# AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AMNESTY PROGRAM FOR EX-MILITANTS IN NIGERIA’S NIGER DELTA

**BY**

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(MSC/SOC-SCI/14422/2010-2011)

# DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, NIGERIA**

# MARCH, 2018

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# A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTERS DEGREE IN SOCIOLOGY

**DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

# AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, NIGERIA

**MARCH, 2018**

# DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation titled An Assessment of the Amnesty Program for Ex- militants in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta has been undertaken by me in the Department of Sociology, under the supervision of Yohanna K. Gandu, Ph.D and Bashir Tanimu Ph.D. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided accordingly. No part of this work has been previously presented for another degree or diploma at any institution.

# Aaron Jeb Dandodo Date

# CERTIFICATION

This dissertation with title ―An Assessment of the Amnesty Program for Ex-militants in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta‖ meets the regulations governing the award Masters of Science Degree in Sociology of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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**Chairman, Supervisory Committee**

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**Member, Supervisory Committee**

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**Dean, School of Postgraduate Studies**

# DEDICATION

I dedicate this work first to my Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ and to my ever lovely God mother, Mrs Eunice S.P. Ejeh.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATION

**AFF:** Arogbo Freedom Fighters

**CENND**: Conference of Ethnic Nationality of Niger Delta

**COMA**: Coalition for Militant Action

**COSEND:** Comprehensive Development for the Niger Delta

**DDR:** Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (1st mention)

**FBO:** Faith Based Organization

**FGD:** Focused Group Discussions

**IDI:** In-depth Interviews

**IMF**: International Monetary Fund

**IVF:** Iduwini Volunteer Force

**IYC:** Ijaw Youth Council

**JRC:** Joint Revolutionary Council

**JTF:** Joint Task Force

**KKK:** Ku Klix Klan

**MEND:** Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta **MOSOP:** Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People **MOSOP:** Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People **MSSND:** Movement for the Sovereign State of Niger Delta **NDCG:** Niger Delta Coastal Guerrillas

**NDDB:** Niger Delta Development Board **NDDC:** Niger Delta Development Commission **NDMFS:** The Niger Delta Militant force squad **NDPF** Niger Delta People‘s Salvation Front **NDRBA:** Niger Delta River Basin Authority **NDTC**: Niger Delta Technical Committee **NDVF:** Niger Delta Volunteer Force

**NNPC:** Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

**OBC:** Oil Bearing Communities

**OBR:** Ogoni Bill of Right

**OMPADEC:** Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission

**PTF:** Petroleum Trust Fund

**PTI:** Petroleum Training Institute

**RNC:** Royal Niger Company

**SCF:** Standard Cubit Feet

**SPDC:** Shell Petroleum Development Company **SSLM:** South –South Liberation Movement **TNC**: Transnational Cooperation

**TNC:** Transnational Corporations

**UNDP:** United Nations Development Programme

**VAT**: Value Added Tax

**YES:** Youth Employment Scheme

# ABSTRACT

This study is an assessment of the Amnesty Program for ex-militants in the Niger Delta as a government palliative for Oil Bearing Communities in the region. The study examined the extent to which the Amnesty Program addressed the issues of development of the people of the Niger Delta and militancy in particular; the job prospects of trained ex-militants and its implication on their standard of living; the extent to which the Amnesty Program has contributed towards a peaceful resolution of militancy in the Niger-Delta and its implications to the emergence of other forms of insurgences in other regions of Nigeria like the Boko Haram; and finally, the study assessed the implications of the omission of women and children in the Niger Delta Amnesty program. Ways to ensure lasting peace in the oil rich region were also looked into. The Political Economy Thesis served as the theoretical framework for the study and an expanded framework for assessing the amnesty program for ex-militants in the Niger Delta. Data were obtained from a sample of 200 respondents in a community survey from Okrika town, Bonny Island, Opobo kingdom and Port Harcourt City areas of Rivers State; Seventeen (17) In-depth Interviews (IDIs) and three (3) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were also conducted comprising Ex- militants, their Leaders, Training partners, Amnesty and Oil Company Officials, Pressmen, Community Leaders, Women and children. The findings revealed that not all participants in the amnesty program were militants, the core militants never benefited much in the program in terms of their allotted stipends, and that their living standard as militants was much better economically then in the creeks compared to the post amnesty period; but on social ground the reverse was the case. Not many of the trained ex- militants have been absorbed into Oil companies as anticipated by the ex-militants and Niger Delta community. While most of the respondents both in the survey, IDIs and FGDs saw a reason to agree that the amnesty might have instigated insurgencies in other regions of the country, they did not however see a relationship between the amnesty offer and the Boko Haram insurgencies in Nigeria‘s North East. Women and children were thought to be omitted in the Amnesty Program and the possible future implication of this neglect being the rise of other social vices if not well tackled. Findings also showed that over 84% of the respondents were of the view that social amenities could alongside the amnesty aid peace building efforts in the region. In addition, there was a general opinion among ex-militant discussants in the FGDs and other interviewees in the IDIs that, although the Amnesty Program was a welcome development and has brought relative peace to the region, it has not yet met their issues of a fair share of the national cake and community development. Suggestions from the study showed that increase derivation, the passing into law of the Petroleum Industry Bill and job creation will help sustain peace building efforts in the Niger Delta. Also, suggested by the respondents in the study was the need for the government to be committed to her promise of developing the Niger Delta region, investing in her human capital and creating a robust economic environment for other Non-Oil Economies in the region to flourish and for the people of the region to find expression.

# Background to the Study

# CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

―I hereby grant amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly, or indirectly, participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta.‖ Umaru Musa Yar‘Adua (Late), Nigerian President (Lawal, 2009:15).

President Musa Yar‘Adua (Late) for the first time took a non-violent path in resolving the crisis in the Niger Delta region in his bid to rescue the Nigerian economy when his government was faced with the reality of a drastic drop in oil production which has great implications on the country‘s economy that is heavily dependent on oil. June 24th 2009 witnessed a 60 day amnesty policy announcement which was a great effort on the side of the government that shows a radical departure from that of his predecessors like President Olusegun Obasanjo who adopted some violent measures as with the Odi massacre in 1999. Successive Nigerian governments have in the past taken a sticker measure through its violent repression, on the social movement (by various groups notably Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) which has become violent at that stage became more violent in its approach as the number of militant groups increased, making it very difficult to explore and exploit oil in the region. Consequently, the 2.5 million barrels of oil production per day in Nigeria dropped to less than half of that number (1.2 million barrels per day), making Angola which was the second highest oil producing country in Africa to become the first (Chidi, 2011).

The discovery of crude oil by Shell D‘Arcy in the Oloibiri oil field in 1958 changed not only the economic landscape of the Nigerian states and its external relations, but also the social, economic and ecological fate of communities in the Niger Delta region. According to Evoh

(2009:46) on the state of oil economy and development in the Niger Delta: ―Rather than bringing social and economic growth and development in Nigeria, the oil industry together with the institutions of the State have eroded ‗community spirit‘ and social capital; brought untold hardship to the people, and ruin to the natural environment of the country‖ over time with exploration activities. He further states that; besides, unsustainable approaches to resource exploitation and community relations, the foundations of traditional economy in the Niger-Delta have also been destroyed. In line with this, Ukiwo (2009) observed that:

―The Oil industry (in Nigeria) has remained an enclave economy for 50 years with little or no linkages to the regional economy… Surpluses derived from oil have not been ploughed back into transforming local agriculture and aquaculture, which still employs most of the population‖.

Community actions and efforts to seek redress both from oil companies operating in the region and the Nigerian state have led to unprecedented levels of sabotage, vandalism and unrest (Evoh, 2009: 48), thus agitations and militancy.

Agitations in the Niger Delta dates back to the colonial era when the fear of domination and neglect by the major ethnic groups in the country triggered demands for state creation seen by the Niger Delta as a guarantee for development. The colonial government established the Willink Commission to inquire into the fears and demands of minorities. However, having recognized the lack of development as the key reason for the agitations, it recommended the declaration of the region as a special area of development and a board to plan its development (Ibaba, 2011:239, Gandu, 2011:148). This was one of the first attempts by the Nigerian State to address not just the Niger Delta question but also that of other minorities in Nigeria. According to Gandu (2011:148);

It was set up to address the ‗apprehension‘ and fears of all minorities in Nigeria, as it moved towards formal political independence. The Willink commission

documented the depth of neglect that the Niger Delta region had experienced and recommended the best strategies for the development of the region. The commission specifically recommended that the Niger Delta region be accorded special developmental status by making it a special area to be developed directly by the federal government of Nigeria.

Other palliatives after the Willink commission have been in place in the past to address the development challenges of the Niger Delta region but have been met with failures due to obvious reason of funds, corruption and approach among others. Not meeting up with the needs of the region led to violent agitations and vandalization of properties and kidnaps of oil workers. Militancy was on the increase.

In response to subsequent violence and militancy in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian State in the past has used both violent and non-violent means to bring to rest the unrest in the Oil Bearing Communities (OBCs) of the Niger Delta. However, a more recent non-violent means was introduced by the Late President Musa Yar‘adua which is been studied and understood as the Amnesty Program, since it seems to be efficacious. It is also worthy of note here that the Amnesty Program was focused on the militants only in the Niger Delta.

# Statement of the Research Problem

Oil may be a blessing to many countries as it is the case with Saudi Arabia, Russia, United States, United Arab Emirates (Key World Statistics, 2012), but since its first discovery in commercial quantity in 1956 in Nigeria, it has become one decisive commodity of the corporate existence of Nigeria as a nation (See Shala, 2006:265; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Dafinone, 2007; Edevie, 2001 and Frynas, 1998). For over 40 years now oil has pitched the Nigerian government with its cohort of Transnational Oil Corporations (TNOCs) against pauperized communities of the oil-producing region, who have been protesting against environmental

degradation and its attendant socio-economic deprivation. The resultant armed clashes between the Nigerian government and the militant groups lasted for over ten years (Okeregbe, 2010).

The Oil Bearing Communities of the Niger Delta region have been a region characterized with fierce violent conflicts for several years. The conflict has between successive Nigerian Governments, their collaborating oil companies and militant groups from the region. The core issues in the conflict are the socio-economic deprivations and denial of resource control which were occasioned by corporate malfeasance and indifference of successive Nigerian Government to the plight, demands and aspirations of the people of the region.

Worthy of note here is that non-violent efforts were pursued by the Nigerian state to address the developmental challenges (but not militancy in particular) in the region with the establishment of a number of palliatives. The palliatives included the establishment of various commissions, such as the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1960; the Presidential Task Force to manage the reduced derivation allocation of 1.5% of the federation account for tackling the special needs of the region; the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992; and the Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund (PTF) in 1995. With the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000, violent agitation increased, putting the militants and criminals against the Joint Task Military Force (JTF) set up by the state to protect oil facilities and companies in the region (Oluwatoyin, 2011:49). This study partly hopes to investigate why these policies were limited in their efforts to forestall peace in the Niger-Delta which necessitated the introduction of the amnesty policy.

The Amnesty policy aimed solely at disarming, rehabilitating and reintegrating the militants into the Nigerian state. The implementation of the policy brought about relative peace to the long troubled region for the first time, with the seeming compliance of the militants (Chidi, 2011). The demands of the Niger Deltans have been community based and not individualistic,

however what we see is a division of the people and the isolation of the militants from the rest of the population in the Amnesty program. Men, women and children have been affected in the course of the militancy and violence in the Niger Delta with no provision for them in the Amnesty Program. Gandu (2011:35) further buttresses this point on the exclusiveness of the Amnesty program as it related it to the neglect women, adolescent girls and youths. He noted that:

In the Niger Delta, women, adolescent girls and the youths remain the powder keg. Unable to get proper schooling or stable employment, they constitute a

‗reserve army‘ for social discontent. Frustration associated with aspirations makes women and the youth of the Niger Delta very volatile and cynical towards overtures by the Nigerian state, oil TNCs and the International community. If differences of gender inequality and class are addressed, a productive community relations and conflict resolution system would be facilitated in the Niger Delta. Over the years, economic reform policies and programs designed and directed by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and implemented by the Nigerian governments have continued to ignore the differential impacts on men and women. Decision-making mechanisms in the country have continued to turn a

‗blind eye‘ to the need to incorporate specific socio-economic challenges confronting Nigerian women.

Nsirimovu (2009), also corroborates this when he opined that:

The Amnesty Agenda is already succeeding in its very negative essence, by way of placing highest premium on individual militant leaders, over and above the real issues of contention by millions of citizens of the region. The federal government by voiding genuine participatory DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration) process as provided in the Niger Delta Technical Committee Report, seem to be saying: as long as oil flows, and revenue levels returns, to hell with the yearning of the peoples of the region. The implosion process seems to be moving so fast with the very quick transformation of General Boyloaf, from a militant general to a political general, so eager to crush anything on his path to please his new found masters.

This has raised a fundamental and critical question as to what the actual motive of the government is and its intension towards the developmental issues embattling the oil rich region. This research attempts an assessment of State Palliatives in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta with particular

reference to the Amnesty Program, looking at its prospects, omissions and the ability of the policy endangering lasting peace in the Oil Bearing Communities of the Niger-Delta. The policy implications of the amnesty program on other regions in Nigeria and its associated problems will also be of focus in this study which has been an area with little or no research. This is where this work finds its relevance.

# Research Questions

This study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. To what extend has the Amnesty Program addressed the issues of development of the people of the Niger Delta and militancy in particular?
2. What are the job prospects of trained ex-militants and what implications have the training of ex-militants had on their standard of living?
3. To what extend has the Amnesty Program contributed to a resolution of Militancy in the Niger-Delta and its implications on the emergence of other forms of insurgences in other regions in Nigeria like the Boko Haram?
4. What are the implications for the omission of women and children in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program?

# Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this work was to look at the State palliatives in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta and attempt an assessment of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, its prospects and omissions. The specific objectives however are:

1. To examine the extent to which the Amnesty Program has addressed the issues of development of the people of the Niger Delta and militancy in particular?
2. To investigate the job prospects of trained ex-militants and what implications have the trainings of ex-militants had on their standard of living?
3. To examine the extent to which the Amnesty Program has contributed to a resolution of Militancy in the Niger-Delta and its implications on the emergence of other forms of insurgences in other regions in Nigeria like the Boko Haram?
4. To assess the implications for the omission of women and children in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program?

# Hypotheses

* + 1. There is a relationship between employment status and age of respondents.
    2. There is a relationship between age and monthly income of respondents.
    3. There is a relationship between highest level of education and monthly income of respondents.

# Significance of the Study

With the relative peace enjoyed by the oil region since the announcement and implementation of the policy, many Nigerians as well as international agencies applaud the policy a success. Even though the policy seems to be a success, little or no attempt has however been made to interrogate the feasibility of the policy engendering genuine and lasting peace in the region since the policy has no potentiality of attending to the root cause of the crisis but instead focused only on disarming, rehabilitating and reintegrating the militants into the Nigerian State. It is hoped that this study will give answers to the discrepancies between the Amnesty Program and the specific issues of development of the people of the Niger Delta and Militancy in particular. Additionally, it is anticipated also that this study will provide a predictive understanding of the future of the Niger Delta and possible occurrence or not of militancy in the

region with the reintegration of the trained (rehabilitated) ex-militants into the larger Nigerian society. This study is hoped to shed light on the development and prospect of the amnesty program in the Niger Delta as well as the developmental effect on the standard of living of ex militants.

A critical examination of the Amnesty Program as a current conflict resolution strategy in the Niger Delta will provide us with a framework for resolution in similar cases in the future. Findings from this study would form part of the ongoing interventions aimed at peace building and de-escalating conflict in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta region and beyond. Finally and most importantly, this work will contribute to scholarly articles on peace efforts in the Niger Delta.

# Scope of the Study

Every research has a boundary and specific areas of concern. This study is limited in the sense that it shifts attention away from the ‗resource curse‘ chorus and debate to focus on State Palliatives in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta with major emphasis on the Amnesty Program for militants. This work is limited to Rivers State, South South geo political zone of Nigeria. Four specific sites and locations namely Okrika, Opobo, Bonny and Port-Harcourt city were visited. The study adopted both the survey research method and the qualitative research approach involving the use of Focus Group Discussions, In-depth Interviews, pictures and researcher‘s observations. Using these tools, the research interrogated the ex-militants that had gone through the DDR and relevant key informants. The analysis therein is limited to the researcher‘s findings and interactions in the field. Thus, all analyses are restricted to the key objectives of the study.

# CHAPTER TWO

# LITERATURE REVIEWS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.

# Introduction

The review of relevant literatures centred on the issues under study with regards to the Oil Economy in the Niger Delta was captured in this chapter which is further divided into seven sub-sections. It touches aspects on the Historical background and development of the oil industry in the Niger Delta, the activities of oil companies and multi-nationals in the region which provoked the reactions and agitations of the Niger Delta people and the review of past palliative efforts to address the Niger Delta crisis by the Nigerian state, why they failed and factors that necessitated the introduction of the Amnesty program which for a long time has brought relative peace to the region. The Political Economy Thesis was reviewed and used to aid our understanding of the enclavied nature of the oil industry in Nigeria, State approach in the past to curb the uprising and the emergence of the amnesty policy as a conflict resolution strategy in the Niger Delta.

# The Nigerian Oil Sector and Development in the Niger Delta region (1956-2016)

The Niger Delta is one of the 10 most important wetlands and coastal marine ecosystems in the world and is home to some 31 million people. The Niger Delta is also the location of massive oil deposits, which have been extracted for decades by the government of Nigeria and by multinational oil companies. Oil has generated an estimated $600 billion since the 1960s. The oil industry in the Niger Delta started commercial production in 1958 following the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity at Oloibiri now in Ogbia Local Government Area of Bayelsa State (Eheazu et al., 2012) by Shell British Petroleum (now Royal Dutch Shell). Today, the oil industry is highly visible in the Niger Delta and has control over a large amount of land. Shell

Petroleum Development Company alone operates over 31,000 square kilometers. The area is crisscrossed by thousands of kilometres of pipeline, punctuated by wells and flow stations. Much of the oil infrastructure is located close to the homes, farms and water sources of communities. At night often the only light visible for miles are from flares burning unwanted gas (Amnesty International, 2009). Eheazu et al. (2012), reports that Nigeria has a total of 159 oil fields and 1481 wells in operation according to the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. The most productive region of the nation in terms of oil production is the coastal Niger Delta Basin in the Niger Delta which has 78 0f the 159 oil fields.

The oil and gas sector represents 97 per cent of Nigeria‘s foreign exchange revenues and contributes 79.5 per cent of government revenues. The oil industry in the Niger Delta comprises both the government of Nigeria and subsidiaries of multinational companies such as Shell, Eni, Chevron, Total and ExxonMobil, as well as some Nigerian companies. Oil exploration and production is undertaken in what are known as Petroleum, pollution and poverty in the Niger Delta ―joint ventures‖, involving the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and other oil companies within production sharing contracts. NNPC is the majority stakeholder in all joint ventures. One of the non-state companies is usually the operator, which means it is responsible for activity on the ground. SPDC, a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, is the main operator on land. The SPDC joint venture involves NNPC, which holds 55 per cent, Shell 30 per cent, Elf Petroleum Nigeria Ltd., 10 per cent and Agip, 5 per cent (Amnesty International, 2009). In 1958, Nigeria became an oil exporting country. At its current peak production, Nigeria production capacity is about 2.5 million barrels of crude oil per day (Aghalino, 2009). The oil sector consists of the upstream and downstream.

Prior to the discovery of her crude oil potential, Nigeria depended very heavily on the production and exports of agricultural products, mainly palm produce, cocoa, cotton, groundnuts,

and hides and skin, as well as coal and tin mining. The transition from agrarian to an oil enclave economy came at a time Nigeria was transforming from autonomous regions into increased centralization of administration and decision-making. This process was reinforced, first by civil war and later by long years of military rule that resulted in the federal government ―assuming a position of unprecedented and disproportionate pre-eminence‖ (Gandu, 2011).

With massive oil revenues accruing, the centralization of power and its control at the federal level, meant that the Nigerian state was ―conferred enormous powers of patronage and influence, with consequences for the intensity of the struggle for access to, and control of the state‖ (International IDEA: 2001:156). The unfolding environmental, social and economic effects which led to agitations, militancy, state aggression and now the amnesty are part of the focus which this study seeks to interrogate. Oil revenue contributed an estimated N3.63 trillion or 80% to total government national budget in 2008. Non-oil sectors which include manufacturing, agriculture and solid minerals contributed N910 billion or 20 % (Alabi: 2008:63). These figures reflect the pre-2007 levels (Economic Commission for Africa (ECA): 2005:55–80, cited in Gandu, 2011). Oil and gas reserves in the Niger Delta region have been estimated at 25 billion barrels and 130 billion cubic feet respectively. With 5284 oil wells, 10 gas plants, 275 flow stations and 10 export terminals, crude oil production stood at 2.45 million barrels per day in 2007. It is therefore no surprise that Nigeria‘s budgetary and developmental programs have been predicated on the gas and oil industry (Ibeanu: 2002a:164, USAID: 2006:2 cited in Gandu, 2011:11).

# Oil Explorations, Environmental, Societal and Economic Dislocation of the Niger- Delta

Oil brings wealth and socio-economic development to oil-producing states and regions, albeit with some fundamental challenges. The same resource has

brought untold misery, repression and unmitigated environmental devastation to oil-producing regions in Nigeria (Evoh, 2009:40).

Despite the huge oil revenue that accrues from oil of Niger Delta, the situation in the region is a deplorable one because of the high level of poverty, diseases, unemployment and illiteracy in the region. The region which was once the agricultural pride of West Africa because of its fertile agricultural lands, forests, rivers, creeks, and coastal waters teeming with fish and sundry water creature is one of the most polluted places in the world today and one of the poorest regions in Nigeria (Okonta and Douglas, 2003). The people of the Niger Delta region live below national average with an average poverty rate of 83.3 % compared with the national average of

78.3 % (Draft Report Survey, 2003-2004) and the mortality rate of the people of the region is 40 years (Watts, 2008). Part of the reason being that major part of the oil reserve is located in the forests, farms and water ways and even residential areas of the local communities. With heavy explorative and exploitative activities of the multinational oil companies, the means of livelihood of the rural people who are mainly farmers, fishers and hunters are destroyed.

The major activities of the oil companies that destroy the means of livelihood of the people of the region are gas flaring, oil spillage and forest encroachment. Gas flaring which is the process of burning natural gas that is associated with crude oil when it is pumped up from the ground occurs as result of insufficient infrastructures to make use of the natural gas, hence flaring is employed to dispose of this associated gas. And this process of gas flaring has been on for more than half a century that the oil was discovered in the region and has tremendously increased over the years as oil production increased. For example, the official data of oil production is estimated at around 2 million barrels per day for the last few years but reached 2.5 million barrels per day in 2004. The Shell is reported to account for nearly half of this or about

1.1. Million barrels per day while Exxon Mobil produces about 570,000 barrels per day while other companies produce the rest.

According to the then Chief Executive of Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Mr. Basil Ominyi,: ―On the average, about 1000 Standard Cubic Feet (SCF) of gas is produced in Nigeria with every barrel of oil. Therefore, with oil production of some 2.2 Million barrels per day, about 2.2 billion SCF of associated gas is produced every day‖. With regard to this amount of SCF produced in the region, World Bank noted in its 2000 annual report that Nigeria is one of the highest gas flaring nation in the world, contributing more greenhouse emission than the whole of sub Saharan Africa combined. The most worrying aspect of it is that people‘s residential homes are literally near these flaring sites. The roaring of the flares and belching of the dark clouds full of toxins from the leaping fires of the flaring pollutes the environment of the people, and due to radioactive elements of the gas flared, people of the region suffer carcinogenic disease, asthma, chronic bronchitis, blood disorder and other diseases (Jike, 2004:692). And toxic elements in flared gas causes acid rain as well which acidifies lakes and the people of the region depend heavily on rain and lake water due to lack of pipe borne water or fresh waters. Drinking such water leads to slow and massive death of the people of the region. Apart from the adverse health effect on the people, gas flaring affects farmlands and forest near the flaring sites and this leads to poor harvest as crops and economic trees shrink and wither, thereby worsening poverty and the death of rain forest respectively (Jike, 204:692).

The Nigerian Government has set three different deadlines since 1969 to stop the practice and the latest of which is January 2010, yet none has been observed. The Nigerian judiciary has over and over again ordered different oil companies to stop gas flaring because ‗‗it is a gross violation of the constitutionally – guaranteed right to life and dignity, which include right to a clean environment, poison free healthy environment‘‘(Jike, 2004:692). But none of the oil

companies has heeded this injunction, rather gas flaring continued unabated at a very scorching temperature.

Oil spillage is another major activity of the oil companies that destroys the means of livelihood of the people. According to World Bank record, oil spills are generally caused by the companies themselves, with corrosion being the most frequent cause (Frynas, 1998:464). This is due to the fact that most of the oil installations are old and poorly maintained .Changing the old installations is expensive and as such oil companies prefer making use of the rusty old pipelines that were installed in the 50s and 60s because it is cheaper for them. And this is contrary to the claims of the oil companies that oil spillage is as a result of sabotage .The World Bank reports note that though sabotage has a role to play in oil spillage, its role is very minimal (Frynas, 1998).

Most of these rusty and obsolete ‗‗high pressure pipelines crisscross over land that are used for agricultural purposes rendering it economically useless‘‘ (Okonta and Douglas, 2003:77). As pipelines pass through people‘s villages and farms, whenever there is an oil spillage, human and wild lives are destroyed. Ken Saro Wiwa, the late environmentalist while commenting on the first oil blowout in well 11 in the Bori field in 1970 said that he was a ‗‗ witness to the great damage which the blowout occasioned to the town of Kegbara Dere .Water sources were poisoned, the air was polluted , farmland devastated. I watched with absolute dismay as indigent citizens found neither succour nor help from Shell‘‘ (Douglas and Okonta, 2003:76). The situation which Saro Wiwa observed has become rule rather than exception because oil spillage increased in occurrence ever since that incident took place. According to Shell‘s 2009 annual report, the company spilled 14,000 tons of crude oil into the creeks of Niger Delta last year, a figure that was more than twice the amount that was spilled in 2008 and

quadruple what was spilled in 2007. The reason for the increase in spillage is simple; the pipeline are old and poorly maintained and the oil production is on the high demand due to the global demand of oil and this subjects the old and worn out pipelines to pressure they cannot, hence the spillages.

In a report by Amnesty International in 2009, it was observed that The Niger Delta has suffered for decades from oil spills, which occur both on land and offshore. Oil spills on land destroy crops and damage the quality and productivity of soil that communities use for farming. Oil in water damages fisheries and contaminates water that people use for drinking and other domestic purposes. Amnesty International also advanced a number of reasons why oil spills happen so frequently in the Niger Delta as Spills resulting from corrosion of oil pipes, poor maintenance of infrastructure, spills or leaks during processing at refineries (World Bank, 1995), human error and as a consequence of deliberate vandalism or theft of oil (Steiner, 2008). In the 1990s corrosion was acknowledged as a major problem with oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta. Infrastructure was old, and many pipes were above ground.

Despite this, the government and the companies have not taken effective measures over these 50 years to prevent oil spills from recurring, or to properly address the impacts of oil spills (Amnesty International, 2009:15-16). All these brought about agitations and various forms of reactions from the people of the Niger Delta.

# Responses and Agitations of the Oil Bearing Communities: The Agitations of the Niger Delta People

Reactions to these problems of neglect, marginalization and environmental degradation started even before the independence of Nigeria. According to Oloya and Ugbeyavwighren (2009), the struggle for resource control in the Niger Delta dates back to the pre-colonial era

when the Royal Niger Company (RNC) by its action tried to deprive the people of their legitimate trade and industry. When then British merchants were challenged by King William Dappa Pepple of Bonny in 1854, he was deposed and exiled to Fernando Po. King Jaja of Opobo was deposed and exiled to the West Indies when he opposed British merchants‘ direct dealings with his subjects to forestall their exploitation. For moving to prevent British exploitation of his subjects, Prince Nana of Irsekiri was deported to Accra in 1894. In about 1897, the Oba of Benin was dethroned and exiled in Calabar where he died in 1913, also for challenging British authority.

When the Royal Niger Company stopped the people of Nembe (Akassa) city-state from trading in their palm oil and other palm produce, there was mass protest, which resulted in the attack on the Royal Niger Company depot in Akassa in 1895. Consequently, Isaac Adaka Boro declared the Republic of Niger Delta on February 23, 1966. The Federal Government declared war against him and he was clamped down. Ken Saro-Wiwa also vigorously pursued and internationalized the Niger Delta struggle and was sentenced and hanged in 1994 by the Abacha administration as a deterrent to others. Unfortunately, the death of Saro Wiwa was to be the beginning of militancy in the Niger Delta struggle (Egwemi, 2010:137), as we will see later in this discourse.

These dehumanizing conditions in the region resulting from the activities of the oil companies made the Niger Delta Communities feel that they were being disinherited by the Nigerian Government and their collaborating multinational companies and started agitating for improved socio –economic situation on the part of the multinational companies and resources control on the part of government. The first of such agitations was in 1966 when Ijaw activists; Isaac Boro (as noted earlier) along with Samuel Owonaru and Nottingham Dick under the name

of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) declared a Republic of Niger Delta. In the event of the declaration, Isaac Boro said,

Remember your petroleum which is being pumped out daily from your veins and fight for your freedom‖ (Watts, 2008:37).

It was crushed by the Nigerian Government and the activists were condemned to death but were later pardoned. This led Ibeanu and Lukham (2006) to observe that: ―Though the movement was crushed, the apocalyptic pumping of petroleum from the veins of Niger Delta people increasingly came to fruition as the situation in the Niger Delta deteriorated each passing day‖.

Many years after Isaac Boro was dead, the ecological and oppressive war waged by the oil companies and Nigerian Government continued until the emergence of the late environmentalist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and his Ogoni People‘s Movement. He led and internationalized a non-violent social movement known as Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in demand for improved socio-economic situation and resource control. Though the Ogoni people are not the only tribe affected by the oil operation, their agitation was distinct due to their high level of organization, thanks to their capable leaders, their radical demands and the popular support for MOSOP even on the international level. MOSOP drafted the Ogoni Bill of Right (OBR) which contained a new social contract formula based on human rights and resource control (Ibeanu and Lukham, 2006:38). The Nigerian Government Instead of addressing the issues in Ogoni Bill of Rights, the military junta then, led by General Sani Abacha in collaboration with Shell Company on May 22, 1994 arrested Ken Saro-Wiwa along with eight other Ogoni leaders, tried and sentenced them to death by hanging.

The effect of Ken Saro-Wiwa‘s and his co- accused death on the Nigerian State was the suspension of the country from Common Wealth with limited sanction (Isike et al., 2007:28). And Nigeria was for the first time in its history branded a rogue State because of the death of

Ken Saro-Wiwa (Isike et al., 2007). Inspired by the Ogoni case, other communities joined in the struggle for resource control. But as Ken Saro-wiwa had predicted and feared before his death, that:

The non-violent struggle would turn to violent in the face of business –as- usual politics… security forces still operate with impunity, the government failed to protect communities in oil –producing areas while providing security to the oil industry , and the oil companies bore responsibilities too for the appalling misery and the political violence across the region (Isike et al., 2007).

Till date there have been a wide spread of struggle , agitations and violence against the Nigerian State and their collaborating oil companies who are viewed by the people of the Niger Delta region as being in an unholy alliance to impoverish them. The struggle is still a demand for improved socio-economic situation and resource control and there is litany of militant groups in pursuit of this demand. The groups are ; Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF),The Niger Delta Militant force Squad (NDMFS), Niger Delta coastal Guerrillas (NDCG), South –South Liberation Movement (SSLM)

, Movement for the Sovereign State of Niger Delta (MSSND) , the Meinbutus, the November 1875 movement, ELMOTU , the Arogbo Freedom Fighters (AFF), Iduwini Volunteer Force (IVF), the Niger Delta People‘s Salvation Front(NDPF) The coalition for Militants Action (COMA) The Greenlanders, Deebam, Bush Boys, KKK, Black Brazier, Icelanders and so on (Tuodolo, 2008:114-115). However, some of these groups are criminally minded who are into militancy for pecuniary gains by vandalizing oil pipelines and stealing the crude oil and selling it into lucrative ‗black‘ market, kidnapping of expatriate workers and demanding ransom for their release, extortion (Chidi, 2011:17).

