**A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF THE JOINT MILITARY TASK FORCE IN THE NIGER DELTA, 2003-2010**

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# CERTIFICATION

I certify that this work which has been read and approved as meeting the requirement for the award of the Doctor of philosophy (Ph.D) Peace and Conflict Studies, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, was carried out by **HENRY OLORUNDARE MEJABI** under my supervision at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

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# DEDICATION

This Thesis is dedicated to the Glory of God Almighty, the Source of knowledge, the Giver and Sustainer of life. The grace, energy and favour with which this work was completed emanated from Him who is my all in all. Thank you Father.

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AHQ - Army Headquarters

ATG - Army Task Group

CIMIC - Civil –Military Cooperation CNL - Chevron Nigeria Limited

DHQ - Defence Headquarters

DSS - Department of State services

FAC - Fast Assault Craft

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

IS - Internal Security

JTF - Joint Task Force

MEND - Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta MOSOP - Movement for Survival of Ogoni People

NA - Nigerian Army

NAF - Nigerian Air Force

NAFTG - Nigerian Air Force Task Group NDDC - Niger Delta Development Commission NN - Nigerian Navy

NNTG - Nigerian Navy Task Group NPF - Nigeria Police Force NPTG - Nigeria Police Task Group

SPDC - Shell Petroleum and Development Company SSS - State Security Services

SSSTG - State Security Service Task Group MOOTW - Military Operation Other Than War MOUs - Memorandum of Understandings

OMPADEC - Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission ROE - Rules of Engagement

POL - Petroleum Oil Lubricant PSOs - Peace Support Operations

SALW - Small Arms and Light Weapon

TOE - Table of Organisation and Equipment

VPs - Vulnerable Points

KPs - Key points

NGOs - Non - Governmental Organisations IYC - Ijaw Youths Council

GSM - Global Satellite Mobile Phone

EFCC - Economic Financial Crimes Commission EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone

DDR - Disarmament Demobilisation and Re-Integration CSOs - Civil Society Organisations

AOR - Area of Responsibility

# ABSTRACT

Existing studies on the Niger Delta crisis focus largely on causes of the problem, the insurgency tactics of the militants, and some non-violent response mechanisms of the Nigerian state. These studies have neglected the use of military force to terminate the conflict. This study tries to bridge this gap by examining an aspect of counter-insurgency in the region by the Federal Government. The study is particularly focused on the preparedness, deployment, capabilities and impact of the operations of the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) in the region since 2003.

Data were collected from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources involved in-depth interviews with seven military Generals and thirteen Colonels all of which were directly involved in the Niger Delta operation. In-depth interviews were also held with ten security agencies (the police and SSS most especially) as well as eight security officials of oil companies; fifteen community and youth leaders, and four civil society organizations (CSOs). The secondary sources were magazine and newspaper reports, journals, books and internet reports and publications of oil companies. The analytical method used was content analysis.

The mandate of JTF was found to be in tandem with the expectations of a Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). It was expected to use force to make the Niger Delta region safe for oil exploitation. The operation was a strategy through which the government tried to evade responding proactively to the demands of the Niger Delta people. The mission has two flanks: Operation RESTORE HOPE which started in 2003 and Operation FLUSHOUT III which commenced in 2004 in Warri and Port Harcourt respectively. The two operations were merged into one in 2009. JTF was not specially trained for the riverine operations it carried out and was not adequately equipped and maintained to engage in asymmetrical warfare, curb militancy and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation. The study further reveals lack of interagency collaboration amongst the security agencies, CSOs and community leaders. Hence, it was difficult for JTF to achieve its goals. Instead, it caused collateral damages to communities and is perceived to have created “new” Niger Delta problem. Collusion of the community members and the militant youths led to the death of several JTF operatives.

The JTF has failed to arrest the insecurity problems in the region. The study recommends that the government should review the rules of engagement of the JTF with a view to making it to truly support a genuine disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of militants. Community members and civil society organizations should be involved in these reconstruction efforts of the Nigerian state as they are closer to the militant youths than the government.





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# CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

# HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT

The Niger Delta, an area of dense mangrove rainforest in the southern tip of Nigeria, comprises nine of Nigeria‟s thirty six states of the Federation. The states include Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers states (Figure 1).



ONDO

EDO

DELTA

IMO

BAYELSA RIVERS

CROSS RIVER

AKWA IBOM

## Figure 1: MAP OF NIGERIA SHOWING NIGER DELTA

ABIA

**Source: UNDP Niger Delta Human Development Report 2006**

This area has remained the treasure base of the Nigerian nation state in the past five decades. The area is endowed with over 95 percent of Nigeria‟s oil and gas reserves. The Niger Delta is strategic to the growth and development of the Nigerian economy, which is heavily dependent on earnings from crude oil and natural gas export. These resources account for approximately 90 per cent of the value of Nigeria‟s export, 88 per cent of its total revenue and 40 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), (Ross 2003:10). Ironically, the Niger Delta has been perceived as one

of Nigeria‟s least developed regions. The Niger Delta region is, therefore, a place of intense exploration and exploitation of oil and gas with its attendant massive environmental degradation and pollution.



**Plate 1: Shell Operations in Plate 2: Shell Operations in Oloibiri Oloibiri, Bayelsa State Showing Polluted Areas**

**Source : Googlesearch.com Accessed on 15 September, 2009 Accessed on 15 September, 2009**

**Plate 3 : Activities of Illegal Refineries Showing Polluted Areas Source : Researcher’s Fieldwork, 20 September,2010**

According to Ogbogbo (2005: 169), “the minority status of the autochthonous peoples of the area has led to their political and economic marginalization in the larger Nigerian federation”. He opined that this has imbued in them, a feeling of utter neglect, relegation and discrimination. Other problems of the area include; poverty, high level of unemployment, lack of poor socio-economic infrastructure where available, communal conflict, piracy, armed robbery, kidnapping and general state of insecurity.(*Newswatch Magazine*,(Lagos), June 8, 2009)

Allegation of neglect by the Federal Government had led to conflict between the people and the Federal Government in the region for many years. This began to surge appreciably in the late 1990s and was facilitated by poverty, youths‟ restiveness, political disenfranchisement, and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). These led to various armed factions and criminal gangs. The armed groups fought each other over the control of the illegally acquired oil (bunkering) and engaged in violent acts against oil and gas companies.



**Plate 4: Captured Militant’s Weapons Magazine**

**Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork**

**Plate 5: Captured Militant’s Weapons Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork,**

**20 September, 2010**



The government responded to the conflict by the use of military force and economic programmes of intervention and succour.(*ThisDay,* March 8, 2006)

Previous governments largely ignored the Niger Delta, partly because its geographical terrain made it relatively inaccessible. In fact, the Niger Delta‟s

topography constitutes a risk factor. This type of terrain in the Niger Delta can provide a safe haven for guerrilla fighters that outnumber the legitimate government forces. It has also been observed that the long period of military rule in Nigeria has contributed to bad governance and corruption.

The Niger Delta region, most especially Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa States has remained key flash points of political and criminal violence in Nigeria. Until recently when the Federal Government started its amnesty programme for Niger Delta militants, general insecurity occasioned by ethno-communal crises and widespread cult and criminal activities by restive youths abound in the region. Militant gangs proliferated at an uncontrollable rate in the region.



**Plate 6: Typical Militant Groups in the Niger Delta Source:** [**www.google.com**.](http://www.google.com/) **Accessed 15/09/2010**

The militants blew up oil installations, kidnapped oil workers (for ransom) and provided security for illegal oil bunkering activities. At this moment, the conflicts were no longer restricted to the issues of ecology, marginalization and resource control but also self- enervating. Many of the militant youths saw armed conflict as a vocation or business from which to earn a living. All of these posed threat to Nigeria‟s

internal and external security in the sense that, Nigeria absolutely depends on the oil economy for its survival.

There was an existing knowledge on the state of conflict and conflict management in the Niger Delta by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). There was the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) exercise, coordinated by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution in collaboration with the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) between 24th August and 9th September, 2002. The report emanating from this project identified three “hot spots” in the Niger Delta region with Rivers State and Delta State constituting two-thirds of the problems. Specifically, communal violence in Rivers State and ethnic conflicts in Delta State has been identified.

Arguably, the conflicts in these two states arise from dwindling capital resources, demographic explosion, social fragmentation and decadence between ethnic groups, economic and political marginalization, repression and articulation of class interests. The Eleme/Okrika conflict, for example, revolves around the ownership of oil–rich land and location of oil–related industries. Similarly, the specificities of the Ogoni struggle for self-determination have been variously treated. Apart from the writings, interviews and speeches of prominent leaders of Movement for Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) such as Late Ken Saro-Wiwa, other writers have treated it in terms of a local resistance and globalization (Obi, 2005), struggle against internal colonization (Naanen, 1995: 197-199), ethnic minority elite agitation (Osaghae, 1995) or the minority nationality question in Nigerias Federalism (Nyemutu-Roberts, 1994). Likewise, a study carried out by Imobighe and some scholars in Delta State also identifies the problem in Delta State as that of ethnic conflict among the three ethnic groups of Itsekiri, Ijaw and Urhobo in Warri and environs (Imobighe et al, 2002:37- 62).



## Plate 7: Late Ken Saro Wiwa, Leader of Movement for the survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP). Source: [www.google.com](http://www.google.com/) Accessed 15/09/2010

A study sponsored by USAID in 2004 has shown that conflicts in Rivers State, as identified by SCA team in 2002, have not only escalated, new ones have now been added to the existing long list. The problems in the state now include political assassination, hostage taking and kidnapping, as well as widespread of violent inter- cult rivalries. The politicians in the two states were reported to have armed militant youths against their opponents. These militant youths were also used to re-activate old communal and chieftaincy conflicts.

The major causes of the conflict in the Niger Delta emanate from real and perceived neglect, resource control and deprivation of the Niger Delta communities in terms of development (Oshita, 2005). This is coupled with the environmental pollution caused by the activities of the transnational oil and gas companies (Fayemi, 2005:5). For instance, the Ogoni-Shell crisis as reported by Egunjobi (2005:273) is an environment driven crisis. Egunjobi enumerated oil exploration, oil spillage, water pollution, and air pollution, decimation of fish stock and improvisation of vegetation life as being involved. All these are inimical to human well-being and cannot be

expected to maintain peace and harmony between the indigenous people and oil and gas companies.



**SPILLAGE FAULTY**

## Plate 8: Oil Spills and Environmental Disasters in the Niger Delta Source: [www.google.com](http://www.google.com/) /Researchers Fieldwork

Others, including prominent elites of the Niger Delta region such as Chief Edwin Clark and Chief Dakorou of Nembe argued that amongst the factors responsible for the crises in Niger Delta are “oil companies” polarization of communities. These have exacerbated the conflict through selective empowerment, ready disposition to "settle", appeasing on implementation of valid Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) between them and the oil bearing communities" and "failed institutional transactions such as extinction of traditional occupations and demise of indenture system".

Successive governments, donor organizations and transnational oil and gas companies have put in place different policy instruments and measures to specifically address the Niger Delta problems since the pre-independence era without success (Nwankpa, 2003; Ogbogbo, 2005; Fayemi, 2005; Albert, 2007).These include the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 and later the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000, the Ministry of

Environment in 2002, the Amnesty programme of 2009, and the creation of the Niger Delta Affairs Ministry in 2009. From the research carried out by the Centre for Democracy and Development on the Niger Delta conflicts, Fayemi (2005: 5-7) gave three reasons why such policies have failed to achieve the desired objectives. Firstly, "they were imposed without collective ownership by the Niger Delta people. Secondly, they were primarily reactive to particular problems and not to the holistic frameworks for developing the communities. Thirdly, because "the development interventions were temporary palliatives without any serious consideration for human development in the Niger Delta", (Fayemi, 2005:20). However, these measures could not curtail militant activities, hence, the introduction of the military operations.

The introduction of military operations in the Niger Delta was necessitated by the fact that the conflicts have manifested with such intensity and dimensions that, the militants have often over-whelmed the intervention of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), (Bolarin, 2005:40). The first involvement of the military in the management of conflict in the Niger Delta was during the Isaac Adaka Boro revolt of 23rd February 1966. There was also the Rivers State Internal Security (IS) Task Force of 1993-1998 set up to check communal clashes between the Ogoni and Andoni people.

Furthermore, there was the Operation HAKURI II that was established to curtail the Kaiama Declaration of November 1998 by Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), and was also mandated to protect lives and property, particularly in oil platforms, pipelines and power installations in the Niger Delta. This operation culminated in the quelling of the Odi uprising of 1999 with its attendant gruesome consequences. There was also the Joint Task Force (JTF) code- named 'operation RESTORE HOPE', which is ongoing in the Niger Delta. However, JTF and operation RESTORE HOPE will be used interchangeably in this research.

Operation RESTORE HOPE was established on 19th August, 2003 following the persistent ethnic crises in Warri and the general insecurity in the Niger Delta region. At its inception, the JTF was mandated primarily, to arrest the criminal activities of militant groups in the Niger Delta, restore law and order as well as ensure a secure enabling environment for socio-economic activities to thrive. Operation RESTORE HOPE comprises members of the Armed Forces, the NPF and the State Security Services (SSS). The JTF is presently conducting a Military Operation Other

Than War (MOOTW) that oscillates between traditional IS tasks and counter- insurgency operations in the Niger Delta region.

The outcome of the study by Obasi (2005: 111) clearly brought out the fact that, though the military has a constitutional role to play in the management of IS in the Niger Delta, it has however performed such roles with some inherent inadequacies and challenges. These and other issues are germane to this research and need to be rigorously examined with a view to proffering solutions towards the effective management of the Niger Delta conflict. The persistent unabated militant operations in the Niger Delta despite the various military operations by the government motivated the researcher to undertake the study.

## Location and Strategic Importance of the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta region is located in the southernmost physiographic region of Nigeria. The region covered an area of over 20,000 sq km having the 9th largest drainage area of the world's rivers and it is therefore one of the world's largest wetlands. The Map of the Niger Delta is at Figure 1. The Niger Delta has a coastline of 3 nautical miles (205km) contiguous to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which is 22,200 km2 and also rich in oil deposit. The presence of numerous creeks/mangroves swamp forest presents a rather difficult terrain of the JTF operations. Similarly, conducting successful military operation in such a vast maritime environment would require numerous logistics and some specialised equipment on the part of the JTF.

The Niger Delta has rich oil deposits. It is strategic to the growth and development of the Nigerian economy which is heavily dependent on crude oil and natural gas export. These commodities alone from the region have generated 40% of Nigeria‟s National GDP in the last 2 decades. For instance in 2008, crude oil accounts for about 80% of total government revenue and about 95% of Nigeria's foreign earnings. However, instability in the region has not augured well for the security of the country.

Since the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta region at Oloibiri in 1956, people of the area have been agitating for better socio - economic development, infrastructure and basic necessities of life for the region. These expectations and grievances have been expressed in various ways, and in recent times through violence.

Plate 9 :**Oloibiri In Bayelsa State Plate 10: Oloibiri Community, Bayelsa state**


(**Source: Googlesearch.com) After Decades of Oil Exploration Accessed 15/09/2010 Source: Googlesearch.com**

**Accessed 15/9/10**

For instance, Briggs, (2004: 217-226) expressed the view that in 1966, Isaac Adaka Boro drew attention to the agitations of the people of the area, which the government termed a rebellion. In 1990, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni people (MOSOP) sensitized the Ogonis on their plight as oil producing communities. This drew the attention of the world community to the environmental degradation and poverty suffered by the Ogonis as a result of operation of the oil companies.



**Plate 11 : Ogoni Crisis Showing Protest: 1992-1995. Source:** [**www.google.com,**](http://www.google.com/) **Accessed 15/9/10**



**Plate 12: Ogoni Crisis on No To Shell: 1992-1995.**

**Source:** [**www.google.com.**](http://www.google.com/) **Accessed 15/9/10**

The agitation has built up over time, and spread throughout the Niger Delta, resulting in internal security threats to national security.

However, instability in the region has not augured well for the security of the country. Not even the military with its operation RESTORE HOPE has been able to provide such needed security that could stem the militancy in the region, even as human development and the environment continued to suffer. All these pose serious security challenges to military operations in the region. Since the 1990s, the Niger Delta has assumed the characters of a conflict-ridden region. The most common and vicious forms of conflict, in terms of lives lost and property destroyed include intra and inter-community, inter-ethnic and community and Oil company conflicts. A catalogue of violence in the Niger Delta between 2003 and 2006 as reported by UNDP 2006 Report was handy during the research. Today, the Niger Delta conflict has attracted immense local and global attention as it takes considerable toll on the state of security and economy of the nation. In this study, the Niger Delta conflict is seen as a resource-based conflict involving the dynamics of the intricate Niger Delta environment, the communities, militants, the multinational oil and gas companies and government including its agencies.

## Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict

In the past two decades, the Niger Delta region most especially Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers, has become a zone of complex insecurities that pose serious threats to national security. This is due to the dynamics of oil and gas exploitation and exploration which have generated tensions and violence, as well as loss of lives and properties in the region. Additionally, the Niger Delta conflict is also attributable to decades of neglect suffered by the region from both Federal and State governments, corruption, poor „indigenous‟ leadership and absence of basic social infrastructures (Sesay and Simbine, 2006). At inception, the conflict in the Niger Delta region was centered on legitimate agitation against obvious and perceived political and economic exploitation, and environmental degradation associated with the activities of oil/gas transnational companies and negligence by the Federal Government of Nigeria. This has however degenerated into militancy and criminal activities in the last decade.

The major cause of the conflicts in the Niger Delta emanates from real and perceived neglect, resource control and deprivation of the Niger Delta communities in terms of development. According to Oshita (2007), the Niger Delta communities, oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities of transnational companies in the region have degraded the environment. These have adversely affected the means of livelihood of the people who are basically farmers and fishermen, thus militating against their sustainable development. Also, oil companies polarization of communities have exacerbated the conflict through "selective empowerment" a ready disposition to 'settle', appeasing the local 'elite' and default and delay an implementation of valid Memorandum Of Understanding (MOUs) between the companies and the oil-producing communities.

Likewise, the youths of the region including militants (cultists, militia groups, armed bandits and gangster, criminals and hoodlums) often react negatively to the alleged inadequate attention that government and the transnational oil and gas companies have demonstrated towards them, thus constituting serious security threat to the country. These threats manifest through sabotage of oil facilities, illegal oil bunkering, hostage taking and incipient terrorism among others.



**Plate 13: Attack on Opobo Pipeline 2004 Source:** [**www.google.com.**](http://www.google.com/) **Accessed 15/9/10**



**Plate 15: JTF Operatives Destroying**




**Plate 14: Illegal Oil Refinery**

**Source Researcher’s Fieldwork, Illegal Refinery in the Niger Delta 2011.**

**Plate 16: Spills from illegal Refinery Activities Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2010**

**Plate 17: Illegal Oil Refinery in the Niger Delta Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2011**

**Plate 18: Pollution from Oil Spills Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2010**



**Plate 19: Seized Crude from Illegal Oil Bunkerers during JTF Raids Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2010**

Thus, conflicts in the Niger Delta region are embedded in the tripartite relationships between the government, oil and gas companies as well as the communities where these resources are explored. Deriving from the above, violent conflicts in the Niger Delta region are deeply rooted in underdevelopment and have continued unabated, with grave consequences for the communities, the transnational oil and gas companies and the Nigerian economy in particular.

In the same vein, scholars have focused on the poor state of development in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria for some time now. The central issue of concern is the paradox where, despite its evident and abundant resources, the region is extremely poor. The literature blames this on federalism and politics of revenue sharing in Nigeria (Ibaba, 2005: 193-300), environmental injustice and human rights violation (Aaron, 2006: 272), the failure of corporate social responsibility on the part of multinational oil companies (Ikelegbe, 2008: 107) and accountability and transparency failures in governance (Enweremadu, 2008: 448).

The issues involve development, militancy and security. Thus, violent conflicts perpetrated by militants in the region have constrained developmental efforts. After all, development cannot take place in societies where militancy and conflict are the order of the day. The lack of development however, contributes to the tensions and violence that resulted in conflict. This vicious cycle must be broken for realisable and sustainable development. Similarly, government cannot allow reprisal attacks by militant ethnic groups in any part of the country, especially the Niger Delta region to continue unabated. Hence, the establishment of the Joint Military Task Force.

## Implications of the Niger Delta Conflict for National Security

The Niger Delta conflict has serious implications on the socio-economic, political and security fortunes (situation) of the nation. This is because the conflict borders on territorial integrity, well-being of the Niger Delta communities, security, development and peace among others. Any attempt to truncate any of these vital national interest and core values is usually resisted by government and might lead to application of force. However, the consequences of the Niger Delta conflict are identified to include, economic, environmental, social, political and security issues.

A cursory look at the economic consequences of this conflict shows that economic sabotage is a causal factor to so many incidents. Economic sabotage in the

Niger Delta is mainly manifested in pipeline vandalism, oil theft or illegal bunkering, work stoppages, piracy, hijacking, outright bombing and destruction of oil platforms. All these problems are being exacerbated by militancy.



**: Attack on**

## Plate 20: Chanomi Creek Pipeline –Warri and Kaduna Refineries 2003 Source: [www.google.com.](http://www.google.com/) Accessed 15/9/10



**JESSE FIRE DISASTER**



**PIPE LINES**

**Plate 21: Oil Spills and Environmental Plate 22: Pipelines traversing Niger**

**Delta (Source: Researcher’s**

**Disasters in the Niger Delta Fieldwork, 2009)**

Militancy in the Niger Delta has many consequences. It leads to unrest and consequently inhibits optimum capacity for oil production. There are areas where production has been abandoned because of insecurity and actions of militants.

Inevitably, this diminishes oil production output and lowers oil revenue with its knock-on effect on the nation's economy. Militancy also scares away personnel and investing firms. Most oil companies do not allow their foreign staff to work in areas considered „dangerous‟. In addition, it was reported that the unrest has forced some foreign oil-servicing companies to turn down contracts awarded in the oil-rich region. Figure 2 shows that crude oil theft fluctuated between 148 million barrels per day (mbpd) in January 2003 and 27 mbpd in September 2008. It was revealed that the highest theft rate of oil took place between 2003 and 2005 when the JTF on internal security operations did not have Fast Assault Craft (FAC) for patrols against illegal bunkering in the Niger Delta.

Likewise, the gradual increase in the oil theft rate from the beginning of 2008 depicted in the chart was attributably due to reduced patrols against illegal bunkering because most of the FAC had become unserviceable owing to overuse. In addition, the illegal bunkerers and most militants in the Niger Delta show increasing dexterity to confront JTF troops with arms and sophisticated weapons.



## Plate 23: Typical Militant Group in the Niger Delta Source: [www.google.com](http://www.google.com/) Accessed on 15 September, 2010

The rising spate of militancy in the Niger Delta took a huge toll on Nigeria's oil revenue. The report of the 2009 Technical Committee on the Niger Delta revealed that the country lost about N8.84 trillion ($61.6 billion) to oil theft and sabotage in the region between 2006 and 2008. For instance, in 2006 alone, the total loss of oil due to militancy was N2.45 trillion ($17.1 billion) while additional N283 billion ($1.9billion) was lost to illegal oil bunkering; in 2007 also, the loss was N2.69 trillion ($18.8 billion) due to militancy while in the first 9 months of 2008, the country's loss was about N2.97 trillion ($20.7 billion) due to militancy that resulted into shutdown of oil wells stations and oil spillages. Details of these losses in revenue between 2006 and 2008 are contained in *Newswatch Magazine* (4 May, 2009: 19).

Thus, the escalation of violence in the Niger Delta has led to a drastic reduction of operation in the petroleum sector, while the impact on the nation's future and global energy markets has been profound. President Yar'Adua, while signing the 2009 Appropriation Bill stated that while crude oil output per day for 2009 was projected at 2.209 million barrels, actual production was put at 1.6 million barrels due to militants' activities in the Niger Delta. With the recent economic meltdown, this projected oil revenue for the budget could portend serious negative effect for the economy. This could lead to increased unemployment, poverty and further insecurity. These manifestations pose serious threats to national security.

The political dimension to the Niger Delta conflict is the engagement of militants in hostage-taking. This started in 2003, as one of the features of undeclared war against transnational oil and gas industries by the local militia. The victims are usually traded for ransoms. In July 2006, two foreign oil companies – Berger Nigeria Limited and Wilbros Engineering Services withdrew from the Niger Delta because of safety concerns. Wilbros, a United States Engineering Services‟ firm which had nine of its expatriate staff taken hostage, decided that operating in the Niger Delta had become too dangerous and that the commercial and operating risks associated with doing business in Nigeria has exceeded their risk levels (*Global Insight*, 2006).

The Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) Security Department provided the documented incidences of hostage taking in 2008 as shown in Figure 2.

## Figure 2 – Incidences of Hostage Taking in Niger Delta in 2008 Source: Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, Security Division.

From the statistics, a total of 390 persons were abducted in 2008, out of which 13 were killed and 342 were released by the militants on an average period of less than three weeks after abduction. A closer look at the chart shows that except in the months of April and June, there was a steady rise in hostage taking and kidnapping from the months of January to October 2008. The month of October alone, 130 expatriates (Nigerians inclusive) were taken hostages. Abduction however, reduced in November most probably because some construction companies like Julius Berger Nigeria Limited and Wilbros Engineering Services, suspended operations in the Niger Delta and more robust security measures were accorded the expatriates. The surge in hostage taking shows that the main aim was financial gains. This complicates the nature of incidents in the area and the conduct of Joint Military Task Force operations.

The foregoing suggests, however, that the hostage - taking most especially foreigners for ransom posed a serious challenge to the nation's international image. This often portrays a poor image for Nigeria in the diplomatic circle. The numerous travel alerts issued by Western European countries and of late, the Philippines,

exemplify the perception of the international community on the state of insecurity in the country. This trend of kidnapping and hostage - takings could strain diplomatic relations between Nigeria and other countries. It could also discourage foreign investments and tourism development in the country.

There is also the issue of environmental degradation. According to the UNDP Niger Delta Thurman Development report, oil and gas exploitation has had a severe impact on the Niger Delta‟s environment and communities. Apart from pollution, oil and gas exploitation has negatively affected socio-economic condition through effluence and wastes from oil operations, oil spills, gas leaks and flares and canalization among others.



**Plate 24: Gas Flaring in the Niger Delta**

**Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 14 September, 2011**

**Plate 25: Pollution of Niger Delta Creeks due to Vandalism Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 14 September 2011**

**Plate 26: Pollution of Niger Delta Environment due to Militant Activities Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 14 September 2011**

**Plate 27: A typical site for Illegal Refinery in the Niger Delta Source: Researcher’s 25 June 2010 Fieldwork,**

**Plate 28: Illegal Oil Refinery Site Destroyed by JTF Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2 September 2011**

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## Plate 29: Spills from Illegal Oil Refineries in the Niger Delta Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2009

There are social costs of the conflict in terms of loss of lives and property due to militant activities in the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta was impoverished in the midst of vast oil wealth, due to frustrated expectations, fostered widespread indignation, entrenched deep- rooted and destructive mistrust, and incited unprecedented restiveness in the region. The most common and vicious forms of conflict in terms of lives lost and property destroyed are intra-community, inter- community, inter- ethnic and community-oil company conflicts. Appendix 4 gives some details of cost of the crisis in the region. Obasi (2005) observed certain features of these conflicts to include expansion in the spatial spread of the conflicts, increasing role of ethnic/community militias and youth groups in the conflicts and increasing loss of lives and property.

Perhaps, the most disturbing consequences of the Niger Delta conflicts are the twin problems of SALW proliferation and militancy.

The increasing activities of militants in the Niger Delta and the rate at which they acquire weapons give cause for grave security concern. The asymmetric warfare they engage the JTF troops in their estimated 13,329 settlements in the region with a population of less than 5,000, gives cause for concern (UNDP Report, 2006 : 16). Nevertheless, the violent conflict in the Niger Delta region presents a no-win scenario to all the contending parties. Many of the militant youths saw armed conflict as a vocation or business from which to earn a living. Regardless of the difference in their background and however lofty their intention/ideals may be, the activities of these groups carry significant implications for human right, good governance, national security and stability of the country.

From the foregoing, the results of the Niger Delta conflict have been a general deterioration of economic, social and political cohesion. The conflict denied the region lasting security, enduring peace and prosperity, and the realization of the abundant opportunities. In spite of the myriad of challenges posed by the Niger Delta conflict, government owes its citizens a duty to protect them from the adverse effects of these militants‟ activities. The federal government owes it as a duty to address substantive questions of development as well as insecurity in the region.

It must however be recognized that there have been some multi-dimensional approaches that have been introduced or currently in place to address the Niger Delta conflict. Government responded to the conflict by the use of economic development incentives through the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 and later the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000 and the Ministry of Environment in 2002. However, the measures taken so far by the government and various stakeholders in tackling the socio-economic and human security problems in the region have not succeeded. Hence, the deployment of JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE in 2003. Much later, the Federal Government established the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs in 2008 and the Amnesty programme of 2009.

# ATTEMPTS AT SOLVING THE PROBLEMS IN THE NIGER DELTA

Violent conflicts in the Niger Delta have been seen by the Federal Government from a security standpoint, where containment and suppression have been the primary objectives rather than long-term conflict resolution. Attempts to involve traditional rulers and community leaders in conflict prevention and resolution

or community development initiatives have been largely unsuccessful, as local chiefs are accused of diverting money intended for community projects to themselves. As such, youth groups have become the power brokers in several communities.

