 2016). The details of migration routes are shown in Figure 6.5. The actions of the local farmers by blocking migration routes have resulted in conflicts and fatalities which further undermine the security situation.

# FIGURE 6.5: MAP SHOWING LIVESTOCK MIGRATION ROUTES



Source: UN HQ, New York, 2015

Attempts by UNAMID to establish an effective early warning approach towards solving the problem failed due to inability of assigned forces to dominate these areas owing to poor operating platforms as some


contingents lack enough COEs to enable them perform assigned forces. In some instances, the poor road network hinders movement. This is worse due to limited air capability as situational awareness and quick deployment of forces are undermined.

Although fatality figures relating to tribal/resources have stabilized at an average of about 35 fatalities/month in 2016 from 74 fatalities/month in 2010 (John-Okon, 2016), tensions between communities over resources persist, particularly between farmers and nomads. UNAMID has not been able to achieve a sustainable and comprehensive solution necessary to carry out fundamental reforms that will tackle the root causes of inter-communal confrontation including nomadism (migration routes) as well as demographic pressure and desertification which has largely contributed to scarcity of resources (water access, farm and grazing lands). This situation is part of the root cause of the problems and undermines the ability to achieve the mandate.

# CRIMINALITY

Criminal activities including attacks against UN personnel are consistent throughout the region, with higher frequency in state capitals and areas with easy access to weaponry. State capitals like El Fasher, Nyala and El Geneina where the population is concentrated, as well as areas like Kutum, Kabkabiya, Shaeria, Kass and Neititi where weapons are widely available have experienced a surge in the levels of criminal incidents. In 2013, the number of fatalities due to criminality rose to 825 but declined to 468 in 2016 due to improving security environment underpinned by UNAMID patrols as seen in Figure 6.6.

# FIGURE 6.6: NUMBER OF FATALITIES RELATED TO CRIMINALITY 2010-2016



**710**

**825**

**780**

**780**

**510**

**514**

**468**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**

**2016**

**NUMBER OF**


**CAUSALITY**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

IDP camps in areas like Zam Zam, Abu Shouk, Kalma, Dereige, Ardamata, Al Riyadh, Hassahisa, Hainidiya, Nertiti, Shaeria, Kutum, Kabkabiya and Kass have also been affected as proliferation of weapons in the region has resulted, for instance, in shooting incidents targeting IDPs especially at night. Shooting incidents against IDPs have increased from a total of 95 cases in 2010 to 248 cases in 2011 but declined to 153 in 2015. Recent unrest in Zam Zam IDPs camp was a direct consequence of abusive activities of the Central Reserve Police against the IDPs, which constituted a serious protection challenge. UNAMID interventions have not stabilized the situation as these interventions are reactive rather than proactive. Interventions would need to be proactive to achieve the desired result.

# FIGURE 6.7: NUMBER OF INCIDENTS RELATED TO BANDITRY 2010-2016

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.



**2700**

**2650**

**2130**

**2430**

**2484**

**2472**

**1460**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**

**2016**

**NUMBER OF**

**INCIDENTS**

Cases of Criminality are basically four in nature: Cases of murder; cases of banditry, incidents of attack and ambush against UNAMID, UN agencies and INGOs; and incidents of banditry and kidnapping against UNAMID, UN agencies and NGOs. The number of banditry and criminal activities slightly decreased from 2650 in 2014 to 2472 in 2016 as shown in Figure 6.7. Specifically, the sectorial breakdown show that the highest is in Sector North with a total number of 864 criminal incidents in 2016, while Sector East recorded the least at 260 incidents in the same year as shown in Table 6.8.

# TABLE 6.8: SECTOR/STATES BREAKDOWN OF INCIDENTS OF BANDITRY

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Year** | **Number of Incidents** | | | | | **Remarks** |
| **North** | **South** | **West** | **Central** | **East** |
| 1. | 2010 | 700 | 380 | 400 | 480 | 170 |  |
| 2. | 2011 | 380 | 250 | 300 | 250 | 280 |  |
| 3. | 2012 | 810 | 320 | 400 | 550 | 350 |  |
| 4. | 2013 | 820 | 480 | 510 | 530 | 360 |  |
| 5. | 2014 | 800 | 470 | 500 | 510 | 370 |  |
| 6. | 2015 | 780 | 432 | 584 | 428 | 260 |  |
| 7. | 2016 | 864 | 444 | 596 | 308 | 260 |  |
| 8. | **TOTAL** | **5,154** | **2,776** | **3,290** | **3,056** | **2,050** |  |

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

Attacks and ambushes on UNAMID patrols and convoys constitute the most serious violence on UNAMID personnel and are part of the general acts of criminality in Darfur which underline the unstable security environment.

**TABLE 6.9: SOME CASES OF ATTACK OF UNAMID PERSONNEL LEADING TO DEATH OF PEACEKEEPERS**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Date** | **Nature of Incident** | **Number Killed** | **Number Wounded** | **Remarks** |
| 1. | 9 March  2016 | Unidentified assailants attacked UNAMID  peacekeepers | 1 | N/A |  |
| 2. | 16 October  2014 | Ambushed and Shot by  unidentified assailants | 3 | N/A |  |
| 3. | 24 May  2014 | Caught in an ethnic  group clash | 1 | 3 |  |
| 4. | 24  November 2013 | Attacked by unidentified assailants | 1 | NIL |  |
| 5. | 11 & 13  October 2013 | Ambushed by unidentified gunmen | 4 | NIL |  |
| 6. | 3 October  2012 | Ambush by armed  gunmen | 4 | 8 |  |
| 7. | 7 October  2012 | Ambush by armed  gunmen | 1 | 3 |  |
| 8. | 20 April  2012 | Ambushed and Shot by  unidentified assailants | 1 | 4 |  |
| 9. | 24 February  2012 | Ambushed by  unidentified gunmen | 2 | NIL |  |
| 10. | 29 February  2012 | Ambushed by  unidentified gunmen | 1 | 3 |  |
| 11 | 21 January  2012 | Attacked by  unidentified assailants | 1 | 3 |  |
| 12. | 6 November  2011 | Attacked while on  Patrol | 1 | 1 |  |
| 13. | 10 October  2011 | Ambush by  unidentified gunmen | 3 | 6 |  |
| 14. | 5 November  2010 | Unidentified militants  shoot | 1 | NIL |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 15. | 21 June  2010 | Attacked by  unidentified assailants | 3 | NIL |  |
| 16. | 28  September 2009 | Ambushed by unidentified gunmen | 1 | 2 |  |
| 17. | 7 May 2009 | Attacked by  unidentified assailants | 1 | N/A |  |
| 18. | 27  December 2008 | Car-jacking event | 1 | NIL |  |
| 19. | 29 October  2008 | Attacked by  unidentified assailants | 1 | NIL |  |
| 20. | 6 October  2008 | Attacked by  unidentified assailants | 1 | NIL |  |
| 21. | 8 July 2008 | Attacked by armed  militia members | 7 | 19 |  |
| 22. | May 2008 | Ambush by armed  gunmen | 1 | N/A |  |
| 23. | 29  September 2007 | Attacked by unidentified assailants | 10 | NIL |  |
| 24. | Total |  | 51 | 52 |  |

Source: Researcher's compilation from UN Documents, 2017.

Table 6.9 contains list of several attacks against UNAMID personnel, which resulted in casualties. For instance, on 16 October 2014, 3 Ethiopian peacekeepers were ambushed and killed at Karma, North Darfur. Most of these attacks took place in major towns (Kutum and El Fasher) in Sector North, Nyala and Ed El Fursan in Sector South and in Habila and Jebel Maira in Sector West. Incidents of banditry and kidnapping activities against UNAMID, UN agencies and INGOs reoccur in Darfur. GoS, the armed movements, unknown armed groups, IDPs and criminals perpetuated numerous banditry activities including attacks, burglary, break-in, armed robbery and shooting against UNAMID, UN agency and INGO personnel. In 2011, there was a rise in banditry activities (113 incidents) against UNAMID

personnel compared to 2010 (74 incidents), while the number of banditry cases against UN agencies and INGO personnel decreased from 66 incidents in 2010 down to 32 in 2011. Banditry against the UN system however increased to 38 in 2016 (Awog-Badek, 2017). Kidnapping targeting the international community has continued in Darfur as in 2012 two Jordian troops were kidnapped and later released. Similarly, in 2011, one UNAMID staff was kidnapped in El Fasher locality and while seven INGO staff were abducted in Kutum. Also, on 26 April 2010, four UNAMID peacekeepers were held for more than 2 weeks by kidnappers before their release. In Sector South (South Darfur)in 2011, Nyala locality recorded 33 banditry activities against UNAMID, UN agencies and INGOs while 14 UNAMID staff were kidnapped in 2010 (seven in Nyala town; three in Hai Alwad; one in Abojoro; and two in Al Matar). In Sector West, three UN agency personnel were kidnapped in Um Shalaya in El Geneina in 2011. The current situation is basically same as UNAMID and UN personnel continue to face threats of kidnapping and attack which reflects the poor security environment. According to Fayemiwo (2017) a Nigerian peacekeeper, Warrant Officer Remi Anakwe was killed on 5 June 2017 in Nyala-Dafur by armed militants while he was in Nyala Market. The militants made away with a UN Mobil Workshop the late peacekeeper went to repair in the market.

# VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST IDPs


The current number of IDPs in Darfur is estimated at 1.9 million. The politicization of IDPs in Darfur has in some cases resulted in intra-IDP violence. In July 2010, pro-Doha and anti-Doha IDPs violently confronted each other in Kalma and Hamidiya IDP camps (Adegbite, 2015). Cases of

violent crimes against the IDPs slightly reduced from 573 in 2013 to 452 in 2016. El Fasher locality where such camps as Zam Zam, Nifasha and Shaddad where many IDPs are affiliated with SLA/MM recorded the highest number of crimes against the IDPs followed by Zalingei traditionally known as a strong support base for Abdul Wahid. According to Hassan:

Rape is very common in IDP Camps. Women are also raped in groups including under aged girls. SAF backed militia Forces are mostly responsible particularly in areas like Zam Zam. Torture and extra judicial killing also takes places particularly when IDP refuse to give up livestocks. Rape painful to the women, very painful. Omar Hassan (2013).

This conforms to tribal undertones in the conflict, as IDP camps in Zam Zam, Nifash and Zalingei are usually attacked by government backed popular Defence Forces.

# FIGURE 6.8: NUMBER OF INCIDENTS RELATED TO IDP ISSUES 2010-2016



**573**

**511**

**509**

**550**

**480**

**452**

**347**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**


**2016**

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

Several IDPs have also died due to various causes ranging from poor sanitary condition, malnutrition, inadequate medical support to murder and attack by GoS supported militia groups. In 2010, about 2,505 IDPs died while the number reduced to 1,032 in 2016 due to various causes.

# FIGURE 6.9: TOTAL IDPs FATALITIES 2010-2016



**2505**

**1494**

**1049**

**1065**

**1244**

**1212**

**1032**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**

**2016**

**NUMBER OF VICTIMS**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

The high level of criminality in Darfur is not likely to decrease both in the short and medium term due to poor economic situation as a good percentage of criminal acts have economic undertone. The availability of small arms increased banditry and other acts of criminality as a source of quick income. Where armed conflict has largely subsided, more daring criminality such as carjacking of vehicles remains paramount. Violence against IDPs by GoS and armed groups often allied with GoS is in a bid to tighten control over the IDP camps. This aims to prevent the armed movements, which have lost some of their strongholds and military

significance, from resorting to the support of IDPs‟ to improve their influence and capability.

# RULE OF LAW

Over the years, the capacity of GoS police to respond to various crimes and other policing needs is limited not only due to inadequate resources and non-availability of complementary criminal justice institutions, but also due to their limited capacity in managing public disorder (Carey, 2013). This is as evidenced by violent crackdown on protestors against the El Fasher Pyramid Scheme, student demonstrations at the Universities of El Fasher and Zalingei in 2010, and the disturbances in Nyala in January 2012 against the appointment of the Wali of South Darfur. According to Adedoja (2016), UNAMID Police has not been able to bridge gaps in GoS police capabilities despite launching a number of initiatives. This includesconduct of UNAMID Police patrols in and around IDP camps in conjunction with GoS police, involvement of GoS police in implementing crime prevention strategies including the establishment of Joint Operation Center and Security Coordination Committees. UNAMID Police also conducts capacity building projects for GoS police in the areas of investigation of criminal cases including SGBV. Attempts to mobilize donor support/funding for projects geared towards addressing infrastructural (e.g., police stations, training centres, and training schools) and other policing needs for the enhancement of the operational capability of GoS police have not been successful. UNAMID Police conducts trainings for GoS police in the three training centers in Darfur (El Fasher, Nyala, and El Geneina). The courses include:

Community Policing; Crime Scene Management; Criminal Investigation; Human Rights, Gender Based Violence, and Child Protection; Detention and Treatment of Suspects; Support of Victims of SGBV; and Public Order. Between 2009 and 2011, 18,211 male officers and 439 female GoS police officers were trained in various short term courses. In 2009, 3,950 GoS police personnel were trained on community policing and crime investigation while in 2014 about 2,600 on crime scene management and criminal investigation ad detailed in Table 6.10. According to Atolagbe:

the level of awareness on issues of human rights, rule of law and SEA have improved due to UNAMID activities particularly through training of GoS Police and conduct of Joint Operations with them. I see these improvements as one of the major success of UNAMID. Human dignity is important, when security agencies respect people‟s rights, then one can say it is a part of finding solution to the problem, part of addressing it. You can only address a problem if people are respected and allowed to be part of the solution. Atolagbe (2017)

# TABLE 6.10: BREAKDOWN OF TRAINING BY UNAMID FOR GOS POLICE

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Year** | **Course** | | | **Number** | **Remarks** |
| 1. | 2009 | Community  Investigation | Policing, | Crime | 3,950 |  |
| 2. | 2010 | Crime Scene Management, Human Rights, Gender Based  Violence and Child Protection | | | 3,100 |  |
| 3. | 2011 | Community Policing, Detention  and Treatment of Suspects | | | 2,900 |  |
| 4. | 2012 | Support of  Public Order | Victims of | SGBV, | 3,300 |  |
| 5. | 2013 | Criminal Investigation,  Community Policing | | | 2,800 |  |


|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 6. | 2014 | Crime Scene Management,  Criminal Investigation | 2,600 |  |
|  | **TOTAL** |  | **18,650** |  |

Source: UN HQ, New York, 2014.

While some progress have been recorded in the capability of GoS police, it is still far below the standard required to effectively maintain peace and security in Darfur, as seen in the number of security breaches. The low number of female police officers and those trained as compared to men also undermine reporting of cases of SGBV by local women. In 2010 about 144 cases of SGBV were reported, while the number decreased in 2016 to 120. This shows some progress though this number of reported cases is however; far lower than the actual numbers as most cases are not reported due to stigma associated with such incidents. For instance, the reported mass rape in Tabit in November 2014 was not investigated, as Sudan refused to grant UNAMID access to Tabit and its people for investigation purposes (Bangura, 2014). Again on 8 July 2016, while briefing the UN Sudan's Sanction Committee, Bangura reported that "sexual violence was a consistent characteristic of the Darfur conflict" (Banguru, 2016).

The major challenges of the UN Police towards improving capacity of Sudan local police include the unpredictable security situation which subjects the mission area to a relapse of conflict, political instability, rising criminality, increase in unilateral use of violence against the IDPs, recurring insecurity and public disorder, and resource constraint in areas of budget, personnel, training and donors support. The lack of predictable and sustainable funds and budgeting support for planning future police operations led to uncertainties and failure.

# FIGURE 6.10: NUMBER OF SGBV INCIDENTS REPORTED IN DARFUR 2010-2016



**160**

**144**

**151**

**130**

**114**

**120**

**120**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**

**2016**

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

The delays in deploying the authorized strength of police as scheduled caused serious challenges to mandate implementation, and execution of tasks in support of the implementation of DDPD. This significantly stretched the low skill set currently available in UNAMID. This was further exacerbated by the issue of visa limitations placed by the Sudanese authorities on nominated police officers for deployment in Darfur.The inability of PCCs to provide the readily deployable police expertise to the mission area and lack of proper training needs assessment also undermined capacity building for GoS police. The key problem however, is the lack of donor support to sustain efforts of the UNAMID Police in performance of its mandated tasks.For


instance, the lack of donor support from the international community pose a critical challenge as it may imply re-alignment of priorities toward reduction in capacity building (Adetoro, 2016). Other challenges include the risks associated with GoS institutional shortcomings and the quality of governance, especially in context of the police and rule of law institutions as well as the weakness of institutional capacities on the part of the public administrations. The unwillingness of the Local Police to accept recommended programs also slows theimplementation of the various programs within the police capacity building framework. Related to the operational environment, geography of Darfur characterized by difﬁcult terrain, poor roads and scant infrastructure hamper logistical supply efforts particularly during the rainy season and critically strain vital logistics support to the UNAMID police operations, especially in event of a crisis and towards capacity building for GoS police in Darfur.

# HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

The humanitarian space in Darfur is limited likewise safe areas as UNAMID hasbeen unable to dominate Darfur AOR due to limited operational capability. In Sector North, SLA/W is present in Jebel Elsa in the outskirts of Malha, Jebel Marra and surrounding areas such as Sortony, as well as around Kutum while JEM remains in the Shangil Tobaya general area.In Sector South, Pockets of SLA/MM remain in Khor Abeche, Labado, Muhajeria, and Adoula mountains in Shaeria locality while JEM is around El Ferdous. In Sector West SLA/AW and JEM forces are in Tine, Komoi, Um Baru, Shegeg Karo, Furawiya, Beida, Masteri and Al Kereinik among others.

Towns and villages and surrounding areas with presence of armed movements are prone to clases between armed movements and SAF as shown in Figure 6.11. Clashes between GoS and the armed groups located in mentioned areas are concentrated in Shangil Tobaya in Sector North; Jebeel Marra at the intersection of three Darfur states as well as vicinities of Shaeria locality in Sector South. These activities reduced the humanitarian space and increased displacement, which undermines the humanitarian situation. On 20 Jan 2017, Ambassador Volodymyr Telchenko (Ukraine), the chair of the UNSC Sudan Sanctions Committee while briefing the SC stated that "United Nations and its partners continue to face access restrictions in providing humanitarian assistance in different regions of Darfur, in particular in the areas of Jebel Marra affected by the 2016 crisis". Access for humanitarian assistance thus continues to be an issue which undermines the humanitarian situation. This is particularly in unstable and conflict prone areas like Jebel Marra, as there are recorded improvements in humanitarian passage and delivery of food in relatively stable areas in west Darfur (Atolagbe, 2017).

# FIGURE 6.11: MAP OF DARFUR SHOWING HOT SPOT/ARMED MOVEMENTS LOCATIONS




Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

In North Darfur, total displacement during 2011 is estimated at more than 70,000 due to fighting between GoS and armed movements in North

Darfur while most of the IDPs are concentrated around the El Fasher – Zam Zam localities. The integrated map of Sector North Showing UNAMID locations, IDP camps, IDPs, resources based conflicts and flash points as at 2014 is at Figure 6.12. Areas like Kutum, Zam Zam and Tobaya Shangil remains flash points.