# Attempts by the Nigerian State to Address the Challenges of the Oil Industry and the Niger Delta

1. **The Willink Commission and the Emergence of the Niger Delta Development Board**

The Willink Commission was the first constitutional step taken in response to poverty and human development problems in the Niger Delta Region with the appointment of the Henry Willink Minority Rights Commission in September 1957 (Gandu, 2011:147). The problem of the Niger Delta and its peculiar terrain engaged the attention of the colonial state. This as it were necessitated the setting up of the Sir Henry Willink‘s Commission to recommend the best strategies for the development of a region that boasts of, perhaps, the most difficult terrain in Africa. When it turned in its report in 1958, the commission recommended that the Niger delta deserved special attention and should be made a special area for development. The commission also specifically recommended that the Niger Delta region be accorded special developmental status by making it a special area to be developed directly by the federal government of Nigeria. It also recommended the establishment of a special developmental body to handle the problems of the Niger Delta.

Based on the Commission‘s report, the Federal Government established the Niger Delta Development Board, (NDDB) in 1960 to cater for the unique developmental needs of the area (Ikporukpo 1981:119-129; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2006). Gandu (2011:148) reports that, the enactment of the NDDB under Section 14 of the 1960 independent Constitution mandated it to provide physical development for the Niger Delta region. The NDDB was also enjoined to be responsible for advising the government of the Federation of Nigeria and the government of Western Nigeria and Eastern Nigeria with respect to the physical development of the Niger Delta. The inauguration of the NDDB was met with high expectations that the widespread poverty and neglect in the oil rich region would be addressed in a comprehensive manner. He

further states that with a 15% revenue contribution from the federal government and technical support provided by Britain, the NDDB was expected to transform agricultural development in the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta Development Board was at best moribund and did not achieve the lofty objectives for which it was established (Aghalino, 2004: 119-120).

The British agricultural advisers gave their verdict which saw NDDB as ―an inefficient institution‖. Their 1965 confidential report also noted that the NDDB had no ―clear idea‖ of its objectives or how they should set about sorting out desirable projects into priority order. The report went further to assert that there was a desire among Nigerian politicians ―to have something spectacular to show for political motives‖ and that this was one the reasons why

―misguided effort‖ was ―put into rice development‖ at the expense of other agricultural developments in the region (Gandu, 2011:149). In other words Frynas (2000:49 in Gandu 2009), states that ―the agricultural development efforts put into rice production by the NDDB rather than support for the diverse forms of robust agricultural subsistence practices in the region, were nothing more than ―a public relations exercise‖ (Gandu, 2011).

It was probably the failure of the NDDB that facilitated the establishment of the Niger Delta River Basin Authority (NDRBA), along with other Basin Authorities through decree No.37 of 1976 .While the terms of reference of the Basin Authorities were unequivocal, they failed to incorporate the provision of infrastructures and restitution of derelict land in the Niger Delta (Aghalino 2004).Besides the Authority was starved of funds as budgetary allocations were either too meager or were slow in coming. Indeed, the funds in the coffers of the Authority were grossly mismanaged (Egborge,1998:5, Aghalino,2009:58). It was because of the clear manifestation of potential threat to national security by anti-oil protest that some serious attention was paid to the Niger Delta question. In 1996, the 1.5 per cent fund was put in place

under the allocation of revenue (federation accounts). To disburse this fund a commission was set up known as the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Fund Committee.

# Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC)

What seems to be the boldest attempt at tackling the Niger Delta crisis was the establishment of the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC).The OMPADEC was established through decree No. 23 of 19th July 1992 (OMPADEC Decree No. 23, 1992 but came into being in 1993). The Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), and became the second robust palliative put up to again attempt to address the problem of human and environmental development in the Niger Delta. Compared with its predecessors, OMPADEC appeared better established to make some impact on the development of the region because it had at its disposal 3% revenue allocations for each of the nine oil producing state from the federal account (Gandu,2011).

Aghalino (2009:59) gives us more insight:

This decree raised the limit of the derivation fund to 3 percent of the federation account. Section 11 of the decree which set out its objectives empowered the Commission among other things to; receive and administer the monthly sums from the allocation of the federation account in accordance with confirmed ratio of oil production in each state for the rehabilitation and development of oil mineral producing areas; for the tackling of ecological problems that have arisen from the exploration of oil minerals.

The administrative structure of the Commission showed a radical departure from earlier boards. This was possibly to stem the feeling of ‗alienation and to involve the people in deciding what projects were necessary for them (Akinyele 1998:84).This was perhaps also due to the need to avoid a top down approach of earlier boards which resulted in poor performance. By 1993, barely a year after its inauguration, OMPADEC published the list of 78 projects embarked upon as part of phase one of its activities. The list included; 63 projects in River state, 13 for Delta,

and 1 each for Akwa Ibom and Abia states. By 1996, the list had risen to 1,182 projects, covering a wide range of activities such as provision of pipe borne water, roads, electrification and hospitals (Aghalino, 2009:59).

Both The Guardian in January, 1997 and The Vanguard in June, 1996, reported that the Commission received a total sum of N11.5 billion between 1992 and 1996 when its operation was suspended. This means that the Commission received a yearly average of N3 billion or N250 million per month. On face value, it would appear that the development on ground contrast with the amount of money released for the Commission. Be that as it may, we must quickly add that the performance of OMPADEC is a subject of heated debate (Aghalino, 2004). It would appear that those who benefited from the commission lauded its activities, while communities that failed to realize anything substantial from it poured a lot of vituperation on it. One area that drew the ire of some critics was the way contracts were indiscriminately awarded. Furthermore, it was alleged that contracts awarded by the Commission failed to satisfy the conditions laid down by government. The high level of corruption in the Commission probably explains why it was so insolvent that, at a time, it was indebted to the tune of ₦2.3 billion.

In the face of copious corruption and mismanagement of funds reported, the federal government instituted an investigation into its activities in 1996. The sordid findings culminated in the sacking of the Chairman of OMPADEC, A.K. Horsefall, in December 1996. The appointment of Eric Opia to replace Horsefall failed to assuage matters. Rather Opia‗s corruption aligations surpassed that of Horsefall (See Aghalino, 2001). Consequently, Opia was again sacked in 1998, when he could not account for the sum of N6.7 billion that accrued to the Commission. In due course, OMPADEC was restructured under the Chairmanship of Vice- Admiral Preston Omatsola before its activities were liquidated (Human Rights Watch 1999: 120, Aghalino, 2009:59).

The failure of these efforts worsened the people‘s conditions, leading to frustrated expectations. This slowly gave rise to tension, anger and conflicts and by 1999 the region was awash with thousands of abandoned projects, relics of the people‘s expectations. The people had developed a strong distrust of government intentions and the people of the region started taking their destinies into their own hands (Arnold, 2000).This situation has engendered what Ikelegbe referred to as an emerging economy of conflict in the Niger Delta which is characterized with intense, violent and bloody struggle for the appropriation of oil resources and benefits from the oil economy and a thriving market of illegal trading and smuggling of arms, crude and refined oil (Ikelegbe 2005:209; Subair, and Adesanmi, 2003).This pathetic situation which is akin to terrorist threat and or an emerging Colombia drew the attention of Obasanjo as he attempted to tackle the festering crisis head on (Oronto et al., 2004; Aghalino, 2009:59-60).

Finally, The Commission could not do much because its activities were halted by a Supreme Court judgment (OMPADEC Quarterly Report, Vol. 1, No., 1st October, 1993.) More importantly, the money set aside for the committee was forwarded to the State capitals and never got to the affected oil producing communities.

# The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)

By 1999 when Olusegun Obasanjo assumed office as the president of Nigeria, the Niger Delta was in the heat of insurgencies. Olukorede tells us more on the state of the people; ―The people were not happy. Values and infrastructures had deteriorated; the people had become restive and desired immediate intervention in their lives and the life of the region. The rate of poverty was scary. The people of the region had little or nothing to show for playing host to a multi-billion dollar a year industry‖. Furthermore, environmental remediation measures were limited and negligible. Farms, streams and the whole environment were constantly under the threat of pollution. All these led to the springing up of ethnic groups, formed largely by the Ijaw

and Ogoni, championing confrontations with the Nigerian government and multinational oil companies. The youths of the Niger Delta decided to take their destiny in their own hands (Olukorede, 2007). The gory yet gloomy picture painted above was what confronted Olusegun Obasanjo when he assumed power. Definitely, this nightmare could not be wished away.

Thus, one of its major actions was to see how to alleviate the crisis in the oil- producing communities of the Niger Delta. In 2000, the President implemented the 13 percent derivation as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution. In what seemed to be a major frontal attack on the festering Niger Delta problem, the federal government under Chief Olusegun Obasanjo initiated a bill to the National Assembly on the development of the Niger Delta. The National Assembly in accordance with section 58 (a) and 5 of the 1999 Constitution subsequently passed the bill establishing the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), after the president refused to assent to the bill. As it were, there was disagreement between the Presidency and the National Assembly on the funding of the Commission. The National Assembly claimed to have acted in the national interest by overriding the president in passing the bill.

The remit of the Commission is to accelerate economic development and provide the much needed social infrastructures in the area. Indeed, the NDDC is charged with a clear mission: ‗to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful‘ (NDDC Act, 2000). Possibly to guard against the weakness of the OMPADEC, the NDDC Act provides for special bodies to supervise the activities of the Commission in order to avoid waste and corruption. These bodies include the management committee made up of eight directors, a managing director, and a governing council, to give general direction to the management committee, an advisory committee made up of governors of member states of the Commission, to advise and monitor its activities. The Commission is to be at the forefront of

facilitating interaction among all development stakeholders and identifying priorities and approaches for Niger Delta development. Its responsibility for the sustainable development of the area confers on it, the onerous task of mobilizing resources, effort and initiatives to ensure effective coordination, and coherence (Aghalino, 2009:60).

Implicitly, the NDDC also has monitoring functions to ensure that regulations and policies are observed and, it is its task to ensure that the process involved in its function is participatory and inclusive. Since inception the NDDC has embarked on systematic efforts to put in place enduring institutions and operational mechanisms which will consolidate its take-off, in order to prevent the mistakes of the past. A pointer to the failure of the NDDC could be seen in the caustic remark about the Niger Delta in 2006 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) when it noted that ―the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and service, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth, squalor, and endemic conflict‖ (UNDP, 2006).

The Obasanjo administration in some rare instances waved the olive branch to the agitators in the Niger Delta. This was done by putting in place a number of committees to keep the peace in the region. These include: constitution of the Major General Ogomudia Security Committee on the Oil Producing Areas; constitution of the Governor James Ibori Presidential Committee on the Niger Delta, 2004; constitution of the Major General Muhammed Abdullahi led Presidential Committee on Peace and Reconciliation in the Niger Delta with a special sub- committee to resolve the conflict in Rivers State; and the Niger Delta Peace and Security Strategy allegedly inspired by oil firms in the region (Ebiri, 2006). It is difficult to assess the achievements of the plethora of committees aimed at tackling the restiveness in the region. What perhaps is not in doubt is that intentions by government are not in short supply. The multiple

knee-jerk responses and proliferation of committees is a pointer to the fact that the government is yet to get its bearing right in taming the crisis in the region. Nevertheless, it may not be out of place to posit that the fire-brigade responses of the government so far to the issues in contention in the region is a manifestation of the little premium place on the region despite its economic importance to Nigeria (Aghalino, 2008).

To ensure the sustainable empowerment of the people, the Calabar Export Processing Zone and the Onne oil and gas zone were established. This was possibly done by the government in anticipation of their multiplier effects in terms of employment generation and capacity building of local industries. To encourage indigenous participation, marginal oil fields were farmed out to state governments in the Niger Delta (Academic Associate Peace Work and Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation, 2004: 37) .The point were made earlier that the oil wealth of the Niger Delta would seem to be antithetical to the aspirations of the people. For one, it is more or less a curse. Again, any attempt to endanger the flow of it has always been met with brute force. Consequently, to the Federal Government, the advocates of resource control are viewed with suspicion and hatred – unnecessary distraction that must be crushed. Indeed, without any convincing evidence, the call for the resource control is seen as a call to break up Nigeria as it smacks of separatist tendency.

There has been a quantum leap in the national resources being devoted to the Niger Delta region. Recent distribution of revenue allocation to the state governments is most revealing. Based on derivation alone, in 2005, Bayelsa state received ₦6.4 billion, Rivers, N8 billion, Delta state, ₦15 billion, Akwa Ibom, ₦4.6 billion. However, the issues seem not to be how much as it is how much of a trickle down there is to the grassroots and its impact on the local communities in these states. According to Aghalino, (2009:62), ―It needs to be acknowledged that while the government took some remedial measures, including new revenue sharing criteria based strictly

on derivation, the government is still flunking the litmus test of tackling the restiveness in the Niger Delta‖.

The Obasanjo administration also tried to combat the Niger Delta crisis through the National Political Reforms Conference in early 2005.Some proponents of resource control decided to take the opportunity of the conference to address the issue. After a bitter and divisive debate, the conference ended on July 11, 2005. Among other things, the conference made the following recommendation on the Niger Delta issue: an increase in the level of derivation from the present 13 per cent to 50 per cent. Cognizant of the need for national unity, peace and stability, they agreed to accept in the interim, 25 per cent derivation with a gradual increase to attain the 50 per cent over a period of five years. When it became clear that the president was not in a hurry to implement the recommendation, the militants resumed and intensified their attacks on oil installations and outright kidnapping of oil workers (Aghalino, 2009:62-63). The militants raised the ante of their agitation possibly because of the arrest and detention of Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, the leader of the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteers Force (NDPVF) and the impeachment of Dipriye Solomon Peter Alamieyesegha, the governor of Bayelsa state in early 2005.

The Obasanjo administration also initiated the Council for the Social Economic Development of the Niger Delta. On 18 April 2006, 13 days after the meeting of ‗stake holders‘, the Federal government inaugurated the Consolidated Council on Social and Economic Development of the Coastal States of the Niger Delta (COSEND) headed by President Obasanjo as Chairman and Secretary to the Federal Government. Other members included all Governors from the Niger Delta; five persons nominated by the President; and representatives of NDDC, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); oil TNCs; Ministry of Petroleum Resources, Ministry of Works, and Ministry of Power and Steel. Altogether, COSEND was a 50-member

body (Gandu: 2011:153-154).The Council, which was likened to the United States of America‘s post-World War 11 Marshall Plan for Europe entails several far reaching measures and is reportedly valued at over ₦20 trillion, most of which will come from the oil industry (International Crisis Group ,2006). COSEND was charged with the responsibility for the development of the Niger Delta and mandated to implement a nine-point plan for the socioeconomic development in areas which included: employment generation; transportation; education; health; telecommunications; environment; agriculture; power; and water resources Gandu, 2011:155).The programme, was envisaged, will also create some 20, 000 new jobs for the locals. Another facet of the plan is the pledge by President Obasanjo to flag off the ₦230 billion ($1.75 billion) highway- the long abandoned East-West road; the dredging of the River Niger; upgrading of the Petroleum Training Institute, (PTI), Effurun, Warri to a degree awarding institution; establishment of a Federal Polytechnic in Bayelsa State by September 2006: rural electrification of 396 communities; water supply for over 600 communities, and appointment of an officer in the office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation to coordinate the various intervention programmes by all tiers of government and those of the oil companies and development partners.

In the light of the widespread concerns and acknowledgement that addressing youth‘s unemployment would be vital given it‘s trickled down income generation capacity, the decision to immediately lift the embargo on police recruitment, thus facilitating the intake of 10,000 new recruits, is a salient one. The creation of 1000 new positions by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and recruitment of 7,300 National Certificate of Education (NCE) and University graduate teachers by the end of 2006, will go a long way in lifting the present unemployment pressure. The process by which the government arrived at the new policy remains suspicious. It is noteworthy that the leading militia group in the Niger Delta, the Movement for

the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), rejected the initiative, thus leading one to suspect that the government took a quick approach without adequate consultation of all stakeholders concerned. Requiring serving state governors to nominate the members seems senseless, given that it would be used as a patronage system (Hank, 2007).

It took almost seven years before President Obasanjo launched the promised

―Comprehensive Development for the Niger Delta‖ (COSEND). When he launched the plan on March 27 2007, two months to the end of his 8 - years rule,‖ because of its timing or its doubtful motive, or both, the Niger Delta Regional Master Plan recently launched by the outgoing President Olusegun Obasanjo did not attract the expected enthusiasm both from its target beneficiaries and their compatriots in other parts of the country‖ (This Day, 2007). It would appear that, increasingly, it became clear that Obasanjo administration in its untidy succession plan could not but include the South- South in its calculations if he was to bequeath a Nigeria that would be minimally governable (Amuta, 2008: 56). This must have influenced the choice of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, the then governor of Bayelsa state, an Ijaw as the vice presidential running mate of Umar Yar‘ Adua in the ticket of the People‘s Democratic Party during the 2007 elections.

It will be recalled in late 1999, several young men described as hoodlums by community leaders in Odi, Bayelsa State, kidnapped and killed several police men in alleged retaliation for the earlier death of Ijaws at the hands of Yoruba militants in Lagos. They then took refuge in Odi. After a government deadline to hand over the killers lapsed, the security forces responded brutally (International Crisis Group 2006).The invasion of Odi was ostensibly to teach a ‗lesson‘ to the residents of the town, and serve as a warning to other militant communities in the area. In that expedition, more than 2000 people were killed, many more injured and unquantifiable resources destroyed. Senator Chuba Okadigbo, the then President of the Senate, visited the scene

a week after the massacre and stated: ―the facts speak for themselves…there is no need for speech because there is nobody to speak to‖ (Quoted in Rowell 2005: 4).

The destruction of Odi by the Nigerian government, elected only in May 1999, is not only symptomatic of the crisis that has gripped the country‘s oil rich Niger Delta since the late eighties, it also a clear indication that the brutality and heavy handedness with which previous regimes dealt with legitimate political dissention is still very much a feature of governance in the crisis-ridden nation. A later example of government‘s heavy handed approach came on 19th February, 2005, when troops attacked the town of Odioma, in Bayelsa State. The military said it had come under fire from militants in the village. At least seventeen people were killed, including a two year old child and an elderly woman, both burnt to death (Amnesty International, 2005).The response of the Nigerian state to crisis in the region should not surprise keen watchers of the Nigerian economy.

The point was made earlier that there is a convergence of interest in the politics of the control of oil resources and the survival of Nigeria because of the mono-cultural nature of the economy. Thus, according to Ikelegbe, ―given the very high stakes of oil, it constricts the state to be sluggish on dialogue negotiation and concession, and expansive in terms of the repressive response‖ (Ikelegbe, 2001; Ikelegbe, 2005). The point to note about these responses is that none has tackled the Niger Delta problem to any reasonable extent. The problem with all the so called initiatives were that as good intentioned as they were (or have been), the government has yet to really bring the political will to bear on making them succeed.

# The Amnesty

With the coming of Yar‘Adua‘s administration in office in May 2007, an early attempt to convene a Delta summit was aborted due to local opposition. A May 2008 proposal that militants incorporate as security companies so they could be hired to guard pipelines and other oil

installations met with public skepticism and militants‘ rejection and never got off the ground. Creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs in September 2008 initially drew mixed reactions, but low funding in the 2009 budget, an uncertain division of responsibilities with the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and unclear guiding principles have cost it credibility.

The Technical Committee has been the government‘s most promising effort to develop a coherent, long-term strategy in the Delta. Launched on 8 September 2008 with broad and credible membership, the committee was mandated to collate, review and distil all previous reports, memorandums and submissions and ―make suggestions for Government‘s necessary and urgent action‖. Then then Vice President Goodluck Jonathan pledged that its recommendations

―will not be treated with levity‖. It was widely believed that the government would adopt those recommendations as its definitive roadmap for resolving the region‘s crisis.

The resulting report recommended amnesty for militant leaders within a comprehensive demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation (DDR) program; an increased allocation of oil revenue to the Delta; urgent improvement of infrastructure and human welfare services; and new institutions for the region‘s longer term development. While it did not address all aspects of the crisis, its proposals were sufficiently comprehensive to serve as a catalyst. The Technical Committee also urged the government to issue a White Paper by 1 January 2009 outlining strategies for rapid implementation of its recommendations. Yar‘Adua‘s statement at the time that the government would implement those recommendations it found ―acceptable‖ raised apprehensions in the Delta and across civil society that it would carry out only what was politically convenient (Crisis Group, 2009:1).

# The Niger-Delta Summit and the Technical Committee

On the 4th of September 2008, the government announced a Technical Committee to address the Delta crisis (Adeniyi, 2007). Its 45 members were all drawn from the nine states broadly regarded as the Niger Delta region. The states are Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers (within the Delta as geographically defined and so referred to as ―core Niger Delta‖), Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Imo and Ondo.

Technical Committee members are listed in Appendix B. The committee was inaugurated by the then Vice President Jonathan on 8 September, it was handed the following terms of reference:

* 1. Collate, review and distil the various reports, suggestions and recommendations on the Delta, from the Willinks Commission report (1958) to the present and summarize the recommendations for government action;
  2. Appraise the summary recommendations and present detailed short-, medium- and long-term suggestions; and
  3. Make and present to the federal government any other recommendations that will help it achieve sustainable development, peace and human and environmental security in the Delta region.

The government gave the committee ten days to report, saying the bulk of the required information was already available in earlier documents and position papers that the public might forward. This implied urgency but was unrealistic. Further, the administrative support the committee requested from the government so as to begin work was delayed, and the committee eventually took almost three months on the assignment. It began by electing as its chairman Ledum Mitee, president of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and as its

secretary, Nkoyo Toyo, a leading civil society activist. It then publicized its terms of reference and asked for submissions (See Mitee, 2010).

On 5 October, it divided into eight sub-committees (The sub-committees dealt with (i) critical infrastructure;(ii) health and education; (iii) economic development and regional planning; (iv) environment, sustainable development and corporate social responsibility; (v) governance and the rule of law; (vi) community, youth and women‘s empowerment; (vii) resource ownership, management and distribution; and (viii) conflict, militancy and decommissioning) that consulted national and international experts and various important sources which included representatives from state security agencies, international development agencies and various ethnicities within and outside the Delta Perhaps most significantly, the sub- committee on conflict, militancy and decommissioning visited militant camps in Oporoza, Delta State, where it obtained the views of the armed groups, including MEND (Joint Revolutionary Council, 2009). Through these processes, the committee assembled and reviewed over 400 reports, memorandums and other documents from local, national and international stakeholders. These included the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) in northern Nigeria; Afenifere, the pan- Yoruba socio-cultural body in western Nigeria; Ohan‘Eze Ndigbo and the Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the Ibo south east; and oil companies operating in the Delta (Omunu, 2008).

The government initially appointed Dr. Kalu Idika Kalu, a former World Bank economist who had served twice as finance minister and also as national planning and transport minister, as chairman, but bowed to the objections of Delta leaders that he was not from the core Delta but from Abia State, and the committee should be allowed to elect its own chairperson. Ms Nkoyo Toyo, a lawyer and development consultant from Akwa Ibom State, was executive director of Gender and Development Action was therefore elected. She was a delegate to the National

Political Reform Conference convened by the Olusegun Obasanjo administration in 2005. She was nominated while serving on the technical committee and subsequently confirmed as Nigeria‘s ambassador to the African Union.

The sub-committees dealt with:

1. Critical infrastructure;
2. Health and education;
3. Economic development and regional planning;
4. Environment, sustainable development and corporate social responsibility;
5. Governance and the rule of law;
6. Community, youth and women‘s empowerment;
7. Resource ownership, management and distribution; and
8. Conflict, militancy and decommissioning.

These included representatives from state security agencies, international development agencies and various ethnicities within and outside the Delta. A submission was made by the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC), an umbrella militant body, on behalf of MEND, The Reformed Niger Delta People‘s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Martyrs Brigade (Crisis Group interview, 2009; Omunu, 2008).

Based on its analysis of these, it presented its recommendations in three parts. The first part was a ―Compact with Stakeholders on the Niger Delta‖. On the premise early action was needed to build stakeholder confidence so it could address longer-term tasks, it recommended that the government:

1. increase immediately the Delta‘s allocation from oil and gas revenues from the present 13 per cent to 25 per cent, to be dedicated largely to new infrastructure and sustainable development of the region;
2. complete within six months initial steps to support a process for disarming youths involved in militancy, including a comprehensive ceasefire and pull-back of forces; bail (with a view to an eventual negotiated release) for Henry Okah; credible amnesty conditions; a negotiated undertaking by militant groups to stop all kidnappings, hostage taking and attacks on oil installations; and formation of a Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) Commission.
3. Improve the operational integrity of security forces and police in the Delta sufficiently to assure communities and businesses about their safety;
4. Establish by mid-2009, with state and local governments, a Youth Employment Scheme (YES) to give at least 2,000 young people community work in each local government of the nine Delta states;
5. Complete by June 2010 the work to turn the East-West Road from Calabar to Lagos into a dual carriageway and the construction of at least a link road to the coast in each state, backed by a fully funded roads maintenance program.
6. Ensure by June 2010 a total of 5,000mw of power for the Delta region;
7. Strengthen independent regulation of oil pollution, including work towards an effective Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) mechanism, and end gas flaring by 31 December 2008, as previously ordered by the federal government; and
8. Rehabilitate all health care facilities and give free medical care to those 65 and above, children under five, and pregnant women, as well as free drugs to malaria patients.

The second part laid out broad themes and roles for stakeholders in a regional transformation agenda running to 2020. The third part recommended that the federal government create institutions and mechanisms to implement the Compact and other medium- and longer- term processes, including a Multi-Stakeholder Niger Delta Policy and Project Compliance Monitoring Agency to monitor the implementation of the Compact and longer-range recommendations; a Niger Delta Special Infrastructural Development Fund to receive contributions from federal and state governments, oil companies, donors and others; a Niger

Delta Futures Trust Fund for developing agriculture and industries outside the oil and gas sector; and a Community Trust Fund Scheme and National Minorities Commission to advance the rights of Delta minority and micro-minority groups and ensure compliance with affirmative action policies and programs.

Political leaders outside the Delta have made few public comments on the still unpublished report. The general attitude, especially in the north and west, has been to refrain from statements, while quietly urging the government to be ―generally very cautious‖ (Crisis Group interview, 2009) in responding to the recommendations. Those recommendations have drawn modest praise but also considerable criticism from the Delta. MEND affirmed that ―the Technical Committee‘s report in part does reflect some of our thinking as well as that of our affiliates‖ but added that it had expected more ―candour (and) punch‖; and that the report was

―drafted with some caution, perhaps not to rock the boat with the Northern ruling class‖, and failed to deal with ―some key points in the report, (See pg. 62), alternatively referred to it as the Niger Delta Policy and Project Compliance Monitoring Committee.

The report referred to the proposed fund as both the Special Niger Delta Infrastructural Intervention Fund (See pg. 63) and the Special Niger Delta Infrastructure Intervention Development Fund (See pg. 68). The report proposed that the Fund might also explore other funding possibly available from donors or from value added tax (VAT), the Excess Crude Oil Account, foreign exchange reserves and the private sector. It also suggested that some resources might be drawn from the 12 per cent increase in derivation revenue the region is demanding. The report, (in pg. 63), said this fund might be resourced from ―a fraction of the additional 12%‖ demanded by the region. On structure and operations, it said the following principles must be observed:

* 1. Foreclosure on spending capital so that interest earnings might grow over at least fifteen years;
  2. Independent and conservative management under international standards that protect the fund from opportunistic raids; and
  3. a policy that visibly empowers communities in the region and involves them in decisions on the long-term use of the fund (Crisis Group interview, 2009).

The Conference of Ethnic Nationalities of Niger Delta (CENND), an umbrella organization of the region‘s ethnic groups, was even more critical, saying ―the report failed to meet the aspiration of the ethnic nationalities of the Niger Delta‖, because it did not recommend that the Delta receive initially a minimum of 50 per cent of derivation revenue and ultimately full control of resources by states and communities. It stressed that nothing short of control of resources, with payment of appropriate taxes to the federal government, would satisfy grievances.

This view notwithstanding, some of the report‘s recommendations seem overly ambitious and unrealistic, and the timelines set for their implementation were bound to be overtaken by events. But the key ones – an amnesty and DDR and increased derivation revenue – targeted the major challenges of ending unrest and meeting the most fundamental Delta demand. If carried out carefully and with effective measures to ensure better accountability for derivation revenue, they would form a roadmap with which the administration could begin to resolve the conflict and address the insecurity in the region (Crisis Group, 2009:6-9).

# The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs

One of Yar‘Adua government‘s most significant initiatives to respond to the Delta crisis, other than the aborted summit and the Technical Committee process, have been the establishment of a cabinet ministry and an attempt to co-opt the militants by giving them responsibility for guarding the region‘s oil and gas installations. Created on 10 September 2008,

the Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs has a twin mandate focusing on infrastructure development and youth empowerment. According to the government, it is to be responsible for development projects in the region, including roads, electricity and other utilities, previously executed by multiple ministries, in order to provide better focus and quick development (Taiwo, 2008). The ministry drew mixed reactions, particularly in the Delta. Some welcomed it as a significant sign of commitment. The prominent Ijaw leader, Chief Edwin Clark, said it was ―a step in the right direction and evidence of political will and sagacity by the President‖ (Thisday, 2008). MEND warned: ―The people of the region should receive this latest dish with apprehension. It will be yet another avenue for corruption and political favouritism‖ (Reuters, 2008).

The Creation of the ministry has also raised several unanswered questions and attracted criticism from other parts of the country. Firstly, the timing pre-empted to a degree the Technical Committee, which was still working (Crisis Group Interview, 2008). Secondly, addressing regional problems with a new ministry risks opening a Pandora‘s Box of demands for region- specific ministries elsewhere (Ali and Orji, 2009). Thirdly, the relationship with the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), in existence since 2000, is unclear. The NDDC is mandated to facilitate ―the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful‖ (NDDC, 2009; Crisis Group, 2009:10).

Yar‘Adua‘s statement that the new ministry is to become the primary vehicle for addressing ―the challenges of infrastructural development, environment protection and youth empowerment in the region‖ (Thisday, 2008), suggests potential duplication and conflict of responsibilities. The government disputed this, saying the NDDC will function as a parastatal body under the ministry, but the law establishing the NDDC was yet to be amended in this sense. (Taiwo, 2008; Thisday, 2008; Reuters, 2008; Crisis Group Interview, 2008). A committee

member told Crisis Group: ―One would have thought that the government which set up a committee to suggest strategies, mechanisms and vehicles for bringing peace and development to the Delta would have waited to receive that committee‘s report before creating new institutions... it suggests that the government already has its own hidden agenda which it is going ahead to implement, regardless of the submissions of the committee‖ (Crisis Group, 2008). See, for example, George Orji and Ali M. Ali, ―Nigeria: Dasuki – Niger Delta Ministry unnecessary‖, Thisday, 4 January 2009. Niger Delta Development Commission Act. no. 2, of 1999. See also

―NDDC: About Us‖, <http://nddc.gov.ng/about>).

Funding is a further complication. The federal government still owes the NDDC 326 billion naira (about $2.2 billion). It may have been more reasonable to rectify that funding deficit than to create an entirely new organisation with which the NDDC must now share the money. Donu Kogbara, a member of the Oil and Gas Sector Reforms Implementation Committee (OGIC), commented: ―The NDDC does not need to be replaced or eclipsed because it can do everything that a ministry can do — if it is given the human and financial resources with which to play a dynamic coordinating role. There‘s a very real risk that the new ministry will largely turn out to be nothing more than a glorified version of the NDDC and a cynical, expensive window-dressing‖ (Kogbara, 2008).

Doubts were also expressed about the ministry‘s leadership, funding and mode of operation. A first source of misgivings is the appointment of Ufot Ekaette, a former secretary to the federal government, as minister, with Godsday Orubebe as his deputy. Ekaette was selected for his long experience in the federal bureaucracy and because he is both a Delta native and acceptable to elites and officials from elsewhere, notably the north. The appointment inspired limited enthusiasm, however, especially in the Delta (Crisis Group Interview, 2009). Militant leaders had no confidence in leadership of Ekaette or the ministry. (Crisis Group

Correspondence, 2009). MEND maintained that it ―cannot trust a man who betrays his friend‖. Another cause for concern is the relatively low funding provided for the ministry in the 2009 budget. The raw figures showed an allocation of ₦47 billion (about $314 million), while the NDDC, which in previous years received between ₦58 billion ($387 million) and ₦79 billion ($527 million), was to be slashed to ₦27 billion ($180 million). This meant that the two organizations together were to receive about ₦5 billion ($33 million) less than what the NDDC alone obtained in some past budgets (Johnson, 2008). If the ministry fails to deliver early credible results, many in the Delta will add it to the list of institutions by which they have been hoodwinked by successive federal administrations. That was believed would deepen the sense of betrayal and alienation across the region that fosters support for the continued insurgency (Crisis Group, 2009:9-10).