There are also a large number of local NGOs and civil society organizations engaged in community development and conflict prevention work using the 'third party decision-making' and joint problem-solving approaches. These initiatives were considered useful by some and successful in terms of raising awareness and building capacity of the participants in conflict management and negotiation techniques. However, they failed to have a lasting impact for resolving the various conflicts.

The communities and various socio-political associations have ventilated their grievances through dialogue, protest, litigation and confrontational means without much success (Ogbogbo 2005:170-177). Responses from the government date back to 1967 when the then military government invoked the Petroleum Decree of 1967. There were also the promulgation of the Anti-Sabotage Decree of 1975 that was enacted to combat sabotage and illegal bunkering. There was the promulgation of the Treason and Treasonable offences decree of 1993. Following this enactment was the commencement of the Armed Forces and police mobilization to guard oil installations and keep the peace in the oil-producing areas of Niger Delta. There was also the Presidential Task Force created in 1979 to handle the ecological crisis in the Niger Delta. This was followed by the establishment of the Oil Mineral Producing Areas and Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 in replacement of the hitherto created Task Force.

In 2000, the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo then created the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to help end violence and spur up a rapid socio-economic development. Even with that, during and after the 2003 and 2007 presidential elections, violence between rival militia groups and against the oil corporations with political rivals increased considerably. All these interventions were seen as mere palliatives because they failed to address the core issues that brought about the crisis in the region.

The scale of neglect (as observed) has been an important factor behind the violence in the Niger Delta which is carried out by 'social group' referred to as "cults”. These groups are made up of youths from the Niger Delta. The groups were believed to have originated with the intention of offering physical protection and providing it


members with an opportunity to meet people with similar ethnic or social identity. With time, these groups acquired arms and also began to compete with each other over oil bunkering.

The violence perpetrated by these groups, however grew out of the political campaigns of 2003. In April 2003, the militant held 100 oil workers hostage. Sometime in June 2003, the SPDC security reported that, Ijaw youths were demanded the sum of N25 million ransoms having abducted three contract workers of the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation. In the same week, it was reported that Chevron employee was kidnapped. In a renewed orgy of inter-ethnic conflict in Warri on Sunday 3 August 2003, about 72 persons were reportedly killed. As typical of militant activities, during the disturbance, property and oil installations worth of mil1ions of Naira were destroyed. Thus, one form of lawlessness or the other has always been observed to be going on in the Niger Delta region.

The civil disturbance led to massive relocation of law-abiding citizens and operators of the oil and gas industries from Warri to Benin and Port Harcourt. The Federal Government of Nigeria loses about $3.6 billion annually as a result of this conflict. There is also its attendant disruption of peace and sustainable development of the Niger Delta. No responsible government will allow reprisal attacks by militant ethnic group in any part of the country, especially in the Niger Delta region, nor tolerate any damage to the nation's oil wealth and also peace and security in the land. This made the President and Commander-in-Chief to direct the activation of contingency plan for the security in Niger Delta through military operations by a " Joint Task Force" code named Operation **RESTORE HOPE.**

# STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The Niger Delta region, especially Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States, have since remained key flashpoints of political violence and crime in Nigeria. General insecurity occasioned by ethno-communal crises and widespread cult and criminal activities by restive youths abound. Militant gangs grow at an alarming rate in the area. They blow up oil installations, kidnap oil and gas workers, and also provide security for illegal oil bunkerers. These activities pose Internal Security (IS) threat which, if not contained, could severely hamper Nigeria's monocultural (oil) economy. Figure 2 shows the theft of oil while Figure 3 shows the number of incidents of

hostage taking in 2008 in the region.

## Figure 3 – Crude Oil Theft in the Niger Delta 2003 – 2008

**Source: Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, Security Division.** The measures taken so far by the government and various stakeholders to address poverty, socio-economic and human security problems in the Niger Delta appear not to have succeeded in dealing with the insecurity situation of the region. Consequently, the escalating level of insecurity in the area has continued unabated. This has necessitated the deployment of the military Joint Task force (JTF) Operation RESTORE HOPE in 2003. Eight years after the deployment, the conflict still lingers. The study, therefore, seeks to assess the conduct of the JTF with a view to determining the extent to which it has impacted on the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict.

It is against this backdrop that the study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. What are the security challenges of the Niger Delta conflict?
2. Under what contexts did the Federal Government resort to the military option in dealing with the security challenges in the Niger Delta?
3. What is the mandate of the Joint Task Force (JTF) in the management of the

Niger Delta conflict?

1. What are the approaches adopted by the JTF in dealing with the Niger Delta crisis?
2. What are the challenges and achievements of the Joint Task Force in the Niger Delta?
3. How can the mission be made more effective?

# RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The main objective of the study is to conduct a strategic assessment of the Joint Task Force (JTF) in combating/solving the Niger Delta conflict/crisis. The specific objectives are:

1. To review the mandate of the JTF in the Niger Delta and evaluate its appropriateness for the attainment of sustainable peace in the region.
2. To assess the strategies adopted by the JTF towards the achievement of its vision and goals.
3. To conduct a perception survey of the JTF operational activities in the Niger Delta region.
4. To conduct a stakeholders analysis with a view to identifying gaps occasioned by the non-inclusion of some parties who are sine qua non to the attainment of sustainable peace in the region.
5. To identify the multi dimensional risk factors that are germane to the successful attainment of the JTF mandate.
6. To establish a correlation between the adopted JTF strategies and the ensuing actions adopted by the JTF towards the desirable results or otherwise in the quest for sustainable peace in the region.
7. To make recommendations to the government and other related agencies that may be involved in the conflict mitigation programmes in the Niger Delta.

# RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research guides were used as checklist during the fieldwork:

1. What is the mandate and mission of the JTF? Is it conflict termination, conflict prevention or preventive diplomacy or combat operations?
2. From the perspective of the component Niger Delta communities, how appropriate is the involvement of the JTF in solving the Niger Delta conflict?
3. From the perspective of the other non-state actors (NGOs, oil and gas companies, political elites, media, etc), to what extent, if any, is the JTF involvement in tackling the Niger Delta crisis appropriate?
4. What are the approaches adopted by the JTF in dealing with the Niger Delta crisis?
5. To what extent is the JTF all-inclusive vis-à-vis the non State actors in the Niger Delta crisis?
6. Who are the extant stakeholders the JTF ought to have partnered with towards the management of the Niger Delta crisis?
7. What are the strategic limitations of current responses, particularly the military (JTFs) response.
8. To what extent is the JTF successful if at all in restoring peace and Security in the Niger Delta?
9. What are the security challenges of the Niger Delta conflict?
10. What are the challenges of the JTF in its bid to stem the on-going Niger Delta crisis?

# JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY

The justification for this study is that, it is aimed at measuring the effectiveness of the military approach at addressing the seemingly intractable Niger Delta conflict. The study will, therefore, look into the military response as well as the existing non-military approaches towards proposing policy options for a multi- dimensional and integrated development of the Niger Delta.

Thus, the rationale of the study is for the strengthening of the peace process in Nigeria. The study would also serve as research pedestal for peace workers, development practitioners and academics wishing to carry out further studies on this subject. It will also be beneficial to members of the Nigerian Armed Forces as they

may be involved in future MOOTW in Nigeria or elsewhere, defending Nigeria‟s interest.

Furthermore, this study will assist policy makers at the Ministry of Defence and Defence Headquarters to determine the essence of military JTF Operations as panacea for resolving internal security crisis in Nigeria and especially in the Niger Delta region.

# SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study covered military operation in the Niger Delta region within the period between 1999 and 2011. This is when the people of the Niger Delta intensified their agitation for a more meaningful development of the region being the producers of oil, which is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. It also marked the period of increased militancy by the restive Niger Delta youths after the enthronement of democracy following a protracted military rule in Nigeria. The JTF operations RESTORE HOPE was also established in 2003 and it is therefore the focus of this study.

The major limitations this study encountered include the difficulty of obtaining audience with some key actors in the Niger Delta conflict, especially the militants and having access to classified materials. Another limitation which was encountered in the field was gathering of information that is believed to be classified and sensitive to both the security agencies and officials of the oil and gas companies. Thus, the classified nature of the required data affected the non-willingness of some Service personnel to avail the researcher with all the required information. There were suspicions especially from the officials of these oil and gas companies and community leaders about the purpose of data collection.

To cater for these lapses, the use of newspaper reports on conflict incidents in the Niger Delta vis-a-vis the activities of the JTF was handy in getting data that relate to and reflect the substantive security issues in the region. However, these limitations did not in any way downgrade the validity of the findings of the study, as adequate secondary materials and some of the stakeholders were consulted to generate the data required to produce the work.

# DEFINITION OF TERMS

Deployed troops should adhere strictly to the International Humanitarian Law and the ROE.

Qualitative Content Analysis: Qualitative content analysis is a classical method for structuring and categorizing written material of any origin. This method is particularly useful when we have to work with a largely unstructured and narrative text.

Rules of Engagement (ROE): The principle of the use of minimum force and proportionality shall be applied at all time throughout the operation. This entails the use of force for self defence and whenever the lives of the troops or other security personnel are in mortal danger or against a hostile acts or intent. The JTF troops are to use force only when absolutely necessary to achieve immediate aim, protect colleagues, other designated personnel, installations, equipment and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

Hostile Act: An action where the intent is to cause death, bodily harm or destruction of designated properties.

Hostile Intent: The threat of imminent use of force, which is demonstrated through an action, which appears to be preparatory to hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required before the use of force is authorized.

Code of Conduct: Troops are to maintain strict service discipline. Troops are to establish firm but cordial relationship with law – abiding citizens. Troops on operation are also to respect the right of individuals and supremacy of the rule of law. Operational Readiness: Operational readiness is rooted in personnel, equipment, logistics/resources, maintenance capabilities, mission training and welfare arrangement for the troops. Thus, operational readiness is speed and effectiveness which leads to the success of any operation.

Internal Security (IS) Operations: Internal Security IS operations involve the activities geared towards the protection of the citizenry from internally generated threats or crisis.

Guerrilla Warfare: A term literally translated “little war”. It generally refers to any non- state, irregular armed force that is engaged in a prolonged conflict at the domestic level against an incumbent government. The term was first used in reference to the Peninsular war of 1808 to 1814, to describe the hit-and-run tactics of the local

Spanish forces opposing Napoleon‟s effort to extend his rule over Spain. Emphasis is placed on fighting quickly and winning. It is viewed as a war of Survival and others sees it as a terrorist attacks.

Relative Deprivation: The feeling of perception of a gap or discrepancy between

what one considers one‟s rights, dues, or expectations, and what one has actually attained. The feeling of deprivation is theorized to produce frustration and anger, and is therefore linked to the onset of rebellion.

**CHAPTER TWO**

**LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

# CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE

## Military Task Force in Global Perspectives

The American Heritage Dictionary of English language defines a "Task Force" (TF) as a temporary grouping of military units or forces under one commander for the specific operations or assignment. It is also a grouping of individuals and resources for the accomplishment of a specific objective. While the Collins English Dictionary defined it as a temporary grouping of military units formed to undertake a specific mission. It could also be a semi permanent organization set up to carry out a continuing task. A closer look at these definitions suggests that a "TF" is a unit or formation established to work on a single defined task or activity. In addition, a task force could be broken into several task groups and finally task units and elements.

The term was originally introduced by the United States Navy but has now caught on for general usage and is a standard part of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) terminology. Many non-military organizations now create "task force" or task groups for temporary activities that might have once been performed by an ad hoc committee.

In the United States Army, a task force is a battalion-sized (usually, although there are variations in size) ad hoc unit formed by attaching smaller elements of other units. In the British Army and armies of other Commonwealth countries, such units are known as battle groups. In this definition, the timeframe that would be allowed for a task force to accomplish its mission is missing, although there is a lot that is suggested by the use of the word "temporary". To attempt a more precise definition of a "Task Force" would mean an ad hoc force mandated for, specific objectives within a given time-frame. On accomplishment of its task, the force is dissolved to pave way for an established formation in the area of operation to continue with the mission. However, there are many types of task forces. These include, Joint Task Force, Combined Task Force and Combined Joint Task Force.

Apart from constitutional constraints on the military, it is obvious that theirs is a profession which in the modern complex and dynamic world cannot bear the stresses of Nigeria precarious political practices. One or two things of grave consequences may happen and had happened, either the nation is unduly militarised

or the military is dangerously politicised. Nigeria has witnessed both in telling proportions. By the imperatives of the military organisation, its nationalistic profile, and roles defined by the constitution, the question may be what profile professional pre-occupation is proper that they remained consigned to and maintained in the polity vis-à-vis its role and place within Constitutional provisions? All Nigerian constitutions have provided for direct access to the President and Commander-in- Chief for the Chief of Defence Staff and the Service Chiefs. As it were, the military hierarchy has officially, and through social and non- official avenues, direct access to the highest executive in the land. They would in war be members of the war Council or in peacetime, members of the National Defence Council by invitation.

The synthesis of my postulation therefore is that, the conceptualization of a role for the military must begin and end with the dictates of the peoples constitution and not at the convenience of circumstances and, or expediencies of the military organization or national crisis or peace situation. Not even entirely a matter of roles, but of military historical relevance in nation building process, as the question of application. This relates to applying the abundant, skilled manpower and resources warehoused by the military to national development in peace time.

The aforementioned notion gave credence to the Military Task Force which is primarily organized to undertake Low Intensity Operation (LIO) Other Than War (Jordan, 1964).Others critically examine military task force as a sub-unit of the military which undertakes specific operations. In some countries, military task forces are permanent, like USA- the NAVY SEAL Special Forces that carried out the operation at ABBOTTABAD in PAKISTAN that killed Osama Bin Laden on 2nd May 2011. Indeed, the pride of any nation is solely depended on the versatility of her armed forces and it responsibility to nation building.

Woodrow (1969) warned that, in setting up military task forces, it has to be within the ambit of the constitutional role of the armed forces as enshrined in the nation‟s constitutions. He further stated that military task force should have a Time– frame, whilst the community within the area of operation should be adequately enlightened about the objectives and operational reference of the task force to enable them develop a co-operative instance within the task force for successful operations.

Clark (2007) posited that military task force can only be seen as cosmetic solution; thus he, contended that meaningful solution cannot be achieved through the

use of task force. He described the military task force as a group of soldiers organized to liquidate and annihilate the unarmed civilians who are involved in a “legitimate” demand. Indeed, his definitions lack the real reasons for involvement of military task force in an area. That is, in a place where there is a civil disturbance, it is the police that will first be involved, but where it involves armed conflict that goes beyond the power of the police, and then it will be the decision of Government to deploy the military for such task. In other words, task force may be involved to avoid further breakdown of law and order, but on the contrary, if the disturbance is overss there would be no need for military task force to operate in such an area.

One interesting aspect of task forces is that, they are code–named. For instance, the Joint Task Force in the Niger Delta is Operation RESTORE HOPE while that of Abia State is Operation JUBILEE 1, to give it the true objective of the operations.

## Joint Task Force

The term Joint Task Force as used by the US including NATO, implies the combination of more than one military service. That is, some combination of army, naval and/or air forces. Therefore, a Joint Task Force (JTF) is a Task Force (TF) which includes more than one service.

In the US Department of Defence, a JTF is a Joint Task Force that is constituted and so designated by a JTF establishing authority. A JTF establishing authority may be the Secretary of Defence or the Commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or existing JTF. In most situations, the JTF establishing authority will be a combatant commander. JTF's are established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. Examples include Joint Task Force Bravo, Joint Task Force Guantanamo and Joint Task Force Lebanon.

For Canada, the JTF concept is not temporary but permanent. For instance, Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) is the Canadian Forces Elite Special Forces unit. The TF involve personnel from all three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force, therefore Joint") but not temporary and hence not a "Task Force" by the US definition. It is known to have fought in Afghanistan and was part of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

## Combined Task Force

In US military terminology, including NATO, the term combined implies more than one nation. At the start of World War 2 the UK used "Combined" to denote forces composed of more than one service, which is how the Combined Operations term originated. Presently, a combined Task Force is a task force which includes sub-elements of more than a nation.

## Combined Joint Task Force

A Combined Joint Task Force is a task force which includes elements of more than one service and elements of more than one nation. Examples include Combined Joint Task Force 76 and Task Force Viking.

In this study, JTF means an ad hoc or temporary force comprising military and Para-military agencies mandated for specific objectives within a given timeframe. In the Niger Delta the JTF comprises the Army, Navy and Air Force. Others are the Police, EFCC and the State Security Service (SSS).

# CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

## Peace Support Operation

While a detailed conceptual definition of all the operating terms applicable to Peace Support Operation (PSO) might not be possible now, it is important to note that, the full range of operations classified as PSOs are very broad, each with its terminologies that need to be understood in its contextual usage. The Nigerian Army Peace Operations' Doctrine manual defined PSO as an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter, purpose and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Thus, the aim of PSOs is to contain and de-escalate conflict as well as addressing the root cause of the conflict.

According to Albert (2007: 164), the term Peace Support Operation's (PSO) is collectively used to characterize the different intervention mechanism for restoring peace to war torn societies". He also identifies three core functions in the conduct of PSOs to include: intelligence gathering; "shaping, controlling and fixing; and "conflict resolution". He went further to observe that the participation of Nigeria in international PSOs has to do with the first two.

Approached from the mirror of military peace-keeping and according to the

United Nations Charter, we have the classical or Chapter VI peace-keeping operation; the chapter VII peace-keeping or "peace enforcement" and the Chapter VIII peace- keeping. The Chapter VI PSO involves the deployment of an interposition force between the parties to the conflict and Chapter VII PSO in which the "peacekeepers" have the authority to use minimal force to enforce a peace enforcement plan which a party or some parties to the conflict attempt to violate. In the Chapter VIII peace- keeping, the peacekeepers are authorized to use force to defeat a completely recalcitrant conflict party.

Peace support operations may include; peace-keeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention and peace building. Peace-keeping operations following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is usually limited to self defence.

Peace Making is a PSO conducted after the initiation of conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement that involves primary diplomatic action supported when necessary by direct or indirect use of military assets. Lastly, we have the concept of peace building.

On the other hand, Peace Enforcement is a PSO conducted to maintain a ceasefire or a peace agreement where the level of disruption is high. A Peace Support Force (PSF) must be capable of applying some credible force and must apply the provisions of peace agreement impartially.

According to International Alert, Peace-Building includes "measures designed to consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic and cultural institutions capable of mediating conflict, as well as strengthen other mechanisms that will either create or support the creation of condition for sustained peace”.

The effectiveness or otherwise of PSOs depends to a large extent on the mandate. The "mandate" is the legal document which authorizes the establishment of a mission. Thus, it specifies the details of the structure, command and scope of operations as well as duration of the mission.

Today's PSO are likely to occur in environment that bears the characteristics of civil war or insurgences of parties to the conflict may have origins that are barely comprehensible to outsiders. Belligerent's tactics may be improvised, irregular,

irrational, and bizarre including the use of environmental warfare. Random atrocity and large scale human suffering may characterize the overall security environment.

The modern PSO is a complex battle space with belligerents on one side of the divide and complex actors pursuing peace on behalf of national and international communities on the other. The belligerents may have created a chaotic environment which requires a team with high mental capacity and professional prowess to contain it. For effective conduct of any PSO, all commanders must understand the characteristics of PSOs which are likely to influence the conduct of such operations. The characteristics include the numerous parties to a conflict, "undisciplined" factions who are not responsive to their own authorities, ineffective ceasefire, absence of law and order and risk of local armed opposition to the government, UN or AU forces. Other characteristics include; the presence and involvement of large number of civilians including refugees and displaced persons, collapse of civil infrastructure and undefined area of operations.

The principles guiding the conduct of PSOs must also be comprehended by commanders. In the same vein, while the principles of war are generic to all military operations, in PSOs, restraint and primacy of political considerations modify the relevance and application of some of the principles of war. In PSOs, there are the consent- promotion principles which are most relevant in peace-keeping but may be only of limited use in peace enforcement. There is also the issue of strategic consent- driving principle which guides the selection and application of appropriate PSO principles. The consent-promotion principles include; minimum necessary force, impartiality, legitimacy, transparency and mutual respect. However, the general principles of PSOs include unity of efforts, perseverance and freedom of movement. Others are flexibility and security. Recently, PSO have come to be grouped along with other "lesser military operations" as Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW).

## Internal Security Operations

The role of the military in Internal Security (IS) operations is the subject of attention because it is located within a certain framework that may generally be misunderstood, much less accepted, by the larger society. What then is Internal Security Operations? The Nigerian Army defines IS as:

Any military role which involves primarily the maintenance, restoration of law and order as well as essential services in the face of civil disturbance and disobedience using minimum force. It includes revolt and even the early stages of rebellion (Military Precise, 1981:A-1).

This Nigerian Army definition is primarily concerned with the military aspect in any IS situation, as it is addressed, roles in IS operation that are purely of military concern.

To Nwolise, IS has to do with the activities and services of the police and other security agencies in ensuring the maintenance of peace, law and order, as well as security of lives and properties. These include combating smuggling, armed robbery, religious and ethnic riots, communal and community clashes, armed insurrection, rebellion and others including natural disaster, (Nwolise, 1999: 7). From Nwolise's concept, the activities and services of the police and other security, agencies suggest that Internal Security is a venture that calls for the integration of the police and other security agencies to achieve common goal(s). The prominence given to the police in this definition justifies the primary responsibility for maintenance of law and order while other services assist. Thus, the collectivity of effort of the police, the armed forces and other security agencies are to ensure desired national security objective by ensuring the maintenance of peace, law and order as well as lives and property.

A number of studies have been done on IS and conflict management in Nigeria. Balogun (1999) in his work, "An Appraisal of Police Management of Internal security in Nigeria" posits that a quadrilateral approach involving the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), Government, other security agencies and the Nigerian Public was an essential option in his work. He, however, did not discuss the military and other related agencies.

Akoma (2004), in his work, "The State Security Service and Management of Internal Security in Nigeria" focused on the relevance of proactive and preventive aspects of IS. His concern was on effective use of intelligence for the proative management of crisis before their manifestation. However, he did not make proper linkage of the usage of intelligence in proactive manner by the military as well as highlighting the ways the military could ensure the gathering of adequate intelligence

for their operational use. Additionally, IS operation information management is a twin concept encompassing operation intelligence and information management with the media in IS. Akoma's study concentrated on the first aspect of intelligence management of information with the media and other stakeholders which the military need for successful IS operation.

From the foregoing, the literature sought on IS are relevant to the management of internal security operations in Nigeria. Nonetheless, more look into IS management from the collective effort of the Armed Forces in conjunction with other security agencies becomes imperative.

It should be noted also, that the legal provisions regulating the employment of the Nigerian Armed Forces in the management of internal conflicts are found in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and related subsidiary legislations. This legal provision is often resorted to when the police cannot cope, especially in a complex and difficult IS threat situation. Section 217 of the Constitution established the armed forces and specified their responsibilities in Sub- Section 2 as follows:

1. Defending Nigeria from external aggression.
2. Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea and air.
3. Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but to such condition as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly; and d. Performing such functions as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. Thus, the justification for the deployment of the Nigerian Military in IS situation is to be found in Section 217 (2) (c), to wit, „acting in aid to civil authorities, to restore law and order when called upon to do so by the President‟. In the same vein, due to perverseness of violence in Nigeria, the Federal Government has had to deploy the military to complement the action of the police in several parts of the country, especially since 1999.

## Military Operation Other Than War

According to Ihekire (2008), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), is a concept in the United States military that refers to the use of military capabilities across a range of operations that fall short of outright war. He enumerated its focus to include; deterring war, arms control, disaster relief, resolving conflict, promoting

peace and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. Thus, the types of activities that can be undertaken under MOOTW include, but not limited to arms control, combating terrorism, enforcement of sanctions and humanitarian assistance operations. Others are peacekeeping operations, peace-enforcement operations and recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and raids, policing duties amongst others.

**MOOTW** may involve elements of both combat and non-combat military operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations. That is, **MOOTW** can take place in peacetime or in wartime. If it is in peacetime, proper procedures must be followed to mount it and conclude it. However, because of political considerations, **MOOTW** operations normally have more restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) than in war and they follow some basic principles.

There are six **MOOTW** principles: "objectives, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance" and "legitimacy". The first three derive from the principles of war, and the remaining three are MOOTW-specific. This paper will examine the last three MOOTW principles. For restraint, judicious use of force if necessary, carefully balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of changes; otherwise it can result in fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment. Thus, ROE in **MOOTW** are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. In the same vein, some **MOOTW** may require years to achieve the desired results and hence, element of perseverance is required.

Lastly, for legitimacy, the goal here is to have committed forces sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government or community as the case may be. In **MOOTW,** legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions.

In looking at command in **MOOTW,** Obiakor (2007) commented that, "an enduring feature of military operations other than war is the importance of the political dimension. Military commanders are unlikely to have primacy of command, as military activity may form only one component of an integrated campaign plan in which economic, political, humanitarian or legal achievement can be as important as military success".

Thus, political consideration may influence decision-making down to the tactical level and constrain the freedom of action of military commanders. To succeed in **MOOTW,** one requires consultation with political advisers and joint action with other agencies. Commanders must be aware from onset that speedy solutions in **MOOTW** are difficult to achieve and must therefore initiate long-term plans. The application of force will be restricted to the minimum, necessary to achieve the mission at hand. Minimum force must remain appropriate, demonstrably reasonable and confined in effort, to the specific and legitimate target intended. **MOOTW** are characterized by heavy media attention, so dealing with the media should be a constant theme for commanders.

In sum, the term **MOOTW** would generally be classified under either Military Aid to Civil Authority (MACA) or Internal Security (IS) duties. They are therefore not to be called core military tasks and traditionally the military does not specifically train or organize for many aspects of MOOTW. However, the military can always be called out to provide support in emergency when a bad situation assumes national significance.

When this happens, military units that are called out have to adapt the capabilities of such units to meet civilian needs. The jobs are essentially civilian jobs (civil police) and are meant to be so, but what is unique to the military is the speed with which they can be brought to bear on an emergency.

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that MOOTW forms part of a continuum of military operations and it oscillates between PSOs and IS duties. By implication, the Joint military Task Force (JTF) Operation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria falls under MOOTW.

# LITERATURE REVIEW

In the Niger Delta region, the context (geographic or social environment), the parties, the government, oil companies and the communities are involved at different levels in the degenerating conflict profile of the area. For the purpose of this study, context means a geographical or social environment where conflict exists and is composed of actors, causes, profile and dynamics.

Environmental degradation, poverty and neglect, created the fault line for perennial conflict over oil in the Niger Delta. The conflict has also engendered

polarization within and between communities, dilating the conflict and occasioning cyclical violence. According to Oshita (2005:95) "the conflict in Niger Delta could be linked to be a denial of the ontological needs of the people and complicated by the communal content, governance of the state, and international linkages".

Azar (1990 :7), also observes that "a single communal group or coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflicts". Thus, Azar argues that the need-based grievances of communities cultivate the niches for protracted social conflict. Oshita (2005:95) argues that "this mirror of neglect underscores the relevance of Azars notion of protracted social conflict and diminishes Collier's subordination of grievance to greed. He asserts that Collier (2001) was wrong in believing that greed was, more prominent than grievance in resource-based conflicts. The argument that abundance or lack, therefore, of natural resources in Africa is a major cause of intra-state conflicts is well documented (Collier, 2001; kaldor, 2001; Dufield, 2001; Stewart and FitzGerald, 2001).

Conflict can benefit certain sector of the society, thus creating vested interests in perpetuating conflict and impeding a lasting peace. The political economy of conflict is thus an important consideration in analyzing the Niger Delta conflict. According to Le Billion (2001), the oil sector in Nigeria operates 'enclave economy', based on selective patronage. The state-centric nature of oil exploration concentrates oil wealth in the hands of the ruling elite, their foreign partners and the multinational oil companies, where they most probably maintained interest (Oshita, 2007).

Many conflicts for example are understood to have their origin in an unaddressed ethnic or religious discrimination, horizontally unequal distribution of resources and dramatic increase in unemployment. Researchers, like Collier and Hoeffler (1998) have recently begun to emphasise the role of "greed" in conflicts and draw attention to the benefits that accrue from participation in conflict employment in militancy, access to scarce resources and power. Rarely is the political economy of conflict clearly delineated as simply "greed" or "grievance". Often, one can observe a shift over time from "grievance" to "greed" (Collier, 1998). For example, insurgents need funds for food and supplies which they often have to raise by illegal commercial activity or "taxes" (such as ransoms from kidnapping and illegal oil bunkering). However, this fundraising can cease to be a means to an end and become an end in

itself.

Many observers argue that in the Niger Delta, for instance, the militants are

now less concerned with addressing outstanding grievances than with controlling the illegal oil bunkering. According to Keen (1998), over time, violent conflict encourages the emergence of a war economy dominated by politicians, 'elites', commanders "of irregular armies" and fighters whose interests are to generate new forms of profit, power and protection. Key activities he contended include the taxation of legitimate and illicit economic activities, asset stripping and looting as well as the economic blockage of dissenting areas. At the same time, a shadow economy may emerge to make high profits at the margin of the conflict. Political and other entrepreneurs benefit from the general insecurity and lack of adherence to rule of law to extract precious natural resources, illegal oil bunkering and criminality. The results of all these are concentration of power and wealth, the destruction of economic assets, and impoverishment of vulnerable groups especially youths and women. Development agencies, including State actors, then need to factor that political economy of conflict into their strategies and approaches to ensure they do not fuel existing conflicts through boosting war economies.