# FIGURE 6.12: INTEGRATED MAP - SECTOR NORTH OF DARFUR 2014




Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

In South Darfur, IDP household predominantly from the Zaghawa tribe are located at El Daein with 139,000; Nyala about 497,052 and Kass IDP Camp with about 126,720 IDPs. The integrated map of Sector South showing UNAMID locations, IDP camps, IDPs, resources based conflicts

and flash points as at 2014 is at Figure 6.13. Jabel Marra remains a flash point as Amnesty International alleged in October 2016 that SAF had used chemical weapons in the Jabel Marra area (Amnesty International, 2016). This allegation however, is yet to be conclusively verified by UNSC.


# FIGURE 6.13: INTEGRATED MAP - SECTOR SOUTH OF DARFUR 2014



Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

In West Darfur, households who fled from Dulu and Jurto in eastern Jebel Marra due to armed clashes in and around Hashaba movedto Zalingel and are settled in Hassahisa IDP camp. The integrated map of Sector West showing UNAMID locations, IDP camps, IDPs, resources based conflicts and flash points as at 2014 is at Figure 6.14.

# FIGURE 6.14: INTEGRATED MAP - SECTOR WEST OF DARFUR 2014



Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

Large-scale armed confrontations between GoS and the movements continue to take place due to the movements intend to topple the regime through, as they say, all necessary means. JEM and SLA/MM remain active

in Khor Abeche and Graida while GoS reinforced and repositioned its troops in all key areas including Kutum, Shangil Tobaya, Malha, Muzbat in North Darfur, El Daein, Graida and Buram in South Darfur and in Masteri and Nertiti in West Darfur, in order to contain the armed movements. This has shrinked the humanitarian space and UNAMID appears incapable of opening these areas.

UNAMID response through patrols has not being effective though UNAMID has increased the number of its patrols from an average of 90 per month in 2010, 140 in 2011, 150 in 2012 and down to 145 in 2016. While UNAMID continues to patrol, the overall increase in number of patrols has not contributed to the deterrence of violence as the coverage is not expanded to sensitive areas and potential ﬂashpoints like Jebel Marra, El Tawisha, Abu Matariq and Kaﬁa Kingi. This is because the patrol are mostly SRP which do not go outside the secured towns. Long range patrolwhich are ideal to enhance humanitarian situation in outlying areas are almost non- existence.Table showing monthly military Patrol and Escort activities for Sector South (South Darfur) for November 2016 is below.

# TABLE 6.11: UNAMID MONTHLY MILITARY PATROL AND ESCORT ACTIVITIES FOR NOVEMBER 2016 SECTOR SOUTH (SOUTH DARFUR)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Location** | **Protection of Civilians** | | | | | | | | **Protection of UNAMID** | | **Support** |  |  |  |
| **SRP** | | **LRP** | **NP** | | **Village** | | **IDP** | **RP** | **LAE** | **HE** | **Total** | **Ops** | **Reason** |
| **(a)** | **(b)** | **(c)** | | **(d)** | **(e)** | | **(f)** | | **(g)** | **(h)** | **(i)** | **(j)** | **(k)** | **(l)** | **(m)** |
| 1. | Nyala (NIBATT 45) | 300 | | 2 | 48 | | 33 | | 30 | 30 | 1 | 2 | 446 | Conducted |  |
| 2 | Kass (NIBATT 45) | 90 | | 1 | 50 | | 30 | | 25 | 36 | 2 | 1 | 235 | Conducted |  |
| 3 | Labado (BANSRIC 8) | 51 | | 1 | 47 | | 34 | | 28 | 58 | 10 | 8 | 237 | Conducted |  |
| 4. | Khor Abeche  (TANZBATT 10) | 61 | | 0 | 46 | | 30 | | 22 | 56 | 9 | 6 | 230 | Conducted |  |
| 5. | Menawashi  (TANZBATT 10) | 63 | | 2 | 44 | | 35 | | 29 | 58 | 8 | 8 | 247 | Conducted |  |
| 6. | Graida (ETHBATT 18) | 140 | | 2 | 0 | | 38 | | 34 | 59 | 8 | 7 | 288 | Conducted |  |
| 7. | Kalma (ETHBATT 18) | 55 | | 1 | 0 | | 38 | | 26 | 62 | 6 | 6 | 194 | Conducted |  |
| 8. | Buram (ETHBATT 18) | 30 | | 2 | 0 | | 39 | | 21 | 55 | 1 | 2 | 150 | Conducted |  |
| 9. | Tulus (EGYBATT 5) | 50 | | 0 | 41 | | 30 | | 18 | 48 | 1 | 2 | 190 | Conducted |  |
| 10. | Edd El Fursan  (EGYBATT 5) | 60 | | 1 | 48 | | 31 | | 20 | 40 | 2 | 1 | 203 | Conducted |  |
|  | TOTAL | **900** | | **12** | **324** | | **338** | | **253** | **502** | **48** | **43** | **2,420** | Conducted |  |
|  | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | | | **Grand Totals** | | | PoC | | Villages | | IDP | PoU | HE | Total |  |  |
| 1,236 | | 338 | | 253 | 557 | 45 | **2,429** | Conducted |

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

Improvement in the humanitarian space can only be achieved by UNAMID carrying out deep long range patrols and a remarkable decline in armed confrontation between GoS and armed movements. Recent displacements that occurred in all three states with, for example, the displacement of more than 70,000 individuals in North Darfur in 2011 andabout 75,000 in 2016 are in fact an indicator of a fluid security situation. Movement restrictions are further reminder and additional evidence that Darfur remains a conflict area. The alliance between armed movements and possible support from external actors like South Sudan suggest the conflict is far from over. Despite the death of Khalil Ibrahim, JEM has been able to maintain its coherence under the leadership of Jibril, who was elected leader of the movement on 25 January 2012. JEM though is visibly struggling for political and military survival and is occupied with succession issues, organizational restructuring, internal dissent and search for allies. There are different schools of thought concerning the impact of Khalil Ibrahim‟s demise on the SRF, but the SRF have continued to retain its command structures which allows for SRF coordinated operations against SAFs. The constant clashes between the SRF and SAF, fully demonstrated in Operation Decisive Summer I and II conducted by SAF using Special Forces in 2015 and early 2016 have grave implications for the humanitarian space.

The shrinking humanitarian space also affected UN humanitarian operations. As one of the largest humanitarian operations in the world, Darfur accounts for some 60 percent of sum that have been spent on humanitarian action in Sudan and South Sudan to date. In 2010, over 130 organizations

delivered humanitarian protection and assistance that amounts to 685 million US dollars to persons who were either displaced or affected by the conflict in Darfur. Also in 2010, up to 3.3 million people benefited from over 304,300 tons of food aid delivered by WFP. In 2012 of the estimated 1.9 million IDPs in Darfur, 525,000 IDPs in North Darfur, 604,000 in South Darfur and 425,000 in West Darfur received WFP food aid (HWP, 2002). In 2016, the number of IDPs receiving food aid has increased due to the activities of WFP is distributing food aid to most IDP camps. According to Awog – Badek:

WFP is distributing humanitarian supplies in all safe areas with support of troops who escort deliveries. If you check the number of escort duties by troops you will see that a lot humanitarian supplies are going in. A major impediment is the weather, during raining seasons, roads are very bad, and as such supplies takes longer period to get to rural areas, but in dry seasons much more food aid and other supplies get to people in need. The humanitarian situation is improving gradually though any conflict between GoS and armed movements throw up more cases, this is the situation in Shangil Tobaya areas.

# IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON THE PRESENCE OF UNCT AND INGOs

Apart from the impact of the security situation on UNAMID operations, the UN Country Teams are also affected as UN agency staffs are only deployed in 12 locations in Darfur. These locations are mostly state

capitals and some prominent towns like Kutum, Kabkabiya among others as shown in Table 6.12.

# TABLE 6.12:DEPLOYMENT OF UN COUNTRY TEAM IN DARFUR


|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Location** | **Sector** | **Remarks** |
| 1. | El Fasher | North | State capital |
| 2. | Kutum | Town |
| 3. | Kabkabiya | Town |
| 4. | Mellit | Town |
| 5. | Nyala | South | State capital |
| 6. | Kais |  |
| 7. | El Geneina | West | State Capital |
| 8. | Zalingei | Central | State Capital |
| 9. | Moumei |  |
| 10. | Habila |  |
| 11. | Garsilla |  |
| 12. | Mukja |  |

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

The overall humanitarian presence, including INGOs, is mostly in the areas which are within UNAMID Team Site AORs. In locations where there is no UN and NGO presence, humanitarian agencies provide relief services through governmental bodies as is the case in Wakheim, Tine, El Sireaf in North Darfur. Of note, is that most supplies sent through government bodies are diverted as supplies to military and paramilitary forces (Marshi, 2016). Humanitarian presence is thus lacking in areas north of Malha and Muzbat, most parts of Um Kadada locality, as well as south of Buram such as Bahr al Arab and Rahad el Berdi due to lack of UNAMID presence (Adetoba, 2016). The part of Jebel Marra that belongs to West Darfur does not have humanitarian presence either. Priority areas for humanitarian support are identiﬁed on the basis of criteria which include presence of UNAMID Team

Sites, presence of international partners, distance from the destination, as well as the locations of operational basis of the partners in order to ensure the continuation and flow of the delivery of humanitarian services. Overall there has been a decrease in operational presence of humanitarian actors. INGO staff currently maintains presence in 11 major humanitarian hubs, as compared to 15 locations in 2010. The number of international staff members in remote field locations also dropped by 50%, from 80 to 40 international humanitarian workers due to poor security situation (Lar, 2016). UNCT and INGOs remains victims of carjacking incidents by criminal elements. In 2010, 47 carjacking incidents against UNCT and INGO's were recorded while the number reduced to 16 in 2016 as UNCT and INGO's began to move around with military escorts towards the execution of the humanitarian mandate. This has placed additional stress on available military and FPU capability (Vivek, 2017).

# FIGURE 6.15:CARJACKING INCIDENTS IN DARFUR 2010-2016



**47**

**40**

**38**

**33**

**28**

**24**

**12**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**

**2016**

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

Insecurity and the absence of law enforcement due to sporadic fighting between SAF and armed movements primarily in pockets of North Darfur and South Darfur have impeded humanitarian assistance in parts of Darfur. While humanitarian actors have had some degree of access to the vast majority of Darfur, various constraints on humanitarian access remain. Areas under the control of armed opposition movements, such as eastern and western Jebel Marra, have remained largely inaccessible for humanitarian actors and UNAMID have not being able to do much, owing to lack of operational capability to fully execute the mandate throughout Darfur.

As shown in Table6.13, UNAMID provided a total of 1,010 humanitarian escorts for UNCT and INGO's (Sector North: 655, Sector South: 227, Sector West: 128) in 2010.In 2011, the number of escorts increased to 1,663 (Sector North: 763, Sector South: 732, Sector West: 168) and in 2016 about 1,630 escorts.The number of escorts is on the increase, but remains limited to areas with UNAMID presence.

# TABLE 6.13: HUMANITARIAN ESCORTS BY UNAMID

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Year/Period** | **Numbers** | | | **Total** | **Remarks** |
| **North** | **South** | **West** |
| 1. | 2010 | 655 | 227 | 128 | 1,010 |  |
| 2. | 2011 | 763 | 732 | 168 | 1,663 |  |
| 3. | 2012 | 815 | 706 | 279 | 1,800 |  |
| 4. | 2013 | 790 | 630 | 290 | 1,710 |  |
| 5. | 2014 | 740 | 580 | 260 | 1,580 |  |
| 6. | 2015 | 690 | 501 | 339 | 1,530 |  |
| 7. | 2016 | 706 | 592 | 332 | 1,630 |  |
|  | **TOTAL** | **5,159** | **3,968** | **1,796** | **10,923** |  |


Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

While this indicates an increase in assessment visits and delivery of humanitarian assistance, the areas where there is no UNAMID presence as described above are rarely visited and these areas are the critical areas. There are no UNHAS and UNAMID landing sites in these critical areas as UNAMID landing sites are basically located in places where there are UNAMID Team Sites for security reasons (Hassan, 2015). Though UNAMID flights also land in areas without Team Sites for special humanitarian missions such as inter agency assessments or for high level delegations, this is however in rare cases. The vastness of the AoR and the limitations of the helicopters available (maximum endurance of MI8-5 hrs), present challenges as UNAMID Forward Refueling Points (FRPs) are not enough to enhance Darfur wide coverage as they are located only at Kabkabia, El Daein, Kulbus and Foro Baranga (Atolegbe, 2017). Areas south of Buram and North of Malha among others are thus not covered. Apart from FRP, flight clearances are also problems as GoS must approve. The process is very cumbersome as GoS effectively uses cancellation of UNAMID operational flight to undermine its effectiveness. In 2010 1,000 UNAMID flights was cancelled by GoS National Security Services while it increased to 1,180 in 2013 and later dropped to 708 in 2016 as shown in Figure 6.16.

**FIGURE 6.16: UNAMID FLIGHT CANCELLATIONS BY GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN 2010-2016**

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.



**1180**

**1010**

**872**

**990**

**1070**

**744**

**708**

**408**

**0**

**2010**

**0**

**2011**

**0**

**2012**

**0**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**0**

**2014**

**0**

**2015**

**2016**


**MI/NS**

**Other Factors**

There are also access constraints such as ofﬁcial movement restrictions and rejection of authorization earlier issued to UNAMID patrols. USG Ladsous (2017) while briefing the UNSC on 12 Jan 2017 stated that "delays in customs clearance for contingency-owned equipment and delays in issuing visas (as well as denials of visa request) for UNAMID's human rights sections continued to be problem for the mission". Access to eastern Jebel Marra region remains limited as permission was not granted from April-May 2011 and July-August 2014 by GoS for a planned mission by UN agencies to conduct polio campaign and deliver food supplies. Similarly, between February and May 2011, access to Trejj in West Darfur was not permitted to UN agencies, and between May and June 2011, there was a three week restriction of all movements to within a 15km radius from Nyala town. Restriction of UNAMID patrols was 278 in 2010, reduced to 205 in 2013 and further dropped to 32 in 2016. While restriction to foot patrols is reducing, delays in issuing visa's for UNAMID staff and in providing customs clearance for supply of containers to be shipped to UNAMID Darfur in on the

increase. For instance, in July 2016, Government of Sudan stopped delivery of UN Food Container though issue was later resolved.

**FIGURE 6.17: INCIDENTS – RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENTS**



**278**

**263**

**182**

**205**

**181**

**42**

**32**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**

**2016**

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

This restriction by GoS, which amounts to gradual withdrawal of consent undermines the ability of UNAMID to implement its mandate. Carey (2013) observed that:

Denial of UNAMID patrols access to certain areas by GoS security agencies is an issue UN HQ, AU HQ and UNAMID deals with regularly. Patrols are turned back under the guise of there is trouble in theses or that area and that it is in the interest of patrol to go back. These areas where patrols are turned back are areas that actually need patrol for UN situation awareness, for humanitarian reasons as in move supplies to people in need and even for POC issues. Air patrol is a no go area as our helicopters are always on the hanger, GoS hardly gives flight clearance. Infact the Ethiopian helicopters unit hardly flew before

the Rwandan helicopter unit deployed to Darfur.

In all cases, GoS authorities cite security reasons including on-going ﬁghting or military operations to restrict UNAMID movement. There are also cases where goods and services were delayed or withheld from vulnerable population by GoS security and intelligence institutions such as NISS and Military Intelligence despite prior clearances from HAC. As a consequence, health clinics in Dar al Salam, Shangil Tobaya and Kaguro were forced to run without essential drugs, and the supply of fuel to IDP camps in Zam Zam and Shangil Tobaya was limited due to restrictions on delivery in 2012 and 2013. Although minimal in number, these restrictions impede UNAMID in assessing critical areas in need of humanitarian assistance and fulfilment of the core mandate of protection of civilians.

# IDP RETURNS

The number of IDP returns is a critical yardstick of measuring improvement in the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur. UNAMID has recorded some returns of IDPs as well as refugees from Chad since in 2011. While the returns were assessed as voluntary, push and pull factors did exist, including the expectation that assistance would be provided and available upon arrival. The primary reasons for return were the reduced level of food distribution among IDPs by WFP; some incentives promised by the GoS to IDPs upon return such as land; improved security situation in Western Darfur attracting IDP and refugee returns; and the protracted stay at IDP camps which was not condusive for some IDPs (Kashyap, 2014). However,

returnees experienced challenges, including a lack of access to basic services, livelihoods opportunities, and agricultural support which undermine quality of life and discouraged further returns. Return in many cases remains fragile, and without support from the international community, may prove unsustainable in the longer run.

The sustainability of future IDPs returns by UNAMID will depend upon security and livelihood opportunities, as well as on the provision of basic services including the existence of community infrastructure, such as functioning health centers, schools and markets. There are also possibilities that should the number of returns continue to increase in areas with limited absorption capacities and the lack of adequate basic services on the ground, tensions may increase leading to renewed conflict as returnees put strains on the limited resources of fragile communities. Returns back to places of origin is also hampered in areas that the original homelands have been taken over by other tribes. These situations thus increase the likelihood of increased resource-based conflict due to limited access to water and land for cultivation or for pasture (Kashyap, 2014). Ability of UNAMID to work on these areas using traditional conflict resolution mechanisms to ensure there is no problems remains doubtful due to limited capacity (Kashyap, 2014). This would demand focused attention by UNAMID Return and Reintegration Working Groups (RRWG) under the Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM) which has the responsibility of monitoring returns trend through regular inter- agency assessments and visit to return sites under the leadership of UNHCR.Of note is that most of the returns originated from outside IDP

camps as IDP in camps are still reluctant to return. On the whole, return of IDPs back to their villages would be key in addressing Darfur problems and is at the heart of the crisis. UNAMID peace building effort would need to be targeted to these areas.

In West Darfur, the working number of returnees from 2011 – 2013 amounted to 30, 665 verified refugees (this includes the population of Jebel Moon of 17,614 individuals and 13,051 in three return villages: Anjimmi, Terbeba and Nyooro) and 43,180 verified IDP returnees. The improved security environment in the state as a result of joint Chad/Sudan patrols along the border and the repositioning of some armed movements, as well as the desire to return to agriculture activities are among the main factors identified by RRWG of West Darfur. The major destinations of IDP returns included villages in Wadi Salih, Um Dukhun, Mornei, Bindisi, Beida, Mukjar, and Habillah localities (Marshi, 2016).

In North Darfur, the cumulative number of refugee / IDPs return households verified in 2011, were 2,616. Return took place in Mallit, Alha Kutum, Komoi,and Tine in South Darfur, the RRWG estimated 11,727 households about 58,599 people who had returned to South Darfur in 2011. The areas of return in South Darfur include: Kass, Alradoum,Bilail, Alsalam, Gereida and Yassin (UNAMID FHQ, 2014). The precise profiles of unverified spontaneous returnees remain unknown due to limited accessibility and capacity of UNAMID and UN Country Team. The lack of assurance of IDPs security in their places of origin is one of the reasons behind their extended stay in the places of displacement where livelihood

opportunity is limited. The absence of livelihood support in the places of return also potentially forces some segments of returnees to engage in illegal economic activities for survival. Lack of access to basic services, livelihood opportunities, and agricultural support hamper the reintegration process of returnees and often make it unsustainable.

Access to water resources remains at the core of the Darfur crisis. The UNICEF has drilled, with support of UNAMID, boreholes across Darfur over a period of years. UNICEF estimates access to water for Darfur to have improved from 30 percent to about 50 percent between 2004 and 2015(UNHQ, 2016). This is however, still short of the required standard as access to water is a key dynamic in the crisis and would need to be addressed to achieve the overall improvement in the security situation.It is therefore important that UNAMID strengthen elements of human security in light of returns and that basic services are provided in places of return, especially in West Darfur.

# OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

The number of IDPs in Darfur is about 1.9 million despite the activities of humanitarian agencies in Darfur and moderate gains achieved in the past few years. The increases in IDP is directly linked to intensive fighting between GoS and the armed movements in Shangil Tobaya and Jebel Marra general area and series of GoS aerial attacks in Sortony from 2011 – 2013 and Operation Decisive Summer I and II of 2015 and 2016 which led to a massive displacement of population (Fashinu, 2016). Security situation has remained volatile as JEM combatants, remain in the areas along Wadi Hawar

where clashes and air strikes with GoS were recorded. Due to lack of UNAMID presence north of Kutum and Malha, monitoring of the border areas between northeastern Chad, Darfur and Libya has been challenging likewise effort to improve the security situation. The lack of UNAMID presence encourages cross-border arms smuggling, which is a key dynamic of the crisis. Clashes over resources between farmers and nomads in the areas of Kutum and Kabkabiya persist and the same areas are also characterized by high rate of criminality due to economic crisis as most youths are idle (Awoo-Badek, 2017). Youths are at high risk of being drawn into criminal activities in North Darfur and account for 42% of the total population. Peace building by UNAMID has been ineffective as regards finding jobs for youths to ensure that youth bulge is channelled to better purpose. Projects such as UNAMID DDRs and CLIP that directly target youth populations have not achieved much in alleviating the risk of criminality (Adedoja, 2016).

In South Darfur, fighting in the areas of Shaeria and Khor Abeche in 2011 - 2012 and 2013 – 2015 undermined the security situation. UNAMID‟s access to the areas such as Shaeria and Labado which are under GoS‟ strict monitoring due to the presence of armed movements has been restricted on a number of occasions, which undermine situation awareness. In West Darfursecurity has improved in the sector largely due to the effective Chad- Sudan Joint Border Patrols which encouraged refugee return from Chad to West Darfur. The presence of armed movements is minimal compared to other sectors especially after eviction of JEM from Jebel Moonwhich opened access for UN to the area. Clashes over resources are recurrent around Nertiti

and Zalingei areas between Misseriya and Rizeigat/Nawaiba, though UNCT and UNAMID actively support conflict resolution by, for instance, assisting farm and crop protection initiatives.Security situation however, remains unpredictable due to the large number of weapons available combined with the worsening of economic situation.

Threats and expulsion of individuals and groups particularly NGOs and other humanitarian actors undermine the humanitarian situation and are typical Khartoum behavior towards undermining UNAMID mandate.Notably is the expulsion of 13 foreign NGOs for alleged complicity in ICC investigations (Secretary-General Report, 2009:26). Apart from the 13 foreign NGO's, several other UN Personnel and INGOs have been expulsed from Darfur by GoS.

# CHAPTER 7

**REVIEW OF UN ABILITY TO MEET CHALLENGES OF PSO IN DARFUR**

# OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

The operational capability of the mission is critical and underpins the inability of UNAMID to guarantee a favourable security environment that could be leveraged to pursue a holistic and enduring solution to the conflict. The lack of enablers in the mission particularly at the early stage undermined effective implementation of the mandate (Agwai, 2016). Engineering, transport, multi role logistics, well drilling and tactical helicopters were all lacking and undermined the credibility of the force particularly its ability to show deterrence and conduct early peace building activities. The repatriation of some enablers after 2012 review, was not well thought through as the need for the enablers later arose. For instance, one engineering company was repatriated in June 2013, and a second in 2014, while the Chinese WDU was also repatriated due to non performance. The repatriation of enablers though in line with the overall mission logistics concept was not well balanced against the intent to use FOBs to achieve Darfur wide security,which is critical to achieving enduring political solution.

Operationally, there is a lack of balance between military enablers/force multipliers and commercial logistics assets. This is particularly as regards 3 X medium utility helicopter units as per UNAMID force

requirement and civilian contracted helicopters. This is considering that both assets serve different roles (Obiakor, 2016).Currently, and based on the 2012 review, contracted civilian assets were fully retained at the expense of military enablers and force multipliers under the false assumption of improving security situation and as a means of cost reduction. The force was thus denied the ability to influence the security situation which contributed to the inability of UNAMID to fully executed its mandate. Another key problem area is striking a balance between Military strength verses police strength vis- à-vis the overall task of maintenance of security and protection of civilians. Both the military and the police perform different task but in some cases their functions overlap as regards maintenance of security as they complement each other in conduct of patrols and associated issues. The expected support effects the military is to receive from the police in terms of burden sharing did not materialize as the police component proved incapable of independent operations due to insecurity. This would need to be fully factored into decisions as regards the future size of the military component and vice versa. The protection of armed FPU by the military for operational activities like patrols and escorts does not support optimal utilization of available human resources as both FPU and the military are armed. This created manpower shortfall that undermined the capability of UNAMID to cover the entire Darfur AOR. Accordingly, the concept of the use of FPU in UNAMID needs to be revisited for optional utilization of human resources.

The use of team sites and FOBs for projection of force towards achievement of Darfur wide security created problems primarily due to lack

of force enablers and multipliers for quick deployment. The establishment of cross cutting task groups per sector that can be activated when needed to occupy FOBs would have been a better alternative. The task groups will be primarily dormant but the composition and configuration already known to enhance joint training which would breed confidence when asked to establish FOBs. This is to take advantage of various capabilities available in various contingents and in the mission.The Mission logistics concept and sustainability plans is also inadequate and was not fully synchronized with the plans to considerably reduce military enablers. Kashyap while commenting on operational readiness stated that:

The reduction of military enablers to trim down cost of operations due to budgeting issue was necessary but created challenges. With the reduction of military enablers in 2013, sustainment of units, particularly units deployed in hot spots and areas of clashes between GoS and armed movements became difficult. We managed the situation well but then units were wondering what will happen if immediate backup is needed. The doubt was not good for morale, and you know morale affects operational capability.

Ultimately, units were not favourably disposed to deploying outside their comforts zone, due to lack of capability to quickly reinforce troops in periods of emergency.

The disposition of forces is also a key reason why UNAMIDwas unable to positively enhance the security situation throughout Darfur. This is

considering that some contingents do not accept deployment in certain areas as they wait to get orders from their home government. Thus, disposition of forces had political undertones and not wholly influence by security situation on the ground. The force posture of the force and its ability to effectively deal with the emerging security situations remains doubtful.Resource base conflicts was not adequately factored into the force review in 2012 particularly in Sector North (North Darfur). Thus, the current force disposition in Sector North is not able to support the security situation particularly issues of resources conflicts. The Military Force Structure also does not encourage increased liaison with other elements of UNAMID. Military deployment is still structured along 3 Sector HQ while the Police and Civil staff has been reconfigured into 5 sectors in line with the 5 States Structure of Darfur as shown in Table 7.1.

**TABLE 7.1: UNAMID SECTOR HQ LOCATION**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Component** | **Sector HQ** | **Remark** |
| 1. | Military | Sector South - Nyala Sector North - El Fashir Sector West - El  Geneina | East and Central Darfur subsumed into the 3 Sector  arrangements. |
| 2. | Police | Sector South - Nyala Sector North - El Fasher Sector West - El Genaina  Sector East - El Daein Sector Central - Zalingei |  |
| 3. | Civilian | Sector South - Nyala Sector North - El Fasher Sector West - El Geneina  Sector East - El Daein Sector Central - |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Zalingei |  |

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2013.

Is this arrangement still fit for purpose now and in the near future? The viability of the military component arrangement with changing dynamics including the need for closer integration with police and civil components at all level on the one hand and UNAMID relations with GoS authority at all level on the other hand is suspect. Lack of integration of all elements remains an issue at the current stage of the mission.

The size of the humanitarian space in Darfur remains small as opening new humanitarian space is required, without prejudice to UNAMID continued efforts in the Jebal Marra genral area. This can be achieved by using the military to create enabling conditions for humanitarian aids to reach previously inaccessible areas.The emphasis by UNAMID on the humanitarian line of operations did not get deserved UNHQ logistical support despite the fact it is critical to the achievement of the mandate. The critical nature of the humanitarian line of operation was recognised by UNAMID but lacked enough capacity to address the challenges. The FC averred that though he directed all sector and contingents to lay emphasis on CIMIC and QIP to enhance relations with their local community as a means to improving situational awareness and facilitating operational tasks, only few had the capacity and where withal (Nyavumba, 2013). The importance QIP as peace building platform is critical to success considering the increased linkages between peacekeeping and peace building. Creating local ownership for the various QIP was also a challenge as some of the locals were averse to effective participation in the construction of the projects. The locals demand that UNAMID pay them for labor while UNAMID only offers food for work

which the locals reject. UNAMID thus need to develop an option that ensures full participation of the locals in construction of QIP which will create local ownership for the projects. Creating local ownership is key to the sustainability of these projects on withdrawal of UNAMID and also on creating a buy-in in the whole peace process. Some form of payment for labor may have to be employed but the idea is still under consideration by UNAMID (Awog-Badek, 2017). The second challenge of QIP is to ensure equitable distribution of projects, UNAMID has made no focused attempt to ensure that QIP are equally distributed among the sectors and other notable different groups in Darfur. This is considering that various contingent site their QIP in their AOR without considering the big picture as regards overall distribution of projects. This is considering that most QIP are internally funded by contingents. The criticality of achieving balance is tied to the need to ensure UNAMID is not biased towards any group. For instance, the Thai Contingent Agricultural Project in North Darfur recorded much success which enhanced their acceptability in the local community.

The need for robustness by peacekeepers tosuccessfully execute the mandate was an issue. The mentality of troops as regards the need to defend the mandate through robust peacekeeping needed to be improved (Nyavumba, 2013). Some troops find it difficult to react appropriately when challenged or attacked by armed movements with varying consequences including loss of lives and UN equipments. For instance, in Forobaranga (2010), Nyala (2012) and El Genenia Super Camp (2013) and Nyala (2017) attack on peace keepers led to loss of arms and equipments. This questions

the level of training of peacekeepers. According to Aminu (2017) two types of training are important for peacekeepers, Green Beret training offered by National Armies and PDT which the UN provides. He furthered that the quality of Green Beret training which every UN troop must have at times are lacking in some contingents. This was a problem in Mali and Darfur and the UN is concerned on quality of Green Beret training. On PDT, the UN through its Training Architecture Project is working on ensuring troops earmarked for deployment are adequately trained. Apart from Green Beret training and PDT, mission specific training including in-theatre training was also an issue. This is particularly as regards mission specific duties, ROE and SOPs (Ahmadu 2016). More training both in the mission and pre deployment training by TCCs is needed to rectify the deficiency, and ensure that troops thoroughly understand the ROE. TCCs would need to be encouraged on the need for pre deployment training to pay more attention on ROE to enhance robust peacekeeping and achievement of the mandate.

The concept of a light and mobile force was ideal but UNAMID lacked the availability of „rugged‟ force multipliers in the mission like attack helicopters, particularly at the early stage up to 2013 when Rwanda helicopter unit arrived the mission. While the Ethiopian contingents had about 3 helicopters before the arrival of a Rwandan helicopter unit, two of the Ethiopian helicopters were not air worthy. This undermined situational awareness and security assessments which ultimately contributed to the poor security situation. The situation enabled JEM to move down wards to south Sudan in 2012 as reorganization in South Sudan offered a better prospect of


integration with other members of the Kaunda Alliance. According to the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan Sanction (2013), in 2012, JEM had operated a large base around Bentiu in South Sudan's Unity State. The cross border activity of JEM in Darfur and indeed other rebel groups in Africa, particularly the use of sanctuary in neighbouring countries create complex situation which undermine ability of PSO to create enduring security situation. Locations of pockets of JEM and other movements continued to attract increased SAF military operations leading to restrictions on UNAMID patrols, unintended casualty on civilians and generation of more IDP's. Hot spot include UMKADADA, KHOR ABECHE, SHANGIL TOBAYA,

LABADO, GRAIDA, SHEARIA, and AL DEAIN in Sector South, MUZBAT, MADO and MALHA in Sector North and JABEL MARRA in West Darfur. Also, weak command and control among the movements made centralised negotiations and respect of agreed outcomes difficult. Widening of splinter groups within JEM and other groups and slack command and control within the group led to increase in isolated attacks against locals and even UNMAID. This underscores UNAMID inability to achieve enduring security framework.

Cross boarder activities and sub-regional crisis spill over also account for the reasons why the UN fail to effectively enhance security situation in host countries. The security situation along the Sudan/Chad/CAR border created security challenges though it has improved considerably due to the joint border monitoring activities of the Sudan / Chad Border Task Force and improved relations between both countries midwifed by the UN. Border

incidents involving armed movements, other factions and criminal elements reduced from 88 in 2013 to 39 in 2016 as shown in Figure 7.1, partly due to the effectiveness of the Sudan-Chad border task force. According to Farrukh (2017), the security situation along the border with Chad has improved considerably, which has also encouraged some refugees return in the Chad- Darfur border area.

# FIGURE 7.1: BORDER INCIDENTS INVOLVING ARMED MOVEMENT, OTHER FACTIONS AND CRIMINAL ELEMENTS 2010-2016



**78**

**88**

**84**

**61**

**62**

**60**

**39**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**YEARS**

**2014**

**2015**

**2016**

**NUMBER OF INCIDENTS**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.



Despite the decline in border related issues, South Sudan - Sudan border contested areas around East Darfurand South Kordofan create hot spots in areas of 'Mile 14' that includes Samaha, Kiir Adem as well as Kafia Kingi, Kafindibei and Alfifi. The lack of effective security presence in this areas particularly Kafia Kingi allows armed movements to replenish and restock. Elements of LRA also operate around Kafia Kingi up to DRC, which highlighted the regional and cross-border dynamics at play in the conflict.

A key challenge to effective and efficient UN PSO in Africa include the shortages of personnel due to reluctance of TCC to provide enough troops;both quantitativelyand qualitatively (Ogunewe, 2016). The shortage of military observers and the reluctance of available ones to deploy to team sites were reported. The reasons for shortages of MilObs are obvious as contributions are few but reluctance of MilObs to deploy to team sites due to their locations in the interiors, rural and isolated areas denies UNAMID the ability to ensure full situational awareness throughout Darfur (Fashinu, 2016). The lack of full situational awareness undermines full assessment of level of mandate implementation and critical areas of need. For instance, the provision of Darfur wide security for CFC activities and implementation of the DDPD failed because of lack of commitment to the stakeholders and poor security arrangement by UNAMID (Saraso, 2016). The FHQ favored the use of Temporary Operation Bases (TOB) to achieve Darfur wide security in support of CFC activities towards the verification of location and strength of LJM and SAF. The concept of TOB was tactically sound considering that it would be practically impossible to dominate the entire AOR.However, the challenges involved in deploying well configured troops and adequate logistics to sustain and develop the TOB, standby reinforcement for the TOBs, and dedicated air support could not be met which undermined the

situation. A well thought through plans for use of FOB was lacking and ultimately did not fully support the implementation of the DDPD and Darfur wide security. The use of pre-established task group per sector for FOB duties when needed would have enhanced command and control, logistics and sustainability and force protection.

UNAMID challenges also include delays in the deployment of new and rotating units due to deliberate efforts of GoS to undermine the mission by delaying deployments and clearance for movement of logistics equipment from the sea ports to Darfur.This undermines operational plans as units do not rotate and redeploy as at when due. TCCs difficulty in obtaining visas for Milobs and security and customs clearance from GoS are other issues that affect the mission (Fayemiwo, 2017). UN DPKO and TCC request for visas well ahead but these are deliberately delayed by GoS. UN HQ would need to engage with GoS on issues pertaining to violation of SOFA as regard delays in visa and custom clearance which would enhance the operational capability of UNAMID. Also, the capability of the force is hampered by poor APC serviceability status of some battalions, poor equipment specification, lack of commitment of some battalions, inadequate training in PSO and ineffective command and control at the lower level. Attacks on UNAMID personnel, proliferation of armed movements, restriction on ceasefire monitoring and verification, restriction on flights to some part of the AOR and GoS inability to prevent attacks on civilians/IDP remain critical challenges. These have undermined the ability of UNAMID to successfully execute the core part of its mandate which are PoC and ensuring a stable security environment. This is considering that IDP related issues and banditry are the major incidents reported in 2016 at about 452 and 2,500 cases respectively as shown in Figure 7.2.

**FIGURE 7.2: NATURE OF INCIDENTS IN 2016**



**3000**

**2500**

**2000**

**1500**

**1000**

**500**

**0**

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

The need for information/intelligence on armed movement to enhance POC remains. The lack of information and its adverse effect on PoC is due to lack of increased collaboration between the Force HQ and UN DSS on intelligences issues. This undermines proactive engagements by Force HQ towards the PoC. Poor intelligence and situation awareness also attributed to the inability of UNAMID to conduct long range patrols into the rural areas. About 90% of patrols conducted by UNAMID are within the towns and team sites which denies them opportunities for information and intelligence collection. For instance, Table 7.2 shows that in November 2016, UNAMID Sector South conducted only 12 long range patrols as against 900 short range patrols while short range patrols has relatively enhanced security in Sectors HQs and adjourning areas, security in the hinterlands remains unstable.

**TABLE 7.2:COMPARISM OF UNAMID LONG RANGE PATROLS AND SHORT RANGE PATROL FOR NOVEMBER 2016 IN SECTOR SOUTH**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Location** | **Type of Patrol** | | **Remarks** |
| **SRP** | **LRP** |
| 1. | Nyala | 300 | 2 |  |
| 2. | Kass | 90 | 1 |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 3. | Labado | 51 | 1 |  |
| 4. | Khor  Abeche | 61 | 0 |  |
| 5. | Menawashi | 63 | 2 |  |
| 6. | Graida | 140 | 2 |  |
| 7. | Kalma | 55 | 1 |  |
| 8. | Buram | 30 | 2 |  |
| 9. | Tulus | 50 | 0 |  |
| 10. | Edd El  Fursan | 60 | 1 |  |
| 11. | **TOTAL** | **900** | **12** |  |

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Fasher, 2016.

Poor APC serviceability status and poor equipment specification by some TCCs negatively affected the operational capability of UNAMID. These are PDV issues which can be rectified by more thorough inspections of contingents before deployment and is within the purview of Office of Military Affairs, UN HQ. The current practice is to conduct PDV for only new countries inducting into the mission. UN and UNAMID may need to consider PDV for rotating troops to ensure COEs are up to the required standards. This is considering that poor PDV undermine operations capability, and ultimately the ability of the mission to execute its mandate.

# NATURE OF CONFLICT ANALYSIS

The inability of UN PSO to provide enabling environment to ensure enduring solutions to African conflicts is partly traceable to the nature of the conflict which was complex as UNAMID partially failed to understand and tackle the local and regional dynamics which underpin the conflict. Large scale fighting between JEM and GoS and resource based competitions (2010-2014) led to increased militarization of tribes with Abbala Rizeigat tribes incorporated into Border Guards which under SAF command, were supplied with large amounts of weapons. Similarly, clashes with SLA/AW and SLA/MM also influenced the mobilization of Berti, Birgid and Tunjar tribes by GoS against the Zaghawas who make up SLA/MM, arming and recruiting them into the Public Defence Force (PDF). The reunification of the movements under SRF and JEM shifting of strategic

focus from Darfur to Southern Kordofan in close cooperation with SPLA-N were other dynamics at play UNAMID could not deal with. GoS continued use of armed Arab elements as ground support to its military operations against armed movements as was the case in Hashaba North in 2013 are part of the conflict dynamics which undermined the security situation by creating further displacement of people.

