**AN ANALYSIS OF THE COVERAGE OF BLASPHEMOUS INCIDENTS IN *DAILY TRUST* AND *THE PUNCH* NEWSPAPERS**

**BY**

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**DEPARTMENT OF MASS COMMUNICATION FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY,**

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**APRIL, 2018**

# DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this Dissertation titled**AN ANALYSIS OF THE COVERAGE OF BLASPHEMOUS INCIDENTS IN*DAILY TRUST*AND *THE PUNCH***

**NEWSPAPERS**was carried out by me in the Department of Mass Communication, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and in the list of references provided. No any part of this dissertation was previously presented for another degree in this or any other Institution.

# ABUBAKAR ALHAJI BUKAR Date P14SSMM8001

**CERTIFICATION**

This Dissertation entitled**AN ANALYSIS OF THE COVERAGE OF BLASPHEMOUS INCIDENTS IN*DAILY TRUST*AND *THE PUNCH***

**NEWSPAPERS**by **ABUBAKAR ALHAJI BUKAR** meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Science (M. Sc) in Mass Communication of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and it is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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# DEDICATION

*to Mummy*

*for being there always, unconditionally &*

*Daddy*

*for unending goodwill & to*

*Wifey*

*for patiently bearing the odds of this course including solitary confinement and abrupt journeys &*

*Baby too*

*yet to fathom this abiku-like daddy*

# ABSTRACT

Conflicts precipitated by religious discords or under such pretext, have resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and destruction of property worth billions of dollar in Nigeria, brewing mutual suspicion among its heterogeneous citizens, shipwrecking, ultimately, their cordial coexistence and progress in most facets of life. In all this, the media is a stakeholder whether as a promoter of peace or exacerbater of tension and division. This research therefore explored 306 editions of *Daily Trust* and The Punch newspapers to ascertain how these national dailies are responding to peace journalism and its antithesis in their approaches, diction and overall coverage of blasphemy controversies in the country. Using quantitative content analysis, census, framing and agenda-setting as methodological and theoretical frameworks, the study found that, generally, these newspapers framed their stories more in line with peace journalism enunciated by Galtung and other scholars emphasizing on condemnation and solutions (66.0%); de- emphasizing ethnic, religious and elite-oriented frames (33.9%)which are war journalism indicators potential of exacerbating violent conflict. In this bid also, certain genres (pictures of victims and cartoons) were completely muted for their sensitivity and combustibility respectively. The absence of invisible effects and people-oriented frames in both papers, on the other hand, coupled with the preponderance of war lexical indicators especially in The Punch, triggers the need for conscious training on conflict-sensitive journalism in Nigerian Press. Specifically, *Daily Trust* distinguished itself with more peace-oriented frames (57.1%), less war frames (22.2%) and war language indicators (11.2%) compared to The Punch which has higher war frames (77.8%), war language (88.7%) and lesser peace-oriented frames (42.9 %). This is arguably associated to professional, geographic and political-economic factors. The research finally recommended that for blasphemy conflict with its attendant violence to be pre-empted, Nigerian journalists covering ethno-religious crises need to be conscientized on the tenets of peace journalism, and massive campaign via particularly radio, pulpits, movies and maulid avenues needed to be conducted to sensitize the northern populace about the divergent Islamic views on the ruling of blasphemy and how to react appropriately in the face of it, inter alia.

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# GENERAL INTRODUCTION

# BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The idea of freedom, right and liberty has been appealing to human psyche since time immemorial and forms the cornerstone of several debates and emotion-laden controversies. John Locke posits that even in the state of nature where individuals were on their own rather than acting collectively as members of a society, there was right to life and own property (Appadorai, 1974). However, the modern conception of human right and its coherent theoretical framework is traceable to the Enlightenment era in Britain, France and the United States (between the second half of the 17th century to the 18th) which, with vehemence, advocated for a form of representative government that would respect and protect citizens‟ rights; radically questioned traditional thoughts and practices such as superstition and religious beliefs, challenged religious intolerance; feudal caprices and consequently ushered in the Age of Reason, science and rationality with attendant freedom of opinion and expression. This ultimately resulted in both French and American revolutions. The era produced such notable personalities as John Locke, John Milton, Francis Bacon, J.J. Rousseau, Voltaire, Immanuel Kant, Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill and of course Edmund Burke, who according to McQuail (2005), gave media the Fourth Estate title - equating its functions to the three other branches of government (Sunny Levin Institute,2015, Munday and Chandler, 2011, Habib, 2005).

Freedom of expression belongs to the political-civil right typology of human rights which is largely concerned with freedom of thoughts, conscience, association and political participation, equality before the law etc and prohibition of torture, slavery, arbitrary arrest, marginalization on account of sex, race, region, religion etc, inter alia (Sunny Levin Institute, 2015).

These rights have been universalized with constitutional provisions,declarations, charters, covenants and conventions recognizing them for the protection of human dignity and effective workings of democracy nationally, regionally and globally. Besides, several civil societies have emerged to monitor the implementation of these rights; blowing whistle against their violation so that contemporary Socrates, Prynns and Galileos would not lose their lives on account of unorthodox opinions and expressions (Okoye, 2007, Bumstead,1997). But the idea of absolute freedom is bogus and utopian as no society in human history has ever guaranteed it (Hedges 2015, Triggs 2014, Moore 2013, Appadorai, 1976). More often than not, mechanisms are put in place by the authorities to check the excesses in exerting one‟s freedom. Thus censorship became the bane of liberal thinkers from the time of the ancient Greek philosophers to the modern. Socrates was, for example, executed for allegedly indoctrinating Athens‟ youths with dangerous ideas; William Prynn had his ears lopped in addition to life imprisonment for writing a scathing criticism against the Queen in 1637. In the same vein, the famous scientist, Galileo, was „mildly‟ put under house arrest till death overtook him for averring that it is the earth that rotates around the sun rather than other way round. Moreover, during the Inquisition, not quite a few authors and their works were burnt at stake for alleged heresy and blasphemy (Bumstead, 1992, Okoye, 2007). The travails of such writers during Inquisition, and of printers in the 18th century Europe and America, has been exhaustively discussed in Okpoko (2014); Pember and Calvert (2008).

According to Adamu (2006), Plato was the first person on record to advocate censorship. Ever since blasphemy, heresy, sedition, defamation, public taste and order, inter alia, are frequently invoked as reason d‟état to curtail the latitude of freedom. Invariably, these have been the trigger of serious debates among stakeholders from 1644 when Milton wrote *Areopagitica* to date, and will arguably continue thus because these are primarily axiological issues with no definite scientific criterion.

However, modern societies vary in degree of flexibility with regard to toleration of blasphemy. While most Asian and Middle Eastern countries like Malaysia, Egypt and Pakistan are dead serious about it, Western countries in both Europe and America treat it with laxity (Kamali, 2010). This is precipitated by the divergent and often conflicting views and perspectives about what constitute freedom of expression, resulting ultimately in spades of actions and reactions that are negative, violent, suspicious and inimical to the peaceful, trustful and cordial correlation among global citizens. For example, there was the trail-blazing saga that turned out to be popularly known as Rushdie Affair featuring at the center the British-bred Indian novelist, Salman Rushdie, who published *Satanic Verses* in 1988 – a convoluted, magical-surrealistic novel which satirizes the personality of prophet Muhammad, casts aspersion on the integrity of angel Gabriel and the household of Muhammad (s.a.w.). In no time the then Iranian spiritual leader, Ayatullah Khomeini, issued a fatwa that Muslims everywhere were duty bound to kill Rushdie for desecration of that sacred personality. This attracted a lot of controversies even among Muslim scholars on the validity or otherwise of the verdict (Kamali, 2010). Consequently, the book was banned in most Muslim countries; the Japanese and Italian translators of the novel were stabbed to death respectively, and Rushdie himself had to go underground.

Similarly, when in September 2005 a Danish newspaper *Jyllands Posten* published some blasphemous cartoons in series as exercise of freedom of expression (and latter German *Die Welt* and Norwegian *Magazinet*, among others, republished them), the reaction was more serious – riots echoed all over Muslim countries, ambassadors to Denmark were recalled and boycotts followed. In Nigeria, for example, the protest turned into a sectarian crisis between the two regions of the country leaving over hundred dead and places of worship (both mosques and churches) damaged. Press coverage of the crisis, according to Okunna and Omenugha (2006), is too sour to the spirit of peace journalism and the country‟s quest for national cohesion. Prior to this there was Miss World Beauty Pageant

saga in Nigeria involving *Thisday*‟s columnist, Isioma Daniel, who in 2002, provacatively wrote that Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) would probably have chosen from the swinging damsels when some concerned Muslims objected to hosting the contest in Abuja during Ramadan.

Furthermore, when recently (January, 2015), *Charlie Hebdo,* a French satirical magazine, drew irreverent cartoons about the Prophet of Islam, some individuals identified as Muslim terrorists sieged the publication‟s office and shot to death 12 staff members including the publishing director and several prominent cartoonists. Not only that, there were series of protests in some Muslim countries (with the one of Niger Republic turning violent) in reaction to the publication.

However, „this‟, says Professor Sturges (2006:6)

is certainly not confined to the Muslim community. There was comparatively enormous volume of Christian protests at the TV transmission of *Jerry Springer: The Opera,* in which there was a comic and disrespectful portrayal of Christ. The protests included death threats to the executives who approved the transmission. Street protests by the members of Sikh community in Birmingham at the performance of the play *Behzti* (which has scenes portraying criminal behaviour taking place in a gurdwara) reached such levels that further performances were cancelled because of the risk of harm to people and property.

Furthermore, Dan Brown‟s *Davinci Code* (a novel which questioned the purity of the present day Bible, insinuated Christ had a child with Mary Magdalene and offered unorthodox view about The Grail, among other things) received as expected, negative reactions from Christian faithfuls and was consequently banned in their communities. There was also *The Last Temptation of Christ* and the *Vision of Ecstasy* movies which since 1988 have been triggering protests, attacks on theatres and official ban „for showing Jesus being seduced on the cross‟ (Evans, 2012); the protest spurred by the rumour of *The Gay Jesus* film forthcoming based on a play called *Corpus Christi* (Huffington Post, 2012, Dec. 26) et c.

Blasphemy attacks the values that people hold dear and are not ready to tolerate any attacks on them. For Mass Communication students and scholars, blasphemy is important

as a source of material for news, analysis and commentary. But beyond that it brings to the public arena people‟s differences particularly on issues bordering on their identity – ethnic, religious, professional, social standing et c. Blasphemous acts are not just newsworthy, they also pose questions on the limits of freedom of expression. How the media handles blasphemous acts and statements could therefore have consequences on peace and peaceful coexistence especially in a heterogeneous and volatile state like Nigeria.

From Achebe‟s (2012) *There Was A Country,* Adichie‟s (2007) *Half of a Yellow Sun* and other readings on Biafran war, one can deduce that the Igbos of Eastern Nigeria feel marginalized from the political schemes of things in the country. This is practically manifested in the recurring separatist protests by MASSOB (Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra) and IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra). The cases of „blasphemy‟, therefore, which significantly involve the Igbos (Okunna & Omenugha, 2006) as alleged perpetrators and subsequent victims of violent reprisal (Gideon Akaluka, Methodus Emmanuel, Bridget Abahime et c) adds fuel to the flame of tension which if not contended and nipped at embryonic stage, may escalate to another web of violent conflict between particularly the Hausa and Fulani of the North and the Igbos of the South as evident in the aftermath of Danish cartoon crisis (Okunna & Omenugha, 2006).

Based in the nation‟s capital, Abuja, *Daily Trust* is the largest circulating newspaper in the northern part of the country and one of the top 7 national dailies which debuted in January 2001. It is one of the several titles published by Media Trust Limited, a private company which started *Weekly Trust* in March 1998 as a precursor to the daily title, community- based titles (*Kano Chronicles* and *Aminiya*), and pan-African magazine (*Kilamanjaro*), among others. The company‟s website archive describes them as „profit-driven and general interest‟ publications oscillating between libertarian ideals and social responsibility;

thriving on the professional strength of its board of directors and editorial team whose chair, Kabiru Yusuf, was an academic, former BBC correspondent, and editor of *Daily Triumph, Today* and *Citizen* magazine. From its reach, content (including adverts), directors and workers, one cannot fail to sniff its northern undertone despite claim to national outlook.

Like the Media Trust, Punch Limited also came into being as a profit-making publishing company in 1965. It was principally intended to improve the economic lot of the proprietors, workers and ultimately the nation at large, in addition to the triadic functions of journalism: information, education and entertainment. It commenced publication in 1971 with the *Home* magazine, and debuted *Sunday Punch* and *The Punch* (daily) in March 1973 and November 1976 respectively. Owned by James Aboderin and Sam Amuka (before they parted ways), *The Punch* began as a soft, popular tabloid based in Lagos, before venturing into socio-political commentaries in 1980s. This opened a vista of confrontation with the successive military regimes which attempted intermittently to gag it by shutting down the company and detaining its editors. Today *The Punch* is one of the largest circulating national dailies from the South boasting a readership of 80,000. From its founders, editors, workers, content and location, one can feel its diametricality with the *Trust* titles(Aliagan, 2015, https:/[/www](http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/).[dailytrust.com.ng>](http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/)aboutus[www.punchng.com/aboutus#mission](http://www.punchng.com/aboutus#mission) ).

# STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Blasphemy has arguably proven to be a major source of tension encumbering peace from reigning among different people, locally and internationally. In Northern Nigeria, so many people have lost their lives in blasphemy controversies from 1994 when a certain Igbo trader, Gideon Akaluka, was hacked to death for alleged desecration of the Qur‟an; to 2002 when *Thisday’s*Iseoma Daniel made irreverent characterization of Prophet

Muhammad resulting ultimately to the violent reprisal that claimed over two hundred lives, down to 2016 when similar cases recurred more than ever before in Kano, Zamfara and Niger states of Northern Nigeria (Anekwe 2002, Isaac & Bucher 2002, Ehikioya & Alabelewe 2016, Soniyi 2016).

There wasalso Danish cartoons‟ uproar ignited by *Jyllands Posten, Magazinet, Die Welt* and other publications in 2006 and the case of *Charlie Hebdo*‟s cartoons (one of which featured the prophet of Islam naked) in 2015. All of these sparked the fury not only of the marginal Muslim extremists and terrorists but also of the mainstream Muslims, resulting in street protests and flags burning, economic sanctions, disruption of diplomatic ties, destruction of property, prosecution and the wanton killing of the cartoonists (in the case of *Charlie Hebdo*) by ISIS terrorists.According to Okunna and Omenugha (2006), Nigeria was nearly plunged into inter-regional conflict as a result of the Danish cartoons‟ reactions and counter-reactions.

All these cases are pointers to the fact that the modern world is in turmoil as far as values are concerned; blasphemy and freedom of expression are at the center of this quagmire – which suggests the urgency to investigate media‟s framing whether in line with peace journalism advocated by Galtung and others or not. This isparticularly necessary considering the dearth of empirical literature on the subject-matter in the area: northern Nigeria.

# AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

Generally, the study aims at ascertaining how Nigerian dailies contribute to peace building in theirframing of incidents of „blasphemy‟ in northern Nigeria. Hence it will be guided by the following objectives:

* + 1. To examine the extent of coverage given to incidents of blasphemy in *Daily Trust*and *Punch*newspapers
    2. To compare the framing of incidents of blasphemy stories in *Daily Trust*and *The Punch*newspapers
    3. To justify whether the dominant frames in *Daily Trust*and *Punch* are consistent with Galtung‟s thesis of peace journalism
    4. To analyse the occurrence of war language in *Daily Trust*and *Punch* newspapers in the coverage of blasphemy controversies in northern Nigeria

# RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In line with the above objectives, the following research questions were formulated:

1. What is the extent ofthe coverageof incidents of blasphemy in *Daily Trust*and *Punch* newspapers compare?
2. What are the similarities and differences in the nature of framing blasphemy controversies between *Daily Trust*and *Punch* newspapers?
3. How compatible are the dominant frames used by *Daily Trust* and *Punch*

newspapers with Galtung‟s thesis of peace journalism?

1. How comparable are*Daily Trust*and *Punch* newspapers in terms of the war language indicators used?

# SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The field of Peace Journalism is just developing (Ozohu-Suleiman, 2013, Raza, Jan, Sultan & Aziz 2012, Irvan 2006), hence this humble contribution will add to the corpus of literature brought forth by the trail-blazer in the area, Johann Galtung, and other contributors such as Lynch, McGoldrick and Majid Tehranian. On theother hand, cases of blasphemy in Nigeria, especially the ones in question, have never been subjected to

empirical researches as my humble investigation revealed. Actually, there are only two conference papers (Adamu‟s forthcoming *Blasphemy from Below…* and Gwandu‟s (2015) *Glocalizing Blasphemy Debate:…*) on the subject-matter. This paucity, therefore, spurred the necessity and significance of this research to literature.

Moreover, media professionals will benefit from recognizing framing that could hurt sensitivities and leads to violence. It will, in other words, help in stirring up professional caution and enhance skill for sensitivity to diversity – peace journalism.

In this volatile World that is already enmeshed in protracted conflicts and terrorist attacks from Syria to Somalia; from Libya to Nigeria to America; from France to Afghanistan to Palestine and Belgium – everybody seemingly feels vulnerable even in the remotest cocoon, hence worried about the future of World peace. In this, the media is a major stakeholder whether as a promoter of peace through conflict-sensitive and socially responsible journalism, or exacerbater of conflict via crass journalism that warrants blasphemy. So any research undertaking that seeks to ascertain the role of media in conflict with a view to finding lasting solutions will no doubt be beneficial to humanity.

# SCOPE AND LIMITATION

The scope of the study is limited to blasphemy among other constraints to freedom of expression, as it is covered in the two selected national dailies (*Daily Trust* and *Punch* newspapers) from May-September, 2016. The cases considered emanated from Northern Nigeria, all – from Bridget‟s case in Kano to Methodus‟ in Niger down to Abdu Gusau Polytechnic incident in Zamfara state.

Its implications on the peace, security and the social intercourse among different cultural/religious groups, locally and globally, were equally considered. Thus, Islam and Christianity as affected by the phenomenon under investigation were the chief concern of


the researcher as all religions could not be brought onboard because of the duration allotted to the research.

Moreover, both article 19 of the United Nation‟s *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948) and MacBride *et al* (1980)‟s report posit that freedom of expression encompasses not only the right to opinion and its expression, but also freedom of information. But freedom toseek, receive and impart information especially from official sources is another burgeoning battleground attracting political and scholarly attention which therefore needs to be handled independently(GCFE,2000, Malemi, 2009, Dimba, 2011, Joseph, 2011, Sendugwa, 2011).

The choice of these newspapers is informed by the fact that they are national dailies available in the major cities and towns of the country and widely patronized by Nigerians of different social status. Most importantly, *Daily Trust*and*The Punch* are to my knowledge, the only two among the top 7 national dailies that make public their strong ethical commitment of ensuring proper conduct among their reporters particularly with regard to gratification through *No, thank you* and *Ethical Complaints?* policies respectively. So it will be interesting to compare the extent of this commitment especially in conflict coverage.

However, because of their ownership and readership, Nigerian media arguably stoop to ethnocentrism, regionalism and religionism for economic expediency (Aliagan, 2015,Okunna & Omenugha, 2006, Kukah, 1993) in particularly issues of controversy such as blasphemy. It will equally be interesting to compare how these affiliations reflect in the framing of the issue at stake, *inter alia*. Butfindings from these two newspapers are limited to the content and cannot be used to generalize on over a dozen local and national dailies.

# A Map of Nigeria Indicating the States where the Incidents of Blasphemy Occurred



**Source:** [**www.world.gazetter.com**](http://www.world.gazetter.com/)

# DEFINITION OF RELEVANT TERMS

**Blasphemy:** in this research is viewed from the perspective of those who believe in the existence of God and the sacredness of the divine – basically from the viewpoint of two Abrahamic religions: Islam and Christianity. For this purpose, it is defined as an intentionally disparaging remark or act against God, His prophets, Holy Book or anything considered sacred by the followers of these organized religions which ultimately offend their religious sensibilities.

**Freedom of Expression:** the right to say openly what one thinks or feels about any given issue whether in speech, writing or other forms such as paintings, signs, arts etc. It is often interchangeably used with freedom of speech in literature (although the former is broader) and hardly divorced from freedom of the press, assembly and worship in discourses. It is

manifested not only in mediated communication, but also in interpersonal and symbolic communications.

**Peace-Oriented Journalism:**the type that digs into the causes and effects of conflicts, proffers solutions, tones down ethno-religious differences and eschew stereotypes or cue to reprisal.

**War-Oriented Journalism:**the one that favours stereotype, pessimistic and sensational in tone, and alludes to reprisal or ethno-religious difference. It also prioritizes elite as sources of information; peripheral in nature as it focuses on visible effects of conflict such as casualties and property damaged at the expense of invisible ones (e.g fear, trauma et c.); often constricted in time and space as it narrows conflict to two parties and quickly moves away from the scene when violence stops.

**Extent of Coverage:** refers to the frequency, placement and the story type (s) given priority.

**Framing:** in this context means how the stories dealing with blasphemy are slanted in the newspapers to suit the framework of peace/war journalism. It therefore involves inclusion, exclusion and emphasis on certain words, pictures and other graphics to drive home a point.

**Northern Nigeria:** although the north stretches geographically to the predominantly traditionalist and Christian communities in the Middle Belt (Kukah, 1993), the usage in this research concentrates on what is commonly called the „core north‟ or „the Muslim north‟ in the southern press. This primarily consists of northeastern and northwestern geopolitical groupings which have a tremendous influence of Islam as a result of historical antecedent – an influence which largely defines the perception and reaction to issues within and without.

# CHAPTER TWO

# LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

# INTRODUCTION

One cannot properly appreciate the nuances and intricacies of the issue at stake without solid grounding in such concepts as blasphemy per se, freedom, free speech, peace, conflict, violence and peace journalism in particular. Hence, in this section the researcher wishes to explore these concepts, empirical researches on media and conflicts, cases of blasphemy locally and internationally as its affects both Islam and Christianity and consequently the peaceful coexistence of peoples across the globe. Gap in literature will be identified and theoretical framework explained to justify the logical focus of this research.

# CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

# THE NUANCES OF BLASPHEMY

Blasphemy, according to Kamali (2010), derived from two Greek words: *blapto* (to harm) and *pheme* (speech). While Nitisor (2007) submitted *blasphemein*, the Greek word for

„evil-speaking‟ in her etymological exploration. The concept has been operationally problematic in all monotheistic faiths because of the difficulty in deciding its latitude. This is more so in Islam as a result of its broad treatment in the classical texts of jurisprudence which extends its scope to conterminous concepts such as disbelief (*kufr*), apostasy (*riddah*) and its political dimension (which somewhat sounds like sedition). However, its thematic preoccupation, according to Kamali (2010), substantially remains that of a “contemptuous and hostile attack on the fundamentals of the religion, which offends the sensibilities of its adherents” (p.213). The author further stresses that “words and acts must be explicitly hostile and offensive if they are to qualify as blasphemous” (p.217), arguing that although Christians call Christ God or the Son of God, and denied the prophethood

and messengership of Muhammad (s.a.w.), that cannot be considered as blasphemy as it springs from the fountain of their faith, without intention to offend or be injurious to others.

Aswad, Hussain and Suleman (2014) also see blasphemy as irreverent speech directed at God, scoffing the divine and being critical of religious beliefs to the extent of offending the sensibilities of the adherents. The same scholars cited US Oklahoma‟s statutes as saying „[b]lasphemy consists in wantonly uttering or publishing words, casting contumelious reproach or profane ridicule upon God, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Ghost, the Holy Scriptures or the Christian or any other religion‟.

According to Encyclopaedia of Religion cited in Kamali (2010), „in describing the Islamic concept of blasphemy, it is necessary to include not only insulting language directed to God, the Prophet or any other prophets of Allah, and the revelation, but also theological positions and even mystical aphorisms that have come under suspicion‟ (p.222). Regarding blasphemous mysticism from within Islam, Gwandu (2015) has explored such in the Hausa music of *Faira* followers (a deviant sect in *Tijjaniyya* Sufi order) of northern Nigeria where the singers (Jamilu Kofar Waika, Rabiu Umar Hotoro, Mustapha Mai Gausi et c) submitted that Sheikh Ibrahim Nyass, a Senegalese Sufi scholar born in 1900, “is the father of God” (p.9), he “created Jinns and mankind” (p.15), “begets not, giving birth to you is a pure lie” p15, “that Prophet‟s reign is over” (p.18),“…the creator of heaven and earth”(p.13) to cite but few excerpts from the songs. But in line with Kamali‟s (2010) argument, these can equally be lumped into the talon of *kufr* (disbelief) and *zandaqah* (heresy).

Blasphemy, says Nitisor (2007) „emerges as the underpinning of an impressive number of fictional and philosophical works such as John Donne‟s *Biathanatos* (posthumously printed in 1647 by Donne‟s son), Thomas Paine‟s *The Age of Reason* (1794-1796),

Ambrose Bierce‟s *The Devil’s Dictionary* (1911), Mikhail Bulgakov‟s *The Master and Margarita* (completed in 1940), Bertrand Russel‟s *Why I am not a Christian* (19574), Naguib Mahfouz‟ *Children of Gebelawi* (1959), Salman Rushdie‟s *The Satanic Verses* (1988), José Saramago‟s *The Gospel According to Jesus Christ* (1991), and Norman Mailer‟s *The Gospel According to the Son* (1997), to randomly name just a few‟. These become subject of scholarly discourse since the second half of the twentieth century over the boundary of art and religion, freedom of expression and respects for values (secular or religious) in the post- modern world. But long before Donne‟s, Socrates had dialogically analyzed and charged Homer of similar offence in Plato‟s (1997 trans.)*The Republic*.

The Punishment for blasphemy is another bone of contention in Islam. Unlike in the Bible (Leviticus 24:16), there is no explicit text in the Qur‟an or tradition of the Prophet regarding the nature of punishment that should be meted out to the blasphemer. Scholars and jurists are sharply divided between death penalty and *ta’zir* (deterrent punishment).Whereas such classical Muslim scholars as Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya and Qādi Iyād al-Yahsabi favoured the former which is seemingly the most popular (see Moore (2013) for erroneously sweeping generalization on this), contemporary ones (Ali 2015, Akyol 2015, Bhat 2014, Kutty 2014, Kamali 2010 and Khan n.d.) subscribed to the latter. For example, after reviewing all the cases in which apostates were dealt with during the Prophet (S.A.W.), Kamali (2010) found out that those who turned away from the faith and even defamed the Prophet on a number of occasions, were forgiven. While those who combined these with subversive activities that threatened the religious and political existence of the faith were executed. Similarly, after reviewing all the Qur‟anic verses (8:12-13, 9:63, 33:57-8, 58:5&20-21) relied upon by both Ibn Taymiyyah and QādiIyād,he concludes:

…Ibn Taymiyyah‟s categorical statement that killing the perpetrator of blasphemy is a Qur‟anic obligation was founded primarily on some Qur‟anic passages wherein God Most High has cursed those who vilify Him and His messenger (S.A.W.)…The tone and tenor of his analysis are dominantly speculative and it does not, with due respect to Ibn Taymiyyah‟s unquestionable erudition and piety, stand the test of accuracy which is normally observed by the commentators (*mufassirun*) on the Qur‟an. The Qur‟an has made no death penalty for blasphemy, and the text does not warrant the conclusion that it is a Qur‟anic obligation, or a prescribed punishment or a mandate… (thus) automatically falls under the category of *ta’zir* offences, whose punishment may be determined by the head of state or competent judicial authorities. There is ample evidence in the Qur‟an that pagan Arabs, the disbelievers, and the hypocrites insulted and offended the Noble Prophet (s.a.w.) on numerous occasions. Note, for example, the use of such insulting expression as

„possessed‟ (*majnun*), „soothsayer‟ (*kahin*), and „magician‟ or „sorcerer‟(*sahir*)… The Qur‟an usually gives the lie directly to these charges, and, on numerous occasions, instructs the Prophet (s.a.w) to exercise patience, sound reasoning and persuasion(pp 243- 244).