The Niger Delta area is bedeviled by two major social vices which are mutually reinforcing. These are socially debilitating poverty occasioned by long years of unemployment and the recent seemingly intractable communal militant youth‟s insurgencies mostly against the government and the oil companies' interests in the area over their apparent failure to meet the expected social responsibilities to the oil bearing communities.

As observed by Nying'uro, (2005:40) one of the major factors causing and sustaining violence and civil wars in Africa is related to mineral resources politics. Thus, the Niger Delta crisis is seen as an environmental driven crisis. The major causes of the conflict include perceived deprivation of the Niger Delta communities in terms of development. This is coupled with the environmental degradation caused by the activities of the transitional oil and gas companies. Hence, the insurgency of the militant youths in the Niger Delta. It should be noted that Guerrilla Warfare is a very difficult operation to embark upon by any regular or legitimate force considering especially the terrain of operations in the Niger Delta. Thus, there is ubiquitous killing of innocent civilians in an attempt to fish out the militants resulting into undesirable

consequences (collateral damages). As rightly pointed out, Clapham (1998:9), "the inaccessibility of the areas in which they usually arise and the exceptional levels of violence and social disruption that accompany them, have made guerrilla movement in Africa extremely difficult to study". In analyzing Africa insurgencies, Clapham went further to suggest causes of insurgency. He notes the "insurgencies derive basically from blocked political aspirations and in some case also from reactive desperation" (Clapham 1998:17). The causes of particular insurgencies also derive from different combinations of leadership or elite action on the one hand, or popular resistance on the other.

All of the literature on insurgent warfare places an enormous emphasis on the relationship between the insurgents among whom they operate. Then, what needs to be done in order to tackle the root causes underlying violent conflict in the Niger Delta? There is a complex and multiple interplay of factors contributing to conflict and, by necessity, there needs to be multiple strategies and approaches to tackling them. There was existing knowledge on the state of conflict and conflict management in the Niger Delta by governments, transnational oil companies and the civil society organizations. From the literature, these interventions and responses have hitherto been piecemeal, sometimes ad hoc and non strategic. Agencies and actors have not collaborated but rather too often have competed against one another.

Successive governments have put in place different policy instruments to specifically address the Niger Delta issue since the pre-independence era. Thus, the government responded to the militancy emergence with a combination of military force and development programmes.

Imobighe (1989:223-226), made a detailed analysis of the doctrines which inform the conceptualization of internal security of Nigeria and the real internal threats the nation faces. The Military joint Task Force (JTF) is borne out of the Nigerian Defence policy at the operational strategic level. The status of military power and the ability to engage successfully in combat could be the key to restoring peace to a country, region or ethnic group. However, nations must also be conscious of the ability (and of course limitation) of military forces in conflict prevention, including defence diplomacy. The military, in turn, ought to be conscious of the perceived ideas and indeed misperceptions that other actors might have of them.

A military intervention by Peace Support force, within a multi-functional

peace support operations, is usually required where restoration or maintenance of peace cannot be successfully achieved by States' political and economic instruments. In general, peace support forces are used to promote, create and maintain a safe and secure environment where short and long-term solutions can be put in place.

It is imperative for policy makers and all those working in a peace support operations environment to have an understanding of the strategic context within which such military operation is conducted. An appreciation of the strategic goal, the desired end-state, or any interim outcomes to be achieved, will shape the way in which the operation is conducted and the means that are used. It is against this backdrop that the activities of the JTF in the Niger Delta are going to be strategically assessed. The existing gaps in the existing non-military approaches towards a sustainable development and conflict reduction in the Niger Delta will be brought out with a view to proffering a workable solution to the conflicts in the Niger Delta.

Some studies have been done on conflict in Nigeria in general and the Niger Delta in particular. Ogbogbo (2004, 2005) made an assessment of the conflict handling styles while researching into the Niger Delta people and the resource conflict from 1960 - 1995. By "handling styles", he referred to the various responses of the Niger Delta peoples to the challenge they faced while striving to achieve their resource control goal. Furthermore, for the Niger Delta communities, he opined that, "the resource control struggle is about the use and management of their resources without external control or direction. He further asserts that "resource control for the Niger Delta people means ownership, management and exercise of authority over oil, gas, land, forest, water and any other identifiable resources within the region" (Ogbogbo, 2005:169-170). According to Ogbogbo (2005), the handling styles adopted by the Niger Delta peoples in the conflict between 1960-1995 were largely conditioned by the responses of the stakeholders, the oil/gas industry (government and transnational oil companies). He evaluated these handling styles to include the dialogue option, protest option, litigation option, recourse to violence and other reactions such as incidence of sabotage including pipeline canalization, rig blockages and hostage taking. Ogbogbo's study dwell extensively on the history, nature and causes of the Niger Delta conflict but did not provide the much needed panacea to the seemingly intractable problems of the Niger Delta. Similarly, his work did not look at the involvement of Operation RESTORE HOPE and therefore did not look at the

challenges faced by the operation which is the focus of this study.

In the same vein, Adedeji (2005:vii) observed that the "post 1999 democratic order has witnessed an explosion in the number of violent communal conflicts and the permanent engagement of the military in Internal Security (IS) operations". To this end, this study aims partly at generating understanding of why the military is an instrument for managing conflicts within Nigeria, in particular the Niger Delta and the consequences of their involvement in IS operations.

Since the end of the Cold War more attention has been given to the role played by environmental factors in shaping global security and international relations, (Klare and Thomas, 1994). The impact of globalization has also heightened concern for the environment. In researching into Globalization and local resistance, Obi (2005:318) pointed out that "the extractive and polluting activities of Shell, which produces slightly over half of Nigeria's oil, has spawned alienation, protest and resistance across the local host communities of the oil-rich Niger Delta region in the past two decades". He further asserts that the "the primary lesson of the reversal of the Ogoni revolution is the danger in underestimating the capacity of global capital and the local state to defend oil -based accumulation in Nigeria". The eventual outcome of this local resistance of the Ogonis against Shell and the State, he opined, would be difficult to predict. He further enunciates that the environment here becomes a constant terrain reflecting social and political relations of power over production, distribution and access.

Environment- resource conflict nexus focuses on how “easily exploitable resources” could be used to finance violent conflicts. Cilliers (2000) posits that, resource scarcity or abundance can cause conflicts. He emphasized that in resource- rich countries like Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, conflicts have arisen in response to struggles either over access to or control of these resources. Such struggles are sometimes worsened by wide social disparities arising from corruption, poverty, maladministration, elite manipulation, ethnic cleavages and poor governance among others.

In his philosophical analysis of conflict in Africa, Williams (2005:21-22) cited environmental conflicts, as a form of conflict in Africa. The study emphasized that the conflict in the Niger Delta is an example of conflict within nations over natural and environmental resources. For instance, the Ogoni-Shell crisis as reported by

Egunjobi (2005:272-273) is an environmental driven crisis. To Oshita (2007) the denial of access to basic needs, rather than Paul Colliers' allusion to greed, explains the protracted social conflict in the Niger Delta. The major causes of the crisis include perceived deprivation of the Niger Delta communities in terms of development. In his own contribution Williams opined that, the incompatibility of goals and interest over the proceeds from oil and gas in the Niger Delta has been the main point for conflict there (Williams 2005:22). He suggested dialogue towards solving the conflict. However, Williams did not discuss the role of the military operations in solving the Niger Delta conflict and thus could not have studied the challenges faced by the JTF.

In contributing to the research on conflicts in South-East Zone of Nigeria, Nnoli (2006) rightly identifies political and economic factors as main causes of the violent conflicts and equally blamed leaders for exploiting ethnic differences for personal benefits and in the process created tension even within the same ethnic group. However, Nnoli's study did not identify neglect and marginalization as some reasons for violence in the zone. Suberu (1996:27), stressed that the reasons for conflict in the Niger Delta is rooted in the demand and grievances of Nigeria's oil producing areas. The communities have identified underdevelopment, environmental degradation, poverty and neglect as some of their grievances. They have made demands for better infrastructure, social services and better living conditions. However, he failed to identify with the inter-ethnic conflicts involving some of the ethnic group in some part of the Niger Delta, which dates back to the colonial era, as the remote cause of conflicts in the Niger Delta. In his contribution to the management of National Question in Nigeria, Naanen (2007:197-206) opined that the national question is perceived in the Niger Delta mainly in the delivery of social justice, equity and equality.

A collection of essays in Adedeji A.G and Zabadi I.S (2005) addressed issues relating to the use of the military to manage violent conflicts in Nigeria. It was argued that the inherent tendency for conflicts, especially violent ones, to occur and endanger the society has meant that certain mechanisms must be put in place to avoid chaos and disintegration. A basic framework for such mechanisms is the setting up of government and its institutions, within the political community. However, it was quickly remarked that, "the use of the military to manage conflict presents results

which are increasingly challenged as unacceptable from the human rights perspective". Adedeji and Zabadi (2005) further observed that "the plural nature of the country, in addition to the sources of violent conflicts, necessitated the emergence of a framework for managing such situations by using the military". This framework exists in the form of the IS operations which has constitutional and statutory provisions. It is the procedure and training given to the military for managing conflicts.

Obasi (2005:111-135) aptly examined the Niger Delta region which has witnessed conflicts over resources and the involvement of the military in managing it for over a decade. His discourse focused on the survey of the Nigerian Government's overall framework for management of conflicts in the Niger Delta and situates the military within the framework. Obasi stated the need for "force to be applied in a professional, coordinated and sustained manner" by the military on Internal Security Operations in the Niger Delta, using minimum force. He also carried out a critical appraisal of the performance of the military in the management of conflict in the Niger Delta. Nonetheless, Obasi failed to proffer solutions towards the management of the seemingly intractable conflicts in the Niger Delta.

In his contribution, Zabadi (2005) assessed the role of the military in managing internal conflicts, citing a number of cases. Despite the fact that the military has a constitutional role to protect the territorial integrity of Nigeria, including internal security, it has been observed that its mode of operation, when it comes to managing these conflicts, has been widely misunderstood, and, in most cases, criticized. Zabadi (2005) also highlighted the challenges of the military involvement in managing internal conflicts as well as the future of the military involvement in conflicts management. He opined that, "in spite of the embedded rules and regulations guiding IS operation and the need to exercise force in a "human way", … control of the use of force for the security operations, represents a constant challenge for commanding officers and other ranks in the field. Zabadi, however did not cover current development and challenges since the literature was published in 2005 when the military operations in the Niger Delta was still on a small scale and were yet to be concluded.

The outcome of the various scholars clearly brought out the fact that, the military has a constitutional role to play in the management of internal security in Nigeria. In addition to this, the military is duly trained for such a role and they have

established principles, processes and procedures for their involvement in such operations. Nonetheless, the current practice by the Nigerian armed forces in IS operations was adjudged unsatisfactory in the sense that it produces results which are always below the expectation of the Nigerian public. The inadequacies inherent in the present framework of involving the Nigerian military in managing violent conflicts were also brought out by Zabadi (2005). These and other issues are germane to the study and need to be rigorously researched into and addressed as a way of proffering solutions towards the effective management of the Niger Delta conflicts.

Likewise, an overview of existing works indicates that gaps still exist in the study of the Niger Delta conflict. The reviewed literature from the foregoing therefore, gave no critical study on the military operations being employed in the Niger Delta conflict. For instance, it has not been explained why the military was the chosen instrument for managing conflicts in the Niger Delta. Most of the studies have not done in-depth research into the activities of the Joint Military Task Force in the Niger Delta. In seeking to achieve the objective of this study, these gaps will be adequately addressed.

# CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

# BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The methodology adopted for this study leans heavily on the use of qualitative and quantitative approaches in sourcing data from the respondents. This chapter concerns itself with the specification of what information was collected, from which sources, and by what procedure. The research methodology adopted ensures that information relevant to the research problem was obtained by objective and economic procedures, (Green and Tull, 1990; Beri, 1993). It also involves the development of suitable research instruments for the study. The data for this study was collected in 2008 - 2010 from Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States. The respondents were State actors, the community citizens, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), NGOs, transnational oil/gas companies and non-state actors.

The research design adopted was exploratory and descriptive in parts, consisting mainly of primary data sources using a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques. Quantitative research involves the collection of information (data) from a representative sample of the study population, whereas, qualitative research helps in obtaining information of how people think, feel and talk about a particular service which can be obtained by interviewing or discussing with a small number of people who are representatives of the target population (Mayal and Palmer, 1993). As such, sample sizes were chosen so as to meet the conditions of statistical analysis.

To compliment these primary sources of data, secondary data were extensively collected to provide background information about the Niger Delta conflict and the workings of the JTF. The secondary sources of data were textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers as well as the internet.

## Concept of Strategy Circle

In order to make a strategic assessment of the JTF, it is imperative to take a critical look at the concept of strategy circle. The concept of strategy circle gives us a clear picture of how the objectives of an intervention project or mission will be achieved. Strategy circle is an integrated theoretical/analytical framework that brings several tools together to enable one understands all that is embedded or that must be embedded in a conflict transformation project. It enables a conflict analyst to bring

all this thoughts "together and plan strategies and specific actions aimed at moving closer to long-term vision" (Fisher et al. 2000:73-75). Strategy circle has 12 components that could be used to map the work that has to be done in a strategic assessment as shown in Figure 4.

1

Vision /Goal

2

Change 3

Parties

12

4

Perceptions

Assessment

5

Issues

11

Action

10

Risks

6

Interests

9

Allies

7

Strategies

8

Inclusion

Figure 4 – 12 Components of Strategy Circle Source: Adapted from Fisher et al. 2000:73 – 75

1. **Component 1-Vision/Goal:** Component 1 seeks to carefully investigate what the vision and goals of the JTF operations are, and relate this to the vision and goals of the contending forces in the Niger Delta crisis. Thus, the vision and goal of the JTF will inform the study the desired change that is envisaged.
2. **Component** 2 - Change: This focuses on the nature of change already taking place inside the operation of the JTF to which the task force must relate. It also entails what change is desired by JTF.
3. **Component 3** - Parties: Component 3 Carry out stakeholders' analysis of who and who must the intervention engage. List all relevant actors who can significantly influence conflict or are most vulnerable to it. The identification of major parties in the Niger Delta crisis and the analysis of their interest, relation, capacities, agencies as well as required incentives are necessary, for measuring the effectiveness of the JTF. Useful approaches could be:
   1. M**apping out conflict actors:** Example of relevant actors to consider in the Niger Delta conflict include: traditional and community leaders, local NGOs, local media, criminal organisations and networks, the militia, security forces (JTF), political leaders, prominent civil servant, business men, diaspora, donors governments, intergovernmental organisation, transnational oil/gas corporations, governments, humanitarian and human rights organisations etc.

## Analysing for each of the actors:

* + 1. **Interest:** What interests do they have in relation to the conflict and how do these interests influence the conflict?
    2. **Relations:** What are the relationships between the various actors?
    3. **Capacities:** What capacities do they have to influence conflict either positively or negatively?
    4. **Incentives**: What types of incentives could be offered for them to choose peace or disincentives to engage with violence?

## What are the security agencies involved in the JTF?

(d) **Components 4 - Perceptions:** Component 4 carries out perception survey on the JTF. How is the mission being perceived by the Niger Delta communities? How does JTF perceive the Niger Delta people? How do Niger Delta people perceive JTF? And how does the JTF perceive the Niger Delta communities in their actions at solving the Niger Delta crisis. Methods of analysis include participatory community

assessments, expert workshops, individual interviews and consultations. A visual mapping can be useful at initially trying to understand the relations between different actors. For example, those who are allied, opposed to or have shared interests. This analysis will bring out the stereotypes, prejudices and perception of conflict parties. This would be taken into consideration in designing any intervention (strategies) for the management of the Niger Delta conflict.

1. **Component 5 - Issues:** Component 5 discusses the issues in the Niger Delta conflict. What are the issues in the Niger Delta crisis that different stakeholders must engage? How many of the issues pertain to the mandate of JTF? Is it environmental degradation, resource control, neglect, poverty, security, etc? This context of the conflict was done through compilation of a broad contextual analysis. These information were derived from desk study of relevant reports and documents (media reports, academic literature, websites, research organization). Examples of sources of tension and conflict in the Niger Delta are:
   1. **Security:** Do security forces have limited capacity? Human rights abuses from security forces/militia? Presence of non-state military actors? Proliferation of small arms and light weapons? Legacy of past conflicts?
   2. **Economic:** Economic decline: trends in poverty, unemployment, inflation, food security, access to social welfare, increase competition over shared resources and development of war economy.
   3. **Social:** Social exclusion, failure of dispute resolution mechanism and decreasing legitimacy of customary authorities.
   4. **Political:** Political exploitation of ethnic differences, flawed election processes and corruption etc.

## What are the implications of these issues and contexts?

1. **Component 6-Interest:** What are the interests of different stakeholders in the Niger Delta crisis? How do these interests work for and against the JTF?
2. **Component 7 -Strategies:** What do the JTF need to do to achieve their goals (objectives or mandate)? The aspect of this study will identify the strategies needed to make the JTF project work. What are the counter insurgency tactics employed by the JTF?
3. **Component 8-Inclusion**: Component 8 seeks to identify gaps for non inclusion. Having identified gap(s) in the JTF military approach to conflict

management in the Niger Delta, which particular stakeholders should JTF include in its operation? Which stakeholder are included or excluded? Were the communities involved in the JTF operations?

1. **Component 9 – Allies:** This is related to the inclusion component as stated in the preceding sub-paragraphs. Specifically, effort shall be made to identify other parties and organisations in which the JTF can be partnered or form alliance(s). Here, the study considered the possibility of the political elites, community leaders, NGOs, and the media amongst others forming alliance.
2. **Components 10-Risks:** The study will make a Risk Analysis of the JTF operation in the Niger Delta. Are there risks to look out for?
3. **Component 11-Action**: What actions should be taken to solve the seemingly intractable Niger Delta conflict having identified gaps? The study will seek to investigate the level of implementation of the JTF terms of reference. How are the risks enumerated being dealt with?

I. **Component 12-Assessment:** The assessment is geared towards measuring the success rate of the implementation of the JTF tasks and mandate in the management of Niger Delta conflicts. Suggestions were made so as to enhance the management of Niger Delta conflicts.

# RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

Three research instruments were used to collect data for this study. These include questionnaires, oral interviews and review of existing literature.

The instrument for conducting a perception survey of JTF activities in the communities of the Niger Delta was developed in the form of a questionnaire as shown in Appendix 1. The perception questionnaire had a section to capture socio - demographic data of the respondents. Another section is made up of a battery of attributes for assessing the JTF performance. Copies of the perception questionnaire were distributed to 600 respondents.

The issues covered by the survey include strategies adopted by the JTF, assessment/evaluation of JTF operations, perception on causes of militancy in the region, perception of the Niger Delta youths together with other stakeholders on activities of the JTF amongst others. Of these, 577 people filled and returned the questionnaires sent to them representing a response rate of 96.2%. We had 195 in

Bayelsa, 192 in Delta and 190 in Rivers States. The respondents were randomly selected. About 75.6% of the respondents were male and 24.4% female. Most of the respondents (86.3%) fell within the age brackets of 15 - 49 years. This suggests that the respondents have a tolerable knowledge of the issue addressed by this research. The set of interview questions used to interview JTF personnel in the field is presented in Appendix 11. A total of 50 JTF personnel were planned for interview but only 37 personnel were eventually interviewed. Likewise, Appendix 12 shows the set of questions used to conduct the interviews with oil and gas company workers. A total of 20 oil/gas workers were planned for interview but 12 people were

interviewed.

# METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

Data for the study were collected from primary and secondary sources.

Specifically, the methodology includes the following:

1. Primary sources of data were through the conduct of unstructured interview and interactions with the JTF (Operation RESTORE HOPE) personnel such as the Commanders of JTF (past and present), Commanders Task Force Group in the JTF (Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air Force, NPF and the SSS).



**Plate 30: Interview with Colonel Mohammed Commander Army Task Group Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2009**



**Plate 31: Interview with Navy Captain Bola Omilade JTF Chief of Staff at Warri. Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2009**



**Plate 32: Interview with CSP Tokunbo Afolabi JTF NPF Task Group Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2009**

A perception survey was conducted amongst community leaders, opinion leaders, youth leaders in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), oil and gas companies, security advisers, Federal and State Government Agencies, the media and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) amongst others were also interviewed. Specifically, the commanders JTF (Operations RESTORE HOPE and FLUSHOUT III) as well as the commander Army Task Group (ATG) were interviewed. The Commanding Officers, some officers and soldiers of Battalions who had served or are currently serving in the JTF operations in the Niger Delta, were also interviewed. Others include the DHQ Chief of Training and Operations (CTOPS), the Chief of Operations (Army) (COPsA), DHQ Director Plans, DHQ Director of Operations and DHQ Assistant Director Land Operations. Additionally, the Vice President Security Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), Area Manager Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL) Warri, community leaders and the Bayelsa State Commissioner of Police were equally interviewed.



**Plate 33: Interview with Lieutenant Colonel NU Efik Commanding Officer JTF at Yenagoa, Bayelsa State**

**Source : Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2008**



**Plate 34: Interview with Lieutenant Colonel AT Lawal Commanding Officer JTF (Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2008)**

1. Secondary sources of data were through review of special reports, newspapers and newsmagazines. Special reports from security organisations and data collated by CSOs, Donor Agencies, NGOs, and Human Rights Activities on Niger Delta amongst others were reviewed. Most especially, documents and materials from DHQ, Army Headquarters (AHQ), JTF Operations RESTORE HOPE and FLUSHOUT III, some other security agencies and relevant companies were equally useful and reviewed. There was also the tracking of daily newspapers for conflict incidents. For the purpose of this study, about six daily papers were tracked including the Punch, ThisDay, Vanguard, Daily Trust, The Sun and the Guardian.

# METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS

The 600 questionnaire were electronically analysed. The data generated from the interviews helped to contextualize some of the responses collected from those who filled the questionnaires. This entails content analysis of open- end responses to obtain additional information. Where necessary, some extant literature was used to support or controvert some of the findings.

Responses to questions asked in the research instruments were entered into the computer using the database application software, dBASE V. The data was then exported to the computer software, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS),

SPSS/PC+ version 4.0, for statistical analysis. Statistical analysis carried out included frequency counts, cross-tabulation, T-test. Researchers sometimes present respondents with a list of products or product attributes for which they are asked to indicate their relative feelings or evaluations. The instruments most frequently used to capture this evaluative data are called attitude scales; they include Likert scales, semantic differential scales, and rank-order scales (Schiffman & Kanuk, 1998; Green & Tull, 1990; Hawkins, Best and Coney, 1995).

The Likert scale is by far the most popular form of attitude scale because it is easy for researchers to prepare, interpret, and simple for respondent to answer. Respondents simply check or write the number corresponding to their level of "agreement" or "disagreement" with each of a series of statements that describe the attitude-object under investigation. Usually the scale consists of an equal number of agreement/disagreement choices on either side of a neutral choice. A principal benefit of the Likert scale is that it gives the researcher the option of considering the response to each statement separately or of combining the responses to produce an overall, summarized score.

# SAMPLE AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES

The methodology made use questionnaires for the interviews of JTF stakeholders. A total of 30 interviews were planned per State within the focal States.

Structured questionnaires were administered to the communities for the perception survey. A total of 600 people were surveyed, 200 people from each of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers States respectively. The respondents were randomly picked while the correspondent results (questionnaires) were electronically analyzed. The data generated from the interviews and discussions helped to contextualize some of the responses got from those who filled the questionnaires. Field research assistants were recruited and trained to ensure quality data gathering.

# PROBLEMS OF DATA COLLECTION

The researcher faced the problem of seeking audience with some key actors in the Niger Delta conflict, especially the militants. The difficult terrain traversed during the conduct of interviews of the stakeholders made navigation quite difficult and tasking. A lot of difficulties were encountered in the course of data collection, especially the field trip. Logistics was a major problem as trips to riverine

communities by boats often took hours and sometimes at prohibitive cost. The aforementioned problems made the fieldwork to last longer than was expected. However, these problems did not affect the validity of the findings of the study. Publications such as books, reports, journals, magazines, briefs, internet and newspapers were used to make up for the shortcomings.

# CHAPTER FOUR RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

* 1. **INTRODUCTION**

Data obtained from the fieldwork are presented in this chapter. The results from analyses of the data are presented and discussed.

# ASSESSMENT OF JOINT MILITARY TASK FORCE AND NIGER DELTA CONFLICT

## Background Information

This section gives an overview of the Joint Military Task Force in the Niger Delta by tracing the evolution of military operations in the Niger Delta region, the historical context of JTF, the JTF Rules of Engagement (ROE), JTF mandate and concept of operations. Also presented in this chapter, is the achievement of JTF operation, and an assessment of Operation RESTORE HOPE and Operation FLUSHOUT III. Furthermore, the community perception of JTF operations was also analysed and discussed.

## Overview of Joint Military Task Force in the Niger Delta

It is imperative to give an overview of the Joint Military Task Force in the Niger Delta as a prelude to the assessment of the various operations therein. Towards this, the evolution of military operation in the region, the historical context of the JTF, the Operation RESTORE HOPE mandate, as well as the JTF organisation were discussed. Furthermore, the JTF's concept of operation and its attendant challenges were also highlighted.

## Evolution of Military Operations in the Niger Delta

According to Obasi (2005), the military has been deployed in several operations to manage the conflicts in the Niger Delta since 1966. Six major types of military operations has been identified. First, the military clampdown of Isaac Adaka Boro Revolt; 23 February – 06 March, 1966. On 23 February, 1966 Major Isaac Adaka Boro and a gang of 158 youth volunteers tagged the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) sought to pull the Niger Delta region out of the Nigerian Federation. Within 12 days, the force overran many communities and disrupted socio-economic

activities of the populace including expatriates working on oil installations. The military responded immediately by the deployment of a unit of the Nigerian Army to clampdown on the rebels. (*The Guardian*, September 2, 2007: 15)

## The Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, 1993 – 1998

The Rivers State Internal Security (IS) Task Force was set up in May 1993 by the Rivers State Government. This was in response to the violent clashes between cult groups and the incessant communal clashes particularly involving the Ogonis and their neighbours notably the Afams, the Okrikas and the Andonis. This eventually led to emergence of the Movement for the Survival of Ogonis People (MOSOP) struggles. The inability of the NPF to contain the situation, led to the deployment of military under the auspices of the River State IS Task force led by the then Major Paul Okuntimo. A noteworthy episode in these operations was the sacking of some Ogoni villages by the River State IS Task Force. According to the MOSOP, between July and September 1993, eight Ogoni villages were attacked and destroyed, leading to the death of about 1000 people, while 20,000 others were turned into refugees (*The Guardian*, December 14, 1993:40). The active involvement of this task force in the Ogoni crisis rendered it suspect and it was therefore accused by both the local and international communities of high handedness and various human rights abuses such as indiscriminate use of road blocks, extortion, torture and rape. The force was later withdrawn with little or no success.

## Operation HAKURI II for Ijaw Kaiama Declaration, December 1998 – January 1999

On 11 December, 1998, Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) was formed at a meeting in Kaiama, Bayelsa State. The meetings in its communiqué referred to as “Kaiama Declaration” condemned the underdevelopment and environmental degradation of Ijaw land by the oil companies thereby attributing the Niger Delta crisis to the struggle for the control of oil mineral resources in the region. The declaration also called for the withdrawal of all oil companies from Ijaw land by December 30, 1998 (Ojo, 2003). The youth claimed:

We are tired of gas flaring, oil spills, blowouts and being labeled saboteurs

and terrorists. It is a case of preparing the noose for our hanging. We reject this labeling.

Hence, we advice all oil companies‟

staff and contractors to withdraw from Ijaw territories by the 30th December, 1998. (*The Guardian*, September 2, 2007: 50)



## Plate 35: Niger Delta Community Protesting against Environmental Degradation. Source: [www.google.com](http://www.google.com/) . (Accessed 15/9/10)

Following this threat, the Federal Government established a Joint Task Force codenamed Operation HAKURI II to curtail the Kaima Declaration by the IYC and was mandated to protect lives and property, particularly the oil platforms, pipelines and power installations in the Niger Delta. This Operation HAKURI II culminated into the quelling of the November 1999 Odi uprising with its attendant gruesome consequences.

## The Military Deployment to Quell the November 1999 Odi Uprising

On 20th November, 1999 the Federal Government ordered the military to restore law and order in Odi town following the killings of some security forces hitherto dispatched to the town for official assignment.

Odi is a community in Kolokuma/Opokuma local Government Area of Bayelsa State. On 9th November, 1999, a team of 7 policemen, including a Deputy Commissioner of Police dispatched to Odi for official assignment were abducted and killed by Egbesu militants in Odi. This was closely followed by abduction and killing of 3 soldiers travelling along the Warri-Port Harcourt highway. Consequently on 20th November, 1999, the military was ordered by the Federal Government to restore law and order in Odi town.

The operation was supposed to be jointly conducted by the Nigerian Army and

the Nigerian Navy troops, but the Navy did not take part due to the Port Harcourt naval base operational exigencies. This lapse arising from communication gap could have been averted if there had been appropriate liaison between the two Services. In effect, failure to conduct joint operations, poor contingency plan and entry strategy, poor leadership at tactical level and ineffective application of information operations were cited to have impacted negatively on Odi operations. The collateral damage in Odi sparked off propaganda war against the Nigerian Army and the Federal Government for allegedly razing Odi town and killing thousands of innocent people.