# Militants as Pipeline Guards

On 20 May 2008, the then defence minister, Alhaji Yayale Ahmed, outlined what was thought to be a major policy initiative for reining in militant activities in the Delta. At a briefing to the House of Representatives Committee on Defence, he said the federal government had formulated plans for ―constructive engagement‖ (Usigbe and Salem, 2008). This specifically included negotiating with the militants to form private companies that would be hired to provide security for oil pipelines and other installations. The rationale was that the scheme would wean the militants from armed conflict and solve some of the region‘s unemployment problem (Crisis Group, 2008).

This evoked a torrent of questions from the public: would the government arm the militants? If yes, would they operate like the military or the police? If no, how would they be able to guard pipelines? If they were to be armed, what would guarantee that they would not someday turn those arms against the government and overrun the installations? (Thisday, 2008).

Several critics argued that protecting critical national infrastructure is an integral part of a government‘s national security responsibility, for which its security forces are trained and constitutionally mandated. Ceding that responsibility to armed groups would be unconstitutional and ultimately dangerous (Nuhu-koko, 2008).

Furthermore, some insisted, even if such an arrangement could address the criminal or security dimension of the Delta crisis, it would not respond to its more fundamental political, socio-economic and environmental aspects. A strategy that focused on only one dimension could not provide a lasting solution. MEND, one of the main groups whose members the government was trying to attract, spoke of a ―desperate and laughable‖ diversionary scheme that could not persuade it to abandon its campaign for control by the Delta of its own oil resources (Izeze, undated, cited in Crisis Group, 2009). Shredded by intense public criticism and spurned by the militants, the idea was still-born (Crisis Group, 2009:11-12).

In conclusion, it is noteworthy that conflicts in the region became increasingly frequent and intensely violent, which led to incessant loss of lives and property. Violent conflicts and economic progresses are mutually exclusive. This became precarious, particularly for Nigeria whose major source of foreign exchange earnings – Nigeria‘s engine of growth – is the bone of contention in the Niger Delta. Moreover, recent management Strategies (earlier discussed), such as the creation of such institutions as the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the creation of local government areas/councils, the provision of social amenities and payment of compensation for land failed to arrest conflicts in the Niger Delta. If anything, the violent conflicts have taken a turn for the worse. This pointed to the need to revisit the management strategies of relations within and between communities and oil companies, and communities and government, with a view to instituting conflict management procedures that would lead to peace and sustainable

development in the Niger Delta region and the Nigerian economy. It is clear that violent conflicts in the Niger Delta have socio-cultural, political and economic dimensions which are interconnected with oil-related issues, such as deprivation, marginalisation, environmental degradation, military interventions in the conflicts and old rivalries between the communities (Okoh, 2004:98-99).

The emergence of youth groups and the radicalization of same marked a major turning point of the conflict, as militia groups emerged to confront the state and the security operatives. Groups such as Niger Delta Volunteers (NDV), Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) which emerged with the goal to provide a common platform for all militia groups in the region, confronted the military and attacked oil infrastructure and oil company personnel. The oil industry and the national economy became the victims. Obi (2009) captured the implications thus: Between late 2005 and mid-2009, attacks against oil installations forced the shutdown of between 25% and 40% of Nigerian‘s oil production and exports, leading to substantial loss of revenues and profits by the state-oil multinationals alliance. These militia attacks (in addition to oil theft) have largely accounted for a drop in oil production from about 2.6 million barrels in 2005 to 1.3 million barrels in June 2009. The resultant loss of revenue is estimated in billions of Dollars. The transformation of initially uncoordinated, non-violent protests into a full-blown pan-Delta insurgency and the attendant insecurity in the region has continued to occupy the attention of strategic and policy analysts and oil multinationals, whose Multibillion dollar investments are at grave risks. Also at stake are the energy security and strategic interests of oil-dependent Western powers, which back the oil multinationals and rely on oil imports from the Niger Delta. Other sources indicate that oil production dropped to about 700,000 (AIT, 2010).

This endangered the national economy which depends on oil, and the economies of other countries which depend on Nigerian oil. Thus, the kidnapping of oil company personnel, the instability, and threat to national security occasioned by the proliferation and stockpiling of arms and ammunitions by the militia groups necessitated the amnesty program.

Before the amnesty program, a number of interventions have been made by the Nigerian government and the TOCs. The oil companies responded to community protests with community development projects, by providing basic social amenities such as clean water, health facilities, school buildings, and the provision of scholarships and training of youths to acquire vocational skills. The government intervened in development engineering through the establishment of ministerial and extra-ministerial agencies, such as the Presidential Committee on the disbursement of the 1.5 percent oil derivation fund, the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). Further, the government increased the oil derivation fund to oil producing states from 3 percent to 13 percent. However, these attempts failed to address the frustrations which drive conflict in the region thus setting in the transformation of the conflict from one phase to another. The amnesty program, the latest attempt to resolve the conflict faces the challenge of the unresolved frustrations.

# An Overview of the Amnesty Program in the Niger Delta

The amnesty programme represents a policy attempt to seek an alternative route to peace and is anchored on the triad of anti-violence, pro-dialogue and welfarism. The programme seeks to decriminalize the activities of the militants and unconditionally exonerate them of culpability in the myriad felonies with which they have been associated – namely illegal oil bunkering, arson, hostage-taking, kidnapping and ransom receipts, killing and maiming, pipeline and oil

installation destruction and high treason. The amnesty programme of the Nigerian government, unveiled on 25 June 2009 by President Umaru Musa Yar‘Adua, was scheduled to run from 6 August to 4 October 2009, a period of 60 days. The president hinged the amnesty on several conditions: the willingness of the militants to give up all illegal arms in their possession, a complete renunciation of militancy in all Getty Images 34 I conflict trends its ramifications and deposition to an undertaking to this effect (Ebiri and Onuorah, 2009).

By the specified deadline, many militants had surrendered their weapons at the government-designated collection centres for that purpose. According the chief coordinator of the amnesty committee, Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Lucky Ararile, 8,299 ex-militants had been disarmed and documented as at October 2009, when the arms-surrender window was shut. A statistical breakdown of the response to the amnesty call showed that Bayelsa state topped the list of disarmed militants with 4,869, Delta state had 1,061, Rivers 1,047, Ondo 750, Edo 250, Akwa Ibom 162 and Cross river 160. An analysis of the surrendered arms showed that 2,760 of the arms were of different classes and calibre, with 287,445 various types of ammunition. Also surrendered were 3,155 magazines, 1,090 dynamite caps, 763 explosives and dynamites, and 18 gunboats. The highest cache of ammunitions (130,877) was recovered from Bayelsa, followed by Rivers with 82,406 and Delta with 52,958 (Awolusi, 2009).

Nwazor, (2010:33), states that:

In spite of the success recorded by the amnesty programme, there is widespread divergence in the opinions of analysts: while some are sceptical that the wide disparity between the caches of weapons surrendered and the enormous fire power of the militants bespeaks of insincerity and a distinct possibility of reneging on ceasefire agreements, others are optimistic that, by accepting the amnesty offer, the key militant leaders have effectively been co-opted into government and will now work for its success.

This view is anchored on the target of the amnesty plan to rehabilitate and pay allowances to the ex-militants: each militant that agrees to disarm is likely to receive a monthly stipend of between US$300 and US$450 for his upkeep (Connors and Swartz, 2009; Nwazor, 2010:33-34).

The amnesty program has three components: The first is disarmament, with the militants being expected to turn in their arsenals of weaponry and complete the requisite form of renunciation of violence. The second is the rehabilitation and reintegration of demobilised militants, including the payment of stipends. The federal government has projected that the amnesty programme would cost the state some N10.14 billion. Third is the post-amnesty package of massive infrastructural development (Nwazor, 2010:129).

The amnesty programme is basically DDR oriented. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants are the first step in the transition from war to peace. However, it is believed that the DDR is much more complicated in a post-conflict environment, when different fighting groups are divided by animosities and face a real security dilemma as they give up their weapons, when civil society structures have crumbled, and when the economy is stagnant. DDR supports the transition from war to peace by ensuring a safe environment, transferring ex-combatants back to civilian life, and enabling people to earn livelihoods through peaceful means instead of war.

DDR is an applied strategy for executing successful peacekeeping operations, and is generally the strategy employed by all UN Peacekeeping Operations. Disarmament is the first phase of DDR, and logically precedes demobilization and reintegration. However, it is often a long-term process. It entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents (weapons, ammunition, etc.); Disarmament is important not only for the material improvement

of security conditions, but also for its psychological impact. There are added psychological benefits when ex-combatants physically disable their own weapons, and are led in doing so by their commanders, immediately upon entering the disarmament site. The process symbolically underscores the transition from military to civilian life. Additionally, public destruction of weapons is an important tool in sensitizing the population and promoting the DDR program.

Demobilization entails the disbanding of armed groups. Demobilization includes assembly of ex-combatants, orientation programs, and transportation to the communities of destination. These movements of large groups of people should be timed to coincide with phases of civilian life that facilitate reintegration, such as crop and school cycles. According to Massimo (2003) demobilization requires:

* + 1. **Assembly of ex-combatants**: This helps ensure their participation in the DDR program, through their disarmament, registration, and access to DDR benefits in the form of goods and services. When ex-combatants are assembled, they are first registered and then receive civilian identification cards, which allow the holders to participate in the DDR program and receive benefits. Encampments are not intended to host ex-combatants for a long time, but adequate facilities, food supplies, and medical assistance are important to maintain discipline and security. In addition, encampments' infrastructure should be built to meet not only the needs of ex-combatants, but also of the many dependents who may follow them.
    2. **Orientation of ex-combatants**: This is essential in establishing and reinforcing ex- combatants' beliefs that the DDR program offers viable alternatives to conflict as a livelihood: Pre-discharge orientation has important practical and psychological functions. Practically, it provides ex-combatants and their dependents with basic information about the DDR program. Psychologically, it empowers DDR beneficiaries as free citizens, by

addressing their needs and doubts and asking for their interactive participation. The pre- discharge orientation typically focuses on the DDR program, the implementing agencies, the rights and obligations of participants, and how they can access the program's benefits. General information is also offered about reintegration into civilian life, such as health issues, education and employment opportunities, and access to land and credit. Post- discharge orientation caters to more specific needs, in the context of the community of resettlement. Post-discharge orientation is the first step in the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. It provides information about the place of relocation, economic opportunities, and relevant local institutions and social networks, including religious groups, NGOs, veterans' associations, farmers' associations, women's groups, and others.

After ex-combatants have been demobilized, their effective and sustainable reintegration into civilian life is necessary to prevent a new escalation of the conflict. Reintegration describes the process of reintegrating former combatants into civil society, ensuring against the possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict. In the short term, ex-combatants who do not find peaceful ways of making a living are likely to return to conflict. In the longer term, disaffected veterans can play an important role in destabilizing the social order and polarizing the political debate, becoming easy targets of populist, reactionary, and extremist movements. Massimo (2003) argues that reintegration includes:

* + - 1. **Reinsertion:** This addresses the most immediate needs of ex-combatants. Reinsertion assistance consists of short-term relief interventions, which provide a safety net for demobilized ex-combatants. Assistance may include housing, medical care, food, and elementary education for children. The distribution of cash allowances has proven to be the most effective and efficient way to provide reinsertion assistance. Cash

payments are preferred over in-kind assistance because of reduced transaction costs, easier and more transparent accounting, and because cash payments can adapt more closely to the specific needs of beneficiaries. Additionally, cash allowances have the positive psychological effect of empowering ex-combatants to take charge of their lives. However, cash payments present two dilemmas: they can give the negative impression of being "cash for weapons," and they can be easily lost or misused for consumption and pleasure. A common solution to this problem is to distribute allowances neither in advance, nor at the time of disarmament, but instead after arrival at the community of destination, in separate installments, and accompanied by post-discharge counselling.

* + - 1. **Economic Integration**: This is the final requirement for a DDR program to be successful and sustainable in the long term. The goal of economic reintegration efforts is to provide ex-combatants with financial independence through employment. Different initiatives should cater to the special needs of disabled veterans who cannot reintegrate into the labour force, for rural settlers, and for urban settlers. Common economic integration programs include education and professional training, public employment, encouragement of private initiative through skills development and micro credit support, and access to land.

The DDR has two goals and this we shall examine:

* + - * 1. **Short-term goals**: The immediate goal is the restoration of security and stability, through the disarmament of warring parties. Demobilization of armed groups is another fundamental step in the improvement of security conditions at the end of an armed conflict. Progressive disarmament reduces the mistrust that fuels a

security dilemma between the fighting factions, allows aid workers to intervene more effectively, and allows peaceful social and economic activities to resume.

* + - * 1. **Long-term goals**: The final goal of DDR is the sustained social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into a peaceful society. However, DDR programs are not comprehensive development projects; they are temporary measures to facilitate the transition from war to peace. If a DDR program is to be sustainable and successful in the long term, it must be integrated with and supported by interventions for post-conflict reconstruction and social and economic development (Massimo, 2003; Otite and Umukoro, 2011:222-226).

DDR has become a major strategy for the resolution of conflict and management of post- conflict situations for over two decades now. Widely utilized by the United Nations and similar organizations, its preference in conflict resolution appears to be linked to its acceptance as an effective tool for achieving sustainable peace. The Nigerian government adopted the amnesty program in this contest. However, the program has been questioned by some scholars who argue that, by its conception and operation, the amnesty program does not conform to DDR in its fundamentals. According to Davidheiser and Nyiayaana (2010:1), ―A DDR program is typically adopted as a means of transition from conflict to peace since its function is to remove one or more of the disputing parties from the scene. Accordingly, peace negotiations generally include DDR clauses, yet in peace-building theory, a DDR program is only expected to comprise the preliminary phases of a much broader process of addressing root causes that initially motivated the combatants. By failing to include the latter, the Amnesty Program does not conform to this model‖.

The lack of negotiations between the government and combatants is identified here as a major flaw which dissociates the amnesty program from DDR. But Ikelegbe (2010) lists other

defects such as the absence of cease fire and cessation of hostilities before the proclamation of the amnesty program, and the lack of gestures such as the release of detained combatants and those on trial, and the non-involvement of international organizations as evidences why the program deviates from DDR.

It is true that these are essential components of DDR, but their absence in the amnesty program is not enough to dismiss it as non-DDR compliant, as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are core policies of the amnesty program. Negotiation and cease fire for example, are processes which lead to DDR, and to insist that there must be negotiation between the government and combatants will be ignoring context, and thus missing out the point. This is also true of international support that may not be necessary always. The essence of negotiation is to establish a framework for conflict resolution, which is expected to address the root causes of the conflict and a determination of how to resolve them. In the Niger Delta Context where these were already known and established, pre-DDR negotiations with combatants can be overlooked. Furthermore Watts (2007), believes that; ―the violence was championed by a welter of groups and thus, negotiations with combatants could have been disorderly‖. The individual acceptance of the amnesty by militia leaders, the feelings of betrayal by others and the separate meetings between militia groups and the late President Umaru Musa Yar‘adua after they have accepted the amnesty vindicate this point.

At another level of analysis, there is no single path to DDR, as it can be secured in three ways. First, DDR can be secured through negotiated settlement between parties in conflict with support from a third party. Second, it can be established by one party after defeating others, and third, DDR can be the result of peace agreements midwifed through international intervention (UN Report on DDR, 2007). Thus the insistence that the amnesty program deviates from conventional procedures for the establishment of DDR, simply because it did not follow the path

of conflicting parties negotiating to secure DDR ignores context, and again misses the point. That the amnesty program satisfies the core phases and goals of DDR is not in doubt, as it adopted the DDR phases and processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia groups in the Niger Delta was a policy recommended by the Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC), a committee established in 2008 by the Nigerian government to determine appropriate peace-building strategies in the region. The 40 member committee, made of scholars and opinion leaders from the region made wide consultations with stake holders, including the combatants before making its recommendations. The policy recommendations on DDR stated in part that: Federal government should establish a credible and authoritative DDR institution and process including international negotiators to plan, implement, and oversee the DDR programs at regional, state, and local government levels; Grant amnesty to all Niger Delta militants willing and ready to participate in the DDR program; Work out long-term strategies of human capacity development and reintegration for ex-militants and Exclude from amnesty and criminalize the activities of those militants not committed to the DDR process and unwilling to surrender to arms (Niger Delta Technical Committee Report, 2008: 66).

Furthermore, specific tasks were assigned to the states and local governments, communities, militia groups and security operatives in order to ensure the success of the program. In particular, state governments were required to support the rebuilding of communities destroyed by military invasion, and establish youth development centers and community demobilization and reintegration committees to enhance reintegration and capacity building. State governments were also required to provide social amenities such as health centers (Federating units in Nigeria are called States, and there are 36 of such states and 774 local government councils) and schools at the site of former militant camps (NDTC, 2008: 67). The

amnesty program was therefore not imposed by the federal government, neither is it a beneficent gift to Niger Delta militias, nor is it an instrument of political patronage or primitive accumulation of wealth as argued by Davidheiser and Nyiayaana ( 2010) and Joab-Peterside ( 2010).

As note earlier, the amnesty program was proclaimed on June 25, 2009, and militias were given a 60 day period (August 3 to October 4, 2009) to accept the offer. Arms collection centres and withholding camps were created across the region. At the end of the period, over 20,000 militias disarmed and surrendered thousands of arms ammunitions, and other weapons of war ranging from rocket launchers, AK 47 Rifles, pump action guns, machine guns and gun boats (Okogun & Okeneye, 2009: 1-2; Joab-Peterside, 2010: 85-98).

The program has since moved on to the rehabilitation and reintegration phase. First, the militias were sent for non-violence training, to ensure behaviour modification and equip them with strategies for peaceful resolution of conflicts. Thereafter, they have been sent for training in their chosen areas of economic empowerment, including vocational skills acquisition and entrepreneurship training. While some are trained within the country, others were sent to South Africa and Ghana. The federal government has also stepped up efforts in providing social infrastructure, although the noticeable project in this area thus far, is the accelerated construction of the East-West road (The East-West Road is the major road that connects the Niger Delta states. Importantly too, it is the major link between the Niger Delta and other parts of Nigeria. This makes it an important road for communication and the evacuation of petroleum products from the Niger Delta to other areas in Nigeria).

It is discernible from the above that the amnesty program has the essential features of DDR. The report of the NDTC which was based on wide consultation with stake holders, and the consultations and negotiations between opinion and political leaders of the Niger Delta and the

militia groups which preceded the commencement of the amnesty program can be termed in context as Pre-DDR negotiations. Importantly also, militia leaders who accepted the amnesty held meetings with the late president of the country, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar‘adua, to clear doubts, build trust, express demands, make guarantees, and clarify intentions‛ (Ikelegbe, 2010:11).The disarmament and demobilization of militias, the sub-sequent closure of their camps, and the on-going rehabilitation and reintegration process are also indications of the DDR strategy for peace-building.

Thus far, the program has restored ―relative‖ peace; the militias have left the creeks, attacks on oil infrastructure and oil company personnel have stopped, and oil production has been restored to normal level of about 2.3 million barrels per day (AIT, 2010). Ibaba is of the view that; the possible recurrence of violence is however a major concern (Ibaba, 2011:244-249). These and more will be the focus of this study.

# Peace in the Post Amnesty Period in the Niger Delta

Conflicts may have negative or positive effects. The resolution of conflicts helps to push society towards enhanced humanity. Conflicts are inevitable in human affairs but if carefully handled, they can lead to social and economic progress. When unresolved contradictions are allowed to linger and explode into violence, conflict becomes undesirable and may develop into a menace. Violent conflict is therefore the consequence of the inability or failure to accommodate and resolve contradictions in society through arrangements and procedures that eliminate their negative effects and maximize their positive effect. According to Nnoli (1998:16), such failures result from the inability of conflicting units to accept the arrangements and procedures that have been adopted to resolve the conflict (Okoh, 2004:94). This is the case with the management of conflicts in the Niger Delta. The inability to tackle the current manifestation

of insurgency goes as far back as the colonial era from the time of king Jaja of Opobo, the Sir Henry Willink Commission the Military era and now the civilian regimes of President Olusegun Obasanjo, Late President Musa Yar‘adua and now the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan.

Be that as it may, the critical issue at this point is that through the amnesty the Yar‘adua administration was able to provide peace for all of Niger Delta. However, as Muogbo (2009a) has argued ―sustaining that peace remains the source of concern for Nigerian‖. Indeed without any doubt sustaining peace in the Niger Delta is imperative. But how can this be done? This question is important because as some people in government are rejoicing about the success of the amnesty, MEND one of the key militant groups is saying that it has not given up on violent agitation (Muogbo, 2009b).

When the 60 days amnesty period ended on October 4, 2009 a new phase in the programme commenced namely, making the deal reached with the militants and indeed the entire region work in the post amnesty period.

The first step in this period (for the militants) involved ―a rehabilitation process that will ultimately lead to their full rehabilitation and integration back into peaceful life‖ (Idris and Bello, 2009). However the then media coordinator of the Amnesty Implementation Programme did not put a time frame to this process saying, it is indeterminate and could take a long time (Idris and Bello, 2009). Egwemi (2010) was of the opinion that putting a time frame and working toward achieving it would have been a better option. As is to be expected in all human activities the amnesty programme had its problems, which the government has been grappling with the best way it can. For example it can be argued that the post amnesty programme was literally speaking at the take off stage when President Yar‘adua its arrow head took ill and left the country in a hurry November 2009.

On the 23rd of November the President left the country on what should ordinarily have been a medical vacation. Unfortunately the President and his men did not handle the issue properly in terms of the constitutional requirements as stipulated in section 145 of the 1999 Constitution. This was to herald the beginning of a major constitutional crisis, which only ended after a national assembly declaration, which proclaimed Vice President Goodluck Jonathan as Acting President on 9th February 2010. As is to be expected while the Nigerian polity drifted as it were, a lot of burning national issues did not get the required attention. One of such issues was the post amnesty (Ojo, 2009).

In his first broadcast to the nation after assuming power as acting president (and specifically in relation to the post amnesty programme) Goodluck Jonathan Declared that, ―The federal government will take every step necessary to consolidate the gains of amnesty in the Niger Delta and execute the post amnesty programme. I, therefore, appeal to all concerned to be patient as there can be no meaningful development without peace and stability‖ (Newswatch, 2010).

As reassuring as these words are there is not gain saying the fact that they would make more sense when practical steps are taken to actualize them. In the period in which the power vacuum lasted, there were signs that the gains of the amnesty were going to be lost to the uncertainties of the post amnesty period. For example there were signs of renewed militancy in the region and speculations about the oil giant shell relocating from the region. With the power vacuum taken care of and with a Niger Deltan in power, it is hoped that the post amnesty period is carefully handled so that an end can be brought to insecurity in the region in particular and Nigeria in general (Egwemi, 2010:139).

# Theoretical Framework

# 2.8.1 Political Economy Theory

The Marxist Political Economy approach is deemed fit and adopted as an analytical construct in this study. The reason has been that, the approach scientifically studies the society in its totality and takes into consideration of the interconnection of social relations, class conflict and the organic relationship between the sub-structure (economy) and the super structure (politics).

Political economy is concerned with the social laws of production and distribution (Lange, 1974:7). The Marxist political economy approach is a holistic, historical orientation, which is used for the analysis of social formations and their contradicting relationships. It mainly focuses on the economic laws which govern the production and distribution of material benefits among individuals and groups at different stages of development of society (Iwarimie, 1991:50). Put differently, the approach is seen as the window to understand the laws that govern the economic life of the society. It explains the relationship between what man produce and how he benefits from the surplus he produce. The approach show how the various parts of the superstructure are used as instruments of the ruling class domination, and as mechanism of oppression of the subject class (Ebienfa, 2012:9).

According to Ake (1981), a major advantage of this approach is that, it emphasizes the relatedness of social phenomena. This links exist between the economic structure and social structure. More so, the approach helps to penetrate deep into the processes and policies, lay bare their essence and then explain concrete forms of their manifestation. In essence the political economy approach will unravel the oil production and lack of development paradox in the Niger Delta, which is attributed to the obnoxious laws that governs the oil industry, the lopsided federalism and revenue allocation mechanism in the country, neglect and marginalization of the

ethnic minorities that bear the burden of oil exploration and exploitation, etc. It will also explain the lack of political will on the part of the federal government to develop the region (Ebienfa, 2012:9). The lack of political will on the part of the Nigerian State goes a long way to explain the lack of a true commitment and policy action aimed at developing the Niger Delta which is the crux the first objective of this study intends to address. Additionally, this thesis explains the neglect of women and children being that they constitute the core victims of oil insurgencies and thus explains the plight of women and children in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Similarly and in this regard the Political economic thesis helps us to see the Amnesty policy in light of a mere palliative measure to curb militancy and ensure the continuous flow of crude without a real attempt to develop region and attend to the root cause of the violence and insurgencies in the first place. Again the first objective of this study is fully explained.

The political economy tradition is rooted in Marxist historical materialism and it holds that any form of exchange inherent in human nature depends on the production and distribution of surplus value (Pereira, 2009). The political aspect of this approach is rooted in the issue of power, which differs according to structures of control in a society. The evolution of amnesty for militants in the Niger Delta is occasioned by incessant violence and colossal wastage of oil resources in the region. It is a radical shift in attempts to address the crisis of underdevelopment in Nigeria. While extant official measures to ensure peace for development in the Niger Delta were largely coercive, amnesty was highly persuasive. Official attempts to manage the social movement for the recognition of the need to develop the Niger Delta resulted in the death of Isaac Adaka Boro and the creation of mid-western region in the 1960s, followed by environmental degradation and neglect of the agricultural sector in the Niger Delta since the 1970s. In light of this situation, the Niger Delta has witnessed an upsurge in identity-based social movements in the 1990s especially with the popularity of the Movement for the Survival of

Ogoni people (MOSOP), which was under the leadership of Ken Saro Wiwa and other key members, who were murdered in 1995 by the Nigerian military government. The murder of the MOSOP leaders coupled with mounting socio-economic malaise in the Niger Delta created an atmosphere for the emergence of a new wave of militancy characterized by mass destruction of lives and properties and hostility against the Nigerian government.

Studies have shown that activities of the militants adversely affected the Nigerian economy. An installed capacity of Nigeria‘s oil sector declined from 3.2 million barrels of crude per day (mbpd) to 1.3 mbpd in 2008 and it fluctuated between 800,000 bpd and 1.2 mbpd until June 2009 (Essien, 2008). The amnesty was politically motivated as the Nigerian government used it to demonstrate its interest in promoting peace and development in the region. A major motivation for the use of amnesty in the management of oil-driven militancy in Nigeria is the belief that peace rather than violence is a necessary condition for sustainable development. This explains the third objective of this study which seeks to investigate the prospects of the amnesty policy leading to lasting peace in the region. The political economy thesis finds its relevance here.

However, the amnesty is exclusive; it targets only militants without consideration for the victims of militancy particularly women and children and hostage taking in the region. According to Economic Confidential (2009), the amnesty has ushered in the cessation of arms conflict, the wanton destruction of lives and properties and other forms of criminality in the region with recorded improvement in the economic sector and the barrel of crude oil jumping to

1.84 million per day from 1.3 million barrels within the space of time (Akinwale, 2010). This is a commendable effort but more needs to be done to consciously address the root cause of oil militancy in the Niger Delta.

In summary, the Political Economy theory posits that people pursue collective economic goals and deal with conflicts over resources and other economic factors in authoritative way by means of government as in the case of the Nigerian State. In as much as the Marxist Political Economy approach is deemed fit to be adopted as the analytical construct in this work. Its major strength being that, the approach scientifically studies the society in its totality and takes into consideration the interconnection of social relations, class conflict and the organic relationship between the sub-structure (economy) as well as the super structure (politics). Thus, Political Analysis adopts this approach to explain or present a critique of any major political and economic policy of political actors as with the amnesty program. The experiences in the developing States of the world have shown that scholars, who are Marxist- inclined in their writings, often adopt the approach to explain certain economic-political relationship existing in a named political system or between a political system and another political system. They do this by applying the contending theories in political economy – Class Analysis, Dependence Theory, Development/Underdevelopment. In fact, their action only confirms the contention that the central concept of political economy is that of ―class‖.

Political economy is concerned about the relationship between the economy and state and about the various ways individual try to use the state to improve their economic welfare. The central premise of this perspective is that the mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual process of life. Thus, the society has a sharp divide and is characterized into classes of the rich and the poor or the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Therefore, the rich own the means of production, distribution and exchange, use their wealth/resources to persuade the poor to gain power. Put differently, the approach is seen as the window to understand the law that governs the economic life of the society and in this case the Niger Delta and Nigeria at large.

According to the Marxist thought, this domination (Politics), exploitation (economic), and marginalization (dependency) of society is a dialectical material distribution and power which eventually will result in a consciousness or revolt to upturn the status quo. Therefore, political leadership owns the apparatus of government which can be used to marginalize, exploit, and dominate others in the stratum of the society. It is in this wise that this work tries to expose and underpin the acts and policies of the federal government of Nigeria that are detrimental and at variance to the expectation of the responsibility of political actors in the discharge of duties in the society especially the developmental challenges of the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Despite the revolts, agitations and insurgencies so far the government is yet to be totally overthrown as or capitalism being replaced by socialism as posited by the Marxist Political Economy. This shows us the weakness of this theory in explaining fully the Niger Delta phenomenon.

# Introduction

# CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY

This chapter is primarily concerned with the process of collecting valid and reliable data for the study. It comprises the location of the study, study population, types and sources of data, techniques of data collection and analysis and other methodological challenges. In general this chapter describes the data collection methods that were used to achieve our research goals and aims. This study adopted both the quantitative and qualitative research techniques.

# Research Design

The survey research methodology adopted employed the use of questionnaires and qualitative techniques to complement the data obtained.

# Location of the Study

This study was conducted in Rivers State South-South geo-political zone of Nigeria. This location was selected after due consultations with literature and some personnel in the Presidential Amnesty Office and the Ministry of Niger-Delta Affairs in Abuja. With their help and consultations in place the researcher was aided to reach the target study population without much difficulty. There, the researcher was directed on where to get specific information and data for the study. Additionally, the prominent role held by the state in the oil economy of the Niger Delta in terms of oil production output and militant agitations helped in arriving at the choice of this location.

The study was conducted in four selected communities and locations in the Rivers state, namely in Okrika, Bonny, Opobo Islands and Port-Harcourt (the state capital). These locations were purposively selected for this study. The four communities play a significant role in the

Amnesty process. For instance, Okrika was one of the selected sites for collection of weapons at the unset of the amnesty program. Port-Harcourt offers us an urban settlement where most of the training sites and organisations for ex-militants are found. Majority of the oil pipelines are cited in this area with major oil companies‘ headquarters.

Rivers State was chosen because it has been at the forefront of minority agitations in Nigeria. It was created in 1967 after a decade of struggles by the leadership of the Conference of Rivers Chiefs and Peoples against marginalization in the Eastern region. Rivers State is located in southern Nigeria, comprising the Niger River delta on the Gulf of Guinea. It is bounded by the states of Anambra and Imo on the north, Abia and Akwa Ibom on the east, and Bayelsa and Delta on the west. Rivers State contains mangrove swamps, tropical rainforest, and many rivers the State has several Ijo(Ijaw) fishing settlements in what is now Rivers including Abonnema, Degema, Okrika, Bonny, Brass, Akassa, Nembe (Nimbi), and New Calabar all of which became important in the early 19th century because of their trade in slaves and later for the export of palm oil and palm kernels. Incorporated as part of the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1885 and Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893, the area became part of the amalgamated British colony and protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. In 1976 some parts of the Ndoni territory in former Bendel state were added to Rivers state (Rivers, 2010).

Rivers State remained largely the same size, with minor increase as a result of boundary adjustment after the civil war, though, in 1996, it was divided into two in which Bayelsa State was created. The state is ethnically diverse as earlier mentioned with the Ikwerre, Ogoni, Kalabari and Okirika as the dominant groups. The major cleavage is between the upland and the riverine groups. The upland group includes the Ogoni and other groups whose languages are similar to the Igbo language such as the Ikwerre, Etche, Ekpeye, Ogba, Egbema, and Ndoni;

while the riverine groups include Ijaw speaking groups such as the Kalabari, Okrika, Abua, Igbani (Opobo, Bonny) and Andoni (Bonny, 2010).