The North-South relationship is another conflict dynamics as it informed the course of actions of the Darfur armed movement to date (Ihekire, 2017). Due to ideological differences, especially between the secular orientation of the SLA and the SPLA-N and the Islamist inclination of JEM, as well as the dominance of SPLA-N within the SRF structure, it was envisaged that the alliance would be short lived but this hasbeing proved wrong. The tactical capacities of SRF remains on the increase contrary to the general perception that the severance of external supply sources would weaken the movements.The movements have actually managed to sustain themselves through effective operations to replenish supplies inside Darfur usually through banditry attacks on targets of commercial and tactical value. SRF continued ability to locally sustain its operation, would need to be addressed by UNAMID by looking at the root causes of the Darfur problem with a view to creating the condition that would support enduring political solution.

The GoS reliance on use of air power and special forces against the movements created more IDPs due to unintended consequences.Operation Decisive Summer of 2015 in North and South Darfur instead of weakening the movement, only undermined security and generated more IDPs. According to Edmond Mulet (2013), "most worrisome is the devastating impact that it has on innocent civilians and the obstacles, created for their protection and for humanitarian assistance". In general, tribal support to GoS is now conditioned less by loyalty than a combination of economic and tribal interest. SAF reliance on air strike creates the greatest challenge to POC apart from tribal clashes. Also important is that most of the dropped bombs in air strikes do not explode on impact due to various reasons (condition of ammunition, nature of the ground) and have safety

implications for local as it is not immediately detonated. Pushing to stop SAF air and ground operations in Darfur is critical and the UN seems to lack the capability to carry it out due to division in the UNSC P5 as regards sanctions on Government of Sudan with China always supporting GoS. Nyanvumba averred that:

SAF relies on its air platforms to counter armed movements operations, quickly before arrival of SAF ground troops. The unintended consequences of air attacks are the main problem, heavy casualty, refugees, and unexploded bombs. It rolls back progress made in convincing villagers to return to their villages. UN HQ

is trying to stop air attack but no success yet. GoS is very strong and carries out these attacks without fear of sanctions. Nyanvumba (2013).

Tribal realignment could radically alter current dynamics and would need to remain in UNAMID focus.The GoS continued operations against armed movement, especially in the central corridor between Jebel Marra and Adoula Mountains and its strategy to set Arab as well as GoS allied non Arab tribes against the movements and associated tribes undermine UNAMID operations and complicate the conflict.

The GoS support and arming of militias particularly the Berti, Brrgid and Junjar tribes loosely aligned to it remained critical andcontinue to undermine the achievement of Darfur wide security. While these situations have reduced, it still remains a problem as these weapons were never surrendered. More so, these groups who still retain their weapons are not currently under GoS firm control, as allegiance in Darfur changes based on direction of tribal interest. GoS continues to use them as ground troops in encounters with armed movement, while these armed tribal groups are also involved in banditry activities which undermine the security situation.

The shift in the armed movements strategic interest to Southern Kordofan is strategic, as it broadly ties Darfur issues to wider political issues in Sudan (North Kurdofan and Blue Nile). The linking of these issues makes it difficult for UMANID to influence peaceful solution to the Darfur crisis (Isandu, 2016). A holistic political solution to address internal contradictions in Sudan which is outside UNAMID mandate remains

critical to peace in Sudan. Understanding the dynamics that will kick start SRF strategic focus back to Darfur as in settlement of SPLM-N issues, posturing of SAF in Darfur, completion of JEM reorganization considering the breakaway of the Bashir group and acquisition of new capabilities is key to UNAMID and UN contingency planning towards the implementation of the mandate. Similarly critical is reasons underpinning the apparent difference in focus of the Darfur movements within the SRF as SLA/AW and SLA/MM remain focused and active in Darfur while JEM is in Southern Kordofan.This questions the coherence and unity of purpose of the SRF at least in the Short to medium term. UNAMID situational awareness, intelligence collation and analytical capacity are unable to address these key questions. Improving UNAMID intelligence and situation awareness towards understanding the conflict dynamics remain important towards enhancing the effectiveness of the mission.

The improved tactical capacity of SRF as alluded by the FC and visible in isolated encounters between GoS and SRF underpin the nature of the conflict. Of more concern however, are the reasons behind the improved tactical capacities despite dwindling external support. This is unconnected to acquisition of new capabilities, training, synergy of efforts which is key and gradual but effective degrading of SAF capabilities owing to over stretch due to deployment in several fronts. SRF demonstration of the capacity to internally generate its logistics support shows enduring capacity which is often not factored into the equation by UNAMID as their survival has mostly being linked to external support which is not entirely correct.Also, more focus on issues of inter communal clashes is needed as they are generating more security threats which undermine UNAMID POC mandate. The possibility that illegal power and authority is shifting from the armed movements to tribal groups/militias competing for scarce natural resources exist and deserves the attention of UNAMID likewise changes in traditional patterns of alliance between these groups which further complicate the security situation.

* 1. **POLITICAL ISSUES ANALYSIS**

The political dynamics between Khartoum, Juba and Chad has implications for peace and stability in Darfur as there is a complex connection beyond Darfur and theconflicts between its southern and eastern borders as Darfur armed groups are part of the conflagration in the Darfur-Kordofan-South Sudan triangle. This will require the buy in of regional actors in the overall political direction. Political issues are undermined by the lack of concrete progress in the implementation of provisions related to the permanent ceasefire and final security arrangement. Verification of armed movement as part of DDPD was inconclusive despite the Joint Commission decision that verification of disposition shall be undertaken in areas not originally verified. Armed movements like LJM contested the results of the verification on the ground that some of its areas were not verified while GoS alleged that the LJM infiltrated non-combatants into its ranks, thereby inflating the numbers of its combatants. This led to delays which undermined progress in the implementation of the security arrangements envisioned in the DPAand the DDPD itself as a whole.

The then FC (Nyavumba, 2013) observed that the DDPD and other political arrangements needed to be enhanced and facilitated by all stakeholders, including the parties and the major international partners and donors. This will provide the UNAMID force with a more safe and secure environment to pursue its mandate. Major issues which undermined the CFC was plans for the establishment of CFC at team site level which never happened and the upkeep for the parties' representatives to the CFC as there was no funds for such payment. The support and commitment of the international community to the DDPD and GoS respect for the provisions of the SOFA are critical factors for overall success of the mission.

Politically, the DDPD initially gained a certain momentum and seemed to even weaken IDPs support to the movement in early 2014. However, the failure in implementing the DDPD reversed the early gain.According to Mbeki, (2017), chair of the AU High Level Implementation Panel while addressing the UNSC, "the political process in Darfur has been unsuccessful in ending a conflict now in its 14th year". He noted that

the rebel group continue to have objection to the Doha Document, several provisions of the document including those related to compensations, arms control and justice and reconciliation among others have not occurred. While IDP support for the movements in recent times remains, the slow implementation of political solution no longer engender the required support from IDPs and as such undermines the returns of IDPs which is critical for sustainable peace and development. The poor implementation regime is linked to deepened economic crisis in Sudan.The international community and UN system inability to kick start economic development undermined the development of a positive political effect that would have underpinned a peaceful solution. The conclusion of the implementation of provisions related to the Permanent Ceasefire and Final Security arrangement to the peace process remains of important. Establishing the CFC at team sites level and determining the source of upkeep for parties' representatives to the CFC remains critical likewise disarmament and disbandment of malitia groups in Darfur. Determining the sincerity of GoS to this arrangement is necessary considering that it still uses militias to bolster SAF and the Police.

The achievement of UNAMID mandate in Darfur would be made possible through increase partnership at global level between the UNSC, TCC, General Assembly bodies AU and other regional partners, UN Secretariat and Sudan. This is considering that each partner has a role to play in achieving UNAMID mandate and such partnership will be evident in the quality of contributions of critical capabilities. Such partnership will also be visible in the political front, as currently, sanctions against Sudan are bring frustrated by Chinese oil deals. Similarly, UNAMID would need to be more flexible and adaptable in dealing with the local dynamics at play in the mission, whichundermines command and control and coherence of the mission. This is particularly as regards the national interest of some TCC's in Darfur, whose contingents get clearances from their home governments before execution of UNAMID HQ instructions. The mission would also need to build consensus on key tasks in other to achieve the mandate including robust peacekeeping, protection of civilians and critical peace building task. There must be common vision

among all stakeholders on modalities to achieve the mandate. In line with this, a clear political strategy with stakeholders buy-in is necessary going forward as peacekeeping is part of a political solution, not an alternative to it, and this is most critical in Darfur.

Similarly, cohesive mission planning is necessary as the design of mandates of UNAMID and their linkages with mission planning would need to be reviewed to help better define mission goals. Effective mission planning requires clear political goals and parameters and a clear understanding of the capacities and limits of the resources available to achieve them (Ewansehia, 2014). This, however, is not the case in UNAMID. While recognising that there is often the need to deploy robustly and rapidly, the deployment and transition from AMIS was not sequenced, thus initial credibility of the mission was lost, leading to gradual withdrawal of consent by GoS through the restriction of UNAMID freedom of movement. UNAMID lacked early mission effectiveness and credibility and this have not been fully rectified till date.The command and control of troops is also an issue in UNAMID. Countries contributing significant capabilities and volunteering for complex tasks expect to be involved in an enhanced dialogue on mission planning processes that directly affect their personnel. This is not the case, so some TCC like Egypt chose the kind of mission their troops are to be involved in and the locations where they are to be deployed. This, thus undermines command and control in the mission which ultimately undermine the implementation of the mandate.

Some schools of thoughts believed that the arrest warrant against President al-Bashir on charges of war crimes against humanity in Darfur on 4 March 2009, following his indictment on 14 July 2008 by Luis Moreno- Ocampo, ICC prosecutor contributed to a lack of political solution to the Darfur conflict. The ruling, first such indictment of a sitting President, was dismissed by Khartoum as a neo-colonialist act to destabilize Sudan, while labeling Moreno-Ocampo messenger of destruction. A day before ICC decision, Bishop Desmond Tutu underscored its importance that: the issuance

of an arrest warrant for President Bashir would be an extraordinary moment for the people of Sudan and for those around the world who have come to doubt that powerful people and governments can be called to account for human acts. African leaders should support this historic occasion, not work to subvert it.

While discerning observers of the Darfur situation would hardly disagree with the ICC ruling, prudential concerns over potential backlash on the peace process, questioned its timing. This reflected AU earlier call for deferment of the application, and consequently commissioned the Thabo Mbeki-led eight member panel on balancing accountability with peace in Darfur. The indictment and consequences highlighted the dilemma of ordering issues of peace and justice; which should take precedence? Concerned parties worry is that untimely pursuit of justice could torpedo ongoing resolution efforts. But would not precedence of justice serve as deterrence to potential violators, thereby reducing infractions and commit parties to peace?

Undeterred by al-Bashir‟s defiance, ICC in July 2010 issued second arrest warrant against him on charges of Genocide. Mbeki-led panel‟s report endorsed by AU on 29 October 2009 and UN in December 2009 noted widespread human rights violations in Darfur, and recommended, inter alia, institution of Special Criminal Court on the events in Darfur (under AU- appointed experts), and truth and reconciliation commission (AUPD Report, PSC Communique, 2009). Unsurprisingly, al-Bashir rejected key

recommendations of the panel. ICC persecutor Luis Ocampo remained resolute as on 2 December 2011, she requested the pre-trial chamber to issue an arrest warrant for Sudan's then Defence Minister, Abdelrahim Mohammed Hussein, for crime against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. Similarly, on 17 June 2014, ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda while delivering ICC Brief on Sudan to the UNSC stated that; "the time is long overdue for Sudan's

consistent defiance of SCR to be met by decisive action from the council."The exasperating situation was encapsulated by Ban Ki-moon, former UN Secretary-General‟s report:

Sixty years of peacekeeping have taught us that our operations can be most effective when there is a cessation of hostilities, when the parties consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation and, when a viable political agreement provides a foundation for peace to keep. Events during the reporting period underscore that, in Darfur none of these conditions are in place. The fighting continues, with UNAMID personnel under threat, and the parties still lack the will to pursue political solutions.

Similarly, JSR Martin Uhomoibhi (2017) stated that "there is no military solution for the Darfur conflict" which again reiterates the pre-eminence of political solution to the Darfur crisis. Unfortunately, there is no clear political strategy towards ending the conflict.

* 1. **STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES**

The hybrid arrangement of UNAMID underpinned the near 90 percent African nature of troops in the mission. A key part of negotiation between UN, AU and Sudan for the deployment of the mission in 2007 was that it will be wholly staffed by African TCCs, and this reflects the situation on the ground. African TCCs operational capability in Darfur

reflect poor standard in terms of COE holding. Nigeria as at 2012 was the largest troop contributor to UNAMID with four Infantry battalions, one Level 11 Hospital, and several staff officers and MilObs with a total strength of 3,430. Nigeria also pledged to provide one sector reserve and sector reconnaissance companies but this pledge was cancelled in 2012, after 2 years of waiting by the UN (Isandu, 2014). Nigeria Army troops in Darfur were challenged operationally due to lack of major Contingent Owned Equipments (COE) which makes it difficult to carry out operational task. Some of Nigerian Team Sites were at less than 50% COE and not operational resulting in the loss of confidence of the UN and other observers in Nigerian troops. Other African TCCs like Senegal, Ethiopia also fell within the same category.

The poor operational capability led to the disarming of UNAMID troops on three different occasions (March 2010, 21 Jan 2012, and 29 Feb 2012) leading to death of peacekeepers and their arms, ammo and APC confiscated by rebel groups. Based on the incidents the government of Sudan in March 2010 and January 2012 protested to the UN Security Council over what it considered "the deliberate re-arming of rebel groups in Darfur by peacekeepers. The UN equally declared the battalion involved in the last two incidents (NIBATT 31) non operational and the battalion was repatriated. Other UNAMID Battalions also had shortfall in major equipment status with total serviceability rates of some unit between 13-15 % as against the required rate of not less than 90%.

The COE of some UNAMID units are below standard which makes it difficult for the units to perform assigned task. This includes major COE like APC and four wheel drive jeeps for patrols and other related tasks. For instance, the serviceability status of NIBATT 45 APC's as at September 2016 is about 27% as shown in Table 7.3.

**TABLE 7.3: APC STATE AS AT SEPTEMBER 2016 (NIBATT 45 - SECTOR SOUTH)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Location** | **COE** | | | **Total** | **Remarks** |
| **Holding** | **Svc** | **Unsvc** |
| 1. | SC Nyala | 16 | 5 | 11 | 16 |  |
| 2. | Kass TS | 6 | 2 | 4 | 6 |  |
| 3. | MUH | 1 | - | 1 | 1 |  |
| 4. | **TOTAL** | **23** | **7** | **16** | **23** |  |

However, the serviceability state of soft skin vehicles for the same battalion was 90% is seen in Table 7.4. The key issue is that the APC are operational equipments needed for patrols and domination of AOR.

**TABLE 7.4: SSV VEHICLE STATE AS AT SEPTEMBER 2016 (NIBATT 45 - SECTOR SOUTH)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Serial** | **Location** | **COE** | | | **Total** | **Remarks** |
| **Holding** | **Svc** | **Unsvc** |
| 1. | SC Nyala | 50 | 46 | 4 | 50 |  |
| 2. | Kass TS | 10 | 8 | 2 | 10 |  |
| 3. | MUH | - | - | - | - |  |
| 4. | **TOTAL** | **60** | **54** | **6** | **60** |  |

Source: UNAMID HQ, El Farsher, Darfur, 2017.

The serviceability status of APC's arelimited due to lack of spare parts and technical manpower to repair them (Shafa, 2015). It may also be linked to the rate of UN reimbursement of TCCs as some TCCs claim the current is not adequate though the COE manual is reviewed every 3 years to ensure reimbursement rates are acceptable to TCCs. According to Fayemiwo (2017) the Generic fair market value system used in computing COE reimbursement is unfair to African TCCS who spend more than European TCCs in procuring equipment due to shipping costs, tax among others. Similarly the self- sustainment status of some units also faces similar challenges. Some units never met the requirement in medicals (all level I Hospitals in UNAMID are sub standard), telephone, furniture, minor engineering, basic fire fighting, and catering among others. The self sustainment rates of some battalions were as low as 42% as was the case with some Senegalese Battalion. Apart from the negative impact on operational capability it also have a negative effect on the morale of troops while the TCCs involved lose a substantial part of possible reimbursement from the UN.

The second issue is the nature of contribution from African TCC, primarily based on large number of infantry personnel while the mission needs niche capabilities in response to the complex nature of contemporary peacekeeping. These include specialized capabilities relating to heavy lift, mobility, intelligence, medical evacuation and hospital

provision, and rapid reaction/high intensity capabilities. Specific platforms include attack helicopters, military utility helicopters, air ambulance, engineer units, recce units, logistics multi role units and well drilling units. Niche capabilities in form of force multipliers and enablers could enhance the overall performance of contingents through force protection, logistics support and execution of Quick impact projects (QIP) among others. Apart from Rwanda and Ethiopia prior to withdrawal of Ethiopia attack helicopters in 2011, no other African TCC deployed force multipliers such as military utility helicopter unit (Bam, 2017). Excellent mix of capabilities like infantry battalion, attack helicopter unit, multi role logistics unit and recce unit guarantees high performance. This was clearly lacking in UNAMID up till 2014 and undermined mandate implementation.

The force generation process of some African TCCs in UNAMID can be better as some units are attached elements heavy like cooks, drivers and orderlies hurriedly converted to fighting troops for purpose of peacekeeping operations. This undermined operational capability and efficiency of the units, initially contributing to lose of credibility (Ovbude, 2017). The UN conducts pre-deployment visit (PDV) to TCCs on initial deployment into a mission but does not conduct on rotation of units, thus poorly trained and equipped units are deployed into the mission during rotation. Capability gaps among TCCs in UNAMID are also visible in limited ability to conduct QIP as part of harts and minds operations. Effective peacekeeping requires activities to win the heart and mind of the locals. While the UN does provide funds for units to conduct QIP, contingents are encouraged to fund QIP from own resources. Most African troops in Darfur have not done much in these areas as they are not financially empowered to conduct QIP unlike troops from Asia like the Thailand company that had an extensive agricultural farm which was instrumental to the success of the company. UN may consider funding units for QIP to enable them perform optimally.

Differences between donors and regional organizations on one hand and the UN and AU on the other hand present structural challenges in UNAMID. UNAMID have been undermined by disputes between donors and

regional organisations over who should play a bigger role which ultimately undermines synergy towards the achievement of the mandate. By virtue of their financial contributions, donors tend to smuggle in their own political agendas,which at times are at variance with UNAMID programmes (Adekoya, 2016; Atolegbe, 2017). Secondly, the hybrid nature of the mission raised questions as to who have the authority between AU and UN to implement future peace agreements or ceasefire.Adopting rapid and unilateral response mechanisms that suit the whims of powerful countries but does not enhance African Security remains the bane of peacekeeping in Darfur.