Kutty (2014) and Akyol (2015) too made similar conclusion as above, with the latter submitting Q. 4:140 as the crux of his argument, where God says „Already has He sent you in the Book, that when you hear the Message of Allah held in defiance and ridicule, you are not to sit with them unless they turn to a different theme: if you did, you would be like them…‟

In complement, Ali (2015) concentrated on hadith literature and concluded that the two oft-cited traditions in which the Prophet allegedly ordered that those who insulted him be killed are „unfounded and weak‟ (p.8). On the contrary, the Prophet forbade such a measure especially on non-Muslims who disparaged him, according to the highly esteemed source of hadith: al-Bukhari. However, it is the personal opinion of not only al- Bukhari but other classical scholars like Imam Abu Hanifa and Sufyan al-Thawri that it is wrong to execute anyone on a singular charge of blasphemy as that negates the overall spirit of Islam.

On the other hand, Akyol (2015) argues that there is something politically fishy about the Muslim world where blaspheming God (manifest in *Charlie Hebdo*) and indeed other prophets than Muhammad (s.a.w.) do not attract weighty reaction as does the caricaturing of the Last Messenger. Moore (2013), Kamali (2010) and Ramadan (2006) also draw attention to the propensity of manipulation by political elite in terms of widening its scope

or capitalizing on the controversy thereof to achieve a goal – a sort of temporalizing spiritual issues. On the other hand, the prevalence of blasphemy in Western media can also be a subterfuge of gauging (or according to Hedges (2015) a culturally neocolonial project of marginalizing, suppressing and oppressing) the ideological Other and extending secularism rather than the pretext of freedom of expression thrust on the world. This can be seen in what seems to be coincidence: the award of Nobel Prize to Naguib Mahfouz and the specific citation of his *Children of Gebelawi* in the same year (1988) that heralded Rushdie‟s *Satanic Verses* and *Last Temptation of Christ.* This I have humbly argued in greater detail in my forthcoming *Political Economy of Blasphemy.* That‟s by the way.

Whether the punishment for blasphemy is decidedly death or deterrent, or nil till hereafter (as Akyol opines), the bone of contention is: who said it should be meted out by you and I or any commoner on the street? How can one be a judge; jury and executioner in a case where one is a plaintiff? Of what repercussion are these mob lynching to the welfare of Muslims in Southern Nigeria, nay in the other parts of the world particularly the West? What socio-psychological forces are likely at work in the process of mob actions and altercation over blasphemy in Nigeria? These are addressed in the remainder of our dissertation.

Just as the jurists differ in their views and verdicts regarding the extent of blasphemy and the application of its law, so do the predominantly Muslim nations of the world. Countries like Turkey, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, United Arab Emirate and Bahrain practice *ta’zir* (deterrent) punishment, while Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Iran have life sentence/death penalties in their statutes. Although article 29 of the *United Nations Declarations of Human Rights* (1948) has stated limitations to freedom of expression „…for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the right and freedom of others and of the meeting the just requirement of morality, public order and

general welfare in a democratic society‟, and article 20 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966) strongly reprimanded against „any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence‟; coupled with blasphemy laws in several Western countries (Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark et c (Nitisor, 2007) as panacea to civil tension, application of these has been substantially dormant (only two prosecution in UK since 1923, and none in Spain and Denmark since 1938); in fact they are under the threat of repealing in some of these countries (Callamard, 2006).

Obviously, blasphemy laws were originally promulgated to serve as censure to absolute freedom of expression vis a vis defamation, national security, public taste and order, inter alia. In this way censorship reared to prominence curtailing not only the „excesses‟ of the printed words but also of motion picture (see Adamu (2005) for in-depth treatment of this point).

As the West struggles to expunge blasphemy bans and expand the scope of free speech across the globe, the East, nay The Rest, grapple in its clutches with the attendant clash of definitions over the fate of the defaulters – death, deterrent or zero punishment. In a world seeking breath from the embrace of countless conflicts, tolerance and mutual respect of our respective values will surely pave ways to peaceful coexistence that the space we inhabit direly needs but sadly lacks. From this prism, US‟ „cannot agree to disagree on blasphemy ban‟ argument of Aswad *et al* (2014) sounds intolerant, coercive and globalizational in tone which can obviously open a vista of confrontation with those countries that think and act contrarily. For, as Chinweizu, Jemie and Madubuike (1980) would argue, standards are culture-relative, hence the imposition of one‟s standard upon another only amounts to cultural imperialism. Persuasion, compromise and dialogue can therefore be more effective.

# FREEDOM AND FREE SPEECH

Generally, liberty, right and freedom are often synonymously and interchangeably used in literature. But since there are no complete synonyms, linguistically, Appadorai (1974)‟s review of *liberty* impresses the notion that it is broader than *freedom*. In other words, it is from the all-encompassing concept of *liberty* one gets the offshoot: *freedom,* and freedom of expression is a component of political liberty (one of the three divisions of liberty suggested by Laski in *A Grammar of Politics* and adopted by the author –with the other two being private liberty and economic liberty).

Freedom denotes the power to will and act upon what is willed without any external influence or restraint (Appadorai, 1974); which Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics (2003) tersely refers to as „absence of interference or impediment‟ (p.206). The absolutist aura ingrained in these definitions has never been enjoyed by mankind at any time in human history, not even in stateless societies. For, our quest and exertion of freedom as social animals stop at a particular territory – where others‟ rights to life, health, reputation et c are involved (Ogbondah, 2003, Reader‟s Digest, 1973). We have a duty to safeguard these rights not only of those in our propinquity, but those far removed from us – in other nations; across the globe (MacBride *et al*, 1980,Wollstonecraft,1792). Hence „freedom implies, paradoxically, the imposition of some limitation with a view to securing the equal freedom of all,…(Appadorai, 1974:68)‟. But radical rationalists view is contrarian to this stand. Philosophers like J.S. Mill, Milton and Laski forcefully maintain that man is a rational being; he knows what is right and what is wrong and thus capable of auto-critique and self-censorship. Hence, according to Ashrvatham and Misra (2006), nothing should be placed officially or otherwise to curtail his freedom even in times of unrest. It is in this vein jurists like Hugo Black gave a literal interpretation to the First Amendment, opining that „no law means no law‟. From this jurisprudential framework also emanates the

contemporary legal luminary, Evelyn Aswad, canvassing that all sorts of blasphemous views be protected and that the US government should not „agree to disagree on blasphemy laws‟ even in other lands for their impingement on freedom of expression and human rights as a whole. However, this is a minority position (Baran, 2009).

Freedom of expression on the other hand, is also called free speech or freedom of speech – which Chandler and Munday (2011:163) define as „the right of any person to express their ideas or views without the threat of official censure.‟ While reviewing Laski‟s position on this, Asirvatham and Misra offered a similar opinion with candour, that „all opinions, whether in the sphere of religion or morality, science or art, literature or politics, should be allowed to be expressed freely and no penalty should be inflicted…(p.341)‟. Moreover, in her *Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press*, Lichtenberg (2004) maintains that the agitation/clamour for free speech is premised on the desire to achieve two main goals, namely: „people (should) be able to communicate without interference, and that there be many people communicating, or at least many ideas and points of view being communicated (p. 176).‟ What she otherwise called noninterference and multiplicity of voices principles.

But Kamali (2010) being a professor of Law, appears ill at ease with these absolutist conclusions, arguing that „freedom operates within the limits of law… Whether one talks of freedom in Western laws, Chinese law or Islamic law, this must essentially means the ability of the individual to say or do what he or she wishes, or to avoid doing so, without violating the right of others, or the limit set by the law (p.7).‟ In his review of *Freedom of Speech Abridged?...,*Breindl (2009) reveals that none of the contributors has portrayed it as

„unlimited right (p.916)‟. Similarly, Socrates (in Plato‟s *Republic*,1997 trans.), vigorously expressed sentiment in favour of censoring content that children will particularly be exposed to for the ideal society they envisaged to materialize. For instance, he said to

Glaucon, „…our first duty will be to exercise a superintendence over the authors of fables, selecting their good productions and rejecting the bad…we must express our disapprobation if Homer or any other poet is guilty of such a foolish blunder about the gods… let not our mothers be persuaded by these poets into scaring their children by injudicious stories, telling them how certain gods go about by the night in the likeness of strangers…‟ (pp.61, 63 & 66). Thus any false and blasphemous material should not, according to them, be allowed to ventilate in public sphere – a limitation on the marketplace of ideas. Milton (1644) on the other hand, is a bit less severe in what needed to be censored, hence upbraided Plato for being stricter and utopian for suggesting that poets should first be okayed by the authorities before they read out their products in both public and private.

Figueroa (2012) specifies two types of regulations to freedom of expression: content- neutral and content-based regulations. The former focuses on the timing, place (e.g prison, military base, airport) and manner of expression rather than the message. While the latter concentrates on the substance in the content – whether it includes incitement to violence that can trigger such, obscenity, fighting words or not.

The most oft-cited defence and definition of freedom of expression is the assertion in article 19 of the United Nations‟ (1948) *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* which says „everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.‟

However, freedom of speech seems lexically narrower to that of expression which obviously covers not only speech, but writing and other forms of communication such as painting, signs, sculptures et c. Notwithstanding, they are interchangeably used in literature and hardly divorced from freedom of press and religion in discourses. In

practice, the exercise of this freedom is complemented by freedom of association and assembly to protest and seek redress of grievances (MacBride *et al*, 1980). Michel Foucault, the French philosopher, terms it „fearless speech‟ and did a series of lectures on it under the classical Greek concept of *parrhesia* (Neher & Sandhir, 2007).

# REFLECTION ON PEACE, VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT

Researches on crises management in human coexistence never fail to use (and sometimes overuse) concepts as conflict, violence and peace. Actually a whole discipline is now called Conflict Studies (Conflictology) which primarily aimed at exploring not only the causes and effects of conflicts, but their lasting solution for perpetual peace and progress. Due to their polysemous nature, these concepts lack universally accepted definitions despite their recurrence in social science researches.

Merriam Webster Dictionary, for example, gives layers of meaning with regard to

„conflict‟ ranging from disagreement as a result of incompatible goals, to competition for scarce resources, down to degeneration of these to „fight, battle (and) war‟. Contradiction and competitiveness are also the thrust of Galtung‟s (1996) conception. According to Spangler and Burges (in Mohammed, 2006:11), „conflict involves deep-rooted moral or value differences, high-stake distributional question, such as who dominates whom. Fundamental human psychological needs for identity, security and recognition are often at issue as well‟. Pruitt ( in Ozohu-Suleman, 2013:14) proposed what he deems as two fairly general definitions of conflict: „The first refers to “overt conflict” – an argument, fight or struggle. The second refers to “subjective conflict” – my perception that you and I have opposing beliefs and interests, or that you have deprived or annoyed me in some way‟. To this end Tjosvold (1993) in Bambale (2006) considers conflict as either cooperative or competitive.

These scholars also maintain that conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction and can be positive when properly managed as in the effort among coworkers to outshine one another. This may bring about maximum output through physical, mental and/or emotional exertion. However, what is dreadful about conflict is its devolution to violence.

Violence is often described as the use of brute force to inflict injury, cause death or damages to property. Mohammed (2006) considers it as a confrontation of forces inimical to human existence. For this reason, Galtung (2013a, 1990; 1969) differentiates three types of violence, namely: direct, structural and cultural.

Direct/personal violence involves interpersonal confrontation and destruction at which instance people get hurt, killed and property damaged. It is brought about using gun, machete, fist, bomb or any element of physical weaponry. This type of violence usually takes the form of simple sentence structure of subject-verb-object. In other words, the doer, the victim and the action are identifiable.

Structural violence, on the other hand, is manifest whence resources (material and nonmaterial e.g health service, education, water, power et c) are monopolized, diverted or unevenly distributed so much so that a vast majority of people are deprived hence left to wallow in abject poverty, preventable diseases, unemployment, illiteracy and other social deprivations. As result of this, they are incapacitated from meeting the basic needs of life and retarded from developing to their potentials. It is, in other words, a manifestation of social injustice occasioned by malfunctioning political and economic structures. Contrastively, Galtung (1969:171) asserts that „when one husband beat his wife there is a clear case of personal (direct) violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance there is structural violence‟. This also reminds one of Festus Iyayi‟s novel *Violence,* wherein the microcosmic protagonist, Idemudia, had to sell his blood on

one occasion to eat, and his wife, on a similar cruel twist, had to surrender to sexual exploitation/extortion in a bid to settle her husband medical bill.

Pate (2010:3) has starkly referred to this when he says, „Look at indicators like poverty index, infant and maternal mortality rates, illiteracy levels, access to social services (like water and electricity), corruption, fragility of institutions, unemployment, disease burden, gender inequity, poor governance et c. The statistics on all these are discomforting and look like numbers borrowed from an 18th century statistic book.‟ This resonates with a recent (September, 2017) United Nation Development Programme research entitled *Journey to Violent Extremism in Africa* which found that poor educational (inability to read or understand religious text) and economic background (poverty and unemployment) and social dislocation (unhappy childhood and perceived parental neglect) as prime factors facilitating youths‟ recruitment to violent extremist circles such as Boko Haram and Alshabaab. In other words, it is structural violence that gives birth to direct/physical one – a point beautifully reiterated by Malcolm X on the racially-infused shortchanged condition of black Americans and its attendant violent backlash. How media can help in curbing the menace of these vices is the thrust of Development Communication which ultimately presupposes its interrelation with Peace Journalism.

Both direct and structural forms of violence can be physical or psychological; manifest or latent; intended or otherwise, as shown in the diagram below:

intended manifest

# VIOLENCE

not intended latent

physical **personal structural** physical psychological psychological

without with without with objects objects objects objects

(Source: Galtung, 1990) Munira‟s rumination over violence of sight, thought and memory in Ngugi wa Thiong‟o‟s

*Petals of Blood* fits into this multi-layer given by Galtung. Fatunde (1985) on the other hand, sees these forms of violence as basically class phenomenon when exploring their interrelation in both colonial and neocolonial contexts. Fanon‟s (1980) radical exposition of the concept has strong inclination to psychological damage and extends to the

legitimation conferred by myth and religion on both physical and structural violence. Forced by the colonial circumstances or perhaps youthful exuberance strengthened by Marxism, he seems to believe in the efficacy of countering violence with violence to attain freedom – a strategy which Malcolm X earlier on advocated in quest for racial justice in the US; which Nelson Mandela adopted in fighting the white apartheid system in South Africa but which Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jnr. stood against in their respective struggles against colonialism, racism and all suppressive tendencies in and beyond their constituencies. From this latter perspective I think Galtung developed the idea of „peace by peaceful means‟.

Cultural violence therefore attempts to give legitimacy to the preceding forms of violence. In the word of Galtung (1990:291), it „makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong.‟ To this category belong all killings, destruction and discrimination in the name of religion, race, language or sex(ism). It reminds one of colonialism (eg in Algeria), racism (in America), Holocaust, female infanticide in the pre- Islamic Arab world, wife-beating as discipline in some African cultures, or the dumping of twins in Evil Forest in pre-colonial Igbo communities as recounted in Achebe‟s *Things Fall Apart* and the banishment of their mother as demon-possessed in some Northern Nigerian communities as reported in Joyce Cary‟s *Mister Johnson*.

To counteract the adverse effects of these variegated forms of violence, peace is advocated

* which Galtung (2013b, 1967) defines as the absence of violence and the presence of social justice. However, peace can be negative or positive. It is said to be the former when it succeeds but does not go beyond the elimination of the three types of violence explained above in human coexistence. Where besides this there is cooperation, love and accommodativeness for mutual progress among the people, then the latter (positive peace)

is said to be in charge (this categorization is often attributed to Galtung, but seems to originate from Martin Luther King‟s (jnr.) essay: *Nonviolence and Racial Justice*).

In his *Theories of Peace,* Galtung (1967) has presented more than thirty different (and sometimes contradictory) postulations on why peace is elusive and how it can be achieved in interpersonal and international relations. In this process, mass media is considered as a key stakeholder – hence the notion of peace journalism (Galtung, 2013a).

# PEACE JOURNALISM: AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM IN FRAMING CONFLICT

Peace journalism is a departure from violence-as-news value orientation in journalism practice. It emphasizes on the context and background of a conflict rather than the violent scenes of „here and now‟. Thus it disaggregates the parties involved into visible and the invisible ones with salience on common grounds, on peace initiatives and dialogue among the parties. From the surface, it seems to divorce journalism from its tradition of objectivity, but closely studied, it calls for in-depth, more analytic and nuanced coverage and reportage. For example, in exploring the consequences of conflict, it goes beyond such visible effects as deaths and destruction of property to uncover invisible ones like trauma, resentment, fear and desire for revenge. In the process of doing this, propaganda and demonizing language are eschewed to allow less tense platform for negotiation and change that will result in peace ultimately (Mare 2017, Galtung 2013a, Tumber, 2009, Hanitzsch, 2007, Lynch, 2007, Hackett, 2006, Tehranian, 2002, McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000).

Johan Galtung, a Norwegian Professor and pioneer in Peace Studies, is credited with the coinage and groundbreaking work in Peace Journalism. He observes that much of war reporting is akin to sports journalism where the focus is on contest between two parties each struggling, principally, for victory against the other which therefore tends to

exacerbate tension. This, according to him, is a low road of looking at a conflict (Galtung, 2013a). He consequently started deflecting attention towards what he called Peace Journalism (otherwise the high road) in the 1970s which he likens to Health Journalism that typically traces the causes of a particular disease, its effects on the body system, its cures and preventive measures. This started gaining currency among media scholars and practitioners with the turn of the 21st century (Galtung 2013a, Tumber, 2009, Hanitzsch, 2007, Siraj, 2007, McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). A schema which highlights the attributes of peace and war journalism respectively was subsequently presented by Galtung (1998) in Fong (2009:33):

**Table 2.1 Juxtaposing the Features of War and Peace Journalism**

War Journalism Peace Journalism

Approach: Approach:

1. *Reactive 1. Proactive*
   * Waits for war to break out, or about to – Anticipates, starts reporting long before break out, before reporting war breaks out
2. *Visible effects of war 2. Reports also on invisible effects of war*
   * Casualties, dead and wounded, – Emotional trauma, damage to society and damage to property culture
3. *Elite-oriented 3. People-oriented*
   * Focuses on leaders and elites as actors – Focuses on common people as actors and and sources of information sources of information
4. *Differences-oriented 4. Reports areas of agreement*

*that might lead to a solution to conflict*

1. *Focuses on here and now 5. Reports causes and consequences of*

*the conflict*

1. *Dichotomises good and bad, 6. Avoid labeling of good guys and bad guys victims and villains*
2. *Two-party orientation 7. Multiparty orientation*
   * One party wins, one party loses – Gives voice to many parties involved

in conflict

1. *Partisan 8. Non-partisan*

Biased for one side in conflict – Neutral, not taking sides

1. *Zero-sum orientation 9. Win-win orientation*

**–** One goal: to win – Many goals and issues, solution-oriented

1. *Stops reporting and leaves after war 10. Stays on and reports aftermath of war*

**–** Stops reporting with peace treaty – reconstruction, rehabilitation, and signing and ceasefire and heads for another implementation of peace treaty war elsewhere

Language Language

*1 Uses victimising language that tells 1. Avoids victimising language*

*only what has been done to people* – Reports what has been done and could be

– For example, destitute, devastated, done by people, and how they are coping defenseless, pathetic, tragic, demoralised

1. *Uses demonising language 2. Avoids demonising language*
   * For example, vicious, cruel, brutal, – Uses more precise descriptions, titles, barbaric, inhuman, tyrant, savage, ruthless, or names

terrorist, extremist, fanatic, fundamentalist

1. *Uses emotive language 3. Avoids emotive words*
   * For example, genocide, assassination, – Objective and moderate. Reserves strongest massacre, systematic (as in systematic language only for gravest situation. Does

raping or forcing people from their homes not exaggerate

Source: Galtung (1998) & Fong (2009)

Broadness and in-depthness are therefore a hallmark, a sine qua non to conflict coverage associative to peace journalism. In multiplicity of voices, the truth, however muzzled, will therefore emerge in full glare and regalia. When for example, the Iraqi war was covered in every thinkable material details by some 3000 journalists representing diverse media organisations (Tumber, 2009), it came to be realized that WMDs were just a hoax, a wool pulled over the unsuspecting Americans‟ eyes to legitimize aggression on a foreign land. As a result of this intensive coverage (for „the rest of the world was not depending on European and American broadcasters and newspapers anymore…‟, Lynch and McGoldrick, 2009:249) some media outlets, notably Aljazeera, became a victim of selective attacks by Euro-American troops „with the organisation‟s offices hit in Kabul, Basra and Baghdad. A memo of a conversation between Blair and George W. Bush, leaked to a British newspaper, seemed to suggest that the American President wanted the station‟s headquarters in Doha to be bombed.‟

Peace Journalism is therefore synonymous to what Howard (2009) called „conflict- sensitive reporting‟, „better reporting,‟ „…based on rigorous adherence to the essential core standards of journalism…greater analytical depth and skills to report on it (conflict) without contributing to further violence nor overlooking peace building opportunities‟ (pp. 13-14). McGoldrick and Lynch (2000:45) gave its equivalent as

„holistic journalism, analytical journalism, solution journalism, constructivejournalism, post-realist journalism; conflict-analysis journalism‟ among several other appellatives.

War journalism, on the other hand, is the antithesis of peace journalism. It is naturally preoccupied with what happen in the battleground (violence, death and destruction of property with their attendant sensationalism). Constricted in time and space, war journalism reduces the parties in conflict to two entangled in tug-of-war each striving to win as the ultimate (if not the only) goal. The “grass” underneath is therefore

stampeded not only by the actors but by such journalism, which quickly moves on to the next flashpoint after the victor has emerged. It is thus not a win-win or solution- prone, nor does it stay to monitor the implementation of peace agreement or reconstruction of damages done.

According to Lynch and McGoldrick (2009), „Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices - of what stories to report and how to report them - that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value nonviolent responses to conflict‟ (p.256). The duo had, earlier on (in their 2000 work), given a 17-point dos and don‟ts in the practice of peace journalism which include:

2. AVOID accepting stark distinctions between „self‟ and „other‟. These can be used to build the sense that another party is a „threat‟ or „beyond the pale‟ of civilised behaviour. Both key justifications for violence. INSTEAD seek the „other‟ in the

„self‟ and vice versa... 12. AVOID demonising adjectives like “vicious”, “cruel”, “brutal”, “barbaric”. These always describe one party‟s view of what another party has done. To use them puts the journalist on that side and helps to justify an escalation of violence. INSTEAD, report what you know about the wrongdoing and give as much information as you can about the reliability of other people‟s reports or descriptions of it. If it is still being investigated, say so, as a caution that the truth may not yet be known…. 13. AVOID demonising labels like “terrorist”; “extremist”; “fanatic” or “fundamentalist”. These are always given by “us” to “them”. No-one ever uses them to describe himself or herself and so for a journalist to use them is always to take sides. They mean the person is unreasonable so it seems to make less sense to reason (negotiate) with them. INSTEAD try calling people by the names they give themselves. Or be more precise in your descriptions, eg “bombers” or, for the attacks of September 11, 2001, “suicide hijackers”, are both less partisan and give more information than “terrorists”.

One finds an interesting, terse paraphrase of these points in Howard‟s (2003) 9- point checklist for conflict-sensitive journalism which provide practical guidelines for aspiring peace journalists. These include:

1. Avoid reporting a conflict as consisting of two opposing sides. Find other affected interests and include their stories, opinions, and goals. Interview merchants affected by the general strike, workers who are unable to work, refugees from the countryside who want an end to violence, etc
2. Avoid defining the conflict by always quoting the leaders who make familiar demands. Go beyond the elites. Report the words of ordinary people who may voice the opinions shared by many.
3. Avoid only reporting what divides the sides in conflict. Ask the opposing sides questions that may reveal common ground. Report on interests or goals they may share.
4. Avoid always focusing on the suffering and fear of only one side. Treat all sides‟ suffering as equally newsworthy.
5. Avoid words like devastated, tragedy, and terrorized to describe what has been done to one group. These kinds of words put the reporter on one side. Do not use them yourself. Only quote someone else who uses these words.
6. Avoid emotional and imprecise words. Assassination is the murder of a head of state and no one else. Massacre is the deliberate killing of innocent, unarmed civilians. Soldiers and policemen are not massacred. Genocide means killing an entire people. Do not minimize suffering, but use strong language carefully.
7. Avoid words like terrorist, extremist, or fanatic. These words take sides and make the other side seem impossible to negotiate with. Call people what they call themselves.
8. Avoid making an opinion into a fact. If someone claims something, state their name, so it is their opinion and not your fact.
9. Avoid waiting for leaders on one side to offer solutions. Explore peace ideas wherever they come from. Put these ideas to the leaders and report their response.

(Mare 2017:40-1)

Tehranian (2000) on the other hand, argues that government-controlled media and the commercial ones are primarily responsible for whipping up sentiment that accentuate „we‟ versus „them‟ division and „exacerbate international tension‟. An alternative media (peace journalism) system supported by an independent institution and sanction is needed for the harmonious cohabitation of global citizens. In his Ten Commandment of Peace Journalism, Tehranian toes the path of Galtung, Howard; Goldrick and Lynch by suggesting the diversification of sources, disaggregation of actors, skepticism and relativism, *inter alia*, for a fairer representation of the parties in a conflict.

# REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

# GALTUNG‟s SCHEMA, MEDIA & CONFLICT RESEARCHERS

A number of empirical studies (Hussein and Lynch 2015, Shehu 2014, Ozohu-Suleman 2013, Raza *et al* 2012, Fong 2009, Steien 2008, Siraj 2007 et c) have been conducted to ascertain the presence or otherwise of Galtung‟s peace journalism indicators in media content using Goffman‟s framing theory. Raza *et al* (2012), for example, explored two leading Pakistani newspapers (*Daily Nation* and *Business Recorder*) to find out how the

„war on terror‟ is framed, and concluded that both newspapers were generally more inclined to peaceful resolution of the conflict in their framing – in terms of details, context, language and tone of coverage. They „condemn and criticize the attacks and destruction (sic) activities of the Taliban in most of their news stories…(and) paid more time, space and focus on the social and economic impact on people and society whenever the bomb blast or suicide attack occurred‟ (P.106).

Ngige, Badekale and HammanJoda (2016) also surveyed media environment with regard to the coverage of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria. But unlike Pate (2012), Shehu (2014) and Unaegbu (2016), they commended the Nigerian press for being consistent in relating relevant information to the public and policy-makers, timely criticism and advocacy of practical solutions. Ita, Idiong and Ita(2017) found *Thisday, Vanguard* and *Punch’s* coverage of Boko Haram to be quite positive as they concentrated largely on cause-solution frames which ultimately influence readers‟ perception thus.