The negative publicity resulted in international disapproval of the handling of the operation. According to Human Rights Watch, security forces working under this task forces have "often failed to protect property from damage or civilians from violence, and have themselves carried out serious and widespread violations of human rights in response to such incidents" (Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, 2002:2).

Unfortunately, both the Government and the Nigerian Army made no coherent effort to respond because information operation was not part of the overall plan for the Internal Security operation. Effective use of information operation as a veritable tool required to enhance the professional conduct of Internal Security operations was grossly lacking. In sum, some lapses at various levels of leadership responsible for the planning and execution of Odi IS operations impacted negatively on its conduct. The foregoing were the antecedents of the present JTF codenamed Operation RESTORE HOPE, since 2003, which is the focus of this study.

## Operation RESTORE HOPE – (2003 – 2009)

The history of the JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE could be traced to the struggle for socio-economic and political dominance of Warri and its adjoining maritime areas by the three major ethnic groups of Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo. This has been the major cause of the violent conflicts that have taken place in the Niger Delta. These crises had resulted into wanton destruction of lives and property, pipeline vandalisation and disruption of oil production in the region, thus forcing multinational oil companies to either relocate or completely shut down operations. This situation in Warri and the general insecurity in the Niger Delta region led to the establishment of Joint Task Force codenamed Operation RESTORE HOPE on 19 August 2003. The JTF had its Headquarters in Army Barracks, Effurun-Warri. At its inception, it was mandated primarily to arrest the criminal activities of militant groups, restore law and

order, as well as ensure a secure and enabling environment for socio-economic activities to thrive in the Niger Delta. The overall objective is the restoration of political and socio-economic stability in the Niger Delta. The JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE is made up of Army Task Group (ATG), Nigerian Navy Task Group (NNTG), Nigerian Air Force Task Group (NAFTG) and State Security Service Task Group (SSTG). The JTF is presently conducting a Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) that oscillates between traditional IS tasks and counter- insurgency operations in the Niger Delta region.

The Task Force was said to have been largely successful in the realization of its mandate particularly in Delta and Bayelsa States. It has been able to locate and destroy some identified militant camps like the Ijaw militant group camp at Clough creek and the Madahor camp around Escravos in late December 2007. Between 15th and 20th May, 2009, the JTF troops destroyed camps 5 and 2 at Okerenkoko and Diebu creek respectively (*Sunday Sun,* May 24, 2009). The JTF also controlled inter and intra-communal violence, provided relative security for oil/gas companies and made several arrests to check illegal oil bunkering activities.

## Operation FLUSHOUT III (2004 – 2009)

Militant and criminal activities in Rivers State were at its lower ebb in early 2004. However, from May 2004 inter-militant conflicts broke out in Buguma and Okrika over control of area of influence or having access to illegal oil bunkering and other related criminal activities during which sophisticated weapons were used. The violence escalated to Port Harcourt city and its environs, which resulted in the killing and maiming of innocent citizens, hostage taking and economic sabotage. The high level of insecurity therefore led to the establishment of Operation FLUSHOUT III on 4 September 2004. According to the then JTF operation FLUSHOUT III Commander, Brigadier General Sarkin Yaki Bello, it was tasked to "checkmate the activities of the militant groups and provide an enabling environment for both government and socio- economic activities to thrive in Rivers State”.

During this period, there was also the „Arms Buy Back Deal‟ between militias and government. The Rivers State government called the Niger Delta People‟s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) for dialogue in 2004. The peaceful dialogue led to an agreed ceasefire and disarmament. The militias that turn in their arms were reported to have been paid 150,000.00 naira for every single weapon surrendered to the

Government Committee on Disarmament of the militias. Thus, as at 30th November 2004, a total of 854 „guns‟, 1353 rounds (assorted ammunition), 2 grenades and 11 pieces of explosives has been handed over to the Military JTF Operation FLUSHOUT III in Rivers State by the NDPVF (*The Guardian* (Lagos) November 16, 2004 : 2).

The operation started in 2004 with very little riverine and amphibious equipment and only about a battalion troops, mainly from the Nigerian Army. This is against the truism that Riverine operation is a very costly business in terms of logistics, manpower (amphibious troops and special forces) and specialized equipment (flat bottom boats, gunboats and helicopter gunships).1 Therefore, the contingency plan and entry strategy was ineffective because, the forces deployed could not contain the threats, even within Port Harcourt city. For instance, on 31 December 2004, militants attacked two police stations and killed four policemen and thirteen civilians in Port Harcourt. Hence, the leadership at the strategic level did not assess the threat situation correctly before deciding on the force size for the operation. Thus, the ineffective contingency plan impacted negatively on the professional conduct of the operation.

Following series of requests, the number of troops was gradually increased. By July 2008, the number had increased to about a brigade troops all ranks. Thereafter, the JTF operations recorded some successes, including dislodging some militant cult groups from their enclaves within Port Harcourt and environs. Likewise, the JTF captured some of the militants' arms and ammunitions. Thus, increase in the strength of troops enhanced professional conduct of the JTF operations. For example, on 17th December 2008 Operation FLUSH OUT III troops raided the Mbiama hideout of some oil bunkerers in Ahoada West Local Government Area of Rivers State. The gang escaped into the bush and abandoned 9 boats loaded with crude oil.

Likewise, on the 28th December, 2008 Operation FLUSH OUT III reported that the JTF troops succeeded in arresting one militant leader, Sogboma Jackrich alias Egberipapa in Buguma, Rivers State. The militant who is aligned to another militant leader – Fara Dagogo has been responsible for series of kidnapping, piracy, armed robbery and attacks on security forces and oil installations. Further probing of the

area of operation of the militant, led to the recovery of 3 AK 47 rifles, 6 AK 47 rifle magazines and some ammunition.



## Plate 36: Recovered Arms from the Militants during JTF Raid Source: Army Headquarters Department of Operation, 2009

The Assistant Director Army Public Relations, Lieutenant Colonel Sagir Musa confirmed the arrest and subsequent handing over to the State Security Services for further interrogation.2 The Commander, Operation FLUSH OUT III Major General Sarkin Yakin Bello observed that, considering the difficult terrain, proliferation of militant camps and general insecurity, more would have been accomplished if adequate troops trained for special operations and equipped with special riverine equipment were available.3 Special riverine operations‟ equipment such as gunboats, house boats, helicopter gunships, casualty evacuation helicopters, Global Positioning System (GPS) facilities were regarded as high-value equipment required for the effective conduct of military operations in the Niger Delta. In summary, inadequate planning was responsible for the weak entry strategy of the operation. The resources provided for the operation at inception were inadequate compared to the threats. With subsequent increase in the number of troops and equipment, the troops recorded successes against the militants. However, inadequate special equipment and troops trained for special operations impacted negatively on the professional conduct of this operation by the armed forces.

This attests to what the commander, JTF Operation FLUSH OUT III, Major General Sarkin Yaki Bello said about the operational challenges of the operations:

There are many causes; availability

of weapons. That is proliferation of illegal weapons in the region has been one of reasons that has aided insecurity. Inadequate logistics is also a problem. In many fora, I have always asked for more platforms for the Nigerian Navy; for more radar coverage, for more suiveillance to monitor what goes on in

Nigerian waters. Other problems include illegal oil bunkering and communal clashes. The government was also battling with a large amount of unemployed youths.4



**Plate 37 : Captured Militant’s Weapons**

**Source: Army Headquarters Department of Operations, 2009**



**Plate 38 : Confiscated Outboard Boat Engines of Bunkerers Source : Researcher’s Fieldwork, 20 September,2010**

Government policies, exemplified by the Rivers State Government‟s “arms-buy-back” programme, have not been effective and therefore have clearly missed the point. In the same vein, when the military‟s JTF intervened in August 2007 to combat warring gangs, many Port Harcourt residents welcomed the move in principle but worried that the gesture would prove pointless unless the politicians who sponsored and help armed these gangs were held accountable. One interviewee attests that “what will this military intervention do to the whole idea of the politicians paying, motivating, recruiting and keeping as well as protecting these militants, including encouraging them to carry out illegal oil bunkering” (Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, 2002:2).

## Operation RESTORE HOPE (2009 – 2011)

The merger of the activities and duties of JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE and Operation FLUSHOUT III was therefore borne out of the need for coordinated and harmonized efforts to sustain the modest achievements recorded so far then. It was also to stamp out the trend and waves of criminality in the Niger Delta. It was designed to achieve high level of operational and professional competence through effective coordination, synergy of efforts, judicious utilization of resources and effective management of information. However, as the new JTF was taking shape, the unprovoked militants‟ attack on two separate JTF Land Component (JTFLC) patrols on 13th May 2009 and the subsequent rescue operation conducted by JTF on 15th May 2009 changed the entire landscape.

Colonel Rabe Abubakar, Coordinator of the JTF Media Campaign Centre, Warri gave the genesis of the JTF troops versus militants to be the unprovoked attack by the militants on the JTF troops on 13th May 2009 along the Chanomi creek, Warri South-West L.G.A, Delta State Plate 12. In his words:

JTF troops detailed as escort to MC Spirit-NNPC chartered vessel carrying 20,000 metric tonnes of petrol to Warri as well as those troops on

relief duties were simultaneously attacked. Also, crew members mostly Filipinos equally hijacked while another cargo ship with 22 Ukrainians were also hijacked by the same militants. The JTF responded

to these attacks by organising a Search and Rescue operations on 15th May 2009…5

Reports following the counter-attack indicated that although casualties were sustained by the JTF as well as the militants, the collateral damages were high (*Newswatch,* June 8, 2009:38-43; *Sunday Sun*, May 24, 2009). However, some Ijaw leaders were emphatic that …

it was criminal and unjustified for the JTF to have declared full military operations on Ijaw communities in the guise of undertaking a search and rescue mission for hostages and missing personnel.6

But Colonel Rabe Abubakar, coordinator of the media campaign of JTF in Warri, told Newswatch Newsmagazine Special Report Correspondence, Chris Ajaero that….

It was wrong for Ijaw leaders to equate their (JTF) action to genocide. Rather, he accused the militants in camp 5 led by Government Ekpomupolo

(alias Topompolo) of attacking the JTF unprovoked at the Chanomi creek, thereby leading to the counter attack by the soldiers (*Newswatch*, June 8, 2009 : 42 – 43)7

Furthermore, he said, “we are not targeting anybody or any ethnic group. We targeted only the militants in camp 5 who attacked our men and hijacked the expatriates”.

These incidents nurtured the basis of the Presidential unconditional amnesty granted to militants in Niger Delta.

During the amnesty period, the JTF observed absolute ceasefire as directed by higher Headquarters to enable the militants respond positively to the Presidential amnesty offer. To the JTF, the amnesty period was a window for capacity building to upgrade its state of combat efficiency. It was a period for building intelligence data base, appraising plans and deployments. The period also provided opportunity for acquisition and repair of equipment and platforms as well as logistic acquisition, distribution and dumping. According to the Commander JTF Land Component, Brigadier General Ugwu Chima, it has done all within its purview to prepare for the post-amnesty challenges.8 He remarked that, the mandate of the JTF is clear and unambiguous; to stop illegal oil bunkering activities, pipeline vandalism and stamp

out sundry crimes being perpetrated by renegade and ex-militants within (Area of Responsibility) AOR in all its ramifications.

The Headquarters is located at Yenagoa, Bayelsa State. The mandate of the JTF covers only the three core States of the Niger Delta namely: Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers. For ease of command and control therefore the AOR has been divided into three Sectors with each covering a State. Sector 1 covers Delta State with Headquarters located in Warri. The sector is being commanded by a colonel with a brigade plus strength. The study reveals that the prevailing security situation greately determines the disposition of units under command to contain emerging threats. Sector 2 covers Bayelsa State with Headquarters located at Yenagoa. The sector is also commanded by a colonel. Lastly, is Sector 3 that covers the entire Rivers State. The sector Headquarters is located in Harry‟s Town.

# HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE JTF

The military has conducted two types of internal security operations or Joint Task Force in the Niger Delta since 2003. This comprised operation RESTORE HOPE and operation FLUSHOUT III. In August 2003, the Federal Government responded to the deepening crisis in Warri and its environs by deploying JTF operation RESTORE HOPE. The AOR covered the entire Niger Delta, until JTF operation FLUSHOUT III was established for internal security in Rivers State on 4th September 2004. The JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE is made up of Army Task Group (ATG), Nigerian Navy Task Group (NNTG), Nigerian Air Force Task (NAFTG) and State Security Service Task Group (SSSTG).

Operation RESTORE HOPE and operation FLUSHOUT III were conducted simultaneously but independently in the Niger Delta until 2009 when both operations were harmonized under operation RESTORE HOPE. This was done by the military higher command to cater for better command and control. However, operation FLUSHOUT III and the Amnesty programme will be briefly highlighted in the ensuing paragraphs.

## Operations of the Joint Tasks Force

In August 2003, the Federal Government responded to the deepening crisis in Warri and its environs, by deploying JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE, with

Headquarters in Army Barracks, Effurun-Warri. The JTF at its inception was mandated primarily to arrest the criminal activities of militant groups in Niger Delta, restore law and order, as well as ensure a secure an enabling environment for socio- economic activities to thrive. The overall objective was the restoration of political and socio-economic stability in the Niger Delta. The Task Force was said to have been largely successful in the realization of its mandate. It has been able to locate and destroy some identified militant camps like the Ijaw militant group camp at Clough creek and the Madahor camp around Escravos in late December 2007. Between 15- 20th May 2009, the JTF troops destroyed camps 5 and 2 at Okerenkoko and Diebu creek respectively. Appendix 4 shows details of identified militant camps in the region. The JTF also controlled inter and intra-communal violence provided relative security for oil/gas companies and made several arrests to check illegal oil bunkering activities.

Nonetheless, the DHQ had made a strategic mistake in that, the initial mandate given to Operation RESTORE HOPE as the Task Force was for only a period of 90 days (time limitation). Since such a timeline had been specified, the mandate given for the operation could have since been reviewed in line with new developments and in consonance with current situation of the mission. It could be argued, that such non- renewal of missions' mandate has led to what the American military term 'mission

creep'. The danger of not completing the military operation on time has a tendency of exacerbating the hitherto already fluid situation in the Niger Delta.

## The JTF Mandate

The JTF operation RESTORE HOPE at inception was mandated primarily to contain the criminal activities of militant groups in Niger Delta, restore law and order, as well as ensure a secured and enabling environment for socio-economic activities to thrive. The overall objective is to achieve a long-term peace settlement and reinstate political and socio-economic stability in the Niger Delta. As earlier noted, the JTF was to be deployed to the Niger Delta Region for a period of 90 days to conduct military operation accordingly. It was noted that the mandate itself could not bring about the containment of the state of insecurity in the Niger Delta given the perceived force capability vis- a- vis its ROE for now. It is, therefore, necessary to determine

whether the mandate of the JTF can effectively contain the insecurity problems prevailing in the Niger Delta. As time went on, the tasks assigned to the JTF were expanded to include low level IS operation, maintenance of law and order, oil pipeline surveillance, aerial surveillance of oil/gas assets and reconnaissance/escort. Others are maritime air patrol, protection of on-shore/ off-shore oil facilities, destruction of militant camps and blockade of creeks and re-entrant of rivers among others. An appraisal of these tasks against some factors like militant capabilities, difficult and complex terrain and operational readiness of the JTF troops brought out some worrisome revelations. First, the state of insecurity prevailing in the Niger Delta region has remained high due to increased scale and tempo of militant activities since the commencement of JTF in August 2003. Appendix 4 contains number of reported militant camps the JTF are not at inception expected to engage unless in self defence.

Nonetheless, the DHQ had made a strategic mistake in that, the initial mandate given to Operation RESTORE HOPE as the Task Force was for only a period of 90 days (time limitation). The operation which has lasted for 8 years is still ongoing without achieving the desirable end – state. Since such a timeline had been specified, the mandate given for the operation could have since been reviewed in line with new developments and in consonance with current situation of the mission. It could be argued, that such non-renewal of missions' mandate has led to what the American military term 'mission creep'. The danger of not completing the military operation on

time has a tendency of exacerbating the hitherto already fluid situation in the Niger Delta.

## Rules of Engagement (ROE)

At inception, the ROE allow for the application of minimum force in self- defence when JTF personnel were attacked. This, by implication, restricts offensive action against militants' camps and such other targets as may be presented by militant groups.

An exception to this rule occurred recently (15-20 May 2009) when the militants came under reprisal attack by the JTF in self defence and in an effort to retrieve their (JTF) soldiers missing in action plus their equipment as claimed by the Task Forces. Perhaps, this position justifies the common doctrine that minimum force


is relative to threat. Thus, the ROE have not been reviewed to cater for the offensive action that may be required to meet the new realities of militants' activities and capabilities. This rather restrictive ROE has hindered the success of Operation RESTORE HOPE in the region. The poor performance of the force has given room to proliferation of militant camps as well as unwarranted casualties incurred by JTF troops and other security agencies. The ROE needs to be reviewed and made robust enough to enable commanders in the field take timely and decisive actions.

## Organization of Operation RESTORE HOPE

The JTF is made up of the Armed Forces, NPF and SSS. According to JTF Commander Operation RESTORE HOPE, the Task Force comprises a headquarters and five field Task Force Groups. The organogram showing the JTF organization is at Figure 5. The staffing of the headquarters reflects the joint nature of the operations consisting of the Army, Navy and Air Force Task groups. Others are the NPF Task Group and SSS Task Group. The Army Task Group (ATG) which is the land component is responsible for land operations in co-operation with the other Task Force components. Their tasks include reconnaissance, patrols, cordon and search as well as low level IS operations. The Nigerian Navy Task Group (NNTG) which is the maritime component of the Task Force is responsible for maritime operations in co- operation with other task groups. Its tasks include protection of offshore oil installations, escort duties, maritime air patrol and blockade of creeks/estuaries of major waterways. The Nigerian Air Force Task Group (NAFTG) equipped with Mi-

35 helicopter gunships provide close air support, maritime air patrol, armed reconnaissance and pipeline surveillance in support of the JTF.

The Task Force also has the Nigeria Police Task Group (NPTG) that is made of personnel of the Police Mobile Force drawn from various squadrons. Their tasks include operating with other components of the Task Force at checkpoints, deployment at creeks and IS duties. There is also the State Security Service Task Group (SSSTG). The group consists of operatives working in conjunction with other security agencies to provide real time information/intelligence to the Task Force. It is obvious from the foregoing, that the JTF was appropriately organized to meet the objectives for which it was established.



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
**Figure 5: Organogram showing the JTF Organization as at 2008 Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2008**



**Plate 39: Interview with CSP Ahmed Magaji JTF NPF Task Group Commander Source:Researcher’s Fieldwork,2009**

* + - 1. **Assessments of JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE**

Operation RESTORE HOPE will be assessed using the parameters of JTF concept of operations, operational readiness, mandate, Rule of Engagement (ROE), scope of tasks and achievements. This is done in succeeding paragraphs. First, Operation RESTORE HOPE is hereby being assessed for a better understanding of the general conduct of the JTF operations in the Niger Delta. There is thus the need to highlight the existing threat within the Task Force Area of Responsibility (AOR). The JTF concept of operations will also be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

The existing threat involves armed militants that have good knowledge of the terrain aside from being equipped with sophisticated weapons and communication gadgets. The activities of these militants have increased the proliferation of SALW in the Niger Delta, thereby aiding the sustenance of violence in the region. They have also attracted international attention with the intent of internationalizing the conflict. In addition, they were reported to have been involved in illegal oil bunkering, sabotage, sea piracy and other criminal activities. The Technical Committee Report on the Niger Delta revealed that, the estimated loss to illegal oil bunkering is 700,000 barrels of daily production.

## Plate 40: Illegal Oil Bunkering (Seized Boats Loaded with Crude Oil Products) Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork,2010

Therefore, the trend in the Niger Delta has remained militancy and criminality over the years. At present, operation RESTORE HOPE is not adequately trained and equipped to deal with these threats in the Niger Delta. Aside, the Federal Government lacks the political will to resolve the Niger Delta conflict.

The concept of operations of the JTF operation RESTORE HOPE involves the use of dialogue to resolve issues. Occasionally, the use of force against militant attacks and destruction of militant camps become necessary. The JTF employs the Army, Naval and NPF Task groups to secure strategic areas. They are deployed primarily in static roles to guard oil facilities and multinational oil companies, on- shore and off-shore. Hence, the concept of operation which revolves mainly around dialogue and the principles of MOOTW operations are in line with universal practices. This concept must have been thought out to reflect the JTFs rather rigid ROE mandate and tasks as well as the need to minimize collateral damages that may have occurred during military operations. Thus prolonging the end to the conflict.

The contingency plan for the operation prepared by Defence Headquarters (DHQ) demonstrated visionary leadership. Based on the Force composition, there was evidence of detailed threat analysis. The plan, therefore, aimed at achieving effective entry strategy, though it contained nothing on exit strategy, but it was explicitly stated that the JTF operation would last for 90 days. Nonetheless, the three military Services did not comply with the directive on force generation. That is, the Services weakened the entry strategy by not providing the required troops and equipment that resulted into a poor start at the inception of the operation. According to information gathered during interview with field commanders, "as at December 2008, only the Nigerian Army came close to providing the troops and equipment as tasked in the contingency plan of 2003". This accounted for the weak start at the onset of the operation, which was responsible for its inability to dominate the entire Niger Delta as planned. In essence, failure to comply as tasked by the contingency plan impacted negatively on the military Joint Task Force operation.

Operational readiness: This is a function of units' preparedness for mission or operation in terms of having adequate Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), maintenance capability, trained personnel, training and troops' welfare. These parameters will be examined holistically.

Table of Organization and Equipment: In terms of TOE, Operation RESTORE

HOPE is not adequately equipped to conduct effective military operations in the Niger Delta. For instance, NNS Delta which ought to have a posted strength of 875 all ranks is currently having 359 personnel. This falls short of over 50% of the required unit strength. Furthermore, an interview with the JTF Commander Naval Task Group (NTG) revealed that the NTG ratings are equipped with FN rifles and lack assault rifles like AK-47, GPMG and grenades. Conversely, most militants were armed with AK-47 rifles, GPMG, BMG, RPG7, speed boats and anti-aircraft gun. This explains the high level of casualties being recorded whenever naval personnel come under attack. The current level of equipment in the Operation RESTORE HOPE is therefore inadequate. Likewise, Petroleum Oil and Lubricant (POL) are not sufficiently available for the JTF conduct of operation. The riverine nature of the JTF AOR exerts serious strain on the POL available for the operation. For instance, a ship that takes 60,000 litres of diesel oil would only be able to remain at sea for only 2 weeks before refueling. Noteworthy therefore, is the constraint being posed by the high fuel consumption of the JTF Fast Patrol Craft (FPC). The dependence on Oil Company‟s source for POL requirement sometimes becomes inevitable. This causes delays and sometimes cancellation of scheduled missions.

Maintenance Capability: At JTF inception, the DHQ issued 28 patrol vehicles, most of which are now worn out due to poor maintenance culture. Besides, JTF has over 57 gunboats, dozens of Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) - 4 APCs were delivered in December 2008 and dozens of FPC among others. Of course, all these, require top level maintenance. At the onset, there was no integral maintenance outfit even against the enormous resources and equipment that are in the JTF inventory requiring maintenance. They range from gunboats, vehicles, communication equipment and weapon systems to water treatment plants. However, the then ATG and present Land Component could only boast of few tool boxes and about one company of personnel of the Nigerian Army Electrical and Maintenance and Engineers (NAEME). The employment of armoured vehicles in the current operations of the Task Force further necessitated the need for a mobile and functional workshop which is lacking. The JTF maintenance capability could be inferred to have fallen below expectation.

Trained Personnel: To ensure an all time combat readiness and optimum capacity utilization of troops; the troops must be adequately and constantly trained.

With the JTF, induction training, in situ training and joint operation training ought to have received attention which is not the case here. For instance, most of the troops enter a boat for the first time on arrival at the mission area and are then required to fire their weapons from the platform, like the gunboat without any previous experience. Akin to this is the inability of most of the troops to swim and are thus afraid of the creeks and the rivers.

Troop‟s Welfare: Undoubtedly, welfare is a morale booster and thus a sine qua non for success in military operations. Thus, the need for special attention to the well being of troops participating in Operation RESTORE HOPE is required. This is expected to be achieved through ensuring good feeding, prompt payment of allowances, medical cover to include proper casualty evacuation. Similarly important is the need for provision of adequate clothing stores such as uniform, rain boot, rain coats, taking cognizance of the climatic condition of the prevalent JTF AOR. Ironically however, most of these items were not adequately available for replenishment to troops. Similarly, a military operation of this magnitude requires a dedicated helicopter for casualty evacuation. However, JTF only relies on the unpredictable magnanimity of oil companies. It is glaring therefore that operation RESTORE HOPE welfare capability still requires improvement.

Furthermore, the conduct of the JTF operations was assessed and evaluated against its achievement or otherwise. The evaluation involves:

* What worked?
* What did not work?
* Change of leadership in JTF and why; their involvement in what operations and where.

The insecurity in the Niger Delta started as agitation for resource control. This however, degenerated into an all time high occurrences of vandalization of oil installations, seizure and occupation of flow stations and oil installations, illegal oil bunkering, attacks on security agencies, hostage taking/hijacking, terrorism, sea robbery and proliferations of SALW. The resultant near collapse of socio-economic activities in the region necessitated the Government to deploy the JTF to restore normalcy.

The result of the study reveals that the level of preparedness of troops for optimum performance as required by the mandate was low. This becomes apparent

when considered against the backdrop of manpower, training, equipment, logistics and welfare. A combination of these factors has hampered operational efficiency. The study sought views of JTF commanders on the appropriateness of the mandate under which they operate. From an aggregate of their views, inadequate man-power, equipment, joint training, logistics and communication are the major problems. In view of these, operation RESTORE HOPE has not achieved those tasks it was mandated to carry out. For instance, training, equipment, logistics and other requirements have not been stepped up to meet the emerging threats and challenges. By inference, equipment, logistics, troops' preparedness and training required are supposed to have changed. Likewise, it can be argued that operation RESTORE HOPE that was supposed to have lasted for 90 days initially is ongoing for eight years now without achieving the end-state. This could lead to 'mission creep' as prolongation of the operation of the JTF in the region would complicate the already delicate security situation in the Niger Delta. There is therefore, the need to review the JTF mandate to effectively contain the present state of insecurity in the Niger Delta.

The mandate given the JTF was not robust enough to adequately meet up with the enormity of the task as posed by the existing security threat in the region. Incidental to this was the inability of the Task Force to accomplish its mandate within the initial timeline of 90 days. It was revealed that Rule of Engagement for the JTF task was too restrictive for offensive action because, a state of insurgency has hitherto not been declared.

Akin to the period of mandate of the JTF is the nature and scope of duties of the Task Force. The scope of tasks derivable from the mandate of the JTF was reported by the field commanders as being too ambitious. These tasks included maintenance of law and order, prevention of sabotage, security/guarding of Key Points (KPs) and Vulnerable Points (VPs), arrest of illegal oil bunkering, escort duties, oil pipeline surveillance among others. By implication, the JTF was saddled with a lot of responsibilities which makes concentration and co-ordination of effort rather difficult.

Consequently, Operation RESTORE HOPE has not effectively perform its assigned tasks. For instance, estimated crude oil loss in 2008 due to theft was put at 700,000 barrels per day as against between 200,000 to 300,000 barrels per day in

2003. There is, therefore, the need to re-appraise and streamline the JTF tasks to enable it achieve its mandate within a given time frame.

However, the mission analysis for the JTF invariably did not adequately disclose the real nature and tasks of the operations as most of the implied tasks manifested as the operation unfolds. It could be argued therefore; that there has been a mismatch between the operational readiness of the units involved and the tasks of operation RESTORE HOPE. Efforts to bridge the gap between this operational readiness and the mission have been too slow to create the level of' effectiveness. This would have however been possible if the political will to decisively resolve the Niger Delta conflict is engendered in the government political solution as well as the military line of action. From the foregoing, the tasks derived from the mandate need to be reviewed.

In conducting military operations in the Niger Delta region, operation RESTORE HOPE faced many challenges which include lack of robust mandate, inadequate logistics such as platforms, communication, equipment and inadequate manpower. Others are lack of effective command and control, proliferation of SALW, poor level of co-operation and co-ordination among the stakeholders and lack of political will on the part of the Federal Government. An interview granted by the JTF Maritime Task Group Commander, Commodore Henry Babalola also confirmed that:

Lack of coordination of defence logistics Procurement (boat, gunships, crafts etc), Inter Service rivalry militated against the Concept of jointness in the operation.

However, there is A slight improvement at present. Military personnel‟s technical know-how were equally not coordinated. There is also the problem of lack of thorough terrain analysis…..9

The conflicts in the three States sampled are considered by the respondents to be very violent. The JTF has actually done a lot at stemming the conflict in the Niger Delta*.* This was aptly confirmed during interviews with the JTF personnel and not thoroughly reflected in the perception survey conducted on the communities. The approaches adopted by the JTF in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict which is mainly through the use of force and occasional use of dialogue and negotiation.