The tendency for developed countries to prefer deploying their citizens in missions outside the African continent also affected UNAMID and its ability to achieve the mandate. The mission, like other missions in Africa have had to rely on an increase in African and Asian personnel, while places such as the Balkans and the Middle East have relied almost purely on Western military personnel with critical capabilities (Gowan & Johnstone 2007:2; Sidhu 2006:32-37). Bello (2015) also believed this affected the operational capability of UNAMID forces. Such open „peacekeeping apartheid‟ has strengthened the perception that powerful donor states prefer


„big league, big budget, advanced technology, war fighting roles‟, only to leave the UN and other continental bodies such as the AU to clean up the mess. This was further emphasised by then AU Chairperson Dlamini Zuma (2017) when she stated that „we call for more UN support to AU peace support operations as in areas of troop contribution….not just dollars and cents‟. This is considering that deployment of troops from developed

countries as part of UN PSO in Africa would enhance the availability of niche capabilities required for mission success. Also, some donor countries, such as the US, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, Britain and the Netherlands, have been criticised for supplying arms that fuel African conflicts while at the same time pursuing peacekeeping, often in the same conflict zones where they have dumped weapons. China also falls within this category as is the case in Darfur. Sudan not being a former colony of any of the 5 permanent members also undermined the interest of P5 in a quick deployment to enhance the security situation.

The US earlier involvement in Darfur is not unconnected to the war on terror as in the post 9/11 strategic environment, peacekeeping has become an element of the „war on terror‟. This is considering Bin Laden call in an audiotape for al-Qaeda fighters to begin travelling to Darfur to prepare for a

„long-term war against the Crusaders‟, an apparent reference to the UN force in 2008 (Bello, 2015). The increasing use of Chapter VII mandates as in UNAMID may support the perception that most peace operations may be influenced by US and British concerns with terror. „The significance of US choices in current peace operations cannot be doubted as Washington not only pays 28.38 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget but also provide training and funding for regional and sub-regional operations in Africa‟ (Gowan & Johnstone 2007:10). For instance, the Rwandan contingent to UNAMID was trained, equipped and airlifted into the mission area (Darfur) by the US under a bilateral agreement.

# FIGURE 7.3: CONTRIBUTION OF UN MEMBER STATES TO UN PEACEKEEPING BUDGET



**2.97%**

**2.98%**

**3.13%**

**19.56%**

**28.38%**

**10.83%**

**4.45%**

**7.14%**

**7.22%**

**6.64%**

**6.68%**

**United States**

**United Kingdom**

**Canada**

**Japan**

**China**

**Spain**

**France**

**Italy**

**Others**

**Germany**

**Russia**

Source: UN HQ, New York, 2016.

US foreign policy heavily influenced hybrid operations is Sudan as US and Britain, attempted to rally a „coalition of the willing‟ under a Chapter VII mandate in the Security Council Resolution 1706, allowing the use of military force, including the imposition of economic sanctions and a no-fly zone over Darfur. This was however later watered down tremendously to get Khartoum‟s buy-in in the resolution, in other to agree to the deployment of

UNAMID in Darfur. It was reported that imposing a no-fly zone would enable the enforcement of UN resolutions by allowing the use of punitive air strikes against Sudanese air force bases in the event that Khartoum violated the no-fly zone (Mail & Guardian 2007). This was however, not to be, and it remains a possibility that such arrangement could have reduced the humanitarian crisis in Darfur by striking SAF air operation which undermine PoC.

According to Lakhdar Brahimi „the UN‟s global credibility is suffering because it is seen to be heavily influenced by Washington, and is almost always biased in favor of the interests of Western countries - to the detriment of the developing world‟ (UN 2000). Thus, where significant national interests are not an issue, western countries tend to be hesitant to commit troops, fund or equip peacekeeping missions. This is because, more often than not, Western countries are likely to join a mission or intervene when the issue at hand appears to be related to its political culture (ICISS 2001 :215- 221). Darfur and indeed most PSO in Africa does not fall into this category, hence the very minimal attention which they receive. Thus, African states and AU need to take genuine action to develop their own solutions for Africa‟s security and development challenges as reliance on the support of external partners and donors for PSOs only perpetuates dependency. The solution to African security challenges lies in reducing both technical and financial dependence on external partners. The AU security architecture of PSC, ASF, and CEWS to facilitate early warning need to be more effective as a means of enhancing African Security. This would require supporting structures and

sufficient resources to enable it to work effectively and more use of sub- regional powers.

The Darfur crisis and indeed conflicts in Central Africa have created space for illicit diamond trade, transnational crime and an environment conducive to terror networks. In turn, the threat of terror networks embedding themselves in Africa‟s conflict systems underlines US counterterrorist initiatives in Africa, such as such as the Pan Sahelian Initiative (PSI) and Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorist Initiative (TSCTI). In all these situations, the US has shown greater willingness to fund, train and equip „lead states‟ that align themselves with its anti-terror initiatives. The AU and the UN thus support unilaterally initiated peace support operations in the interests of stability. The problem is that lack of resources and capacity on the part of the UN and the AU has created opportunity for global powers, such as the US, to advance their own foreign policy interests in the name of Africa‟s peace support operations. The US government‟s AFRICOM is thus meant to strengthen US security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of its African partners.

The thesis argues that although the UN and other major state actors became aware of the crisis in Darfur by late 2003, they failed to act decisively because Darfur is of least geo-strategic importance to the major world players. Furthermore, parochial national interests particularly of the US, contributed to this reluctance to be decisive. The role of China in Sudan

also complicated the situation. Sudan is the largest and most chaotic African country yet it is located in one of the worst geographical area in the continent. Darfur in particular is of little or no strategic importance: it has no water and no oil. The US thus, promised to act only through AU-sponsored peacekeeping force including the UK. The presence of China in Sudan is purely for its oil interests and consistent with its foreign policy in Africa, it does not meddle in the internal affairs of states. It is doubtful if major world players would have reacted in a similar manner in North Africa or the Middle East. This is not to suggest that Sudan is not economically important. It has significant reserve of oil and supplies 80 per cent of the world's gum Arabic needs and this product is so vital to international capital that it was exempted from the sanctions placed on Sudanese products in 1997 for allegedly sponsoring terrorism.

Why then is it that the US which invested so much resources in the North-South peace process and ultimately the independence of South Sudan has not reacted positively in the Darfur conflict? This paper argues that America is frustrated because as the 21 years civil war in Sudan came to an end, the Darfur conflict opened another chapter which affected its oil interest. The GoS placed a ban on the US and UK firms from exploring oil in Sudan and China moved in to fill the vacuum. Perhaps more importantly, America was constrained to act decisively because of close intelligence relationship with the GoS in its war on terror (Bello, 2015). For example in late 2005, „it flew Salah Gosh, the Sudanese Chief of Intelligence and one of the architects of the Darfur atrocities on a private plane to the US for consultations with the

CIA (Grono N, 2006:628). However, Williams Paul and Belami Alex (2004) have argued to the contrary. They contended that the unwillingness of the West to intervene in Darfur was due to three main reasons. These include the increased scepticism about America‟s humanitarian interventionism especially over the invasion of Iraq, the minimal western strategic interests in Sudan and the relationship between the Darfur conflicts and Sudan‟s civil war.

This is not to suggest that America has not shown interest in Sudan rather. The US has reacted to the Darfur conflict in a number of ways including the determination of genocide in September 2004. In fact, America is the only nation to have made such a determination and the US Government has aggressively sought for a political solution for Darfur as the best way to implement a just and lasting peace. America provided funds to AU in support of AMIS operations and played a leading role in the transition from AU to UNAMID. Further assistance include US airlift operations in January 2009, transporting Rwandan equipment into Darfur (Emma, 2016). On its part, the EU‟s approach is similar to the US and the EU supported an African solution to an African problem by funding AU mission. However, this support dwindled as AU rehatted to UN force. NATO provided AMIS with limited logistics such as strategic lift and technical assistance but never went beyond this gesture. On its part, China has strategic interests in Sudan as it is Sudan‟s largest trading partner with a bilateral trade of about US$8.6bat 2010, US$8.9b in 2016 and the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) currently owns 40% of stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating

Company, a consortium dominating oil production in Sudan. Sudan provides about 10% of China's oil need as China purchase 90% of Sudanese oil. China's involvement in Sudan is however, consistent with its involvement in Africa. In 2014, China approved extra funding package of $12b to Africa with most of its forms of infrastructure financing. The Chinese government including its State owned banks are expected to provide about $1 trillion in financing of Africa by 2025 (CFR, 2016), using the "Angolan Model" of infrastructural development. For instance, China provided about US$6 billion for capital investment including the Mevowe and Kajbar Dam Projects in northern Sudan, Khartoum rail line and port capacity. Beijing is also Sudan's primary supplier of weapons and military supplies as Amnesty International (2007) highlighted China and Russia irresponsible weapons transfer to Sudan.

**FIGURE 7.4: SUDAN TRADE WITH CHINA**

**US$ Millions**

Source: E Kim, ***et. al.***, International Economics, Spring Semester, 2016.



**10000**

**9000**

**8000**

**7000**

**6000**

**5000**

**4000**

**3000**

**2000**

**1000**

**0**

**1990**

**1994**

**1998**

**2002**

**2006**

**2010**

**2014**

**2016**

**YEARS**

**Imports**

**Exports**

Based on its strategic interests, China has consistently abstained on UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) on Darfur, It abstained on UNSCR 1556 on disarming of Janjaweed (30 Jul 2004), UNSCR 1564 (18 Sep 2004),

UNSCR 1590 on armed embargo on Sudan (24 Mar 2005), UNSCR 1591 (29

Mar 2005), UNSCR 1593 on crimes against humanity (15 Mar 2006) and UNSCR 1706 (Aug 2006). In addition, China succeeded in diluting the proposals over intervention measures in Darfur including an oil embargo. China‟s response could be based not only on her strategic interests but also on a long outstanding mistrust of US sponsored interventionism. So far, China‟s only contribution to the peace process in Darfur was in the form of humanitarian aid valued at about US$610,000 and a well drilling unit.

From the foregoing, this thesis contends that the conflict in Darfur required enormous political and diplomatic support to succeed. The support from US, EU and NATO to AMISON though small was needed likewise support to UNAMID though much more is still required to enable UNAMID succeed. This thesis argues that unless AU peacekeeping logistics support structure is addressed, the AU cannot seek for African solution to African conflicts through the employment of force. It may have to rely on the UN framework of intervention with AU‟s active involvement which remains the best and most viable alternative in the Short to Medium term towards maintaining African security.

Critics of UN peacekeeping operations have likened western involvement to a new form of neocolonialism. Adebajo argues that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) have tended to maintain an ambiguous attitude towards regional organisations, that is, rejecting to fund them and then recognising them while attempting to maintain control over certain missions (Adebajo 2007). This is considering that some UNSC P5 members have shown greater willingness to sanction deployments of peace missions only in their former colonial or geo-strategic

„spheres of influence‟. For instance, the British in Sierra Leone, the US in Liberia and Somalia, and France in Cote d‟lvoire (Adebajo 2007). Critics argue further that some peacekeeping missions have provided the opportunity for former colonial powers to interfere in the internal affairs of their former colonies, especially against unpopular governments, using newly adopted norms of intervention in international affairs such as the concept of

responsibility to protect. This is against the non-threatening posture of Chapter VI traditional peacekeeping operation. The heavy footprint of the interests of Western countries in the UN SC‟s decisions on PSOs affects UN‟s credibility and fuel the perception that the world body is being used to perpetuate or legitimise neo-colonialism hence the AU constant quest for Africa to solve African crisis.

# CHAPTER 8

**SUMMARY CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

# SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF THE THESIS

An examination of the maintenance of African Security through UN PSO is considered appropriate, given that several African countries have hosted UN PSO but the root causes of conflicts in these countries remains unresolved. Indeed, peacekeeping operation in Darfur have been ongoing since 2003 when AMIS deployed in Darfur up to 2007 when it rehatted to UNAMID yet the inability of UN PSO to provide enduring security both in Darfur and other African countries like DRC is yet to be exhaustively explored. This thesis has therefore attempted to investigate the extent to which UN PSO enhanced security in African States by using UNAMID as a case study. This thesisis therefore particularly focused on UNAMID operations in Darfur. While the successful resolution of African conflicts is generally predicated on a variety of factors, UN PSO, as in functionalist theories easily emerges as a key means of resolving such conflicts and ensuring enduring peace. Indeed, some previous attempts at enhancing African security through PSO failed as in DRC, Somali, Rwanda among others leading to catastrophic consequences and re-emergence of conflicts after the withdrawal of UN troops.

Seen simply as "freedom from threat", African Security is conceptualized in this thesis from the human centric approach to include the areas of political, economic, military, societal and environmental security. PSO on the other hand which is essentially the object of the thesis is conceptualized simply as an umbrella term for UN and regional intervention aimed at stabilizing and restoring peace and stability to states in conflict. Thus, the extent to which UNPSO may have enhanced African Security is as the centre of this thesis.

UNAMID commenced on 31 December 2007 following the full rehatting of AMIS Force and is still ongoing. Accordingly, the thesis identified fourpotentional outcomes as assumptions of the study. First, is that despite the holistic nature of PSO,enduring and sustainable peace can only be achieved with the full cooperation and willingness of the parties to a conflict to end the crisis.Second, the inability of UN PSO to sufficiently improve African security situation is not unconnected to their inability to address the root causes of conflicts in the region. This is considering that the nature and characteristics of contemporary conflict in Africa which is intrastate rather than interstate demands greater insight into root causes.Third, UN PSO would be more effective in Africa if it fully collaborates with regional and sub regional conflict resolution mechanisms like those of the AU and ECOWAS amongst others in addressing African crisis. Fourth,the full backing of the P5 is necessary especially in the area of burden sharing and diplomatic backing likewise the support of AU, sub regional organisations and the political will of African government to promote durable peace in

Africa which would be anchored on post conflict economic, social and political development.

Evidence presented in this thesis indicates that there is no peace to keep in Darfur as the armed movements and GoS failed to agree to the implementation of the DPA 2006 and the DDPD of 2012. This in partly due to the fact that both agreements did not factor in the root causes of the crisis bothering on the continued marginalisation of the Darfur region of Sudan by the Khartoum based government over the years. The novel nature of UNAMID hybrid mission arrangements which sought to tap into AU conflict resolution mechanism have not aided the achievement of UNAMID mandate. This is not unconnected to the lack of full backing of UNAMID operation by UNSC P5 members, particularly China, due to her economic interests in Sudan. This trend implies that only the first, second and fourth assumptions of this research are valid: enduring and sustainable peace can only be achieved with the full cooperation and willingness of the parties to a conflict to end the crisis; the inability of UN PSO to sufficiently improve African Security situation is not unconnected to their inability to address the root causes of conflicts in the region; and the full backing of UNSC P5 and support of regional organizations and the political will of African governments to promote durable peace in Africa through post conflict economic, social and political development is critical. Furthermore, evidence presented in this thesis also indicates that:

* + 1. There is minimal Western strategic interest in Darfur and Sudan as a whole, as it is of least geo-strategic importance to the major world players.
    2. The inability of UNSC P5 members to adopt a common position on Darfurowing to different interest of the P5 in Africa undermined the quick deployment of UNAMID. China consistently abstained from UNSCR on Darfur due to her oil and economic interest in Sudan which is consistent with her foreign policy of not meddling in the internal affairs of African states. China is Sudan‟s largest trading partner and owns 40% of Greater Nile Petroleum Company which dominate oil production in Sudan.
    3. There was no peace to be kept in Darfur particularly at the initial stage of the conflict as the major parties to the conflict did not agree to the implementation of the DPA. This is considering that the DPA did not sufficiently address the root causes of the conflict.
    4. The root causes of the conflict which is the marginalisation of Darfur people and resources conflicts are not been addressed by UNAMID.
    5. There is no comprehensive political solution to the problem owing to lack of free, fair and credible elections that would lay the foundation for meaningful representation of Darfur at the national level. The DDPD though provides opportunity for continued negotiation by all parties to the Darfur conflict towards finding a political solution.
    6. There is a lack of secure and stable environment in some parts of Darfur due to increased military and criminal activities including banditry. This has reduced the humanitarian space which need expansion to ensure that the humanitarian community has free and unhindered access to population in need of assistance.
    7. The GoS gradually withdrew its consent to the deployment of UNAMID through restriction of UNAMID freedom of movement and delays in granting of approval for induction of personnel and equipment into the mission.
    8. The lack of force multipliers and enablers and the cumbersome command and control structure due to the hybrid nature of UNAMID undermined the credibility of the mission particularly during the deployment and consolidation phases. This was evident in the inability of the mission to achieve its mandate which led to the 2012 review of UNAMID concept of operations.
    9. African TCCs operational capability in Darfur reflect poor standard in terms of COE holding and serviceability status of equipment holding. This limited the capability of some of the contingents to successfully execute assigned task.Also, the nature of contributions from African TCCs is mostly infantry personnel rather than niche capabilities. This situation does not support AU stance on the ability of Africans to solve African problem particularly when it involves deployment of a PSO.AU position also hinders immediate UN deployment as was the case in Darfur.
    10. UNAMID PoC Strategy is too broad and neglected activities that directly contribute to the protection of civilians from physical violence. Emphasis was placed on humanitarian assistance, early recovery, human rights and rule of law. This accounts for the marginal success recorded in protection of civilians achievedmostly through the construction of some UNAMID Camps close to IDP Camps and patrolling of IDP Camp for physical security.
    11. IDP and refugees returns have been recorded particularly from Chad and Western Darfur border areas due to improved security along Sudan/Darfur-Chad border areas. The reintegration of IDPs and refugees into their communities was undermined by poor social infrastructure evident in lack of adequate recovery and development project in the communities.
    12. Improvement in passage and distribution of humanitarian deliveries to people at risk particularly in stable areas.
    13. Relative security has been achieved in various Sector HQs and adjourning areas leading to reduction in loss of lives and destruction of properties while security in the hinterlands remains unstable.
    14. UNAMID has increased awareness on issues of human rights, rule of law, democratic governance and SEA in Darfur. This was achieved through various capacity building programs for the judicial institutions including the Police.

# CONCLUSION

The maintenance and enhancement of African security is certainly not dependent on UN PSO alone. Indeed, other factors like socio-economic development, nation building, good governance, political inclusiveness and environmental sustainability contribute in enhancing national and regional security. There are also other regional dynamics like border security, cross border activities, sub-regional and regional bodies like IGAD and AU respectively which play significant role in enhancing regional security. However, in spite of the role of these other factors in enhancing African security, UN PSO have a role to play in ensuring global peace and security particularly in conflict states. This reality is the hallmark of functionalism theory. Contemporary African security includes the area of political, economic, military, societal and environmental security. Insecurity in any or a combination of these areas largely accounts for conflicts in African states.

UN PSO play a central role in conflict resolution. This is particularly through separating the warring factions, disarming the belligerents, delivering humanitarian aid, protection of civilians, peace enforcements, civilian policing, institution building, infrastructure reconstruction and national reconciliation with a view to transform war-torn societies into liberal democratic societies. Yet, this has not been the case in Darfur-Sudan experience. This thesis has established that enduring and sustainable peace can only be achieved with the full cooperation and willingness of the parties to a conflict to end the crisis.The inability UNAMID to sufficiently enhance security situation in Darfur is not unconnected to their inability to address the root causes of conflicts in the region.The full backing of UNSC P5 and

support of regional organisations and the political will of African governments to promote durable peace in Africa (Darfur) through post conflict economic, social and political development is critical. Particularly, the reliance on the capacity of African TCC to undertake the required tasks in UNAMID poses challenges due to poor logistics sustainability most visible in poor state of COE and operational readiness. The lack of force multipliers and enablers undermined the credibility of the mission particularly during the deployment and consolidation phase. However, a general factor accentuated by this thesis is that UNAMID operations in Darfur, through novel by its hybrid nature, lacked a clear political strategy and direction necessary to address the root causes despite the fact that PSO is part of a political solution and not an alternative to it.