Using Critical Discourse Analysis (and the only exception to framing theory among the empirical researches cited), Ayoola and Olaosun (2014) also examined how Nigerian press (*The Nation, The Punch*and *The Guardian)* handled Boko Haram attacks on

Nigerian Police Headquarters and United Nations House in Abuja, concluding that

„contrary to scepticisms about daily newspapers as purveyors of misery and libel, Nigerian national newspapers serve as a source of accurate information and perceptive analysis on Boko Haram…(p.1) For instance, the July 9, 2011 news report in *The Punch*which states that the Nigerian security agencies had received warnings on planned attacks on location in Abuja by Boko Haram proved remarkably accurate‟ (p. 57).

Similarly, Ozohu-Suleman (2013) examined the coverage of Israeli-Palestinian protracted conflict in international television stations: BBC World, Aljazeera English, Press TV and CNN International in line with Galtung, Howard; McGoldrick and Lynch‟s peace journalism indicators. He found, on a general note, the prevalence of war frames over the peace ones in the content of these global networks. Specifically, he observed that only *Aljazeera English* coverage of the conflict within the period studied tilted significantly towards peace journalism (61.7%) - in comparison to CNN International (46.7%), BBC World (45.0%) and Press TV (32.3%) respectively. Buttressing this conclusion is a latter research on the same conflict by Ozohu-Suleman and Ishak (2015) which reveals that Southeast Asian press (represented by *Star* of Malaysia, *Philstar* of the Philippines, *Jakarta Post* of Indonesia, and *The Nation* of Thailand as microcosm of local media) were not only bias in favour of conflict but partisan in their coverage. For a similar conclusion on the same conflict, see an earlier work by Philo *et al* (2003).

Siraj (2007) used the same criteria to decode the various frames deployed by *New York Times* and *Washington Post* in the coverage of Indian-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. Like Ozohu-(2013), he too submitted that war journalism indicators dominated the coverage of these papers on the issues at hand. This, he said, also coincides with the

findings of such scholars as Shinar (2004) who observed that even in covering peace negotiation, media prefers war frames, and Wolsfeld (2004) who claims that „the default mode of operation for the press is to cover tension, conflict and violence‟ (p.3). This is because, as Tumber (2009) opines, „conflict sells and the emphasis on violence, and the simplification of the conflict, increases the value of their commodity‟ (p. 396). Hence Owens-Ibie (2002) in Pate (2012:61) figuratively asserted that conflict is „the bread and butter of journalism‟. [Note that Ngige *et al* (2016) attributed these words to Popoola (2012) while Auwal (2015) credited them to Thomas and Lee (1996)]. A similar conclusion was reached by Chiang and Knight (2008:37) regarding the political economy of the media industries that „the outlets are primarily driven by profit motives,… under the assumption that consumers prefer to consume news that confirms their prior beliefs; competition forces newspapers to differentiate themselves by moving to the ideological extreme‟.Aliagan (2015) equally reveals that the major national dailies (the top 7) in Nigeria pander along ethnic/regional ideology as market strategy. For instance, *Daily Sun* newspaper has pro-Eastern inclination, *The Nation* pro-western, while *Daily Trust*pro-northern values, hence most of their adverts come from these respective regions. Oso (2012), on the other hand, dissects how sensationalism and frivolities overwhelm serious issues in Nigerian media industries as corollary of economic forces. While Okoye (2007) observes how the media content is constrained for the fear of backlash from „Sacred Cows‟, among which big advertisers.

Moreover, Steien (2008) studied six Norwegian dailies (*Aften, Aftenposten, Dagbladet, Dagens Næringsliv, Dagsavisen and VG*) to discover how they covered the 2006 Prophet‟s cartoon controversies in the country. At the end, the researcher found that nuanced frames (which combines the features of war and peace journalism on almost equal measure) and war frames outweigh peace frames significantly – each having

46%, 39% and 15% respectively. This is strikingly similar with the finding of Shehu (2014) who, after examining four Nigerian national dailies (*Daily Trust, Leadership, Vanguard and Punch newspapers*) in respect of Boko Haram insurgency coverage, submitted that „[w]hile war frames got the total frequencies of 1239, peace frames got only 470 in all the four sampled newspapers‟. The dominance of war frames (95% against 5% neutral) is also found by Fong (2009) in *Sin Chew Daily*„s (a Chinese newspaper with the largest circulation in Malaysia) coverage of Sishammuddeen dagger-holding controversy in the country between 2007 and 2008.

On the other hand, Okoro and Odoemelam (2013) used ten frames as categories of ascertaining how Nigerian national dailies (*Guardian, Daily Sun, Vanguard* and *Thisday* newspapers) covered Boko Haram insurgency in the year 2012. Their findings reveal that these newspapers largely prioritize response frame (57) which focuses on what the government was doing to end the crisis for public scrutiny – ultimately categorisable into peace journalism frames. Paradoxically, this is succeeded in magnitude by religious frame (29), labeling frame (28), ethnic frame (24), and human interest frame (20). All these (a sum of 101) frames which typically sensationalize and emphasize that it is members of a particular faith or tribe that are being selectively targeted by the insurgents, belong to war journalism indicators which fan the embers of conflicts rather than their peaceful resolution.

Lilian Unaegbu (2016) took a gender perspective in conflict analysis, arguing that Nigerian press is not only gender-insensitive but peripheral in its overall coverage of Boko Haram crisis which results in the escalation of fear, tension and confusion in the populace rather than proper understanding that would have otherwise proceeded from detailed analysis of the situation. In this, women are the worst hit – grossly underrepresented as reporters and decision-makers, and overblown as conflict sufferers

thereby solidifying the preexisting stereotype of women‟s vulnerability and subordination to masculine dominance.

Akpan, Ering and Olofu-Adeoye (2013) also explored the roles of media in Niger Delta, Boko Haram and Jos crises and concluded that „the media in the reportage of conflict phenomenon in Nigeria like most conflict prone society (sic) is culpable in stoking conflicts and making reconciliation difficult for conflict parties‟ (p.2286).

One of the most incisive and oft-cited study of media and violent conflict in Nigeria prior to Boko Haram uprising is Bilkisu Yusuf‟s (2002) *Media Coverage of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Some Parts of Northern Nigeria.* Using qualitative approach to content analysis, Yusuf (2002) reviewed the intermittently perennial violent clashes in such Northern tinderboxes as Wukari, Zangon Kataf, Kachia, Kafanchan, Tafawa Balewa, Jos and Kano, the attendant backlash from the South and media responsibility in such crises since 1985. She found out that whereas Northern press (*New Nigerian, Citizen* and *Democrat)* strove to be fair, balanced, contextual and humane in their coverage as demanded by their professional calling (see also Kukah (1993) for similar opinion about particularly *New Nigerian*), their Southern counterpart (*The Guardian, Daily Times, Newswatch, Tell et c*) chose to be essentially the opposite: „biased, one sided, unbalanced, and even outrightly false and inflammatory… Instead of playing the role of mediators they are a bunch of rumour peddlers and **“*dramatist*”** reporters who dramatise news, distort reality and instigate the public to violence‟ (pp. 144&156). Interestingly, in contrast to above, Jimoh and Abdul-Hameed (2017)‟s comparative analysis of *Daily Trust* and The Sun‟s coverage of Ese Oruru/Yunusa controversy and IPOB protest found both the southern and northern press ethnically bias. Whereas *Daily Trust* portrayed Ese/Yunusa‟s case as primarily a love-affair with elopement as its suspense, The Sun skewed it significantly toward „criminality‟ stressing on „abduction‟.

The same trend is vindicated in IPOB agitation. *Daily Trust* considered it as a

„criminality‟ and „security threat‟ largely while The Sun presented it as a „powerful, freedom struggle‟. Hence this collaborates with previous similar findings that Nigerian newspapers stoop to regional rather than national interest in their coverage of conflict. This is mainly for economic reasons.

In *Manipulation of Religion…,* Usman (1980) also charges Nigerian media for inciting violence along religious divides through a calculated scheme of „provocation-reaction- counter-reaction‟ in order to „make profit at whatever expense to our country‟ (p. 81). While Kukah (1993) deconstructs how media is used to intensify prejudice and surreptitiously normalize marginalization – which apparently reminds one of the invisible effects of conflict in Nigeria. Ibrahim and Jimoh (2017) on the other hand, found Nigerian dailies (represented by *Daily Trust* and Vanguard) quite aloof in their condemnation of violence by Niger Delta Avengers on oil facilities despite its negative consequences on Nigerian economy.

After reviewing several literatures in the area, Pate (2010:8 & 2012:62-3) too corroborated previous findings that Nigerian media capitalize on our „poisoned perceptions‟ of one another, hence exacerbate violent conflict through:

* + - 1. Promoting, by selective reporting, prejudicial stereotypes about groups and individuals.
      2. The reporting of inter-group conflicts out of their fundamental sociological, economic, political and other contexts; in many cases, media persons merely respond to statements of politicians, ethnic champions, religious zealots and other interested party rather than initiate their own independent inquiries about specific social conflict.
      3. Making generalized statements not supported by facts and figures.
      4. Attributing statements by individuals to collectives.
      5. Publishing of rumours as facts.
      6. Publishing unfair and discriminating adverts.
      7. Use of inflammatory language in news reporting.
      8. The problem of editors allowing the letters column and opinion pages to be used to make inflammatory statements against some people or groups.
      9. The use of inflammatory, misleading and sensational headlines to attract sales.
      10. Demonization of certain ethnic, religious or political groups in an already divided and tensed society.
      11. The use of cartoons to malign a community, group or individual.
      12. Use of unrepresentative pictures
      13. Un-objective and clearly biased reporting against some groups, individuals or communities.
      14. Inappropriate use of language in reporting conflict stories.
      15. Total blackout on some groups, individuals or community
      16. Expression of ill-informed opinions by columnists, writers, etc. on issues that affect certain groups of people in the country.
      17. Shallow and episodic coverage.

These may not necessarily be due to political-economic interests. Other factors such as laziness and poor knowledge-base of the journalists, pressure to beat strict deadlines, dated facilities, poor remunerations, insecurity and lack of diversity in the newsroom, among others, can be additional contributors to unprofessional coverage of conflicts in Nigeria (Pate & Dauda, 2015, Pate, 2012, Pate, 2010 & Yusuf, 2002).

Internationally, Orwell (1970a & b) reflected on the Spanish civil war of 1937 and concluded that newspaper coverage of the conflict was severely ridden with propaganda because of the ideological leanings of the parties involved – anarchists, communists, socialists, Trotskyists, capitalists and whatnots. Thus the fringed treatment and blackout of some of these ideologies in the international press depended significantly on who controls the outlets.

Hussein and Lynch (2015), on the other hand, observe the dearth of literature in peace journalism studies that comparatively analyze multiple conflicts and media response thus, hence they reviewed Pakistan‟s ethnic, political and religious conflicts, concluding that media reaction to such situation is often determined by the magnitude of threat to national security. If the level of threat is high, the watchdog button is normally pressed, but when such is at low ebb, sensationalism is resorted to for marketability. The media entangled thus keep oscillating between active and passive peace journalism.

Hanitzsch (2007) criticizes the idea of peace journalism as a compromise to the time- honored ethos of professionalism where the journalist is supposedly detached and objective in the coverage of his subject, and that it seems to subscribe to the discredited notion of all-powerful effect of the media. When peace journalism scholars accuse war reportage as stooping to negativities (violence, drama et c), he argues that it is out of economic expediency precipitated by audience preferences; that such scholars and advocates hardly even notice the gulf between media and journalism. But his argument that „a peaceful culture is the precondition of peace journalism‟ appears lame, underrates the transformative role of journalism and erroneously presents culture as if it were immutable.

I also think the nexus between peace journalism and magic bullet theory in his earlier essay (Hanitzsch, 2004b) is overstretched. From Galtung to Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick; to Howard and Tehranian, I am yet to read or derive the alleged impression that media can, on its own, prevent or end conflict. But it is reasonable to surmise that it can be a facilitator for peace or war – as it was in Rwandan genocide of the 1990s. In this vein, Mallan (2006) also argues that no matter what may be said on this discourse, one thing stands out: media does not precipitate conflict, although it can (and does) help in the escalation or de-escalation to a limited degree.

Plausible as his argument on detachment is, objectivity is still a concept mired in controversy (Hasan, 2016, Tumber & Prentoulis, 2003) – to what extent can a journalist be neutral, unaffected „automaton‟ in dealing with his subject? Whether it is alright to take side with morality and conscience as in identifying with the victims? What are the forces behind the emergence of objectivity as a concept per se? Ad infinitum. In practical terms, this reminds one of Sam Anderson‟s memoir on Vietnam‟s war:

We stayed objective; we didn‟t get involved. Our job was to merely witness and write. That is how I had always operated – without a pang of conscience. Why should Vietnam be any different?...(p. 28)

…Detached, professional, objective observers, we called ourselves - and it was a lie. About the war, one couldn‟t be objective; every word written, every foot of film taken, was a choice, no less than the one at the pavilion of Takeo. Indochina offered no escape. Not choosing sides was choosing sides,… In that sense, my friends and I had merely been witnesses to a small, tragic fragment of history – bystanders to a bloodletting, you might call us, and not so innocent ones, at that. To believe otherwise, as I had for long, was a preposterous conceit… It was the illusion that had kept me going (pp. 308-9).

Scandalous as it sounds, the impracticability of absolute objectivity especially in conflict coverage was also expounded by the British novelist and former BBC journalist, George Orwell, in his *Homage to Catalonia,* which chronicles his involvement in the Spanish civil war of late 1930s. The same argument can also be found in his *Looking Back on the Spanish War.* As these journalists identified with the victims out of humanitarian concern, not few others sided with the policies of their home countries out of patriotism in Vietnam, after 9/11 attack and in the buildup towards Iraqi invasion (Hallin 1986 in Thussu & Freedman 2003, Williams 2003, Rodgers 2003, Speckman 2008), thus jettisoning „all pretence of objectivity‟ (Williams 2003:177) as „an impossible goal‟ (Tumber & Prentoulis 2003:216).

Donald McDonald, a Journalism professor and former editor, added that:

When the reporter moves from relatively uncomplicated, concrete, even physical phenomena into the realm of abstract and the complex, - i.e, studies, conferences, programmes, policies on urban affairs, race and ethnic relations, foreign and military affairs, economic and fiscal conditions, the administration of criminal justice, cultural ferment, youth unrest, population problems, environmental issues, politics and government, - the value judgements he must take at every critical stage in his investigation of the facts must reflect the values he already holds. Again, these values flow from his personal history. They are the products of his education, his religious experience, his childhood, family life, social and economic background, friendships and associations, national ties and culture, as well as his emotional life and experiences... (Okoye, 2007:152-3)

Similarly, when in his earlier intervention Hanitzsch (2004:490a) argued that „it cannot be the task of journalism to engage in the peaceful settlement of conflicts since it is the

task of other social systems such as politics, law or the military‟ (an argument which Loyn, (2007) also subscribes to), the point ignores systemic interdependence central to functionalist theory enunciated by eminent sociologists such as Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons.

Peace Journalism, therefore, to me, is an ethical call which spurs journalists to broaden their horizons on other sidelined yet important indices in conflict coverage – on invisible actors, on structural and cultural factors et c. In this regard it can be called good journalism, comprehensive coverage or any befitting appellation. Thus, it is unarguably consistent with teleological theory of ethics.

# CASES OF „BLASPHEMY‟ IN NIGERIA: AN OVERVIEW

Chronologically, the controversy of blasphemy in Nigeria, whether genuine, prima facie or spurious, commenced with Gideon Akaluka‟s case in December 1994, who, according to the account of Onwuka (2016), was accused of desecrating the Qur‟an, forced out of police custody and beheaded by mobs in Kano. This was followed by the uproar caused by Isioma Daniel‟s pageantry piece in *Thisday* of 16th November, 2002.

Disgusted by Muslims‟ opposition to the hitherto scheduled Miss World Beauty Contest, she wrote: “The Muslims thought it was immoral to bring 92 women to Nigeria to revel in vanity. What would Mohammed think? In all honesty, he would have chosen a wife from one of them” (The Telegraph of UK, 2002).

This sparked up riots in Kaduna (and latter in Abuja) where over two hundred were reported dead and the Kaduna office of the newspaper set ablaze amid commotion that left many vehicles smashed (The Guardian of UK, Feb. 17th, 2003). According to The Michigan Daily (Nov. 27th, 2002), in spite of the apology issued by the offending paper

that the part was edited off the piece but resurfaced due to technical error, the then deputy governor of Zamfara, Mahmood Shinkafi, was said to have given a religious verdict that “Just like the blasphemous Indian writer Salman Rushdie, the blood of Isioma Daniel can be shed,” (The Michigan Daily, 2002).

In her *I Lit the Match* (The Guardian of UK, Feb. 17th, 2003), Miss Daniel claimed that her „irreverence (word hers)‟ was caused by the journalistic background she had in UK where nobody is above the board of satire. But obviously, the editors and reporters of the paper had taught her the hard way that geography and cultures vary, hindsight to social responsibility. Hence frowningly avoided her and tendered their timely apology in the 18th, 19th, 20th& 22nd Nov. 2002 editions, part of which reads, “With all sense of responsibility, sensitivity and respect for all Muslims, the staff, management, editors and Board of *Thisday* newspapers apologize for the great editorial error in last Saturday‟s editor on Miss World Beauty Pageant. We are sorry that the portrayal of the Holy Prophet Mohammed in a commentary written by one of our staff was not only unjustified, but utterly provocative… At *Thisday* we have no reason to denigrate Muslims or the Holy Prophet…” (Anekwe, 2002). This is complemented by the widely publicized call for peace by the then Sultan, late Muhammad Maccido and Gov. Mohammed Makarfi and the consequent dusk-to-dawn curfew.

The repulsion from the Muslims, according to Miss Daniel herself, is caused by the fact that the event was slated to take place at a time that coincided with Ramadan (Muslim holy month of fasting) and in Abuja where the inhabitants largely profess Islam. This simmered when some of the contestants staged a protest over the death-by-stoning sentence issued to one Amina Lawal for adultery by a Shariah court in Zamfara.

To a lesser degree of outburst, similar incident occurred in Gombe State in March 2007 where a secondary school teacher, Christianah Oluwasesin, was killed by her students

after accusing her of mistreating the Qur‟an – allegedly throwing it away with other books while supervising an exam (BBC News, 21st March, 2007).

Then came to the fore the controversy of blasphemy within – where last year (May, 2015), a certain cleric, Abul Nyass (of a deviant sect from Tijjaniyya Sufi order) allegedly claimed that Ibrahim Nyass has priority over the Prophet (s.a.w.). Protesters in their multitude razed down his house in the outskirt of Kano and burnt down the Rijiyar Lemo Shariah court when they perceived „a tactical delay‟ in his arraignment. He was sentenced to death with four others in absentia, but an appeal court in Kaduna recanted the judgement and acquitted the appellants. To calm down and diffuse the atmosphere of unrest, Kano state government has affirmed its resolve to pursue the case in an upper court (Sahara Reporters, 2015, May 22nd, Mudashir and Yaya, 2015, May 23, Ikeji, 2016, May 25, Shuaibu, 2016, May 25).

2016 has proven to be the most notorious in the historical juggernaut of blasphemy where within the space of three months three such incidents recurred, claiming lives and properties worth millions. The first instance in the year occurred in May 27th, where sticks-carrying mobs lynched one Methodus Emmmanuel in Pandogari area of Niger state for alleged discourteous comment against the Prophet, online. Three others also reportedly died in an effort to restore order. Few days after (2nd June), Bridget Abahime, a septuagenarian Igbo trader in Kano Textile market, was killed on similar allegation. Both the President, Muhammadu Buhari and the Sultan, Abubakar Saad II, condemned the killing strongly and called for immediate prosecution of the perpetrators, which the state government acted upon promptly (Egbujo, 2016, June 11, Onwuka, 2016, June 7, Premium Times, 2016,).

When this deadly monster reared its head in Zamfara in August 22nd, 2016, eight people were lost in the most gruesome manner. According to newspaper reports

(Thisday, Aug., 25,2016, Premium Times, Sept., 25, 2016, The Nation, Aug. 25, 2016, Punch Aug., 22, 2016, Vanguard, Aug. 22, 2016) the incident broke out of altercation between two students in Abdu Gusau Polytechnic, Talata-Mafara. One subdued the other; the latter cried out that his assailant has insulted The Prophet. In no time fellow students descended on him until he was motionless. When he was taken to hospital, the mob returned to the person who lent out his car for the rescue mission and burned down his shop, proceeded to his house and set it ablaze, killing the 8 inhabitants inside. This drew the ire of not only the governor who vow to deal with all those involved, but the President and the Sultan whose JNI (Jamaatul Nasril Islam) issued a communiqué saying:

This recurring matter is becoming tediously monotonous and remains condemned in the strongest terms. The unfortunate attacks that ensued thereafter are criminal and also stand condemned. We reiterate that human lives are sacred and therefore must be dignified. That has been the position of Islam… The nasty behavior of some miscreants should not be misconstrued as the Islamic teaching. We however call on the state governments, particularly in the North, to hasten mechanisms which will address these repeated acts of blasphemy; it seems that there are deliberate attempts to cause more tension in the region and the country at large, in the name of blasphemy (Ehikioya and Alabewe, 2016).

However, not quite a few (Egbujo, 2016, Adesanmi, 2016, The Citizen, 2016, Punch, 2016) have expressed pessimism over the solution to these controversies, referencing how previous perpetrators were not brought to book which emboldens the recurrence of such provocation and consequent carnage. But as I have argued elsewhere, laws are just not enough to curb this menace. Besides blasphemy law in the Criminal Code, Nigeria has extant defamation, sedition, public disturbance, murder, arson, terrorism laws, *inter alia.* Hate speech law and a special court for its adjudication are right now in the offing. But these never seem to be effective in ensuring everlasting peace, security, stability in the polity and the badly needed cordiality among its heterogeneous citizens. It is therefore our humble submission that solution should rather be sought through what

Mahmood Mamdani calls „Culture Talk‟; through promoting dialogue; through educational projects; through soft media such as theater, novels and movies, as well as other strategies that prove to be effective in national (re)orientation.

# INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES ON BLASPHEMY

# THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR

Using surrealism and intertextuality, Salman Rushdie‟s *Satanic Verses* (1988) weaves a narrative of two aircraft explosion survivors: the anglophile Indian actor, Saladin Chamcha, who turned into a real devil „with horns, goat hooves, tail, thick fur and sulfurous breath‟, and Gibreel Farishta, the other survivor who originally was also an Indian movie star but consequently transmuted into a proper angel, in contrast to the former. Both obviously competed for influence over Mahound (the provocatively derogatory name given to Prophet Muhammad s.a.w.) with the former luring him to endorse the paramountcy of the triune Arab gods: Lat, Manat and Uzzah. Hence the context in which the „satanic verses‟ (Q. 35:19-22) were revealed, or rather Qur‟anic text distorted and deprived of their context and originality. Their recantation upon realization subsequently, is ironically not recorded in the hadith literature, according to the novel (Bader, 1992).

In a nutshell, the novel is a satire overplayed against the purity of the Qur‟an, authenticity of the angel Gabriel and the holiness of Muhammad (s.a.w.) with numerous unprintable insults to the Prophet‟s wives and companions in order to ultimately concretize further the existing perception of Islam‟s oddity and incongruity with the Western culture and civilization. „Rushdie‟s inflammatory aspersions on the Prophet (s.a.w.),‟says Kamali (2010:295), „and the gratuitously indecent language he uses in reference to the wives of the Prophet (s.a.w.), the mothers of the believers

(*ummahat al-mu’minin*) on pages 381-82 are simply too outrageous, and far below the standards of civilized discourse. The Prophet Abraham (a.s.) and the companions of the Prophet (s.a.w.) are reviled in the most ugly and despicable terms (pp. 101, 117, 374).‟ This is widely viewed in the Islamic world as a deliberate provocateur with inexcusable profanity. Hence instigated serious protests and condemnation all over Muslim countries with the then Iranian spiritual leader, Ayatullah Khomenei, issuing a fatwa (verdict) on February 14th, 1989, that Muslims world over are duty bound to execute Rushdie and any promoter of the book knowingful of its content. Although the fatwa had been criticized by other Muslim leaders and scholars for lacking in legal procedural propriety, a number of people associated with the book (as translators or publishers) were killed while others lost their lives in the process of protest against the book. With the notable exception of Turkey, the book was banned in all Muslim countries and Rushdie himself had to go under cover with British police giving him 24 hour protection. While the book circulates in the West as a literary work that exercised the right to free expression, it was considered as violation of the same by the Organization of Muslim Conference in its twelfth session of Foreign Ministers held in Riyad between 13 and 16 March, 1989. The official Vatican newspaper too condemned the book as blasphemous, while a prominent Rabbi, Avraham Shapira, attempted to prevent its publication in Israel.

What this obviously underscores is the clash of values and political interest over what constitute blasphemy and freedom of expression (Kamali 2011, Falk 2011, Bader, 1992, AbuBakr, 2009). That is why when Rushdie was knighted in 2007 by the Queen in acknowledgement of his contribution to the world of letters, Mohammed Haruna, one of Nigeria‟s ace columnists, sniffed a double standard in analogy with anti- Semitism, opining, „…imagine how the Western establishment would react if, say Iran,

was to reward a well-established anti-Semitic writer with a national honour. You will not have to imagine hard guessing the huge uproar the western media and its politicians would have gone up in‟ (Abubakr, 2009:79).

# THE UPROAR OVER DAVINCI CODE

*Davinci Code* is a factional story of Robert Langdon, a Harvard professor and scholar of cryptology, who was invited to decode Leonardo Davinci‟s artwork, and together with Tebbing, a royal historian, they unravelled a lot of mysteries and conspiracies covering the “authentic” message of Christian faith.

The novel claims that contemporary Christianity is a complete distortion of the original

* hybridized with pagan religion of sun-worship by the Roman Emperor Contanstine the Great in 325 A.D. for political expediency. And the content of the Bible reduced in substance and quantity through „countless translations, additions, and revisions (p.251)‟. Perhaps more outrageously (from a Christian viewpoint), Christ‟s divinity was a latter conferral while the Holy Grail isn‟t the symbolic cup from which Jesus (a.s.) drank during the Last Supper (matt.26), rather an allusion to Mary Magdelene (as synecdoche of feminine power) through whom The Master‟s lineage is traceable, but

„unjustly‟ smeared by the Church as prostitute in order to deprive her of „rightful‟ succession to Christ‟s Church. This therefore largely informed the sexist nature of the present Christian faith as argued in pages 46 and 134 of the novel. Here are some excerpts directly from the novel:

„The Bible did not arrive by fax from heaven… [it] is a product of *man*, my dear. Not of God. P250

The Bible, as we know today, was collated by the pagan Roman emperor Constantine the Great…More than *eighty* gospels were considered for the New Testament, and yet only a relative few were chosen for inclusion – Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, among others. P251

Nothing in Christianity is original. The pre-Christian God Mithras – called *the son of God* and *the Light of the World* – was born on December 25, died, was buried in a rock tomb, and then resurrected in three days… Originally, Christianity honored the Jewish Sabbath of Saturday, but Constantine shifted it to coincide with the pagan‟s veneration of the sun. p252

At this gathering (Council of Nicaea), many aspects of Christianity were debated and voted upon – the date of Easter, the role of the bishops, the administration of sacraments, and, of course, the *divinity* of Jesus. P253

…thousands of documents already existed chronicling His life as a *mortal* man…p254

The Grail is literally the ancient symbol for womanhood, and the *Holy Grail* represents the sacred feminine…It was *man*, not God, who created the concept of „original sin‟,… p258

…Unfortunately for the early editors, one particularly troubling earthly theme kept recurring in the gospels. Mary Magdalene. More specifically, her marriage to Jesus Christ. P264‟

When Grail legend speaks of „the chalice that held the blood of Christ‟… it speaks, in fact, of Mary Magdalene - the female womb that carried Jesus‟ royal bloodline. P270

…presenting to the world thousands of ancient documents as scientific evidence that the New Testament is a false testimony. P369

…that the modern Bible was compiled and edited by men who possessed a political agenda-…P254 (all emphases original).