Although it is difficult to establish oil production figures as a result of claims by different states to position themselves as the highest oil production, there is no doubt that Rivers State ranks among the largest oil producing states. It is also host to strategic oil infrastructure notably the LNG Plant at Bonny, the Port Harcourt Refinery and Soku Gas Project. In addition, most of the multinational oil corporations and oil service companies have their headquarters and or major operational bases in Port Harcourt, which doubles as state capital and Nigeria‘s oil capital. The state has also been at the centre of struggles of ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta for resource control. Contemporary resistance to the Nigerian State and multinational oil companies started in the early 1990s when the Ogoni people under the aegis of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) presented the Ogoni Bill of Rights to the Nigerian federal government. The government largely ignored the 500,000 or so strong Ogoni people and MOSOP, which adopted a philosophy of non-violence in its rights advocacy. State repression against the MOSOP leadership and the Ogoni people at large which culminated in the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 8 other Ogoni activists set the stage for the transition from non-violent to violent struggles. It contributed to the proliferation of ethno-political associations and ethnic militias that were committed to violent struggle (Ibeanu and Luckham, 2006).

The State is also one of the first Delta states to commence a disarmament and rehabilitation programme for ‗repentant‘ militants. Militants who disarmed are admitted into a rehabilitation camp administered by the Rivers State Social Rehabilitation Committee. Since this study aimed at former militants and the establishment of a rehabilitation camp that housed repentant militants greatly influenced the choice of Rivers State (Langer and Ukiwo, 2009).

Fishing and farming are the principal occupations of the region. Plantains, bananas, cassava, oil palms, coconuts, rubber trees, raffia, and citrus fruits are grown. Large deposits of crude oil and natural gas in the Niger River delta are the state's major mineral resources. Major oil terminals exist offshore from Brass and Bonny, and petroleum refineries have been established at Port Harcourt and nearby Alesa-Eleme. Port Harcourt, the state capital and one of the nation's largest ports, is on the southern terminus of the eastern branch of the Nigerian Railway's main line. Most industrial activity in the state is centered in Port Harcourt, which has become one of the nation's leading industrial centres and is the site of a federal university; the University of Port Harcourt. Because the landscape is dominated by the networks of rivers and mangrove swamps, water serves as the principal means of transport through much of the western part of the state. It covers an area of 8,436 square miles (21,850 square km) and a population of 5,185,400 according to the 2006 Nigeria census (Rivers, 2010).

Okrika town and port, is also in Rivers state, in southern Nigeria. It lies on the north bank of the Bonny River and on Okrika Island, 35 miles (56 km) upstream from the Bight of Benin. The town can be reached by vessels of a draft of 29 feet (9 metres) or less. Formerly a small fishing village of the Ijo (Ijaw) people in the mangrove swamps of the eastern Niger River delta, Okrika became the capital of the Okrika kingdom in the early 17th century and actively dealt in slaves. It served as a port for the exportation of palm oil after the abolition of the slave trade in the 1830s, but it was a less significant port facility than either Bonny (18 miles [46 km] south) or Opobo (32 miles [81 km] east-southeast). By 1912 Okrika had been completely eclipsed by Port Harcourt, and it was not revived as a commercial port until 1965, when the nearby Alesa-Eleme oil refinery was completed and pipelines were built to a jetty on Okrika Island. Refined petroleum products are Okrika's only significant exports. The town has considerable local trade in fish, oil palm produce, locally processed salt, cassava (manioc), taro, plantains, and yams. Its

population is put at approximately 222,026 based on Nigeria Census figures in 2006 (Okrika, 2010).

# Types and Sources of data

This study made use of both the Primary and Secondary sources of data. The primary sources of data were derived directly from the respondents via the use of questionnaires and Knowledgeable Individuals (Key Informants), Focus Group Discussions (FGD) on the subject matter for the residents in the region and particularly ex-militants who have undergone training; while the secondary data was derived from publications from the presidential amnesty office which covered her activities within the first three (3) years of the amnesty program. A number of the publications were able to answer a few of our research questions and objectives particularly the responses of some of the militant war lords such as Alhaji Asari Dokubo and a foremost Niger Delta Environmental activist Female activist.

# Study Population and Sampling Techniques

The population of the study comprised primarily the trained ex-militants who have been fully demobilized, rehabilitated and reintegrated back into the larger society. However, the need arose to include other categories of ex-militants who have not yet completed their training, not included in the amnesty program or abstained from it. Additionally, the need arose to include and investigate other categories of the population such as women, children and other key informants.

The target populations for the survey were both male and female residents and different ex-militants categories in the sampled communities of Okrika town, Port Harcourt Town, Bonny Island and Opobo kingdom. Households served as the unit of analysis while respondents in the

households were the units of response for the study. In this study, a household is defined as a family living under the same roof and sharing things in common.

Both the probability and non-probability sampling techniques were used in this research work. In the case of the non-probability sampling technique, the four study locations of Port Harcourt town, Bonny Island, Okrika town and Opobo Island were purposefully selected, while the Probability sampling techniques of Multi – stage cluster and systematic sampling were used for the study in reaching the final respondents in the community survey in Port Harcourt Town, Bonny Island and Okrika town. In Opobo Kingdom however, the approach was slightly different due to the clustered nature of the settlement without clearly demarcated streets (from the researcher‘s point of view). For instance, from one house in Opobo kingdom, one could reach many others, as most houses were interconnected and interlinked through pathways, backyards and back doors. Due to the costly nature of land and its scarcity in Opobo land, houses are decked and built on each other in form of story buildings. The streets in Opobo land are so narrow that no cars were allowed on the Island except for motor bikes. Most indigenes will park their cars on the main land and navigate by canoe or speedboats to Opobo at weekends or at ceremonial times, which takes at least 30 minutes to reach. An alternative route on land by motor bikes through Nkoro from Bori (Ogoni Land) was expensive and longer which costed over a ₦1, 000 ($3.3 as at the time the research was conducted at the exchange rate of about ₦305 to $1). On boat it costed only about ₦500 ($1.6).

The case is however different when compared to the other three study locations of Port Harcourt City, Bonny Island and Okirika Town, where the towns are well planned and streets clearly demarcated with names, numbers and addresses on them. In Opobo, people are located by family name and compound. About three or more generations lived within the same house or family compound in Opobo. To locate any one in Opobo was to find out which family he or she

comes from first and from there one can further narrow his search to a particular house and then the specific household and nuclear family.

Opobo kingdom is divided into 14 Families or Sections. The largest and strongest being the family of Jeki; same family of King Jaja of Opobo. (See picture Jaja Family war canoe). The 14 families or sections have 64 sub houses/families known War Canoe Houses. The history of Opobo cannot be told without the mention of the War Canoe. Every major family had one. A war canoe usually had a Canon, a talking drum, a gong and carried about 66 fighters. The 64 war canoe houses were not equally divided amongst the 14 families. Some had more war canoe houses than others.



**Figure 1:1 Jaja Family War Canoe, Opobo Kingdom. (Source: Field work, 2015).**

The multi-stage cluster sampling was adopted for the study due to the vast areas covered and the researcher lacking accurate data on the exhaustive list and approximate population of the

study areas. This technique was adopted also in that it gave all elements of the population an equal chance of being selected.

The sampling was done in stages. In first stage, the population of each of the study locations represented a cluster, except for Opobo Kingdom (which was divided based on the existing 14 major family clans forming a cluster for each and as such there were several clusters from which the sampling was made). The 14 families in Opobo were purposively adopted and used as clusters representing the first stage of clusters. In subsequent stages, simple random sampling techniques were employed to select the wards (or families) then houses and households that were reached. Each of the selected study locations were existing Local Government Areas in themselves, except for Port Harcourt town which consisted of four LGAs.

In the second stage, from each of the clusters (i.e each ward or household), Phalga Local Government Area within Port Harcourt town was selected. For the third stage, a ward was chosen from the selected local government areas. Finally, a community was selected from the wards. This procedure was adopted in selecting two communities that constituted the study areas in Port Harcourt town, Okrika town and Bonny Island.

Households were selected for the study through systematic sampling. This was done by selecting two main streets in the community and every fifth house on both sides of the street were selected for administering questionnaires. For houses with one to three households, one household was selected, houses with four to six households, two households were surveyed while those with seven or more (as it was in the case in Opobo), five households were chosen where five questionnaires were administered to the final respondents in their houses and some in their shops attached to the houses.

Since the population that constitutes the study area in each community was largely homogeneous, in respect to similarity in characteristics of the community being studied, their

socio-economic status such as occupation, language, culture and religion; it therefore translated to a small sample size for each of the communities. A sample size of 50 respondents was drawn from each of the selected study communities giving a total sample size of 200 respondents for the community survey.

In the Port Harcourt town, Phalga LGA was selected covering cultural centre and civic centre areas. From there, two communities of Ibimina Polo and Fe – Polo were selected where 25 questionnaires were distributed in each making a total of 50 questionnaires. Five houses were selected in each of five questionnaires were administered to five identified respondents. Okrika LGA (Okochiri community) had 12 wards and 7 units. Koni Ama and Kalio Ama units were selected and 25 questionnaires were distributed in both, where 5 houses were selected and 5 questionnaires administered. The same applied to Bonny LGA were two wards were selected and administered with 25 questionnaires each. Five respondents were reached in five selected houses and issued with questionnaires. In Opobo kingdom (LGA), the Jeki and Fabura families were selected and administered with 25 questionnaires each. Five questionnaires were further administered to five war canoe houses in each. In Jeki Family for instance, Sunday Jaja, Saturday Jaja, Aaron Jaja, Bruce Jaja and Tom Jaja war canoe houses were each administered with five questionnaires. Similarly, the war canoe houses reached and administered with questionnaires in Fabura family were Ogolo Fabura, Gogo, Black Fabura, Finebone and Manilla.

# Methods of Data Collection

Both the qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques were used for the data collection in this study. This helped bridge the gap in data collected and thereby enriched data for the study. The quantitative data was collected through survey instrument through a

questionnaire, while the qualitative data was collected through focus group discussions and in- depth interviews and pictures.

# a. Qualitative Data Collection Instrument

The Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and in-depth interview (IDI) guides were used for the study with a set of guided and semi structured questions on issues with reference to the study objectives. Pictures were also obtained in the course of the field work. The philosophical view behind the qualitative technique is rooted in Ethno methodology i.e humanistic in nature. In this context, social facts are studied and seen as internal, hidden, dynamic and emerging as products of interaction and therefore can be studied through indepth, holistic and contextual interactions. Specifically, data was gathered through an in-depth interaction with the respondents ( i.e ex- militants, women, children, traditional/community heads and amnesty officials) in the forms of Indepth Interviews (IDIs), Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) and the Observational Studies employing visual sociology to elicit data from the sampled population. The quantitative technique however focuses its attention on numbers which can be inferred with statistical significance.

# Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

FGD was held with ex-militants, women and children in Ibimina Polo community. The aim of the FGD was to elicit information on views of participants on the amnesty program with focus on the main research objectives. The suggestions derived possibly can improve the peace building efforts in the Niger Delta. FGDs were adopted for the study because it provided more insights on the real state of the ex-militants outside the creeks and investigated possible reasons that may lure them back to the creeks if any. On the other hand, the FGD was used to find out the views of women and children in the community on how the amnesty program has impacted their

lives since its conception and also enriching the data collected for the study. Three focus group discussion were held with a total of 25 participants.

Three sets of Focus Group Discussions were conducted in only one selected community of Ibimina Polo, (comprising of Nembe, Bonny, Bille waterfronts or jetties & cultural center areas) in old Port Harcourt town. One set of the FGDs consisted of seven (7) women who are aware of the amnesty program, all over 21 years and have suffered the ills of the oil enclave economy and survived. The second category comprised of six (6) Children who were all more than 6 years of age but less than 18 years old. The last category comprised of twelve (12) ex- militants who have been trained at different levels and reintegrated into the society. Other categories of ex-militants were interviewed separately on a one on one bases.

The composition of each FGD was fairly homogeneous with regard to age and marital status and this helped to cut off all extremities of shyness and discussion snatchers among participants during the discussion sessions. A female note taker assisted the researcher in taking notes while the researcher moderated the FGD. All participants spoke in English and local pidgin. A brief introduction to the study and purpose of involving participant was discussed, assuring anonymity and confidentiality. Also, the use of tape recorder was explained and their permission was sought. Discussion was based on the FGD guide which contained lead questions but flexibility was maintained in introducing the topics to ensure that participants were free to bring up issues they choose to discuss in response to particular questions. The discussions were audio recorded.

# In-depth Interviews (IDIs)

A total of sixteen (16) in-depth interviews were conducted comprising of 1 Ex-militant leader in Okirika twon; 6 Ex-militants (5 males from Ibimina Polo community in Port Harcout City and 1 female ex militant from Okirika); 2 community leaders (1 in Opobo kingdom, 1 in

Ibimina Polo - Port Harcourt town); 1 Oil company official (based in Port Harcourt Town, 1 Amnesty official (Head of Reintegration in Abuja), 1 Exco member of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) in Rivers State Chapter; 1 training partner/facilitator, 1 undercover news agent; 1 coordinator of a multi religious peace building organization working on the amnesty program (Global Peace Mission, Lagos) all in Port Harcourt city; and finally, a professor of peace and conflict resolution (Zaria). All these interviews we conducted based on availability.

Most of the interviews we conducted on a one on one bases except for coordinator of the multi religious peace building NGO (Global Peace Mission, Lagos) where a phone interview was conducted. All interviewed were served with a written letter of consent to be interviewed alongside, the letters of introductions and set of questions. Some of the interviews were granted almost immediately while a few others were scheduled for a time most convenient to the interviewed. The recorded audios were played to the hearing of the interviewed at the end of each interview session. A few requested to have a copy which the researcher did not object. Some of the interviews were conducted in secrete and on the credibility of Mr A an undercover journalist for militant camps in Rivers State.

1. **Quantitative Data Collection Instrument**
   1. **Questionnaire (Community Survey)**

A structured questionnaire was administered to respondents in their homes by the researcher and his aides who was sometimes helped by few of the literate ex-militants to fill the questionnaires for respondents who could not write or claimed they did not have the time to commit to it. In such a case, questions in the questionnaire were asked the respondents and their desired responses filled. This method was adopted in order to save time and cost.

The questionnaires contained both open ended and close-ended questions. The close- ended questions enabled respondents to choose from options, which allowed for comparison of the extent of uniformity of response. The open-ended questions provided opportunity to probe into the depth of their responses. The structured questionnaire was divided into six sections of A which elicited information on The Socio Demographic data of the respondents; B, the extent to which the Amnesty Program addresses the issues development of the people of the Niger Delta and militancy in particular; C, the job prospects of the trained ex-militants and its implication on their standard of living; D, the prospects of the Amnesty Program towards a peaceful resolution of Militancy in the Niger-Delta and its implications to the emergence other forms of insurgences in other regions in Nigeria like the Boko Haram; E, an assessment of the implications of omissions of women and children as the most vulnerable groups and victims of militancy in the Niger Delta Amnesty program and lastly F questions relating to long lasting solutions and peace building in the Niger Delta region respectively.

# Methods of Data Analysis

In this research both quantitative and qualitative data were utilized. Each data was separately analysed, after which the process of triangulation was used to combine and merge both data together to obtain a more balanced report. The quantitative data was analysed using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 17.0. The data generated were first of all cleaned, coded, analysed and thereafter presented in tables (frequencies & percentages) and subsequently interpreted in line with the study objectives.

The descriptive qualitative method of data analysis was employed to analyse the qualitative data gathered. Besides the written notes taken by hand in the process of the interviews and focus group discussions, most of the data was audio recorded. The data was first manually

transcribed, typed into the computer, word processed and thematically formatted using Microsoft Word. The transcribed data was produced as a discussion document with verbatim quotations from participants, reason being that the objective was to ensure that the transcription of data is a true reflection of the issues covered during the interview and discussion sessions with the respondents. This was the most pain taking aspect of the post field research work, yet the need for correct ethical procedure and practice of this nature cannot be under or overemphasized. The use of the computer was limited to word processors to enable the researcher track relevant thematic segments of texts.

Meaningful thematic categories for the analysis of salient issues were manually determined. The advantages are immense; and this was primarily so because the data collected was done through qualitative interviewing methods. Additionally, it was very easy for participants‘ responses to be thematically itemized, arranged and analysed. The qualitative or descriptive data analysis approach in this study exhibits a distinctive approach, which gave us room not only to understand, but to blend the various forms of data collected from the questionnaires and photographic or visual sociological methods adopted.

# Problems Encountered in the field

The major challenge encountered by the researcher in the course of the field work was that of the researcher being a non-indigene of the Niger Delta community or any oil bearing community. Language was the next major barrier that the researcher had to contend with, which the researcher just had to pull through and succeed at all cost. This is not entirely new in academic field research. With regard to the 200 questionnaires designed for the ex-militants, not many of the ex-militants were willing to entertain filling them, as most of them were more interested in what they could get from the researcher since the research had to do with the

amnesty program. A good number of them preferred interviews where they could easily air their views as against filling questionnaires. This led to the abandonment of the questionnaires designed specifically for them (See Appendix J) and adopting interview approach. Two hundred

(200) questionnaires were set aside for the ex-militants but none was successfully administered.

That changed a lot about this research work. The Interviews and FGD however worked in eliciting information from the ex-militants. Focus was now channelled to the community survey. Most of the respondents in the community survey had much challenges with regards to the questionnaires as regards to subject matter of the amnesty. First it was a silent grief then later in an open confrontation (findings in later chapter 4 reveals more). Additionally, their complaints were due to the number of questions they were to respond to. That therefore translated into a lot of time taken to fill the questionnaires and in a number of cases the researcher had to help fill the questionnaires. Some were reluctant to provide responses but after being persuaded responses were given. At the end of the fieldwork, 189 filled questionnaires were retrieved out of the 200 questionnaires administered to different communities sampled. The unaccounted ones were either missing or not filled. The researcher could not interview the JTF Command in Bori Camp Port Harcourt to obtain an assessment of the program from the security angle even after following the due protocol.

The field work especially the qualitative lasted from February 2013 to December 2015 and some parts of 2016. That explains why the work took so much time to complete. Despite the challenges faced in the course of the field work it did not in any way affect the reliability and validity of this research.

# Introduction

# CHAPTER FOUR

# DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

This chapter is a presents and analysis of the data derived from the fieldwork, a synthesis of both qualitative and quantitative data obtained. The discussion is divided into six different sections. These include the Socio Demographic data of the respondents; the study examined the extent to which the Amnesty Program addresses the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and militancy in particular. the job prospects of the training given to the rehabilitated ex-militants and its implication on their standard of living in comparison to their former militant status, the prospects of the Amnesty Program towards a peaceful resolution of Militancy in the Niger-Delta and its implications to the emergence other forms of insurgences in other regions in Nigeria such as the Boko Haram, the implications of possible omissions and neglect of women and children as vulnerable groups and victims of militancy in the Niger Delta Amnesty program.

A total of Two hundred questionnaires (200) were administered in the Community Survey to residents in the selected four Niger Delta Communities of Okrika, Opobo, Bonny Island and Port Harcourt City, but only One hundred and Eighty Nine (189) were retrieved. Three (3) Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and Seventeen (17) Indepth interviews (IDIs) were conducted. Additionally, a number of unstructured and informal interviews and discussions were also conducted which added to the data base of our field findings and reports. Observations and pictures were also part of the field work process. The analysis and interpretation therefore is based on all the data obtained in the process.

The field work and data collection process although originally scheduled for three (3) specific locations in Rivers State, was later expanded to cover four (4) locations. The negotiation

for field access and collection of data started from Zaria through to Kaduna then Abuja, Rivers and Lagos.

# Demographic Characteristics of Respondents (Community Survey)

This section shows the demographic characteristics of respondents in the community survey from Bonny, Opobo, Okrika and Port Harcourt city and comprising of their, ages, sex, marital status, and number of children, state of origin, religious affiliation, educational qualification, employment status and monthly income levels.

# Table 4.2.1: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents in the Community Survey

|  |
| --- |
| **Variables Frequency Percentage (%)** |
| **Age**  15 – 24 years 10 5.3  25 – 34 years 105 55.6  35 – 44 years 42 22.2  45 years and above 28 14.8  No response 4 2.1  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Sex**  Male 130 68.8  Female 56 29.6  No response 3 1.6  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Marital Status**  Single 127 67.2  Married 61 32.3  No response 1 0.5  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **If had Children**  Yes 80 42.3  No 104 55  No response 5 2.6  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **If yes, Number of Children had**  1 32 16.9  2 40 21.2  3 or more 35 18.5  Not applicable 80 42.3  No response 2 1.1  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **State of Origin**  South South 183 96.8  South East 3 1.6  South West 3 1.6  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Community of Residence**  Okrika 50 26.5  Opobo 47 24.9  Bonny island 44 23.3  Port-Harcourt City 47 24.9  No response 1 0.5  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Religious Affiliation**  Christianity 166 87.8  Islam 1 0.5  Traditional 4 2.1  No response 18 9.5  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Highest level of Educational Attainment**  No Formal Education 80 42.3  Primary School 33 17.5  Secondary School 62 32.8  Tertiary education 14 7.4  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Employment Status**  Unemployed 49 25.9  Self-employed 44 23.3  Civil servant 75 39.7  Others 3 1.6  No response 18 9.5  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Average Monthly Income**  I don‘t know 32 16.9  N20,000 and below 13 6.9  N21,000 – N40,000 26 13.8  N41,000 – N60,000 33 17.5  N61,000 – N80,000 18 9.5  N81,000 and above 57 30.2  No response 10 5.3  **Total 189 100.0** |

Table 4.2.1 shows the community survey on the Amnesty Program. Their age distribution shows that 55.6% of the respondents were between the ages of 25-34 years. A few (10%) were between the ages of 15-24years. Thirty seven per cent (37%) of them were 35 years and over. This means that most of the respondents in the community survey were youths and active labour force. Thus the findings shows why the agitations have been persistent over time as many of the actors are young and active. The sex distribution of the respondents shows that majority (68.7%) were males while, 29.6% were females. This implies that more men than women participated in the study; however the women population had good representation.

The distribution of the respondents based on their marital status indicates that most of the participants were single (67.2%), while 32.3% were married as at the time of the study. The marital status further confirms the result on the ages, as almost 67.2% of the population sampled shows. This means that more singles than married persons participated in the study. On the question of whether or not the respondents had children, 55% indicated not having children while 42.3% said that they had children. Furthermore, for those that indicated having a child, a question was asked to know the number of children each had. The table shows that 67% of them said that they had either 2 or more children while only 16.9% said that they had only one child. This means that most of the respondents in the survey that had children have had at least two children as at the time the study was conducted.

The distribution of the respondents based on their state of origin (classified into geo- political zones), shows that 96.8% were from South-South states, while 1.6% were from South Western States and equally another 1.6% were from South Eastern states of Nigeria. These implying that majority of the respondents were from south southern states of Nigeria. On the community of residence of the respondents, 26.5% resided in Okrika, 24.9% in Opobo, in 23.3%

in Bonny Island and another 24.9% resided within Port Harcourt city. This means that most of the respondents in the survey resided within the sampled study locations.

The distribution of the respondents according to their religious affiliation shows that 87.8% of them were Christians, 2.1% traditional, while 0.5% were Muslims. This means that majority of the respondents in the survey were Christians. The highest level of educational attainment of the respondents shows that 42.3% indicated not having any formal education while 17.5% indicate attending only primary school, 32.5% had a secondary school education and 7.4% said they have had one form of tertiary education or the other. This means that most of the respondents had formal education not many had post-secondary education.

The employment status of the respondents shows that 39.7% were civil servants, 25.9% were unemployed, and 23.3% were self-employed. This means that most of the sampled respondents in the survey were civil servants. The average monthly income and distribution of the respondents was investigated and showed that 16.9% did not know how much they earned, while 6.9% earned below ₦20, 000, 13.8% earned between ₦21, 000 - ₦40, 000, 17.5% between

₦41, 000 - ₦60, 000, 9.5% earned between ₦81, 000 - ₦100, 000 and a larger percentage 30.2% earned over ₦100, 000 averagely monthly income. This means that most of the respondents live below ₦60, 000 average monthly income level and almost all are low income earners. With average family size of 4 and with no secondary source of income, many are likely to fall into one military e.g the 25.9% that were unemployment are more likely if they are youths.

# Test of Hypotheses

**Relationship between Employment Status and Age**

Table 4.3.1: **Cross tabulation of Employment status \* Age**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | **Age** | | | | | **Total** |
| **No response** | **15-24**  **years** | **25-34**  **years** | **35-44** | **45 years and above** |  |
|  |  | Count | **4** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **14** | **18** |
|  | **No response** | % within  Employment status | 22.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 77.8% | 100.0% |
|  |  | Count | **0** | **10** | **39** | **0** | **0** | **49** |
|  | **Unemployed** | % within  Employment status | 0.0% | 20.4% | 79.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | **100.0%** |
|  |  | Count | **0** | **0** | **44** | **0** | **0** | **44** |
| **Employment status** | **Self employed** | % within  Employment status | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | **100.0%** |
|  |  | Count | **0** | **0** | **22** | **42** | **11** | **75** |
|  | **Civil servant** | % within Employment  status | 0.0% | 0.0% | 29.3% | 56.0% | 14.7% | **100.0%** |
|  |  | Count | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **3** | **3** |
|  | **Others** | % within Employment  status | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | **100.0%** |
|  |  | Count | **4** | **10** | **105** | **42** | **28** | **189** |
| **Total** |  | % within Employment  status | 2.1% | 5.3% | 55.6% | 22.2% | 14.8% | **100.0%** |

The table above shows that 39(79.8%) of the respondents were unemployed and within the age bracket of 25 to 34 years, implying that they are of a youthful and productive age. This also meaning that they represent a ready army capable of joining the militancy in the Niger Delta

region. This further shows that there is a good relationship between unemployment and age as the chi square test shows in the table below. Additionally, a fewer proportion 10(20.4%) between the ages of 15 and 24 years were unemployed; self-employed between ages 25 and 34 years were 44(100%) and civil servants between ages 35 and 44 years were 42(56%).

# Table 4.3.1.1Chi-Square Tests

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | Df | Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) |
| Pearson Chi-Square | 248.741a | 16 | .000 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 232.781 | 16 | .000 |
| Linear-by-Linear Association | 14.074 | 1 | .000 |
| N of Valid Cases | 189 |  |  |

a. 15 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Result above showed that there is significant relationship between Employment status and Age. This is at the calculated p value of 0.000 which is below the 0.05 alpha level of significance and the computed chi square value of 248.741 is higher than 26.296 Chi square critical value at df

16. The cross tabulation shows that the many of those who did not disclose their employment status were within the age bracket of 25 to 34 years. Also most of those between ages of 35 and 44 years (100%) were unemployed hence the null hypothesis is hereby rejected.

# Table 4. 3.2: Cross tabulation of Age \* Monthly income

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | **Monthly income** | | | | | | | **Total** |
| **No response** | **I don't know** | **N20, 000**  **and below** | **N21, 000 - N40,000** | **N41, 000**  **- N60, 000** | **N61, 000 -**  **N80, 000** | **N81, 000**  **and above** |  |
|  |  | Count | **4** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **4** |
|  | **No response** | % within Age | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| % within Monthly income | 40.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.1% |
|  |  | Count | **0** | **10** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **10** |
|  | **15-24** | % within Age | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
|  |  | % within  Monthly income | 0.0% | 31.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.3% |
|  |  | Count | **0** | **22** | **13** | **26** | **33** | **11** | **0** | **105** |
| **Age** | **25-34** | % within Age | 0.0% | 21.0% | 12.4% | 24.8% | 31.4% | 10.5% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
|  |  | % within  Monthly income | 0.0% | 68.8% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 61.1% | 0.0% | 55.6% |
|  |  | Count | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **7** | **35** | **42** |
|  | **35-44** | % within Age | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 16.7% | 83.3% | 100.0% |
|  |  | % within  Monthly income | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 38.9% | 61.4% | 22.2% |
|  |  | Count | **6** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **22** | **28** |
|  | **45 years and above** | % within Age | 21.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 78.6% | 100.0% |
| % within  Monthly income | 60.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 38.6% | 14.8% |
|  |  | Count | **10** | **32** | **13** | **26** | **33** | **18** | **57** | **189** |
| **Total** |  | % within Age | 5.3% | 16.9% | 6.9% | 13.8% | 17.5% | 9.5% | 30.2% | 100.0% |
|  |  | % within  Monthly income | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

The table shows that 33(31.4%) of those earning between N41, 000 and N60, 000 were within the age bracket of 15 to 24 years. Those that earned N81, 000 and above 35(83.3%) were within the age bracket of 35 to 44 years. A good proportion 57(30.2%) shows that those aged 45 years and above earned over N81,000 monthly incomes, this meaning that the higher the ages of the respondents, the more likely they are to earn higher incomes.

# Table 4.3.2.1 Chi-Square Tests

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | df | Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) |
| Pearson Chi-Square | 305.164a | 24 | .010 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 293.045 | 24 | .020 |
| Linear-by-Linear Association | 69.974 | 1 | .030 |
| N of Valid Cases | 189 |  |  |

a. 23 cells (65.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.

Result above showed that there is significant relationship between Age and Monthly Income. This is as the calculated p value of 0.010 is below the 0.05 alpha level of significance and the computed chi square value of 305.164 is higher than 36.415 Chi square critical value at df 24. The cross tabulation shows that the many of those who did not disclose their age did not also disclose their income. Also most of those between ages 24 and above earned higher income and vice versa hence the null hypothesis is hereby rejected.

# Table 4.3.3.1 : Highest Level of Education \* Monthly income Cross tabulation

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Highest Education** | **Monthly income** | | | | | | | **Total** |
|  | **No response** | **I don't** | **N20, 000** | **N21, 000** | **N41, 000** | **N61, 000** | **N81, 000** |  |
|  |  | **know** | **and** | **-** | **-** | **–** | **and** |  |
|  |  |  | **below** | **N40, 000** | **N60, 000** | **N80, 000** | **above** |  |
| **No formal Education** | **6**  7.5% | **32**  40% | **5**  6.2% | **20**  25.0% | **5**  6.2% | **1**  1.2% | 11  13.8% | **80**  **42.3%** |
| **Primary School** | **3**  9.1% | **0**  0.0% | **0**  0.0% | **0**  0.0% | **0**  0.0% | **0**  0.0% | **30**  90.9% | **33**  **17.7%** |
| **Secondary School** | **1**  1.6% | **0**  0.0% | **8**  12.7% | **6**  9.7 | **28**  45.2% | **15**  24.2% | **4**  6.5 | **62**  **32.8%** |
| **Tertiary Education** | **0**  0.0% | **0**  0.0% | **0**  0.0% | **0**  0.0% | **0**  0.0% | **2**  14.3% | **12**  85.7% | **14**  **7.4%** |
| **Total** | **10** | **32** | **13** | **26** | **33** | **18** | **57** | **189** |
|  | **5.3%** | **16.9%** | **6.9%** | **13.8%** | **17.5%** | **`9.5%** | **30.1%** | **100%** |

The table shows that 32(40%) of those without formal education did not know precisely how much they earned, 20(25%) of them earned between N21, 000 to N40, 000 and only a fewer proportion 11(13,8%) earned over N81,000. Furthermore, a greater proportion 30(90.9%) earned over N81, 000; 28 (45.2%) that had secondary school education earned between N41, 000 to N60,000; only a fewer proportion 4(6.5%) of them earned N81,000 and above. Those that had tertiary education and also earned over N81, 000 were 12(85.7%). This means that an average of 57(30.1%) of the respondents earned over N81, 000.

# Table 4.3.3.2: Chi-Square Tests

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Value | df | Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) |
| Pearson Chi-Square | 206.537a | 18 | .002 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 218.990 | 18 | .002 |
| Linear-by-Linear Association | 40.365 | 1 | .002 |
| 2 of Valid Cases | 189 |  |  |

a. 14 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .74.

Result above shows that there is significant relationship between highest level of education and monthly income. This is as the calculated p value of 0.002 is below the 0.05 alpha level of significance and the computed chi square value of 206.537 is higher than the 28.86 Chi square critical at df 18. The cross tabulation shows that the higher the education, the higher their monthly income and vice versa, hence the null hypothesis is hereby rejected and therefore the null hypothesis is hereby rejected.

# The Amnesty Program and the Issues of Development of the Niger-Delta and Militancy

This section examined the views of the communities as to whether the amnesty program is meeting up with the demands of the region as a whole and in particular if it addresses the issues of militancy and agitations.

# Table 4.4.1: Respondents Awareness of the Amnesty Program

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Awareness** | **Frequency** | **Percentage (%)** |
| Yes No  No response  **Total** | 117  9  3  **189** | 93.7  4.8  1.6  **100.0** |

Table 4.4.1 shows the responses of the survey respondents on their awareness of the amnesty program in the Niger-Delta. Ninety four per cent (94%) of them said that they were aware of the amnesty program while only 4.8% said that they were not aware of it. This implies that most of respondents had knowledge of the on-going amnesty program. For those that indicated having a knowledge of the on-going amnesty program, a question was asked to know their source of information about it and 58.7% that said they knew about the program got to know about it through TV/Radio news, 23.3% said the read about it in the papers, 11.1% said they were reached or told about the program by others. A fewer number of the respondents (5.3%) said that they got to know about the program through the internet. This means that the radio/TV was most effective in reaching the people on the amnesty program.