Generating the necessary capability for UNAMID is also another important area that has had serious implications for UNAMID operations in Darfur. UNAMID requires greater mobility and niche and specialized capabilities to be able to achieve Darfur wide security, a pre-condition for political solutions towards achieving enduring peace and sustainable development.There is a broad recognition that the problems affecting peacekeeping are, at their centre, political in nature and that greater consensus is needed among troop and police providers, financial contributors, the UN Secretariat, the Security Council and regional interlocutors in order to sustain the complex and ambitious multidimensional peacekeeping operations currently deployed and into the future. The peacekeeping/peace building nexus is critical now and in the future particular in Africa, as it has the

potential to ensure a holistic and enduring solution to conflicts in Africa thus enhancing African security.

African conflicts are rarely of purely military nature as suchPSO in Africa require a multidimensional or comprehensive approach focusing on post-conflict peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building along various Lines of Operations. This would include the political and diplomatic dimension focusing on building a minimally capable state by rebuilding the states institutions and infrastructure through Security Sector Reforms. The economic line would address the deepest causes of conflict which are economic despair, social injustice and aim at a lasting development of the economy. This will include programmes like reconstruction of infrastructure, trade development and free trade arrangements. Security is "a precondition of development" and the line will includethe military and police contribution to the overall process in the provision of "physical" security by restoring order. This will create the "humanitarian space" in which the civilian agencies will be able to operate. The last line would deal with humanitarian and social elements of the development and includes education, health care, basic services.

Capacity building for African TCC, who provide about 80% of UNAMID troops (and indeed bulk of other troops in UN PSO, in Africa) is critical. This is mostly in areas of training and capability acquisition. Training is critical to the success of any kind of operation and as such, training for

military and civilians elements for PSO would have to be harmonized with a view to adopting institutionalised training. This would define the substance of training and who, at what level should be trained in other to provide integrated pre-deployment training and post-conflict reconstruction training.

A major contribution to knowledge is that the understanding of the concept of peace in PSO to mean ending physical violence is inadequate in tackling the conflict in Darfur as it undermines the ability for long term and broad based recovery plans involving human development across all areas. Emphasis would need to go beyond rebuilding infrastructure to investing in social capital including the trust that creates safety needs and the ability of Darfurians to make informed choices. Further contributions to knowledge include that the nature of hybrid peacekeeping structures and operations weakens UN command and control and undermines flexibility to quickly respond to changes on the ground. This is primarily due to dual reporting channels to UN HQ and AU HQ by peace keepers in Darfur and the requirement for concurrence by both HQs before major shift in operational focus. Similarly, the concept of PoC in UNAMID to include all facet of life: humanitarian assistance, political empowerment, socio economic empowerment and access to right and justice while relevant undermine the prioritization of the central requirement for physical protection to prevent loss of life. Physical protection would need to underpin other protection activities across board until establishment of a stable security environment.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

The approach adopted in the analysis of UNAMID operations in this study offers a specific advantage which is that it is essentially reform oriented. Indeed, by examining UNAMID operations in terms of specific implementation of the various mandates and the associated benchmarks, the areas of strengths and weaknesses becomes easily identifiable.The findings of this thesis indicates that the strength of UNAMID operations in Darfur is in the progress it has made in areas of improving border security arrangement between Sudan and Chad and in humanitarian assistance while the weakest areas in mandate implementation lies in areas of comprehensive political solution through a clear political strategy and direction, PoC and secure and stable environment. It is in the light of this finding that the following recommendations are made:

* + 1. The generation of niche, specialised and qualitative capability for civilian, military and police components of the mission. In spite of the crucial importance of ensuring Darfur wide security towards the achievement of a secure and stable environment, UNAMID does not have adequate force multipliers and enablers. Helicopters and other enablers to ensure greater mobility of its forces and other sustainment issues are critical success factors.
    2. The streamlining of activities which constitute PoC with focus on the physical aspect of PoC. Given the importance of PoC, which is currently the key mandate, this recommendation will also include

opening up of the humanitarian space to reach civilians trapped in unstable security areas in the hinterlands.

* + 1. The broadening of the UNAMID contributor base and working with partners.Expanding the base of troops and police contributing countries and more intensive engagement between the UN, international donors, and contributors in capacity building support for UNAMID operations are critical success factors. Broadening the contributor base will attract western and more Asian countries which would increase the overall operational capability of the mission. UNAMID would also need to improve inter-operability with key regional and other partners, particularly AU and OGED. Strengthening the capacity of the African Union towards finding a political solution to the crisis is critical to enduring peace in Darfur.
    2. The maintenance of UNAMID freedom of action in Darfur. In spite of the critical importance of UNAMID freedom of action in Darfur as enshrined in the status of Force Agreement, GoS restricts UNAMID freedom of action through restriction of movement, cancellation of planned operational flights and unnecessary delays in issuance of visas, and induction of new personnel and equipment into the mission.
    3. The development of a clear political strategy and direction towards a comprehensive political solution. Peacekeeping is part of a political solution, not an alternative to it. This would include an active political strategy in form of additional political and operational support

tools like robust political/diplomatic efforts, immediate peace dividend investments and logistics support to deployed troops. A comprehensive political solution would mean bringing the hold out/armed movement to the negotiation table towards addressing the root causes of the conflict including issues of marginalization, control of resources and of recent, on-going conflicts in the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile areas. Indeed, unless the fifth recommendation is realised the impact of the four earlier recommendationon the entire UNAMID operation is likely to be quite minimal.

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**APPENDICES**

# Appendix “A”

**PARTICIPANTS IN THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION**

The focused group discussions held in September 2013 (UN HQ, New York), June 2016 (Bonny Camp, Lagos), January 2017 (NDC Abuja and AHQ Abuja) and March 2017 (AFCSC Jaji). Participants include:

* Ten members of NIBAT that just returned from Darfur at 65 Bn, Lagos.
* 4 Members of Darfur 10T, UN DPKO and 3 UNAMID Desk Officers, OMA, UN DPKO.
* 6 Officers of DATOPS, AHQ Abuja.
* 10 Officers on Course at NDC, Abuja who served in UNAMID.
* 10 Officers on Course at AFCSC, Jaji who served in UNAMID.

The general theme of the focused group discussion was UN PSO in Darfur 2003-2016. Participants were encouraged to share their experiences in UNAMID, Darfur.

# Appendix “B” DETAILS OF FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION

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| **Serial** | **Date of FGD** | **Location** | **No of People** | **Themes/Questions** |
| **(a)** | **(b)** | **(c)** | **(d)** | **(e)** |
| 1. | 2 Sep 2013 | IOT Darfur Conference Room UN HQ, New York | 7 (Darfur IOT and OMA Staff) | * Extend of political support of the UNSCP5 members to UNAMID. * UN interface with the AU on running of the mission. * Sustainment issues particularly as regard availability of Force multipliers and Force enablers for   the mission. |
| 2. | 4 Jun 2016 | Bonny Camp Lagos | 10 (members of NIBATT/65 Bn that just returned from UNAMID) | * Operational issues in the mission as regards state of COEs. * Security situations in remote and outlying areas where they were deployed and how the situation affected the achievement of specific UNAMID goals. * What specific actions were being carried out towards the POC and to what extend did it succeed. * What challenges did the troops face in the conduct of the operation   in Darfur. |
| 3. | 10 Jan 2017 | DATOPs, AHQ Abuja | 6 (DATOPs AHQ staff officers) | * TCC/PCC views and perspectives on the conduct of the mission. * Nigerian Army involvement as part of AMIS and events leading to AMIS re-hatting to UNAMID. * What are the challenges of NA in sustaining her troops in the mission and why is the serviceability ratio of   NA COEs low in UNAMID. |
| 4 | 24 Jan 2017 | AFCSC Jaji | 10 (former staff officers and Milobs in Darfur) | * Command and control relations between UN HQ, AU HQ and UNAMID. * Security situation in the various sectors and remote areas. * Humanitarian access and POC in remote areas. |
| 5. | 31 Mar 2017 | Conference Room, NDC Abuja | 10 (Staff officers and Milobs) | * Nature of security incidents in the various sectors in Darfur which hinder the provision of a stable security environment. * Respect for rule of law and human rights by GoS security   agencies. |

**Appendix “C”**

**LIST OF RESPONDENTS**

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| **Serial** | **Name of Respondent** | **Date of Interview** | **Place of Interview** | **Position** |
| **(a)** | **(b)** | **(c)** | **(d)** | **(e)** |
| 1. | MrHerveLadsous | 8 August 2013 | Office of Respondent , UN  HQ, New York | Under Secretary General for Department of Peacekeeping  Operations |
| 2. | Ms Margret Carey | 3 July 2013 | Office of the  Respondent, UN HQ, New York | Director Africa 1 Division,  Office of Operations, UN DPKO |
| 3. | Lt Gen Babacar Gaye | 3 July 2013 | Office of the  Respondent, UN HQ, New York | Military Adviser, (ASG)  Office of Military Affairs, UN DPKO |
| 4. | Mr Edmond Mulet | 2 September 2013 | Office of the  Respondent, UN HQ, New York | ASG, Office of Operations, UN DPKO |
| 5. | Ms Ingrid Hayden | 6 June 2013 Follow-up telephone interview on 13  November 2015 | Office of the Respondent, UN HQ, New York | Head, Darfur Integrated Operational Team, Office of Operations, UN DPKO |
| 6. | Ms Emma Shitaka | 14 August 2013 | Office of the Respondent, UN HQ, New York | Deputy Head, Darfur Integrated Operational Team,  Office of Operations, UN DPKO |
| 7. | MsManishaAgalawata | 2 September 2013 | Office of the  Respondent, UN HQ, New York | Darfur Integrated Operational  Team, Office of Operations, UN DPKO |
| 8. | Mr P Matt | 22 August 2013 | Office of the Respondent, UN  HQ, New York | Darfur Integrated Operational Team, Office of Operations,  UN DPKO |
| 9. | Col VevikKashyap | 9 August 2013 | Office of the Respondent, UN  HQ, New York | SMLO, Darfur Integrated Operational Team, Office of  Operations, UN DPKO |
| 10. | Col KentaroNagayoshi | 13 August 2013 | Office of the  Respondent, UN HQ, New York | Force Generation Service,  Office of Military Affairs, UN DPKO |
| 11. | Col James Ataguba | 21 December 2012 | Office of the  Respondent, UN HQ, New York | Current Military Operations  Service, Office of Military Affairs, UN DPKO |
| 10 February 2016 | AHQ Abuja | Deputy Dir Policy, AHQ |
| 12. | Col Bobby Ugiagbe | 14 June 2016 | Residence of the Respondent, Wu  Bassy Barracks, Abuja | Assessment Office, Office of Military Affairs, UN DPKO |
| 13. | Col John Lar | 21 September 2013 | Office of the Respondent, UN  HQ, New York | Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs,  UN DPKO |
| 17 November 2015 | Residence, Wu Bassy Barracks,  Abuja | Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs,  UN DPKO |
| 14. | Col EPA Undiandeye | 19 September 2016 | Office of the  Respondent, HQ NAIC, AHQ Abuja | Former Deputy Chief ,  Assessment Office, Office of Military Affairs, UN DPKO |

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| 15. | Col Bindul | 20 November 2015 | UN HQ, New York | Military Planning Service Officer, Office of Military  Affairs, UN DPKO |
| 10 Sep 2017 | NDC Abuja | Former, Military Planning  Service Officer, DPKO |
| 16. | Col Apere | 15 June 2016 | Office of the Respondent, Special  Forces BdeMarkurdi | Former Senior Military Liaison Office, Office of  Operation, UN DPKO |
| 17. | Maj Gen LJ Ogunewe | 22 December 2012 | Office of the  Respondent, New York | Defence Adviser, Nigeria Embassy to United Nations, |
| 22 December 2015 | Wu Bassy Barracks,  Abuja | Appt |
| 18. | Mr Sullivan Bam | 18 January 2017 | Telephone Interview | Director, AU Peace Support  Operations Division |
| 19. | Col AA Adeyinka | 15 June 2014 | Office of the Respondent, AU  HQ, Addis Ababa | Desk Officer, United Nations Office in African Union |
| 6 Jun 2017 | Army War College Nigeria Abuja | Former Desk Officer, UNOAU, Addis Ababa |
| 20. | Col A Bello | 16 June 2014 | Office of the  Respondent, AU HQ, Addis Ababa | Desk Officer, Peace Support  Operation Division, AU HQ, Addis Ababa |
| 20 February 2017 | NDC Abuja |  |
| 21. | Col NFK Azeez | 16 June 2014 | Office of the Respondent, AU  HQ, Addis Ababa | Peace Support Operations Division |
| 22. | Col AA Adekoya | 26 October 2016 | NDC Abuja | Nigeria Defence Adviser to  AU HQ |
| 23. | JSR Ibrahim Gambari | 11 January 2013 & | Office of the Respondent, El  Fasher, Darfur | JSR UNAMID |
| 26 August 2013 | UN HQ, New York | JSR UNAMID |
| 24 | JSR Mohamed  IbnChambas | 27 August 2013 | UN HQ, New York | JSR UNAMID |
| 25. | Lt Gen Nyavumba | 10 January 2013 | Office of the Respondent, UNAMID HQ, El  Fasher, Darfur | Force Commander |
| 3 April 2013 | OO, DPKO, UN HQ  New York | Force Commander |
| 26. | Brig Gen Atolegbe | 22 June 2016 | Office of the Respondent, AHQ  Abuja | Force Sector Commander, Sector South |
| 27. | Brig Gen Gaje | 13 October 2015 | Office of the Respondent, UNAMID Sector West, El Geneina,  Darfur | Sector Commander, Sector West |
| 28. | Col H Hassan | 15 September 2014 | Office of the Respondent, UNAMID HQ, El  Fasher, Darfur | Deputy Chief Mission Support Division |
| 29. | Col ASO Onilenla | 15 September 2014 | UNAMID HQ, El  Fasher, Darfur | Joint Mission Analysis Centre |
| 30. | Col AS Fashina | 29 November 2016 | NDC, Abuja | Desk Officer, Joint Operation |

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| 31. | Brig Gen Chailes Calder | 24 March 2017 | NDC, Abuja | Defence Adviser UK |
| 32. | Col A Adegbite | 10 March 2015 | 81 Div, Lagos | Military Observer, UNAMID |
| 33. | Maj Gen IR Nicholas | 22 June 2016 | Office of the Respondent, 3 Div,  Jos | Former CO NIBAT 5 |
| 34. | Col WB Etuk | 18 May 2016 | Office of the  Respondent, AHQ, Abuja | Former G1 Administration Branch, UNAMID FHQ |
| 35. | Col AC Adetoba | 12 January 2013 | Office of the Respondent, UNAMID Force HQ, El Fasher,  Darfur | J6 Logistics Branch |
| 36. | Col BS Adetoro | 29 September 2016 | NDC, Abuja | Former Military Observer,  UMANID |
| 37. | Col ME John Okon | 11 January 2013 | Office of the Respondent, UNAMID Force HQ, El Fasher,  Darfur | Desk Officer, J5 Plans |
| 10 April 2017 | NDC Abuja | Former Desk Officer, J5 Plans |
| 38. | Col MLD Saraso | 10 January 2013 | Office of the Respondent, UNAMID HQ, El  Fasher, Darfur | Desk Officer Cease Fire Commission, UNAMID |
| 15 April 2017 | NDC Abuja | Former Desk Officer Cease Fire Commission, UNAMID |
| 39. | Col AT Adedoja | 10 January 2013 | Office of the Respondent, UNAMID HQ, El  Fasher, Darfur | Chief of Operations, Sector South |
| 40. | Col OM Obere | 23 November 2016 | NDC Abuja | Former Second in Command, UNAMID HQ |
| 41. | Col MA EtsuNdagi | 16 February 2017 | NDC Abuja | former Liaison Officer,  UNAMID |
| 42. | Col FHC Ude | 24 April 2016 | NDC Abuja | former CO NIBATT 35,  UNAMID Force HQ |
| 43. | Col KO Osemwegie | 15 August 2016 | NDC Abuja | former J5 Plans, UNAMID  Force HQ |
| 44. | SY Bello | 14 January 2015 | Office of the  Respondent, ONSA, Abuja | Coordinator on Counter  Terrorism, Office of the National Security Adviser |
| 45. | Maj Gen JAH Ewansiha | 12 October 2014 | Office of the  Respondent, AHQ, Abuja | Former Chief of Training and Operation, AHQ |
| 46. | Maj Gen DD Ahmadu | 14 December 2016 | Office of the Respondent, AHQ,  Abuja | Chief of Training and Operations, AHQ |
| 47. | Maj Gen PJ Isang | 26 August 2014 | Office of the  Respondent, DHQ, Abuja | CTOP, DHQ |
| 48. | GpCapt D Djokoto | 21 August 2015 | Ghana High  Commission, Abuja | Defence Adviser, Ghana  High Commissioner |
| 49. | Col ND Shagaya | 15 June 2014 | Office of the Respondent, AU  HQ, Addis Ababa | Military Operations Officer, PSOD, AU HQ |

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|  |  | 12 Sep 2017 | NDC Abuja | Former Military Operations Officer, AU HQ |
| 50. | Maj Gen BM Monguno | 12 May 2016 | Office of the Respondent, ONSA  Presidency | National Security Adviser |
| 51. | Maj Gen BM Shafa | 19 August 2014 | Office of the Respondent, Ministry of  Defence, Abuja | former Coordinator on Peacekeeping Operations |
| 52. | Hassan Omar Hassan | 10 January 2013 | Office of the Respondent UNAMID HD, El  Fasher | Contract Local Staff, UNAMID HQ. |
| 53. | Brig Gen BA Isandu | 29 November 2016 | Office of the Respondent,  Defence Headquarters, Abuja | Director, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DHQ |
| 54. | General ML Agwai | 22 November 2016 | Residence of the  Respondent, Maitama | former AMIS/UNAMID Commander |
| 23 March 2017 | NDC Abuja | former AMIS/UNAMID  Commander |
| 55. | Maj Gen CRU Ihekire | 9 February 2017 | Residence of the  Respondent, Abuja | former Commander AMIS |
| 56. | Lt Gen Isaac Obiakor | 21 March 2017 | Residence of the  Respondent, Abuja | former Military Adviser,  OMA, UK DPKO, New York |
| 57. | ACP Aderemi | 10 January 2012 | Office of the  Respondent, DPKO | Senior Police Liaison Officer,  IOT, OO |
| 58. | Lt MM Marshi | 12 December 2016 | NDC, Abuja | Intelligence Officer NIBAT 45 |
| 59. | Brig Gen LYM Hassan | 7 March 2017 | Office of the Respondent, Ministry of Defence  Abuja | Coordinator on Peacekeeping Operations |
| 60. | Col UG Ogeleka | 20 February 2017 | Office of the Respondent, AHQ,  Abuja | Deputy Director, Force Generation, Department of  Peacekeeping Operation |
| 61. | Col AL Okodu | 20 November 2016 | Office of the Respondent, AHQ, Abuja | Deputy Director, Peace Keeping Operations, Department of Peacekeeping  Operations |
| 62. | Col MU Ikoba | 10 February 2017 | Office of the Respondent, AHQ,  Abuja | Deputy Director, Integrated Support Services, Department  of Peacekeeping Operations |
| 63. | Col AO Ajagbe | 20 February 2017 | Office of the Respondent, AHQ,  Abuja | Director, Department of Training |
| 64. | Col MT Aminu | 20 July 2017 | Office of the  Respondent, AHQ, Abuja | Former, Integrated Training  Officer, UN HQ, New York, 2013-2017 |
| 65. | Col CA Ovbude | 18 July 2017 | Office of the Respondent, AHQ,  Abuja | Deputy Director, ISS, AHQ, DPKO, Abuja |
| 66. | Lt Col R Bazatoha | 3 Aug 2017 | Office of the Respondent, PM of  Rwanda, New York | Defence and Military Advisor, PM of Rwanda,  New York. |
| 67. | MrIdrisLatreche | 14 Aug 2017 | Office of the  Respondent, PM of AU to UN, New | Seniour Adviser for peace  and Security, Permanent Observer Mission of AU to |