Had Brown used derogatory language with cultural snobbishness and intellectual arrogance, he could have made the atmosphere combustible as Rushdie. Luckily, he wisely deployed mature and liberal (academic-like) style to offer an*other* viewpoint with seeming invitation for refutation. He therefore got wiser responses as more than a dozen books and hundreds of articles were written as rebuttal to *The Code’s* claims (Hixson, 2004). Mikhail Bulgakov‟s Master and Margarita (1940), based on Nitisor‟s (2007) dissection, sounds much like a prelude to *Davinci Code*.

# THE DANISH CARTOONS

Published under the title *The Face of Muhammad,* these were twelve editorial cartoons serialized by *Jyllands Posten,* a Danish daily, in September 2005 and latter syndicated by newspapers and magazines in Norway, Germany, Italy, France and a host of other European countries. The cartoons portrayed the Prophet in different moods: sublime and contemplative in some; enraged and obviously determined for suicide mission in others. The most outrageous appear to be the one depicting him (s.a.w.) with a bomb- shaped turban, and another, apparently from heaven, remonstrating suicide bombers with „stop, stop, we have run out of virgins!‟ An allusion to the appetite of terrorists. Decoding the cartoons while exploring their political economy, McGraw and Warner (2012) conclude that „of the 12 cartoons, two don‟t portray Muhammad at all; in three others, the depictions are ambiguous at best. One cartoon is completely unintelligible…‟ The scholars were surprised how Lars Refn‟s entry which criticizes *Posten’s* intolerance of diversity got lost in the uproar, alluding that the selective hype and slant on Kurt Westergaard‟s bomb-turbaned cartoon was a cunning effort by

Middle Eastern leaders to pull the wool over the internal failures in their respective countries. As we make „noise‟ over Muhammad the prophet, the duo observe, focus is now shifted to Muhammad the profit as Westergaard rocks in wait of the higher bidder of the controversial cartoon.

Two weeks after the maiden edition in *Jyllands Posten*, a delegation of Muslim ambassadors wrote a petition to the Danish government demanding that it should condemn and punish the publisher and apologise to the Muslim Ummah world over. The government refused, stressing that it had no control over any media and so could not interfere with their freedom. This further drew the ire of Muslim nations as a result of which some cut off diplomatic ties instantly and recalled their ambassadors from particularly Denmark and Norway. In fact the embassies of these two countries were set ablaze in Syria on Feb. 4th, 2006, and became the target of attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Lebanon, the threat of which caused the Danish government to close its Afghan embassy, according to the *New York Times* of June 3, 2008.

As these cartoons were defiantly and doggedly reprinted in other Western countries in solidarity, information about them turned viral, spreading all over Muslim countries. There were massive protest and flag-burning around the globe; accompanied by severe boycott of Danish and Norwegian products. In Nigeria for example, Kano State Assembly openly condemned it as blasphemy and adopted a resolution that all bilateral transaction with the aforementioned countries be cancelled. The state government heeded and immediately a power supply deal worth #18b with Denmark was declared null and void, while traders withdrew the offending countries products from their shops (*Daily Trust*, Feb. 11, 2006).

As the controversy raged, scholars debated over the limits of freedom of expression in pluralistic societies with subtle bitterness and amazement about its uneven application especially where the *Other* is involved. For, even the *Jyllands* itself was said to have shied away from publishing anti-Semitic cartoons and those of Christ (Hassan 2015, Gambo 2006, Haruna 2006, Kperogi, 2006). Asad (2009a.) observes that when the World Union of Muslim Scholars issued a statement calling Muslims around the globe to boycott Danish and Norwegian products and services, it elicited condemnation from Western pundits as unwarranted restriction on freedom of expression. He thus brought to the fore the contradiction that: it is alright a „freedom to criticize belief publicly‟ but not so „to campaign against particular consumer goods‟ (p.38). While the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Palestinian Human Rights, Prof. Emeritus Richard Falk (2011) accuses *Jyllands Posten* for being crass in retrospection of Rushdie‟s novel aftermath, the editor of the paper, Flemming Rose, maintained that „the idea wasn‟t to provoke gratuitously, rather to push back self-imposed limits on the expression that seems to be closing in tighter (Cottee, 2016)‟. Here, one can only aver that the distinction between being liberal and libertine is too blur and easily evadable.

# THE ROW OVER HEBDO

In an interesting chronicle of the Prophet‟s cartoons saga since 2005, the *Telegraph* of UK (May 4, 2015) reveals that *Charlie Hebdo*, the French satirical weekly magazine, became a player when on 8th February 2006 it republished the controversial *Jyllands*‟ cartoons with a special front page - the Prophet saying „it‟s hard to be loved by embecile.‟ And with a renewed vigour, it mockingly appointed the Prophet as „the editor-in-chief‟ of its November, 2011 edition while caricatured him (s.a.w.) naked in a September 2012 edition. Thus can one guess the content of the 65-paged illustrated biography of this revered personality by *Hebdo’s* edition of January, 2013. So when in

January 6, 2015 it featured a certain Michel Houellebecq‟s Islamophobic novel submission (perhaps for serialization) which forecasts, fictionally, the outlook of France in the hands of Muslim rulers in 2022, it was responded with violent attack on its office, leaving 12 of its staff dead. This was coming a couple of years after its Paris office was burnt down, and after *Hebdo* has been severally cleared off racial hatred charges to the chagrin of the several Muslim organizations who took it to court seeking redress since February 2007.

The January 7, 2015 attack aroused a lot of sympathy and support for *Hebdo* and the French government in general. There was solidarity match (or „unity rally‟) in Paris by some notable world leaders (Obama, Cameron, Mahmoud Abbas, Netanyahu, Markel et c) on the 11thand renewed, emotionally charged debates in the media over the latitude, nuances and preferences in treatment of free speech and human casualties (particularly when Facebook did a picture filter with French flag) *vis a vis* protests in some Muslim countries.

Two articles stand out: Teju Cole‟s *Unmournable Bodies* published in *The New York Times* of January 9, 2015, and Prof. Dabashi‟s *Je Suis Muslim* which appeared on *Aljazeera’s* website on 14th November, 2015. Both of them condemned the two attacks by ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in the strongest term possible, and the systematic othering of a segment of humanity on the other hand by the West which culminated into the tense and mistrustful atmosphere we are all wallowing in. Cole (2015) particularly seeks to belie the assumption that the West is a paradise of *liberte,* retrospecting as far as 1500s how people with heretical views were burnt at stake by the Inquisition, and how contemporarily information about torture and war-crime by the Western powers in other lands is strictly monopolized and attempt to divulge them criminalized (with severe repercussions) as in the case of *WikiLeak’s* Chelsea Manning

and Edward Snowden. While Dabashi (2015)‟s *Je Suis Muslim* critiques Barack Obama and David Cameron‟s speeches in Paris for systematic exclusion of the rest of the vast majority of Muslims from „the universal values that we share.‟ Taken collectively, these are liberal calls to view issues and events beyond what meet the eye.

The cases reviewed cannot claim to be exhaustive, however. There was, for example, Taslima Nasreen‟s Affair in Bangladesh, whose *Lajja* (a novel) stirred uproar and ban in 1993 (Hassan, 2010); the Texas-cartoon contest, *The Innocence of Muslims* film (Aswad *et al* 2014), and the annual Qur‟an burning by a pastor, Terry Jone, in commemoration of 9/11(Falk, 2011) – all were in public limelight but drew lesser controversies and discourses than the aforementioned cases.

# WESTERN MEDIA‟s PORTRAYAL OF ISLAM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE MUSLIM MINORITIES OF THE WEST

Curiously, scholars and reporters have drawn attention to the correlation between these provocative publications (which deride and typify Islam with terrorism to gauge the shock-absorbing capacity of Muslims world over) and the rising of Islamophobia in the West with its attendant negative consequences on the Muslim minorities of these countries. Allen (2001;2004) for example, recounts how Muslim women were thrown off moving bus or denied boarding; spat on and their Hijabs torn publicly, or verbally assaulted on account of their faith in such countries as Germany, Italy, Denmark and Britain. Hassan (2015) on the other hand, discusses how Muslim men were repeatedly shortchanged from job and educational opportunities particularly in Germany and France. While Power (2008) details their ordeals in workplaces especially in France and Spain.

All these repercussions are less than the idiomatic tip of the iceberg compared to what is documented in the *Same Hate, New Target: Islamophobia in the United States (January 2009-December 2010)* report by University of California, Berkeley Center for Race & Gender and Council on American-Islamic Relations as incidents of prejudices against Muslims in the US or anybody perceived as such. In it one gets overwhelmed with innumerable cases of abrupt jobs termination, harassment with racial slurs and physical attacks on persons and places of worship.

Coupled with above are the loss of lives and property occasioned by the „blasphemy‟ uproar. From Rushdie Affair to Miss World Pageant Contest in Nigeria; to the Danish Cartoons and Charlie Hebdo‟s hundreds of people have been killed in the process of reactions and counter-reactions. These have emboldened terrorist groups to intensify their attacks under the pretext of protecting the Prophet and Islam.

Writing in the *Hofstra Law Review*, Figueroa (2012) examined how constricted American legal system has become after 9/11 in terms of adjudicating in favour of constitutional rights. Specifically, he exposes how Islamophobia from officialdom shortchanges Americans‟ rights to receive information especially from the ideological Other, citing prominently, the cases of the Swiss-born modern Muslim philosopher, Tariq Ramadan, and the South African scholar, Adam Habib. „Islamophobia‟, he wrote,

„has diminished this fundamental right (the right to receive information) in America as evidenced by three types of situations: 1. Muslims have limited free speech rights in public; 2. Muslims do not share the same nonverbal speech rights as other groups; and

3. Islamophobia limits the marketplace of ideas by rejecting Muslim foreign scholars‟(p. 469).

Besides being a fellow in Oxford University, Ramadan is a regular guest speaker in various public fora in the US. He was ranked by *Time* magazine as one of the „top hundred most important innovators of the twenty-first century‟(Figueroa, 2012: 469). In January 2004, Indiana‟s Notre Dame University offered him a tenured professorship and applied for a visa on his behalf. But it was consistently denied by the government despite repeated attempts by both the University and Tariq himself, and legal actions challenging this by the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Academy of Religion, the American Association of University Professors and PEN American Center.

In *Why I’m Banned in the USA* (*Washington Post*, Oct.1, 2006), he said „I am increasingly convinced that the Bush administration has barred me for a much simpler reason…In recent years, I have publicly criticized U.S. policy in the Middle East, the war in Iraq, the use of torture, secret CIA prisons and other government actions that undermine fundamental civil liberties. And for many years, through my research and writing and speeches, I have called upon Muslims to better understand the principles of their faith, and have sought to show that one can be Muslim and Western at the same time.‟

Dr habib‟s case is quite similar with that of Ramadan. A South African scholar of Political Science and Executive Director of its Human Science Research Council‟s Programme on Democracy and Governance, Habib attended City University in New York for his Ph. D, and was regularly in the US for public lectures and meetings. He suddenly had his visa revoked and repatriated after disembarking in John F. Kennedy Airport in October 2006. No explanation was given to the South African officials and the US organizations who invited Habib despite inquiries. Habib also said that it might not be unconnected to his consistent criticisms of American foreign policies in Africa

and Middle East. Thus Figueroa (2012) concludes it is „ideological exclusion/viewpoint discrimination (which) directly affect(s) Americans‟ rights to receive information‟ (p.497).

# THE ROOT OF TENSION BETWEEN THE WEST AND MUSLIM WORLD

According to Abdallah (2005), Ruthven (1991) and Lewis (1990), the root of this tension and mutual revulsion which influences media narrative, public discourses and policies, dates back to seventh century and was precipitated by military confrontation between the West and the world of Islam which resulted in conquest and reconquest of each other‟s territory and sphere of influence. Muslim power and dominance extended to European countries such as Spain, Sicily, Portugal and some parts of France during the heydays of Islam between seventh and tenth century; Crusade retributed between 11th and 13th; Ottoman Turks reversed this balance and held sway over Balkans, Constantinople and twice attempted to capture Vienna between 14th and 17th century, then came the era of colonialism whence the imperial hegemony was felt in such Muslim countries as Egypt, Algeria and Libya, which was succeeded by the rise of nationalism and national independence among these colonized territories, among other things.

This competition for domination was largely orchestrated with religious zealotry. But with the triumph of secularism over religious dogma (as a result of Protestant Reformation and Enlightenment in the sixteen century), the conflict continued via secular institutions of the West (Bryan, 1974).

Dawn (1980:86) noted that right from the outset of their penetration, „Those Euro- Americans who have concerned themselves with the lands inhabited by Muslims have

throughout history thought of Islam as an entity in contradistinction to another entity, the West, which is Euro-American world… (they) generally have believed Islam to be radically different from the West or from other religions, notably Christianity.‟ For it to modernize, it has to reform its institutions and adopt such Western preconditions of development as secularism, freedom and democracy. It is in this drive that some Muslim countries (Turkey under Kamal Ataturk, Iran under Reza Khan and Egypt under Anwar Sadat) attempted to ape their Western models in all ramifications, but with relative success (Byran, 1974, Ruthven, 1991).

To latter scholars who wrote primarily for American foreign policy such as Lewis (1990), Huntington (1993; 2002) and Fukuyama (1989, 2002; 2014), Islam is a potential threat; a potent competitor to the West and an enemy that should be closely watched for its „combustibility‟ (as evident in the Iranian Revolution of ‟79) and from another enemy – communism. In *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, Lewis (1990) for example, contends that Muslims‟ resentment of the West is significantly caused by envy to latter‟s achievements in terms of material wealth, science and technology, successful separation of state and church and flexible political institutions which accommodate pluralism et c the experimentation of which failed in yielding the same result of modernity in most Middle Eastern Muslim countries. Hence the bitterness and disappointment which was further worsened by the increasing descent of Islam as a world power. (Not minding that Prof. Ernest Dawn had argued a decade earlier that „the feeling of hostility to the West (is) a sense of being victims of unfair exploitation by the West‟ (p.101).

In this fashionable drive of pitting the West against Islam, Fukuyama (1989; 2002) postulates that ideologies have reached their final stage of evolution and Western liberal democracy has come to stay as the ultimate form of government for mankind.

But it will have to contend intermittently with the forces of what he called „Islamo- fascism‟: „radical Islamists, intolerant of diversity and dissent‟ (p.58). On a general note he wrote, „The Islamic world differs from other world cultures today in one important respect. In recent years it alone has repeatedly produced significant radical Islamist movements that reject not just Western policies, but the basic principle of modernity itself, that of religious tolerance‟ (p.61). (But) „the present conflict is not simply a fight against terrorism, nor against Islam as a religion or civilization, but rather with Islamo-fascism - that is, the radically intolerant and antimodern doctrine that has recently arisen in many parts of the Muslim world…Wahhabi ideology easily qualifies as Islamo-fascist‟ (p.62).

Samuel Huntington, who Fukuyama acknowledges as having tremendous influence on him (2014), had earlier on, beat the same drum of bellicosity in *The Clash of Civilizations?* (1993) and its sequel where he theorizes that the future world conflict after the Cold War will be fought along cultural lines as countries in the world are increasingly identifying and aligning with their cultural similar to form major civilizational fronts. The United States needs to be abreast of such alliances in preparation of impending clash of civilizations with particularly Islamic-Confucian front as the major threat to Western „interests, values and power‟ (p.45). The same argument is extended to his *Age of Muslim War* (2002) wherein he, more disturbingly, concludes that even if the conflict between Islam and the West is resolved, it will „be succeeded by a new era dominated by other forms of violence among the world‟s people‟ (p13); thus giving the impression of a world of endless wars. At this juncture and with little regard to context, Huntington seems to be rehashing the argument of the British poet, novelist and journalist, Rudyard Kipling (1936), especially where he says:

*Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet*

*Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgement seat;*

One of the most authoritative voices prominent in the global public sphere who argue quite fearlessly that „the semantic field of Islam‟, nay, the entire gamut of scholarship by the Westerners about the Middle East, Arabs and Islam is bias, „narrow and constricted‟, is Edward Said, a Professor of Comparative Literature in Columbia University and leading post-colonial theorist/critic. His *Orientalism* (1978) set the ball of this discourse rolling, where inter alia, he interrogated: why when the Middle East is mentioned, for example, certain images come to mind about the people and the culture there even if one has never met anyone from there? Why these images and imageries remain immutable for centuries? Are the people not evolving? What connections are there between such scholarship and political power? In a word, he said, „the Orient is Orientalized‟ (p.202) for a convenient Other.

In *Covering Islam* (1981) and *Islam Through Western Eyes* (1980), Said indicted media as a major accomplice in problematizing the definition of Islam and that the Oriental scholars from whom the media derive input, are not without motives – political, religious and economic. He further argued that it is chronically naïve to take incidents in one or few countries and make them typical of all and the religion. Islam is quite vast and diverse than the monolithic thing given by the media. In other words, there is lack of serious, honest engagement with Islam and little concern for „extra-media‟ data.

What we have instead is a limited series of crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world presented in such a way as, among other things, to make that world vulnerable to military aggression… The views of the experts and of the media are nearly identical on this. Far from attempting to refine, or even dissent from, the gross image of Islam as a threat, the intellectual and policy community in the United States has considerably enforced and concentrated the image. From Zbigniew Brzezinski‟s vision of the “crescent of crisis” to Bernard Lewis‟s “return of Islam,” the picture drawn is a unanimous one. “Islam” means the end of civilization as “we” know it… Assiduous research has shown that there is hardly a prime-time television show without several episodes of patently racist and insulting caricatures of Muslims, all of whom tend to be represented in unqualified categorical and generic terms: one

Muslim is therefore seen to be typical of all Muslims and of Islam in general… To the extent that Islam is known about today principally in the form given it by the mass media: not only radio, films and TV but also textbooks, magazines and best- selling, high-quality novels. This corporate picture of Islam on the whole is a depressing and misleading one. What emerges is that Ayatollah Khomeini, Col. Muammar e-Qaddafi, Sheik Ahmad Zaki Yamani and Palestinian terrorists are the best known figures in the foreground, while the background is populated by shadowy (though extremely frightening) notion about *jihad*, slavery, subordination of women and irrational violence combined with extreme licentiousness. If you were to ask an average literate Westerner to name an Arab or Islamic writer, or a musician, or an intellectual, you might get a name like Kahlil Gibran in response, but nothing else. In other words, whole swatches of Islamic history, culture and society simply does not exist except in the truncated, tightly packaged forms made current by the media. (Said,1981:26, 69; 1980: 6 & 8).

(Butler (2009:134) too made the same argument, calling this sort of characterization

„not only an unjustified generalization but also racism.‟ Lemu‟s (1978) *Woman in Islam* also echoed similar remarks about how misinformed or totally uninformed the average educated westerner is about Muslims and Islamic culture).

In *The Clash of Definitions* (2000) and *The Myth of the Clash Civilizations* (1998), Said wore the toga of peace scholarship and took back squarely on Lewis and Huntington, arguing that the latter in particular, is selfishly bent on expanding the scope of the Cold War through all means possible so as to keep his ilk in the American security enterprise afloat, and that both relied hugely on second and third-hand sources to arrive at conclusion rather than rigorous engagement with the original cultural sources of scholarship that will enable us understand, actually, the current global situation. „A brief look at the people and opinions he quotes suggest that journalism and popular demagoguery are his main sources rather than serious scholarship or theory. When you draw on tendentious publicists and scholars, you already prejudice the argument in favour of conflict and polemic rather than in true understanding and the kind of cooperation between peoples that our planet needs‟ (1998:3). „Like Lewis,‟ Said (2000) continued,

Huntington defines Islamic civilization reductively, as if what matters most about it is its supposed anti-Westernism… I do not want to spend much time discussing the lamentable features of Lewis‟s creed; elsewhere I have described his methods – the lazy generalizations, the reckless distortions of history, the whole demotion of civilizations into categories like irrational and enraged, and so on. Few people today with any sense would want to volunteer such sweeping characterizations as the one advanced by Lewis about more than a billion Muslims, scattered throughout at least five continents, speaking dozens of differing languages, and possessing various traditions and histories. All he says about them is that they are all enraged at Western modernity, as if a billion people were but one and Western civilization were no more complicated matter than a simple declarative sentence… But the truly weakest part of the clash of civilizations thesis is the rigid separation assumed among civilizations, despite overwhelming evidence that today‟s world is in fact a world of mixtures, of migrations, of crossings overs. There are no insulated cultures or civilizations. Any attempt made to separate them into the water-tight compartments alleged by Huntington does damaged to their variety, their diversity, their sheer complexity of elements, their radical hybridity.

In *Orientalism Reconsidered*, Said (2000) re-examined the role of intellectuals‟ meticulousness and independence in scholarship, and the politics of racism, on the other hand, in (re)constructing the societies, cultures and histories of the Other (again the Orient, Arabs and Islam as fixed and threat, are the focal point of clarification from the obfuscation of Daniel Pipes).

However, Said himself never went unscathed by counter-critique. Porter (1994), for example, said in all this Said has not been able to provide alternative systematic methodology to dichotomizing knowledge from ideology, or explain how certain counter-mainstream voices in Oriental studies emerged from the sea of „dominant hegemonic formation‟ (p.153). While Ahmad (1994) views *Orientalism* as self- contradictory in some respect and collapses *Covering Islam* as Said „most forgettable book‟ for being too exonerative of Islam and Khomenei‟s politics.

But from the emergence of such scholars as Karen Amstrong, Judith Butler, Christopher Allen and Tariq Ramadan, from the speeches of former President Obama (in Cairo and Maryland mosque (Hasan, 2016) about Muslims‟ contributions to US greatness; from the UC Center of Race & Gender and CAIR report and the

condemnation from World leaders that followed Donald Trump‟s campaign policies against immigrantsand his stand on Jerusalem as Israel‟s capital, one gets a succor of some sorts that the future heralds a world of accommodativeness, of pluralism, of crossings over and peaceful intermingle among races, religions and cultures.

# THE VICISSITUDES OF WESTERN BLASPHEMY LAWS & SOLUTIONS TO TENSION

In tracing the historical evolution of freedom of expression, we have seen how Western countries have been busy since the end of Renaissance, distilling human rights (speech freedom inclusive) into coherent legal framework. The effort resulted in England‟s *Bill of Rights* (1689), France‟s *Declaration of the Right of Man and that of the Citizen* (1789), *First Amendment* and *American Convention on Human Rights* (1791). These were complemented by specific articles on freedom of press and expression in the respective constitutions of these countries.

However, knowing fully the aftereffect of untrammelled freedom (Holocaust in mind), these countries have also legislated on some restrictions which include official secrecy, defamation, sedition, obscenity, incitement to violence and racial hatred, among others, to protect the citizens from the excesses of particularly media messages. Sensitive of religious differences which can easily be trespassed and consequently trigger civil unrest, blasphemy laws were equally promulgated in several Western countries, which include: United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Netherland, Spain, Brazil, Canada, Finland and Poland. The Criminal Code of Canada (296), for example, states that „everyone who publishes a blasphemous libel is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years‟. While the Penal Code of Finland (10) maintains that „a person who publicly blasphemes against God or, for the

purpose of offending, publicly defames or desecrates what is otherwise by a church or religious community… shall be sentenced for a breach of the sanctity of religion to a fine or to imprisonment for at most six month‟. Poland‟s Criminal Code (196) mandates a maximum of two years in jail for the same offence, while Spain‟s Criminal Code

(525) leaves the punishment discretionary – between eight and twelve months imprisonment (Mahmood, 2009, [www.humanrightsfirst.org>](http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/)default>files)

Some states in the US (Michigan, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Massachusetts and Wyoming) still do have blasphemy laws in their respective statutes. For example, Michigan‟s law states that „Any person who shall willfully blaspheme the holy name of God, by cursing or contumeliously reproaching God, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor‟; upon conviction such a person „shall be punished by imprisonment in jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars…‟ according to Massachusetts statute (Aswad *et al,*2014:130).

Based on the blasphemy law, four people were reportedly hanged in Massachusetts in 1660. However, these laws remain nominal and redundant having been ruled over by the US Supreme Court in 1952 in *Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson* whence the court decided that „…it is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine…‟ (Aswad *et al*, 2014:130).

As of 2011, virtually half of the countries in the world (47%) have blasphemy and other related laws and policies - specifically 32 out of 198 countries (16%) have unequivocal blasphemy laws, according to Pew Research Center (cited in Aswad *et al* (2014). These blasphemy laws are obviously promulgated with the implicit intention of protecting especially the main religion of the land (Christianity in the West and Islam in the East – cases in Britain and Turkey have respectively proven that). But with the constant influx

of immigrants across the divides, especially of Africans and Muslims crossing to the West, the world has become so hybridized with people of different races, religions and nationalities cohabiting the same geographic space.

The West, according to one narrative (Aswad *et al*, 2014, Callamard, 2006, *Telegraph*, 2008, May 10th), therefore feels blasphemy laws portend the possibility of discriminating one religion/religious group over the other(s), and making the state the ultimate arbiter of religious right. Hence the essential dormancy of these laws in Western countries. „In the United Kingdom, for example, there have been only two prosecutions for blasphemy since 1923; Norway saw its last case in 1936 and Denmark in 1938. Other countries, including Sweden and Spain, have repealed their blasphemy laws‟ (Callamard, 2006:3).

The government of UK which successfully banned the circulation and fought the certification of *Vision of Ecstasy* (a film „showing Jesus seduced on the crossed‟, Evans, 2012, Jan. 13th) in the European Human Right Court, and before its very eye had Denis Lemon, the publisher of *Gay News*, punished „for printing a poem about Roman centurion‟s love for Jesus,‟ (*Telegraph*, 2008, May 10th), followed the suit of repealing in 2008 and certified the aforementioned movie in 2012.

The underlying motive of these scrapping may be linked to the Western idea of development believed to widen up with increasing secularization – continuous shedding off of religion‟s relevance in particularly public sphere. But since the aftermath of 9/11, there has been intensified satirization of Islam and Muslims in Western media vis-à-vis their outcry about the attendant backlash which affects their security and wellbeing in such countries where they are minorities (Allen, 2004, 2001). The Danish cartoons‟ uproar, *Charlie Hebdo*‟s and *Innocent of Muslims* video are the most visible instances

thus far; rivaled in magnitude of controversy by such cases as the *Satanic Verses* of yore.