The DHQ set up a committee to look into the possibility of merging the two

JTF operations. Consequently, the 2 JTF were by June 2009 merged into a unified command to make for flexibility and effectiveness. Before this merger, it was discovered that there was no liaison between operations RESTORE HOPE and FLUSHOUT III. This shortcoming did not make for synergy of effort as the two outfits hardly exchange information or share resources/assets.

A unified JTF command meant ensuring flexibility in the use of scarce military resources/assets. This will in turn enhance cooperation and economy of effort. Likewise, the JTF unified command allows for unity of command and concentration of forces which are very important principles of military operations required for the achievement of JTF mandate and military objectives.

This merger also necessitated a change of leadership and structure of the JTF. This unified JTF command consists of a JTF Headquarters located at Yenagoa, and commanded by a Major General or its equivalent in the Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Air Force as against the current rank of a Brigadier General.

The larger size of a new force was considered before opting for the appointment. The JTF also consists of Land, Maritime and Air components, each commanded by a Brigadier General or its equivalent. The sectors are commanded by Colonels or equivalent and they are responsible to the JTF commander. The AOR of the unified JTF is restricted to Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states. Each of these States forms a sector for effective performance and for the attainment of the JTF mandate.

The violent conflicts in the three States sampled was viewed by the Federal Government from a security standpoint, where containment and suppression have been the primary objectives rather than long-term conflict resolutions.

## Strategies Adopted by the JTF towards Achieving its Vision and Goals

* + 1. **Vision and Goal**

This is the mandate which had earlier been determined to have been too ambitious, with restrictive ROE, faulty entry strategy and no exit strategy. Therefore, it was envisaged that militancy and vandalism of oil and gas assets would be sustained. What change was desired? Within the broad mandate, the following tasks should have been identified, itemized and operationalised:

* Maintenance of law and order.
* Oil pipeline surveillance.
* Protection of on-shore and off-shore oil facilities.
* Reconnaissance and escort duties.
* Checking illegal oil bunkering.
* Maritime air patrol of creeks, waterways and re-entrants.
* Blockade of creeks and re-entrants.
* Aerial surveillance of oil and gas assets.

Implementing this would have better served the mobilisation of troops. Logistics and equipment for successful achievement of JTF operations and allowed for better mitigation of the challenges.

## Strategies Adopted by the JTF

The strategies adopted by the JTF included dialogue, patrols, static guarding of key points and vulnerable economic assets, escort duties and sometimes use of force when necessary. Although the ROE at inception specified the use of minimum force in self-defence. In May 2009 while reacting to the attack and abduction of its troops by militants, the JTF used offensive action to regain their troops. This reactionary rather than proactive response typified several of the strategies adopted by the JTF. In the same vein, the JTF carried out several destruction of illegal oil refineries when the illegal bunkerers shifted their activities to include refining stolen crude oil products.

## Inclusion

The JTF comprised the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air-Force, Nigeria Police Force and the State Security Services. They also collaborate with the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) in handling arrested criminals arising from its operations. However, the JTF ought to have collaborated and co- operated more with other agencies. The former Commander JTF, Major General Sarkin Yaki Bello corroborated this assertion when he observed that:

Inter-agency cooperation is a serious problem. The nature of military operations is such that no one service goes alone now. With experiences and certain misunderstandings we saw, I made a case as a Commander of JTF for the incorporation of more agencies. Like the EFCC, and the Civil Defence Corps. There is need for inter-agency

cooperation, without which success will not be achieved.

There ought to be a meeting point for intelligence to be shared.10

The workings and situation of the JTF can be enhanced through a more carefully worked out inter-agency co-operation and collaboration.

Inter-agency collaboration in the conventional sense refers to a situation in which different agencies charged with the task of IS and safety (the Armed Forces, Police, SSS, Customs, Immigration Services, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps etc) work together to carry out PSO (Albert, 2006).

The JTF setup by the Federal Government to deal with the insecurity problems of the Niger Delta is a semblance of inter-agency collaboration in IS operations. This sssis nonetheless, a military understanding of the concept. The study notes that the JTF military outfit has not co-operated nor collaborated well, even among the constituents of the Task Force. This was most evident especially at the inception of the operation and before the merger of the hitherto two Task Forces.

## Plate 41: Members of the JTF on Patrol to check Illegal Oil Refineries Activities Source : Researcher’s Fieldwork, 20 September 2010

What this study proposed however, goes beyond the existing JTF structure but an improved version of it. This would obviously enable the body to work formally with NGOs, CSOs, the Niger Delta Community leaders, and representatives of the militants‟ youth, ex-militants and other stakeholders in producing more sustainable strategies or framework for managing the Niger Delta conflicts. This entails giving the JTF a “human face”.

This requires increased government/civil society collaboration and co-operation. This type of partnership affords the JTF and other security agencies to share ideas, knowledge, information and resources in order to learn from one another. At present, no one body or organization can alone deal with the mirage of the developmental issues or problems in the Niger Delta.

Abolurin (2011) corroborates this view when he averred that, “vandalism of Government infrastructure and oil scooping has increasingly become a cause for serious concern at all levels of government owing to the loss of revenue, destruction of property and loss of life among others”. He further remarked that in recent times the efforts of government, particularly through the NSCDC have helped to temper the frequency of vandalism and oil scooping. From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the fight against pipeline vandalism could involve the co-operation of all security agencies including para-military outfits.

This type of collaboration enables those charged with the responsibility of keeping law and order to share ideas, knowledge and resources in order to learn from one another. It also enables collaborators to pool their experiences and energy together in order to enhance their collective and individual impacts. In the same vein, promotion of inter-agency cooperation could be through conduct of periodic joint training exercises in Internal Security operations by security agencies.

## Risks Factors Identified in JTF Operations (History/Actions Taken)

The following were identified risks to the conduct of JTF operations:

* Terrain - Swampy, mangroves and difficult and vast creeks.
* Accessibility – Difficult.
* Militancy - High and difficult to contain.
* Proliferation of arms - High incidence of Small Arms and Light Weapons

(SALW) proliferation.

* General insecurity.

The study carried out a risk analysis of the JTF operations in the Niger Delta. This analysis revealed the following:

1. The environment in the Niger Delta constitutes a risk factor knowing full well that guerrilla activities can thrive in such a difficult terrain. Aside, the area is characterised by numerous creeks and rivers which make navigation quite difficult. This inaccessibility on the part of the JTF is further compounded by the lack of specialised platforms such as Flat Bottom Boats (FBB), Fast Patrol Craft (FPC), Tug boats, Boat ambulance, inadequate gunboats and operational maps.
2. Another risk factor is the issue of arms proliferation in the Niger Delta.
3. On whether the JTF activities are producing some negative activities, the study is on the affirmative. The cases of collateral damages occasioned by the JTF tasks were recorded and at times these cases are inevitable. For instance, the Okrika episode involving the manhunt of the militia leader Ateke Tom, the May 2009 counterattacks on militant camps as well as the November 2010 attacks on John Togo‟s camp in Delta State are cases in point.
4. In the course of JTF operation, they have created personal, diplomatic, political, social and economic risks.

# ACHIEVEMENTS OF OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Major General Sarki Yaki Bello, the Commander JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE believes that the Task Force has recorded relative success especially in the areas of security of lives and properties, abatement in inter-communal conflicts, opening of blocked waterways for free flow of economic activities and peace enhancement initiatives. These achievements are therefore subsequently examined.11

## Reduction in Oil Bunkering and Pipeline Vandalisation

Some potent threats to the nation‟s economy identified in the Niger Delta included illegal oil bunkering, operation of illegal oil refineries and pipeline vandalism. Pipeline vandalism occurs either of oil wellheads, pipeline channel, into terminals or flow stations in the creeks or pipeline that passes through communities on land. Prior to the declaration of amnesty for militants by the Federal Government,

there were major attacks on oil pipelines within the region. However, with the successes recorded by the Amnesty programme aside the robust effort of JTF, sabotage activities have greatly reduced except some isolated cases.

## Plate 42: Operations of Illegal Refineries in Niger Delta Source : Researcher’s Fieldwork, 20 September 2010



**Plate 43: Operations of Illegal Refineries in the Niger Delta Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 14 September 2011**

The weak entry strategy notwithstanding, the JTF operation recorded much achievement in the battle against illegal oil bunkering and pipeline vandalisation. For instance; between December 2007 and January 2008 alone, the JTF had effected the arrest of 47 persons, 6 barges, 2 tug boats and dozens of surface fuel tankers ascribable to illegal oil bunkering and pipeline vandalisation. Statistics of petroleum products recovered from illegal bunkerers for years 2001 through 2008 is at Appendix

5. Similarly, 93 persons were arrested for illegal oil bunkering and pipeline vandalisation. There were also 34 barges, 91 wooden boats, 57 fuel tankers and 55 surface fuel tanks with crude oil and condensate, seized between January and August 2008 due to the JTF pro-active patrols. Statistics of pipeline vandalism and illegal oil bunkering between January-November 2008 are captured in figures 2 and 3. Lastly, 14 Filipinos were arrested in their alleged process of loading about 150 metric tonnes of crude oil from AGIP pipeline around AKASSA and BRASS while the arrested culprits had been handed over to the EFCC. The confiscated items had been returned to the legitimate owners. For instance, 461,500 metric tonnes of crude oil were handed over to the appropriate oil companies.

## Plate 44: Oil Bunkerers Arrested by the JTF Troops Source : Researcher’s Fieldwork, 14 September, 2010

**Plate 45: Oil Bunkerers Arrested by the JTF Troops Source : Researcher’s Fieldwork, 14 September, 2010**

In its caption “JTF smashes illegal oil bunkering cartel”, the NEW SOJA magazine of the Nigerian Army 1st Quarter, 2008 reported the arrest of a gang of illegal oil bunkerers. The cartel was caught with 10 loaded tankers, 2 fibre-glass speed boats, 2 pumping machines and 4 wooden boats containing crude-oil. Similarly, 2 wooden crafts popularly known as “Cotonou boats” laden with an estimated capacity of 165,000 litres of crude oil were also recovered by the JTF troops at Sapele in a creek near Oghara, Delta State in another operation. The products were suspected to have been stolen from oil wells located deep in the creeks and brought to Elume village creek for distribution into waiting oil tankers. The drivers and owners of the arrested trucks were reported to have also been arrested and handed over to the EFCC for further investigation. In related development, some JTF operatives at Ubeji and Jeddo waterside, Delta State at separate operations arrested 2 Ford delivery vans containing 10 drums each of substance suspected to be condensate and 8 wooden boats containing same substance.

## G:\New Folder\SDC11316.JPGPlate 46:Confiscated Cotonou Boats used for Bunkering Activities Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2 September, 2011

Furthermore, 5 persons were arrested for their roles in an illegal oil bunkering activities at their operational base in Ajagbodudu village, near Koko in Delta State. Items which include 2 tankers and 5 barges loaded with crude oil, pumping machines, boat engines, speed boats, storage tanks and 2 cars were handed over to the EFCC operatives for investigation. As a way out, an interviewee named Bebenimibo pointed out that the powerful syndicates involved in the oil theft required the Federal Government's intervention in a number of ways, including the promulgation of laws against illegal bunkering. The enumerated catalogs of bunkering activities explain the ability of the Niger Delta insurgents to carry on. For instance, the Niger Delta People‟s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) successfully sustains itself as an organized armed group through illegal oil bunkering (*ThisDay*, March 8, 2006 : 1). The fact that there was no law against illegal bunkering until June 2011 is a clear evidence of weak political leadership. Effective political leadership at strategic level is required to take proactive measures against illegal bunkering, thus enhancing the professional conduct of IS operations.

The culture of impunity by the government and citizens that guaranteed that perpetrators of illegal oil bunkering were not arrested and prosecuted should be discontinued. Unfortunately, those who can ensure that this is done are the

perpetrators of illegal oil bunkering. Therefore, pressure from the civil society is necessary to ensure that those behind illegal oil bunkering are made to face the law without sacred cow.

On pipeline vandalism able to, the Commandant General, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) opined that, “vandalism of Government infrastructure and oil scooping has increasingly become a cause for serious concern at all levels of government owing to the loss of revenue, destruction of property and loss of life among others”, (Abolurin, 2005). He further remarked that in recent time, the effort of government, particularly, through the NSCDC has helped temper the frequency of vandalism and oil scooping. From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the fight against pipeline vandalism could involve the co-operation of all security agencies and para- military outfits.

## Checking of Illegal Oil Refineries

Contingent to illegal oil bunkering is the emerging trend of illegal oil refineries by criminals. This trend could be attributed to the inability of the illegal oil bunkerers to move crude oil through the waterways to the high sea due to effective blockade of the channels by the JTF. Consequently, the bunkerers have resorted to operating illegal local refinery. The JTF has thus moved swiftly to address this new trend. Thus, about 291 of such illegal refineries were destroyed between May and August,2008

## Plate 47: JTF Troops Checking Illegal Refineries Activities in the Niger Delta Source : Researcher’s Fieldwork, 20 September 2010

* + 1. **Anti-Kidnapping Operations**

As part of its mandate, the JTF embarked on crime fighting to complement the role of the NPF given the upsurge in crime rate especially kidnapping and hostage taking in the region. Consequently, there were many instances where the JTF foiled kidnapping and hostage taking attempts. Thus, in December 2008, the JTF succeeded in arresting Sogboma Jackrich alias Egberipapa in Buguma with other militants believed to be responsible for the series of kidnapping and attacks on security forces in the area. This further led to the recovery of 3 AK47 rifles with 6 AK-47 rifle magazines and 165 rounds of ammunition. The culprits were handed over to the SSS for further action. Furthermore, 175 weapons of various calibres as well as 2,529 rounds of ammunition were recovered between December 2007 and August 2008 through regular anti-crime patrol by the JTF. Consequently, the rampant armed robbery attacks and abduction of people by militants in the region was largely curtailed.

## 4.4.4. Economic Respite

In conformity with JTFs mandate to ensure a conducive environment for oil companies‟ operations, the JTF deploys troops to protect various oil platforms. In the same vein, the conduct of patrols at the vicinity of oil platforms and escort of personnel and logistics of oil companies to facilitate their operations, in addition to the physical protection of facilities. Hence, most of the assets and operations of the multinationals, oil servicing companies as well as construction firms were secured. For example, the construction of East-West road by SETRACO Nigeria Limited has steadily progressed due to the deployment of JTF troops. Likewise, according to Brigadier General Rimtip JTF Commander, the JTF intervened in community disputes through convening of several fora for meetings between stakeholders including affected communities to facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts. In the same vein, the multinational oil companies, NNPC and Petroleum product Marketing Company (PPMC) from time to time do request for JTF security coverage for their operations including logistics movement.

**Plate 48: JTF Troops on Patrol with Local Boat Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2 September, 2010**



**Plate 49 : Interview with Brig Gen NW Rimptip Comd ATG, (former Commander JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE)**

**Source: Researcher’s Fieldwork, 2009**

Prior to the intervention of the JTF in the Niger Delta, the militants as part of their strategies blocked waterways to terrorize the economic life of innocent victims. To stem this trend, the Task Force on 16th December 2007 dislodged some Ijaw militant groups stationed at Clough Creek camp. Similarly, some Itsekiri militant groups who attempted to establish such a camp at Madahor, Escravos were disallowed in December 2007. This action has been sustained by frequent patrol of the waterways to reinstate normalcy to the hitherto blossoming economic life of the people in the area. This effort has come to stay by way of daily routine patrol and armed escorts for logistics movements being undertaken by the multi-national oil companies.

# CHALLENGES TO MILITARY JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS IN NIGER DELTA

## Background

Although the JTF has achieved a measure of success to a reasonable extent, the fact remains that the JTF has not been able to solve the insecurity problems of the Niger Delta region. Aside, the logistics and related challenges faced by the JTF, the lack of political will by the Federal Government to deal with the conflict constitutes serious challenges. Hence, the escalation of violent conflict in the region. It could be inferred therefore that, the military operations have not been able to holistically resolve the Niger Delta conflict. However, the military line of action could be strengthened to complement other political measures aimed at ensuring sustainable development, enduring peace and security in the Niger Delta. The challenges to Operation RESTORE HOPE and strategies for enhancing the military operations are considered in the succeeding discussions.

## Lack of Robust Mandate

The mandate of the JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE appears adequate at the inception of the Task Force in August 2003 to address the insecurity posed by the inter-communal c1ashes. The initial success of the force also led to the re-entry programme of the multinational oil and gas companies. However, there was a corresponding increase in militancy due to the increased involvement of the militants in illegal bunkering activities. Likewise, the tasks of the JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE also involve the issues of combating illegal oil bunkering. The mandate

problem has allowed the prolongation of the conflict as the militants kept coming out with different guerrilla tactics all the time. Akin to the issue of mandate is the rather restrictive ROE which did not allow commanders on the ground to take decisive actions on the use of force whenever the need arose.

The result of the study reveals that the level of preparedness of troops for optimum performance as required by the mandate was low. This becomes apparent when considered against the backdrop of manpower, training, equipment, logistics and welfare. A combination of these factors has hampered operational efficiency. The study sought views of JTF commanders on the appropriateness of the mandate under which they operate. From an aggregate of their views, inadequate manpower and equipment, lack of joint training, inadequate logistics and lack of communication are the major problems. In view of these, Operation RESTORE HOPE has not fully achieved the mandated tasks at inception of the operation. For instance, training, equipments, logistics and other requirements have not been stepped up to meet the emerging threats and challenges. By inference, these variables required are supposed to have changed. Likewise, it can be argued that Operation RESTORE HOPE that was supposed to have lasted for 90 days is still ongoing.

## Ineffective Leadership

Ineffective leadership at strategic, operational and tactical levels impacted adversely on the conduct of JTF operations in the Niger Delta. The weak entry (deployment) strategy in the two operations under examination was due to unrealistic contingency plans by the leadership at the strategic level for the operation. This could be attributed to lack of clarity or poor mission conception analysis at the strategic level consequently creating problems for the military in MOOTW. For example, ineffective strategic leadership manifests in lack of political will to take necessary steps to stop illegal oil bunkering in the region.

Ineffective leadership at the strategic level also manifests in lack of clear directives on a number of issues affecting JTF‟s Internal Security operation. For instance, there were no clear directives on military actions that could have be taken against major militant camps in the Niger Delta until several officers and soldiers were killed in an unprovoked attack by the militants in May 2009. Additionally, there were no directives on what could be done with barges, boat, tanks and vehicles

arrested for illegal bunkering, which were littered all over the place. It was discovered that, apart from deploying troops to guard the arrested items, they also constitute environmental hazards. Therefore, lack of clear directives from the political leadership hinders the successful professional conduct of IS operation by the JTF.

Effective strategic leadership would ensure clear directives required by JTF commanders to accurately identify their objectives and plan for accomplishment within the given timeline. Decisive action would help to reduce collateral damage, reduce cost for government and ensure rapid withdrawal when required on completion of tasks.

## Support of Militant Activities by Local Population

One important factor that hinders professional conduct of Operation RESTORE HOPE is the support of the local population for the militants. The local population sees the militants as volunteers fighting for their course and not for a fee (*The Guardian*, October 28, 2007). They often provide information for the militants on troop‟s movement activities and deployment position. This was been responsible for various attacks on IS troops locations by militants. Between October 2006 and January 2009, militants carried out 21 attacks on ATG locations; some of which were attacked twice within this period. Agbara, Shell SPDC Security Adviser stated that the many years of neglect and marginalization have united the people of the Niger Delta in a common cause.

According to the former Army Task Group Commander, Colonel Obi Umahi, the militants‟ support of the local populace has been traced to the near absence of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in the conduct of JTF operations, negative use of propaganda and wrong perception of JTF workings.12 This partly accounted for why the local population was sympathetic to the militants‟ course and resists volunteering of information of tactical intelligence value to JTF troops. According to an interviewee, in counter-insurgency operations, the object should be the local population and once you win the support of the local population, the insurgents become isolated. The JTF could use CIMIC to win the confidence and support of the local population, if its plan is integrated into its Internal Support operations plan and

adequate funds made available for execution.

Likewise, the use of propaganda in the Niger Delta conflict has assumed a crucial dimension. The study revealed that there is ineffective application of information operations by the government and the JTF in the conduct of military operations in the Niger Delta. Each time the JTF troop‟s responds to attacks emanating from the militants, the adversary manipulate the electronic and print media to gain sympathy from the populace. This is worsening as the JTF is most times perceived as an occupation force in the region. The initial lack of attention to information management and dissemination by the JTF media centre has made the host communities to support the militias rather than the Task Force. The Joint Media Communication Centre (JMCC) could maximize the use of propaganda via the media to sensitize the populace on the need for their cooperation towards arresting the renegade militants and criminals alike. This is because the quest for information advantage is an important issue, not only in relation to the electronic and print media, but also obtaining and maintaining information dominance over the militants. There is therefore the need to effectively intensify the use of CIMIC activities to enhance the conduct of JTF operations in the Niger Delta.

It is also important to embark on activities aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the local population, thereby isolating the militants. This can be achieved through political dialogue and massive infrastructural development in the area by the Federal Government and CIMIC activities by JTF troops on IS operations. Therefore, winning the hearts and minds of the people of the Niger Delta through political line of operations (dialogue and socio-economic development) and CIMIC are required to enhance the professional conduct of IS operation in the Niger Delta.

## Inadequate Logistics

Provision of adequate logistics support is a prerequisite for the success of any military operation especially in the difficult Niger Delta terrain. However, the military JTF operating in the Niger Delta is beset with some serious logistics constraints that hamper the attainment of its set objectives. Some of these logistics problems include lift capability, inadequate communication and specialised equipment Fast Patrol Crafts (FPCs), gunboats, Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant (POL), storage facilities and bowsers, night vision devices, Global Positioning System (GPS),

inadequate combat ration, clothing weapons, vehicles, medicals and surveillance equipment. For instance, Rimtip, Commander Operation RESTORE HOPE argued that, quick responses to situations by the force as well as its effectiveness were usually not achieved most times. Consequently, the operation that was supposed to be an ad-hoc one quickly got bogged down due to lack of sufficient supply of logistics. The result of the study reveals that the logistics requirement for POL for the JTF operations is enormous and grossly inadequate. This is due to the difficult terrain which the troops traverse during operations and the need for pro-active patrols and surveillance of the JTF AOR. Some of the key challenges relating to logistics and equipment are discussed in a little more detail.

The then Commander JTF operation FLUSHOUT III Major General Sarkin Yaki Bello, observed that considering the difficult terrain, more would have been accomplished if adequate troops trained for special operations and special equipment such as gunboats, house boat, air and naval support assets were regarded as high- value assets required for the effective conduct of JTF Operations, especially the destruction of militant camps in the creeks. He remarked that the inadequacy of these assets had hampered the operations and partly account for its protracted nature and the continuous acts of criminality. Therefore, adequate special warfare troops, special equipment, air and maritime support assets are required to enhance the professional conduct of JTF operations.

Another serious logistics constraint to the JTF operations is lack of adequate communication. A secure and reliable communication is indispensable in military operations. Effective communication therefore is a force multiplier and it enhances effective coordination of operational activities. This view was corroborated by a JTF field commander when he observed that the lack of communication facilities has most times compelled JTF to rely on personal mobile cell phones (where there is network) as well as the communication facilities of some transnational oil companies. During interview with the JTF air liaison officer, it was observed that the major constraints of the air component have been the inability to coordinate operations with ground troops. This is due to the fact that, ground troops lack ground-to-air communication capability. This has compelled the troops to resort to timed programme to coordinate with NAF pilots. These inadequacies hamper effective operation of the JTF in the Niger Delta region.

## Inadequate Platforms

The terrain in the Joint Operational Area (JOA) is predominantly riverine, creeks and estuaries. This generally restricts movement of troops and logistics to be water – bound. This makes boats essential operational platforms for the JTF missions. However, the JTF is grossly equipped with only few scores of gunboats. Apart from these gunboats, being inadequate, their operators complained of them being cumbersome and too slow for offensive operations when compared with the speed boats used by the militants. There is also the teething problem of the unserviceability of most available gunboats. The study reveals that the functional gunboats were mostly deployed for static guard of strategic facilities. While gunboats earmarked for patrols and essential escort duties were very few. The conduct of ad- hoc tasks by the JTF troops often results into the pooling of available gunboats.

The JTF is however constrained by limited air and naval platforms. This result in the inability of the Task Groups to maintain aggressive and robust maritime patrols and surveillance, effectively check illegal oil bunkering and defend oil/gas installations. The study noted that the militants carry out their activities on the high sea, creeks and swampy grounds making it difficult for JTF troops to engage them when required.

According to Commodore Agba, the Naval Task Force Group Commander, the JTF is capable of successfully executing its tasks if provided with adequate platforms. He further added that, the few Inshore Patrol boats available to the JTF could only be useful within the canals which preclude them from patrolling the creeks. This has compelled the NTG to rely on ATG fast assault boats which are not protected against small arms attacks. The provision of adequate Fast Assault Crafts would facilitate the effective patrol of the JTF AOR. The JTF in some cases is compelled to use multinational oil and gas companies' helicopters for some operational exigencies like casualty evacuation. This situation severely affects air and maritime operations and the overall performance of the JTF. This could also compromise the neutrality of the Force. Arising from the need for more platforms for the Task Force is the requirement for dedicated jetties for the FPCs, gunboats and naval operational use. At present, these facilities operate at government and public jetties in Warri, Yenagoa and Port Harcourt.

## Lack of Basic Equipment and Kits for Troops

The JTF operations are being conducted in difficult riverine terrain and swampy terrain. The climate of the JTFs AOR is characterized by a long rainy season from March – October. The attendant heavy rainfall and high humidity requires that troops be specially kitted with rain boots, rain coats, and camouflage uniforms amongst other to withstand these conditions. Similarly, the riverine and thick mangrove/forest rainforest terrain severely limits visibility and exposes troops to unnecessary ambushes and drowning. These conditions require that troops be properly kitted with dual purpose fragmental/floating jackets, night vision devices, binoculars and ballistic helmets. The military higher command had recently authorized the issue of some of these essential equipment and kits. They are however inadequate due to frequent beef up of the JTF Land component‟s troops. Additionally, units inducted into the operations are usually not issued pre-induction kits. Furthermore, most of the essential stores and essential kits are consumables that need to be issued periodically. Hence, these items are not readily available for re- issue to troops.

## Lack of Operational Maps

There are no operational maps of the Niger Delta region. The maps in use by the JTF are non operational maps produced by transnational oil companies which were specially produced for their specific operations. Likewise, there are no facilities for battle field surveillance such as radars and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Additionally, more than half of the JTF AOR is adjudged to be below sea level characterized by swampy and thick mangrove forest terrain criss - crossed with a network of creeks and rivers. The effects of this terrain on JTF operational activities are limited field of fire, poor visibility and limited maneuverability. There is therefore, the need to provide up – to –date operational maps for the JTF operations.

## Inadequate Manpower

The present manpower holding of the JTF is grossly inadequate to address the security threat in the Niger Delta. For instance, the mandate establishing the JTF initially recommended the troop strength of a brigade plus for, the Army Task Group (ATGP). However the current militancy in the Niger Delta calls for a synergy of

effort for effective operation. Due to the wide AOR in relation to troop‟s availability and the numerous but compelling tasks of the Task Force, the JTF hardly has enough manpower for its operation. This inadequate manpower has resulted in the skeletal deployment of troops and the inability of the JTF to dominate its AOR.

## Proliferation of Militant Camps

There are several militants‟ organizations in the Niger Delta region. These various militant groups have equally established numerous camps in the creeks and swamps of the region. Major General Lawrence Ngubane, a former JTF Commander posits that:

there are more than 150 militant camps in the Niger Delta. The camps were used as operational bases for the diverse militants‟ activities. These camps formed alliances in cooperation with one another whenever attacked.13

Most of these militant camps are relatively big in size, fairly organized and equipped with assorted weapons and ammunitions. (Time, May 22, 2006). The other smaller militant camps aspire to become big through illegal exploits. These minor militant camps are usually splinter groups from major camps and are encouraged to greater acts of criminality by perceived successes of the larger camps (*Sunday Sun*, May 24, 2009). The list of some identified militant camps is at Appendix 4.

Major General Nandap Wuyep Rimtip, former Commander JTF, equally observed that, a greater number of these camps have been destroyed by the JTF. However, once a camp is destroyed, several others mutates within a few days. The problem of identifying and neutralizing these camps has also been a major challenge for the JTF.

As part of its post amnesty mandate, the JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE attacked and destroyed dozens of militants camps in the creeks of the Niger Delta. These included the four militant camps at Foropa area of Southern Ijaw, Bayelsa State commanded by Keiti Sese (alias Commander Nomukeme), Igbikiri camp in Nember, John Togo‟s camp in Bayelsa and Commander Obez camp in Rivers State (*Vanguard*, November 19, 2010).

A onetime JTF Commander, Major General Lawrence Ngubane also averred

that, oil companies award security related contracts to known militant leaders, while state governments, wealthy individuals and oil companies are equally quick to pay ransoms demanded by hostage takers. This is additional to some of the protection money paid by some oil companies to forestall the vandalism of their facilities or installations (*The Guardian*, July 27, 2008). The militants use proceeds from these contracts and ransoms to equip and sustain their nefarious activities.

The study also noted the proliferation of militant organizations in the Niger Delta. These militants‟ organizations in the various states of the Niger Delta include, the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC), the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta Vililante (NDV). Others included the Martyr Brigade (MB), Ogoni Youth Council, Klansmen, Greenlanders, Black Axe and Outlaws.