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|  |  |  | York | UN |
| 68. | Omer Ahmed | 14 Aug 2017 | Office of the Respondent, Permanent Mission  of Sudan, to the UN, New York | Head of Chancery, PM of Sudan. |
| 69. | Mr Mike Okwudili | 14 Aug 2017 | Office of the Respondent, Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the  UN, New York | SeniorCounselor in charge of C34 (Peacekeeping Affairs) PM of Nigeria to UN, New York |
| 70. | Dr CyprianTerseerHeen | 14 Aug 2017 | Office of the Respondent Permanent Mission  of Nigeria to the UN, New York | Head of Chancery/ Minister (At the time of interview, he was the acting PM, as the  substantive PMwas out of station) |
| 71. | Col VivekNarang | 3 Aug 2017 | Office of the Respondent, Darfur, IOT, OO, DPKO,  UN HQ, New York | Senior Military Liaison Officer, OO, DPKO |
| 72. | Col RizviFarrukh | 3 Aug 2017 | Office of the Respondent, Military Planning Service, OMA, DPKO,UN HQ,  New York | Desk Officer, UNAMID, MPS, DPKO |
| 73. | Col Caesar Awog-Badek | 4 Aug 17 | Office of the Respondent, Current Military Operations Service, OMA, DPKO, UN HQ,  New York | Desk Officer, UNAMID, CMOS, DPKO. |
| 74. | Col VE Emma | 7 September 2016 | NDC, Abuja | Former Logistics Officer,  UNAMID HQ, El Fasher |
| 75. | Brig Gen AA Fayemiwo | 10 March 2017 | Office of the Respondent, AHQ  Abuja | Director, Department of Peacekeeping Operations |

**Appendix“D”**

**KEY PLAYERS IN THE DARFUR CRISIS**

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| **Field Marshall Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir: President of the Republic of Sudan; Head of the Sudan Armed Forces** |
| **Background:** Born in 1944 (near Shendi, River Nile State), al- Bashir belongs to the Ja‘ ali tribe. He joined the Sudanese Armed Forces in 1960, attended a military staff course in Malaysia, and became the Sudanese minister of Defence from 1989 to 1993. On 30 June 1989, he led a court of military officers in a mutiny against prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. The coup was allegedly aimed at purging the country‘s corrupt political parties but it had the effect of blocking the signing of a peace agreement with Garang‘s SPLM. In 1993, he appointed himself president of the nation. He won the 1996 elections with 75.7% of the vote following a boycott by all major opposition parties (BBC News, 2003). In January 1999, president al- Bashir set up the National Congress Party (NCP) with the Islamic political leader and speaker of parliament; Hassan al-  Turabi. Following al-Turabi‘s attempt to introduce a bill to reduce al-Bashir‘s powers, the president dissolved parliament, removing al-Turabi from his position, which divided the Islamic Movement into al-Bashir‘s NCP and al-Turabi‘s popular congress party, and declared a state of emergency. In 2000, al-Bashir was re-elected president during much-criticized elections, with 86.5% of the vote. In 2005, the Sudanese government signed a peace deal with the SPLM, although Bashir himself was not a signatory to the agreement, which was signed by Vice president Ali OsmarTaha. On 4 March 2009, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir, indicating him on five counts of crimes against humanity, and two counts of war crimes committed in Darfur. On 12 July 2010, after a length appeal by the prosecution, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for charges of genocide to be brought and issued a second warrant containing three separate counts.  **Other Developments:** Originally bolstered by economic benefits that followed Sudan‘s oil boom in 1999, al-Bashir‘s government has suffered-economically and politically-from the fallout of South Sudan‘s secession and loss of oil revenue. In December 2011 the GoS confiscated 2.4 million barrels of oil from South Sudan due to be shipped from port Sudan, and the RSS government responded by shutting down the oil pipeline one month later. This forced the GoS to implement austerity measures, including the lifting of fuel subsidies, which prompted protests beginning in June 2012. However, in spite of speculation that Khartuom would follow the mold of the Arab Spring, the largely-discredited and divided official political opposition and obstructed civil society have thus far been unable to create momentum to bring about a change to al-Bashir‘s government. Although the immediate economic pressures have subsided somewhat since Sudan and South Sudan signed an agreement on oil on 27 September, the exposed economic situation created a new level of public debate over the extent to which al-Bashir‘s government has sincerely advanced the Islamist agenda that fueled the civil war and served as a justification for al-Bashir‘s claim to power, by bringing to the fore allegations of corruption and nepotism amongst the president‘s inner circle. Evidence of this discontent was manifested in late November, when the GoS announce that several high-ranking individuals, including senior military officials and Al- Bashir‘s former intelligence chief, were arrested on charges of plotting a coup.  Al- Bashir‘s ICC indictment has effectively cut off his own direct relations to the western world, though his foreign minister has recently made some overtures towards US. The president has instead recently strengthened his attention towards allies in Libya, Egypt and the Middle East, which has helped to buttress the faltering economy and patronage networks that sustain the government.  Immediately before South Sudan‘s independence, al-Bashir‘s army engaged on another front, in the Two Areas of Southern Kordofan and (later) Blue Nile, formerly, occupied by the SPLA‘s 9th and 10th  Divisions. His government has consistently maintained that South Sudan continues to provide support to the rebels in the Two Areas and Darfur. |

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| In August 2012, Al-Bashir underwent throat surgery in Qatar, and his public appearance have subsequently dropped, leading to speculation that the president was facing health issues and conjecture over possible succession, revealing power struggles within the NCP (Magdi EI Gazouli, 2012) The GoS announced that several current and former high-ranking military officials, including al- Bashir‘s former intelligence chief, were arrested on charges of planning to overthrow the government on 21 November 2012. Bashir won re-election in the April 2015 polls, with the official results showing that he received about 94 percent of the vote. In addition to the boycott of the election by the opposition, the elections were also marred by low voter turnout—despite officials extending voting by an extra day—and international criticism of Sudan for not providing a conducive environment for  credible elections. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

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| **Ali Osman Muhammad Taha (NCP): Former First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan** |
| **Origin:** Shayqiyya from Khartoum State |
| **Background:** Ali Osman Muhammad Taha has served as Vice President since 1998, and has played a key role in ensuring that the NCP maintains an Islamist orientation. He was appointed second Vice president of the Government of National Unity after the signing of the CPA in 2005, and First Vice president after the secession of South Sudan in 2011upto 2013. He was Minister for Social Affairs from 1993-1995 and Foreign Minister from 1995-1998. He served as the Secretary – General of the Islamic Movement from 2004-2012.  Like Bashir, Taha comes from a modest background and is of Riverine origin. The son of a Khartoum zookeeper, Taha hails from the Shayqiyya tribe. Taha and Bashir attended the same secondary school in Khartoum; both were active members of the Muslim  Brotherhood. While a law student at the University of Khartoum, Taha was a leader of the Islamic movement and head of the student union, where he was involved in the student protest movement s. He was involved in the ―Islamization‖ of laws and government policies of the Nimieri government, but fell out of favor with the leader, and he several other Islamic movement leaders were arrested shortly before Nimieri was overthrown. Although Taha was in prison at the time of al-Bashir‘s coup in 1989, reports have indicated d that Taha contributed to the endeavour (Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, 2008). After Bashir took office, Taha led the initiative to incorporate Islamism into state polices. He created a new ministry that controlled Islamic charities, religious affairs, youth, women, and relief activities, in an effort to systematically enforce Islamic norms across Sudan (Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed,2008). In 1995, he became Foreign Minister and in 1998, splitting the Islamic movement, Taha facilitated Sudan‘s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and Ansari as-Sunni, integrating diverse Islamic groups into the NCP.  **CPA role:** Taha held a series of one-on-one, private meetings with SPLM/SPLA leader John Garang in Kenya between 2003 and 2005, and was the Sudanese signatory to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement alongside John Garang in 2005.  **Darfur:**Taha handled the Darfur file from 2003-2005 , and it is widely reported by human rights organizations and media that he was involved in the release of Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal, who was responsible for the ensuring military campaign against civilians in Darfur. Although mentioned several times in the international Criminal Court caese field against al-Bashir, Taha does not face charges.  **NCP Leadership dynamics:** A well-known rivalry exists between Vice President Taha and presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie, also a senior Islamic figure, who is a member of the same Ja‘ ali ethnic group as al-Bashir and exerts control over the intelligence/security sectors. The rift has been characterized as representing the party‘s division between security hardliners ( Nafie‘s group) and  more accommodating moderates of Taha‘s group (Crisis Group Africa Report 174, 2011). |



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| **AI- Haj Adam Yousif (NCP): Former Second Vice President of the Republic of Sudan** |
| **Origin:**BeniHaiba from South Darfur State |
| **Background:** AI-Haj Adam Yousif, the highest ranking person in Government from Darfur up to 2013, was appointed second Vice president of Sudan in September 2011, in accordance with the Doha Document for peace in Darfur. A career university professor and member of the National Islamic Front ( NIF), his first Government position was in 1995 as Governor of Northern State. He went on to serve as Governor of South Darfur State from 1997-1999, and briefly as minister of Agriculture. While serving as Governor of South Darfur, Youssef was criticized by Khartoum when he announced the formation of his cabinet before that of the central government.  He resigned from government and joined AI-Turban‘s Popular party during the Islamic movement split of 1999. He was amongst the PCP members accused of sabotage in 1999 and he field to Eritrea,  where he remained until 2005 when the charges were dropped. In April 2010, he unsuccessfully ran against NCP as the PCP candidate for South Darfur‘s gubernatorial elections. In November of the same year, he resigned from the PCP and joined NCP shortly thereafter. He rose quickly within the rank of the party, earning the favor of president al-Bashir, and was appointed as political Secretary.  Youssef has been public critical of the number of individuals from the Riverine ( Nile River Valley) region who hold positions of power in government, and vocal about the need for Sudanese citizens from across the country to receive equal opportunities.  **Other Developments:** Since becoming the second vice president of Sudan on 13 September 2011 Youssef has maintained a relatively low profile. In January 2012, he stated that ―if necessary, Juba is not far‖ if the military decided to pursue the SPLM-N in South Korodofan and Blue Nile, which Khartoum claims are backed by South Sudan.He was instrumental to the rapprochement between Sudan and South Sudan up to 2015 leading to reduction in proxy warfare and support of armed  movements in each other territory. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

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| **Dr Al- Tijani Al- SeisiAteem (LJM): Chairman of the Darfur Regional Authority and Chairman of the Liberation and Justice Movement** |
| **Origin:** Fur from Darfur |
| **BACKGROUND**: Dr AI- Tijani AI-SeisiAteem comes from a well-to-do Darfur Fur family. He was a member of the Umma party in the 1980s and appointed as Governor of Darfur under prime Minister al-Saddiq al- Mahdi. He has previously worked for the united Nations at the Director –level in Addis Ababa. After al- Bashir‘s coup, Al-Seisi left the country and spent several years as an exiled activist in the UK where he Chaired the UK Darfur Union. Al-Seisi was appointed leader of the Liberation and Justice Movement ( LJM)  when it was formed in February 2010 from various splinter groups and smaller opposition |

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| movements.  **Other Developments:** AI-Seisi signed the Doha Document for peacein Darfur Agreement between the LJM and Government of Sudan on 14 July 2011which included the provision for a regional authority with both executive and legislative functions, the Darfur Regional Authority was formed. On 20 September 2011 AI- Seisi was named as chairman of the new authority, and on 8 February 2012 the authority was officially inaugurated. He was subsequently removed as the Leader of LJM on 18  January 2015. Under him, the DRA largely failed to advance the peace process as it was funded by the Government of Sudan as envisaged in the terms of reference establishing the DRA. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

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| **Nafie Ali Nafie: NCP Deputy Chairman And Assistant To The President** |
| **Origin:**Ja‘ ali from River Nile State |
| **Background:** Like Bashir, Nafie is of the Ja‘ali (Riverine) tribe, form a modest village family. As a student at the University of Khartoum, he became involved in the Islamic Movement as a protégé of Hassan al-Turabi. He later acquired a PHD in Genetics from the University of California in 1980, and upon return to Khartoum, he took on security and intelligence a role within the movement, travelling extensively throughout the Islamic world to make contacts with other Islamism militant organizations. This knowledge was later applied towards Bashir‘s government; al-Bashir appointed Nafie as chief of the National Internal Security Services (NISS) in 1990. He was dismissed from this post in 1995 in a controversy associated with the attempted assassination of Egypt‘s Hosni Mubarak. Nafie broke with aI- Turabi in 1998 when he , alongside a number of other senor Islamic, signed the ‘  Memorandum of the Ten‘, which signaled widespread discontent within the Islamic movement towards the policies pursued by al-Turabi during the 1990s. Nafie grew closer to al- Bashir served as a presidential advisor during the Naivasha peace talks with South Sudan, and then as a Federal Affairs Minister after the signing of the CPA.  **CPA Period:** Throughout the CPA period, Nafie exercised significant influence as presidential Assistant, reportedly influencing cabinet and gubernatorial appointments, as well as controlling the security/ intelligence sectors which in turn facilitated the NCP‘s patronage network (Crisis Group Africa Report 174, 2011). In 2004 Nafie made a crucial intervention that Heglig belonged to Western Kordofan State, rather than United State, citing maps that have been subsequently questioned by experts. A much-publicized rivalry developed between Nafie and Vice president Ali UthmanTaha;some analysis say this stems from ideological differences ( with Nafie advocating a military approach, critical of Taha‘s signing of the CPA), others attribute the rivalry as ethnic, due to Nafie‘s shared tribal affiliation with president al-Bashir.  **Post-Independence:** In June 2011, immediately before South Sudan‘s secession, the president repudiated a framework political and security agreement with SPLM-N that Nafie signed on behalf of Sudan. This was originally interpreted by some as a sign of diminished closeness between president and Assistant, but Nafie has continued to publicly and vehemently reflect hard line positions on issues  ranging from GoS‘ response protests, Islamism, Darfur, Israel and negotiations with Sudan. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

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| **Lt. Gen Abdel Rahim Muhammed Hussein (NCP): Former Minister of Defence** |
| **Origin:** Northern State |

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| **Background:** A staunch military Islamist and close ally of al- Bashir, whom he known since secondary school, Abdel Rahim Hussein joined the Sudan Armed Forces in the 1960s and was a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood‘s military cell from the 1970s. He played a major role in the coup that brought al- Bashir to power in 1989. From 1993-2005 served as minister of interior, where he was reported to have worked with al-Qa‘eda during Osama bin Laden‘s period in Sudan. He was appointed Minister of Defence in 2005.  **Darfur:** Hussein served as the president‘s especially representative for Darfur from 2003-2004, and he was responsible for overall coordination of national, state and Local security  entities and through the recruitment, arming and funding of the police forces and the military/Janjaweed. In March 2012 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant on 20 counts of crimes against humanity (persecution, murder, forcible transfer, rape, inhumane acts, imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty and torture), and 21 counts of war crimes (murder, attacks against civilian population distribution of property, rape, pillaging and outrage upon personal dignity) allegedly committed in Darfur, including 20 counts of crimes against humanity. The ICC stated that he is among those with the greatest criminal responsibility for atrocities committed during the period he served as coordinator.  **Other Developments:** Hussein continues to be considered one of the most influential individuals in Bashir‘s government, second only to the president making military Islamists. Most recently, he has taken a center-stage role at the AUHIP-facilitated negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, tackling issues of security as well as other matters. Although considered a ‗hard-liner‘, his involvement in the negotiations was interpreted as a sign of al-Bashir‘s investment in any decisions made in Addis, given the close relationship between the two. Domestically, there have been a number of reports suggesting rising dissent amongst senior army officers who wish for the SAF to be more independent from the NCP. In the context of the evolving political dynamics in Khartoum, recent protest movements , and reported distancing of some civilian Islamist leaders from the NCP and state, Hussein has remained a mainstay of the establishment and proponent of a security-based approach that is disinclined toward international intervention and dialogue with opposition . After the 21 November arrest of 13 senior current and former military and intelligence officials suspected of plotting to overthrow the government , the ‗reformist‘ faction of the NCP issued a statement calling for the release the detainees and accusing the minister of Defenec of being responsible for the poor performance of the army in Sudanese war zones and failure respond to ― Israeli attacks‖ on Sudan (Magda EI Gizouli, 2012). He was removed as the Minister of Defence in 2015 and is the current  Governor of Khartoum State. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

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| **Mr. Ali Ahmed Karti (NCP): Minister of Foreign Affairs** |
| **Origin:**Hassanyyia from River Nile State |
| **Background:** Considered one of the pillars of the NCP regime and the mastermind of GoS‘ foreign policy, Karti, who was born in 1953 River Nile State, studied law at the University of Khartoum. He practiced law until al-Bashir‘s takeover, when he joined government in 1989 as Director of Internal Security. In 1998 he was appointed as Commander of the popular Defence Forces, and two years later he was elected to the National Assembly as Representative of SoutShandi. From 2001-2005, he was minister of justice and in 2005 he became State Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 2010 he was promoted to Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the same year he was elected as a representative of South Shandi in the National Legislative Corporation. He was removed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2015. |

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| He is a staunch Islamist and founding members of the National Congress of Party (NCP) . Within the NCP, his closest allies include Dr. NafiealiNafie (presidential Assistant), Lt. Gen Abdul Rahim Hassan (Minister of Defence), Lt. Gen Bakri Hassan Saleh (Minster of presidential Affairs) – all reputed‖ hard- liners‖. Like many of his NCP counterparts, his private investments have drawn attention, notably the reported $85 million purchase of a hotel in Khartoum North.  **Other Developments:**  After Sudan lost access to 75% of its oil reserves with the secession of Sudan, compounded by the oil pipeline shutdown which caused inflation to spiral, the Foreign Minister has travelled extensively to develop bilateral relations and discuss economic cooperation, including China, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Qatar and Russia. In Qatar alone, media reported $2 billion in new investments to Sudan, to be parceled out over a four-year period (Qatar News Agency, 2012).  Karti has recently been perceived as having played a progressive role in underscoring the importance of GoS compliance with SCR 2046 within the presidency and elsewhere in GoS. In February 2012 Karti admitted that relations with the United State were in a ‗state of fluctuation‘. Karti spoke with secretary of State Hillary Clinton in early August 2012, where he underscored GoS‘ position that secretary the AUHIP- facilitated negotiations must resolve security matters first, before moving onto other pending issues, and accused Juba of supporting rebel movements in Sudan. Karti has frequently pleaded with the US to remove Sudan from that list of state sponsors of terrorism, reminding the American administration of his government‘s cooperativeness over the implementation of the CPA and willingness to share intelligence with the CIA regarding terror suspects hosted by the government in the 1990s. He was instrumental to the close relations between Sudan and China which enabled the latter to veto most UNSCRs on China. In this regard, he worked very closely with  MrDaffa-AllaElhag Al Osman, the Permanent Representative of Sudan to the United Nations. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

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| **Dr. Amin Hassan Omer Abdullah (NCP): Former Minister of State in the Office of the president and Current Head of the Darfur Peace Follow-Up Office** |
| **Background:** Born in 1951 in Western Sudan, Dr. Amin Hassan Omer Abdullah studied political Science at the University of Khartoum. Graduating in 1975, he pursued a PhD in political science at the university of Missouri, United States. Having worked as a public relations officer in the private sector, he went on to become the Director of the Office of the Attorney General and subsequently entered the world journalism. After holding the position of Director of Research at the Center for social studies in Khartoum, he was appointed Secretary General of the minister of Culture and information. He then became the Chairman of the Board of Directors of communication Technology and subsequently Director General of the Sudanese Radio and Television. Having joined the Islamic movement prior to the 1989 coup, Abdullah is a long serving member of the NCP and its predecessor. He was a key negotiator at the CPA talks in Naivasha and the chief NCP negotiator during the Darfur peace  Talks in Doha. In August 2011, the president established the Darfur peace Follow-up Office and appointed Dr. Omer as its head, tasked with planning strategies for the Darfur region and implementing of presidential decisions in the areas of peace, development and security in Darfur. The decree replaced Dr. Ghazi Salahaddin al-Attain, a prominent NCP leader, from the Darfur file.  **Other Developments:**In May 2012, president al-Bashir formed of the High Follow-Up committee for peace in Darfur (HFCPD) to oversee the implementation of the Doha Document for peace in Darfur (DDPD), chaired by president, with Vice president Taha and DRA chairman Seisi as deputies. At the  same time, the president reformed Dr. Amin Hassan Omer Abdullah‘s office and charge him with preparation of plans and propositions to the HFCPD. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.