Mahmood (2009) argues that there is high degree of personal intimacy between practicing Muslims and the persona of the Prophet which appears quite unintelligible to the Western liberal mind. „The Aristotlean term *schesis*‟, according to her,

captures this living relation because of its heightened psychophysiological and emotional connotations and its emphasis on familiarity and intimacy as a necessary aspect of the relation. What interests me in this iconophile tradition is not so much the image as the concept of relationality that binds the subject to the object of veneration. Those who profess love for the Prophet do not simply follow his advice and admonition to the *umma* (that exist in the form of the *hadith*), but also try to emulate how he dressed; what he ate; how he spoke to his friends and adversaries; how he slept, walked, and so on. These mimetic ways of realizing the Prophet‟s behavior are lived not as commandments but as virtues where one wants to ingest as it were, the Prophet‟s persona into oneself… Muhammad, in this understanding, is not simply a proper noun referring to a particular historical figure, but the mark of a relation of similitude… The sense of moral injury that emanates from such a relationship between the ethical subject and the figure of exemplarity (such as Muhammad) is quite distinct from one that the notion of blasphemy encodes. The notion of moral injury I am describing no doubt entails a sense of violation, but this violation emanates not from the judgment that “the law” has been transgressed but from the perception that one‟s being, grounded as it is in a relationship of dependency with the Prophet, has been shaken (Mahmood, 2009:75-78).

To get out of this psychological quagmire they are subjected to by these caricatures, Mahmood (2009) further argues, the European Muslim minorities can only find solace; not redress from legal measures (through, specifically, European hate speech laws and the precedent laid by European Commission of Human Rights to curtail free speech in the interest of public order - provision to which the European Muslims often turned to for protection). Their efforts thus will „encounter strong challenges…because of structural constraints internal to secular liberal law, its definition of what religion is, and its ineluctable sensitivity to majoritarian cultural sensibilities‟ (p.79). (Butler (2009) too maintains that it is „less a legal question‟ (p.119), rather a broader cultural polarity between those at home with secular values and those at odd - a chasm which

contemporary Muslim philosophers like Tariq Ramadan are striving to bridge). For example, in the cases of *Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria* (1994) and *Wingrove v. United Kingdom* (1997) in which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) upheld both Austrian and British governments‟ decisions of banning the circulation of two movies adjudged offensive to Christian sensibilities, it was the social order and religious peace that were invoked; not blasphemy laws of these countries. For, the second clause of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) recommends that member states can limit free speech where there is obvious/latent threat to „national security, territorial integrity, public safety, health and morals of a society, or reputations and rights of others‟ (Mahmood, 2009:85). Naturally, Mahmood argues further, the jurisprudence of these countries, including the ECtHR, privileges the culture and religion of the majority, as result of which the Muslim minorities continuously feel discriminated and marginalized.

In such a majoritarian consideration, the same court favoured the decision of Turkey on banning a book in *I. A. v. Turkey* (2005) – a sensibility which, locally, the Rigiyar Lemu court arguably succumbed to in the case of Abul Nyass (see Richard Wright‟s *Native Son* for a fictional rendition of this argument). Conversely, El Saadawi (2004) also draws attention to the lopsidedness of judicial system in the Arab world in which justice is unevenly dispensed among people of particularly different gender. Perhaps that is why the French writer, Balzac, equates laws with cobwebs – capable of catching only the small flies.

The future of the Muslim communities in Europe and America, therefore, is suspended often on axis of „assimilation and marginalization‟ with less concern on adaptability, according to Mahmood, hence it is doubtful if the cultural space will be expanded to accommodate them. But Butler (2009) is optimistic that through sustained discussion

some headway can be forged; a concession of some sort arrived. And „curiosity‟ in our differences rather than mistrust and resentment, Galtung (2013c) opines, will thus breed

„dialogue‟, „brainstorming‟, „mutual learning‟ and „respect‟. At the end of all this the decision as to what freedom of expression entails and whose freedom curtailed would be a collective rather than state monopoly.

These are differences to be worked out through cohabitation and struggle, through participation in public discourse, through cultural and educational projects, allowing modes of separateness to coincide with modes of belonging (and not trying to close the fissure between the two). These are surely better strategies than appealing to a state that makes use of the defense of “freedom” to reassert its national purity – its racist conception of culture- as the precondition of reason, modernity, and civilization, and to halt all public criticism of the way it polices its borders and patrols its minority populations. (Butler, 2009:134)

In his *Reply to Judith Butler*, Asad (2009b.) agreed to these submissions, particularly her „insistence that intellectual inquiries into events such as the Danish cartoon scandal must go beyond the normative judicial framework…‟(p.137). Aswad *et al* (2014) too arrived at strikingly similar conclusion in *Why the United States Cannot Agree to Disagree on Blasphemy Law.*

The consensual point of these scholars cum debaters therefore is on the reconfiguration of such sensitive discourses to tilt more towards ethics and culture than the realms of politics and law, notwithstanding their intertwinement and interdependence. In all this, however, Mahmood (2009) concludes, the Muslims have an extra obligation in the

„transformations of their socio-economic power base, of their political and cultural legibility as European citizens (rather than imposter immigrants), and of their participation in civic and political life‟ (p.152).

# MIDDLE EAST: BLASPHEMY CONTROVERSY AND LEGAL DIVERSITY

In the Middle East, Pakistan‟s blasphemy law which mandates the execution/life sentencing and fining the blasphemer, has been a source of tension not only within the nation but in its relation with other nations. Article 295 (c) of the country‟s Penal Code states that „[w]hoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine‟.

Writing in the *Huffington Post* (June, 15, 2014), Faisal Kutty, an Associate Professor of Law in Valparaiso University, argues that such laws have no legal basis in Islamic Jurisprudence and were actually colonial legacies bequeathed to most of these countries in a bid to preempt religious unrest in such multi-cultural societies. Specifically, he points out that Pakistan‟s law had it origin in British blasphemy law of India which dates back to as far as 1860, and whose aura was active in Britain itself as late as 1992, according to Ravy (2012). „It took the US Supreme Court over 150 years to overcome this colonial legacy when it finally ruled that blasphemy bans were unconstitutional in 1952‟Aswad *et al* (2014:133).

Investigation by *Reuters* (Mar. 14th,2014), *Aljazeera America* (June 18/20th, 2015) and Kutty (June, 15, 2014) reveal that although nobody has been officially executed in Pakistan for blasphemy, many (20) have been convicted and serving life-imprisonment. Over 60 people were similarly killed mainly through extra-judicial and mob-lynching since 1990. These include a popular Punjab governor, Salman Taseer, who was shot by his own bodyguard for criticizing the law as unIslamic in 2011; a Federal Minister for Minorities Affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti, who was assassinated after being commissioned by the federal government to re-examine Aasia Noreen‟s blasphemy case and review the law itself, and the murder of Rashid Rehman, a defendant lawyer to the University

Professor, Junaid Haffeez, in blasphemy charges, among other defendant lawyers who met the same fate this way. On the other hand, a prominent Islamic scholar, Javed Ahmad, had to leave the country in 2011 to save his life for subscribing to the criticism of the law.

There seems to be selective media hype and focus on Pakistan‟s blasphemy law in comparison to Malaysian, Saudi Arabian and Iranian laws which contain similar prescription. (On a similar note, Siraj (2007) buttresses this when he empirically concludes that both *New York Times* and *Washington Post* framed Pakistan quite unfavourably in their coverage of Indian-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir). Invariably, countries such as Turkey, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, United Arab Emirate and Bahrain that practice *ta’zir* (deterrent) punishment from 10 days to 7years are hardly subjects of media and scholarly discourses ([www.humanrightsfirst.org>](http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/)default>files). But *The Economist* of March 14th, 2014, citing a report of United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, opines that „the USCIRF is certainly right to stress that blasphemy laws can become a deadly weapon in the hands of an individual or faction with a personal or political grudge. That sort of abuse is widely reported in Pakistan, a country which the report singles out as by far the worst offender. The report lists 14 individuals known to be on death row for blasphemy and 19 others serving life sentences; countless others have been arrested for the “crime” and are awaiting sentencing…‟ Jamil (2016), on the other hand, has underscored how Pakistani journalists recoil on blasphemy and other religiously sensitive issues for fear of their safety which consequently affects their professional practices and the overall exercise of freedom of expression.

Although Egypt also belongs to the *ta’zir* category, it has been constantly chided by the US government for consistently prosecuting people on blasphemy ground. This may

not be unconnected to the fact that in both Egypt and Pakistan some of these controversies involved the Christian minorities of these countries and often mired in interpersonal altercation (Aswad *et al,* 2014).

# FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

A number of scholars (Hedges 2015, Cottee 2011, Falk 2011, Hill and Fenner 2010; Chandler and Munday 2011) posit that freedom of expression is the product and blessing of The Enlightenment – a period (from the second half of 17th century down to the 18th i.e between 1650 and 1799) of remarkable development in the intellectual history of the West, characteristically notable for radical and rational approach to issues whether religious, moral, scientific or cultural without much regard to dogma and tradition. This era gave rise to Protestant movement that sought serious reform of Catholic ideals and dogma. As the Age of Reason preceding Renaissance, Enlightenment allowed secularism, human right and the idea of representative government inter alia to flourish through the philosophical opinions of notable figures as Immanuel Kant, John Milton, Edmund Burke and J. S. Mill. In his 1784 *What is Enlightenment?*, Kant describes it as an epoch of

man‟s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity – immaturity is the inability to use one‟s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! “Have courage to use your own understanding!” – that is the motto of Enlightenment. (Hill and Fenner, 2011:8)

However, to those familiar with the scriptures, this view of freedom of expression emerging from The Enlightenment is contestable. It is rather a feature that evolved and developed with God‟s creatures right before the creation of mankind, transmuting into various shades and forms over time in human history, as it will most probably continue to undergo definitional modification in the future. In other words, freedom of

expression with its glamorous character of dissent and fearlessness, is a God-giving right as graphically illustrated in the pages of the Qur‟an, and particularly in the incident involving God Almighty and the angels on the one hand; God and Satan on the other hand, over the creation of Adam and his progeny (Q.2:30-35, 7:12-13, 17:61-62). Whereas Wein (2008), Pember and Calvert (2008) concur that it is a God-given right, Neher and Sandhir (2007) aver that it is a tradition „associated with prophetic communication (p.29)‟. Adding that „[i]n the Old Testament, the most striking example may be the case of Nathan, who admonished King David for wrongdoing‟.

It can be surmised that God has ingrained this attribute in human physiology hence naturally took it for granted to say „thou shalt have freedom of expression‟, but allowed its manifestations to be evident in the passages of the Scriptures with unequivocally strong emphasis on precautionary measures so that we do not trample on cherished values or hurt our fellows.

As a final note on this, it is imperative to mention that the notion of free speech is inextricably knitted to freewill – which presupposes that the individual can think and act as they wish but ultimately bear the brunt of their temerity.

According to Rodman (2006), controversies over freedom of expression „have raged *at least* (emphasis mine) since the times of the ancient Greeks, who debated whether anyone other than the male landowners should be allowed to express views in public (475)‟. As does Asad (2009), Okpoko (2014) too conceded and added that „it is an idea that had crude beginnings with its roots in ancient antiquity dating back (sic) the times of Greek city-states…(p41).‟ But Egbon (2001) credited the famous English poet, John Milton (1608-74) as the first person to pen an eloquent defence of freedom of expression when he evaded prior licensing and stated in his *Areopagitica* that, „Truth

needs no licensing to make her victorious. Let her and falsehood grapple, who ever knew truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter? Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberty.‟

This was consequent to the official threat of prosecution he was confronted with for printing and releasing unlicensed material which advocated freedom of divorce. The most notable disciple of Milton‟s self-righting principle in both theory and practice, according Baran and Davis (2009), was America‟s third president, Thomas Jefferson, who as if paraphrasing Milton, wrote: „that truth is great and will prevail if left to herself, that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict, unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate (p.101).‟ Similarly, he was often quoted to have said to a friend that „[w]ere it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without government, I should not hesitate to prefer the latter.‟

Obviously, even before the invention of Gutenberg‟s printing press in 1450s, censorship seems typical of Renaissance and other periods predating it in Western history. In *On Liberty* for example, Mill (1859) lamented the execution of Socrates who was allegedly put to death for unorthodox views that corrupted the youths of Athens. (This is despite his self-censorship in articulating some views he perceived to be

„awkward‟ for the time. For instance, on the notion of philosopher-king, he said to Glaucon, „…This is what for so long was causing my hesitation to speak: seeing how very paradoxical it would be to say (Bloom, 1968, trans. Bk V. p. 473).‟

Such was the faith of Galileo in 1633, of Dolet in 1546, of William Prynn in 1637, and the bane of Professor David Irving in Austria for denying the Holocaust (Okoye, 2007,

Kperogi, 2006, Bumstead,1992). Religious history is also replete with similar instances of repression through torture and persecution (Hussain, 2006, Khalid & Eliwa,2003). Haykal (2008:322) elucidates on how the Prophet‟s companions were „subjected to all sorts of maltreatment and contemptuous humiliation‟ for expression of unorthodoxy which latter became the mainstream. A fictional rendition of state suppression of

„subversive‟ expressions can be found in George Orwell‟s *Nineteen Eighty-Four.*

Moreover, Athens‟ free speech philosophy emerged and grew up with other democratic values in the 6th and 5th century BC. But became formalized in the Islamic world during Caliph Umar (r.a.) in the 7th century AC. In Modern history, three vociferous Western thinkers are credited with the coherent formulation and dogged propagation of freedom of expression: John Milton (1608-74), John Locke (1632-1704) and John Stuart Mill (1806-73). Milton‟s *Areopagitica* and Mill‟s *On Liberty* stand out in this regard. In the latter for instance, Mill (1859), like Milton quoted above, forcefully argues that

[t]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error …If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind (p.10).

Despite the uncommon valor and absolutist aura he imbued *On Liberty* with, Mill never lost the sight to aver that the marketplace of ideas is censorable if there is discernable harm to others, especially society‟s gullibles (children and youths). Locke too, notable in this context for his advocacy of diversity and tolerance, has been on record urging the authorities of his time not to allow atheistic ideas to permeate the society if peace

and social order were to be maintained, or if the ideal society attained, in the fashion of Socrates and Plato.

The proper distillation of this right into legal framework with clearly defined limitations was heralded about the same time – when in 1689 England‟s *Bill of Rights* specifically granted the parliament this freedom. Then followed by the French National Assembly‟s *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* in 1789 which in article 11 states that „the free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man. Any citizen may therefore speak, write and publish freely, except what tantamount to the abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by Law.‟

However, the most arguably liberal assertion of this right can be found in what is famously referred to as the First Amendment promulgated in 1791 by America‟s founding fathers which in part, says „congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;…‟ This has attracted enormous controversies with radical jurists like Hugo Black unwaveringly reaffirming that „No law means no law… My view is, without deviation, without exception, without any ifs, buts, or whereases, that freedom of speech means that government shall not do anything to people, either for the views they have or the views they express, or the words they speak or write (Baran, 2012:395).‟

But according to Pember and Calvert (2008), Black was unable to convince and persuade his colleagues to subscribe to the limitlessness of speech and press freedom throughout his tenure in the Supreme Court of the New World. Hence jurists like Anthony Kennedy, Holmes and Felix Frankfurter, among other dissidents, maintain that several forms of speech such as incitement to violence and illegal conduct, defamation, obscenity et c, cannot be allowed to ventilate under the guise of speech

freedom (Fish, 2003, Koch, 2008, Mowlana & Wilson, 1988). Thus Holmes‟ words,

„free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing panic (Baran, 2012:397)‟ become popular. Along this line William Blackstone opines that „everyman has the undoubted right to lay what sentiment he pleases before the public… to forbid that is to destroy the freedom of the press – but if he publishes what is illegal or mischievous, he must face the consequences of his temerity (Malemi, 2009:11).‟ To them therefore, untrammeled right is an invitation to chaos.

Seven different theories on this amendment (absolutist, ad hoc balancing, Meiklejohnian, marketplace of ideas, access, self-realization, and preferred position balancing theories) have emerged offering differing opinions as interpretation (Pember and Calvert, 2008).

Besides the oft-cited UN‟s *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* assertion in article 19, freedom of expression is also recognised and encapsulated in *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* of 1966, *African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights* of 1981, and *American Convention on Human Rights* in articles 19, 9 and 13 respectively. So also in the constitutions of most countries of the world. In the 20th century, Chomsky‟s view about the philosophical underpinning of free speech is the most widely quoted; quoted below:

If you believe in freedom of speech, you believe in freedom of speech for the views you don‟t like. Stalin and Hitler, for example, were dictators in favour of freedom of speech for views they liked only. If you‟re in favour of freedom of speech, that means you are in favour of freedom of speech precisely for views you despise (Breindl, 2009:917).

On a final note, the essence of freedom of expression should not be lost in the diversity and conflict of opinions. Scholars (Ogbondah 2011, Yusuf, 2010, Momoh, 2010, Baran, 2009, Breindl, 2009, Baran & Davis, 2009, Koch, 2008, Ogbondah, 2003, GCFE, 2000, Demac & Downing, 1995, Mowlana & Wilson, 1988, Reader‟s Digest, 1973 et c) have

drawn our attention to its vitality in truth-seeking, self-realization and autonomy, tolerance and effective working of democracy – with its use, misuse and abuse in the internet opening a new vista of discussion (Conway, 2006, Dahlgren, 2005, Terzis & Smeets, 2006).

# RELIGIONS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CASE OF ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY

In his *Freedom of Expression in Islam,* Kamali (2010) reaffirms that Islam considers freedom of speech not only a right but a duty especially where truth, justice and general public wellbeing are at stake. The exercise of this freedom is embedded in such concepts as *hurriyyatal-ra’y* (freedom to hold and express opinion), *hurriyyat al- mu’aaradah* (freedom to criticize especially government officials), *hisbah* (promotion of good and prevention of evil), *shura* (consultation), *nasihah* (sincere advice) and *ijtihaad* (personal reasoning). All these aforementioneds enjoy the support of the Qur‟anic verses and/or ahadith of the Prophet (s.a.w.) theoretically, with their practical exemplification found in the Sunnah and the lifestyle of the companions particularly those who led the Ummah after the Prophet.

However, it is pertinent to state from the outset that something is considered halal (allowed) in Islam when it is permitted in the Qur‟an; the Prophet said or did it, or approved of its doing tacitly by being silent in the face of it. On freedom of opinion for example, Kamali (2010:64) notes that „on numerous occasions the Qur‟an invites people to investigate and explore the world around them, and to draw rational conclusions, not in the manner of blind imitators who follow and accept what others have said, but through intelligent analysis and judgement.‟ In other words, God has consistently encouraged us to stimulate our intellect to „think‟, „ponder‟ and „reflect‟

over issues and events be they spiritual or temporal, so as to arrive at sound, independent opinion that will benefit all and sundry. Not only that, He has equally instructed His prophet (s.a.w.) to seek and consider the opinions of his companions (Q. 3:159) on both state and personal affairs on the basis of their merits. Thus do we regularly find him (s.a.w.) saying „speak out, o men, and give me your counsel (Haykal, 2008:508).‟ Other glaring illustrations of this can be seen in a number of incidents when some notable companions respectively formed a different opinion from the Prophet‟s and raised their sincere objection (criticism if you like) to his opinion – when, for example, the Prophet suggested what to be done strategically as defensive measures during the battle of Kandaq (The Ditch), Salman Al-Farisi, that cosmopolitan companion knowledgeable in warfare owing to his Persian (royal) background, humbly inquired whether what the Prophet stated was a revelation from God or his opinion, when the Prophet replied that it was the later, Salman recommended the digging of ditch at the surrounding of Madina. It was obliged, and consequently proved quite efficacious.

Similarly, Umar Ibn Al-Khattab vehemently raised his eyebrows on the unfair terms the Prophet endorsed during the Treaty of Hudaybiyah with the Quraish leaders; A‟isha (r.a.) too objected when the Prophet (s.a.w.), incapacitated by sickness, commanded that Abu Bakr (r.a.) should lead the congregation. Alternatively, the Great Rasool bowed to Umm Salama‟s opinion on the ritual of haircut when the companions resisted after the truce of Hudaybiyah. And despite their closeness as the most senior companions, Abu Bakr and Umar held irreconcilable opinions and each forcefully argued his position over what to be done to the captives of Badr (Khalid, 2005, Haykal, 2008, Khalid & Eleiwa, 2003).

Moreover, for the truth to be discovered and appreciated against the fluidity of falsehood, God encourages debate, as veritable platform where freedom of expression would apparently allow honest and robust cross-fertilization of divergent opinions akin to the Western concept of *marketplace of ideas.* See Qur‟an 16:125 and 2:258 for the theoretical and practical justification of this claim and juxtapose with how Al-Mamun, that illustrious Abbasid caliph, took this practice to its zenith via his *Baitul Hikmah* (House of Wisdom) – which was largely a congregation of scholars, astronomers and philosophers (Ali, 1998, Rahim, 2001).

Although freedom of opinion and expression find sufficient ground in both the Qur‟an and Sunnah, the caliphs who led the Ummah after the messenger (s.a.w.) promoted the exercise thereof. In his inaugural speech as caliph, Abu Bakr invited the people to correct him whenever he faltered, and „what is your opinion?‟ become identifiable with Uthman (r.a.). But Umar precedence is unparalleled in the caliphal history as the following incidents illustrate:

One day Umar was on the pulpit, craving for silence to address the companions. One of them, Salman al-Farisi, stood and defied him, saying, „we are not going to listen till you explain to us how you come about having two pieces of cloth from the booty while each of us got one‟. The Caliph invited his son to speak in lieu. When they learnt the other belonged to the son, Salman urged him to speak on so that they could listen. What this reveals is the freedom of expression enjoyed by the first generation so much so that a common citizen, who was an ex-slave, could fearlessly demand for accountability from such a powerful ruler as Umar. It is so remarkable when compared with the stifling oppression operating particularly in the contemporary Muslim countries.

In another instance, a lady resisted the Caliph when he insisted on confiscating any addition to the commonly accepted amount as dowry. She fearlessly justified with a Qur‟anic verse (4:20), that Umar (r.a.) had no right whatsoever to take back an ounce from any amount hitherto given as dowry. Unhesitatingly, Umar submitted, admitting that the woman was right and he was wrong (Khalid, 2005).

Furthermore, when Umar sternly gazed at Hasaan, a distinguished poet at work with his craft in the mosque of the Prophet, he looked back and addressed the caliph squarely that he was reciting poetry inside it before a one more pious than Umar – referring to the Prophet (s.aw.). On that, Umar was said to have taken his exit without uttering a word. The same thing happened when he took by surprise some companions reported to have been brewing wine in one house. All things being equal, they unperturbingly explained to him that theirs was a minor offence compared to his. For in the process of arresting them, he had violated three injunctions in the Qur‟an – spying (XLIX:12), entering another‟s house through the back door (11:189), and without permission and extending greeting of peace (Qur‟an XXIV: 27) (Al- Asqalani,1996, Sanusi, n.d.).

This noble companion obviously came to term with freedom of expression the hard way – at a point in time when an Arab from the desert addressed the Prophet rudely and Umar, who was present, attempted to exert some retribution but the Prophet deterred him, saying: „Let him, O Umar, for the claimant has the right to speak (Khalid, 2005:180)‟.

On the other hand, the Qur‟anic injunction of promoting good and preventing evil unequivocally stated that „Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: they are the ones to attain felicity (Q.3:104, Ali, 1998, trans)‟. This is supported by a hadith which says „if any of you sees something, he should set it right with his hand; if he is unable to do so,

then with his tongue, and if he is unable to do even that, then (let him denounce it) in his heart. But this is the weakest form of faith (Kamali, 2010:31, trans.).‟ According to Barzinji (1998), the exercise of this principle includes holding leaders accountable for their actions or inactions and condemnation of injustice in all spheres of life.

The exercise of *Ijtihaad* (personal reasoning) on the other hand, entails a measure of intellectual exertion to deduce the import of Shariah on religious or temporal issues where there is no clear text of reference. All these are intrinsic and translatable into reality where there is freedom of expression, as Kamali (2010) maintains; positing further that the rights are accompanied by responsibilities. Hence freedom of expression in Islam is circumscribed by legal and moral constraints which include slanderous accusation, libel, sedition, insult and blasphemy on one hand; lying, backbiting, ridicule and calling others by offensive names, acrimonious speech, unrestricted jocularity, sycophancy, prying and exposing the weaknesses of others, on the other hand (Q. 49:11-12, 4:148, 24:19, 6:108 et c Ali (1998) trans.).

Much of what we discussed above as the philosophy of freedom of expression rhymes in tandem with the orthodox Christian viewpoint as Miller (2013) buttressed in *What the Bible Says about Freedom of Speech.* According to her, the basic principle of free speech (nay freedom as a whole) is for the discovery of truth through which man will be free from the bondage of sin and deceit as Jesus said in John 8:32 (KJV, 1979). With anecdotal references from the scripture, the author concludes that the idea of absolute freedom of whatever is bogus as from the outset God set a limit for Adam and Eve; the trespass of which robbed them of their blissful life in the garden of felicity as recounted in the Book of Genesis chapter three. Hence society needs to be censored from freedom that will harm others or pervert the minds of children. In the same vein, Nitisor (2007), Counterblast (2006, probably a pseudonym) and Okpoko (2014) reviewed in detail how

the Church, as early as AD 494, collaborated with the state to burn and ban books that were deemed blasphemous, heretical and inimical to Christian sensibilities or would endanger public order. Thus did the Talmud ordered burnt publicly in 1236 by Pope Gregory IX and prominent writers and philosophers as Chaucer, Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, Hugo and Gibbon, among many others, „graced‟ Pope Paul IV‟s *Index Liborum Prohibitorum* (a list of prohibited books) of 1557.

In their protectionist drive for healthier world, it is interesting to note that both religions, despite their infamously cut-throat competition for hegemony (Lewis, 1990, Hungtinton, 1993), find common denominator not only in local censorship but in international campaign against blasphemy; mutually supporting and consoling each other when their sanctity is defiled as evidenced from Rushdie Affair through *The Code* down to *Charlie Hebdo.*

# GAP IN LITERATURE

Apart from Adamu‟s forthcoming *Blasphemy from below…* and Gwandu‟s (2015) theoretical exploration of blasphemy by „Muslims‟ against Islam in specifically the Hausa music of Faira sect – a deviant Tijjaniya Sufi order- the researcher is not aware of any research, whether empirical or theoretical, on the subject-matter in the area (northern Nigeria). But closely related to this research context is Okunna and Omenugha‟s (2006) critical review of the manifestations of various frames in Southern/Northern press (*Daily Champion vs. New Nigerian*) coverage of „Denmark cartoon crisis‟ in Nigeria and their implications on national identity/unity. (Unlike the former, the latter can conveniently be subsumed under the gamut of literature on media and crisis management – a la Malam‟s (2006) *Conflict and Peace Reporting in Africa…* and Ozohu-Suleman‟s (2013) *Media and Peace Building in Israel/Palestine*).

Asad, Butler, Brown and Mahmood (2009) debated over the philosophical complexity and difficulty in harmonizing blasphemy, freedom of expression and critique. In all, not once does the incident(s) of blasphemy in Nigeria mentioned in the whole corpus produced. In fact, the country is cited only in one instance: in reference to where the Danish cartoons triggered violent reaction. Nitisor (2007) on the other hand, examined blasphemy as a topical theme in post-colonial discourse, while Hasan (2010) is specific: Taslima Nasrin Affair being his chief concern. Both deal with blasphemy as a subject of Literature. But Callamard (2015; 2006) focuses on the ineffectiveness of blasphemy laws in Western countries and the normative uncertainties in balancing free speech vis a vis glorification of terrorism in court decisions.