On the survey respondents‘ understanding of what the amnesty meant, 63% thought it to mean some form of pardon, 28.6% believed it meant forgiveness of some sort and a very few 6.9% saw amnesty as a general forgiveness somehow. The qualitative data however gave more insightful understanding and underpinnings of the meaning of amnesty. A professor of conflict resolution and peace studies in an IDI saw the amnesty policy from the stand point of a stick and

carrot perspective where he concluded that the amnesty was simply a way of rewarding crime and criminal activities by the government of the day. In his words:

…for me the amnesty was rewarding criminal activities, it was a reward for people taking arms against the state…

In the same vein, the secretary of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and founding member of Movement for the Emancipation Niger Delta (MEND) in a secrete interview could not agree otherwise. He believed that amnesty is a program for criminals and the MEND are not criminals but Freedom fighters. Their views on the meaning of amnesty had legal connotations. This view was supported further by an undercover journalist for MEND (name withheld) when he emphatically declared that ―the Amnesty was a fraud to the Niger Delta people, because amnesty is only granted to criminals‖ and in this case not all that accepted the amnesty have been tried and declared criminals by the State. He further asserts that ―the amnesty has criminalized the Niger Delta youth and mortgaged their future and for the next twenty years we will be seeing a flock of Niger Delta youths seen as criminals anywhere they go including outside the country and even inside the country‖ He concludes by saying that many were deceived into accepting it

i.e the amnesty; paying them stipend for their freedom. Female activist could not argue otherwise when she said that the terms of the amnesty program states very clearly that if you have been given amnesty, it means that you are accepting that you have committed a crime but you are being forgiven for that crime.

Alhaji Asari Dokubo saw amnesty in the same light as he further expressed his position and understanding of the meaning of amnesty and its application to the Niger Delta:

The presidential Amnesty is a bribe to the people to stop their moral agitation for greatness. But are our people ready? I am trying to be very sincere and truthful. The majority of our people are not ready. They want to be playing. So in the context of this playing, then the amnesty program is a good thing to them because in 3 years, the amnesty has trained people, a lot of people in various fields of occupations. That is as good as the amnesty can get. The people

handling the amnesty have done a good job in that area. But apart from that, the amnesty is a disadvantage to the people of the Niger Delta; it is creating lazy people. A time will come when our people will not work. Even the people that are being; trained will come back and will not work if we don't have the culture of people using their head and their hands to earn a living (Adapted from The Gist Magazine, 2013).

However, the FGD for Infantry ex-militants, women, and IDI for an Oil Company official with Shell Petroleum (name withheld) generally saw the amnesty as an empowerment program. One of the children that took part in the FGD for children simply said that ―the amnesty is a game (situation) where two or three people work together with the government to help the country‖. This view is more socio economic in outlook.

The head of Re-integration of the Amnesty Program took a more historical, political and academic approach in defining the amnesty. For him amnesty means ―to forget‖ from the root word ―Amnesia‖. In applying that to the region he says that ―it‘s a situation where the government suddenly wakes up and forgets all the wrongs done to her and forgives all those who carried guns against her‖

This means that there were divergent views as to what the amnesty really meant.

Furthermore, a question was asked to ascertain the knowledge of the survey respondents on who the Amnesty program was targeted at? In response to that, 76.2% in the survey said that it was targeted at the militants, others said it was targeted at the Agitators and 7.9% said it was targeted at the residents (i.e. Niger-Delta people). This means that most of the respondents believed that the amnesty program was targeted at militants and agitators (Two words used inter changeably here but with the same connotation)**.** The qualitative enquiry and findings did flow in the same direction. Additionally, the respondents in the survey were asked why they thought the militants accepted the amnesty offer. Those that said that the militants were financially motivated constituted 45% of the sampled respondents in the survey; for Peace sake; 24.3% and for

development sake; 30.2%. This means that majority of the respondents in the communities surveyed believed that money was a major motivating factor in accepting the amnesty deal by the militants. The FGD and IDI interviews did also indicate that money was a key factor in acceptance of the amnesty offer. However, a few opined that the need for peace and speedy development in the region was paramount as emphasized by the ex-militants before the agreement for them to drop their weapons.

# Table 4.4.2 Distribution of Respondents based on Previous Involvement in any Form of Agitation

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Previous Involvement** | **Frequency** | **Percentage (%)** |
| Yes No  No response  **Total** | 53  113  23  **189** | 28.0  59.8  12.2  **100.0** |

Table 4.4.2 shows the responses of sampled respondents in the survey on the question of whether they have ever been involved in any form of agitation in the Niger-Delta. A good number of them (59.8%) said that they have never been involved in a form of agitation before, while 28% indicated ever been involved in one form of agitation or other. This means that most of the sampled respondents never agitated. The FGD and IDI did however focus on ex-militants more with a few non-militants (their concerns are captured subsequently). This question was necessary to ascertain why people with the same and similar socio economic conditions will choose to act differently in terms of demanding their rights. As to whether the amnesty program is meeting up with their demands or not (Niger-Deltans), 73% said yes that it was meeting up with their demands, while 26.5% said that the amnesty is not meeting their demands at all (the survey questionnaire did not however ask what their specific community demand was as against that of the whole Niger Delta region, but the FGD did in some respect). This means that most of

the respondents in the community survey believed that the amnesty program was meeting their demands in some ways. The qualitative data obtained from the ex-militants in the FGD tended toward the same direction with the need for peace in the region as being primary, but with a clause that says that the government should be purposeful and fast in delivering their promises to the people and the region. When asked whether the amnesty program was a success in the region, an unnamed Shell official said that:

To a greater extent, one will say it (i.e Amnesty) is 70% successful, and that is because from the oil company perspective, in the days of militancy before the amnesty, the Niger Delta region was very violent, and so, we operate in the Niger Delta region, my company is based in Port Harcourt and our facilities are based in Akwa Ibom state, and so it became very expensive for us to do business, very expensive in the sense that we had to hire Navy to protect our facility, we have to hire gun boats to protect our facilities, and we are talking about millions, and to get gun boat is 3 to 4 million naira a month, and then we pay Navy is up to 3 to 4 million naira as well.

Form the economic and operational cost perspective; she believes that the amnesty is meeting the desires of the oil companies and the demands of the people and therefore a success. The only female ex-militant interviewed in this study said:

It is only the amnesty that will keep Niger Delta youth armless.

The responses in the quotes suggest that the amnesty has met the demands of militants in some ways almost 70%.

To reaffirm the extent to which the amnesty program is addressing community‘s demands for development and other needs, 46% of the respondents believed that the amnesty has fairly addressed their demands and needs as a community, while 30.2% said that the amnesty addresses their community issues and needs. However, 9.5% do not believe that the amnesty program is addressing any of their community issues or needs. This means that most of the respondents in the survey saw the amnesty as fairly addressing their community issues and needs. The study did

not ask the communities their specific needs but listed a number of basic and essential needs and asked them how often or not they went without those identified and under listed needs. See the table 4.3.3 below.

# Table 4.4.3: Respondents & Regular Access to Basic Essential Needs in their Communities

|  |
| --- |
| **Variables Frequency Percentage (%)** |
| **Good and Enough Food to eat**  Always 23 12.2  Many a times 38 20.1  Occasionally 109 57.7  Never 19 10.1  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Good Medical Treatment**  Always 41 21.7  Many a times 129 68.3  Occasionally 13 6.9  Never 5 2.6  No response 1 0.5  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Good Housing/Shelter** Single  Always 69 36.5  Many a times 77 40.7  Occasionally 25 13.2  Never 15 7.9  No response 3 1.6  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Clean Water**  Always 142 75.1  Many a times 21 11.1  Occasionally 26 13.8  Never 0 0.0  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Electricity**  Always 109 57.7  Many a times 66 34.9  Occasionally 13 6.9  Never 0 0.0  No response 1 0.5  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Education/Schooling Facilities**  Always 56 29.6  Many a times 101 53.4  Occasionally 31 16.4  Never 0 0  No response 1 0.5  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Good & Safe Transport System**  Always 61 32.3  Many a times 117 61.9  Occasionally 9 22.2  Never 0 4.8  No response 2 1.1  **Total 189 100.0** |

Table 4.4.3 shows the responses of the survey respondents on a number of suggested community needs and investigated the respondents‘ views on the number of times or frequency that they have had to go without each or any of the listed needs in their communities. These suggestions were seen as essential to community survival progress and continuity. On good and enough food to eat, 57.7% said only occasionally did they go without it; 20.1% said many a times they went without good and enough food to eat; 12.2% said they always had good and enough food to eat; while only 10.1% said that they never had to go without good and enough food to eat. With regards to good medical treatment, 68.3% said they went without it many a times; while 2.6% said they never had to go without good medical treatment. This means that majority of the respondents suggested good medical treatment is occasionally provided; though this depends on how frequently they fell sick.

On the aspect of good housing and shelter, 77.2% indicated not having good housing and shelter arrangements; while only 7.9% said that they never had to go without good housing and shelter at all. This implies that majority of the respondents did not have good housing and shelter. In addition to that, clean water was seen as a vital need for every human society and was therefore enquired of the respondents in the survey. The table 4.3.3 further shows that most of the respondents 86.2% had clean water challenges all the time. However, for a few of them 13.8%, the challenge of having clean water regularly was an occasional experience. This means that the majority of the respondents did not have access to clean water most of the time. On the provision of electricity, the table shows that 92.6% had a regular challenge with power supply while, 6.9% said it was an occasional experience for them not to go without electricity most of the time. This implies that electricity was a scarce resource for majority of the respondents in the sampled locations.

The question on education and schooling facilities shows that 16.4% said it was an occasional challenge, while a good number 83% said they mostly lacked or went without it. This means that majority of the respondents went without good education and schooling facilities most of the time. The female ex-militant from Okrika in an interview simply drew the researchers attention to the lack of good educational facilities in the region when she said; ―Just take note that, the children of the poor are not attending schools again‖. This implies that schools that had good educational facilities were not affordable to the child of the common Niger Delta family. A child in the FGD for children also spoke in this direction when he spoke on the need for good and quality education and complained of teachers paying less attention to them in public schools, and high cost of school fees associated private with schools. Findings and personal observation by the researcher shows that some private primary and secondary schools pay as much as ₦30, 000 for school fees per term as at the year 2015.

On good and safe transportation system, 61.9% said they mostly went without it, while only 4.8% indicated having a good and safe transport system frequently at their disposal. This means that most of the respondents went without good and safe transport system on a more regular bases. The qualitative data gathered supports the need and provision of all these amenities which are seen to be necessary for community growth, survival and development.

# Table 4.4.4: Respondents’ Previous Encounter with Militants in the Niger Delta

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Previous Encounter** | **Frequency** | **Percentage (%)** |
| Yes No  No response  **Total** | 114  63  12  **189** | 60.3  33.3  6.3  **100.0** |

Table 4.4.4 shows the responses of the sampled respondents on a personal bases if they have ever had an encounter with the militants before. A good number 60.3% said that they have had such an encounter, while 33.3% said that they have never had such an encounter before. This means that majority of the respondents have encountered militants before. Following this, their personal experiences with militants was probed further and in terms of whether the experience was perceived negative or positive. In response to this 45% were neutral on this question, while 30.7% said that their personal experiences with militant was a negative one and 22.8% indicated having a positive personal experience with the militants. This implies that most of the respondents had mixed feelings on their personal experiences with militants, their position being neutral suggested that.

The questionnaire further asked the respondents if or not they approved the methods used by militants in their operations and in projecting their demands to the state. Their responses shows that 32.2% said that they approved their approach, and or almost an equal number 31.7% said that they did not approve of their approach while also 34.9% remained neutral on this question. This means that while an almost equal number did approve or did not approve of the methods used by militants in their operations, a slightly higher number could not respond for or against the methods employed by the militant in making their demand known to the state. One of the ex-militant leaders believed that prior to the amnesty, the only language that the government understood was the language of ―Guns‖. The IYC executive and the head of re-integration gave extensive histories of how negotiations and dialogue failed but guns made the government to hear the militants out in the past. ―The gun was more popular than coca kola and the AK 47 was known as the peoples‘ gun that any child can sketch‖ resounded Head of re integration of the amnesty program. Both gave their perspectives of how guns got into the hands of militants and

the Niger Delta as a whole. This confirms and supports the view that while certain individuals may not carry guns, they neither condemn it either, thus explaining why most of the respondents in the survey were neutral as to their approval or not of methods used by militants in demanding for their rights. .

# Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants and its Implication on their Living Standard

This section addresses the prospects of the trained ex militants getting jobs in companies found in the region as a result of the amnesty program and in comparism to their present standard of living.

# Table 4.5.1 Respondents’ Knowledge of anyone who has accepted the Amnesty Offer in their Communities

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Knowledge** | **Frequency** | **Percentage (%)** |
| Yes No  **Total** | 146  43  **189** | 77.2  22.8  **100.0** |

Table 4.5.1 Shows that 77.2% of the respondents said that they knew someone who has accepted the amnesty offer in their own community. Those that said that they did not know anyone who has accepted the amnesty offer constituted only about 22.8% of the respondents. This implies that majority of the respondents are aware of those who have accepted the amnesty offer. For those that indicated knowing someone who has accepted the amnesty offer, they were further asked if they think that their lives (i.e. ex-militants) were now better compared to their former militant status or when they were still in the creeks. The required response here was limited to either a ―Yes‖ or a ―No‖. Those that said ―Yes‖ were (54.5 %) in all, while those that said ―No‖ summed up to 41.3% of the respondents in the survey. For any of the responses either

way, the respondents were further asked to give reasons for their answers. Those that said that the lives of the militants are now better than their former militant status gave their reasons as follows: better jobs (10.6%) and generally better living conditions (19%). This means that most of the respondents here saw better living condition as a reason for their affirmation amongst other reasons such as free association and more money. An ex-militant (under Dagogo Fara camp) from Opobo kingdom in the IDI interview said the freedom of movement that he now enjoys is far better than money or life in the creeks. His words are rightly captured here:

…like we do fight, we do illegal things, we run, we do not sit in one place for more than 30 minutes, there‘s no rest of mind, but right now, we do things normally, but at that time there are clubs we don‘t go to. I have changed my friends now.

Apparently, the different camps that existed had different minimum levels of comfort back in the creeks, but that is not the focus of this study. Chief Government Tompolo‘s view further buttresses this point when he said:

There is not much difference, it is just that you can travel on your own maybe to Abuja Lagos and other places you want and come back with ease unlike before (See the Vanguard of Wednesday July 4, 2012 in Gist Magazine, 2013:71)

The female ex-militant from Okrika under Ateke Tom‘ camp was not of the same opinion however. To her, life as a militant in the creeks was better then than now; especially, when compared in monetary terms and gains. When asked the same question, her response was simply:

That time is better (pre amnesty), is good for the government to train you, but am not very happy, what I expected is not what they gave to me.

She further buttressed her point by explaining the surrounding circumstances that led to her business failing. With this the conclusion is that life was better then in the creeks than now when the amnesty has been declared and the militants have surrendered their arms.

For those in the survey that believed that the current status of the militants compared to the former is not better gave the following as their reasons: Little money (25.4%); No good paying jobs (14.8%), average life (4.2%) and other integration challenges (2.6%). This means that most of the respondents here saw the money being paid to ex-militants as little compared to what they formerly got as gains or profits in the creeks. Money remains a key factor here in determining the current status of the ex-militants.

The type, quality and duration of training given to the ex-militants was also seen as an indicator to the job prospects of the ex-militants. With respect to this therefore, the question (what kinds of training, quality and duration did you receive or what kinds, quality and duration of training did you offer the ex-militants) was asked and limited to the ex-militants, their leaders and training partners or facilitators. The FGD for ex-militants revealed that the ex-militants indicated being trained in various skills and areas such as wielding, crane operations, entrepreneurship, film production, etc both within Nigeria and outside. Most of those trainings never lasted more than 6 months with the longest duration being 2 years. But a few however pointed out that their own peculiar trainings were not handled by skilled and knowledgeable professionals. When confronted with the same question, one of the training facilitators based in Port Harcourt that trained ex-militants on entrepreneurship, only defended what his organization did a quality job for anyone to be self-employed. Some others indicated being sent for trainings in areas that they never indicated interest in. On another instance, a few of the ex-militants that were trained abroad in a separate indepth interview revealed that some had the best instructors in South Africa and India but for some amongst them their trainings were hampered along the way when they discovered some ills in the process and vowed to expose those involved particularly the amnesty officials. MEND‘s undercover journalist maintained that the training was good but

was however a distraction from the truth being that the government was not truly ready to develop the area but to maintain a steady flow of crude and revenue. He further said that he does not see any of the core militants using any of the trainings to live a better life. In his words;

You are training them on flight, maritime, technology, ICT and others, these guys are into war… these boys are violent, if you must train them teach them hand craft and provide jobs for them. Most of them have gone to Dubai, India and are back but no jobs for them. They are all waiting for the amnesty money to survive.

Hand craft rather than formal education and training was the best training option that should have been adopted in training the ex-militants to curb the chase of white collar jobs that are not readily available he noted. A Female activist firmly declared that: ―the program in itself is not the answer to our agitation. Amnesty in itself can never be what the Niger Delta people are looking for. It is not going to answer our quest‖ (See Gist Magazine, 2013).

In the same vein, one of the training facilitators observed that majority of them could not even write their names when being registered to join the rehabilitation camps. High Chief Comrade Ateke Tom did no see the amnesty program as being totally successful with reference to the number of persons trained as at the time the research field work was conducted. For him that meant a lot of setbacks… he said that most of the ex-freedom fighters have not yet been trained and that those that have been trained have not been given their starter packs. That could pose some future challenges. His emphasis was on the need of the government to complete the trainings for the yet to be trained ex-militants and likewise settle the trained with jobs or starter packs. A visit to Greg‘s (the first real ex-militant the researcher met in Port Harcourt) shop revealed that he opted for entrepreneurship and was trained in the same area but his shop was filled with fake and substandard electronics and not the quantity demanded and approved for startup in the Starter Pack was supplied to him. According to him he made several attempts to

complain to supervisors formally but no one heeded his complain. It was also observed that the supplies of equipment and trading items were contracted out of which the contractors in turn to maximize profit supplied substandard goods or items. This was the case also with the female ex- militant and a number of the militants reached on phone.

However, from a different stand point and with a connotation of success from the government‘s angle, Female activist saw the amnesty as being successful on a more sarcastic note. The researcher captures are words thus:

So in terms of whether the amnesty has succeeded or not, it has, in my opinion succeeded because the Federal government has gotten what it wants. Oil output has risen close to 2.8 million barrels per day. So the Federal Government is the main beneficiary, followed by all the states that are now getting increased monthly allocations from the oil that is coming out from the Niger Delta. But quite honestly, the Niger Delta is yet to benefit from the Amnesty Program… You didn't even need to be a genius to figure out that the federal government was in financial trouble. So they had to figure out a way to get the output of oil back to a level where the Federal Government was no longer in a negative economic situation (Adapted from Gist Magazine, 2012:55).

Her point here is more on the economic angle than the social impact on Niger Deltan that saw the government of the day as top gainers in the amnesty deal with evident increase in oil output and revenue. That for her was the government‘s initial and underlying motive for the declaration of the amnesty to the militants. This point captures the crux of the political economy. See section 2.8.

Table 4.5.2 below presents the details of the DDR as at the year 2013. This information was obtained on the second field visit of the researcher to the Presidential Amnesty office Abuja just after the third year anniversary celebration of the amnesty program.

# Table 4.5.2: Stages of the Amnesty Program and Achievement/Challenges as at 2013

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Stages** | **Details of The DDR Achievement & Challenges as at 2013** |
| **Enlistment** | A total **30,000** persons enlisted in the first, second and final phases of the Presidential Amnesty Programme  **822** female participants |
| **Deployment** | **14,029** delegates have been deployed to local and foreign training centres for skills acquisition  programmes and formal education. |
| **Skills Acquisition** | **4,608** delegates undergoing training onshore and offshore ranging from marine technology, heavy duty operations, welding, diving, agriculture, boat building, oil and gas technicians, automobile technology, and aviation.  **690** female delegates placed in specialized centres for training in Fashion Designing, Hotel &  Catering, Cosmetology, and Hair Dressing. |
| **Formal Education** | **2,500** delegates studying Law, Political Science, Business Management, Mass Communication, International Relations, Public Administration, Medicine, Engineering, Applied Sciences, Building and Construction, Information and Communications Technology, among other courses in onshore and offshore universities and colleges.  Peace, safety and security in the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea, contending that the Niger Delta  struggle was not just to secure training or skill acquisition opportunities for 30,000 youths. |
| **Graduation** | A total of **11,700** delegates have graduated in various fields such as Agriculture (239), Automobile (207), Welding and Fabrication (2,204), Entrepreneurship (2,798), Carpentry and Plumbing (298), Oil Drilling and Marine-related courses (964), Electrical Installation (89), ICT (273), Crane and Heavy Duty Operations (1030), Boat Building (299), Pipe Fitting (250), Entertainment (60), and others  (618).  **50** delegates at the Petroleum Training Institute in Effurun, Delta State, made history as the first persons to be trained in terminal operations as a specialized area in Nigeria's oil industry.  **17** delegates have graduated as Commercial Licensed Pilots while 106 are in training in South Africa,  Dubai, Greece and Jordan. |
| **Direct Employment** | **222** delegates have been offered direct employment in various public and private establishments  within Nigeria and abroad. |
| **Empowerment** | **2000** delegates are currently being empowered with business start-up packages as part of the  programme's post training entrepreneurship and empowerment initiative. |

**Source: Field work, 2014; Adapted from Amnesty News, 2013:9**

The information as revealed in the above table was presented by Hon. Kingsley Kuku, the then Coordinator of the amnesty program. In the view of the researcher, the data had two functions, first, to present the success story so far as at then and secondly to show the eminent challenges ahead and therefore project the need for the government to continually fund the program further. He concluded and said:

Other tiers of government really need to speedily redeem the developmental pledges made to the people of the Niger Delta in the amnesty proclamation. I am talking about the commitment made by the Federal G o v er nm e nt to decisively address the issues of the participation of the people and communities of the Niger Delta in the exploration and exploitation of their God-given natural resources; the clean-up and remediation of their polluted environment, the provision of critical infrastructure, the speedy completion of the East-west Road, the construction of coastal roads, bridges and rail lines. In a nutshell, it is the expectation of the Niger Delta people that the Federal Government will adopt the European- style Marshal Plan to provide special f u nd i n g t h ro u gh t he N a t i o na l As s embl y t o a c t ua l i z e t h es e commitments made to them. (See Amnesty News, 2013:9)

Here, he brings in to bare the role of state governments in developing the region.

What the researcher observed here also was that, the real militants succeeded being trained mostly in informal settings while those that posed as militants, favoured in the process or went as substitutes excelled within the formal educational settings like the pilots that got much of the media publicity (this does not however negate the fact that some of the core militants are well educated). It should be noted here that the core militants that lived and fought in the creeks were not more than 4,000 in number the entire time, however the official figure of the disarmed, demobilized and rehabilitated/reintegrated ex-militants was put at a little over 30,000 persons. Employing, skilled and highly trained professionals and workers has for long being an issue between the Oil Bearing Communities and oil companies. The amnesty did not make much difference, hence only a few were absorbed into oil companies as result of the amnesty program.




Figure 1:2 Ex-militants Appeal to Chief Ateke Tom on Negligence of Trained Ex-militants by Oil Companies. (Source: Field work, 2015).

The conclusion with regard to type, quality and duration of trainings given to ex- militants is that, it was posed with many challenges that if not well managed can lead to a number of social problems hereafter. The researcher also did observed in the course of the field work that none of the ex-militant leaders or warlords indicated the desire to be trained or was ever trained in any area or skill. Apparently, they were already skilled and well educated in some ways and never really needed any of such needless but important trainings offered.

# Contribution of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful Resolution of Militancy in the Niger Delta and its Implications to the Emergence Other Forms of Insurgency in Nigeria

This section tries to assess the amnesty policy and its prospects of ending militancy in the Niger Delta region. Furthermore, it does investigate and shows the relationship of the amnesty offer and its implication to the rise of other forms of insurgencies in Nigeria with particular reference to the Boko Haram insurgencies in Nigeria‘s North East.

# Table 4.6.1: Opinion of Respondents on the Amnesty Being the Best Policy to End Militancy in the Niger-Delta

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Amnesty as the Best Policy** | **Frequency** | **Percentage (%)** |
| Yes No  **Total** | 131  55  **189** | 69.3  29.1  **100.0** |

Table 4.5.1 Shows that 69.3% of the respondents in the survey believed that the amnesty policy was the best policy to ending militancy in the Niger-Delta, while 29.1% thought otherwise. This implies that, the amnesty policy was perceived as the best option for peace in the Niger-Delta by most of the survey respondents. In as much as peace is being witnessed now it is not a guarantee as the government is yet to fulfill its promise to the ex-militants and looking at the malpractices in and through the process of implementation.

MEND‘s undercover journalist who has reported for the IYC and MEND for over 15 years does not believe that the amnesty is the best policy for peace in the region and observed that;

No it cannot (i.e amnesty) be the best option for lasting peace, because if the person you are doing amnesty for, by the provision of the states, the provision of amnesty beneficiaries are just less than 15% of the Niger Delta, now let me come again, when we talk of Niger Delta most of us think is only Rivers, Delta or Bayelsa state. Now Niger Delta include Edo, Cross River, Imo, Abia and Akwa- Ibom. These are Niger Delta states also. And please when you go to Aba and see many people walk about, is it not a Niger Delta state? There is oil in Aba, there is oil in Abia state, there is oil in Awka, and so where is the amnesty, when we talk about Niger Delta or the amnesty how many of the Igbo men, how many of the Yoruba men got the amnesty? No, something is wrong somewhere its not holistic, that is why you see lot of things happening, and for me maybe that‘s another reason even the Biafrans are shouting we need a voice.

His argument is more encompassing, as he argues that the Oil Bearing Communities of Nigeria are not just in the South South and comprising only Niger Delta States but also South Western States of Edo and Ondo and South Eastern States of Abia etc. Attention is also drawn to the percentage of ex-militants in the amnesty program from the South South States as against other Oil Producing communities of Nigeria. While however that is a valid point, the scope of this study was limited to the Niger Delta Oil Bearing Communities only. He links up his argument with the uprising in the South East of the Pro Biafra Agitators as a possible protest to the state of seemingly favouring a few i.e. Niger Delta militants. He calls for a holistic and an all-encompassing approach to peace building and does not believe that the amnesty is capable of forestalling lasting peace in the Niger Delta.

Seeing it from another angle with respect to the implication of the amnesty offer in conflict resolution, a Professor Conflict studies interviewed reasoned that:

…in conflict management you do not want to seem to reward people taking arms against unarmed civilians which is exactly what the Niger Delta (militants) were doing, they were taking arms against unarmed civilians…

This implying the unsuitability of the amnesty program in the Niger Delta. The Head of re-integration of the amnesty program on the other hand quickly cautions us not the see the DDR in the light of the UN but an Idea and program of The UN that was adapted, customized and suited for Nigeria with complete local content and control. And perhaps that accounts for its globally acclaimed success.

On the prospects of the amnesty program leading to lasting peace in the Niger-Delta, 67.2% in the community survey thought that it will go a long way to ensuring lasting peace in the troubled region, while 8.5% did not think so. A good number 22.2% were however neutral on

this question. Their position of neutrality in this regard was not probed further. This means that majority of the respondents in the survey saw the amnesty as capable of ending militancy and bringing lasting peace in the Niger-Delta. One of the respondents sampled in the study in an interview tended toward the opposite direction when asked the same question. She worked with one of the NGOs and a training partner (Name not mentioned).

She thus responded; ―hmmm…! (She looked lost in a split second) and then retorted… ―I don‘t think so o! When the researcher asked her for a reason she simply narrated a number of her experiences:

…See the amnesty policy was cool, but the system of implementation was full with many corrupt practices. Many of them were just interested in the money… mothers gave their names to their daughters to use so they could share the allowance… mothers and their daughters fought because of stipends and they were all not ready to go to school or even sit down and learn. Even the ones we registered and sent into the rehabilitation camps did not stay… one of them echoed once that this stipend is just rubbish, how much be shirt wey I dey wear… On one other occasion when I tried to register one of the girls she gave me the names Roland Moses. So I asked her of her first name and she said Roland, then I told her but thats a masculine name then she said her surname was Moses. I told her that also was a name given to men only, all I could do then was to ask her to go see my Madam and in most cases such people returned with an instruction for me to register them like that or sometimes I use wisdom to ask them their native names… because am from the Niger Delta too.

This to her therefore cannot guarantee lasting peace.

Furthermore, a question was asked in the qualitative in-depth interview, which was not featured in the survey questionnaire as to whether all militant groups accepted the amnesty offer. This question was to help ascertain the possible rise in future of any agitations from any of the groups that might not have accepted the amnesty offer. All the respondents interviewed in this regard affirmed the surrender by all militia groups in the Niger Delta and attributed any crime of kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, theft, rape and robbery to criminal gangs and not ex-militants.

To buttress this point, High Chief Comrade Ateke Tom through his Aide in an interview said that all militia camps have been destroyed and offered to take the researcher the creeks and camps that have been destroyed as part of the amnesty deal. Implying that all militant groups surrendered and have unconditionally accepted the amnesty offer. He said that 99% of the militants and freedom fighters accepted the amnesty and have dropped their arm in that respect.

In the same vain the question what other reasons may arise in the nearby or distant future that will take you back to the creeks was put across to the ex-militants in both separate IDIs and FGD. The question was reframed for the other key informants and asked; what other reasons do you think may arise that will prompt the ex-militants to return to the creeks? The responses were that the government should fulfil their own end of the bargain in the amnesty deal and by speeding up development in the region. This indicating a possible comeback by the ex-militants should in case the government does not carry out her part of the bargain. Female activist when approached with the same question clearly states that:

I have never ever deluded myself that our boys are out of the creeks. Just because 26,000 people came out doesn't mean that we don't have twenty six thousand other people that are in the creeks or that have the capacity of going into the creeks. So it is up to the individuals, it is up to us as Niger Delta people to decide what we are really going to do and what we should be doing. Whether that means that things will go back to the way they were before the amnesty program or whether they will get worse is entirely up to the Niger Delta people. But the truth is that the capacity is there that things could degenerate because things have not improved. Our expectations have not been met (Gist Magazine, 2012:66).

This clearly indicates a possible return to the creeks by ex-militants but leaves that option to the individual decision of the ex-militants which may be occasioned by government‘s failure of address the Niger Delta Needs.


A question on the monthly allowances and stipends received by the ex-militants was specially designed and directed to respondents in the FGD and IDI for ex-militants, their Leaders and the amnesty official. The findings revealed that most of the ex-militants got their allowances and stipends but through their leaders via table payments and not through their personal bank accounts. This the ex-militants (or infantry) did not appreciate that because they mostly never got the complete sum as directed by the Federal Government. The monthly pay of N65, 000 was allotted for each ex-militant who has been disarmed, demobilized and in the process of reintegration but majority got less than N40, 000 and in some cases as little as N10, 000 or nothing at all in that respect. This the ex-militants expressed as wicked of their leaders and some regretted ever joining the struggle in the first place. They further explained that their leaders withholding the lot of their stipends and allowances meant that they went back to them regularly to show loyalty and in a few cases carry out dirty jobs for their leaders which they have sworn not to indulge in again. A repentant ex-militant in a chat with the researcher buttresses this point when he declared:

…Because I think they are politicking… With our stipends which can never help the nation. Some of our boys now go astray because of hunger, please they should pay to our accounts… going to collect stipends from our leaders involve dirty jobs if you don't do it you will not get paid but may be killed. Please the office should be sincere and save the future.

The above conversation has a number of hidden denotations when one reads in-between the lines which further buttressed the point made earlier on table payments of allowances and stipends of ex-militants and their involvement in dirty jobs for their leaders.

One of the militant leaders of the rank and file (a commander) explained that on the contrary, table payment was insisted upon by the leaders to help check the excesses of some of

their boys i.e infantry; of which a few cases of criminal activities and rape were recorded and when investigations were carried out and an ex-militant is found guilty, he loses his is allowances completely or just a part depending on the gravity of the offence (See picture of Ateke‘s campaign against criminaAn engineerlity and robbery in the Niger Delta).