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| **Lt. Gen. Mohammed Atta Abbas AI-Moula: National Intelligence and Security Services Director- General** |
| **Background:** Born in 1957 in Khartoum, Tatta is from the same Ja‘ali tribe as president Omer al-Bashir. He obtained his Bachelor of Engineering from the University of Khartoum in 1982, where he first became an active member Sudanese Islamic Movement. He joined NISS in 1994 and was Appointed Secretary-General for the peace Advisory Committee in the president‘s Office in 2000. He was a participant in the Naivasha peace talks, throughout which he served as Director for the peace Office in the Sudanese Embassy in Nairobi. He then served as Deputy Director-General of NISS from 2014-2009. He was promoted from Deputy of NISS to Director after Salah Gosh was removed to become presidential Adviser on Security Affairs in 2009 till date. .  **Other Developments:** Mohammed Atta AI-Moula Abbas has been dismissive of the threat posed by the Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF), and vocal in accusing South Sudan of harboring rebels from Darfur and providing support to the SPLM-N. He is seen as the key architect of the gradual removal of the consent of Government of Sudan for the operation of UNAMID, at the tactical level. This is considering the incessant denial of freedom of movement to UNAMID personnel through restriction of  patrol movements and flight clearance for UNAMID operations. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

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| **Lt. Gen. Ismat Abdel Rahman: Interior Minister and Former Chief of Staff of the Sudanese Armed Forces** |
| **Background:** Prior to his role as Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Ismat Abdel Rahman served as SAF Director of Operations in Khartoum19.  **Recent Developments:** Shortly before South Sudan‘s secession, the Lt. General commanded the SAF deployment into Abyei and the compulsory dissolution of the joint Integrated Units that catalyzed the violence in Southern Kordofan. Currently, the majority of the Lt. General‘s armed forces are deployed in the south of the country, engaged on the conflict in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and South Darfur. After South Sudan‘s takeover of Heglig in April 2012 the General publicly stated that South Sudan will pay of damaging the oil infrastructure in Heglig, commenting that ― the damages they have committed against oil facilities will not go unpunished and they will get to taste it‖**(**Sudan Tribune, 24 April 2012).  Khartoum supported the Libyan rebels in their fight against |

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| Muammar Gaddafi, and since the fall of the dictator, the SAF Army Chief has engaged closely with the new Libyan military, reportedly establishing a joint border force and other border-protection measures. In August 2012, the Lt. General led a military delegation to Libyan, prompting speculation of strengthened reciprocal support between the two armies. He was appointed Minister in 2013 and  initiated agreement and security cooperation with Turkey in combating terrorism and other crimes in all forms. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

**Armed Opposition Movements**

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| **Malik Agar, head of the Sudan Revolutionary Front and Chair of the Sudan people’s Revolution Movement-North (SPLM-N)** |
| **Origin:** Fellata from Blue Nile State |
| **Background**: Malik Agar Eyer joined SPLM/A in 1986 and commanded many military operations in Eastern Sudan until 1997. He was one of the key negotiators during the peace talks in Naivasha. After the CPA, he served as Minister of investment from 2005-2007. He was elected Governor in Southern BLUE Nile in 2010, becoming the only elected SPLM Governor in the north. In February 2011, after the south Sudan referendum, the SPLM was restructured and a new party, SPLM-North was established, with Malik Ager as its Chair.  In early June 2011, fighting broke out between the SAF and SPLM- N in Southern Kordofan after the SAF began disarming SPLA joint integrated forces in the state. Throughout June, Malik Agar and other SPLM-N representatives participated in a heated round of  AUHIP-facilitated negotiations on the two Areas (southern Kordofanian and Blue Nile States). On 28 June 2011, Agar was the SPLM-N Signatory, alongside Gos‘ Nafie al Nafie, of a framework agreement on political and security Arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan State, which was rebuked by president Bashir shortly thereafter. Failure to reach agreement prior to Independence left the SPLM-N in a lurch as a reorganized negotiating partly, since after 9 July 2011 their ties to SPLM were officially severed.  **Post-Independence:** After South Sudan‘s independence, Malik Agar served as Governor of Blue Nile in Sudan until early September 2011, when the conflict between SPLM-N and SAF spread to Blue Nile state, and the Government banned the SPLM-N‘s activities , arrested thousands of its members, and removed Ager from his position as Governor. Agar went semi-underground, and in November 2011, his party formed an alliance with three Darfurian rebel groups (JEM, SLA-Minnie Minawi and SLA- Abdul Wahid), called the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), with Agar as head, with the objective of overthrowing the NCP government.  In April 2012, AU peace and security council issued a communiqué calling for the facilitation by the AUHIP of direct negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-N, which was repeated in security council Resolution 2046. Sudan has maintained that the government would not reorganize the SPLM-N as a political force unless it serves all ties with the SPLM in south Sudan, which Khartoum accuses of aiding the rebels. The AUHIP resumed political talks in September but the parties remained far apart; Khartoum has so far opposed the party‘s demand to reinstate Agar as Governor  of Blue Nile. Fighting has continued with heavy humanitarian impact, particularly in southern |

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| Kordofan, in spite of a tripartite (AU, UN and League of Arab State)–facilitated agreement reached on 3 August 2012 with the Government of Sudan and Agar‘s party on the modalities for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected civilian populations in areas controlled by SPLM-N in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States. His authority over SPLM is currently being challenged by Abdul Aziz al Hilu  leading to division within the ranks of SPLM-N. In July 2017 the factions led by both men clashed inKordofan State over issues related to command and control of the SPLM-N. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

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| **YasirArman,Secretary-General Of The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM- N)** |
| **Origin:**Ja‘aali from Gezira State |
| **Background:** A Sufi Muslim, Armani is married to the daughter of a prominent Ngok Danka leader from Abyei. He studied law at the Cairo University in Sudan in the 1980s, where he was an active member of the communist movement and imprisoned under Nimieiri‘s regime.  In 1987, Armed because one of the first northerners to join the SPLM/A . He advanced quickly and became a commander based in Asmara. In 1997, he became the SPLM/A Arabic-language spokesman. He was one of the members of the SPLM delegation that led to the Naivasha Agreement in Kenya. After the CPA, he was appointed chairman of the SPLM parliamentary caucus in the National Assembly and SPLM deputy secretary General for the Northern Sector.  In the 2010 Sudanese elections, the SPLM political Bureau nominated Armani as its candidate for the National presidency, but the party withdraw its nomination, officially on grounds that fair elections would not be convened in Darfur.  When SPLM-N was officially separated from SPLM and founded as a northern party in February 2011, Armani was appointed as the party‘s secretary-General. Along with SPLM-N chair Malik Agar, Arman participated in the AUHIP-facilitated negotiations in June 2011 which led to the signed 28 June agreement on political and security arrangements in southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, immediately abrogated by President Bashir.  **Post-Independence:** When the Government of Sudan banned SPLM-N activities in November 2011, after the fighting between SPLM-N and SAF (which was already taking place in southern Kordofanian) spread to Blue Nile state, Arman joined other SPLM-N leadership in going semi-underground. He travelled frequently outside of Sudan, and was often seem in Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Juba. Along with Malik Agar, he led the SPLM-N delegation in negotiations that led to the signing of the memorandum with the AU, League and UN on humanitarian assistance to civilians in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan.  Arman has made a number of statements about the political agenda of the Sudan Revolutionary Front and the SPLM-N, namely on building the political base of the Revolutionary Front, along with other  organizations, towards a movement akin to the African National Congress of south Africa. In the |

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| context of recent developing Khartoum dynamics, namely the protest movements that began in June 2012 and the formation by the established political opposition parties of a ‗vision‘ for a post-NCP future in a document title the ‗Democratic Alternative‘, Arman stated in a press release that these parties are simply repeating the bad habits of old by excluding the force of the peripheries and the  actual protesters, ‗elbowing‘ the government from the kitchen of power in Khartoum. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

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| **Gibril Ibrahim, Head of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)** |
| **Origin:** Zaghawa from Northern Darfur |
| **Background:** Gibril Ibrahim lived in London, serving as JEM‘s foreign affairs chief until January2012, when Khaalil Ibrahim (his brother and the group‘s leader) was killed in a SAF airstrike.Gibril served as JEMs Secretary of Foreign Affairs in London from 2006 – 2012. He was part of JEMs negotiating team at the failed peac talks in Abuja and Doha.  Jibril‘s brother Khalil was influenced by Hassan al-Turabi and an NIF member, who, along with other dissidents, allegedly published the ―Black Book‖ in 2000, describing statistically how riverine Arabs dominated political power and resources. In 2001, while living in exile, he established the JEM, which became the most powerful and heavily armed rebel group in Darfur. After the Chad-  Sudan rapprochement (2009), he was expelled from Chad and went to Libya, where he remained and the JEM allegedly fought as mercenaries for Muammar Gaddafi during the war. He fled Libya two months before Gaddafi fall, returning to Darfur. In November 2011, JEM joined the alliance that had already been established between the SPLM-N and two other Darfur rebel groups (SLA –Abdul Wahid and SLA-MinniManawi) to form the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). Khalil was killed in Northern Kordofan in December 2011.  **Other Developments:** Although Jibril Ibrahim was elected to chair the movement after his brother‘s death, a cadre of JEM figurers under al ToumAkhbar reportedly split with the main group over a lack of transparency in Jibril‘s election. Until assuming control of the group Jibril had no military experience and is believed to be more likely to negotiate than his brother, who favored fighting. He reportedly arrived in Bor with a south Sudanese passport. When the SRF leadership was established in January 2012, Jibril Ibrahim was appointed Vice president and given the external affairs portfolio. In 2015, he took over the leadership of the Sudan Revolutionary Front from SPLM-N Chair, Malik Agar. His leadership of the JEM is still being challenged as he has been unable to reunite with breakaway faction. However, JEM has remained potent under his leadership despite the internal crisis and reduction in external support from South Sudan owing to rapprochement between South Sudan  and Sudan. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.



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| **Abdul Wahid, Head Of Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahdi (SLA-AW)** |
| **Origin:** Fur from West Darfur |
| **Background:** Born in 1968 in Zalingei, Abdul Wahid studied Law at the University of Khartoum until 1995, when he began to work as a lawyer. From 2003-2005, Abdul Wahid was president of the Sudan Liberation Army ( SLA), which was the main rebel group in Darfur for the two years prior to its split in 2005. He went on to lead his SLA-Abdul Wahid faction while in self-imposed exile in Eritrea, paris and then Kampala, but reportedly lost the support of many troops and commanders on the ground. Since the DPA negotiations in Abuja concluded I 2006, Abdul Wahid has refused to participate in subsequent peace talks.  **Other Developments:** In August 2011, Abdul Wahid‘s party formed the allied Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) with SLA-MinniManawi and the SPLM-N, which was joined by JEM three months later. In early 2012, Abdul Wahid was appointed Vice president for political and legal affairs of the coalition. Reportedly, as of July 2012, the SPLA-AW‘s presences and sphere of influence is primarily limited to the mountainous Jebel Marra area of Darfur, and the group had several hundred combatants and has significant support amongst Fur IDPs. The SRF has brought to the fore rivalry between Abdul Wahid and JEM;s leadership; reportedly both SLA-AW and JEM sought to lead the SRF but their rivalry ultimately prevented either from obtaining a better position within the joint command structure. Playing for the favor of the secular SPLM-N, the SLA factions reportedly have criticized JEM for not renouncing its Islamist stance (Small Arms Survey , 2012).Abdul Wahdi remains firmly in charge of SLA/AW though some of his field commander renounced the struggle in 2015, and  reportedly closed ranks with the Government of Sudan. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

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| **MinniMannawi, Head Of Sudan Liberation Army-MinniMannawi (SLA-MM)** |
| **Origin:**IIa Deign Zaghawa from North Darfur |
| **Background:** A former schoolteacher from North, Darfur, MinniMannawi was the secretary of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), allied with Abdul Wahid faction until he formed his own splinter party in 2005. After signing the Darfur peace Agreement with the Government of Sudan in 2006 he was appointed chairman of the now-defunct Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, the Go‘s‘ top position in Darfur and technically the fourth-ranking member of the presidency ( from the role‘s categorization as a senior Assistant to the president). Despite this, Manawa was progressively shut out of power, in part based on his 2006 announcement that he did not object to UN involvement in Darfur. In 2010 the Darfur peace Agreement collapsed and Mannawi reportedly fled to south Sudan.  In his absence he was dismissed from his Sudanese Government position. Reportedly, during the talks that led to the Doha Document for peace in Darfur between LJM and the Government, a number of LJM dissidents joined SLA-MM.  **Other Developments:** In late 2011, MinniMannawi joined with SLA-Abdul Wahid, JEM and the SPLM-N to form the Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF), and in early 2012, he was appointed the coalition‘s Vice president for finance and administrative affairs. Reportedly, NISS sources claimed that as of late 2011, the SPLA-MM has strength of 550 combatants and 117 vehicles. While the strength of his fighter remains disputed, the SLA/MM is a key part of the SRF with the key objective of toppling President Bashir‘s government. |

**Source**: Data on the key players in the Darfur Crisis were mostly obtained from UN HQ briefs and compilation on the lead characters in the Darfur conflict, UN HQ, 2016.

# Appendix“E”

**UNAMID MILITARY TASKS**

1. In direct support of the implementation of the UNAMID Mandate and DDPD and subsequent agreements, the military tasks are as follows:

(l) Protect civilians under imminent threat and violence;

1. Identify and patrol humanitarian aid supply routes, and where necessary escort humanitarian aid convoy;
2. Identify and secure, within capabilities, nomadic migration routes and achieve route security through patrols when and where necessary;
3. Contribute to security at return sites
4. Complement police roles to patrol around IDP camps;
5. Verify exact locations of all forces in Darfur;
6. Establish security roadblocks and checkpoints along main supply routes (MSRs) to enhance security;
7. Protect logistic distribution points and centres, which include provision of escorts;
8. Assist in mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance activities;
9. Develop Information Operation Strategy (IOS) for the promotion ofUNAMID military operations;
10. Monitor compliance of parties to DDPD ceaseﬁre and security arrangements;
11. Investigate all ceaseﬁre violations;
12. Report ceaseﬁre violations and violations of the Laws of Aimed Conﬂict (LOAC) to the AU Peace and Security Council and the UNSC through Ceaseﬁre Commission (CFC). I
13. Verify disarmament of all armed militias;
14. Monitor and verify redeployment of long-range weapons;
15. Provide assistance to Darfur Security Arrangement Implementation Commission (DSAIC);
16. Map parties‟ areas of control, humanitarian aid supply routes and redeployment zones;
17. Establish and protect assembly sites for combatants where necessary;
18. Assist in disarmament of former combatants;
19. Ensure security of collected weapons from former combatants prior to destruction.
20. Ensure implementation of veriﬁcation mechanisms through the established Sector Ceaseﬁre Sub-Commissions (SCFSC);
21. Assist development and implementation of comprehensive and sustainable DDR programme of former combatants, including women and children associated with those combatants in accordance with provisions of DDPD; and
22. In addition to military tasks described by DDPD, military component of UNAMID has also been mandated to undertake the following tasks:
    1. Protect UNAMID personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;
    2. Ensure security and freedom of movement (FoM) of UNAMID personnel, humanitarian aid workers and assessment and evaluation commission personnel;
    3. Prevent disruption of DDPD implementation by armed groups, without prejudice to the responsibility of GoS;
    4. Prevent armed attacks;
    5. Investigate and report incidents of armed conﬂict and attacks, including on civilians;
    6. Monitor and report troop movements;
    7. Maintain situational awareness in the area of responsibility;
    8. Seize or collect, as appropriate, arms or related material whose presence in Darfur is in violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of UNSC ResoIution,1556, and to dispose of such arms and related material as appropriate; and
    9. Liaise with parties, stakeholders and friendly forces within area of responsibility (AOR) and Areas of Interest (AOI) as necessary to facilitate accomplishment of assigned tasks.

# Appendix “F”

**MANDATE OF THE UN POLICE**

Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1769 of 31 July 2007 authorized the establishment of African Union United Nations Hybrid Operations in Darfur. UNAMID Police, in close co-ordination with other mission components has the following roles and responsibilities in the implementation of the mandate:

1. Monitor through proactive patrolling, the parties‟ policing activities in camps for internally displaced persons, demilitarized and buffer zones and areas of control;
2. Support in coordination with the parties as outlined in the Darfur Peace Agreement, the establishment and training of community police in camps for internally-displaced persons, to support capacity building of the Government of the Sudan Police in Darfur, in accordance with international standards of Human Rights, Democratic Policing and accountability, and to support the institutional development of the police of the Movements;
3. Support the efforts of the Government of Sudan and of the police of the Movements to maintain public order and build the capacity of Sudanese law enforcement in this regard through specialized training and joint operations;
4. Assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements relating to human rights and the rule of law and to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to respect for human rights and the rule of law, in which all are ensured effective protection;
5. Assist all stakeholders and local government authorities, in particular in their efforts to transfer resources in an equitable manner from the Federal

Government to the Darfur States and to implement reconstruction plans and existing and subsequent agreements on land use and compensation issues;

1. Support the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement in restructuring and building the capacity of the police service in Darfur, including through monitoring, training, mentoring, co-location and joint patrols;
2. Assist in promoting the rule of law, including through institution building, an strengthening local capacities to combat impunity;
3. Ensure an adequate human rights and gender presence capacity and expertise in Darfur in order to contribute to efforts to protect and promote human rights in Darfur with particular attention to vulnerable groups;
4. Assist in harnessing the capacity of women to participate in the peace process.