It is also interestingly amazing to discover from humble exploration that beside Allen (2004), Power (2008) and Hasan (2015) who keenly observed the causal link between media portrayal of terrorism with the rising Islamophobia, no single contribution has been curious to analyze the implication of blasphemy and freedom of expression to our mutual coexistence as peoples of different cultural orientation, belief system and objective in life, let alone going further to postulate whether new ethical/legal codes will emerge to salvage us from this conundrum, or the role different agencies, civil rights groups, scholars, professionals and international organizations such as UNESCO, ITU, Amnesty International, World Christian Communication Association et c can play thus. The thematic preoccupation of most essays revolve around the controversies surrounding the evolution of freedom of expression historically and the challenges of extremists and terrorists to this value and other democratic values; its romanticization as Western pearly gift to humanity; the dilemma in determining its latitude so that it does not encroach on the boundaries of other human/national rights, or its comparative

exercise among different nations and regions of the world. In a word, most of these researches are reactive rather than being proactive.

Kamali (2010)‟s *Freedom of Expression in Islam* which is sadly the ONLY book on the issue, stopped at the level of description on how this right is granted in Islam. If for example the prophet (s.a.w.) had been ridiculed, insulted and badly projected in the poetry of disbelieving, antagonistic Arabs of Jahiliyya (as recorded in the Qur‟an), and the *Seerah* literature didn‟t record bloody reactions and violent protests from the companions who undeniably were more pious than we are, then what explains contemporary Muslims‟ alternate reaction? Or is it Yusuf Bala Usman (1980; 1987)‟s thesis: manipulation of religion at work, locally and internationally? (Excuse me. Wallahi I am just being curious). One expects such a book that claims to be the most comprehensive on the subject matter to navigate the thorny path.

# THEORETICAL REVIEW AND NEXUS

This research will find focus, explanation and justification in Framing, Agenda Setting and Political Economic theories. Asemah, Gujbawu, Ekhareafo & Okpanachi (2012) call this juxtaposition as theory triangulation which, they argue, will help in bringing forth various perspectives of a phenomenon and richer interpretation of data collected.

With regard to blasphemy in northern Nigeria, framing theory is relevant on how the newspapers (*Daily Trust* and *The Punch*) handle the blasphemy controversies in respect of areas of emphasis, inclusion and exclusion which ultimately influences reader‟s perception and judgement of issues and events in line with the intended frames.

Generally, where Islam is primarily the subject-matter in the Western media, the narrative, according to Said (1978, 1980, 1981, 1998; 2000), is deliberately skewed to

suit certain stereotypical images. This is equally the thrust of Goffman (1974)‟s framing theory - which is an extension of agenda-setting (Volkmer, 2009). Whereas the latter draws our attention to what to think about, the former somewhat dictates to us on *how* to think about what we think about. In other words, it involves value-judgement through saliencing certain aspect(s) of reality. „To frame‟, says Entman (1993:52), „is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicative text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation.‟

The process of framing, as McQuail (2005) notes further, requires careful and deliberate selection of certain words, phrases, images, tone et c to define a problem, bolster a perception via moral judgement and suggest a cue for action. In this way, specific contexts are often generalized. The impression one derives from scholarly and literary exploration of framing is that of giving a dog a bad name in order to have the moral alibi of hanging it, as our Nobel Laureate, Soyinka, narrativizes in *The Man Died* (1978). Ironically, Bhadmus (2005), on the other hand, accuses Soyinka of deploying similar schema against northerners in *Season of Anomy*. Achebe (2010) too complains about systematic denigration of Africa(ns) in Western literature where the continent is subjectively portrayed as the household of weird negativities in particularly Conrad‟s *Heart of Darkness –* the kind of racist narrative that ultimately justified colonial incursion and consequent subjugation of the continent (for a similar portrayal, see also Joyce Cary‟s *Mister Johnson*). This resonates with Norman Fairclough‟s (1995) argument of cause-effect relation in representation and domination. The exclusive use of terrorist label against the Palestinians in contrast to their Israeli counterpart for similar actions of violence and counter-violence in Yousef (2011)‟s *Son of Hamas*,

typifies framing. Although it is mostly used for negative end, Ozohu-Suleman (2013) argues that it can be deployed in the service of peace journalism.

According to Entman (1993:52-3), four variables are ever-present and should be closely considered in a framed communicative process. These are:

the communicator, the text, the receiver and the culture. Communicators make conscious or unconscious framing judgements in deciding what to say, guided by frames (often called schemata) that organize their belief systems. The text contains frames, which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain key words, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements. The frames that guide the receiver‟s thinking and conclusion may or may not reflect the frames in the text or the framing intention of the communicator. The culture is the stock of the commonly invoked frame… the empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping.

On the other hand, Azlan (2012) cited in Okoro and Odoemelam (2013) opines that two factors usually account for the selection of frame(s): „the accessibility of an issue, and the correlation between a subject and the audience‟s pre-existing opinions‟ (pp 89-90).

The strength of the theory can be seen in its flexibility and open-endedness with its effects examinable from both micro and macro levels (Baran & Davis, 2009). But it most glaring shortcoming, according to McQuail (2005); Baran and Davis (2009), is in its obvious disregard of objectivity particularly in news stories. In this weakness do we similarly find its strength in the coverage of Islam. Thus, slanting, demonizing, stereotyping and double standard become the recurring lexicals in discourses about media and Muslims especially after 9/11 (Abdallah, 2005, Allen, 2004, Yenigun, 2004, Bonnefoy, 2004).

Abdallah (2005) for one seems perturbed with how acts of terror are being perpetrated over centuries by people professing different faiths – from Hinduist Tamil Tigers; Buddhist Sinhale; Catholic Irish Republic Army; Protestant Ulster Union followers; Brahmist Shiv Sena and Bhartiya Janata Party to Jewish Defence League members –

but it is only the Muslim (the so-called Muslim in most cases) that is identified with his religion in the media. And the experts, who appear on TV and other outlets to give analysis, hardly spare a minute to say that this is not sanctioned by the religion. But I think for a more detached analysis on Islam, media and the experts, one will be better- off reading Said‟s dispassionate rebuttal to Lewis, Huntington, Pipes, Naipauls and other Orientalists in *Orientalism* (1978), *Covering Islam* (1981), *Clash of Definitions* (2000),*The Myth of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ (1998)*,*Islam Through Western Eyes* (1980) and *Orientalism Revisited* (2000).

Framing, in short, is relevant on how a segment of the global population (the Muslims) is being repeatedly and obviously deliberately misrepresented in the Western- controlled, powerful international media. It suggests a kind of moral judgement through skewed narrative and stereotypical delineation of a people for political and economic interests. What otherwise Adichie (2009) calls *a single story.*

Maxwell Mc Combs and Donald L. Shaw‟s (1972) agenda-setting theory posits that the media is very successful in broaching and sustaining subject of discussion in the public sphere through the frequency of reportage and prominence given to the story, in case of print media. This amount of attention otherwise known as „first level‟ of agenda-setting (Coleman,McCombs, Shaw & Weaver 2009), sets the public agenda. Out of numerous issues and events unfolding daily, we all find ourselves focusing attention on the dominant ones in the media – from ebola, to election, to Dasukigate, to fuel subsidy removal and to the „billion naira‟ expended to cure the President‟s ear ailment, we find ourselves thinking about and debating what might have otherwise passed unnoticed (Asemah, 2011, McQuail, 2010, Folarin, 1998).

According to the propounders of the theory, “In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but how much importance to attach in a news story and its position” (Asemah, 2011:176).

Since the media have this power, they are morally obligated to report issues that will enhance peace, unity and development of their audiences and the humankind at large (Asemah, 2011).

The theory, according to McQuail (2005); Baran and Davis (2009) tends to prove, empirically, the nexus that exists between the significance given to an issue by the media and the consequent public attention which shape their perception of social and political realities, ultimately. But it is criticized for being too preoccupied with „news and political campaign‟ in media content. (In some other aspects of media content, argued Baran and Davis, it is the public that actually call the shot). Its effects (for not considering the effects of other variables) have also been questioned by other researchers. It is, however, relevant in this context because it will help in revealing and weighing how much attention was given to blasphemy controversy in the selected newspapers.

The thrust of Political Economy Theory is that a great deal of capitalist media content, irrespective of ownership, is influenced by market forces (audience and advertisers‟ preferences) and a dose of ideology (Munday and Chandler, 2011, Baran and Davis, 2009, McQuail, 2005). In this drive, the industry stretches, not infrequently, beyond the confines of professional ethics to hit a market goal. In Nigerian context for example, Aliagan (2015) studied the major national dailies (the top 7) and found out that they toe along ethnic/regional ideology as market strategy. Oso (2012), on the other hand,

dissects how sensationalism and frivolities overwhelm serious issues in Nigerian media industries as corollary of economic forces. While Yusuf (2002), Pate (2012), Pate and Dauda (2015) elucidate on how media capitalize, inter alia, on sensationalism and stereotype during violent conflicts in order to sell. In *Manipulation of Religion…,* Usman (1980) also charges Nigerian media for inciting violence along religious divides through a calculated scheme of „provocation-reaction-counter-reaction‟ in order to

„make profit at whatever expense to our country‟ (p. 81). Okoye (2007) observes how the media content is constricted for the fear of backlash from „Sacred Cows‟, among which big advertisers. Scholars in other countries (Tumber, 2009, Chiang and Knight, 2008, Said, 1981, Chomsky 1989 in Lynch, 2007, McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000, Tehranian, 2002, Hackett, 2006, Haniztsch, 2007 et c) have equally arrived at similar conclusion, namely: profit is the main target of media industry in a capitalist economy.

It is from this context one begins to appreciate the prevalence of blasphemy in Western media. For such undertaking is substantially driven by market forces for survival, prominence and profitability. Who knows, for example, about *Jyllands Posten* or *Charlie Hebdo* prior to those caricatures? Both reared to global prominence due to the controversies they obviously deliberately courted as market strategy. Westergaad, the guy who submitted the bomb-in-the-turban cartoon of Prophet Muhammad, we are made to understand by McGraw and Warner (2012), has been bargaining with bidders over the price of his „product‟. Mohammed, the Prophet, has turned to Mohammed the profit, as McGraw and Warner would say. Moreover, *Davinci Code*, a novel which questions the purity of the present day Bible, insinuates Christ had a child with Mary Magdalene and offers unorthodox view about The Grail, among other things, has sold more than 40 million copies according to the author, while the film adapted from the novel „made $ 272 million in the United States and $ 532 million overseas‟ (Dominick,

2009). *The Last Temptation of Christ*, a movie of similar theme with *Davinci Code* was also so successful that „it had grossed $ 8, 373,585 domestically‟. While Rushdie‟s *Satanic Verses* was repeatedly a best seller in both US and Britain and its demand rose exponentially internationally following the outrage it elicited due to its controversial treatment of Islam (Pipes, 1989). Just as sex and violence sell, blasphemous contents are increasingly becoming hotcakes enticing consumers. This is facilitated by States‟ nods to such publication for ideological reason. For example, one cannot fail to be suspicious about the surreptitious ideological agenda for blasphemy over the award of Nobel Prize to Nagiub Mahfouz and the citation of particularly *Children of Gebelawi* in

„coincidently‟ the same year (1988) of *Satanic Verses’* publication and *The Last Temptation of Christ* movie*.* And how such states are quick on coming to the protection of such provocatuers as Nigerian Iseoma Daniel, Bangladeshi Taslima Nasreen, Danish Flemming Rose and British Salman Rushdie with asylum and police protection. Such publications therefore are a subterfuge of gauging (or according to Hedges (2015) a culturally neocolonial project of marginalizing, suppressing and oppressing) the ideological Other and extending secularism rather than the pretext of freedom of expression thrust on the world.

Another notable instance of such ideological influence is how in the 1960s Henry Luce, the owner and publisher of *Time*, was prevailed upon by the then American ambassadors to Congo and Belgium, Timerlake and William Burden, to change the magazine‟s cover story on Congolese Prime Minister, Patrick Lumumba, for his leaning to Socialist ideology – inimical to American interest (Okoye, 2007).

Despite little emphasis on scientific verification, the assumptions of the theory can be tested empirically especially with regard to influences of finance on content production (Baran & Davis, 2012, McQuail, 2010). This theory therefore becomes handy

particularly in interpreting the attitude of Nigerian press in handling issues bordering on ethnicity, religion and geopolitics.

# CHAPTER THREE

# METHODOLOGY

# INTRODUCTION

This research used content analysis method of collecting data, with coding sheet as instrument. Descriptive Statistics, on the other hand, was used in presenting and analyzing the data collected.

# RESEARCH METHOD

Since this study focuses on the coverage and framing of blasphemy issues in *Daily Trust*and *Punch* newspapers, content analysis is deemed most suitable as a method of collecting data. Content analysis, according to Kerlinger (in Wimmer and Dominick, 2011:156), “is a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables”. This definition, though accepted by the duo as „fairly typical‟, and reflected the intent of this research, took no cognizance of qualitative content analysis (deployable in examining the frames herein) that is prevalent in textual, inter-textual and ideological analyses. However, its centrality in comparing media content and the real world with reasonable precision on, for instance, how certain people and issues are treated in a given content, cannot be downplayed. It also enables researchers to explore the nuances of variables via well-defined categories; make references and inferences about the characteristics of

a given content objectively so that subsequent researchers can replicate and arrive at the same conclusion (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011, Frankfort-Natchmias & Natchmias, 2009).

Content analysis is therefore deemed fit as a method because the research is concerned with the examination of documented information – how frequent and prioritized this particular issue is in Nigerian dailies, and how the units in the content /frames fit into the broad classification of war and peace journalism indicators developed by Johann Galtung and other scholars. Since suppositions are made not only about the content, but the sources and consumers of the message, the research can be subsumed under inferential content analysis (Neuendorf, 2002).

# UNIVERSE OF THE STUDY

The universe of the study involves all the newspapers being published in the country, out of which a census, which deals with the examination of the entire population elements, on incidents of blasphemy in Northern Nigeria was taken from two national dailies (Asemah, *et al,*2012, Wimmer & Dominick, 2011,Krippendorff 2004). Thus, all the editions of *Daily Trust* and *Punch* newspapers from 1st May to September 30th, 2016 were considered for data collection and analysis. The researcher used purposive sampling in selecting the period of the coverage because it is in the editions of these months that articles on the cases under investigation can be found. Hence this peculiar characteristic informed the choice of timeframe.

These papers are national dailies with editions from Monday to Sunday. A census i.e. total population of the editions within the period specified was taken for the fear of excluding vital editions of this intermittent controversy. Thus a total of 306 editions was considered.

Punch = Mon.-Sun. = 7editions

Punch = 30 in a month × 5 months = 150+3 (May, July and August have 31 days)

=153×2

=306

The choice of the date (May to September, 2016) is informed by the fact that the first case of the blasphemy controversy in the year commenced with the acquittal of Abul Nyass and four others from blasphemy charges in May by Kaduna High Court of Appeal which the Kano State Government vowed to pursue in higher court till they are

„properly‟ brought to book, while the last, so far, occurred in Zamfara on the 22nd of August, but coverage and commentaries spilled into September.

# UNITS OF ANALYSIS

Units of analysis, according to Prasad (in Ozohu-Suleman 2013), are the smallest elements in the content that can be coded into categories. They include single words, letters, themes, layout items, paragraphs, entire article, among others. Articles (news stories, editorials, features, opinion columns, letters, interviews, photo news and cartoons) used in covering these incidents, were considered as units of analysis.

# CONTENT CATEGORIES

Content categories, on the other hand, are the broad classes/cells with specific boundaries within which these units are pigeonholed. The ones formulated for the purpose of this research have to do with the framing of the coverage: whether conflict- sensitive or inflammatory. This is deciphered by the presence or absence of certain words. And thus include:

1. ***Peace-Oriented Journalism:*** the type that digs into the causes and effects of conflicts, proffers solutions, tones down ethno-religious differences and eschew stereotypes or cue to reprisal. Specifically the following frames were considered under this category:
   1. **Invisible Effects Frame:** this is concerned with the socio-psychological effects of „blasphemy‟ killings particularly on the minority groups living in the North. Whether the units of analysis have considered their fear, trauma, feelings of pariah, hate and victimhood or not. On the other hand, there is the feeling of moral injury that one‟s incomparable model of veneration is debased, thus one‟s spiritual and personal wellbeing.
   2. **Solution Frame:** this explores the factors responsible for causing and solving the blasphemy conflicts
   3. **Condemnation Frame:** condemns the mob lynching as unfortunate, unIslamic, illegal, immoral and offensive to civilizational ethos. It advocates the prosecution of the perpetrators.

**People-Oriented Frame:** „focuses on common people as actors and sources of news‟.

1. ***War-Oriented Journalism:*** the one that favours stereotype, pessimistic and sensational in tone, and alludes to reprisal or ethno-religious difference. Specific frames considered under this are:
   1. **Ethnic Frame:**which focuses much attention on the ethnicity and the region of the victims of „blasphemy‟ lynching. Creating an atmosphere of *we* versus *them*.
   2. **Religious Frame:** portrays the conflict as one religion/religious group lording it over to the other.
   3. **Visible Effect Frame:** focuses only on the damages that can be seen: casualties (dead and injured), damages to property (e.g arson and looting), demonstrations, and so on.
   4. **Elite-Oriented Frame:** is concerned chiefly with „leaders and elites as the actors and sources of information‟.

These frames are a modification of similar ones developed by Galtung (2013a), McGoldrick and Lynch (2000); Semetko and Valkenverg (in Okunna & Omenugha, 2006) in their literature of conflict-sensitive journalism. Hence they are priori.

The research also examined the war language used in the coverage of this issue which is detrimental to peaceful resolution of conflict. It is given by Galtung (1998) in Fong (2009); McGoldrick and Lynch (2009), which include:

1. **Demonizing Language:** noticeable by the presence of such words/labels as

„terrorist‟, „extremist‟, „fanatics‟, „barbaric‟, „savage‟, „ruthless‟, „vicious‟,

„cruel‟, „brutal‟ et c and generally creates „we‟ versus „them‟ mood.

1. **Emotive Language:** uses words and pictures that whip up sentiment. Such words include: „genocide‟, „massacre‟, „tragedy‟ and „systematic‟.

**d. Victimizing Language:** which includes the use of such words as: „pathetic‟,

„defenceless‟, „demoralised‟, „destitute‟ and „devastated‟.

The avoidance of such language according to peace scholars, is necessary hence journalism‟s contribution to the promotion of peaceful resolution of conflicts.

# CODING SCHEME

Coding sheet was designed in line with the research objectives and with all relevant categories to collect data from the content of the selected papers. Priori coding type,

which is deductive in nature, was adopted in this study. The researcher has constructed the dominant category and modified Galtung (2013a), Semetko and Valkenberg‟s frames to suite the objectives of this research. This helped in achieving the exhaustiveness and exclusiveness requirement of coding stated by Asika (2009).

# VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

In order to ensure the efficiency of the categories and consistency of result, the researcher defined the categories adequately and coded the content twice at different times for reliability. 10% of the total population (i.e 18 items in our case) as recommended by Wimmer and Dominick was explored for the pilot study, while Holsti‟s formula, which helps in determining the percentage of agreement between coders, was used in calculating/testing the intra-coder reliability. See appendix for the degree of agreement.

Since the reliability test yielded high result, the efficiency of the categories assured as items coded did not overlap, errors attributable to sampling were preempted by census technique; the validity (face validity) of the research is therefore guarded.

# METHOD OF DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

The data collected are presented using tables and graphs (pie charts) while simple descriptive statistics (totals and percentages) is manually used in analysis.

# CHAPTER FOUR

* 1. **PEACE/WAR JOURNALISM IN *DAILYTRUST* AND *THE PUNCH***

# NEWSPAPERS

This chapter is chiefly concerned with the presentation, discussion and interpretation of the data collected from the content of the newspapers. A census of 306 editions from 1st May to 31st September, 2016, was taken from both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* and 53 articles on blasphemy controversies were retrieved, out of which 28 and 25 were published by *The Punch* and *Daily Trust* newspapers respectively. The timeframe considered covers the acquittal of Abul Nyass and four others off blasphemy charges, the killing of Methodus Emmanuel, Bridget Agbahime and eight others in Kano, Niger and Zamfara states respectively over blasphemy allegations (see *cases of blasphemy in Nigeria: an overview* on pp. 39-43 for details).

The story types, placement, frequency, frames and language used in the content of these articles will be presented and analysed, and the research will finally establish whether it is war or peace frames that dominate in the coverage of the said controversies. According to Galtung‟s schema, Howard‟s11-points; McGoldrick and Lynch‟s 17- points checklists for peace journalism, war language which should be avoided in the

coverage of conflict are classified into demonizing, emotive and victimizing language categories. Words such as barbaric, cruel, terrorist, extremist, fundamentalist, savage, ruthless et c belong to the demonizing category, while genocide, massacre, systematic et c belong to emotive category. Victimizing language, on the other hand, has lexical ingredients like pathetic, devastated and demoralized. The frequency and implication of these will equally be subjected to analysis.

# DATA PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

# Extent of Coverage

Table 4.1 reveals the attention given to blasphemy conflicts within the aforementioned timeframe. The frequency of different story types, categories (war/peace) and their placement are also included to ascertain the extent of the coverage.

# Table 4.1 showing the frequency, story type, frames and placement on incidents of blasphemy

***DAILY TRUST THE PUNCH***

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **FRAMES** | **SN** | **F** | **C** | **E** | **P** | **I** | **CT** | **LE** | **TOTAL** | **SN** | **F** | **C** | **E** | **P** | **I** | **CT** | **LE** | **TOTAL** |
| **PEACE** | **15** | **0** | **2** | **1** | **0** | **1** | **0** | **2** | **21** | **9** | **1** | **3** | **0** | **0** | **1** | **0** | **1** | **15** |
| **WAR** | **4** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **4** | **7** | **0** | **1** | **2** | **0** | **2** | **0** | **1** | **13** |
| **TOTAL** | **19** | **0** | **2** | **1** | **0** | **1** | **0** | **2** | **25** | **16** | **1** | **4** | **2** | **0** | **3** | **0** | **2** | **28** |

# PAGE PLACEMENT

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **FRONT**  **n %** | **INSIDE**  **n %** | **BACK**  **n %** |
| ***PUNCH*** | 1 100% | 26 2% | 2 6.7% |
| ***DAILY TRUST*** | 0 0% | 24 8% | 1 3.3% |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **TOTAL** | **1 100%** | **50 100%** | **3 100%** |

**KEY**

**SN = Straight News P = Picture**

**F = Feature I = Interview**

**C = Column CT = Cartoon**

**E = Editorial LE = Letter to Editor**

From table 4.1 it can be seen that a total of 53 articles were published by both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* newspapers within the period of research. 28 of these articles, representing 52.9%, were published by *The Punch*, while 25, representing 47.1%, were published by *Daily Trust*. This presupposes that *The Punch* covered the controversies more extensively than *Daily Trust*, though without significant difference statistically. The extent is further vindicated by individual story types. For example, 4 columnists in *The Punch* (representing 66.7%) wrote on the subject-matter at different points in time, while 2 (representing 33.3%) wrote in *Daily Trust*. Similarly, 3 interviews, representing 75%, featured in *The Punch*, while 1 (25%) appeared in the *Daily Trust*. Furthermore, 2 editorials, representing 66.7%, were published by *The Punch*, while *Daily Trust* had 1, which is 33.3%. The latter is also outnumbered in terms of feature articles published. In fact none was actually recorded in the *Daily Trust* within the timeframe – *The Punch*, on the other hand, had 1, representing 100% of the genre. But with regard to straight news, *Daily Trust* counterbalances with 19 stories, representing 54.2%, against the 16 published in *The Punch*, which represents 45.8%. Out of these 19, 15 (representing 78.9%), were framed along the tenets of peace journalism, while 4 (representing 21%), fell into war journalism category, focusing mostly on elite and visible effects of conflict. Contrastively, 9 (i.e. 56.2%) of the 16 straight news published by *The Punch*

contained peace frames, while the remaining 7 (43.7%) had war frames, largely emphasizing on religious divides. Straight news and editorials are essential categories in drawing conclusion about the position, direction and professional commitment of a given medium – whether in tune with peace or its antithesis. The inclination of each of the two newspapers can therefore be inferred from table 4.1 above.

However, the newspapers are on equal pedestal in respect of letters to editors – each published 2, representing 50% respectively. Conversely, none of these papers evidently published a picture or cartoon on the subject of blasphemy within the timeframe. Perhaps such were avoided owing to the sensitivity of the issue at stake. A cartoon, for example, often satirizes in the process of communicating vital information, while picture, especially of mangled human bodies, can evoke emotion instantly and linger in memory for a long time, thereby engendering and sustaining conflicts rather than quenching them.

The location of a story also reveals the significance attached to it by a given medium, according to agenda-setting theory. In this way we can see how *The Punch* gave priority to blasphemy crises by exclusively publishing a front page (1, representing 100%) with a banner headline, with 2 on the back page, representing 66.7% against its counterpart, *Daily Trust*, which had 1 (33.3%). Since most of these articles are straight news (a total of 35) by both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch,* they are naturally published at the outset of these newspapers – often between pages 1-9. At this too, *Daily Trust* has 24 articles inside (news plus others), representing 48%, while *The Punch* has 26 (news plus others), representing 52%. During analysis we will examine why for example, *The Punch* paid more attention to this crises to the extent of publishing front page story and feature story exclusively, having more editorials, more opinion articles at the back and inside, than *Daily Trust*? Why, on the other hand, the latter carried more news than the

former? What forces were likely to be at play in the process of coverage? Why did a particular genre receive more attention than all others and of what implication? Why certain genres were completely ignored in the process of coverage and what this portends to peace journalism?

# Frames in the Coverage

**Table 4.2 Indicating the Occurrences of Peace Frames**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **FRAMES** | ***PUNCH*** | ***DAILY TRUST*** | **TOTAL** |
| **Condemnation** | 10 66.7% | 11 55% | 21 60% |
| **Solution** | 5 33.3% | 8 40% | 13 37% |
| **People-oriented** | 0 0% | 1 5% | 1 2.9% |
| **Invisible Effects** | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| **Total** | **15 100%** | **20 100%** | **35 100%** |

Table 4.2 indicates that a total of 35 peace frames were recorded from the articles in both *The Punch* and *Daily Trust*. Evidently, *Daily Trust* published more stories in line with peace journalism (20, representing 57.1%) than *The Punch* which published 15 in this vein, representing 42.9%. Out of these frames, condemnation frame has the highest frequency in both newspapers recurring 21 times representing 60% of the total peace

frames. It is followed by solution frame which appears 13 times, representing 37.1%, with comparatively significant difference statistically. People-oriented frame occurred only once, representing 2.9%, while invisible effects of conflict frame was never accorded any attention by both newspapers. This partly accounts for the prevalence of straight news as the dominant genre in the content of both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch*. For, this particular frame requires in-depthness to uncover such abstract attributes of conflict as trauma, hate, fear and desire for revenge.

Comparatively, *Daily Trust* obviously framed its stories in such ways that facilitate peaceful resolution of conflict more than *The Punch* – as earlier studies (Shehu, 2014, Yusuf, 2002, Kawu, 2002) established, and this confirms further. For, the former contains more solution frames (8, representing 22.9% of the total frames) compared to *The Punch* which has 5 (14.2%) of the total peace frames. Similarly, *Daily Trust* also has upper hand with regard to condemnation frame recording 11 (31.4%) in juxtaposition with *The Punch*‟s 10 (28.6%) - although statistical difference is not much. Again, *Daily Trust* has, exclusively, people-oriented frame which appeared once, representing 2.9%.