**Figure 1:3 Campaign against Social Vices by Ex-militants by Chief Ateke Tom (Source: Fieldwork, 2015).**

This has a number of connotations. Firstly, is that of social policing of the ex-militants and secondly it formed a system of character checks for the ex-militants. The above picture (Figure 1.3) supports this assertion.

The second and most advanced reason for the shortfall in allowances and stipends of the ex-militants was that the leaders made certain deductions deliberately so as to help the surviving families and relatives of those that died or lost their lives in the Niger Delta struggle. The researcher on several occasions had such encounters with families of ― heros‖ when they came seeking assistance from the High Chief Comrade Ateke Tom at his residence in first gate Okrika town. The third explanation advanced by the researcher based on his interactions and observations with the ex-militants was that many of the ex-militants opened accounts with fake

names due to security reasons when they yet had not trusted the amnesty program. This supports the notion of Arnold in 2000 when he said; the people had developed a strong distrust of government‘s intentions. At the payment stage however that came with many challenges as the real names of the ex-militants did not match with the account names with the banks, thus the table payment since the militant leaders could know and identify their boys and those who belonged to their various militia camps.

# Table 4.6.2: Respondents & Regular Access to Basic Essential Needs in their Communities

|  |
| --- |
| **Variable Frequency Percentage (%)** |
| **Provision of jobs for young people**  To a great extend 178 94.2  Fairly 11 5.8  Not at all 0 0.0  Never 0 0.0  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Improvement of Social Amenities**  To a great extend 117 93.7  Fairly 12 6.3  Not at all 0 0.0  Never 0 0.0  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Increased Derivation/Resource Control**  To a great extend 186 98.4  Fairly 3 1.6  Not at all 0 0.0  Never 0 0.0  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Addressing Environmental Pollution/Needs**  To a great extend 167 88.4  Fairly 20 10.6  Not at all 0 0.0  Never 0 0.0  No response 2 1.1  **Total 189 100.0** |
| **Grant more Autonomy to Regions, States or Local Government Areas**  To a great extend 175 92.6  Fairly 12 6.3  Not at all 0 0.0  Never 0 0.0  No response 2 2.1  **Total 189 100.0** |

Table 4.6.2 shows a list of suggested items if in place that could alongside the amnesty program lead to lasting peace in the Niger-Delta. Here, the respondents in the survey were asked to indicate their responses in-terms of the extent to which they thought the suggested items could help them and their immediate community. On the provision of jobs for the youths or young people, 94.2% believed that it will go to a great extent, while only 5.8% thought otherwise. On the improvement and provision of better social amenities in the region, 93.3% believed it will go to a great extend in ensuring lasting peace, while 6.3% did not think so. Increased deviation/resource control showed a 98.4% affirmation towards peace building success, as against 1.6% who did not see it that way. Similarly, 88.4% believed that addressing constant environmental pollution challenges and needs will help; however, only 10.6% saw this fairly addressing peace building efforts in the Niger-Delta. With regards to granting more autonomy to the regions, states and local government areas, 92.6% thought that it will go long way in sustaining peace in the region while 6.3% do not believe so. This means that majority of the respondents sustain a belief that these suggestions will go a long way to aid peace building efforts and sustenance alongside the amnesty program in the Niger-Delta region. All the respondents in the qualitative study also thought in the same direction.

# Table 4.6.3: Opinions of Respondents on if the Amnesty Policy could have led to the Emergence of other Forms of Militancy or Insurgencies in other Regions of Nigeria like the Boko Haram

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Other forms of Insurgencies** | **Frequency** | **Percentage (%)** |
| Yes No  No response  **Total** | 101  52  36  **189** | 53.4  27.5  19.0  **100.0** |

Table 4.6.3 shows that 53.4% of the respondents in the survey believe that the amnesty program could have led to other forms of insurgencies in Nigeria such as the Boko Haram, while 27.5% did not believe it so. This means that most of the respondents think that the amnesty offer could have influenced the rise of other insurgent groups in the country. A key informant in the study thus commented:

Judging by the statement of Asari Dokubo who have now assigned himself the prerogative to say whatever he wants, feels he can do anything, say whatever he wants and no one can do anything to him, when you do that other terrorist group would take arms and fight which is why people are asking amnesty for boko haram although this are two different issues. The fight in the Niger Delta was not philosophical, it was over economic disempowerment, the fight of boko haram is philosophical over a philosophy and a doctrine that everyone must become the kind of Muslim that they want to be.

Respondents in the survey who believed that the amnesty program could have led to the emergence of other forms of insurgencies in the country were asked to give the reasons to their responses on the relationship between the amnesty offer and the possible rise of other forms of insurgencies in Nigeria. For those that saw a relationship between the two factors, 41.8% said that the raising insurgents in the North (Nigeria) wanted money too, while other 19% said the rise could be politically motivated. Those that saw no links or close relationship between the amnesty offer and the rise of other insurgencies in Nigeria, (14.8%) simply said they saw no links at all; others said with particular reference to Boko Haram that they were just fighting a religious war and another 9.5% side Boko Haram was fighting a political battle especially with the then President Ebele Goodluck Jonathan being a south south indigene. This means that most of the respondents in the survey could not establish any links between the amnesty offer and the Boko Haram insurgency among other reasons. However, an interviewee in an IDI is of the view that;

…amnesty programs also give rise to insurgences because other insurgencies group believe that if we take up arms, we will realize our objectives so in other words, amnesties are for peace negotiations, in the case of Boko Haram there are people advocating amnesty which is misplaced in the first place. There is no comparison between Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram. We do not know what the government has done against Boko Haram. There is no clear defined issue that Boko Haram is fighting for. In the case of Niger Delta, their land was taken over, fish ponds were destroyed, oil spillage. Practically before now no development was going on in Niger Delta, although I will not completely exonerate the Niger Delta because at some point the people were actually stopping the very development they were asking for. Land in the Niger Delta is gold so they will not give up land for government project so there is really no way government would have even reach them at some point to implement some of these project and corruption by their chiefs, they get money from the government and will not give to the people, the difference between the Niger Delta and Boko Haram is that we do not know what boko haram is fighting for but we know what the Niger Delta is fighting for.

Similarly, Female activist arguing in the same direction of thought said:

How can there be relationship? In my opinion, the people of the South -West have always maintained their right to self-determination, to federalism. The Niger Delta people are talking about their right to their resources. The people of the South West are talking about anti-corruption, we too are talking about anti- corruption, the South-East too, is talking about its own actualization of its right to be independent of Nigeria. Boko Haram, on the other hand, is talking about Islamizing Jonathan, about hating western education, about all of us shifting to Islam. How are those comparable to what the South - East people, the South - South people and the South - West people are talking about? How is the killing of people that worship God on Sunday a course? How is that an issue? (The Gist Magazine, 2013:56)

# The Implications of the Omission of Women and Children in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program

On the Omission of women and Children in the amnesty program, 69.5% believed that the amnesty program did omit and over looked the place of women and children, 14.8% did not see women and children being omitted in the amnesty program; while 9.5% were neutral on this.

This implies that most of the respondents in the community survey said that the amnesty program left out women and children.

On the other hand the Head of re integration of the amnesty program believes otherwise and observed that the program against popular view had a place for women. He further buttressed his point with the official figure and list of disarmed militants and showed the researcher the number of women captured in the rehabilitation camp and the special kind of treatment given them (See Table 4.4.2). Some of them had children with them when they came to the rehabilitation camp. He also recounts a number of the women getting pregnant even while in the rehabilitation camp in Obubra. The researcher captured that scenario thus:

… some of the women got pregnant even right there in the rehabilitation camps, those are some of the things we did not envisage…

# Table 4.7.1: Views of Respondents on the most Affect Group(s) in the Niger Delta Struggle

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **The most affected Group(s)** | **Frequency** | **Percentage (%)** |
| Men Women Children Youths  Women & children only All of the above  No response  **Total** | 19  25  20  8  11  105  1  **189** | 10.1  13.2  10.6  4.2  5.8  55.6  0.5  **100.0** |

Table 4.7.1 shows that the most affected groups in the Niger Delta as indicated by respondents in the survey are women (13.2%) and as against the youths (4.2%) being the least affected. However, a larger percentage (55.6%) of the survey respondents believes that all groups have equally been affected. This means that majority of the respondents said all groups were affected by insurgencies in the Niger-Delta, but women constituted the single largest most

affected group. The qualitative data did not argue otherwise as their responses tended in the same direction and in agreement with the respondents in the survey.

The study further went ahead to find out if there was any implication of the omission and neglect of women and children in the amnesty program from the survey respondents. A good number in the community survey (88.9%) said yes that there were implications of such omissions and neglect of women and children, while only 5.8% did not see any implication of such omissions at all. For those that believe that there are some implications of the omission of women and children in the amnesty program, they were asked to mention a few of those perceived implications. And in response to that, 51.3% of the respondents believed that not compensating the women and children or any other affected group may lead to grievances and subsequently other social vices; 16.9% said it could lead to new forms of agitations while few (6.9%) said it could result to poor or little education for the affected. This meaning that most of the respondents in the survey saw the risk and possible rise of social vices as an effect of the omission of women and children from the amnesty program. An engineer (the Director of Global Peace Mission) in agreement with the view of the survey respondents is of the opinion that the women in the Niger Delta are still giving birth to children and if the Government does not do what is right now in the region those children will rise tomorrow and demand their rights. He also asserts being a part of the struggle many years ago with the likes of Ken Saro Wiwa but only stopped with Ken‘s execution in the 90s by the General Sani Abacha government. This implies that the insurgencies in the Niger Delta has been in phases from one generation of people (agitators) to another and only got to its height between the mid-90s and 2009; most of which was enhanced by the poor handling of the issues and special needs of the region (See the Willink Commission in Gandu, 2011:147) and the people with regards to failed government policies and

palliatives (Ikporukpo 1981;119-129; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2006; Aghalino, 2004; 2009: 58-59; Egborge 1998; Thisday, 2007). If the amnesty is only able to tackle the restiveness of the agitators today and not the real developmental challenges and issues of the region, new generations will demand for a special attention in the future.

On a final note, respondents in the study were asked to proffer solutions to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta. Majority of them were of the view that if jobs were provided for the ex-militants and other youths in the region, it will lead to lasting peace. Additionally, they emphasized the need of the government to tackle the developmental and community needs of the region. In addition to that, Kantiok (2014) strongly believes that at least 20% derivation to the Niger Delta and Oil Bearing Communities will help the region and further backed up his point when he drew from Nigeria‘s economic history with reference to the ground nut pyramids in the North and cocoa plantations in the South - West with a 50% derivation to those regions. He concluded and said:

A sustained development, justice to who is due. Let us just say that people are crying that thirteen percent derivation is too much because they are depending only on oil. In the sixties (60s) it was 50% derivation, the North gave 50% of all that was produced in the North, the groundnut, cotton, skin etc which was sustaining the economy. The West producing cocoa kept 50%, Mid-West kept 50% of the rubber etc and the East kept 50% of the coal from the Enugu mines. We stopped farming in the North, the pyramids have disappeared, cocoa is still in the South but not on large scale as it used to be so we left all the important economic activity that has sustained Nigeria before the discovery of oil, if the Niger Delta cannot get 50% from the revenue at least the minimum they should get is 20%, 13% is not enough for the environmental damage that have been done and cannot compensate the damage done to Niger Delta. Lives have been lost, everything have completely damaged like the environment, oil spills, pollution…

Similarly, an Oil Company official with Shell Petroleum in an IDI said that the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) should be looked into and passed into law. As it will ensure that the primary

beneficiary of the oil industry will be the people first (i.e. Niger Deltans), the State government and then the Federal Government, all in that order. She laments the reluctance of the government to pass the PIB bill into law, because it will not benefit them. She further states the need for law enforcement of oil companies to be deliberate and sincere with their claims of community development. The researcher captures her position this way:

Oil companies should be forced by law, I have said this before, Laws & acts should be put in place to force oil companies to better the lives for the area they are producing, their area of operation, they should impact on the lives of the people, once the oil companies start to give as much scholarship as to, you can imagine SHELL for instance is operating in Ogoni land, one of their locations, and the country newspaper tells atimes for scholarships, as many people in Nigeria that get the scholarship, that pass the exam, they give them the scholarship, but the people in the Ogoni location, they don‘t even see the Newspaper, to even know that Shell want to give them scholarship, they may not even be able to compete with their friends in the city that went to all the good schools, will shell say that they have empowered the youth, which youth did they empower? (Source: Fieldwork, 2015).

She further asserts the importance of the PIB especially to oil bearing communities thus:

Yes, because for many years now we been talking of PIB, the Petroleum Industry Bill, as I speak there are Nigerians that have sworn that PIB will never see the day light… Politicians of course in the senate… The PIB, will empower the oil producing communities… if am producing oil in my community, I should benefit from it, I should be the primary beneficiary, the state becomes secondary beneficiary, and then the Federal government becomes the tertiary… Tertiary, but there are people who do not want that because they are not from the oil producing states and community, they do not want PIB to see the light of day, and what is the impact of these? Oil Companies pay 85% as royalty to federal government… you know who they are…, and so this money is used to better states and people who are not producers of oil, and the people who suffer, who‘s life style have so badly been affected because of the crude produce in their community are left like that. For instance the Kalabari people (Source: Fieldwork, 2015).

A Female activist in a similar view believes that the people of the Niger Delta must be the major beneficiaries of the products and produce of their own land and further advocates for resource control as a way out. She therefore opined that:

In my opinion, the solution to the Niger Delta problem is very simple. We have said continuously that the Niger Delta Region in Nigeria belongs to the people who come from the region. It belongs to us. We have also said that the oil and the gas and every other thing that is to be found on and in the waters of the Niger Delta is the property of the Niger Delta People. What is happening today is that the federal government is claiming ownership of what is in the Niger Delta and we are saying ―No‖; that we disagree. That is where we stand today as far as I‘m concerned. We must continue to establish the fact that the oil and gas and the Niger Delta people and we have to lay claim to that. And so for me and people that believe in the way that I have said that the ultimate benefactor of this amnesty is the Federal Government… I am yet to see what the benefit of the amnesty program is to the Niger Delta people (Gist Magazine, 2012:55)

Obi (2015) is of the opinion that religion and culture plays a vital role in peace building. He believes that for lasting peace in the region we have to go back to our culture and religion to help. This to him helps to instil good conscience and fear of God in people and will not let them carry guns to kill anyone and which is the strategic focus of his NGO (Global Peace Mission) based in Lagos. What he did not point out here is, is culture and religion to be applied on the part of who? The government or the militants/Niger Deltans or both. He does however agree with the idea of the government being committed to the developmental needs and challenges of the region.

On the core ex-militants angle however, their yearnings for jobs, absorption into oil companies, community development and the government fulfilling their promises to them before they laid down their arms were even louder. For the ex-militant leaders on the other hand, a call for participation and inclusion in the government of the day both at the State and National level was top on their priority list.

Alhaji Asari Dokubo when asked to proffer solutions to the Niger Delta region in the post amnesty period simply declared that:

What is the government doing that will need my advice? There is nothing that the government is doing that it needs advice on. Is it in Rivers State where the budget reads Billions of naira every year which they just ssquander? One man is using one year, for eight years, nothing is happening. People are sitting and carrying propaganda everywhere. Or is it Akwa-lbom that People built roads and we celebrate? People built road and we celebrate. If the people are poor how will they drive on the road? You empower the people first. There must be an economic take-off. There must be opportunity for the people to earn a living. If that is not provided and what if Akpabio goes and another one comes, that will not continue to construct the roads. But if you build the people, the people will continue to build the roads. That is what it takes. There must be an economy activity that will sustain the place. Look at Dubai, oil and gas only account for 11% of the economy today because they have built their system and brought everything into reality. So this is what we want, not people building roads and showing the roads to us, not people building schools and showing the schools to us. Were there no schools before? And whatever it was that happened to the schools before will also happen to the ones that are now being built. You build the economy. The economy is what will quicken development and move the effects of government. When you don‘t look at the economy and you are building infrastructures, infrastructure will decay tomorrow like the ones you met before (Adapted from Gist Magazine, 2012:67).

His major emphasis is for human capital development and not just infrastructural of which decay is inevitable. He also is of the opinion that a stable and vibrant economy will aid the Niger Delta and the people in general.

# Discussion of Key Findings

The main objective of this study was to assess the amnesty program as a palliative measure or policy to curb militancy in the oil rich Niger delta region of Nigeria. Both primary and secondary data sources were used in the study. Likewise, the study also combined both the qualitative research methods via FGDs, IDIs, observations, pictures and the quantitative research methods via a community survey (i.e. questionnaire). The data collection and analysis was done

from two perspectives which were the insider and outsider viewpoints. The insider perspective being the ex-militants and their leaders (The War Lords). The outsider perspective had two levels; the first level of the outsiders being the oil companies, women, children, training partners, community leaders, faith based organisations and all residents of the Niger Delta living daily with the ex-militants from the insurgencies to the amnesty and post amnesty periods. The second level of the outsider perspective being the researcher's observation and analysis.

The first objective of the study was to ascertain the extent to which the Amnesty Program addressed the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and militancy in particular. The findings showed that most of respondents had a knowledge of the on going amnesty program and got to know about it mainly through the radio/TV. This means that the radio and TV messages were instrumental to the amnesty program with reference to information dissemination to the general public but not the militants who mostly were fed information through their militant leaders.

On the survey respondents‘ understanding of what the amnesty meant, majority thought it to mean some form of pardon. However, the qualitative data obtained from the field work gave more insightful understanding and underpinnings of the meaning of amnesty as perceived by the sampled respondents. Some of the interviewees in the IDIs particularly a professor of conflict studies, an undercover journalist and the leadership of Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) saw the amnesty from a legal perspective, others being Oil Company officials, women and children gave the amnesty an economic definition. This means that there were divergent views as to what the amnesty really meant, however pardon was most emphasized. From the field reports it can be concluded that Amnesty meant different things to different people. The Government, the ex- militants, the people of the Niger Delta, businessmen and academicians all had their own notions of what the amnesty stood for them. A clearly articulated vision and definition (operational) of concepts, terms and policies is key to the success of any program and must be seen and

understood as such by all parties involved. All parties involved must be able to see the same thing to a large extent to achieve the set same goals and desired result. This was not the case with the amnesty program and likewise other state palliatives to OBCs in Nigeria's Delta South as shown by extant literatures on the Niger Delta question (See Gandu, 2011:147; Ikporukpo 1981:119-120; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2006; Aghalino, 2004; 2009:58-59, Egborge, 1998). By definition, amnesty simply means pardon and with respect to its application in the Niger Delta and conflict zones, it represents a policy attempt to seek an alternative route to peace through the DDR process. Findings in the study does not show a radical departure from that and it agrees with Ebiri and Onuorah (2009) when they said that the amnesty program seeks to decriminalize the activities of the militants and unconditionally exonerate them of culpability in the myriad felonies with which they have been associated. Political Economic thesis here finds relevance with the marginalization and division of the Niger Delta into favoured and decriminalize militants and the larger Niger Delta population.

On the question to ascertain the knowledge of the survey respondents on who the Amnesty program was targeted at, the field findings revealed that most of the respondents believed that the amnesty program was targeted at militants and agitators (Two words used inter changeably here but with the same connotation, further field experiences revealed more concepts or word to refer to the same category of persons). Throughout the field work, the researcher was interfaced with this challenge of proper address for the participants in the amnesty program. The data obtained from the field showed that majority of the respondents in the communities surveyed, discussants in the FGDs and key informants IDIs believed that money was a major motivating factor in accepting the amnesty deal by the militants but was not a genuine commitment to end militancy which was seen and interpreted as part and parcel of the Niger Delta. However, a few opined that the need for peace and speedy development in the region as

emphasized before the agreement of the militants to drop their weapons was paramount. Also most of the sampled respondents in the survey said that they never agitated when asked if they ever had been involved in any agitations. The FGD and IDI did however focus on ex-militants more with a few non-militants. This question was necessary to ascertain why people with the same similar socio economic conditions will choose to act differently in terms of demanding their rights.

Most of the respondents in the community survey believed that the amnesty program was meeting their issues in a way on a personal note. The qualitative data obtained from the ex- militants in the FGD tended toward the same direction with the need for peace in the region as being primary, but with a clause that says that the government should be purposeful and fast in delivering their promises to the people and the region. Form the economic and operational cost perspective, an oil company official interviewed believed that the amnesty is meeting the desires of the oil companies and the issues of the people and therefore a success. This suggests also that the amnesty meets the demand of militants in some ways but in the opinion of the researcher it has not yet met the issues of development of the entire region. The researcher also observed that some of the Niger Delta Youths, women, and children are not yet aware of the situation let alone judge the amnesty program as a success or not in terms of the program meeting their issues.

The field findings further showed that most of the respondents in the survey saw the amnesty as fairly addressing their community issues and needs. The study did not ask the communities their specific needs but listed a number of basic and essential needs and asked them how often or not they went without those identified and under listed needs. These suggestions were seen as essential to community survival, progress and continuity. Good and enough food to eat, good medical treatment, good housing and shelter, clean water, regular electricity supply, education and schooling facilities, good and safe transportation system were seen to be

adequately lacking in most of the communities. The qualitative data gathered supports the need and provision of all these amenities which are seen to be necessary for community growth, survival and development. Extant literatures have over the years expressed these needs as important for the OBCs.

Majority of the respondents in the survey have encountered militants before as revealed by the field findings. Following this, their personal experiences with militants was probed further and in terms of whether the experience was perceived negative or positive. The data obtained here showed that most of the respondents had mixed feelings on their personal experiences with militants, their position of being neutral as revealed by the data obtained in the field suggested that.

On the respondents‘ approval of the methods used by militants in their operations and in projecting their demand to the state, the findings showed that while an almost equal number did approve or did not approve of the methods used by militants in their operations, a slightly higher number could not respond for or against the methods employed by the militant in making their demand known to the state. One of the ex-militant leaders believed that prior to the amnesty, the only language that the government understood was the language of ―Guns‖. This confirms and supports the view that while certain individuals may not carry guns, they neither condemn it, thus explaining why most of the respondents in the survey were neutral as to their approval or not of methods used by militants in demanding for their rights.

The second objective of this study was to investigate job prospects of trained ex-militants and its implication to their living standard. The field report revealed that majority of the respondents in the survey knew someone who had accepted the amnesty offer in their own community and equally believe that the lives of the militants were now better than when they were still in the creeks. This means that most of the respondents here saw better living condition

as a reason for their affirmation amongst other reasons such as free association and having more money. Apparently, the different militia camps that existed had different minimum levels of comfort back in the creeks, but that is not the focus of this study. The female ex-militant from Okrika under Ateke Tom‘ camp was not of the same opinion however. To her, life as a militant in the creeks was better then than now; especially, when compared in monetary terms and gains. Money remains a key factor here in determining the current status of the ex-militants.

The type, quality and duration of training given to the ex-militants was also seen as an indicator to the job prospects of the ex-militants. The FGD for ex-militants revealed that the ex- militant discussants indicated being trained in various skills and areas such as wielding, crane operations, entrepreneurship, film production, etc. both within and outside Nigeria. Most of those trainings never lasted more than 6 months with the longest duration being 2 years. But a few however pointed out that their own peculiar trainings were not handled by skilled and knowledgeable professionals. When confronted on this one of the training facilitators that trained ex-militants on entrepreneurship, only defended what his organization did as qualitative enough for anyone to be self-employed. Some others indicated being sent for trainings in areas that they never indicated interest in. On another instance, a few of the ex-militants that were trained abroad in a separate Indepth Interview revealed that some had the best instructors in South Africa and India but for some their trainings were hampered along the way when they discovered some ills in the process and vowed to expose those involved particularly the amnesty officials. A friend to the researcher who happened to be in the UK at about the same time a batch of the ex-militants were sent there for schooling was of another view when he observed that they (ex- militants) were unwilling to learn and mostly proved difficult for their foreign instructors; which led to the sudden termination of the Institution‘s agreement and contract with the Federal Government.

An undercover journalist of the MEND & IYC maintained that the training was good but was however a distraction from the truth being that the government was not truly ready to develop the area but to maintain a steady flow of crude and revenue. The Political Economic Thesis here finds its relevance as it does help us to see that the introduction of the amnesty program by the state was to further maintain its political dominance and the economic exploitation for the resources of the Niger Delta region. He further said that he does not see any of the core militants using any of the trainings to live a better life. Hand craft rather than formal education and training was the best training option that should have been adopted in training the ex-militants to curb the chase of white collar jobs that are not readily available he noted.

In the same vein, one of the training facilitators observed that majority of them could not even write their names when being registered to join the rehabilitation camps. I the researcher remember tears almost running down his chicks when in a one on one interview with one of the ex-militants that was forcefully returned from South Africa, detained and beaten alongside others (because they protested being ill-treated) could not write his name and asked for his help in doing that as the researcher. The researcher could never have imagined that a handsome man like that who spoke English fairly well could not handle a pen. How can such a one sit in the four walls of a classroom he asked his research assistant who was also not from the Niger Delta? It was indeed an experience for them both.

High Chief Comrade Ateke Tom in an interview in 2015 did not see the amnesty program as being totally successful with reference to the number of persons trained as at the time the research field work was conducted. For him that meant a lot of setbacks… he said that most of the ex-freedom fighters had not yet been trained and that those that have been trained have not been given their starter packs. That could pose some future challenges. His emphasis was on the

need of the government to complete the trainings for the yet to be trained ex-militants and likewise settle the trained. A visit to Greg‘s (the first real ex-militant I met in Port Harcourt) shop revealed that he opted for entrepreneurship and was trained in the same area but his shop was filled with fake and substandard electronics and not the quantity demanded and approved for start-up in the Starter Pack was supplied to him. According to him he made several attempts to complain to supervisors formally but no one heeded his complain. It was also observed that the supplies of equipment and trading items were contracted out of which the contractors in turn to maximize profit supplied substandard goods or items. This was the case also with the female ex- militant and a number of the militants reached on phone.

A Female activist saw the amnesty as being successful, but more to the advantage of the government. For her the government‘s initial and underlying motive for the declaration of the amnesty was largely economic. Her point here is the government‘s economic gain than the social impact on the average Niger Deltan, which she saw the government of the day as top gainers in the amnesty deal with evident increase in oil output and revenue. Again the Political Economic thesis is of great relevance here as it helps us see the Nigerian state introducing the amnesty policy to help maintain its dominance and control of the means and forces of production.

What the researcher observed here also was that, the real militants succeeded being trained mostly in informal settings while those that posed as militants, favoured in the process or went as substitutes excelled within the formal educational settings like the pilots that got much of the media publicity (this does not however negate the fact that some of the core militants are well educated). It should be noted here that the core militants that lived and fought in the creeks were not more than 4,000 in number the entire time, however the official figure of the disarmed, demobilized and rehabilitated/reintegrated ex-militants was put at a little over 30,000 persons.

Employing, skilled and highly trained professionals and workers has for long being an issue between the Oil Bearing Communities and oil companies. The amnesty did not make much difference, hence only a few were absorbed into oil companies as result of the amnesty program. The conclusion with regards to type, quality and duration of trainings given to ex-militants is that, it was posed with many challenges that if not well managed can lead to a number of social problems hereafter. The researcher also did observed in the course of the field work that none of the ex-militant leaders or warlords indicated the desire to be trained or was ever trained for any area or skill. Apparently, they were already skilled and well educated in some ways and never really needed any of such needless but important trainings offered.

The third objective was to investigate further the prospects of the amnesty program towards peaceful resolution of militancy in the Niger Delta and its implications to the emergence other forms of insurgency in Nigeria like the Boko Haram. The amnesty policy was perceived as the best option for peace in the Niger-Delta by most of the survey respondents. There were divergent views with regards to the amnesty program being the best policy and option for peace in the oil rich region by the different interviewees in the IDIs. An undercover journalist for the IYC and MEND for over 15 years does not believe so and observed that; The Amnesty cannot be the best option for lasting peace. He argues further that the Oil Bearing Communities of Nigeria are not just In the South South and comprising only Niger Delta States but also South Western States of Edo and Ondo and South Eastern States of Abia etc. Attention is also drawn to the percentage of ex-militants in the amnesty program from the South South States as against other Oil Producing communities of Nigeria. While however that is a valid point, the scope of this study was limited to the Niger Delta Oil Bearing Communities only. He links up his argument with the uprising in the South East of The Pro Biafra Agitators as a

possible protest to the state of seemingly favouring a few i.e. Niger Delta militants. He calls for a holistic and an all-encompassing approach to peace building and does not believe that the amnesty is capable of forestalling lasting peace in the Niger Delta. In conflict resolution, the implication of the amnesty offer could mean rewarding crime opined Kantiok (2014). This implying the unsuitability of the amnesty program toward ending militancy, ensuring lasting peace and encouraging development in troubled enclaves such as the Niger Delta.

The Head of re-integration of the amnesty program on the other hand quickly cautions us not the see the DDR in the light of the UN but an Idea and program of The UN that was adapted, customized and suited for Nigeria with complete local content and control. The Amnesty News, (2012:7) in corroboration with this view reports that; the Amnesty process has been described as arguably the successful disarmament exercise in the history of DDR in Africa. As against about 24 UN-piloted DDR interventions in Africa and some of which were initiated since 1992 are yet to attain full demobilization despite robust financial and technical assistance from the world body and other international partners. Among such countries are Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Reports in the Amnesty News, 2016 echoed that this has triggered a global demand for a transfer of such programs from the United Nations and other international agencies to governments of participating governments. Whether the Niger Delta has been fully disarmed or not, is not the focus of this study but we shall leave that discourse to time and studies in the future. Therefore in his opinion the amnesty is a good option for peace in the region.

On the prospects of the amnesty program leading to lasting peace in the Niger-Delta, the head of re integration saw the amnesty policy as capable of ending militancy and bringing lasting peace in the Niger-Delta. One of the respondents in the study who worked with one of the NGOs

and a training partner in an interview tended toward the opposite direction when asked the same question. To her the irregularities in the process were much and could not guarantee lasting peace. In as much as peace is being witnessed now it is not a guarantee as the government is yet to fulfil its promise to the ex-militants and looking at the malpractices in and through the process of implementation. The Political Economy Thesis emphasizes the importance of Policy and Processes as ideals in the show of State dominance and control of resources of the Niger Delta. See Ikelegbe (2010) when he opined that in the case of the DDR process and amnesty in the Niger Delta, the right process were not followed as with most DDRs globally. It therefore falls short of global standard and practice.

Furthermore, a question was asked in the qualitative in-depth interview, which was not featured in the survey questionnaire as to whether all militant groups accepted the amnesty offer. This question was to help ascertain the possible rise in future of any agitations from any of the groups that might not have accepted the amnesty offer or any other aggrieved persons/group not satisfied with the amnesty policy. All the respondent interviewed in this regard affirmed the surrender by all militia groups in the Niger Delta and attributed any crime of kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, theft, rape and robbery to criminal gangs and not ex-militants. To buttress this point, High Chief Comrade Ateke Tom through his Aide said that all militia camps have been destroyed and offered to take the researcher to the creeks and camps that have been destroyed as part of the amnesty deal. Implying that all militant groups surrendered and have unconditionally accepted the amnesty offer. He said that 99% of the militants and freedom fighters accepted the amnesty and have dropped their arm in that respect. This was a radical departure from the activities of a new and fierce insurgent group known as the Niger Delta Avengers months later. Additionally, the IYC secretary in an IDI affirmed that MEND in particular never accepted the amnesty because of its legal connotations.

In the same vein the question what other reasons may arise in the nearby or distant future that will take you back to the creeks?‖ was put across to the ex-militants in both separate IDIs and FGD for the ex-militants. The question was reframed for the other key informants and asked;

―What other reasons do you think may arise that will prompt the ex-militants to return to the creeks?‖ The responses were that the government should fulfil their own end of the bargain in the amnesty deal and by speeding up development in the region. This indicating a possible comeback by the ex-militants should in case the government does not carry out her part of the bargain. Female activist when approached with the same question clearly states that: ―I have never ever deluded myself that our boys are out of the creeks. This clearly indicates a possible return to the creeks by ex-militants but leaves that option to the individual decision of the ex-militants which may be occasioned by government‘s failure of address the Niger Delta Needs.

Respondents in the survey believed that the provision of jobs for the youths or young people, the improvement and provision of better social amenities in the region, Increased deviation/resource control, addressing constant environmental pollution challenges, granting more autonomy to the regions, states and local government areas will go a long way to aid peace building efforts and sustenance alongside the amnesty program in the Niger-Delta region. All the respondents in the qualitative study also thought in the same direction. These findings on the issues of development and needs of the Niger Delta also agrees with Ibeanu and Lukman, (2006:38); Watts, (2008); NDDC Act, (2000) and has been long established in literature.