The JTF need to sustain current efforts at identifying and neutralising militant camps in the Niger Delta. This requires that relevant information on location and size of militants‟ camp be available to the JTF operations. Likewise, adequate knowledge of creeks (terrain) and provision of adequate FACs as well as air support will facilitate the neutralization of militant camps.

The JTF troops notes that most identified militant camps were inundated with arms and corresponding ammunition. These arms include the AK 47 rifles, General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), Browning Machine Gun (BMG) and Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG 7). Other arms include the Gun boats, locally configured speed boats and Anti Aircraft guns (*Nigerian Tribune*, November 19, 2010).

The study revealed the unwholesome patronage of the militants and their camps by very important personalities as well as some ambitious prominent politicians. These ambitious politicians in the Niger Delta were alleged to have armed and used these militants as things during the 2003 electioneering campaign. Rather than disarming these armed groups after the election, the groups were observed to have been transformed into various armed militant groups. One of the JTF Field Commanders corroborated this assertion when he observed that „militant camps‟ have also become “Pilgrim centre” for politicians such as governors, senators and speakers of some State Houses of Assembly among others. For example, the Governors of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers State at various times after their inauguration in 2007 visited camp 5, Okerenkoko in Delta State. The patronage and constant visitations

embolden and empowered these militants both financially and emotionally to continue criminal activities. Likewise, it gives the erroneous impression that the visitors support their course and could demoralize JTF troops in the operation.

## Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

The problem of SALW proliferation has assumed an alarming proportion in the Niger Delta. It escalates conflicts, undermines peace efforts, increases criminal activities, and impedes socio-economic development and democracy. This is why most early warning systems around the world now mainstream surplus arms as an important conflict indicator that could be carefully monitored. The problem of SALW has produced both issue and actor proliferation in many parts of Nigeria, in particular the Niger Delta area and is bound to affect future political activities, inter- communal relations, the economy and the general security situation. Other security implications include theft, terrorism, criminality, and increased social disintegration and dislocation of groups and families, and general insecurity. All these portend great danger and security imperatives, thereby compelling the need to begin to think more critically on how to solve the problems of surplus arms in the Niger Delta.

The militants and criminal gangs in the Niger Delta have sophisticated arms and ammunitions. This is the consequence of SALW proliferation in Nigeria. The quantum of and calibres of arms and ammunition surrendered by the militants during the 2009 amnesty programme in the region indicates that all is not well with the Nigerian state. Their weapons include AK 47 rifles, Browning Machine Gun (BMG), Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG 7), General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) G3 rifles, French Nationale (FN) rifles, Sterling Submachine Gun (SMG), Sterling Model 12, Mark IV rifles, Special Single barrel rifles and pump-action guns. Others are speed boats, gun boats, and anti-aircraft guns (*Nigerian Tribune*, November 19, 2010). The possession of these weapons by the militants emboldens them to dare the JTF and other security outfits operating in the Niger Delta.



## Plate 50 : Surrendered Militant’s Weapons Following the Amnesty Programme Source: Army Headquarters Department of Operations, 2010



**Plate 51 : Surrendered Militant’s Weapons Following the Amnesty Programme Source: Army Headquarters Department of Operations, 2010**

The study also revealed that the proliferation of SALWs has equally denied the JTF the monopoly of the use of certain categories of weapons and responsibility for the employment of force to deter or eliminate whatever is considered a threat to National Security.

The arms-back-deal that the government struck with Asari Dokubo-led NDPF

and the Ateke Tom-led Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) in Rivers State in 2004 did not seem to have yielded any results. Surplus arms continue to circulate in most parts of the Niger Delta, most especially in the sampled states. It is believed that these surplus arms have played a major role in sustaining violent conflicts in the region.

One of the field commanders interviewed noted that identifying the sources of SALW used by the militants has been a serious challenge to the JTF. Rimtip however asserts that, illegal oil bunkering serves as a source of funding for the procurement of illegal arms and ammunitions in the conflict ridden Niger Delta.

Effective control of arms proliferation is necessary for a conflict-free Niger Delta region. Security agencies need to be adequately equipped to adopt measures that will effectively prevent further acquisition of weapons and facilitate recovery of already acquired ones. The capacity and resources of the security agencies, especially the police, for intelligence gathering and crime investigation could be enhanced.

Likewise, the Federal Government could investigate the alleged involvement of some government officials and politicians in sponsoring armed groups. The Federal Government could also strengthen control of weapons and equipment. Furthermore, the Federal Government could improve on border security and intensify vigorous campaign against illicit acquisition of SALWs in the country.

## Poor Level of Cooperation and Coordination

The poor level of cooperation and coordination among the FG, DHQ, host state governments and multinational oil and gas companies hamper the quality of logistics and financial assistance for the JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE. For example, at inception of the JTF operations lack of clear source of funding of the Force is arguably identified as one of the problems that have hampered the operation. There are multiple sources of funds and logistics that are not properly coordinated. This loophole could create an untidy situation where the transnational oil and gas industries and some state governments even procure equipment without necessarily appraising their operational suitability to the force. The varied sources of funding and logistics also do not allow for proper accountability and coordination by the Force and fund providers. Likewise therefore, these stakeholders in most cases do not cooperate or collaborate. This is exemplified in the different views held by some State Governments towards the militants‟ posture. For instance, it is a truism that, some

state governments (like Bayelsa and Delta) do set aside some percentage of their security votes as payment (appeasement) to the militants monthly; thereby giving some form official recognition to militant activities. Therefore, there is the need for the Federal Government to direct such State Governments to stop any form of encouragement or recognition accorded the militants or ex-militants as the case may be.

## Need for Improved Inter-Agency Collaboration

There is little inter-agency co-operation and collaboration between the JTF and agencies charged with the task of internal security and safety in the Niger Delta. The workings and situation of the JTF can be enhanced through a more carefully worked out inter-agency co-operation and collaboration.

Inter-agency collaboration in the conventional sense refers to a situation in which different agencies charged with the task of IS and safety (the Armed Forces, Police, SSS, Customs, Immigration Services, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps) work together to carry out PSO (Albert, 2006).

The JTF setup by the Federal Government to deal with the insecurity problems of the Niger Delta is a semblance of inter-agency collaboration in IS operations. This is nonetheless, a military understanding of the concept. The study notes that the JTF military outfit has not co-operated nor collaborated well, even among the constituents of the Task Force. This was most evident especially at the inception of the operation and before the merger of the hitherto two task forces.

What is being proposed in this study however, goes beyond the existing JTF structure but an improved version of it. This would obviously enable the body to work formally with NGOs, CSOs, Niger Delta Community leaders, representatives of the militants‟ youth, ex-militants and other stakeholders in producing more sustainable strategies or framework for managing the Niger Delta conflicts. This entails giving the JTF a “human face”.

The study also noted that the JTF military outfit has not co-operated nor collaborated well, even among the constituents of the Task Force. This was most evident especially at the inception of the operation and before the merger of the hitherto two task forces. The workings and situation of the JTF can be enhanced through a more carefully worked out inter-agency co-operation and collaboration.

This requires increased government/civil society collaboration and co-operation. This type of partnership accords the JTF and other security agencies an opportunity to share ideas, knowledge, information and resources in order to learn from one another. At present, no one body or organization can alone deal with the mirage of the developmental issues or problems in the Niger Delta.

In the same vein, promotion of inter-agency co-operation could be through conduct of periodic joint training exercises, seminars and workshops in Internal Security operations by security agencies.

## Lack of Political Will

There seemingly is lack of political will by the government to tackle militancy and illegal oil bunkering in the Niger Delta region. For example, the inability of the government at both the Federal and State levels to take decisive stand to stamp out militancy is a serious challenge. During an interview with Chief Ileberi, a political elite in Yenagoa, it was observed that the Bayelsa State Government sustained the activities of these militants and or ex-militants through monthly emoluments in the spirit of appeasement. He remarked that the State Government Security Committee paid known militant groups from its security votes. This strategy of appeasement is counter-productive as such money could be used to purchase arms and logistics to sustain their criminal activities. Therefore, there is the need for the Federal Government to direct such State Governments to stop any form of encouragement or recognition accorded the militants or ex-militants as the case may be.

It is also believed that the JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE has not succeeded in solving the Niger Delta conflict due to two major reasons. First, the militants are Nigerians and the JTF is allowed only to act in self-defence. Furthermore, a state of insurgency has not been declared in the region. Towards this, the Force has not been adequately equipped and sustained for military operations in the region. Second, the Federal Government‟s stand till date is that the Niger Delta problem will require military solution as the last option. Invariably, the government has put the last option first and this is not helping the JTF to achieve the aim for which it was set up.

Likewise, strong political will would have helped to keep the JTF operations focused and goal oriented. For instance, strong political will is required for the Federal Government to take adequate measures to stop oil theft arising from illegal oil

bunkering activities in the Niger Delta. It has become necessary therefore for Federal Government to enforce the recently enacted anti-sabotage and anti illegal oil bunkering laws against criminals.

Additionally, there is the failure of the government at various levels to embark on massive socio-economic development of the Niger Delta region including actionable youth employment. The political line of action is expected to perform this role in order to win hearts and minds that would enhance the efforts of the military JTF operations in dealing with criminality that abounds in the region. Unfortunately, the political line of action is rather not effective, resulting in the people of the Niger Delta perception of the JTF troops as a failure and an occupation force.

The Joint Military Task Force Operation therefore, became protracted, having lasted for over seven years. Borrowing from Mockaitis‟ idea, some conflicts have no military solution and the center of gravity could lie in the political, economic and social domain (Mockaitis, 1995: 110). Nonetheless, political line of operations could have enhanced the JTF‟s military operations to achieve the desired peace and security if they were co-ordinated. In the Niger Delta therefore, the importance of concurrent as well as effective co-ordination of the political and military lines of action in Internal Security management proved crucial.

# COMMUNITY PERCEPTION OF MILITARY JOINT TASK FORCE IN THE NIGER DELTA

## Summary of Demographic Characteristics of Perception Survey of Respondents

The summary of data collection shows that, 300 copies of questionnaire were distributed, out of which 240 copies of questionnaire came in from the field. A copy of the questionnaire administered is shown in Appendix 1. The respondents were randomly selected.

## Distribution of Respondents by State

From the frequency distribution; 88 [36.7%] people were from Bayelsa State, 73 [30.4%] from Delta State and 76 [31.7%] from Rivers State while 0.4% did not indicate their state.

## Distribution of Respondents by Gender

Of the 234 out of 240 of the sample that indicated their gender, 75.6% were

male while 24.4% were female as shown in Table 1.

## Table 1: Gender of Respondents

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Gender** | **Frequency** | **Percent** | **Valid** | **Cumulative** |
| **Percent** | **Percent** |
| Valid Male | 177 | 73.8 | 75.6 | 75.6 |
| Female | 57 | 23.8 | 24.4 | 100 |
| Total | 234 | 97.5 | 100 |  |
| Missing | 6 | 2.5 |  |  |
| **Total** | **240** | **100** |  |  |

* + 1. **Distribution of Respondents by Age**

The data in Table 2 shows that the age range between 25 and 34 years were more represented, followed closely by those between 35 and 49 years. The next to this is the 15-24 year range, followed by those between 50 and 60 years. The least represented age bracket is the 61 years and above range.

## Table 2: Ages of Respondents (Age at Last Birthday)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Frequency** | **Percent** | **Valid** | **Cumulative** |
| **Percent** | **Percent** |
| Valid 15 - 24 years | 34 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 14.2 |
| 25 - 34 years | 88 | 36.7 | 36.7 | 50.8 |
| 35 - 49 years | 85 | 35.4 | 35.4 | 86.3 |
| 60 - 60 years | 27 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 97.5 |
| 61 years and above | 6 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 100 |
| **Total** | **240** | **100** | **100** |  |

By implication, most of the respondents fall within the age brackets of 25- 34 years and 35 - 49 years respectively. This suggests that the respondents have lived long enough in the study area to remember the many conflicts that have been witnessed in the Niger Delta. And most probably the respondents have a reasonable knowledge of the issues being addressed by this research.

## Distribution of Respondents by Educational Qualification

The educational qualifications of the respondents are summarized in Table 3. It could be observed that most of the respondents are well educated and this negates the general impression that the people of the Niger Delta are not sufficiently educated to benefit from the oil economy. This is because 107 of the respondents (constituting 45.3% of the respondents) have university education, 28.3% claimed to have secondary education while 17.9% of the respondents have post-secondary education and only 3.3% of the sample population is not educated beyond primary school level.

## Table 3: Educational Qualifications (Highest Level of Education)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frequency | Percent | Valid | Cumulative |
| Percent | Percent |
| Non-formal, religious, | literary |  |  |  |  |
| or adult education |  | 10 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 |
| Primary School |  | 8 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 7.6 |
| Secondary /technical/teachers/ | |  |  |  |  |
| commercial college |  | 68 | 28.3 | 28.8 | 36.4 |
| Post -secondary |  |  |  |  |  |
| (polytechnic/colleges of |  |  |  |  |  |
| education) |  | 43 | 17.9 | 18.2 | 54.7 |
| University |  | 107 | 44.6 | 45.3 | 100 |
| Missing |  |  | 1.7 |  |  |
| **Total** | | 236 | 98.3 | 100 |  |

* + 1. **Distribution of Respondents by Occupation**

The occupation of respondents is summarized in Table 4. From Table 4, the frequency distribution shows that 30 of the respondents [15.7%] were unemployed. While majority of the respondents, representing [47.1%] are intermediate staff of government and companies. This and the number of respondents that claimed to be employed, suggest some structural deformity in the socio-economic characteristics of the communities. A situation where 15.7% of the sampled populations are unemployed and 47.1% depends on the government and companies (probably oil/gas

companies at lower skills) for survival is not sustainable.

## Table 4: Occupation of Respondents

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Frequency** | **Percent** | **Valid** | **Cumulative** |
| **Percent** | **Percent** |
| Valid Unemployed | 30 | 12.5 | 15.7 | 15.7 |
| Farming, fisherman, petty |  |  |  |  |
| trading and self employed |  |  |  |  |
| artisan | 29 | 12.1 | 15.2 | 30.9 |
| Junior staff of government |  |  |  |  |
| or companies | 35 | 14.6 | 18.3 | 49.2 |
| Intermediate staff of |  |  |  |  |
| government or companies | 55 | 22.9 | 28.8 | 78 |
| Self employed | 26 | 10.8 | 13.6 | 91.6 |
| Development or social |  |  |  |  |
| worker | 9 | 3.8 | 4.7 | 96.3 |
| Others (Specify) | 7 | 2.9 | 3.7 | 100 |
| Missing | 49 | 20.4 |  |  |
| **Total** | **240** | **100** |  |  |

Contrasting this with the level of education in these States (Table 3), it can be safely deduced that the general high level of education has not translated into job opportunities for the people - since the percentage of the unemployed is still high.

Dealing with the above paradoxical situation requires devising mechanisms for assisting the 15.7% population that is unemployed to create their own jobs, since there is a limit to the number of people that government and oil companies can employ.

## Distribution of Respondents by Marital Status

The marital status of respondents is summarized in Table 5. While nearly one- third of respondents are single, nearly two-thirds are married. This is an indication that some of them would have children and dependants. Thus, the importance of employment and economic security for the family.

## Table 5: Marital Status of Respondents

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Frequency | Percent | Valid | Cumulative |
| Percent | Percent |
| Single | 74 | 30.8 | 31 | 31 |
| Married | 153 | 63.8 | 64 | 95 |
| Divorced | 5 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 97.1 |
| Widow | 6 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 99.6 |
| Others | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 100 |
|  | 239 | 99.6 | 100 |  |
| Missing | 1 | 0.4 | 3.1 |  |
| **Total** | **240** | **100** |  |  |

* + 1. **Distribution of Respondents by Religion**

Data presented in Table 6 shows that more than three quarters of the respondents are Christians, while 9.2% are Muslims and 4.2% are traditionalists. This is understandable because the 3 sampled States are predominantly Christians.

## Table 6: Religion of Respondents

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Frequency** | **Percent** | **Valid** | **Cumulative** |
| **Percent** | **Percent** |
| Christianity | 205 | 85.4 | 85.4 | 85.4 |
| Islam | 22 | 9.2 | 9.2 | 94.6 |
| Traditional | 10 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 98.8 |
| Others |  |  |  |  |
| (Specify) | 3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 100 |
| **Total** | **240** | **100** |  |  |

* + 1. **Distribution of Respondents by Length of Stay in Community**

The length of stay of respondents in the respective localities is summarized in Table 7. Table 7 thus shows that most of the respondents have been living in the communities in which they were interviewed for a long time. For instance, 48.1% of the respondents have been living in the various areas where they were interviewed for more than ten years. This suggests that the respondents have lived long enough to lend credence to their reports on many conflicts that have been witnessed in the area

sampled. It also gives legitimacy to the opinions of the respondents on what goes on in their communities. Close to this group are those that have lived between 1 and 5 years. Those who have lived less than 1 year are next while those that have lived between 6 and 9 years are the least represented.

## Table 7: Length of Stay in Community

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Frequency** | **Percent** | **Valid Percent** | **Cumulative**  **Percent** |
| Valid  Less than1 year 1 – 5 years  6 – 9 years  10 years and above  **Total**  Missing | 44 | 18.3 | 18.4 | 18.4 |
| 46 | 19.2 | 19.2 | 37.7 |
| 34 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 51.4 |
| 115 | 47.9 | 48.1 | 100 |
| **239** | **99.6** | **100** |  |
| 1 | 0.4 |  |  |
|  | **240** | **100** |  |  |

* + 1. **Interpretation of level of Agreement Scale Used in Perception Survey**

For the perception survey, the data is summarized using descriptive statistics. Differences are tested using the T-test and One Way Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA), both at the 0.05 level of significance.

To determine the significance for the ANOVA:

-if p< 0.05 (Significant): if p > 0.05 (not significant)

or if F-value < 3.94 (not significant): if F-value > 3.94 (Significant).

The Scheffe multiple range test was used to identify the variables contributing to the difference whenever there was a significant difference within a group.

To determine the significance for the T-test:

-if p < 0.05 (Significant); if p > 0.05 (not significant)

or if t-value < 1.96 (not significant); if t-value > 1.96 (Significant).

The mean values of levels of agreement for each variable were interpreted as follows:

1 to 1.75 = Strongly Disagree (SD) [1 to 1.75]

Greater than 1.75 to 2.5 = Disagree (D) [>1.75 to 2.5]

Greater than 2.5 to 3.25 = Agree (A) [>2.5 to 3.25]

Greater than 3.25 to 4 = Strongly Agree (SA) [>3.25 to 4] This was used in the relevant sections that follow.

## Data Presentation and Discussion of the Perception Survey.

* + - 1. **RQ4: Perception on the Use the Niger Delta Youth "Militant" to Describe Agitators for Resource Control**

Respondents were asked the extent of agreement to the idea of using the language Niger Delta youths "militant" to describe those agitating for resource control. The results from the descriptive statistics shows that there is a general disagreement by respondents on the views (f=l).

## RQ5: Perception of status of "Militant" Group in Niger Delta Table 8: Status of "Militant" Group in Niger Delta

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | Mean | SD | Level of Agreement |
| B13 | Employed Youths | 236 | 1.85 | .905 | SD |
| B14 | Unemployed Youths | 233 | 3.38 | .878 | SA |
| B15 | Greedy Youths | 235 | 2.71 | 1.039 | A |
| B16 | Lazy Youths | 234 | 2.63 | 1.079 | A |

Respondents were asked to classify "militant" groups in the Niger Delta as employed youths, unemployed youths or lazy youths. Majority of the respondents in all the States claim that "militant" groups in the Niger Delta are unemployed youths. Equally, the respondents described the "militants" youths in 4.6.11.1 perception on the Niger Delta youths "militant" to describe agitations of resource control.

Respondents were asked the extent of agreement to the idea of using the language Niger Delta youths "militants" to describe those agitating for resource control. The result from the descriptive statistics shows that there is a general disagreement by respondent on the views (f= 1). The Niger Delta youths are greedy and lazy. Extant literature considered youth unemployment as the most potent triggers of conflicts in the surveyed states.

## RQ6: Perception on the causes of the militants Acts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

**Table 9: Perception on the Causes of the Militants Acts in the Niger Delta**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **N** | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of**  **Agreement** |
| B17 | The need for sustainable democracy. | 238 | 2.36 | 1.089 | D |
| B18 | The need for amenities and | 237 | 2.99 | 1.066 | A |
|  | development. |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 236 | 2.72 | 1.054 | A |
| B19 | Selfish interest and greed. |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 237 | 2.89 | 1.007 | A |
| B20 | Resource Control. |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 236 | 2.52 | 1.054 | A |
| B21 | Environment degradation. |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 203 | 2.42 | .905 | D |
| B22 | All of the above |  |  |  |  |

From the descriptive statistics presented in Table 9, it was generally agreed that the causes of the militants‟ acts in the region borders on the need for amenities and development, resource control and environmental degradation. Likewise, the respondents were of the view that the causes of militants acts also arose from selfishness and greed.

During oral interviews, we asked the respondents to indicate the main role players in the militant activities. The submissions of our oral interviewees indicates that the main role players include the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), criminals, elites, illegal oil bunkerers, selfish politicians, restive youths, cult groups and citizens seeking relevance.

## RQ7: Perception on Best Ways of Conflict Management in the Niger Delta

**Table 10: Perception on Best Ways of Conflict Management in the Niger Delta**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | Mean | SD | Level of Agreement |
| B23 | Avoidance | 229 | 1.94 | 1.003 | D |
| B24 | Third party intervention. | 232 | 2.56 | .896 | A |
| B25 | Joint problem solving, |  |  |  |  |
|  | collaboration and compromise |  |  |  |  |
|  | approach. | 235 | 3.36 | .842 | SA |
| B26 | Military and paramilitary |  |  |  |  |
|  | miIitancy, confrontation and | 233 | 2.33 | .945 | D |
| B27 | Sabotage | 230 | 1.73 | .798 | SD |

We sought to know from the respondents the public perception on the best ways of conflict management in the Niger Delta. From the views expressed by the respondents, there is a general disagreement that avoidance and military/paramilitary option should be employed in conflict transformation in the region. The respondents also strongly disagree that people should result to the use of militancy, confrontation and sabotage to resolve the Niger Delta conflicts. Conversely, the respondents strongly agree that joint problem solving, collaboration and compromise approaches should be used in transforming the Niger Delta conflicts. Likewise, the respondents agree on the use of "Third Party" intervention approach in resolving the Niger Delta conflict.

From the views of writers (including news media) on the violent conflicts in the Niger Delta, there have been persistent calls for government to evolve an integrated approach to conflict management for sustainable peace and development in the Niger Delta. This entails giving the JTF operation a "human face". There is the need for the capacity of government functionaries to be further built in joint problem solving strategies.

## RQ8: Perception on why Joint Problem Solving Approach Has Not Been Employed in the Niger Delta

**Table 11: Perception on Why Joint Problem Solving Approach Has Not Been Employed in the Niger Delta**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **N** | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B28 | It is not the best approach to |  |  |  |  |
|  | the Niger Delta region conflict. | 235 | 2.12 | 1.091 | D |
| B29 | Conflictuals are not sincere. | 235 | 2.85 | .921 | A |
| B30 | There is no need for peace |  |  |  |  |
|  | negotiation. | 234 | 1.79 | .889 | D |
| B31 | Stakeholders are the problem. | 234 | 2.94 | 1.045 | A |

From the data presented in Table 11, there are divergent views on the perception on why the Joint Problem Solving Approach has not been employed in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict. Most respondents disagree with the notion that it is not the best approach to Niger Delta conflict. Likewise, respondents disagree with the view that there is no need for peace negotiation through the Joint Problem Solving strategy. The preponderance of opinion by respondents indicates that the stakeholders in the Niger Delta conflict are the real problem.

The study identifies the parties to the Niger Delta conflict to include the Federal Government, State Government/Local Government, Oil/gas companies, NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Other stakeholders include the militants, youth organizations, Niger Delta Communities, security operatives and JTF personnel. It was also observed that there is little inter-agency co-operation and collaboration between the JTF and agencies charged with the task of internal security and safety in the Niger Delta.

## 2.6.11.6 RQ9: The JTF Intervention in the Attainment of Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta.

The perception of JTF intervention in the attainment of sustainable peace in Niger Delta is presented in Table 12.

## Table 12: JTF Intervention in Attainment of Sustainable Peace

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | Mean | SD | Level of Agreement |
| B32 | Yes, it has helped to reduce |  |  |  |  |
|  | conflict proliferation. | 234 | 2.91 | .967 | A |
| B33 | Yes, it helped to terminate |  |  |  |  |
|  | conflict totally. | 235 | 2.01 | .870 | D |
| B34 | No, aim/objectives of JTF |  |  |  |  |
|  | not achieved, JTF is partisan. | 235 | 2.26 | 1.006 | D |
| B35 | Forceful combat operations |  |  |  |  |
|  | was wrong approach. | 235 | 2.65 | 1.045 | A |

* + - 1. **JTF Helped to Reduce Conflict Proliferation**

From the data presented in Table 12, there is general agreement that the JTF has helped in the attainment of sustainable peace in Niger Delta. On a State by State basis, result of ANOVA indicates differences amongst the States (f = 24.178, P =

.000). Although they are all in the agree scale - Bayelsa mean value is 3.43 (SA), Delta mean value is 2.62 (A) and Rivers having a mean value of 2.58 (A). It can be deduced therefore that the JTF is a good interventionist stakeholder.

Considering the gender of respondents, results of the t-test- t = 2.314, P =

.022. Although, there is significant difference between how the males and females rated this variable, the overall outcome being that, both groups agree with the statement males mean value is 2.99 while that of females has 2.64.

Next is to ascertain whether the age difference of respondents has effect. However, on the age group of respondents, there are no significant differences in views (f = 1.310, P = .267). The mean values for 15 - 24 age group is 2.69 (A), 25 - 34 age group is 3.00 (A), 35 - 49 age group is 2.92 (A), 50 - 60 age group is 2.96 (A) and > 60 years is 2.20(D). The observed difference of the age group of > 61 years can

be ignored.

Considering the education background of respondents, there is a strong agreement across the communities. Thus, there are significant differences in the view based on education (f = 3.423, P = .010) occurring between Group 3 - Secondary level of education and respondents in Group 5- University education, although both groups agree with this view.

Based on the occupation of the respondents, there is no significant difference (f = 1.310, P = .255). All occupational groups agree with the view that, the JTF intervention in the attainment of sustainable peace in Niger Delta has helped to reduce conflict proliferation.

Furthermore, the length of stay of respondents in the community is significant in this view (f = 6.585, P = .000). It is necessary to know where lies this difference in Group 1 (less than 1 year) and Group 4 (10 years and above), and Group 1 and Group 3 (6 - 9 years). By implication, they all agree with this view, Group 1 (3.44), Group 2

(2.95), Group 3 (2.70) and Group 4 (2.73).

On a cursory look at the descriptive statistics, it is clear that religion of respondents has an impact on the perception. There are significant differences between religious groups (f = 4.501, P = .008) reveals that there is difference in perception between Christians and Muslims, and between Christians and traditionalists. By implication the Muslim perceptions differ from the Christians and traditionalists. From the *ANOVA* means, traditional religion came out with disagree mean which is not significant at 0.05 and it can therefore be ignored. The mean values for Christians = 2.87 (A), Muslims = 3.52 (SA), traditional religion = 2.40 (D) and other 3.00 (A). Lastly, based on the marital status of the respondents there is no significant difference in their views.

The study notes that at inception, the JTF operations curtailed the criminal crisis in Warri and environs. The re-entrant processes of the oil and gas companies were also made possible through the JTF intervention. The study also reveals that the JTF has destroyed some identified militant camps, controlled communal clashes, curtailed illegal oil bunkering through arrests and seizures.

## RQ10: Perception of Niger Delta Youths on JTF Operations

How do active Niger Delta youths perceive the JTF Operations?

## Table 13: Perception of Niger Delta Youths on JTF Operations.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | Mean | SD | Level of Agreement |
| B36 | Government as agent of | 237 | 3.10 | 1.024 | A |
| oppression & tyranny. |
| B37 | Enemy of youths ambitions & | 237 | 3.00 | .925 | A |
| struggles. |
| B38 | Peacekeeping Agent. | 237 | 2.29 | .985 | A |
| B39 | Opportunists who came to | 236 | 2.69 | .947 | A |
| make fortune. |

We sought to know from the respondents how active Niger Delta youths perceive the JTF operation. From the data presented in Table 13, there is a general agreement on the views of respondents. This perception is corroborated by extant literature. Most of those who have written on the violent conflicts in Niger Delta link the problems with the youths. This is because many of them are jobless, excluded from decision-making processes and exploited by their older generation in government, politics, ethnic and religious affiliations. This view, further attests to the need to focus more on this group for an effective conflict management to be achieved. Across the States, result of ANOVA shows that there are no significant differences amongst States (f = 1.110, P = .331). There is obvious disconnect between the youths and JTF operation. The youths do not trust the JTF. As opined by the respondents, the JTF are considered to be government agents that were all out to curtail their heinous ambitions and struggles. In contrast, the JTF has actually done a lot at bringing peace to the people of Niger Delta. This is not actually reflected in this survey. What this suggests is that, most of the achievements recorded by JTF were

hardly publicized. Good media projections of the JTF activities are also necessary.