Specifically, *Daily Trust* contains more of condemnation frame (11, representing 55% of the total peace frames), followed by solution frame (8, representing 40%) and people-oriented frame (1, representing 5%) of the total peace frames, respectively. Similarly, Punch‟s concentration was also on condemnation and solution frames with the frequency of 10 (66.7%) and 5 (33.3%) respectively. Actually these are the only peace frames used in the newspaper within the time of investigation.

# Table 4.3 Indicating the Occurrences of War Frames

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **FRAMES** | ***PUNCH***  **n %** | ***DAILY TRUST***  **n %** | **TOTAL**  **n %** |
| **Visible Effects** | 4 28.6% | 2 50% | 6 33.3% |
| **Ethnic** | 2 14.2% | 0 0% | 2 11.1% |
| **Religious** | 7 50% | 1 25% | 8 44.4% |
| **Elite-oriented** | 1 7.1% | 1 25% | 2 11.1% |
| **TOTAL** | **14 100%** | **4 100%** | **18 100%** |

From table 4.3 it can be seen that both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* newspapers produced a total of 18 war frames of which religious frame recurred more frequently than any other – 8, representing 44.4% of the summed war frames. It is accompanied by visible effects frame which featured 6 times, representing 33.3%. Ethnic and elite- oriented frames appeared 2 times each, representing 11.1% respectively.

In comparison, Punch‟s articles contained more war frames (14, representing 77.8%) than *Daily Trust* which produced 4 (22.2%) of the total war frames. Specifically, *The Punch* newspaper concentrated on religious frame occurring 7 times, representing 50% out of the 14 war frames it produced. It is followed by visible effects of conflict frame 4 (28.6%), ethnic frame 2(14.2%) and elite-oriented frame 1(7.1%) respectively. *Daily Trust*, on the other hand, gave premium to visible effect 2(50%) while elite-oriented and religious frames appeared 1 time each, representing 25% respectively. Emphasis on religious frame over all others is a matter of concern to national cohesion and peaceful coexistence among the heterogeneous citizens of this country.

Moreover, the prevalence of war lexis in media content also raises alarm to Peace Journalism scholars due to their potentialities in fueling the embers of violence and

detrimenting peaceful resolution of conflict. Table 4.4 and charts 4.1 reveal the occurrences of such words in both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* newspapers.

# Table 4.4 Showing the Occurrences of War Lexical Indicators


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **CATEGORIES** | **WORDS** | ***THEPUNCH***  **n %** | | ***DAILY TRUST***  **n %** | | **TOTAL**  **n %** | |
|  | Barbaric | 15 | 23.8% | 3 | 37.5% | 18 | 25.3% |
|  | Cruel | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
|  | Vicious | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
|  | Brutal | 4 | 6.3% | 1 | 12.5% | 5 | 7.0% |
| **DEMONIZING** | Terrorist | 6 | 9.6% | 0 | 0% | 6 | 8.4% |
|  | Extremist | 11 | 17.4% | 2 | 25% | 13 | 18.3% |
|  | Fanatic | 15 | 23.8% | 2 | 25% | 17 | 23.9% |
|  | Fundamentalist | 3 | 4.8% | 0 | 0% | 3 | 4.2% |
|  | Tyrant | 1 | 1.5% | 0 | 0% | 1 | 1.4% |
|  | Savage | 1 | 1.5% | 0 | 0% | 1 | 1.4% |
|  | Ruthless | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
|  | Inhuman | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| **VICTIMIZING** | Destitute | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
|  | Devastated | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
|  | Defenceless | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
|  | Demoralized | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
|  | Pathetic | 2 | 3.1% | 0 | 0% | 2 | 2.8 % |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **EMOTIVE** | Genocide | 4 | 6.3% | 0 | 0% | 4 | 5.6% |
|  | Assassination | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
|  | Systematic | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
|  | Tragedy | 1 | 1.5% | 0 | 0% | 1 | 1.4% |
|  | Decimated | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
|  | Massacre | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| **TOTAL** |  | **63** | **100%** | **8** | **100%** | **71** | **100%** |

**Charts 4.1 Indicating the Percentages of Each Category in the Newspapers**

War Language in *The Punch*&*Daily Trust*


Emotive, 7% Victimizing, 3%



Demonizing,90%

War Language in *The Punch*

Emotive, 8%




Victimizing 3%

Demonizing 89%

War Language in *Daily Trust*

Emotive 0% Victimizing 0%



Demonizing 100%

A sum of 71 war language indicators were produced by both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* within the period of investigation as evidenced from table 4.4 and charts 4.1. Out of the three categories of war language, demonizing lexis received the greatest attention in both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* taking 90% (DT=11.2%; P=78.8%) of the total war language indicators. It is followed by emotive language usage 7.0% (DT=0%; P=7%), while victimizing language received the least attention in both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* 2.8% (DT=0%; P=2.8%).

Of the 23 words coded, „barbaric‟ 18(25.3%), „fanatic‟ 17 (23.9%), „extremist‟ 13(18.3%), all belonging to demonizing category, received the highest frequency. They

are followed closely by „terrorist‟ 6(8.4%), „brutal‟ 5(7.0%), and „fundamentalist‟ 3(4.2%) respectively. Manifest in this category also but to a lesser degree are „tyrant‟ 1(1.4%) and „savage‟ 1(1.4%). But „cruel‟, „vicious‟, „ruthless‟ and „inhuman‟ were conspicuously absent in the coverage of both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* newspapers.

The succeeding category in terms of frequency is emotive language wherein „genocide‟ outstandingly recurred 4 times, representing 5.6% of such indicators. It is followed by

„tragedy‟ 1(1.4%) in this category. But „massacre‟, „decimated‟, „systematic‟ and

„assassination‟ were consciously or unconsciously eschewed in the coverage of these controversies by both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* newspapers.

On the other hand, „pathetic‟ 2(2.8%) is the only victimizing language used in both newspapers. Implicitly, „destitute‟, „devastated‟, „defenceless‟ and „demoralised‟ were completely avoided by both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* newspapers in covering the subject-matter within the stated timeframe.

Comparatively, *Daily Trust* has lesser war lexical indicators 8(11.2%) vis-à-vis *The Punch* 63 (88.7%). Both newspapers gave „barbaric‟ higher attention than any other indicators – 15 (23.8%) in *The Punch*; 3 (37.5%) in *Daily Trust*. „Fanatic‟ followed with 15 (23.8%) in *The Punch* and 2 (25%) in the *Daily Trust*. Then came „extremist‟ in *The Punch* with 11 (17.8%) of its total war lexical indicators; which *Daily Trust* contained 2 (25%). „Brutal‟ appeared 4 times representing 6.3% in *The Punch*, and only once, representing 12.5% in the *Daily Trust*. In contradistinction to the latter, Punch gave us additional words from its corpus of war language, namely: „genocide‟ 4(6.3%),

„terrorist‟ 6(9.5%), „fundamentalist‟ 3 (4.8%), „tyrant‟ 1(1.5%), „savage‟ 1 (1.5%),

„pathetic‟ 2 (3.1%), and „tragedy‟ 1 (1.5%).

Furthermore, completely absent in *Daily Trust* are: „terrorist‟, „fundamentalist‟,

„tyrant‟, „savage‟, „ruthless‟, „inhuman‟ (all demonizing), „destitute‟, „devastated‟,

„defenceless‟, „demoralised‟, „pathetic‟ (all victimizing), „genocide‟, „assassination‟,

„systematic‟, „tragedy‟, „decimated‟, „massacre‟ (all emotive); while completely avoided in *The Punch* are: „cruel‟, „vicious‟, „inhuman‟ and „ruthless‟ (all demonizing),

„destitute‟, „devastated‟, „defenceless‟, „demoralised‟ (all victimizing); „assassination‟,

„systematic‟, „massacre‟ and „decimated‟ (all emotive).

Why is it that it is the demonizing category overall that received higher attention, and immediately succeeded by emotive category in the content? This is a matter of consideration during interpretation in view of many scholarly researches that have raised alarm thus in examining the role of Nigerian media in particularly ethno- religious crises. Likewise the prioritization of „barbaric‟ in the demonizing category. Although peace scholars like Galtung, Goldrick and Lynch have classified it under war language as typical of we-versus-them, it usage in these cases appears proactive and preemptive of potential reprisal. In this context comes the relevance of exploring the invisible effects of conflict which is sadly lacking in the content of these newspapers within our timeframe. Details on these latter.

# DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

In order not to stray from the aim of this research, four research objectives guided our exploration of the subject-matter along which four research questions were formulated. The findings of the specific objectives will therefore be presented and interpreted through corresponding research questions and in line with the existing literature and our theoretical frame work. Hence:

* + 1. RQ1. What is the extent ofthe coverageof incidents of blasphemy in *Daily Trust*and *Punch* newspapers compare?

Both newspapers share some commonalities especially in the frequency of their coverage in which *Daily Trust* produced a sum of 25 (47.1%) articles on blasphemy controversies in Northern Nigeria while *The Punch* produced a total of 28 (52.9) within the time investigated (see table 4.1 for these and subsequent figures). This similarity is further vindicated by the story types given emphasis in which straight news received the most attention from both newspapers – *Daily Trust* having 19 (54.2%) while *The Punch* 16 (45.8) and mostly located inside the newspapers; between pages 1and 9 specifically. And the articles in this genre contained more peace frames in both newspapers. In other words, the newspapers tilted more towards peace building in covering the incidents under investigation, although to a varying degree (see table 4.1 for the statistical distribution).

Editorials and opinion columns wherein the newspapers and their columnists express opinions about the causes and possible remedies of blasphemy conflicts, nay all issues of public concern, were similarly dedicated in the coverage. For example, both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* produced a sum of 3 editorials representing 33.3% and 66.7% respectively, and 6 opinion columns representing again, 33.3% and 66.7% respectively. In the same vein, each of the newspapers featured 2 letters to the editor as acknowledgement of readers‟ opinion on the issue at stake, as well as a number of interviews all with religious cleric (from mainly the Christian Association of Nigeria and Jama‟tul Nasrul Islam) in both newspapers. In other words, no academics, nor legal professionals, nor even the ordinary people who are directly affected by such disturbances worth having their opinions featured. This reveals the elite-orientedness (a recent trend in framing analysis of news, according to Volkmer 2009) and shallowness

in the coverage of the subject-matter. As the table 4.1 indicates the statistical distribution, straight news received the greatest attention in both newspapers.

Conversely, both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* exercised restraints over the publication of cartoons and pictures on the issues at stake. In the same vein, *The Punch* which normally dedicate a vox pop page on issues of public interest (as it did on Hijab Versus Choir Garb controversy in Osun State about the same time), went aloof on blasphemy - as did *Daily Trust* in its usual aggregation of public opinion through online reaction.

But the newspapers are poles apart in other respects. For example, Punch was the only one to give the issue a front page prominence with a screaming headline to attract readers, and somewhere, gave the only feature story on the controversies.

The extent of the coverage in *The Punch* newspaper can be associated to a number of factors that directly speak on the national question. The national question being the contradictions that arise among a heterogeneous society divided along sensitive fault lines peculiar to such society (Agara 2015, Blaut 1987, Stalin 1949). One, the victims of these mob lynching in both Kano and Niger states were from a particular tribe, region and religion which the newspaper identify with as its own or at least closer to it than the „villains‟ who are from a different, seemingly antagonistic tribe, region and religion. So, a sort of we-versus-them coverage as revealed in these headlines: “Igbo woman stabbed in Kano” (Punch, June 3, 2016), “Stop Killing Christians – S‟East CAN warns Northerners” (Punch, June 15, 2016), will surely attract reader (especially if he is the „Othered‟) and consequently the sale of the paper. This calls to mind the finding of Aliagan (2015) who maintains that the major national dailies (the top 7) in Nigeria pander along ethnic/regional ideology as market strategy. It also reminds one of Pate (2012:62-3), who observes „the use of inflammatory, misleading and sensational

headlines in order to attract sales; (d)emonization of certain ethnic, religious or political groups…(and) promoting, by selective reporting, prejudicial stereotypes about groups and individuals‟. It further strengthens the belief that the media itself is enmeshed in those issues, thereby wittingly or not, widening the divides in the society which makes group interaction socio-politically highly charged and volatile. This sets socio-cultural groups against each other and further complicates the national question in the country.

The reticence in some respect and proactive nature of *Daily Trust* coverage can also be partly interpreted along ethno-religious sentiment. In other words, it is the image of our people (ethnic, regional and religious group) at stake and so should be tactically saved. Hence it consistently churned out headlines like: “Blasphemy: Two in Police net over killing of woman in Kano” (*Daily Trust*, June 4, 2016), “Buhari condemns Kano killing, sues for peace,” (*Daily Trust*, June 5, 2016), “Bridget killers must face the law

* El-Rufai, others” (*Daily Trust*, June 9, 2016), “Victims of Zamfara not Christians – CAN” (*Daily Trust*, August 29, 2016) et c. These are obviously proactive attempts intended to potentially calm nerves and preempt predisposition towards reprisal which is in line with peace journalism‟s tenets. But inherent in these also is the subtle efforts to exonerate a region from blanket stereotype that might accompany backlash from the other end. Perhaps that is why the paper surpassed its counterpart in particularly straight news as shown in table 4.1.

Moreover, print journalism scholars such as Levin (2000), Anaeto, Solo-Anaeto and Tejumaiye(2009); Anaeto and Solo-Anaeto (2010) opine that because of their exaggerative nature, cartoons tend to be humorous and satirical. They „have the potential to cause offence: a joke may be taken as an insult; a pinprick as a stab‟, according to Seymour-Ure (2008:78). Owing to the sensitivity and combustibility of such issues (Danish cartoons and Charlie Hebdo‟s aftermath in retrospection), their

avoidance in both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* can be interpreted as a conscious attempt to be socially responsible in a tense, divided and volatile country. Hence commendable in the realm of Peace Journalism. The same can be said about publishing pictures of such victims. Notwithstanding, “…sliced her throat like a cow,” (Punch June 12, 2016), “…treated like cows and goats” (Punch June 15, 2016; note the allegory in the repetition of cow and goat) “…woman‟s throat was slit with knife” (Punch June 3, 2016), among other graphic, memorable descriptors, not a single picture of any of the victims of the four different cases in question was published by either *The Punch* or *Daily Trust*. For, picture, as Levin (2000) would say, can easily evoke emotion and

„makes whatever is pictured seem more real and true‟. In *Visualizing September11th,* for example, Gettys (2008) recollects how readers across US were outraged by the syndicated photographs of the Twin Towers‟ jumpers in the event of the plane attack. Hence they incessantly buzzed in to lodge complaints with different papers that published them. Such outrage was similarly expressed in the seemingly free world of social media when some unprofessional lots published severed bodies of Boko Haram attackers or victims in Nigeria.

Noticeably downplayed in the coverage of blasphemy by both newspapers is the feature genre which is characteristically in-depth in its treatment of subject-matter, or to borrow the words of Okoye (n.d:11), „more complete, more informative (and) deals with areas not usually covered or underreported by straight news‟. Apparently, it is more resource-consuming and effort-sapping in unearthing the nuances of issues. For, it involves „travel or time on the part of the journalist… in-depth narratives based on days, weeks, even months of meticulous first-hand reporting‟ (Niblock, 2008:49-50). This obviously can affect profit margin and delay scoops which the papers may not be interested in venturing. The irony is that British newspapers are increasingly „over-

featurizing‟ their contents to regain their market strength sapped by new media technologies. So in a predominantly market-driven media (Aliagan 2015, Oso 2012, Pate 2012, Tumber, 2009, Chiang & Knight, 2008, Usman 1980, Said, 1981, Chomsky

1989 in Lynch, 2007, McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000, Tehranian, 2002, Hackett, 2006, Haniztsch, 2007 et c), every outlet seems head over heel to break news or flaunt scoop, hence, as Pate (2012) noted, the journalist are pressured to beat strict deadlines. Consequently, investigative journalism is put at bay, sacrificed on the altar of profit. This is validated by Agbese‟s *The scoop and the goof* (2016) where he opines that

„They (the newspapers) are in a very competitive business. The temptation to scoop would occasionally lead to either minor blunders or goofs‟. Such surface treatment, according to Unaegbu (2016), affects not only audience‟s understanding of the situation but aggravates tension, helplessness and confusion among the people.

Even the letters to editor are arguably published as market strategy. For their writers, according to Richardson (2008), help in increasing the circulation of such papers that published them. „For every letter,‟ says the Managing Editor of San Francisco Bay newspapers, „there are 100 readers. The letter writers say „did you see my letter in the paper today?‟ They do their own personal marketing on behalf of the newspaper. It allows each day‟s paper to go wider than yesterday‟s‟ (p. 56), quite reminiscent of political economy theory. It can also be interpreted as leaning to democratization of information where feedbacks from diverse readers are allowed to be cushioned on these platforms.

All this discussion about where the stories are placed, which genre is prioritized or neutralized, points to the agenda-setting power of the media whose crux, according to Coleman *et al* (2009:147), is on „…presenting certain issues frequently and prominently…‟ And by doing that, according to the propounders, McCombs and Shaw

(in Asemah, 2011:176) „editors, newsroom staff and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but how much importance to attach in a news story and its position‟.

RQ2. What are the similarities and differences in the nature of framing blasphemy controversies between *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* newspapers?

A sum of eight frames (condemnation, solution, people-oriented, invisible effects, visible effects, ethnic, religious and elite-oriented) were constructed and data collected categorized exclusively under a frame to ultimately ascertain the similarities and differences between *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* in their framing of blasphemy controversies in Northern Nigeria. The result shows that condemnation frame which seeks to condemn the mob lynching as unfortunate, unIslamic, illegal, immoral and offensive to civilizational ethos, thereby advocates the prosecution of the perpetrators, received the greatest weight (39.6%) of all frames in both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* newspapers taking 20.7% and 18.9% respectively. (Table 4.2 and 4.3 contains the statistical distribution of each frame.) It is succeeded by solution frame which attempts to explore the factors responsible for causing and solving the blasphemy conflicts, representing 24.5% of the total frames in both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch*; 15.0% and 9.4% respectively. This presupposes that the main focus of their articles (news, editorials and opinion pieces featured) is on condemning, exploring the causes and seeking solution to such conflict that claimed lives and property, and more importantly, undermines friendly coexistence among people of different ethnic, religious and political affiliations.

Similarly, both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* did not direct attention to invisible effects of conflict, nor consider the feelings and opinions of ordinary people worth focusing

attention on. That is why people-oriented and invisible effects frames recorded only one frequency i.e in *Daily Trust* representing 5% of its total peace frames, while none in *The Punch* (see table 4.2 for the distribution). But visible effect frame featured conspicuously in the two newspapers, representing 13.7% of Punch‟s total frames, and 8.3% of *Daily Trust*‟s. This is followed by elite-oriented frame which took 3.7% of the total frames of both newspapers, featuring once in each.

However, both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* differ significantly in their ethnic and religious frames. Whereas religious frame recurred 7 times and represents 24.1% of Punch‟s total frames, it appeared only once representing 4.1% of *Daily Trust*‟s total frames. In this way also comes ethnic frame which focuses much attention on the ethnicity and the region of the victims of „blasphemy‟ lynching; creating an atmosphere of *we* versus *them*, representing 6.9% in *The Punch*, 0% in *Daily Trust*.

According to Entman (1993) and Entman, Matthes and Pellycano(2009) framing involves moral judgement. Hence in a matter where religion is at the centre, where lives and property are battered in a bizarre manner without hindsight to peace, mutual trust and cordial coexistence, it will not be surprising to see condemnation being churned out from all directions, and forming the nub of media narrative. Again, these are transgressions involving people claiming faith to one of the two religions consistently at competition with each other for hegemony in the country, hence the holier-than- thouness embedded in such condemnations. More importantly, Islam and the Muslims world over have in recent times suffered smears and backlash from the weird activities of terrorist organizations (Boko Haram, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab et c) aligning themselves to Islam as the fountain of their ideology. So it cannot be unlikely to see Muslim elite rushing, condemning and thus absolving mainstream Muslims from such actions as lynching for blasphemy without recourse to legal procedures. This echoes

Mamdani‟s (2006) thesis of good Muslim, bad Muslim and the attendant quarantine, as well as Said‟s (2000) clash of definitions.

In the same vein comes the predominance of solution frame. Nigeria as a country has suffered innumerable setbacks brought about by intra or inter religious crises, or under their guise. From Maitatsine crises of 1980s to Jos, Kaduna and Bauchi (see Yusuf 2000 for details) in the last three decades down to the monstrous Boko Haram crisis (see Unaegbu 2016, Shehu 2014), the struggle has been how to keep the country floating in relative peace and unity (Pate, 2010; 2012, Pate & Dauda, 2015). As a result of these mob actions over alleged blasphemy in Kano, Niger and Zamfara states, pundits have been up and doing ascribing causes and solutions to many variables. Their efforts thus complemented by a number of editorials in the media. This therefore accounts for the prevalence of solution frame in both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* which is in tandem with the „treatment recommendation‟ aspect of framing definition (Entman, 1993) rephrased as „supporting remedies‟ in Entman *et al* (2009).

The exclusion of people-oriented frame in the coverage of both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* on blasphemy and other issues can be attributed to the orientation of Nigerian press where elite are considered as the primary source of news. That is why in this context we are inundated with Sultan says…, Ganduje promises…, CAN warns…, JNI calls…, El-Rufai, Okorochas meet…, Soyinka seeks…, minister orders… et c Ordinary people on the streets and market who are most often directly affected by the aftermath of such violence are hardly captured in media narrative. Perhaps their thoughts and emotion, hope and aspiration do not matter because the medium is elitist in nature and patronized by members of that class. That is why no editorial, none but a single news story was framed in their direction: “Pandogari calm as socio-economic activities pick up” (*Daily Trust* June 6, 2016). Buttressing this submission is the finding of Unaegbu

(2016) in respect of Boko Haram coverage by the Nigerian press where, out of the 105 articles she analysed, only 26.6% came from the people in the affected communities – in comparison to 63.8% from government officials and military sources.

Much of the above argument can be extended to the total blackout on invisible effects of conflict frame in the coverage of both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch*. In the reportage of all the incidents one gets overwhelmed with physical attacks and destruction of property, protests, deaths, arson, and other visible effects because they arguably have more human appeal and susceptible to sensationalism than abstract attributes of human feelings (fear, trauma, revenge et c) that are perennially detrimental to lasting peaceful coexistence. This may also be the resultant effect of limited knowledge of the journalists and their editors in the art of conflict-sensitive journalism as discovered by Pate (2010; 2012), Yusuf (2002) and Shehu (2014). The preponderance of religious frame coupled with ethnic ones in *The Punch* newspaper can equally be attributed to this factor, or desperate effort to sustain or even accentuate we/them polarity as market strategy. For, as Chiang and Knight (2008) observed „the outlets are primarily driven by profit motives,… under the assumption that consumers prefer to consume news that confirms their prior beliefs; competition forces newspapers to differentiate themselves by moving to the ideological extreme‟ (p. 37). In this the Trust may be commended for at least being subtle.

RQ.3 How compatible are the dominant frames used by *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* newspapers with Galtung‟s thesis of Peace Journalism?

From tables 4.2 and 4.3 it can be seen that the eight frames we have just concluded analyzing, are equally divided into two broad categories: war frames and peace frames. This juxtaposition is in line with Galtung‟s (1998) original schema of peace journalism

given as a basis for comparative analysis in empirical researches to ascertain the dominance of one form of journalism over the other.

The data collected and statistically presented beforehand revealed a sum of 53 frames with peace frames having 35 representing 66.0% and war frames 18 representing 33.9%. This clearly brought to the fore that both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* concentrated on peace rather than war journalism. Even at that some frames (solution and condemnation) received greater attention than others as our foregoing analysis vindicates. However, this does not preclude the conspicuousness of war frames where particularly in *The Punch*, they compete closely with peace frames – the former 14 (48.2%) while the latter 15 (51.8%).

As table 4.2 shows, *Daily Trust* produced 57.1% of the total peace frames while *The Punch* carried 42.9% of the said frames. Specifically, *Daily Trust* has 11(55%) of condemnation frame, 8(40%) of solution frame, 1(5%) of people-oriented frame and 0(0%) of invisible effects frame. *The Punch*, on the other hand, contains the following frequencies and percentages: condemnation frame 10(66.7%), solution frame 5(33.3%), while people-oriented and invisible effects frames did not feature completely. In other words, the summation of respective peace frames for both newspapers reveals: condemnation frame with 21 (60%), solution frame 13 (37.1%), people-oriented frame

1 (2.9%) while invisible effects frame 0 (0%) respectively.

Conversely, both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* produced a sum of 18 war frames representing 33.9% of the total frames. Whereas *The Punch* takes 14 (77.7%), *Daily Trust* contains 4 (22.2%) of the total war frames. Specifically, *The Punch* concentrated hugely on religious frame 7 (50%), followed by visible effects frame 4 (28.6%), ethnic frame 2 (12.2%) and elite-oriented frame 1 (7.1%). While *Daily Trust* focused on

visible effects frame 2, representing 50% of its war frames; succeeded by religious frame 1 (25%), elite-oriented frame 1 (25%) respectively. Ethnic frame is neutral in *Daily Trust*.

Put together, *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* gave more attention to religious frame 8 (44.4%), followed by visible effects frame 6 (33.3%), ethnic frame 2 (11.1%) and elite-

oriented frame 2 (11.1%) respectively.

In summary, what the foregoing imply is that the press can be used in the service of peace without violating professional ethics as Peace Journalism scholars (Mare 2017, Galtung 2013a, Ottosen 2010, Howard 2009, Tumber 2009,Lynch & McGoldrick 2009, Lynch 2007, Hackett 2006, McGoldrick & Lynch 2005, Tehranian 2002, McGoldrick & Lynch 2000, among others) theorized, which equally coincided with the findings of such empirical researches as Ngige *et al* (2016) who surveyed media environment with regard to the coverage of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria, and commended the media for being consistent in relating relevant information to the public and policy-makers, timely criticism and advocacy of practical solutions; Ayoola and Olaosun (2014) who also examined how Nigerian press (*The Nation, The Punch and The Guardian)* handled Boko Haram attacks on Nigerian Police Headquarters and United Nations House in Abuja, concluding that „contrary to scepticisms about daily newspapers as purveyors of misery and libel, Nigerian national newspapers serve as a source of accurate information and perceptive analysis on Boko Haram…(p.1)‟; Raza *et al* (2012) who explored two leading Pakistani newspapers (*Daily Nation* and *Business Recorder*) to find out how the „war on terror‟ is framed, and concluded that both newspapers were generally more inclined to peaceful resolution of the conflict in their framing – in terms of details, context, language and tone of coverage. They „condemn and criticize the attacks and destruction (sic) activities of the Taliban in most of their news

stories…(and) paid more time, space and focus on the social and economic impact on people and society whenever the bomb blast or suicide attack occurred‟ (p.106).