Most of the respondents in the study both in the survey, IDIs and FGDs thought that the amnesty offer could have influenced the rise of other insurgent groups in the country. Respondents in the survey gave reasons to what they thought to be the relationship between the

amnesty offer and the possible rise of other forms of insurgencies in Nigeria. A good number of them said the rise of insurgencies in the North East could be politically motivated and possibly that the insurgents wanted some money too just as in the case of the Niger Delta Ex-militants. Those that saw no links or close relationship between the amnesty offer and the rise of other insurgencies in Nigeria, believed that the insurgents simply were fighting a religious and political battle especially with the then President Ebele Goodluck Jonathan being a south-south indigene and a Christian. This indicates that most of the respondents in the survey saw politics as the intervening variable in the relationship between the amnesty offer and the Boko Haram insurgency among other reasons. Female activist on the other hand does not see any relationship between them but argues thus:

How can there be a relationship? In my opinion, the people of the South West have always maintained their right to self-determination, to federalism. The Niger Delta people are talking about their right to their resources. The people of the South West are talking about anti-corruption, we too are talking about anti- corruption, and the South-East too, is talking about its own actualization of its right to be independent of Nigeria. Boko Haram, on the other hand, is talking about Islamizing Jonathan, about hating western education, about all of us shifting to Islam. How are those comparable to what the South- East people, the South- South people and the South-West people are talking about? How is the killing of people that worship God on Sunday a course? How is that an issue? (Gist Magazine, 2012: 56)

While it may be difficult to establish a direct link or relationship between the amnesty offer and the Boko Haram crisis in reality, the researcher personally believes that such government policies when without a true motive to help a people or community develop or grow is capable of instigating other forms of insurgencies. A more recent example is the Pro Biafra militant uprising in Nigeria's South - East. Such is usually fuelled by dissatisfaction and failures associated with State Palliative measures from past regimes. An agitation may start in one

regime and when poorly handled can give reasons to the rise of other forms of insurgencies in other areas or take a new form in the same region. Kantiok (2014) is of the same opinion.

The fourth objective was to investigate the implications of the omission of women and children in the Niger Delta amnesty program. With respect to that, the field reports revealed that most of the respondents in the community survey believe that the amnesty program left out women and children. On the other hand the Head of re integration of the amnesty program believes otherwise and observed that the amnesty program against popular view had a place for women. He further buttressed his point with the official figure and list of disarmed militants and showed the researcher the number of women captured in the rehabilitation camp and the special kind of treatment given them (See Table 4.4.2**)**. Some of them had children with them when they came to the rehabilitation camp. He also recounts a number of the women getting pregnant even while in the rehabilitation camp in Obubra.

On the question of the most affected group in the Niger Delta crisis, the study discovered that majority of the respondents said all groups were affected by insurgencies in the Niger-Delta, but women constituted the single largest and most affected group. This finding also agrees with Gandu (2011) in his study on sexual liaisons in the Niger Delta that revealed the socio-sexual relations and the exploitation of women in the Niger Delta. The qualitative data did not argue otherwise as their responses tended in the same direction and in agreement with the respondents in the survey. The study also reveals that most of the respondents in the survey saw the risk and possible rise of social vices as an effect of the omission of women and children from the amnesty program. The Director of Global Peace Missions a Faith Based Organization (FBO) opines that if the amnesty is only able to tackle the restiveness of the agitators today and not the real

developmental challenges and issues of the region, younger generations will arise and demand for a special attention in the future.

Majority of the ex-militants were of the view that if jobs were provided for the ex- militants and other youths in the region, it will lead to lasting peace. Additionally, they emphasized the need of the government to tackle the developmental and community needs of the region. In addition to that, Kantiok (2014) strongly believes that at least 20% derivation to the Niger Delta and Oil Bearing Communities will help and further backed up his point when he drew from Nigeria‘s economic history with reference to the ground nut pyramids in the North and cocoa plantations in the South West with a 50% derivation to those regions.

An Oil Company official with Shell Petroleum said that the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) should be looked into and passed into law. This will ensure that the primary beneficiaries of the oil industry will be the people first (i.e Niger Deltans), the State government and then the Federal Government, all in that order. She laments the reluctance of the government to pass the PIB bill into law, because it will not benefit them. She further states the need for law enforcement of oil companies to be deliberate and sincere with their claims of community development. Female activist advocates for resource control as a way out. An engineer of Global Peace Mission is of the opinion that religion and culture plays a vital role in peace building. He believes that for lasting peace in the region we have to go back to our culture and religion to help. This to him helps to instil good conscience and fear of God in people and will not let them carry guns to kill anyone. What he did not point out here is, who or which party should adopt the use of culture and religion? The government, the militants, Niger Deltans populace or all concerned. He does however agree with the idea of the government being committed to the developmental needs and challenges of the region.

On the core ex-militants angle however, their yearnings for jobs, absorption into oil companies, community development and the government fulfilling their promises to them before they laid down their arms were even louder. For the ex-militant leaders on the other hand, a call for participation and inclusion in the government of the day both at the State and National level was top on their priority list. Alhaji Asari Dokubo is of the opinion that human capital development and a robust economy is key in peace building efforts in the region; he therefore declares;

You empower the people first… There must be an economic take-off… There must be opportunity for the people to earn a living… if you build the people, the people will continue to build the roads. That is what it takes… There must be an economic activity that will sustain the place... You build the economy. The economy is what will quicken development and move the effects of government. When you don‘t look at the economy and you are building infrastructures, infrastructure will decay tomorrow like the ones you met before (See Gist Magazine, 2012:67).

Other major finding of the research shows that three or more terms were used supposedly to refer to the same persons or participants in the amnesty program as earlier highlighted. The most dominant ones being the terms ex-militants, ex-agitators, freedom fighters and delegates. This had a number of connotations. One is that not all were militants in the first place and a name was needed to encompass all categories of people that took part in the amnesty program. In the literatures and media, the participants or beneficiaries of the program were referred to as ex- militants, in the amnesty office they were referred to as delegates or ex-agitators. The core militants called themselves freedom fighters, those incorporated along the way but not real militants called themselves delegates. The term delegate was more encompassing and therefore mostly used to refer to all participants and beneficiaries in the amnesty program regardless of whatever they called themselves or their true status before the declaration of the amnesty policy. The researcher however chose and adopted the term militant or ex-militant mostly in the study.

This was because this research work is an academic work and goes in line with existing literatures on the Niger Delta insurgencies where the term militant(s) was mostly used.

Additional major findings of the field work shows that most of the ex-militants or delegates trained were not militants but went as substitutes (or mare beneficiaries) to real militants who could not cope with the formal education and class room setups provided by some training partners. Both parties get paid nonetheless, but not in all instances. To further buttress this point, one of the interviewees a staff of a particular training partner related her experience when she supposedly asked an acclaimed lady ex-militant the question; Did you (ever) fight…? Her reply was simply; …If my brother fight no bi me fight...? This implying her being a militant but by correspondent through her brother‘s physical involvement in the insurgencies directly or put another if her brother is in the war front, she also was there by proxy and therefore any dividend could be shared. The amnesty was one of such dividends. This finding also falls in line with the findings of Chidi (2011:17) who advanced reasons to say that not all who accepted the amnesty were militants in the first place.

The researcher is also of the view that the amnesty program though with a perceived good intention has consequent latent manifestations. One of such latency is that an intricate network of Social dichotomy is developing and is only but a time bomb waiting to explode. Again is that the Niger Delta is now divided into the favoured ex militants and the general Niger Delta populace i.e. the non-militants as echoed earlier. Mind you, all have been victims of the same oil enclave economy. Additionally, what the researcher observed with kin interest is a social divide in the Niger Delta society as a result of the introduction of the amnesty program. A divide that says that some are more favoured than others or in the words of George Orwen in his book The Animal Farm; ―all animals are equal, but some are more equal than others‖. The amnesty program favoured the Militants which puts them in the position of the ―more equals‖. A

grievance is gradually rising amongst the people who were not formally and directly part of the amnesty program mainly women, youths and community leaders. The grief is gradually being passed down and sent across to the uninformed and the divide in the society is widening up in the hearts of the populace. One of the community leaders in Opobo kingdom felt that the government was wrong to have in his words ―favoured the militants and their leaders‖. This will lead to greater damage to the Niger Delta community as a whole. In the first place, he does not believe that the whole Niger Delta struggle was unified and aimed toward the same goal of liberating the region and its people but it articulated the desires and aspirations of a selfish few divided into various camps. For him the amnesty program clearly demonstrated that as most of the leaders and war lords were only struggling to include and have more militants in their list so they could benefit more.

As the dissatisfaction is rising, the not favoured ones are watching, a few women already airing out their griefs. One of the women interviewed in Ibimina Polo community said... "we no bi human being too... abi na only militants dey Niger Delta? Common fifty thousand if government dey settle everybody we go happy take am do something". In plain grammar meaning; ―Are we not humans… or do we have only militants in the Niger Delta? If the government pays us just ₦50, 000 ($167), will we not better our lives with it…?‖. This implying the divide is obvious and the poverty biting hard on the not favoured residents and people of the Niger Delta. The challenges are enormous but the fullness can only be felt and seen in the not too distant future of the region.

Amongst the participants in the amnesty program (i.e. delegates) again is the divide along the lines of a true militant and a fake militant or genuine opportunist who is seen to have been favoured by someone (or anyone) at the top. Yet still is the divide amongst the war lords and their followers and then the war Lords against themselves.

Here and based on the researcher's interactions with the followers (i.e. ex-militants) from different camps, the conclusion can be reached that the whole program especially the method of paying allowances and stipends favoured mostly their bosses‘ i.e. The Nationals and not the other rank and file i.e. the combatants or intels or intelligence Unit (Informants). This they interpreted as personal and selfish of their leaders; some even regretted ever joining the struggle in the first place. A Confirmed source (an ex-militant) who pleaded anonymity in an IDI, said a few of their colleague are missing due to direct protests to their war lords on what they believed to be their rights which was not given to them. While one may not be able to judge the true motive of such yearnings, there is an element of truth in it. One can only wonder why all the ex- militants approached during the field work were very reluctant in leading the researcher to see any of their leaders. One simply said to the researcher: ―your life is not safe!‖ The researcher believed them but his research instincts kept him focused and maybe fearless!

There are two categories of ex militants and militancy groups the researcher discovered in the course of the field work. Those that accepted the amnesty and dropped their arms e.g. Ateke Tom group, Fara group etc. and those that did not accept the amnesty but "believed" to have dropped their arms or rather ―seized fire‖ e.g. MEND leadership and the IYC. The recent political happenings in 2016 attests to that which include the pseudo merger of some Pro Biafra Militants and some Niger Delta militants known as the Avengers (See Roland et al., 2016:1, 5, 6, 7 & 8 in Daily Trust of May 15) This led to the blow up of several pipelines and killings of Security personnel in both Rivers and Bayelsa States (Also see Daily Trust of May 16, 17 & 18, 2016). Not all militant groups accepted the amnesty offer in the first instance and that has transcended even to the terminal stage of the program in 2016 after 7 years of its implementation.

Militancy in the Niger Delta comprised of core militants groups and core cult groups. The cult groups were more in number than the militant groups which were less in number but more organised, strategic, purposeful and powerful. Additionally, there were more cult groups in Port Harcourt city than anywhere else in the Niger Delta. The cult groups were at rivalry with each other but also formed various alliances with different core militant groups for protection and other gains. The amnesty was one of such gains.

There is a relationship between them both. The cult groups served as recruitment grounds for major militant groups, while the militant groups served to protect the cult groups whenever the need arose. Thus, when the amnesty offer was made, the militant groups accepted the cult groups as militants for mutual benefits. This again suggests to us that not all who accepted the amnesty were militants in the first place. The real definition of a militant in the opinion of the researcher rests either with the academics, the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) or MEND.

In line with the theoretical framework of Political Economy adopted for the study which explained the problem of study, it is evident from the findings that, the government only declared amnesty as a means to sustain her dominance of the Niger Delta region using the state apparatuses of power and coercion and to maintain the continuous exploitation of her resources and not really being committed to the developmental needs and challenges of the region. The amnesty policy is only but a palliative measure which in the researcher‘s opinion has initiated a new divide and rule system in the Niger Delta and has not sufficiently addressed the deep yearnings of the people but temporarily favouring a few i.e. ex-militants over and above the majority of the Niger Delta population. Consequently, the amnesty policy and its implementation is characterized by inadequacies that significantly reveals the nature and character of Oil Enclave Economies.

This chapter concludes on the field reports and findings of the study. The ex-militants were and are currently at different levels of the amnesty program (DDR) which constituted firstly, those trained and mobilized, secondly the trained but not mobilized, thirdly, those not trained at all and a the final category of those whose trainings were truncated or cut short by a number of factors, such as some of the ex-militants being trained in an area they did not opt for, their inability to cope with the formal training schedules/programs and formal class room settings, poor funding of the training partners and expulsion of some of the ex-militants from their trainings due to their hooliganism and hullabaloo behaviours. All of that brought with it a number of unresolved challenges to the program as at the time of the field work in 2013, 2014 and 2015 and till date.

Currently the administration of President Mohammadu Buhari in 2016 has embarked on a winding up stage of the amnesty program due to its cost and huge financial implication. Excerpts from the Guardian online Newspaper of February, 16 2016 in an interview with the current Coordinator of the Presidential Amnesty Program Brigadier General Paul Boroh (td.) is rendered below:

The Presidential Amnesty Programme is exiting 7,242 former militants this year which will save the Federal Government over N5.6 billion, Presidential Special Adviser on Niger Delta and Coordinator of the Presidential Amnesty Programme, Brig Gen Paul Boroh (rtd) has told journalists in Abuja. He announced yesterday that a taskforce has been set up to work out and implement the exit strategy with timelines that will not compromise National Security, just as he disclosed that the environmental clean-up of the Niger Delta will begin in Ogoni land by the end of this month beginning in Rivers State, before moving to Bayelsa and other affected states.

Boroh who assured that the condition on ground was favourable for the clean-up as well as other projects of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), Ministry of Niger Delta,

and Ministry of Power, Works and Housing added that Americans, English, Chinese, and Israelis have shown interest in working with the government to develop the delta region (Daniel, 2016). On the exit strategy which will cover two years, Boroh said his experience as commander of the ECOMOG necessitated its development for the programme. ―I was the last commanding officer of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operations in Sierra Leone and nobody has talked about how ECOMOG exited. The truth is that they left in disarray from that country because there was no exit strategy, so there is a need for an exit strategy in any mission that is planned.‖ The winding down of the amnesty programme, he said, had become necessary because of its expensive nature in view of the country‘s dwindling finances, and because it was never intended to be an unending programme. ―It is a DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Re-integration) an expensive programme not every country can undertake. It is only the United Nation that can successfully achieve that because it is very expensive. Nigeria is the only country that is running a DDR programme without support from the UN. We are in the last phase of the re-integration, and this is the most critical of the phases. What I want to achieve is sustainable reintegration.‖ (Daniel, 2016. Adapted from Thisday online news).

The Presidential Amnesty Programme, he revealed, will be exiting 3,232 beneficiaries this month who have been trained as entrepreneurs and have received business and set up and starter packs. Also affected are beneficiaries of the Oil and Gas International Foundation (OGIF) programme and the 400 for whom the office has secured employment. A second batch of 1,042 who are currently being given starter packs to establish their individual businesses are soon to be exited from the programme which will result in a further N812, 760,000 savings for government this year. Depending on the budgetary allocation and release, the Amnesty Office plans to exit an additional 2,958 beneficiaries by the end of this year which would amount to a N2, 307,240,000

savings that would otherwise have been spent on stipends. So far, the programme has trained 17,322 of the beneficiaries leaving a balance of 12,678 (Daniel, 2016).

Worthy of note here is that the amnesty program was never meant to be a continuous program as suggested by some ex-militants in the study and advanced as a reason for a possible come back if ever stopped or brought to an end. Obviously the new government is kin about delivering one of the amnesty promise with its awarding of the contract to clean up the Niger Delta land affected by oil spillage starting with Ogoni land although that haven been initiated by the past administration of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. This will go a long way in peace building and sustaining peace in the post amnesty period. The excerpt also shows us a summary of the amnesty program in terms of the number of the ex-militants trained 17,322 (58%) as at February 2016 and the balance of untrained ex-militants left behind put at 12,678 (42%). When compared to the figures of the progress that the amnesty program has made in 2013 (See Table 4.4.2), one can only conclude that not much has been done with regards to the number of ex- militants trained. However, it remains a commendable effort so far.

The researcher also discovered and concludes that the real militants (infantry or foot soldiers) did not gain much of the amnesty package as promised by the government especially the payment of allowances, stipends and trainings. This failure was from two or more directions. One was failure on the part of the government to keep her promise on the Amnesty bargain: secondly, the war lords failed to pass down what was meant to benefit the infantry militant. Thirdly, the presence of some corrupt middle men that posed as trainers and contractors with events and instances of poor or no service delivered at all. The conclusion is that infantry ex- militant has no real option but to hope for a change, get back to his old life or get engaged with other forms of social vices. While that may come as a personal decision, developing into a group action is not totally impossible as the case with the so called Niger Delta Avengers. Findings also

reveals that the major beneficiaries of the amnesty program were not the core militants that fought and carried arms as it were but contractors, war lords, pseudo militants and middle men.

# CHAPTER FIVE

# SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

# Introduction

This section summarizes the entire work and the findings peculiar to the study are highlighted in line with the set objectives of study. A conclusion is reached and recommendations were made based on the findings of this study.

# Summary of Major Findings

This study is titled An Assessment of the Amnesty Program for ex-militants in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta which commenced in the year 2009 till date (2016). The specific objectives however did look at, the extent to which the Amnesty Program addresses the demands of the people of the Niger Delta and militancy in particular, examined the job prospects of the trained ex-militants and its implication on their standard of living, examined the contribution of the Amnesty Program towards a peaceful resolution of Militancy in the Niger-Delta and its implications to the emergence of other forms of insurgences in other regions in Nigeria like the Boko Haram, the implications of the omission of women and children as vulnerable groups and victims of militancy in the Amnesty program were carried out and solutions were proffered toward long lasting and sustainable peace efforts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

The Political Economy thesis was used in the study which provided necessary explanation to the character and realities of an enclave economy and in this case the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria‘s South-South geo-political zone. The Political economy perspective served as theoretical framework for the study. In the context of this perspective, social developments like in the oil sector are outcomes of social arrangement, class structure, and ideology in the society. The interrelationships of these variables have led to neglect of rural areas

and established Inequality in the society and has further widened the gap between the state and the people. The theory concludes that the amnesty program was only but a palliative measure in the Niger Delta and has been formulated to further maintain the status quo of domination and exploitation of the resources of the Niger Delta by the Nigerian State. Information was obtained from respondents by adopting both qualitative and quantitative techniques of data collection, which were survey (questionnaires), focus group discussion and in-depth interviews, pictures and observations.

The field findings also revealed that not all militants or militancy groups accepted the amnesty offer and this is because of their different levels of education, exposure and awareness of other legal issues associated with the amnesty policy. They however did not deliberately hamper or interrupt the DDR process. The amnesty program has brought relative peace to the Niger Delta region, but has failed to meet the urgent development needs and challenges of the region which led to the insurgencies in the first place. There is a likelihood of other forms of insurgencies or crimes springing up as dissatisfied groups or persons may regroup with a new focus and vision to meet their unmet financial needs or issues. From both the survey and qualitative data, it was gathered that the amnesty program barely meets the needs and issues of the Niger Delta, which has largely being the quest around resource control, 50% derivation and speedy community, infrastructural and human capital development.

The different parties involved in the amnesty program had different meanings to it. Consequently also, not all militants and Niger Deltans had the same understanding of the true meaning of amnesty. Most of the beneficiaries in the program were never militants or insurgents in the first place. The former living standard of the militants in the heat of the insurgency was better economically then than now, but now better socially when compared. Meaning the ex-

militants attached a lot of importance to their social lives inasmuch as finances are important. The amnesty program came with it a freedom of movement and association them which they lacked before its introduction.

With respect to their monthly allowances, majority of them never got the full sum of N64, 000 for instance. Some got as little as N30, 000 or even N10, 000 monthly or never. Majority only reported receiving the full sum with the coming in President Mahamdu Buhari as the Head of State. Before now their allowances and stipends were paid through the Militant Heads or War Lords in form of table payments and in cash; although all ex-militants that went through the DDR program opened new accounts with a specified bank through which their stipends will get to them.

The payment system favoured the militant leaders. The War Lords had their explanations for not paying their ―boys‖ their complete sums. Firstly, the researcher gathered that the balance sum is claimed to be paid to families of insurgents who died in active combat and secondly, the non-complete payment was used as a social control measure to check the behaviours and activities of infantry militants against social vices. The foot soldiers however had a different opinion in that regard. One reportedly said ―paying us through our leaders meant we have to do certain dirty jobs or risk getting paid for that month… we plead with you and the amnesty office to please pay us through our bank accounts‖. One can only conclude that the payment system favoured the leaders more than the ordinary militant.

The findings revealed that the qualities of certain kinds of trainings received were sub- standard and by people who were never professionals in the areas but mere contractors. This does not say again that there were no quality trainings. Some of the ex-militants indicated being trained by the best hands in the areas and sectors they chose but not having jobs meant untold

hardships for them. Oil companies or others in similar industries were and are still sceptical in employing ex-militants. However, a few have been employed in oil companies and a fewer number are gainfully self-employed with the initial advancement and offer of starter packs. When looked at intently, the percentage is largely insignificant.

The conclusion here is that the amnesty program is only but a temporary bail out for the Nigerian state. The amnesty program (DDR) has hardly succeeded one hundred per cent in any country globally. The relative peace being enjoyed cannot make the amnesty program to be totally ruled out as a failure in Nigeria. It can therefore be established that based on the findings of this study, that the amnesty program has no strong links with the rise of book haram insurgencies in Nigeria‘s North East which was believed by most of the respondents to be religious and politically motivated than any motive for financial gains.

More male than female ex-militants benefited from the amnesty program. The amnesty program did not have any separate provision for women or children; it did however incorporate women ex-militants or females that showed up through the DDR process. The published data in Amnesty News (2012:9), showed that about 822 women were Disarmed, Demobilized and Reintegrated into the society. Looking at it more intently, it means that only female insurgents were favoured in the amnesty program and not the ordinary average Niger Delta woman. Yet still the percentage is insignificant when compared to the number of women affected by the insurgencies in the entire region. The same situation applies to children. The implication is that a kind of divide and rule system through the amnesty program has been introduced in the Niger Delta. It simply says that some are more favoured than others or in the words of Napoleon in George Orwell‘s Animal Farm: ―all animals are equal, but some are more equal than others‖. Here the state determines the more equal ones.

# Conclusion

The amnesty program in the Niger Delta might not have been ill conceived from the onset, but its implementation was faulty just like previous palliative measures initiated by the Nigerian state to attempt a restoration of peace to the troubled region. Peace has been established by literature to be a prerequisite for growth and development. However, the amnesty has in recent times remained the single most effective and popular strategy that brought about relative peace to the Niger Delta and increased crude oil production, general output and revenue to Nigeria. Be that as it is, it is necessary for all parties involved in peace building to be true and sincere to the growth and developmental needs of the sub region and its people. All parties here being the state as the major player, the militants or ex-militants and finally, the common man on the street or in the creeks.

The peace being witnessed currently in the Niger Delta is only but relative, but however can be made more permanent and/or sustainable. It is therefore advised that all the parties involved (Individuals, State and Federal Government) must avoid the interventionist mistakes of the past made as both government palliatives and community development efforts of oil TNCs which were but for a limited time in nature and could not address the fundamental and root problems of oil enclavity. The new strategy should encourage profit-making and surplus generation within subsistence economies both within the oil and non-oil sectors in the region. Previous interventions failed because the subsistence sector of the economy was not consciously supported by a strong policy and action but merely perceived as a survivalist economy that does not need bail-outs.

The region needs a long time, sustainable and committed policy and a strategic execution and action plan, and not just a fast and quick way out of the problem. To precede this as a first step is ―to progressively provide the necessary policy stimuli to the subsistence of non-formal

sectors of the Niger Delta economy. This can be achieved by reviving the intensive activities that characterised the Nigerian public sector before the introduction of Structural Adjustment and neo-liberal policies of privatisation and subsidy removals that began from the late 1980s through the 1990s. Consequently, Human capital development cannot be overemphasized in this regard. Policy must be centred on creating an enabling environment for the people of the region to develop themselves and for them to thrive economically.

# Recommendations

Our recommendation is majorly one and this; that a true policy and action commitment is lacking from all parties concerned (The Federal Government, State Government, Community/Traditional Leaders, the Niger Delta people) and if that is in place, we can have a better Niger Delta. Specifically however, this study recommends the following:

* + 1. With regards to the teaming population of the Niger Delta and the trainings given to ex-militants it is necessary that job creation is prioritized by all concerned.
    2. Increased derivation has been in the forefront of the issues of the Niger Delta Struggles and therefore should be looked into and implemented.
    3. In line with that also, the Petroleum Industry Bill should be passed into law to ensure that the oil bearing communities are the primary beneficiaries of the oil revenues.
    4. Additionally also, oil companies and multi nationals should be enforced to comply with the laws and legislations of governing oil productions and operations in the Niger Delta as enshrined in the constitution.
    5. The role and place of religious and traditional/cultural institutions cannot be overemphasized. It is therefore encouraged that the good values of these institutions

are explored and employed in peace building efforts in the post amnesty periods in the Niger Delta.

* + 1. There is the need for a true and genuine commitment from all parties involved toward community development.
    2. The Government should fulfil their promises to the ex-militants as part of the terms and conditions met before the seize fire and acceptance of the amnesty by the ex- militants.
    3. With regard to the militant heads, there is the need for an increased participation and some levels of inclusion in government.
    4. Human capital development is most necessary for the Niger Delta population as an improved individual can stand alone with less dependent on the government.
    5. There is a need for an enabling environment that permits for economic growth and development in the Niger Delta and indeed Nigeria as a whole. This will have ripple effects for less dependence on the oil economy.
    6. Corruption has been a cancer in the economy of the Niger delta. A true fight against corruption and policies to curb corruption can help boost peace efforts in the post amnesty periods.

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# APPENDIXES

**Focus Group Discussion Guide (Women, Children Groups)**

# Focus Group Discussion Guide for Women and Children to assess if the Amnesty Program meets the issues of the Niger Delta people and the implications of the Omission of women and children in the Amnesty Program.

**Historical Overview of Militancy in the Niger-Delta**

1. Please can you tell us briefly about militancy in the Niger Delta?
2. What are your perceptions on militants and militancy?
3. What are their modes of operation and main activities?
4. How has the activities of Militants affected you in the past.

# The Amnesty Program, the issues of the Niger-Delta and Militants

1. Please give us a brief record or instances of militancy your community?
2. What were they looking for?
3. What do you think is the benefit of persons (militants) engaging in militancy?
4. What is the general perception of your (this) community on militants and militancy?
5. How has the activities of militants and militancy affected your (this) community?
6. Have you as a group ever agitated for anything?
7. What were you agitating for?
8. How did you go about it?
9. Were your issues the same with that of the other militants?
10. Please can tell us of any known efforts in the past to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
11. Can you tell us and possibly why they had little or no success in bringing peace to the Niger Delta?
12. Have you heard of the Amnesty Program?
13. What is your general understanding of Amnesty?
14. How did you hear about it?
15. Can you tell us why the Amnesty Program was introduced?
16. Who was the Amnesty Program targeted at?
17. What is your opinion of the Amnesty Program?

# Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants in Comparison to their former Militant status

1. Do you know any person that has been trained under the amnesty program?
2. If yes, what specific kinds of training did they receive?
3. Do you think that there are jobs for such trainings that they have received?
4. As many ex-militants have been fully trained now, do they now have a good job?
5. Do you think their lives are better now?

# The Implications of the omissions in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program with emphasis on the neglect of women and children

1. Did you participate in the Amnesty program? Probe
2. Do you know of any **Child or Woman** that was part of the amnesty program.
3. How does the Amnesty Program address any of your every day challenges? **Probe**
4. What is your opinion on your **omission as children/Women** in the Niger-Delta amnesty program since its inception?
5. Do you think that the Amnesty program should have been designed to meeting your basic needs as women/children? (Mention these needs if yes) **Probe**
6. What other specific personal needs do you think the Amnesty Program should have addressed?
7. Do you think that the Government was right to have favoured the militants only?

# Prospects of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful resolution of Militancy in The Niger- Delta and its Implications to the emergence other forms of Insurgences in Nigeria

1. Do you think that the Amnesty program was the best policy to end militancy in the Niger Delta especially to help women/children that have been victims of militancy?
2. Tell us about the Boko Haram.
3. Please suggest ways to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta.

# APPENDIX B

**Focus Group Discussion Guide (Ex-militants Only)**

# Focus Group Discussion Guide for Ex-Militants to assess the impact of the Amnesty program so far, if the Amnesty Program meets their issues and that of the Niger Delta people and the future of militancy in the Niger Delta.

**Hstorical Overview of Militancy in the Niger-Delta**

1. What did you think of yourselves militants?
2. Describe yourselves as militants/militia gang members?
3. Why did you join the militia?
4. Describe your life as a militia.
5. What where you fighting for?
6. What were your issues as militants?
7. Were your issues different from that of the other community people of the Niger Delta?
8. What benefit did you derive as militants or in your engagement in militancy?
9. What is the general perception of your community on your activities as militants?
10. Did your community know you as militants or militia gang members?
11. Did your families know you as a militants or militia gang members?
12. What is your personal opinion of militants and militancy?
13. How have your activities as militants or militancy affected your community?
14. How have your activities as militants affected your personal life?
15. Please can tell us of any known efforts in the past to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
16. Can you tell us and possibly why they had little or no success in bringing peace to the Niger Delta?

# The Amnesty Program, the issues of the Niger-Delta and Militants

1. What is your understanding of Amnesty?
2. How did you hear about it?
3. Can you tell us why the Amnesty Program was introduced?
4. Why was the Amnesty Program targeted at militants alone?
5. Why did you accept the amnesty offer?
6. Do you think that it was all the militia gangs that accepted the amnesty?
7. Tell us the process followed and that which you went through in the amnesty program?

# Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants in Comparison to their former Militant status

1. What kinds and quality of training did you receive?
2. What are the job prospects of such trainings?
3. If you have been fully trained, do you now have a good job?
4. Compare your standard of living now with when you were in the militia gang or engaged in militancy.
5. Please indicate your average monthly income before the joining the militia.
6. Average monthly income **in** the militia.
7. Average monthly income **after** the amnesty offer (NOW).
8. Do you think that the Amnesty program is meeting up with the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and militants in particular?
9. Are there any reasons that you think may push you back to the creeks as a militant(s) again?
10. What in your opinion are the major **achievements** of the Niger-Delta Amnesty Program since its inception?
11. What are the major **challenge**s you faced in the amnesty process?

# The Implications of the omissions in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program with emphasis on the neglect of women and children

1. Have you ever come across women and children in the course of your activities?
2. Tell us how your activities have affected women and children in the Niger-Delta.
3. Do you think that the amnesty program should have covered for women and children? Probe
4. What in your opinion are the major implications of **omissions** of Women and Children in the Niger-Delta amnesty program?
5. Do you think that the Government was right to have favoured the militants only?

# Prospects of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful resolution of Militancy in The Niger- Delta and its Implications to the emergence other forms of Insurgences in Nigeria.

1. Do you in your opinion think that the Amnesty was the best policy to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
2. Tell us about the Boko Haram.
3. Do you think that the Amnesty policy could have led to the emergence of other forms of militancy/insurgencies in other regions in Nigeria like the Boko Haram?
4. Please suggest ways to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta.

# APPENDIX C

**Indepth Interview Guide (Amnesty Officials)**

# Indepth Interview Guide for Amnesty Officials on the Amnesty Program Historical Overview of Militancy in the Niger-Delta

1. Please can you tell us briefly about militancy in the Niger Delta?
2. How have the activities of militants and militancy affected the Niger Delta as a whole?
3. Please can tell us of any known efforts in the past to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
4. Can you tell us why they had little or no success in bringing peace and development to the Niger Delta?

# The Amnesty Program, the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and Militancy

1. What is your understanding of Amnesty?
2. How did the message get to the Militants on the Amnesty program?
3. Can you tell us why the Amnesty Program was introduced?
4. What is your opinion of the Amnesty Program?
5. What is the process followed in the amnesty program?
6. Tell us about the main programs of the Amnesty and what it entailed.
7. Do you think that all the militia gangs/groups in the Niger Delta accepted the Amnesty?
8. Do you think that any reason may arise for the ex-militants to return to the creeks?

# Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants in Comparison to their former Militant status

1. At what stage or phase are we in the Amnesty program?
2. What is your role in the amnesty program?
3. What are the specific kinds and quality of training given to the militants?
4. What are the prospects of such trainings with regards to job opportunities for the trained ex-militants?
5. Do you think that the Amnesty program is meeting up with the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and militants in particular?
6. What in your opinion are the major **achievements** of the Niger-Delta Amnesty Program since its inception?

# The Implications of the omissions in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program with emphasis on the neglect of women and children

1. What in your opinion are the major **challenge** (s) faced by the amnesty in the Niger- Delta?
2. What in your opinion are the major implications of **omissions of** Women and Children in the Niger-Delta amnesty program since its inception?
3. Do you think that the Government was right to have favoured the militants only?

# Prospects of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful resolution of Militancy in The Niger- Delta and its Implications to the emergence other forms of Insurgences in Nigeria

1. Do you in your opinion think that the Amnesty was the best policy to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
2. Do you think that the Amnesty policy could have led to the emergence of other forms of militancy/insurgencies in other regions in Nigeria like the Boko Haram?
3. What are the prospects that the Amnesty will lead to lasting peace in the Niger Delta?
4. Please suggest ways to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta .

# APPENDIX D

**Indepth Interview Guide (Ex-Militant Leaders)**

# Indepth Interview Guide for Ex-Militant Leaders on the Amnesty Program Historical Overview of Militancy in the Niger-Delta

1. Please can you tell us briefly about militancy in the Niger Delta?
2. How has the activities of militants and militancy affected the Niger Delta as a whole?
3. Please can tell us of any known efforts in the past to end oil insurgency and militancy in the Niger Delta?
4. Can you tell us why they had little or no success in bringing peace and development to the Niger Delta?

# The Amnesty Program, the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and Militancy

1. What is your understanding of Amnesty?
2. How did you hear about the Amnesty Program?
3. Can you tell us why the Amnesty Program was introduced?
4. What is your opinion of the Amnesty program?
5. What role did you as a Leader play in the Amnesty program?
6. Do you think that all the militia gangs/groups in the Niger Delta accepted the Amnesty?
7. Do you think that any reason may arise for the ex-militants to return to the creeks?

# Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants in Comparison to their former Militant status

1. What are the specific kinds and quality of training given to the militants?
2. What are the prospects of such trainings and job opportunities for the trained ex- militants?
3. As many ex-militants have been fully trained now, do they now have a good job?
4. Can you compare the standard of living of ex-militants now with when they were in the militia gang or engaged in militancy?
5. Do you think that the Amnesty program is meeting up with the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and militancy in particular?
6. What in your opinion are the major **achievements** of the Niger-Delta Amnesty Program since its inception?

# The Implications of the omissions in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program with emphasis on the neglect of women and children

1. What in your opinion are the major **challenge** (s) faced by the amnesty in the Niger- Delta?
2. What in your opinion are the major implications of **omissions of** Women, Children in the Niger-Delta amnesty program since its inception?
3. Do you think that the Government was right to have favoured the militants only?

# Prospects of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful resolution of Militancy in The Niger- Delta and its Implications to the emergence other forms of Insurgences in Nigeria

1. Do you in your opinion think that the Amnesty was the best policy to forestall peace and bring development in the Niger Delta?
2. Do you think that the Amnesty policy could have led to the emergence of other forms of militancy/insurgencies in other regions in Nigeria like the Boko Haram?
3. What are the prospects that the Amnesty will lead to lasting peace in the Niger Delta?
4. Please suggest ways to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta .

# APPENDIX E

**Indepth Interview Guide (Community Leaders/Heads)**

# Indepth Interview Guide for Traditional Heads on the Amnesty Program Historical Overview of Militancy in the Niger-Delta

1. Please tell us of your community records or instances of militants and militancy.
2. How has the activities of militants and militancy affected your (this) community?
3. Please can you tell us of any known efforts in the past to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
4. Tell us why they had little or no success in bringing peace to the Niger Delta?

# The Amnesty Program, the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and Militancy

1. What is your understanding of Amnesty?
2. How did you hear about the Amnesty Program?
3. Can you tell us why the Amnesty Program was introduced?
4. What in your opinion is the aim of the Amnesty?
5. Do you think that all the militia gangs/groups in the Niger Delta accepted the Amnesty offer?
6. What role did you play in the amnesty program?
7. Do you have records of persons that participated in the Amnesty Program?

# Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants in Comparison to their former Militant status

1. What are the prospects of trainings and job opportunities for the trained ex-militants?
2. Do you think that the Amnesty program is meeting up with the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and militants in particular?
3. Do you think that any reason may arise for the ex-militants to return to the creeks?
4. What are the major **achievements** of the Niger-Delta Amnesty Program since its inception?

# The Implications of the omissions in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program with emphasis on the neglect of women and children

1. What in your opinion are the major **challenge** (s) faced by the amnesty in the Niger- Delta?
2. What in your opinion are the major implications of **omissions** of Women and Children in the Niger-Delta amnesty program since its inception?
3. Do you think that the Government was right to have favoured the militants only?

# Prospects of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful resolution of Militancy in The Niger- Delta and its Implications to the emergence other forms of Insurgences in Nigeria

1. Do you in your opinion think that the Amnesty was the best policy to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
2. Do you think that the Amnesty policy could have led to the emergence of other forms of militancy/insurgencies in other regions in Nigeria like the Boko Haram?
3. What are the prospects that the Amnesty will lead to lasting peace in the Niger Delta?
4. Please suggest ways to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta.

# APPENDIX F

**Indepth Interview Guide (Security Agents)**

# Indepth Interview Guide for Security Agents on the Amnesty Program Historical Overview of Militancy in the Niger-Delta

1. Have you ever had an encounter with militants?
2. How has the activities of militants and militancy affected the Niger Delta as a whole with regards to security of lives and property?
3. Please can tell us of any known efforts in the past to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
4. If any how successful were they?

# The Amnesty Program, the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and Militancy

1. What is your understanding of Amnesty?
2. Can you tell us why the Amnesty Program was introduced?
3. What is your opinion of the Amnesty Program?
4. Do you think that all the militia gangs/groups in the Niger Delta accepted the Amnesty?
5. Do you think that any reason may arise for the ex-militants to return to the creeks?

# Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants in Comparison to their former Militant status

1. What are the specific kinds and quality of training given to the militants?
2. What are the prospects of such trainings and job opportunities for the trained ex- militants?
3. Do you think that the Amnesty program is meeting up with the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and militants in particular?
4. Tell us about the amnesty program so far and its implication on the security of lives and property.
5. How has the amnesty program impacted on the security of the Niger Delta region?
6. What in your opinion are the major **achievements** of the Niger-Delta Amnesty Program security wise since its inception?

# The Implications of the omissions in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program with emphasis on the neglect of women and children

1. What is your opinion are the major **challenge** (s) faced by the amnesty program in terms of security in the Niger-Delta?
2. What is your opinion are the major security implications of **omission** Women and Children in the Niger-Delta amnesty program since its inception?
3. Do you think that the Government was right to have favoured the militants only?

# Prospects of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful resolution of Militancy in The Niger- Delta and its Implications to the emergence other forms of Insurgences in Nigeria

1. Do you in your opinion think that the Amnesty was the best policy to end militancy and lasting security in the Niger Delta?
2. Do you think that the Amnesty policy could have led to the emergence of other forms of militancy/insurgencies in other regions in Nigeria like the boko haram?
3. What are the prospects that the Amnesty will lead to lasting peace in the Niger Delta?
4. Please suggest ways to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta security wise.

# APPENDIX G

**Indepth Interview Guide (Training Partners)**

# Indepth Interview Guide for Amnesty Training Partners/Facilitators on the Amnesty Program

**The Amnesty Program, the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and Militancy**

1. What is your role in the Amnesty Program?
2. What is the process followed in the amnesty program?
3. Tell us about the main programs of the Amnesty and what it entailed.
4. At what stage or phase are we in the Amnesty program?

# Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants in Comparison to their former Militant status

1. Tell us about the amnesty program so far with respect to the trainings for ex-militants.
2. What are the specific kinds of trainings offered?
3. What is the quality of training given to the ex-militants?
4. What was the duration of the trainings given to ex-militants?
5. What are the prospects of such trainings and job opportunities for the trained ex- militants?
6. Do you think that the Amnesty program is meeting up with the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and militants in particular?
7. Do you think that any reason may arise for the ex-militants to return to the creeks?
8. What in your opinion are the major **achievements** of the Niger-Delta Amnesty Program with regards to the trainings given since its inception?

# The Implications of the omissions in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program with emphasis on the neglect of women and children

1. What in your opinion are the major **challenge** (s) faced by the Amnesty Program in the Niger-Delta with regards to the trainings given to ex-militants?
2. What in your opinion are the major implications of **omissions** in the Niger-Delta amnesty program since its inception? (Women and Children).
3. Do you think that the Government was right to have favoured the militants only?

# Prospects of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful resolution of Militancy in The Niger- Delta and its Implications to the emergence other forms of Insurgences in Nigeria

1. Do you in your opinion think that the Amnesty was the best policy to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
2. What are the prospects that the Amnesty will lead to lasting peace in the Niger Delta?
3. Please suggest ways to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta.

# APPENDIX H

**Indepth Interview Guide (Oil Company Officials)**

# Indepth Interview Guide for Officials of Oil companies on the Amnesty Program Historical Overview of Militancy in the Niger-Delta

1. Please can you tell us briefly about militancy in the Niger Delta?
2. How have the activities of militants and militancy affected the Niger Delta as a whole?
3. Please can tell us of efforts in the past to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
4. Can you tell us why they had little or no success in bringing peace and development to the Niger Delta?

# The Amnesty Program, the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and Militancy

1. What is your understanding of Amnesty?
2. How did you hear about the Amnesty Program?
3. Can you tell us why the Amnesty Program was introduced?
4. Who was the Amnesty Program targeted at?
5. What in your opinion is the aim of the Amnesty?
6. How practical or feasible is the amnesty program?
7. What is the process followed in the amnesty program?
8. Tell us about the main programs of the Amnesty and what it entailed.
9. Do you think that all the militia gangs/groups in the Niger Delta accepted the Amnesty?
10. At what stage or phase are we in the Amnesty program?
11. What is your role in the amnesty program?

# Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants in Comparison to their former Militant status

1. What are the specific kinds and quality of training given to the militants?
2. What are the prospects of such trainings with regards to job opportunities for the trained ex-militants?
3. Have you offered any job to an ex militant in your organisation?
4. Do you think that the Amnesty program is meeting up with the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and militants in particular?
5. Do you think that any reason may arise for the ex-militants to return to the creeks?
6. What in your opinion are the major **achievements** of the Niger-Delta Amnesty Program since its inception?

# The Implications of the omissions in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program with emphasis on the neglect of women and children

1. What in your opinion are the major **challenge** (s) faced by the amnesty in the Niger- Delta?
2. What in your opinion are the major implications of **omissions** in the Niger-Delta amnesty program since its inception? (Women and Children)
3. Do you think that the Government was right to have favoured the militants only?

# Prospects of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful resolution of Militancy in The Niger- Delta and its Implications to the emergence other forms of Insurgences in Nigeria.

1. Do you in your opinion think that the Amnesty was the best policy to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
2. Do you think that the Amnesty policy could have led to the emergence of other forms of militancy/insurgencies in other regions in Nigeria like the boko haram?
3. What are the prospects that the Amnesty will lead to lasting peace in the Niger Delta?
4. Please suggest ways to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta .

# APPENDIX I

**Indepth Interview Guide (CSO/FBO/NGO)**

# Indepth Interview Guide for CSOs/NGOs/FBOs on the Amnesty Program

**The Amnesty Program, the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and Militancy**

1. What is your role in the Amnesty Program?
2. What is the process followed in the amnesty program?

# Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants in Comparison to their former Militant status

1. Tell us about the amnesty program so far with respect to the trainings for ex-militants.
2. What are the specific kinds of trainings offered?
3. What is the quality of training given to the ex-militants?
4. What was the duration of the trainings given to ex-militants?
5. What are the prospects of such trainings and job opportunities for the trained ex- militants?
6. Do you think that the Amnesty program is meeting up with the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and militants in particular?
7. Do you think that any reason may arise for the ex-militants to return to the creeks? Probe
8. What in your opinion are the major **achievements** of the Niger-Delta Amnesty Program with regards to the trainings given since its inception?

# The Implications of the omissions in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program with emphasis on the neglect of women and children

1. What in your opinion are the major **challenge**(s) faced by the Amnesty Program in the Niger-Delta with regards to the trainings given to ex-militants?
2. What in your opinion are the major implications of **omissions** in the Niger-Delta amnesty program since its inception? (Women and Children).
3. Do you think that the Government was right to have favoured the militants only?

# Prospects of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful resolution of Militancy in The Niger- Delta and its Implications to the emergence other forms of Insurgences in Nigeria

1. Do you in your opinion think that the Amnesty was the best policy to end militancy in the Niger Delta?
2. What are the prospects that the Amnesty will lead to lasting peace in the Niger Delta?
3. Please suggest ways to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta.

Dear Respondent,

# APPENDIX J

**Questionnaire (Ex-militant Survey only) QUESTIONNAIRE**

# Ex-Militants only

I am a Post Graduate student of the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. I am conducting a Study on **State Palliatives to Oil Bearing Communities (OBCs) of Nigeria’s Niger Delta; An Assessment of The Amnesty Program for Ex-Militants in The Niger- Delta**. Your candid responses will be appreciated and treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank You.

Aaron Jeb Dandodo

MSc/Soc-Sci/14422/2010-2011

**INSTRUCTION**: Please tick [√] options of your choice and provide us with your own answers where required.

# Section A: Socio-Demographic Data

1. What is your age? a. 15-24yrs ( ) b. 25-34yrs ( ) c. 35-44yrs ( ) d. 45yrs and above (

)

1. What is your sex? A. Male ( ) b. Female ( )
2. What is your marital status? a. Single ( ) b. Married ( ) c. Divorced/Separated ( ) d. Widowed ( )
3. Do you have children? a. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
4. If yes, how many?

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1. What is your state of origin?

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1. What is your religious affiliation? A. Christianity ( ) b. Islam ( ) Traditional ( ) c. Others specify

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1. What is your highest level of educational attainment? A. No Formal Education ( ) b. Primary School ( ) c. Secondary School ( ) d. Tertiary Education ( ) e. Others please specify………………………………
2. Please indicate your average monthly income before the joining the militia. a. I don‘t know ( )

b. Below N20, 000 ( ) c. N21, 000-N40, 000 ( )d. N41, 000-N60, 000 ()e. N61, 000- N80, 000( ) (f) N81, 000-N100, 000 () g. N100, 000 and above ( )

# Section B: The Amnesty Program and the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and Militancy

1. What is your understanding of Amnesty?

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1. How did you hear about the amnesty program? A. Interpersonal communication ( ) b.TV/Radio news ( ) c. News Paper ( ) d. Through the militia gang leader ( ) e. Through the Internet ( )
2. Why did you accept the amnesty offer?

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1. Is the amnesty Program meeting your issues? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
2. To what extend does the Amnesty Program address your issues? A. Amnesty addresses our issues very well ( ) b. Amnesty fairly addresses our issues ( ) c. Amnesty does not address any demand at all ( ) d. Do not know ( )
3. Have you been fully Demobilized, Rehabilitated and Reintegrated? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
4. Did you face any challenges during the whole process of Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
5. If yes, can you tell us how?

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# Section C: Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants in Comparison to their former Militant status

1. Why did you join the militia?

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1. Employment status **before** joining the militia. A. Employed ( ) b. Unemployed ( )
2. Have you been fully trained for a job as part of the amnesty program? A. Yes ( ) b. No (

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1. If yes, what kind of job training did you receive?

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1. Where were you trained?

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1. For how long did your training last? A. One month or less ( ) b. 2-3 months ( ) c. 4-5 months ( )

d. 6 months and above ( )

1. Please indicate the quality level and standard of the training you received. A. High ( )b. Moderate ( )

c. Low ( ).

1. What is your current employment status now? A. Employed ( ) b. Unemployed ( )
2. If currently employed, state what sector of the economy please. A. Transport/Logistics (

) b. Oil and Gas ( ) c. Maritime ( ) d. Crane Operations ( ) e. Business ( ) f. Fire/Health and Safety ( )

g. Welding ( )

1. Are you currently employed in the area of your training? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
2. What was your living condition **before** joining the militia? A. Very good ( ) b. Good ( )

c. Fair ( )

d. Bad ( ) e. Very bad ( )

1. What was your Living condition like **in** the militia? A. Very good ( ) b. Good ( ) c. Fair ( ) d. Bad ( ) e. Very bad ( )
2. What is your Living condition **after** the amnesty offer? A. Very good ( ) b. Good ( ) c. Fair ( ) d. Bad ( ) e. Very bad ( ).
3. Average monthly income **in** the militia? a. I don‘t know ( ) b. Below N20, 000 ( ) c. N21, 000-N40, 000 ( ) d. N41, 000-N60, 000 ( ) e. N61, 000-N80, 000 ( ) (f) N81, 000- N100, 000 ( ) g. N100, 000 and above ( )
4. Average monthly income **after** the amnesty offer (NOW)? a. Below N50,000 ( ) b. N51,000-N100,000 ( ) c. N101,000- N150, 000 ( ) d. N151, 000-N200, 000 ( ) e. N201, 000 and above ( )
5. How often did you have to go without the following **basic essential needs** in the militia gang hideout?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **S/N** | **Basic essential Needs** | **Always** | **Many**  **times** | **Occasionally** | **Never** |
| a | Good and enough food to  eat |  |  |  |  |
| b | Good Medical Treatment |  |  |  |  |
| c | Good housing/Shelter |  |  |  |  |

1. Did your community know you as a militant? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
2. Was your community in support of your activities as militant? A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )

# Section D: Prospects of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful resolution of Militancy in The Niger-Delta and its Implications to the emergence other forms of Insurgences in Nigeria.

1. Do you in your opinion think that the Amnesty was the best policy to end militancy in the Niger Delta? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
2. What are the prospects that the Amnesty will lead to lasting peace in the Niger Delta? a. A very good Prospect ( ) b. Neutral on its prospect ( ) c. No prospect at all ( )
3. Please indicate to what extend the following will lead to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **S/N** | **Suggested Areas of focus** | **Greater**  **Extend** | **Fairly** | **Not at all** |
| **a** | Provision of jobs for young people |  |  |  |
| **b** | Improvement of social amenities |  |  |  |
| **c** | Increased derivation/resource control |  |  |  |
| **d** | Addressing environmental pollution/needs |  |  |  |
| **e** | Grant more autonomy to regions/states/LGAs |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

1. Do you think that the Amnesty policy could have led to the emergence of other forms of militancy/insurgencies in other regions in Nigeria like the boko haram? a. Yes ( ) b. ( )
2. Please give reasons for your answer above.

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1. Are there any reason(s) that may push you back to the creeks? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
2. If yes, please state these reason(s).

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# Section E: The Implications of the omissions in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program with emphasis on the neglect of women and children

1. Do you think that the Amnesty program has some omissions or overlooked some important issues? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( ) c. I do not know ( ).
2. Who is/are the most affected group(s) in the Niger Delta Struggle? A. Women ( ) b. Children ( )

c. Youths ( ) d. All of the above ( ) e. Women and children only ( )

1. Is there any implication on the Omission of any of these groups (Women and Children)?

A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )

1. If yes, please mention the most important ones.

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Dear Respondent,

# APPENDIX K

**Questionnaire (Community Survey only) QUESTIONNAIRE**

# Community Survey

I am a Post Graduate student of the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. I am conducting a Study on **State Palliatives to Oil Bearing Communities (OBCs) of Nigeria’s Niger Delta; An Assessment of The Amnesty Program for Ex-Militants in The Niger- Delta**. Your candid responses will be appreciated and treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank You.

Aaron Jeb Dandodo

MSc/Soc-Sci/14422/2010-2011

**INSTRUCTION**: Please tick [√] option of your choice and provide us with your answers where required.

# Section A: Socio-Demographic Data

1. What is your age? a. 15-24yrs ( ) b. 25-34yrs ( ) c. 35-44yrs ( ) d. 45yrs and above (

)

1. What is your sex? A. Male ( ) B. Female ( )
2. What is your marital status? a. Single ( ) b. Married ( ) c. Divorced/Separated ( ) d. Widowed ( )
3. Do you have children? a. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
4. If yes, how many?

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1. What is your state of origin?

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1. What is the name of your community?

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1. What is your religious affiliation? A. Christianity ( ) b. Islam ( ) Traditional ( ) c. Others specify

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1. What is your highest level of educational attainment? A. No Formal Education ( ) b. Primary School ( ) c. Secondary School ( ) d. Tertiary Education ( ) e. Others please specify………………………………
2. What is your employment status? A. Unemployed ( ) b. Self-employed ( ) c. Civil servant ( )

d. Others Specify

………………………………………………………………………………………….

1. Please indicate your average monthly income. a. I don‘t know ( ) b. Below N20, 000 (

) c. N21, 000-N40, 000 ( ) d. N41, 000-N60, 000 ( ) e. N61, 000-N80, 000 () (f) N81, 000-N100, 000 ( )

g. N100, 000 and above ( )

# Section B: The Amnesty Program and the issues of the people of the Niger Delta and Militancy

1. Are you aware of the Amnesty Program? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
2. If yes, how did you hear about the amnesty program? A. Interpersonal communication ( ) b.TV/Radio news ( ) c. News Paper ( ) d. Through the militia gang leader ( ) e. Through the Internet ( )
3. What is your understanding of Amnesty?

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1. Who was the Amnesty Program targeted at?

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1. Why do you think the militants accepted the amnesty offer?

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1. Have you ever been involved in any form of agitation? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
2. Is the amnesty Program meeting your issues if any? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
3. To what extend does the Amnesty Program address your issues? A. Amnesty addresses our issues to a great extend ( ) b. Amnesty fairly addresses our issues ( ) c. Amnesty does not address any demand at all ( ) d. Do not know ( )
4. How often did you have to go without the following **basic essential needs** in your community?

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **S/N** | **Basic essential Needs** | **Always** | **Many times** | **Occasionally** | **Never** |
| a | Good and enough food to  eat |  |  |  |  |
| b | Good Medical Treatment |  |  |  |  |
| c | Good housing/Shelter |  |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| d | Clean water |  |  |  |  |
| e | Electricity |  |  |  |  |
| f | Education/ Schooling  facilities |  |  |  |  |
| g | Good/Safe Transport  System |  |  |  |  |

1. Have you ever had an encounter with militants? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
2. What is your personal opinion on militants? A. Negative ( ) b. Positive ( ) c. Neutral ( )
3. Do you approve of the methods used by the militants in their operations? A. Approve ( )

b. Do not Approve ( ) c. Neutral ( )

# Section C: Job Prospects of Trained Ex-Militants in Comparison to their former Militant status

1. Do you know of anyone who has accepted the amnesty offer in your community? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
2. If yes, do you think that their lives are better now compared to when they were still in the creeks?

A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )

1. Can you give reasons for your answer above?

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# Section D: Prospects of the Amnesty Program towards Peaceful resolution of Militancy in The Niger-Delta and its Implications to the emergence other forms of Insurgences in Nigeria

1. Do you in your opinion think that the Amnesty was the best policy to end militancy in the Niger Delta? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
2. What are the prospects that the Amnesty will lead to lasting peace in the Niger Delta? a. A very good Prospect ( ) b. Neutral on its prospects ( ) c. No prospect at all ( )
3. Please indicate to what extend the following will lead to lasting peace in the post amnesty period in the Niger Delta.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **S/N** | **Suggested Areas of focus** | **Great extend** | **Fairly** | **Not at all** |
| **a** | Provision of jobs for young people |  |  |  |
| **b** | Improvement of social amenities |  |  |  |
| **c** | Increased derivation/resource control |  |  |  |
| **d** | Addressing environmental pollution/needs |  |  |  |
| **e** | Grant more autonomy to  regions/states/LGAs |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

1. Do you think that the Amnesty policy could have led to the emergence of other forms of militancy/insurgencies in other regions in Nigeria like the boko haram? a. Yes ( ) b. No (

)

1. Please give reasons for your answer above.

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# Section E: The Implications of the Omissions in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program with emphasis on the neglect of women and children

1. Do you think that the Amnesty program has some omissions or overlooked some important issues like women and children? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( ) c. I do not know ( ).
2. Who are the most affect group(s) in the Niger Delta Struggle? A. Men ( ) b. Women ( )

c. Children ( ) d. Youths ( ) e. all of the above ( ) f. Women and children only ( )

1. Is there any implication on the Omission of any of these groups in the amnesty program (Women and Children)? A. Yes ( ) b. No ( )
2. If yes please mention the most important ones.

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APPENDIX L

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Sir/Madam,

Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Main-Campus, Samaru-Zaria. Kaduna State, Nigeria.

# 08182575335, 07031536898

[St.aaron26@gmail.com](mailto:St.aaron26@gmail.com) 16th November, 2015.

# INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A GROUP DISCUSSION

I write to inform you of your selection to be a part of a Focus Group Discussion (FGD), on the Amnesty Program in the Niger Delta.

I am an MSc research student from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria; conducting my field work on the ongoing **Amnesty Program in the Niger Delta**. The Purpose of the group study is to elicit group opinions on the Amnesty Program so far and the future of peace building in the Niger Delta.

The information learned therein will be used for academic purposes only. You can choose whether or not to participate in the focus group. Although the focus group will be tape recorded, your responses will remain anonymous and no names will be mentioned in the report. There are no right or wrong answers to the focus group questions. We want to hear many different viewpoints and would like to hear from everyone. We hope you can be honest even when your responses may not be in agreement with the rest of the group. The FGD will consist of between 8-12 members and will be held as follows:

# Date: Time: Venue:


This is an academic work and we will therefore ensure that your views are treated with outmost confidentiality. **(Feel free to call or text me using any of the numbers above).**

Thank you in anticipation and best regards. Yours faithfully,

Aaron Jeb Dandodo

MSc/Soc-Scien/14422/2010-11

# APPENDIX L


**Letter of Introduction Presidential Amnesty Office-Abuja**

# APPEDNIX M


**Consent Letter to Conduct an Interview**

# APPENDIX N

**Letter to Conduct an Interview (IDI)**



# APPENDIX O

**Letter of Introduction Department of Sociology ABU-Zaria**

# APPENDIX P

**Chi Square Critical Table**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **α =0.995** | **0.99** | **0.975** | **0.95** | **0.9** | **0.1** | **0.05** | **0.025** | **0.01** | **0.005** |
| **df =1** | --- | --- | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.016 | 2.706 | **3.841** | 5.024 | 6.635 | 7.879 |
| **2** | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.051 | 0.103 | 0.211 | 4.605 | **5.991** | 7.378 | 9.21 | 10.597 |
| **3** | 0.072 | 0.115 | 0.216 | 0.352 | 0.584 | 6.251 | **7.815** | 9.348 | 11.345 | 12.838 |
| **4** | 0.207 | 0.297 | 0.484 | 0.711 | 1.064 | 7.779 | **9.488** | 11.143 | 13.277 | 14.86 |
| **5** | 0.412 | 0.554 | 0.831 | 1.145 | 1.61 | 9.236 | **11.07** | 12.833 | 15.086 | 16.75 |
| **6** | 0.676 | 0.872 | 1.237 | 1.635 | 2.204 | 10.645 | **12.592** | 14.449 | 16.812 | 18.548 |
| **7** | 0.989 | 1.239 | 1.69 | 2.167 | 2.833 | 12.017 | **14.067** | 16.013 | 18.475 | 20.278 |
| **8** | 1.344 | 1.646 | 2.18 | 2.733 | 3.49 | 13.362 | **15.507** | 17.535 | 20.09 | 21.955 |
| **9** | 1.735 | 2.088 | 2.7 | 3.325 | 4.168 | 14.684 | **16.919** | 19.023 | 21.666 | 23.589 |
| **10** | 2.156 | 2.558 | 3.247 | 3.94 | 4.865 | 15.987 | **18.307** | 20.483 | 23.209 | 25.188 |
| **11** | 2.603 | 3.053 | 3.816 | 4.575 | 5.578 | 17.275 | **19.675** | 21.92 | 24.725 | 26.757 |
| **12** | 3.074 | 3.571 | 4.404 | 5.226 | 6.304 | 18.549 | **21.026** | 23.337 | 26.217 | 28.3 |
| **13** | 3.565 | 4.107 | 5.009 | 5.892 | 7.042 | 19.812 | **22.362** | 24.736 | 27.688 | 29.819 |
| **14** | 4.075 | 4.66 | 5.629 | 6.571 | 7.79 | 21.064 | **23.685** | 26.119 | 29.141 | 31.319 |
| **15** | 4.601 | 5.229 | 6.262 | 7.261 | 8.547 | 22.307 | **24.996** | 27.488 | 30.578 | 32.801 |
| **16** | 5.142 | 5.812 | 6.908 | 7.962 | 9.312 | 23.542 | **26.296** | 28.845 | 32 | 34.267 |
| **17** | 5.697 | 6.408 | 7.564 | 8.672 | 10.085 | 24.769 | **27.587** | 30.191 | 33.409 | 35.718 |
| **18** | 6.265 | 7.015 | 8.231 | 9.39 | 10.865 | 25.989 | **28.869** | 31.526 | 34.805 | 37.156 |
| **19** | 6.844 | 7.633 | 8.907 | 10.117 | 11.651 | 27.204 | **30.144** | 32.852 | 36.191 | 38.582 |
| **20** | 7.434 | 8.26 | 9.591 | 10.851 | 12.443 | 28.412 | **31.41** | 34.17 | 37.566 | 39.997 |
| **21** | 8.034 | 8.897 | 10.283 | 11.591 | 13.24 | 29.615 | **32.671** | 35.479 | 38.932 | 41.401 |
| **22** | 8.643 | 9.542 | 10.982 | 12.338 | 14.041 | 30.813 | **33.924** | 36.781 | 40.289 | 42.796 |
| **23** | 9.26 | 10.196 | 11.689 | 13.091 | 14.848 | 32.007 | **35.172** | 38.076 | 41.638 | 44.181 |
| **24** | 9.886 | 10.856 | 12.401 | 13.848 | 15.659 | 33.196 | **36.415** | 39.364 | 42.98 | 45.559 |
| **25** | 10.52 | 11.524 | 13.12 | 14.611 | 16.473 | 34.382 | **37.652** | 40.646 | 44.314 | 46.928 |
| **26** | 11.16 | 12.198 | 13.844 | 15.379 | 17.292 | 35.563 | **38.885** | 41.923 | 45.642 | 48.29 |
| **27** | 11.808 | 12.879 | 14.573 | 16.151 | 18.114 | 36.741 | **40.113** | 43.195 | 46.963 | 49.645 |
| **28** | 12.461 | 13.565 | 15.308 | 16.928 | 18.939 | 37.916 | **41.337** | 44.461 | 48.278 | 50.993 |
| **29** | 13.121 | 14.256 | 16.047 | 17.708 | 19.768 | 39.087 | **42.557** | 45.722 | 49.588 | 52.336 |
| **30** | 13.787 | 14.953 | 16.791 | 18.493 | 20.599 | 40.256 | **43.773** | 46.979 | 50.892 | 53.672 |
| **40** | 20.707 | 22.164 | 24.433 | 26.509 | 29.051 | 51.805 | **55.758** | 59.342 | 63.691 | 66.766 |
| **50** | 27.991 | 29.707 | 32.357 | 34.764 | 37.689 | 63.167 | **67.505** | 71.42 | 76.154 | 79.49 |
| **60** | 35.534 | 37.485 | 40.482 | 43.188 | 46.459 | 74.397 | **79.082** | 83.298 | 88.379 | 91.952 |
| **70** | 43.275 | 45.442 | 48.758 | 51.739 | 55.329 | 85.527 | **90.531** | 95.023 | 100.425 | 104.215 |
| **80** | 51.172 | 53.54 | 57.153 | 60.391 | 64.278 | 96.578 | **101.879** | 106.629 | 112.329 | 116.321 |
| **90** | 59.196 | 61.754 | 65.647 | 69.126 | 73.291 | 107.565 | **113.145** | 118.136 | 124.116 | 128.299 |
| **100** | 67.328 | 70.065 | 74.222 | 77.929 | 82.358 | 118.498 | **124.342** | 129.561 | 135.807 | 140.169 |