Furthermore, the study reveals that mass youth unemployment especially among educated youths is a common problem facing the Niger Delta region. The region has a very frightening rate of youth unemployment and hence their

involvement in criminal activities and militancy. While some have seen such acts as a means of livelihood, others engage in such violent acts as a political protest. The major challenge facing the government is how to engage these unemployed youths in the Niger Delta. The youths it is noted, are armed because of real or perceived socio- economic injustice.

Likewise, large no of unemployed youths took to violent crimes that range from assault, kidnapping and hostage takings, hijack of oil facilities to theft and sabotage. Thus, youth unemployment and rising poverty are veritable tools for violent conflicts in the three states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers covered in this study. There is a deep-seated feeling of deprivation and frustration among the unemployed youths as brought out by the study. Most of the interviewees perceived majority of the youth organizations‟ activities in the Niger Delta region as criminal. Most of these youth organizations were said to have formed themselves into militant organizations.

## RQ 11: Niger Delta NGOs and JTF Intervention Activities. How Do the Niger Delta NGOs perceive the JTF intervention?

**Table 14: Perception of Niger Delta NGO's on JTF Intervention**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | | | | N | Mean | SD | Level of Agreement |
| B40 | Part | of | multidimensional | | 224 | 2.74 | .901 | A |
| Palliatives. | |  | |
| B41 | Well | intended | | government | 226 | 2.82 | .918 | A |
| intervention measures. | | | |
| B42 | Peacekeeping Agent. | | | | 226 | 2.76 | .903 | A |
| B43 | Military outfit for combating | | | | 226 | 2.91 | .885 | A |
| criminality in Niger Delta. | | | |

From the data presented in Table 14, there is a general agreement in the respondents' views. These NGOs could work towards building a comprehensive early warning system for the Niger Delta. The JTF ought to have also partnered with the NGOs towards the management of the Niger Delta crisis.

## RQ12: The Public Perception of JTF Operation

On how the Niger Delta communities perceived the JTF operations, the respondents had a good perception of the JTF troops/operations. During oral interview, it was expressed that JTF presence deters militant activities.

## Table 15: Public Perception of the JTF Operation.

The Perception of the public on JTF operations is presented in Table 15

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | Mean | SD | Level of Agreement |
| Agreement |
| B44 | Government agent of |  |  |  |  |
|  | oppression & Tyranny. | 236 | 2.65 | 1.035 | A |
| B45 | Enemy of youths ambitions & |  |  |  |  |
|  | struggles. | 237 | 2.37 | 1.024 | D |
| B46 | Peacekeeping Agent for Peace. | 237 | 2.78 | .998 | A |
| B47 | Opportunities who came to |  |  |  |  |
|  | plunder resources. | 235 | 2.41 | .954 | D |

We sought to know from the respondents, the public perception of the JTF operation. From the view expressed by the respondents, there is a general agreement that the JTF is a government agent of oppression and tyranny. On a State by State basis, result of ANOVA shown in Appendix 9 indicates differences amongst the States (f = 3.178, P = .043). However, the agreement with this view is not maintained within each State as shown by the mean values Bayelsa (2.46), Delta (2.67) and Rivers (2.87). The submissions of our oral interviewees are however different. Most of them claimed to have expressed a good perception of the JTF operations and troops.

Considering the gender of respondents results of t -test, there is the indication that, gender is not a factor in forming the respondents' views on this issues (f = .793, P

= .428). Based on age group of respondents there are no significant differences in views (f = .509, P = .729). Likewise, considering the education of respondents, the

analysis shows a non-significant differences in views (f = .237, P = 917). It is generally believed that, some government activities generate and enervate violent conflicts in Niger Delta. This seems to have eroded the confidence of people in the ability of the government (including JTF) to help them deal with their conflict situations.

Furthermore, Table 15 shows that, there is a general disagreement by the respondents that the JTF operators are enemy of the public ambitions and struggles. Across the States, result of ANOVA indicates differences amongst the States (f = 5.569, P = .004). Nonetheless, the agreement with this view is not maintained within each State as shown by the mean values - Bayelsa (2.15) Delta (2.32) and Rivers 2.65).

According to the Newspapers and Magazines reports/review, government response to curtailing the intractable Niger Delta conflicts is militaristic in approach. For examples, attacks and militancy in the Niger Delta region attracts militarist approaches from the Nigeria Police Force and the JTF. Attempts by the JTF troops to rescue hostages most times result into collateral damages to JTF troops and equipment, as well as oil/gas facilities. The Punch of 18th July, 2007 reported that the JTF in the Niger Delta confirmed it was planning to confront the militants in the region. Likewise, the Sunday Sun of 24th May, 2009 on it caption “12 Days of Blood” from 13-20 May, 2009 as the JTF clashed with militants Okorenkoko and Ayakoromo attest to this.

However, a visit to Ayakoromo (which is about 45 minutes by flying boat from warri) revealed that the military is currently embarking on rehabilitation and reconstruction of some hitherto damaged buildings at Ayakoromo, Burutu Local government Area of Delta State.

Most of the interviewees opined, that the militarization of the region and subsequent increase use of security outfits in the enforcement of peace have heightened the fragile security in the region. This is however compounded by the free circulation of SALW in the Niger Delta.

## RQ13: Perception of State Government on JTF as Necessary Peace Mechanism.

Respondents were asked whether State governments in the Niger Delta region perceive the JTF as a necessary peace mechanism. The summary of views of respondents is given in Table 16.

## Table 16: Perception of State Governments on JTF as Necessary Peace Mechanism

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | Mean | SD | Level of |
| Agreement |
| B48 | No, governments do not | 234 | 2.17 | 1.026 | D |
| B49 | Yes, governments applaud & |  |  |  |  |
|  | embrace it. | 236 | 3.04 | .889 | A |
| B50 | Governments do not see it as |  |  |  |  |
|  | a necessary mechanism. | 235 | 2.09 | .892 | D |
| B51 | JTF roles and functions were |  |  |  |  |
|  | described as magnificent. | 233 | 2.61 | .869 | A |

The preponderance of opinion by respondents indicates that State governments in the Niger Delta region perceive the JTF as a necessary peace mechanism. According to the newspapers and magazines reports/review, government response to curtailing the intractable Niger Delta conflicts is militaristic in approach. For example, attacks and militancy in the Niger Delta region attracts militarist approaches to conflict from the Nigeria Police Force and the JTF.

* + - 1. **RQ 14: JTF Approaches in Dealing with Niger Delta Conflict** The perception on JTF approaches in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict is presented in Table 17.

## Table 17: Approaches Adopted by JTF in Dealing With Niger Delta Conflict

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | Mean | SD | Level of Agreement |
| B52 | The use of force. | 237 | 3.28 | .863 | SA |
| B53 | The use of | 237 | 2.42 | .973 | D |
| dialogue. |
| B54 | Use of negotiation. | 237 | 2.28 | .938 | D |
| B55 | All of the above. | 214 | 2.42 | .974 | D |

From the data presented on Table 17, there are divergent views on the approaches adopted by JTF in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict. Most respondents strongly agree that the JTF adopted the use of force in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict. However, according to the Newspapers and Magazines reports/review, military actions by the JTF caused collateral damages involving loss of lives and properties (civilian and military casualties), material damages to installations, displacement of civilian population amongst others (*Sunday Sun*, May 24, 2009: 4; *Sunday Sun*, December 9, 2010; The Nation, May 12, 2011; *Newswatch*, June 8, 2009: 38-43). Likewise, respondents generally disagree on the notion that the JTF uses dialogue and negotiations in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict. This rendition attests to what is reported in literature that violent conflicts in the Niger Delta region have been seen by the Federal government, from a standpoint of containment and suppression and therefore have been the primary objectives rather than long-term conflict resolution. However, this claim by respondents contradicts the findings from the JTF personnel‟s oral interviews conducted during fieldwork.

Most of the JTF commanders and key personnel's responses during the oral interview noted that:

“The JTF conducted its operations primarily through dialogues and diplomacy, use of aggressive patrols, insertion of troops between warring ethnic factions, provision of static guards to oil/gas facilities, surveillance patrols, escort of VIPs and oil/gas services/personnel, mounting of road blocks and occasional use of minimum force to

dislodge criminals from hideouts/camps”.

One thing that came out clearly from the foregoing analysis is that it is not just enough to manage the latent conflict in the Niger Delta, it is equally important to dwell more on preventive strategies. Likewise, there have been persistent calls for government and other stakeholders to evolve an integrated approach to conflict management for sustainable peace and development in the region.

Taking the issue of use of force by the JTF in dealing with conflict in the Niger Delta on a State by State basis, results of ANOVA indicates differences among the state (f=8.342,p=000). However, the agreement with this view is maintained with each state as shown by the mean values - Bayelsa (3.01), Delta (3.35) and Rivers (3.54).

Considering the gender of respondents, results of the t-test shown in appendix 10 indicates that gender is not a factor in forming the perception; (t-value = .980 and p

= .328). Likewise, the *ANOVA* result for age group of respondents shows that age is not a significant factor in this view (f = 1.383, P = .241).

Respondents were asked to indicate whether the JTF uses dialogue in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict. From the data presented in Table 23, the respondents generally disagree with the view. Across the States, results of *ANOVA* indicate significant differences amongst the States (f = 36.598, P = .000. However, there is a divergent view by respondents from Bayelsa States that shows agreement with the perception that the JTF equally uses dialogue in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict. A look at the mean values revealed the results in Table 24.

## Table 18: Mean Showing Differences in Level of Perception Across States

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **States** | N | **Mean** | **Level of Agreement** |
| Bayelsa | 88 | 3.00 | A |
| Delta | 75 | 2.23 | D |
| Rivers | 73 | 1.89 | D |

Based on education of respondents, there is no significant difference in the views (f = 2.369, P = .053). Likewise, the occupation of respondents is not a factor in the perception of community surveyed (f = 1.251, P = .278).

## Perception on the Use of Negotiation by the JTF

From the data presented in Table 17, there is general disagreement that the JTF use negotiation in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict. On a State by State basis, results of ANOVA show that there are significant differences across the State (f = 17.344, P = .000). However, there are divergent views across the State as shown by the means values - Bayelsa (2.70), Delta (2.16) and Rivers (1.91). Many of the people we interviewed in Bayelsa corroborated this claim that some form of negotiation by government agencies exists.

Different views were however expressed by some of the JTF commanders when contacted in the field. The study noted that some measures of negotiations were done by the commanders when securing the release of hostages and during resolution of communal crisis amongst others.

## Q15: Possibility of Attaining Peace with JTF Intervention

We sought to know from the respondents whether peace is attainable in the Niger Delta with JTF intervention. The views of the respondents on the possibility of attaining peace with JTF intervention are presented on Table 19.

## Table 19: Attainment of peace with JTF Intervention

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | States | N | Mean | SD | Level of Agreement |
| B56 | Yes peace is attainable. | 235 | 2.78 | 1.038 | A |
| B57 | No, peace is not | 232 | 2.21 | .972 | A |
| attainable. |
| B58 | No, JTF cannot bring | 234 | 2.34 | 1.093 | D |
| peace. |
| B59 | Peace is possible if JTF | 232 | 2.74 | .937 | D |
| strategies are changed. |

From the descriptive statistics presented on Table 19, there are divergent views from the respondents. However, it was generally agreed that peace in the Niger Delta is in sight with JTF intervention.

Across the State, there are differences in perception whether with the JTF,

peace is attainable. However, the analysis in Table 19 shows agreement and therefore, sustainable peace is possible through JTF intervention - Bayelsa (3.28), Delta (2.52) and Rivers (2.44).

Considering the gender of respondents, result of the t-test indicates that gender is not a factor in forming the perception (t-values= 1.54, p = .128). In the same vein, ANOVA results for age group of respondents show no significant differences (f = 1.795, P = .131).

Based on education of the respondents, the ANOVA results show that there are significant difference in view (f = 4.386, P = .131). However, the differences in perception can be ignored since majority of the respondents agree that peace is attainable in the near future with JTF intervention. From the foregoing, it can be deduced that peace is attainable in the near future with the JTF intervention.

On the perception that peace will continue to elude the Niger Delta region with the JTF intervention, the respondents generally disagree with this assertion. On a State by State basis, results of ANOVA indicate differences amongst the State (f = 11.920, P = .000).

However, the disagreement with this view is maintained within each State as shown by the mean values - Bayelsa (1.83), Delta (2.39) and Rivers (2.49). By implication peace in the Niger Delta is in sight with the JTF intervention.

## Perception on Whether JTF Will Never Achieve Its Objective of Sustainable Peace.

From the data presented on Table 19, the respondents disagree with the statement that “the JTF will never achieve its objective of sustainable peace in Niger Delta”. Across the States, the results of ANOVA indicate differences amongst the States (f = 13.280, p = .000). However, the three States are not in the same agreement scale – Bayelsa (1.89), Delta (2.67) and Rivers (2.53).

## Perception on Whether There Will Be Peace If JTF Operations Strategies is Changed

Respondents were asked on the possibility of having peace if the JTF operations strategy is changed. From the analysis of the descriptive statistics of the fieldwork, there is a general agreement on these views. During oral interview, it is paradoxical,

however, that the majority of the respondents (80%) still consider the conflicts in their communities to be active. They are of the opinion that the past conflict management strategies have only helped to change the attitude and behavior of the people but that, the root causes of the violent conflicts are yet to be tackled. We asked the respondent to identify the most potent triggers of these future problems. These, the respondents gave to include youth joblessness, poverty, poor education, elite manipulations, poor traditional conflict management resolution mechanism and lack of government commitment to development.

Considering the education of the respondents, the *ANOVA* results indicate that there are no significant differences (f = .529, P = .714). Majority of respondents (95%) agree to this view. Likewise, based on the length of stay of respondents, there are no significant differences (f = 2.284, P = .080). The respondents generally agree that there will be peace if JTF operations‟ strategies are changed.

## RQI6: Effect of JTF Intervention on the Niger Delta Conflict

The perception on the effect of JTF intervention on the Niger Delta conflict for the overall sample is presented in Table 20.

## Table 20: Effectiveness of JTF Intervention

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **States** | N | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B60 | JTF proliferated & | 233 | 2.27 | 1.071 | D |
| Perpetuated the conflict. |
| B61 | Reduced conflict effect | 235 | 2.74 | 1.011 | A |
| to barest minimum. |
| B62 | Lives & properties were | 233 | 2.33 | 1.074 | D |
| deliberately destroyed |
| By JTF. |
| B63 | Has achieved needed | 233 | 2.30 | .916 | D |
| positive peace. |

The survey instrument further elicited the views of respondents on the effectiveness of JTF intervention. Respondents were asked if the JTF has proliferated and perpetuated conflict in Niger Delta.

On a State by State basis, results of *ANOVA* indicate differences amongst

States (f = 10.460, P = .000). However, respondents within the three sampled States are sharply divided between agree and disagree of the respondent's view - Bayelsa (.87), Delta (2.47) and Rivers (2.55).

Based on education of respondent there are significant differences in views (f

= .624, P = .646). A cursory glance at the mean values shows that respondents with non-formal and primary education agree that the JTF has proliferated and perpetuated the conflict. By contrast, the respondents with higher level of education disagree. The ANOVA results shown in Table 21 attest to this revelation.

## Table 21: Education Output of Respondents

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **N** | **Mean** | **Level of Agreement** |
| Non - Formal | 10 | 2.50 | A |
| Primary School | 8 | 2.63 | A |
| Secondary/Technical / |  |  |  |
| Teachers‟ College | 67 | 2.31 | D |
| Post-Secondary | 41 | 2.10 | D |
| University | 105 | 2.27 | D |

Based on occupation of respondents there are no significant differences in the views (f = 1.227, P = .294). However, the ANOVA results show that most of the respondents that fall into the categories of unemployed (15.7%) and self employed (13.6%) agree to the assertion. From the foregoing, the claimed level of education in the sampled states contradicts the state of employment in the three states that fieldwork was carried out.

This is symptomatic of the general situation in the communities where the fieldwork was conducted. Thus, the people who engage in criminality such as illegal oil bunkering, armed robbery, piracy and kidnapping of oil workers aside engagement in communal conflicts in the sampled states, probably belong to this category of people.

However, the preponderance of opinion here suggests that there is relative peace in sight with the JTF intervention. Hence, many of the respondents considered the JTF intervention to have been successful.

Respondents were further asked whether the JTF mechanism has reduced the

conflicts effects to the barest minimum. From the data presented on Table 20, there is a general agreement with the view.

On a State by State basis, results of ANOVA indicate some difference amongst States (f = 24.922, P = .000). However, divergent views were expressed by the respondents within the three States - Bayelsa (3.28), Delta (2.35) and Rivers (2.47).

It is paradoxical, however, that the majority of the respondents (70%) still consider the conflicts in their communities to be very active. Hence, the disagreement with the statement in most part of the communities across the States.

Respondents were further asked whether lives and properties were deliberately destroyed by the JTF during operations. From the data presented on Table 20, the respondents generally disagree with the statement. Across the States, the results of ANOVA show that there is' no significant differences in views, (f = 5.489, P = .005).

Apart from the issues mentioned above, respondents were asked if the JTF intervention has achieved the needed positive peace in the Niger Delta. From the data presented on Table 20, there is a general disagreement with the view that it has achieved the needed positive peace. Across the States, divergent views were held - Delta State (2.00) and Rivers State (2.06) agree on the statement, while Bayelsa State (2.75) disagrees by extension the security situation in the Niger Delta.

As revealed from the study, the JTF is also confronted with the issue of intelligence failure. Poor intelligence gathering and lack of operational maps restricts the JTF to respond promptly and decisively to militia attacks than being proactive. This partly accounts for some casualties and collateral damages recorded by the JTF troops while conducting their operations.

The study also notes that, tainted public perception of the Niger Delta crisis as well as the inability of the JTF to factor in stakeholders‟ needs, fears, prejudices and nuances in their operations accounted for the little success of the force. Some of the interviewees pointed out that the militants know and understand the nuances of the waters and the creeks more than the JTF troops. This is against the backdrop of the JTF troops‟ poor knowledge of the Niger Delta terrain and absence of riverine training.

## RQ17: Perception on the Security Situation in the Niger Delta Under JTF Operations.

The perception on the security situations in the Niger Delta under the JTF operations is presented on Table 22.

## Table 22: Perception on Security Situations in the Niger Delta under JTF

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B64 | Lives & properties of | 236 | 2.69 | .968 | A |
| the populace are |
| secured. |
| B65 | There is a zero | 233 | 2.33 | .880 | D |
| tolerance for threat. |
| B66 | Sustainable peace has | 234 | 2.35 | .881 | D |
| been achieved. |
| B67 | No security for lives | 235 | 2.12 | 1.024 | D |
| and properties at all. |

From the data presented on Table 22, there are divergent views on the perception of the security situations in the Niger Delta under the JTF operations. Most respondents agree that lives and property of the populace are secure under the JTF. On a State by State basis, results of ANOVA indicate a significant difference amongst the States (f = 18.623, P = .001). However, the agreement with this view is maintained within each State as depicted by the mean values - Bayelsa 3.15(A), Delta 2.52(A) and Rivers 2.32(A). ANOVA results for respondents Age Groups show that there is no significant difference (f = 1.394, P = .237).

Generally, the Niger Delta communities disagree with the notions that there is a zero tolerance for threats, sustainable peace has been achieved and that there is no security for lives and properties at all.

The insecurity in the Niger Delta started as agitation for resource control. This however, degenerated into an all time high occurrences of vandalization of oil installations, seizure and occupation of flow stations and oil installations, illegal oil bunkering, attacks on security agencies, hostage taking/hijacking, terrorism, sea

piracy and proliferation of SALW. The resultant near collapse of socio-economic activities in the region necessitated the Government to deploy the JTF to restore normalcy. However, the result of the study reveals that the level of preparadness of troops for optimum performance as required by the mandate was low. This becomes apparent when considered against the backdrop of manpower, training, equipment, logistics and welfare. A combination of these factors has hampered operational efficiency of the JTF and by extension the security situation in the Niger Delta.

## RQ 18: Perception on Whether the Establishment of the JTF in the Niger Delta is justifiable

We sought to know from the respondents whether the establishment of the JTF in the Niger Delta is justifiable judging from its success or failure. The views of the respondents are presented on Table 23.

## Table 23: Justification for the Establishment of JTF in the Niger Delta

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **N** | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B68 | It is highly justifiable. | 236 | 2.80 | 1.003 | A |
| B69 | It is a total failure and | 235 | 2.09 | 1.032 | D |
| not justifiable. |
| B70 | It has merely ensured | 233 | 2.52 | .900 | A |
| fragile peace. |
| B71 | It has entrenched | 232 | 2.27 | .847 | D |
| sustainable peace. |

From the descriptive statistics presented in Table 23, there are divergent views from the respondents. However, it was generally agreed that the establishment of the JTF to curb violence in the Niger Delta is highly justifiable but merely ensured fragile peace. Likewise, there is a general disagreement that JTF is a total failure, not justifiable and has not entrenched sustainable peace.

## Perception on Whether JTF’s Establishment is Highly Justifiable

On a State by State basis, results of ANOVA indicate significant differences amongst the States (f = 18.200, P =.000), However, the agreement with this view is maintained within the States of Bayelsa 3.28(A) and Delta 2.59(A).

A look at the results of t-test in indicate that gender is not a factor in forming the respondents view (t-value recorded is 1.596, p =.112). Likewise, based on Age Group of respondents, there is no significant difference in views (f = 3.388, P = .010). The difference is between Age Groups 25 - 34 years (A), 35 - 49 years (A), 50 - 60 years (A) and 15 - 24 years (D), 61 years and above (D).

## Perception on Whether the Establishment of JTF in Niger Delta is a Failure and not Justifiable

Respondents were asked to indicate whether the establishment of JTF in managing the Niger Delta conflict is a failure and not justifiable. From the data presented in Table 23, the respondents generally disagree with the view.

Interviewees were asked during oral interviews to suggest other preferred options other than the JTF approach towards the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict. Most interviewees noted that no one solution to the Niger Delta conflict. Rather a multifaceted strategies and approaches must be evolved/used such that would include; cultural and morale re-orientation of the populace, building military capacity to monitor security situation, dialogue as well as international co-operations.

## RQI9: Perception on Whether Observable Mistakes Were Made by the JTF during their Operation in the Niger Delta

**Table 24: Perception on Whether Observable Mistakes Were Made by the JTF during their Operation in the Niger Delta**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **N** | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B72 | High handedness. | 229 | 2.74 | .982 | A |
| B73 | Connivance with oil | 229 | 2.55 | 1.094 | A |
| Bunkerers. |
| B74 | Connivance with anti | 230 | 2.36 | 1.055 | D |
| government agencies. |
| B75 | Activities results into | 230 | 2.49 | 1.040 | D |
| collateral damages. |

From the statistical data on Table 24, some respondents generally agree that the JTF exhibits some elements of high handedness and connivance with illegal oil

bunkerers, while carrying out its operation. On the contrary, the respondents generally disagree with the views that JTF personnel connive with anti-governmental agencies and also that their activities have resulted into collateral damages.

On whether the JTF operations are producing some negative activities, the study is on the affirmative. The cases of collateral damages occasioned by the JTF tasks were recorded and most times these cases are inevitable. For instance, the Okrika episode involving the manhunt of the militia leader Ateke Tom, the May 2009 counter – attack on militant camps of Okerenkoko, Oporozua as well as 2011 attacks on John Togo‟s camps in Ayakoroma, Delta State are cases in point. In the course of JTF operation, they have created personal, diplomatic, political and socio- economic risks.

## RQ20: Perception on Challenges Facing the JTF in the Niger Delta. Table 25: Perception on Challenges Facing the JTF in the Niger Delta

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **N** | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B76 | Inadequate logistics. | 227 | 2.93 | 1.004 | A |
| B77 | Lack of goodwill and | 227 | 2.92 | .888 | A |
| support from indigenes. |
| B78 | Lack of proper co- | 226 | 2.47 | .990 | D |
| ordination between the |
| constituent units of the |
| JTF (military, police, |
| SSS etc). |
| B79 | Poor communication | 224 | 2.90 | .942 | A |
| between JTF and the |
| community. |
| B80 | All of the above | 209 | 2.65 | .960 | A |

Respondents were asked to express their views on the challenges facing the JTF during their operations in the Niger Delta. From the views expressed by the respondents, there is a general agreement that the JTF is faced with some operational challenges such as inadequate logistics, lack of goodwill and support from indigenes and poor communication between the JTF troops and communities. Some respondents

however, disagree with the view that there is lack of coordination among the constituent units of the JTF.

The submissions of our oral interviewees also attest to these findings. The JTF is observed to be faced with obvious operational challenges. These include problems of acceptability of the JTF troops by the rural communities who may not readily be disposed to the military, difficult terrain, inadequate manpower as well as lack of political will especially at the inception of the Task Force on the part of Government.

Furthermore, the study identifies multi-dimensional risk factors that are germane to the successful attainment of the JTF mandate including personal, political, economic, environmental and diplomatic risks. The JTF operation is basically a military operation other than War (MOOTW) in a riverine environment and in some cases in the built-up areas. The geography and terrain of the JTF Joint Operations Area constitute special problems and risks. The militant knows and understand the nuances of the waters and the creeks more than the JTF troops. This is against the backdrop of the JTF troops‟ poor knowledge of the Niger Delta terrain and absence of riverine training.

## RQ21: Perception on Activities of Youth Organizations in the Niger Delta.

Perception of activities of the various youth organizations in the Niger delta is presented on Table 26.

## Table 26: Perception on Activities of Youth Organizations in Niger Delta

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **N** | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B81 | Criminal. | 235 | 2.56 | 1.000 | A |
| B82 | Sometime good. | 234 | 2.83 | .885 | A |
| B83 | Nationalistic. | 230 | 2.31 | .910 | D |
| B84 | Economic Saboteurs. | 232 | 2.27 | .970 | D |

From the data presented on Table 26, there is a divided perception on the activities of various youth organizations in the Niger Delta. It was generally agreed that Niger Delta youths are involved in criminal activities while sometimes these activities could be directed toward good goals for the communities.

## Youth Organizations are Involved in Criminal Activities

On a State by State basis, results of ANOVA indicate a significant difference amongst the States (f=12.888, p=.OOO). However, the agreement with this view is maintained in Bayelsa State 2.97(A).

Considering the gender of respondents' results of the t-test shows there is an indication that gender is not a factor in forming the perception (t value is 1.685, p is

.093).

Based on Age Group of respondents, there are no significant, differences in views (f=2.583, p=038). The generality of respondents agree with the position that the youth organizations are involved in criminal activities. However, the Middle Age Groups 25 - 34 and 35 - 49 years disagree with the perception.

On whether youths are involved in criminal activities in the Niger Delta, extant literature and policy assessments blamed most of the violent conflicts in the Niger Delta on the youth. Generally, the respondents agree that youth organizations are largely involved in criminal activities in the region. Most of the youth organizations form themselves into militant organizations.

Respondents gave reasons for youth involvement in criminal activities to include, unemployment, elite manipulation and inadequate punishment for perpetrators of past violent crimes. Respondents were further asked to cite individuals and organizations that were behind confrontational youth organizations in the Niger Delta. The preponderance of opinion indicates that politicians, elites, illegal oil bunkerers and some government agencies are the agents of confrontational youth organization.

The major challenge facing the government is how to effectively engage these unemployed youths of the Niger Delta region. The government cannot effectively tackle the menace of crime and militancy, illegal oil bunkering, arms proliferation amongst other socio-economic vices without properly addressing the issues of poverty and youths unemployment.

However, few proactive measures have been implemented to address the unemployment – social unrest nexus, and its unfolding dynamics in the Niger Delta region (Benjamin, 2002). It can be deduced that no development works produce any positive results in the Niger Delta without addressing this problem. This situation

required devising mechanisms to assist youths in creating their own jobs since there is a limit to the number of people that government and oil companies can employ.

## Conflict Resolution Strategies

We sought to know from respondents what the roles being played by the stakeholders as well as who these conflict managers were. Majority of the respondents attributed the conflict management efforts to the Federal, States, community leaders, oil and gas companies, youth organizations and political leaders amongst others. The perception on government (Federal, States and Local Government Area) approaches in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict is presented on Table 27.

## Table 27: Roles of Government (Federal, States, LGA) in Resolving the Niger Delta Conflict

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B86 | Fence mending (Peacemaking efforts). | 231 | 2.86 | .956 | A |
| B87 | Fuelling crisis. | 233 | 2.38 | 1.031 | D |
| B88 | Reducing Conflict. | 234 | 2.67 | .893 | A |
| B89 | Indifference  (Complacency). | 227 | 2.37 | .909 | D |

From the data presented in Table 27, there are divergent views on the roles of Government towards resolving the Niger Delta conflict. Most respondents agree that the government carries out peace- making efforts in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict. Likewise, respondents generally disagree on the notion that the governments at various levels were behind the fuelling of crisis in the region. Respondents generally agree also that government at times shows some form of complacency towards transforming the Niger Delta.

Results from oral interviews conducted reveals that respondents blame their problems on poor handling of issues by Federal, States and oil/gas companies. Most of the respondents are of the opinion that State responses to some of the violent conflicts are not well coordinated or appropriate enough. Early warning signs were often ignored and attempts to empower the militant‟s youths are not well-structured.

Several conflicts that have assumed violent dimensions in Nigeria have most

often been linked with government activities or inactivity. The failure of government to act when required or their unwarranted reactions to some situation are sometimes cited as factors behind any conflicts.