The dominance of peace frames over their antagonists may be a result of sympathy and empathy to the nation which has suffered incalculable visible and invisible damages due to religious or ethno-religious crises. The country is still grappling to contend the nemesis of Boko Haram which has proven to be one of most deadly terrorists‟ organization world over, causing the deaths of over 30,000 people, destroying property worth $5.9 billion in Borno alone, displacing over 2 million Nigerians and above all, worsening suspicion, strangling the remnant of trust and cordial relation among Nigerian citizens of different religious affiliation in addition to the enormous damage done to the country‟s image internationally (Pate & Idris, 2016). This is besides other frontiers of violent conflict in Niger-Delta, separatist movement in Eastern Nigeria, farmers/herders clashes in North Central, abduction for ransom and a host of other challenges bedeviling the country‟s progress. So, no patriotic citizen or organization can deliberately add to these national woes. Similarly, this may also be due to the realization by the papers that it is only in relative peace that they can stay in business. For where there is breakdown of law and order accompanied with pandemic violence, it is our survival as humans that will take precedence. Conversely, such coverage may be a corollary of increasing awareness, professionally, of the values, tenets and techniques of conflict-sensitive journalism which is receiving serious attention and advocacy among scholars, practitioners and development workers since the turn of the 21st century.

But the political-economic interests of these newspapers and lack of training in especially language usage and other conflict-sensitive tenets can also be detrimental to peaceful cause as evident in the prevalence of war language and stooping to ethno-

religious sentiments, *inter alia*. This has also been proven by numerous previous researches such as Aliagan 2015, Shehu 2014, Okoro and Odeomelam 2013, Pate 2012,

Fong 2009, Steien 2008, Siraj 2007, Yusuf 2002 et c.

By and large, *Daily Trust* has once more distinguished itself as the paragon of peace journalism among Nigerian newspapers for having greater percentage of peace frames; lower percentage of war frames and war language indicators respectively. This coincides with the findings of Shehu (2014), and may be associated to the professional background of the proprietor, administrators, editors, reporters and even columnists. A number of them, including the current editor-in-chief, Manir Dan Ali, were former BBC journalists, while others like Mohammed Haruna, Bala Mohammed and Farooq Kperogi are academics-cum-veteran journalists. Another reason may be having been born and brought up in the tinderbox of ethno-religious conflicts (northern Nigeria) which does not distinguish in claiming lives and property, has obligated the newspaper to be extra-sensitive and solution-prone for the progress of „its‟ constituency that is constantly bashed by competitors as the microcosm of backwardness, poverty, illiteracy, child abuse and parasitism, among other negativities.

Again, the newspaper may be striving to reclaim the reputation and glory of *New Nigerian* during its heydays, which according to Kukah (1993:69-72) „through its editorials, features and reportage, rose to an enviable position. It became one of the most talked about newspapers from this part of the world… Its editorial excellence was unchallenged in the whole country…(making) Col. Ojukwu, the leader of Biafran army into giving specific instructions that *New Nigerian* vans were to be allowed free access into the rebel enclave during the war, an opportunity that was not extended to all papers‟.

In this way also came the relevance of its *No, thank you* policy which is a stride to inculcate and promote ethical standard in the practice of journalism in a profession seriously bedeviled by ethical violation (note: Punch too has one, similar).

Although Wale Aboderin‟s Punch was able to put its head slightly above the waters of war frames, it generally stooped lower in peace journalism because of arguably, lack of conscious training in the art of conflict-sensitive coverage. That is why in each of the two editorials it produced on the subject-matter, one notices the recurrence of „terrorist‟ and „extremist‟ at least half-a-dozen time. Belonging to the demonizing category, „for a journalist to use them is always to take sides‟, according to McGoldrick and Lynch (2000).

Moreover, the newspaper, particularly its editors, operating along Lagos-Ibadan axis, may not appreciate the implication of such coverage on the socio-psychological and even economic wellbeing of the Other. Perhaps it may be a deliberate ploy to accentuate „we‟/„them‟ polarity especially along religious line, in order to retain its economic hegemony in that domain. Hence the front page screaming banner: “CAN calls emergency meeting over Zamfara, Kaduna Killing” (Punch Aug. 24, 2016), “Probe Pandogari killings, CAN tells Niger govt.” (Punch, June 5, 2016), “There is a grand plan to wipe out Christians – CAN General Secretary” (Punch July 17, 2016) et c.

But fairly enough, it is not all grim. *The Punch* has to its credit the only feature in the coverage that reveals the psychological force at work in the process of such mob action which any proactive government can take cue from and preempt the future recurrence of such violence. More so, one of its columnists, Obo Effanga (Punch, June 6, 2016) has extended the net of investigation to find out from learned Muslim friends: „What

amounts to blasphemy of the religion or the Prophet? What is the nature of proof of actual blasphemy thereof and what is the appropriate punishment and how it should be carried out?...‟ This bid to understand the Other is the only effort by all columnists who wrote on the topic, to my knowledge. Similarly, when Abimbola Adelakun, another Punch‟s columnist, lambasted Presidential media team for reference to Bridget Agbahime‟s Igboness in a country desperate for national cohesion (Punch June 3, 2016), it can be interpreted as tacit admonition to *The Punch*‟s editors that „you don‟t say “…Igbo woman stabbed to death in Kano” (Punch June 3, 2016), rather “Blasphemy: Two in Police net over killing of woman in Kano” (*Daily Trust* June 4, 2016 – note even this without inverted commas enclosing blasphemy is a verdict that it was in actuality). From all this, coupled with “True Muslims won‟t kill Christians – Sani” (Punch July 17, 2016), and the proactive “No Christian died in Zamfara killing – CAN” (Punch Aug. 29, 2016), one gets a succor of some sort that the end of the tunnel is not all doom and gloom.

RQ.4 How comparable are *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* newspapers in terms of the war language indicators used?

The presence or absence of war lexis in media content is another key determinant of a given medium‟s commitment to peace journalism, according to scholars (see Lynch & McGoldrick 2009, Howard 2009, Lynch 2007, Hackett 2006, McGoldrick & Lynch 2005, Tehranian 2002, McGoldrick & Lynch 2000 et c). This research question, therefore, seeks to gauge and compare the occurrences of war lexical indicators in both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* newspapers. From table 4.4 it can be seen that a sum of 71 war terms were used in both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* within the period of this research. Out of this, *Daily Trust* carried 11.2 % (n=8) compared to *The Punch* which contained 88.7% (n=63). Of the three categories of war language, demonizing type

received the greatest attention in both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch*, taking 90% (DT=11.2%; P= 78.8%) of the total war language indicators used. It is followed by emotive category which represents 7.0% (DT=0%; P=7.0%), while victimizing lexical indicators received the least attention – taking 2.8% (DT=0%; P=2.8%). For the frequencies and percentages of the respective words, see table 4.4, charts 4.1 and the succeeding presentation.

It is generally observed that both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* have been relatively sensitive for, arguably, the conscious eschewal of highly emotive words such as

„massacre‟, „systematic‟, „decimated‟ and to some extent „genocide‟. Instead of

„massacre‟ for example, „murder‟ and „killing‟ were repeatedly and consistently used by both newspapers. Even the frequency of „barbaric‟ (which is the highest of all war lexical indicators) can be argued to be in the service of peace and relates closely to our condemnation frame. For, if mob justice (arson and killing for alleged blasphemy or whatever crime) is not strongly chided by particularly the northern elite (Sultan, emirs, governors, scholars et c), it can be easily interpreted as connivance or tacit approval, hence the attendant reprisal and breakdown of peace, order and trust. Implicitly, this triggers the need to revisit this war lexis to ascertain whether it is in all contexts that these terms serve the end of violent conflicts or there are exceptions. If the use of such words as „barbaric‟ in this case cast the actors as „beyond the pale of civilized behavior‟ (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000); „make the other side seem impossible to negotiate with‟ (Howard, 2003) and „to use them puts the journalist on that (other) side and help to justify an escalation of violence‟ (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000), what else shall the journalist use for such action as the one described above where there seem to be unanimous agreement that it is immoral, irreligious and illegal?

Moreover, the frequent use of demonizing language in *The Punch* newspaper (see for example the editorials of June 21, and September 5, 2016 where „extremist‟ and

„terrorist‟ were used more than a dozen time, quite evocative of anarchists in Conrad‟s *Secret Agent*) and the relative downplay of such language in *Daily Trust* for the same incidents can equally be interpreted as a result of economic expediency – pandering to audience‟s preferences. Thus Chiang and Knight (2008) observe „under the assumption that consumers prefer to consume news that confirms their prior beliefs; competition forces newspapers to differentiate themselves by moving to the ideological extreme‟ (p. 37). And language, according to critical discourse analysts, „(i)s a power resource that is related to ideology…‟(Bryman, 2012:536) or, to quote McQuail (2010:462),

„…linguistic forms are vehicles for carrying socially prevailing sentiments and ideologies‟. In the case of *The Punch*, it is like: cast the ideological Other with as much demonizing language and evoke emotion for „their‟ action, and you are assured of market dominance over here. While for the *Daily Trust*: these are our people, their images and imageries matter for our survival. The more they are positively represented the more they cling to us with, „this is our paper‟. That is why according to Aliagan (2015) the major national dailies in Nigeria pander along ethnic/regional ideology as survival strategy and why most of their adverts come from these respective regions. A finding corroborated by Jimoh and Abdul-Hameed (2017) and vindicated by political economy theory.

Again, it may also be a mark of professionalism exhibited by the Trust which according to Shehu (2014), is empirically more conflict-sensitive than the rest of Nigerian newspapers he investigated. Arguably, this is noticeably lacking in *The Punch* for the preponderance of war language and war frames in comparison.

However, this is not an isolated case in war language usage and deployment of conflict- inducing frames. Besides using such words as „brutal‟, „barbaric‟ and „ethnic cleansing‟ in an editorial titled *Rescuing Benue from murderous Fulani herdsmen*, *The Punch* of August 4, 2016 alleged that the President‟s taciturnity over the matter is due to the involvement of his ethnic group to whom he is paradoxically protective in the face of cattle-rustling in Zamfara. As such Benue communities should have a way of self- preservation and defence „….against the impunity and genocide of the Fulani‟ (p.18). A columnist, Tunde Temionu, in *The Punch* of the same day strived to prove that it is

„…a part of the long-time grand design to complete the jihad project of Uthman Danfodio‟. When contrasted with *Daily Trust*‟s *Nigeria’s fleeing nomads: How rustling, violence & crises push pastoral life to the brink* (May 28, 2016), one gets a different viewpoint with regard to the style of coverage and oxymoron of victimhood – where the focus is on marital/familial rupture occasioned by cattle rustling.

Finally, geographical factor may also be another cause of the difference in the coverage. *Daily Trust* being closer to the people and places of these conflicts obviously appreciate better the socio-economic and psychological variables at play in such incidents. This reminds one of Mahmood‟s assertion that

the Aristotlean term *schesis* captures this living relation because of its heightened psychophysiological and emotional connotations and its emphasis on familiarity and intimacy as a necessary aspect of the relation. What interests me in this iconophile tradition is not so much the image as the concept of relationality that binds the subject to the object of veneration. Those who profess love for the Prophet do not simply follow his advice and admonition to the *umma* (that exist in the form of the *hadith*), but also try to emulate how he dressed; what he ate; how he spoke to his friends and adversaries; how he slept, walked, and so on. These mimetic ways of realizing the Prophet‟s behavior are lived not as commandments but as virtues where one wants to ingest as it were, the Prophet‟s persona into oneself… Muhammad, in this understanding, is not simply a proper noun referring to a particular historical figure, but the mark of a relation of similitude… The sense of moral injury that emanates from such a relationship between the ethical subject and the figure of exemplarity (such as Muhammad) is quite distinct from one that the notion of blasphemy encodes. The notion of moral injury I am describing no doubt entails a sense of violation, but this violation emanates not from the judgment that

“the law” has been transgressed but from the perception that one‟s being, grounded as it is in a relationship of dependency with the Prophet, has been shaken. Mahmood (2009:75-78)

Where genuinely so, when one‟s object of adoration is dragged to the gutter, and the judiciary and security institutions are perceived with incapacitation for redress, and one lacks the know-how of the religion let alone of conflict management, such violence can surely be a rule. This also draws the nexus between the invisible and visible effects of violent conflict – a crisscross of identity need and suppression of freedom both of which precursors of direct violence, according to Galtung (2013b).

# CHAPTER FIVE

# SUMMARY, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

# INTRODUCTION

This chapter summarizes and draws conclusion from the literature reviewed and the findings; makes recommendations for further studies and for the betterment of the society, as well as references to this work‟s contribution to knowledge.

# SUMMARY

Thus far, it can be seen that blasphemy is one of the most combustible topics – it easily offends religious sensibilities, its context often contestable for being manipulable, and naturally controversial because of its nuances and close affiliation to freedom of expression in modern discourse. That is why it has been intensely debated by scholars and commentators in the media.

The literature reviewed revealed that freedom, right and liberty, despite their affinity linguistically and their interchangeability in discourse, have never been wholly synonymous. Nor have they been unrestrictedly applied in any society at any time in human history (Appadorai, 1974). Since the ancient Socratic Greece, scholars, philosophers, poets and other intellectuals who are concerned with the moral sanity and political stability of society, have been advocating for various forms of censorship to regulate the excesses of free speech and free press, inter alia. Notable classical examples include Plato‟s (1968 trans.) *Republic*, Milton‟s (1644) *Areopagitica*, Mill‟s (1859) *On Liberty* and Wollstonecraft‟s (1792) *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman…* While contemporary voices thus include Cole (2015), Dabashi (2015), Falk (2011), Kamali (2010),Breindl (2009), Asad, Brown, Mahmood and Butler (2009) who vigorously rationalize cultural interface between the West and The Rest over the boundary of free speech and blasphemy for peaceful coexistence in this world of

„crossings over‟, to borrow the memorable words of Edward Said. However, this is not to deny the existence of absolutist viewpoints - from Laski to American jurist, Hugo Black. As recent as 2014, Evelyn Aswad and others have stressed „why the United States cannot agree to disagree on blasphemy laws‟ across the globe.

In tracing the history of free speech to appreciate its link with blasphemy, the research discovered that some scholars (Cottee 2011, Falk 2011, Hill & Fenner 2010; Chandler & Munday, 2011) claimed that it originated during the Enlightenment. But relying on

the scriptures and other scholars (Okpoko 2014, Asad 2009a, Wein 2008, Pember & Calvert 2008, Neher & Sandhir 2007, Rodman 2006), he argued otherwise, submitting that it is rather a feature that evolved and developed with God‟s creatures right before the creation of mankind, transmuting into various shades and forms over time in human history, as it will most probably continue to undergo definitional modification in the future. In other words, freedom of expression with its glamorous character of dissent and fearlessness is a God-giving right. And that unlike the popular opinion (and propaganda thus), Islam allows, actually enjoins free speech in both theory and practice especially where „truth‟ is at stake.

This research also reviewed high profile cases of blasphemy locally and internationally which include Rushdie Affair, Davinci Code, Danish cartoons‟ uproar, Charlie Hebdo, and Iseoma Daniel‟s pageantry piece which triggered violence and claimed over hundred lives in Nigeria. What constitute blasphemy is also a matter of contention in all monotheistic faiths and easily subjected to political manipulation. But equally contentious in Islam is the nature of punishment that should be meted out to the blasphemer. As reported earlier, Muslim scholars and jurists are divided between death penalty and deterrent or no punishment. In this way therefore the formulation of blasphemy laws differ among the predominantly Muslim countries of the world – Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia on the one hand; Turkey, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, United Arab Emirate and Bahrain on the other.

The study also revealed that Western media‟s caricaturing of Islam (as in the Danish *Jyllands Posten* and *Charlie Hebdo* cartoons) have attendant backlash on the Muslim minority in the West. Power (2008), Hasan (2016) and particularly Allen (2004) have consistently commented on how they (the Muslims) are increasingly shortchanged in jobs, educational opportunities and social life in general. Orientalists like Bernard

Lewis, Daniel Pipes, and Samuel Huntington have aided and abated Muslim stereotype in the West which resulted in many anti-Muslim policies and West-East tension. These are, however, frontally and relentlessly taken on by intellectuals like Edward Said and Karen Armstrong. But the root of this tension and mutual revulsion which influences media narrative, public discourses and policies, dates back to seventh century and was precipitated by military confrontation between the West and the world of Islam which resulted in conquest and reconquest of each other‟s territory and sphere of influence (Abdallah 2005, Ruthven 1991, and Lewis, 1990). On the other hand, Butler, Asad and Mahmood (2009) have debated on how this conflict can be solved in modern times (see the full chapter on literature review for details).

Media and conflict literature principally revealed two opposing conclusions. Whereas Raza *et al* (2012), Ayoola and Olaosun (2014), Ngige *et al* (2016) and Ita *et al* (2017) found media‟s role commendable, Yusuf (2002), Siraj (2007), Steien (2008), Fong (2009), Pate (2010;2012), Ozohu-Suleiman (2013), Shehu (2014), Ozohu-Suleiman and Ishak (2015), Unaegbu (2016) Ibrahim and Jimoh (2017), Jimoh and Abdul-Hameed (2017) et c reported dismal performance after reviewing different local and international conflict situations. Whether head or tail, the current advocacy receiving both scholars‟ and professionals‟ attention is peace journalism propounded by Johann Galtung and developed by Annabel McGoldrick, Jake Lynch, Howard, Majid Tehranian et c but fiercely critiqued by Thomas Hanitzsch.

Nigeria being one of the most religious nations on earth (BBC, 2004) with its media sharply divided along ethno-religious lines especially during violent conflict, has been subject of various researches by both local and international scholars to ascertain among other things, media performance – with result often argued to be dismal (see Akpan *et al* 2013, Okoro and Odeomalam 2013, Pate 2012, Mallan 2006 et c).

However, using framing and agenda-setting theories, quantitative content analysis, adapting Galtung‟s schema of Peace Journalism, conducting pilot study and intra-coder reliability test to ensure the efficiency of the categories, this research took a census of 306 editions of *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* to ascertain how these national dailies are responding to peace journalism and its antithesis in their approaches, diction and overall coverage of blasphemy controversies in the country. The newspapers examined have performed commendably for being relatively sensitive and laying emphasis to peace frames which are expected to help in dousing tension, de-escalating violence and peaceful resolution of conflict. The focus of both *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* has been largely on condemning mob lynching for alleged blasphemy as abysmal and unacceptable to civilizational ethos, which need to be solved through various suggestions advanced. This is interpreted as corollary of not only professional calling, but also political and economic interests.

Although the volume of the coverage has been somewhat appreciable and similar, but the depth is generally peripheral. This resulted in the paucity of feature genre and invisible effects frame which are characteristically in-depth. These, in addition to the elite-orientedness of the content, ethno-religious frames and war language, imply lack of knowledge and application of Peace Journalism tenets (see Shehu (2014) for similar conclusion). That is why the researcher recommended inter alia, refresher course on conflict-sensitive journalism for all journalists especially those covering crises in Nigeria for the peace, unity and development of the country.

# CONCLUSION

Considering the intensity of Nigerian civil war, Maitatsine crisis of the 1980s, Boko Haram and Niger-Delta uprisings over the years, Nigeria has arguably proven itself

indissoluble and poignantly inflammable as well. The amount of hate (visible in both social and mainstream media) being spewed by religious bigots and ethnic jingoists is not only scary but detrimental to national cohesion. The ventilation of such in particularly the mainstream media for whatever reason can only worsen Nigerians‟

„poisoned perception‟ of one another, and in no way melt their differences – social, political and otherwise. When the media consciously wear the humanitarian toga of peace journalism as evident here, the tunnel will surely be bright midway – before we even reach the end.

# CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

Considering the paucity of empirical researches on conflict-sensitive journalism in Nigeria, nay across the globe (Raza *et al* 2012) especially in line with Galtung‟s schema (Ozohu-Suleman, 2013), this research can be helpful in filling the chasm of literature on the subject-matter.

Moreover, blasphemy by its nature is quite sensitive and contentious, thus becoming one of the sources of violent conflict in Nigeria. As the first empirical research (to my knowledge), the recommendations offered here can help in addressing its recurrence and mitigating the violence that usually accompany its occurrences.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

Owing to the volatile nature of Nigeria especially on religious differences (retrospection on the recent Hijab verses Church Garb controversy in Osun state), this research recommends that:

* + 1. Media organizations, professional bodies, the government and interested NGOs should collaborate and mandate refresher course in Peace Journalism

perchance that will mitigate the seeming shallowness and recklessness in covering conflicts.

* + 1. An improved remuneration for journalists will help in safeguarding them from being influenced by politicians, religious bigots or any merchant of conflict.
    2. Blasphemy should be included in the curriculum of particularly northern Universities. Since academia enjoys a relatively high degree of freedom (including that of expression), the nuances of blasphemy and its corollary can be conveniently explored or debated therein. Thus, the larger society will ultimately benefit from it due to the partaking of some of its members.
    3. The religious, traditional and political establishment in the North should consider as a matter of urgency, sponsoring programmes on particularly radio about what constitute blasphemy and how people should react in the face of it, inter alia. In this, even Kannywood and Maulid avenues can be exploited. And National Orientation Agency co-opted.
    4. Since a number of violent conflict in the North are attributed to socio- economic factors (during Pandogari‟s blasphemy mayhem, the mob turned to looting shops according to media reports), leaders should intensify efforts in addressing the pangs of poverty, unemployment and educational backwardness.

# RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

A survey needed to be conducted to ascertain the knowledge of the general public in the north about Islamic ruling on blasphemy and to what extent freedom of expression (in the media or interpersonal communication) can be accommodated.

According to Baran and Davis (2009:322), „the most common finding is that exposure to news coverage results in learning that is consistent with the frames that structure the coverage‟. Thus another survey can be carried out to ascertain the effects of these frames in the decision-making of the audience (micro-level analysis, according to Volkmer 2009) – thereby validating or repudiating this claim.

Equally important is another content-analysis with widely perceived as ethically porous newspapers like the *Vanguard*, and not-so-popular newspapers like *Blueprint* and *Peoples Daily* to ascertain the extent of peace journalism in their coverage of conflicts in Nigeria.

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# APPENDIX

**Analyzed Editions from the *Daily Trust*of 1st May to September 30th, 2016**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Title** | **Date** | **Page No.** |
| 1. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 1st, 2016 | 4 |
| 2. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 2nd, 2016 | 4 |
| 3. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 4th, 2016 | 7 |
| 4. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 5th, 2016 | 13 |
| 5. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 5th, 2016 | 16 |
| 6. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 6th, 2016 | 10 |
| 7. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 6th, 2016 | 14 |
| 8. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 7th, 2016 | 44 |
| 9. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 8th, 2016 | 11 |
| 10. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 9th, 2016 | 4 |
| 11. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 9th, 2016 | 43 |
| 12. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 11th, 2016 | 10 |
| 13. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 11th, 2016 | 10-11 |
| 14. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 13th, 2016 | 12 |
| 15. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 15th, 2016 | Back |
| 16. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | June 29th, 2016 | 4 |
| 17. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | August 23rd, 2016 | 10 |
| 18. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | August 24th, 2016 | 3 |
| 19. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | August 25th, 2016 | 4 |
| 20. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | August 25th, 2016 | 9 |
| 21. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | August 26th, 2016 | 51 |
| 22. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | August 26th, 2016 | 12 |
| 23. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | August 29th, 2016 | 6 |
| 24. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of | August 30th, 2016 | 9 |

25. *Daily Trust* Newspaper of September 1st, 2016 3

# Analyzed Editions from *The Punch*of 1st May to September 30th, 2016

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Title** | **Date** | **Page No.** |
| 1. *The Punch* Newspaper of | May 26th, 2016 | 9 |
| 2. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 1st, 2016 | 9 |
| 3. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 3rd, 2016 | 16 |
| 4. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 5th, 2016 | 7 |
| 5. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 5th, 2016 | 8 |
| 6. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 6th, 2016 | 5 |
| 7. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 6th, 2016 | 7 |
| 8. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 6th, 2016 | 21 |
| 9. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 6th, 2016 | 22 |
| 10. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 7th, 2016 | 23 |
| 11. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 8th, 2016 | 11 |
| 12. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 8th, 2016 | 20 |
| 13. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 9th, 2016 | Back |
| 14. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 12th, 2016 | 52 |
| 15. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 15th, 2016 | 9 |
| 16. *The Punch* Newspaper of | June 21st, 2016 | 20 |
| 17. *The Punch* Newspaper of | July 17th, 2016 | 12 |
| 18. *The Punch* Newspaper of | July 17th, 2016 | 13 |
| 19. *The Punch* Newspaper of | July 30th, 2016 | 40-41 |
| 20. *The Punch* Newspaper of | August 23rd, 2016 | 14 |
| 21. *The Punch* Newspaper of | August 24th, 2016 | Front & 7 |
| 22. *The Punch* Newspaper of | August 25th, 2016 | 10 |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 23. *The Punch* Newspaper of | August 26th, 2016 | 9 |
| 24. *The Punch* Newspaper of | August 26th, 2016 | 15 |
| 25. *The Punch* Newspaper of | August 29th, 2016 | 13 |
| 26. *The Punch* Newspaper of | September 2nd, 2016 | 9 |
| 27. *The Punch* Newspaper of | September 5th, 2016 | 20 |
| 28. *The Punch* Newspaper of | September 6th, 2016 | 20 |

# INSTRUMENTS OF DATA COLLECTION (CODING SHEETS)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **STORY TYPES** | ***DAILY TRUST*** | **PUNCH** |
| **Straight News** |  |  |
| **Feature News** |  |  |
| **Columns** |  |  |
| **Editorials** |  |  |
| **Pictures** |  |  |
| **Interviews** |  |  |
| **Cartoons** |  |  |
| **Letters** |  |  |
|  | **PEACE FRAMES** | **PEACE FRAMES** |
| **Condemnation Frames** |  |  |
| **Solution Frames** |  |  |
| **People-Oriented Frames** |  |  |
| **Invisible Effects Frames** |  |  |
|  | **WAR FRAMES** | **WAR FRAMES** |
| **Visible Effects Frames** |  |  |
| **Ethnic Frames** |  |  |
| **Religious Frames** |  |  |
| **Elite-Oriented Frames** |  |  |

# OCCURRENCES OF WAR LEXICAL INDICATORS

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **CATEGORIES** | **WORDS** | **PUNCH** | ***DAILY TRUST*** | **TOTAL** |
|  | **Barbaric** |  |  |  |
|  | **Cruel** |  |  |  |
|  | **Vicious** |  |  |  |
|  | **Brutal** |  |  |  |
| **DEMONIZING** | **Terrorist** |  |  |  |
|  | **Extremist** |  |  |  |
|  | **Fanatic** |  |  |  |
|  | **Fundamentalist** |  |  |  |
|  | **Tyrant** |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Savage** |  |  |  |
|  | **Ruthless** |  |  |  |
|  | **Inhuman** |  |  |  |
| **VICTIMIZING** | **Destitute** |  |  |  |
|  | **Devastated** |  |  |  |
|  | **Defenceless** |  |  |  |
|  | **Demoralized** |  |  |  |
|  | **Pathetic** |  |  |  |
| **EMOTIVE** | **Genocide** |  |  |  |
|  | **Assassination** |  |  |  |
|  | **Systematic** |  |  |  |
|  | **Tragedy** |  |  |  |
|  | **Decimated** |  |  |  |
|  | **Massacre** |  |  |  |
| **TOTAL** |  |  |  |  |

**HOLTI‟S FORMULA REVEALING THE DEGREE OF CODING AGREEMENT**

𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑁

2𝑀

+ 𝑁

1 2

M = number of coding decision in which two coders agree N1 = total number of coding decision by first coder

N2 = total number of coding decision by second coder

Reliability= 2 (56)

58 + 58

= 0.96