The respondents in this survey were asked if government and its agencies through their actions or inactions generate conflict and violence. Majority of the respondents answer in the affirmative, while some say government does not generate conflicts. The government activity or actions that fuel conflict, according to the oral interviewees include creation of local government areas and headquarters, imposition of bad leadership on communities, misapplication of State resources, unequal distribution of State resources and inability of the State to prosecute criminals.

From the literature, government plays the most effective role in conflict management. While commenting freely on the Niger Delta conflict, most of the respondents opined that there should be strong political will by government to develop the Niger Delta region. One of the interviewees, a community leader, noted: “…for sustainable development, there should be massive development of the region, youth‟s employment by government and other stakeholders and good governance…..”

However, the violent conflict in the three States sampled is viewed by the Federal Government, from a security standpoint, where containment and suppression have been the primary objectives rather than long-term resolutions.

## RQ22b. Roles of Political Elites and Politicians in Conflict Resolution in the Niger Delta.

The perception on the roles of political elites and politicians in conflict resolution in the Niger Delta conflict is presented on Table 28.

## Table 28: Role of Political Elites and Politicians Towards Resolving the Niger Delta Conflict

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B90 | Fence mending  (Peacemaking efforts). | 234 | 2.44 | .988 | D |
| B91 | Fuelling crisis. | 234 | 2.79 | .966 | A |
| B92 | Reducing Conflict. | 234 | 2.25 | .917 | D |
| B93 | Indifference  (Complacency). | 230 | 2.63 | .934 | D |

From the data presented in Table 28, there is a divided perception on the roles of political elites and politicians in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict. It was generally agreed that politicians fuel crisis and are in most times complacent in the handling of conflict issues in the States.

Likewise, there is a general disagreement that politicians were involved in conflict reduction and peace-making efforts. Party politics as a causal factor of violent conflicts in the States has been clearly acknowledged in extant literatures as well as oral interviews that were held during the fieldwork. One of the interviewees for instance cited the most talked about political crisis in Delta State as that between erstwhile Governor Ibori and Chief Ogboru and of recent, that between Governor Uduangan and Chief Ogboru. In the same vein, the problems in the sampled States now include political assassinations and violent inter-cult rivalries. The politicians in the three sampled States arm militants‟ youths against their opponents. The political elites were also said to have manipulated militant youths to reactivate primordial communal and chieftaincy feuds.

## RQ22c Perception on the Roles of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict

Respondents were asked the roles being played by the CSOs in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict. The summary of views of respondents is given in Table 29.

## Table 29: Perception on the Roles of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B94 | Fence mending  (Peacemaking efforts). | 231 | 2.97 | .918 | A |
| B95 | Fuelling crisis. | 232 | 2.02 | .914 | D |
| B96 | Reducing Conflict. | 231 | 2.84 | .887 | A |
| B97 | Indifference  (Complacency). | 224 | 2.13 | .824 | D |

From the views expressed by the respondents, there is a general agreement that the CSOs embark on peacemaking efforts towards the resolution of the seemingly intractable conflict of the Niger Delta region. Likewise, from the statistics presented on Table 29, there is a general disagreement that the CSOs fuel the conflict in the Niger Delta. Furthermore, on whether the CSOs are helpful in reducing the conflicts in the Niger Delta, the respondents are in the affirmative and also disagree that CSOs show complacency towards conflict resolution in the Niger Delta.

The study identifies gaps for non-inclusion of some stakeholders in the JTF military approach to conflict management in the Niger Delta. The JTF ought to have included the NGOs, CSOs, media, militants (ex-militants), NDDC, Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, oil/gas companies, State/L.G.As and other security agencies (EFCC), Customs, Immigration, NSCDC) and communities for better performance and acceptability. This of course, meant giving the JTF a “human face”.

Civil Society Organizations have a lot to do towards complementing government in conflict resolution/management. The responsibility of monitoring early signs generally rests with governments and the CSOs. However, from extant literature, it was noted that CSOs response to early warning signs is weak (and not effective) and often not well coordinated.

## RQ22d: Perception on the Roles of Oil Gas Companies in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict.

The perception on the roles of Oil Gas Companies in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict is presented in Table 30.

## Table 30: Perception on the Roles of Oil Gas Companies in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | N | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B98 | Fence mending  (Peacemaking efforts). | 233 | 2.77 | 1.032 | A |
| B99 | Fuelling crisis. | 232 | 2.30 | 1.097 | D |
| B100 | Reducing Conflict. | 231 | 2.43 | .886 | D |
| B101 | Indifference  (Complacency). | 227 | 2.29 | .965 | D |

The perception of the roles of oil and gas companies in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict is presented in Table 30. From the statistics in Table 30, the respondents generally agree that the oil and gas companies play significant roles in fence mending in the resolution of conflict in the region. In the same vein, most respondents disagree with the view that oil and gas companies exploration and exploitation activities reduce conflict. Rather, it contributes to violent conflict in the Niger Delta region.

Most of the respondents also disagree with the view that the oil and gas are indifferent to the issue of conflict resolution in the region. From the literature and oral evidence from interviews conducted in the field, it was revealed that most oil and gas companies activities are known to generate conflict in the Niger Delta. The particular oil and gas activities that are known to generate conflict in the Niger Delta region include; signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs), acquisition of land for oil exploration and exploitation, payment of compensation to communities, employment of workers/contractors and carrying out community development projects amongst others. Most of the people interviewed feel that the oil and gas companies have not been fair to the Niger Delta communities.

## RQ22e. Perception on the Roles of Youths in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict.

The perception on the roles of Youths in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict is presented on Table 31.

## Table 31: Perception on the Roles of Youths in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **N** | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B102 | Fence mending  (Peacemaking efforts). | 225 | 2.45 | 1.013 | D |
| B103 | Fuelling crisis. | 227 | 2.67 | .982 | A |
| B104 | Reducing Conflict. | 228 | 2.29 | .908 | D |
| B105 | Indifference  (Complacency). | 228 | 2.29 | .908 | D |

We sought to know the roles of youths in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict. From the data presented in Table 31, there is a general disagreement with the view that youths play a significant role in peacemaking at conflict resolution in the region. Rather, the respondents agree that the youths are responsible for fuelling most of the crisis in the Niger Delta.

Likewise, there is a general disagreement by the respondents that the youths help at reducing conflict and at the same time show complacency in issues relating to conflict mitigation in the Niger Delta. Extant literature and past strategic assessments considered the youths to be key players in the violent conflict in all the three focal states surveyed. We tried to confirm this in the survey. Almost all the 240 respondents blamed the conflicts on the problems of the youths.

## RQ22f: The Roles of the Niger Delta Communities in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict

The perception on the roles of the Niger Delta Communities in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict is presented on Table 32.

## Table 32: The Roles of the Niger Delta Communities in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **N** | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B106 | Fence mending  (Peacemaking efforts). | 230 | 2.63 | .966 | A |
| B107 | Fuelling crisis. | 23.1 | 2.50 | .982 | A |
| B108 | Reducing conflict. | 230 | 2.43 | .949 | D |
| B109 | Indifference  (Complacency). | 224 | 2.43 | .921 | D |

From the data presented on Table 32, there is a divided perception on the roles of the Niger Delta communities in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict. It was generally agreed that the communities in the region play a significant role in peacemaking efforts in the Niger Delta region. Equally, the respondents generally agree that most of the Niger Delta communities are seriously involved in fuelling the crisis in the region. These are ethnicity, economic disequilibrium, poverty, poor community response mechanism and party politics.

## RQ22g: The Roles of the Community Leaders in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict.

Respondents were asked to comment on the roles of the community leaders in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict. The summary of views of respondents is given on Table 33.

## Table 33. Perception on the Roles of the Community Leaders in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **N** | **Mea**  **n** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B109 | Fence mending.  (Peacemaking efforts). | 230 | 2.62 | .940 | A |
| B110 | Fuelling crisis. | 231 | 2.51 | 1.008 | A |
| B111 | Reducing Conflict. | 232 | 2.45 | .910 | D |
| B112 | Indifference  (Complacency). | 224 | 2.45 | .936 | D |

From the data presented on Table 33, there are divergent views on the roles of community leaders in the resolution of the conflict in the Niger delta. Most respondents agree that most community leaders are involved in peacemaking efforts and on the other hand being culpable in fuelling violent conflicts in the Niger Delta region. Likewise, respondents generally disagree on the notion that community leaders in the region are involved in reducing conflicts as well as feeling indifferent to the issues of conflict mitigation. This rendition attests to what is reported in literature that attempts to involve community leaders in conflict resolution and/or prevention of community development initiatives have been largely unsuccessful, as local chiefs are accused of diverting money intended for community projects for personal gains.

The roles of the Niger Delta communities in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict brought out some emerging issues in the region. The Niger Delta in Nigeria‟s political economy, the rise of ethnic minority consciousness in the political agitation (resource control), the emerging consequences with its attendants increase in spate of violence and circle of violence in the region were widely reported. Likewise, the issues of environmental problems, poverty, good governance, development and

endemic violence were analysed and discussed by various media and stakeholders. Towards this, there have been persistent calls for government to evolve an integrated approach to conflict management for sustainable peace and development in the Niger Delta.

## Perception on the Roles of Joint Task Force (JTF) in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict

The perception on the Roles of Joint Task Force (JTF) in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict is shown on Table 34.

## Table 34: Perception on the Roles of Joint Military Task Force (JTF) in the Resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **N** | **Mean** | **SD** | **Level of Agreement** |
| B113 | Fence mending  (Peacemaking efforts). | 229 | 2.86 | 1.028 | A |
| B114 | Fuelling crisis. | 231 | 2.15 | 1.042 | D |
| B115 | Reducing Conflict. | 231 | 2.72 | .997 | A |
| B116 | Indifference  (Complacency). | 223 | 2.08 | .900 | D |

From the data presented on Table 34, there is a general agreement that the JTF has been involved in peacemaking efforts in the Niger Delta conflict transformation process. Likewise, from the views expressed by the respondents, there is a general agreement that the involvement of the JTF operations has considerably helped in conflict reduction in the Niger Delta. The preponderance of opinion by respondents indicates that the conduct of JTF operations in the Niger Delta region is perceived as a necessary peace mechanism.

Most of the interviewees attest to the reduction in violent conflicts in the region due to the JTF operations. As reported; "the fallout of the military approach to conflict management has resulted into arrests of militant youths and vandals known to be involved in the criminal activities that range from theft, assault, kidnapping/hostage taking, robbery, arson to illegal oil bunkering among others".

Although the JTF has achieved a measure of success to a reasonable extent, the fact remains that the JTF has not been able to solve the insecurity problems of the

Niger Delta. Aside, the logistics and related challenges faced by the JTF, the lack of political will by the FG to deal with the conflict constitutes serious challenges. Hence, the escalation of violent conflict in the region. It could be inferred therefore that, the military operations have not been able to holistically resolve the Niger Delta conflict. However, the military line of action could be strengthened to complement other political measures aimed at ensuring sustainable developments, enduring peace and security in the Niger Delta.

Likewise, there is another dimension to these views. As observed, insecurity has become a major concern in the Niger Delta due to the presence of heavy security forces, network of informal security groups maintained by oil and gas companies, criminal gangsters thriving on political elitist support, illegal oil bunkerers and proliferation of SALW. Some interviewees have therefore called for the demilitarization of the entire Niger Delta region which was observed to be responsible for the general insecurity in the region.

# DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

## The JTF Mandate and Its Appropriateness for Attainment of Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta.

The mandate of the JTF Operation RESTORE HOPE at inception on 19 August 2003 was to contain criminal activities of militant groups in the Niger Delta, restore, law and order, ensure a secure enabling environment for socio-economic activities to thrive. The time frame for the operation was 90 days and has not been formally revalidated. As a result, the JTF operational activities which should have lasted for 90 days operates now without a time limit.

The JTF carries out some implied tasks during its operations. These are; arrest of illegal oil bunkerers, escort duties and oil pipeline surveillance. Others also include maritime air patrols, blockade of creeks and re-entrants, protection of onshore and offshore oil facilities and putting a stop to hostage taking and kidnappings. During planning, the mission analysis for the JTF did not adequately reveal the real nature (scope) and tasks of operations. This resulted into a mismatch between the operational readiness of the military operating in the Niger Delta and the tasks of the mission. Consequently, efforts to minimise the gap between these variables have been too slow to create the requisite level of effectiveness.

The ROE at inception allows for the application of minimum force in self- defence when under attack and when opposed in course of operational duty. The JTF was reactionary rather than proactive. There was however an exception in May 2009 and November 2010 following the militants attacks on the JTF troops and the expiration of the Post-amnesty period respectively. Thus, after the amnesty, offensive actions are justified on militant‟s camps. Till date (May 2011), the ROE has not been reviewed to permit offensive action in consonance with existing militancy.

A tabular summary of the JTF tasks vis-a-vis the level of achievement and associated sustainability issues are presented at Table 35. Also highlighted on the Table are strategies that worked or did not work and reasons for failure.

## Table 35 - Systemic Analysis of JTF Tasks and Strategies

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **S/No** | **Period** | | | **Tasks** | **Level of**  **Achievement** | | **What**  **worked** | **What**  **work** | **didn’t** | **Reasons for failure** | |
| 1 | Initial Mandate as at 2003 | | | Contain criminal activities of militants Restore law & order Ensure  secure and enabling environment for socio-economic  activities | Relative recorded | success | Relative peace was restored in Warri & environs | Emergence of multifaceted problems | | Mandate too ambitious. ROE too restrictive. Faulty entry strategy. Poor level of cooperation and coordination. Mismatch between operational readiness of units and tasks of mission. | |
| 2 | Subsequent tasks | | |  | Relative success in  reduction of | |  | Non interdiction  of militants | | Mandate has not  formally revalidated. | been |
|  | (2004 – 2010) | | -Curtailing vandalization of oil/gas facilities   * Curtailing political insecurity * Prevent hostage taking and kidnapping * Curtail illegal weapon proliferation * Check sea robbery * Check terrorism * Prevent   sabotage   * Surveillance guard of oil/gas facilities * Destruction of militant camp | | Bunkering and  Emergence of illegal oil refineries due to the inability of bunkerers to move stolen crude through the water ways blocked by the JTF naval  formations | |  | Arms supply. Lack of synergy in intelligence gathering between agencies within JTF operations | | Non – prosecution of offenders   * Absence of law against all these criminal activities and illegalities.   l bunkering   * Lack of prompt disposal of arrested barges/vessels. * Failure of intelligence has given militants freedom of action to acquire   arms/ammunition and movement within AOR of JTF.   * ROE has not been reviewed to permit offensive action exigent on new realities of militant actions and   capabilities | |
| 3 | Rules Engagement (ROE)  inception 2003 | of  at in | Application of minimum force in self-defence (2003) | | Relative recorded | success |  | JTF suffers equipment and personnel causalities | | ROE too restrictive. The ROE has not been reviewed to permit the offensive action in line commensurate with the strength of existing  militancy | |
| 4 | ROE as at 2010 | | After amnesty offensive actions are permissible | | Destruction of militant camps | | Sizeable number of militant camps  destroyed |  | | Collateral damages due to lack of adequate intelligence | |

* + 1. **Community Perception of JTF Operations and Activities in the Niger Delta**

Generally, the Niger Delta communities disagree with the perception that good governance cannot be achieved in Nigeria. It was found out however, that the youths, traditionalists, those with little or no education agree with the view that good governance cannot be achieved in Nigeria.

The youth play critical roles in the Niger Delta conflicts. This is because many

of them are jobless, unemployable and lack basic education. These youths perceive good governance in Nigeria as unattainable. It can be deduced that no development would produce any positive results in the Niger Delta without addressing this problem. This is due to the fact that most of the vices that breed insecurity and violent conflict like cultism, kidnappings, piracy and armed robbery amongst others are associated with this category of the population which accounts for about 16% of the sample. This situation requires devising mechanisms to assist youths in creating their own jobs since there is a limit to the number of people that government and oil companies can employ. It was also found that the level of education in the states of the Niger Delta Region was high (45% had university education). This however, did not translate into job opportunities for the people as the unemployed in the sample was high (16%).

## Gaps Occasioned by the Non inclusion of Some Parties Who are Sine qua non to the Attainment of Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta.

The parties to the Niger Delta conflicts include: The Federal Government, State Governments and Local Governments, oil and gas companies, NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Other stakeholders include the militants, youth organisations, Niger Delta communities, security operatives and JTF personnel.

Gaps for non-inclusion of some stakeholders in the JTF military approach to conflict management in the Niger Delta have been identified. The JTF ought to have included the NGOs, CSOs, media, militants (ex-militants), NDDC, Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, oil and gas companies, State/L.G.As and other security agencies (EFCC, ICPC, Customs, Immigration, Civil Defence) and communities for better performance and acceptability.

## Risk Factors That are Germane to the Successful Attainment of the JTF Mandate

The identified multi-dimensional risk factors that are germane to the successful attainment of the JTF mandate include personal, political, economic, environmental and diplomatic risks. The JTF operation is basically a MOOTW in a riverine environment and in some cases in the built-up areas. The geography and terrain of the JTF Area of Responsibility (AOR) constitute special problems and risks. The militants know and understand the nuances of the waters and the creeks more than the JTF troops. This is against the backdrop of the JTF troops' poor knowledge

of the Niger Delta terrain and absence of riverine training.

There is also the issue of intelligence failure. Poor intelligence gathering restricts the JTF to respond mostly to militia attacks rather than being proactive. This partly accounts for some casualties and collateral damages recorded by the JTF troops while conducting its operations.

The Niger Delta region, most especially Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states, have remained a key flashpoint in political and criminal violence in Nigeria. Militant gangs proliferate at an alarming rate in the area. They blow up oil installations, kidnap oil workers, and also provide security for oil bunkerers.

Tainted public perception of the Niger Delta crisis as well as the inability of the JTF to factor in stakeholders‟ needs, fears, prejudices and nuances in their operations accounted for the little success of the Force.

## Correlation Between the Adopted JTF Strategies and the Ensuing Actions Adopted by the JTF Towards the Desirable Results or Otherwise.

What obtained in Figure 5 ought to have been the outcome of the JTF actions towards the transformation of the Niger Delta conflicts. The correlation between the adopted JTF strategies and the ensuing actions adopted by the JTF towards the desirable results or otherwise is presented in Table 36.

## Table 36: Correlation Between the Adopted JTF Strategies and Actions Adopted by the JTF

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Ensuing Actions | | | | |
| Strategies | Prevent illegal oil  bunkering | Hostage taking \*  kidnapping | Protection of onshore/offshore  oil facilities | Marine and air  patrol | Contain militant  groups |
| Dialogue |  | X |  |  | XX |
| Patrols | XXX | XXX | XXX | XXX | XXX |
| Static  guarding | XXX |  | XXX |  |  |
| Escort  duties |  | X |  |  |  |
| Minimal  use of force |  | X |  |  |  |
| Offensive  action |  |  |  |  | X |

**Key**

XXX – To a high level XX – Moderately

X – Minimally

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Endnotes** |  |
| 1. | Interviewed at Port Harcourt on December 27, 2008. |
| 2. | Interviewed at Port Harcourt on December 27, 2008. |
| 3. | Unstructured Interview at Port Harcourt on December 27, 2008. |
| 4. | Interviewed at Port Harcourt on December 27, 2008. |
| 5. | Interviewed at Warri on June 28, 2009. |
| 6. | Interviewed at Warri on June 28, 2009. |
| 7. | GSM interview with JTF Media Coordinator on September 29, 2009. |
| 8. | Interviewed at Yenagoa on September 30, 2010. |
| 9. | Interviewed at Warri on May 17, 2011. |
| 10. | Interviewed at Yenagoa on June 26, 2009. |
| 11. | Interviewed at Yenagoa on June 26, 2009 |
| 12. | Interviewed at Abuja on July 15, 2009. |
| 13. | Interviewed at Abuja on January 9, 2009. |

# SUMMARY

**CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

The findings from the study, after analysis of the data collected, their interpretations and discussions are summarized as follows:

Maintenance of Law and Order in Nigeria solely lies in the domain of the Nigeria Police Force. Nonetheless, when the police is faced with severe threat to national security occasioned by lack of capacity to curtail the threats the members of the Armed Forces could be called upon to conduct Internal Security Operations to restore law and order. However, the Military involvement in Internal Security operations increase with the ushering in of democratic governance in 1999 due to emergent and perpetuated internal security conflicts across the country.

The study conducted an assessment of the JTF Operations occasioned by the criminal activities of militants in the Niger Delta. Hitherto, the involvement of the military vide the JTF occasioned by a breakdown in law and order had heightened insecurity and thus hampering sustainable human and environment development of the area.

The study revealed that the state of insecurity in the focal States of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers constitutes a serious concern. The violent conflict in the Niger Delta has led to the militarization of the region, with criminal armed gangs, militants and military security forces. Thus, there is the presence of the military (JTF), network of informal security groups maintained by oil/gas companies, criminal armed groups that thrive on political elite support and illegal oil bunkerers as well as proliferation of SALW.

The conflicts in the three sampled states are considered by the respondents to be very violent. The JTF has actually done a lot to stem the conflicts in the Niger Delta. The approaches adopted by the JTF in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict is mainly through the use of force and occasionally, the use of dialogue and negotiation.

The study further revealed that the level of preparedness of troops for optimum performance as required by the mandate was low. This became apparent when considered against the backdrop of manpower, training equipment, logistics and welfare. A combination of these factors has hampered operational efficiency of conducting military operations in the Niger Delta. Operation RESTORE HOPE faced

many challenges which include; lack of robust mandate, inadequate logistics such as platforms, communication equipment and inadequate manpower, proliferation of SALW, poor level of co-operation among the stakeholders and lack of political will on the part of the Federal Government to clamp down on illegal oil bunkering.

It has been noted that the Joint Military Task Force interventions may have stabilised the situation by preventing certain warring communities from indulging in violent conflicts, by saving lives and property and aiding the maintenance of law and order. It has however, also adversely affected the image and professional credibility of the military because of the problems arising from the consequences of collateral damages and professional misconduct. It is widely believed that government could have achieved its objectives through dialogue rather than adopting a military option.

The violent conflict in the Niger Delta is viewed by the Federal Government, from a security standpoint, where containment and suppression have been the primary objectives rather than long-term conflict resolution. Military operation is only part of the counter-insurgency measures and only offers a short term solution to insurgency. The complete eradication of militancy could be attained by addressing the underlying causes of the Niger Delta conflict.

The study revealed that, there is a complex and multiple interplay of factors contributing to conflict in the Niger Delta, and by necessity, there need to be multiple and invariably complex intervention and approaches to tackling them. The study also shows the responses the Niger Delta conflicts have hitherto been piecemeal, most times ad hoc and non-strategic. The state, security agencies and other stakeholders have not collaborated and too often have rather than complementing one another, been competing.

Gaps for non-inclusion of some stakeholders in the JTF approach to conflict management in the Niger Delta have been identified. The JTF ought to have included the NGOs, CSOs, the media, militant (ex-militants), NDDC, securities agencies ( Customs, Immigration) and communities for better synergy, performance and acceptability. This of course would mean giving the JTF operations a “human face”.

Poor intelligence gathering restricts the JTF to respond mostly to militants‟ attacks rather than being proactive. This partly accounts for some casualties and collateral damages recorded by the JTF troops while conducting its operations. Tainted public perception of the Niger Delta crisis as well as the inability of the JTF

to factor in stakeholders‟ needs, fears, prejudices and nuances in their operations also accounted for the little success of the task force.

The persistence of conflict in the region despite the deployment of the military has eroded the credibility of the Armed Forces as an effective instrument of last resort in the management of the Niger Delta conflict. Likewise, it has been observed that the continuing involvement of the military has progressively been militarising the populace, especially the youths. This has been contributing to the growing culture of violence in the region as well as affecting the psyche of the Niger Delta people. From the foregoing, the deployment of troops could be arguably said to have little effect on the conflict situation in the Niger Delta. This, therefore, calls for consolidation of other strategies which could be employed simultaneously with the JTF operation in the quest for a solution to the Niger Delta conflict. What obtained in Figure 6 ought to have been the outcome of the JTF actions towards the transformation of the Niger Delta conflicts. There is therefore the need to consolidate the ongoing government efforts involving dialogue, implementation of the Master Plan for the development of the region, establishment of the Ministry of Niger Delta, NDDC and current amnesty programme among others, for sustainable development of the region. This will invariably complement the Joint Military Task Force efforts at bringing an enduring peace to the Niger Delta region.

This would have culminated into an integrated approach towards the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict as depicted in the model in Figure 6.

Vision/Goal of JTF Perception

Strategies Inclusion Allies Risks

Action

Issues

Peaceful

Peaceful relationship & coexistence

outcomes



INPUT

More development

Interests

Desirable change

OUTPUT

PROCESS

Parties (Stakeholders)

Less violence

Feedback (Assessment

Monitoring/Evaluation)

**Figure 6: Conflict Transformation Diagram Source: Researcher’s Recommendation**

# CONCLUSIONS

The findings led to the following conclusions:

1. A lot has been written on the Niger Delta crisis in recent years but these studies neglected issues relating to military operations. This study tries to bridge this gap by examining the military Joint Task Force (JTF) – most especially Operation RESTORE HOPE. It focused on the preparedness, deployment capabilities and impact of the operations on the management of the Niger Delta crisis since 2003.
2. Maintenance of Law and Order in Nigeria solely lies in the domain of the Ni geria Police Force. Nonetheless, when the police is faced with severe threat to national security occasioned by lack of capacity and perpetual massive threats, the members of the Armed Forces could be called upon to conduct Internal Security Operations to resolve law and order. However, the Military involvement in Internal Security operations increased with the ushering in of democratic governance in 1999 due to emergent internal security conflicts across the country.
3. The study revealed that the state of insecurity in the focal States of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers constitute a serious concern. The violent conflict in the Niger Delta has led to the militarization of the region, with criminal armed gangs, militants and military security forces. The JTF has made effort at stemming the conflicts in the region through the use of force and occasionally, the use of dialogue and low level negotiation with little success.
4. The mandate of JTF was found to be in tandem with the expectations of a Military Operations Other Than War. It was expected to use force to make the Niger Delta region safe for oil exploitation. The mission has two flanks: Operation RESTORE HOPE which started in 2003 and Operation FLUSHOUT III which commenced in 2004 in Warri and Port Harcourt respectively. The two operations were merge into one in 2009 for efficiency and judicious utilization of available resources.
5. The study discovers that the JTF was not specially trained for the riverine operations it carried out and was not adequately equipped and maintained to engage in asymmetrical warfare, curb militancy and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation. The study further reveals lack of interagency collaboration amongst security agencies, CSOs and community leaders.
6. Tainted public perception of the Niger Delta crisis as well as the inability of the JTF to factor in stakeholders‟ needs, fears, prejudices and nuances in their operations accounted for the little success of the force. There is also the issue of intelligence failure poor intelligence gathering restricts the JTF to respond mostly to militant attacks rather than being proactive.

A combination of these factors has hampered operational efficiency of conducting military operations in the Niger Delta.

1. Hence, it was difficult for JTF to achieve its goals. Instead, it caused collateral damages to communities and is perceived to have caused “new” Niger Delta problem. Collusion of the community members and the militant youths led to the death of several JTF operatives.
2. As revealed from the study, the youth play critical roles in the Niger Delta conflicts. It was concluded that the government cannot effectively tackle the menace of crime and militancy, illegal, oil bunkering, arms proliferation amongst other socio-economic vices without properly addressing the issues of poverty and youths unemployment. The JTF has failed to arrest the insecurity problems in the region.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the above findings and conclusions, the following recommendations are made:

* + 1. The Federal Government should provide the military with new platforms and improved logistics, review the JTFs mandate, and genuinely embark on weapon-return amnesty programmes for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of militants.
    2. The Federal Government should embark on massive socio-economic development of the Niger Delta region.
    3. The government at all levels should provide actionable youth employments to the Niger Delta citizens.
    4. The JTF should implement a psychological operations programme for winning the “hearts and minds” of the populace within their Area of Responsibility.
    5. The Federal Government should embark on re-orientation and empowerment of the Niger Delta restive youths.
    6. ​The Federal Government should ensure proper inter-agency collaboration of its security outfits.
    7. The Federal Government should adequately fund the logistics requirements of the Military Joint Task Force operations for management of the Internal Security Operations in the Niger Delta.
    8. The Defence Headquarters should ensure the effective use of Civil-Military Co-operation in the conduct of JTF operations by the Armed Forces.
    9. The Defence Headquarters should ensure adequate special operations training for the Nigerian Armed Forces troops engaged in Internal Security operations in the Niger Delta.
    10. The Defence Headquarters should provide a standardized Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for the JTF.
    11. The Federal Government should provide the Time Frame to end the JTF operation and military to return to the barracks.

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# APPENDICES

**APPENDIX 1- QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR PERCEPTION STUDY**

Peace and Conflict Studies Programme Institute of African Studies

University of Ibadan Questionnaire

Dear Respondent,

I am a Ph.D student in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Ibadan. This questionnaire is meant for the Assessment of the Joint Task Force impact on the Niger Delta Conflict. Your answers to the questions asked below are intended for academic purpose and will therefore be treated in strict confidence.

Hence, your co-operation in this exercise would be highly appreciated. There is no right or wrong answers. Simply indicate the answers which best matches your opinion.

SECTION A: Socio – Demographic Data

1. State Bayelsa ( )

Delta ( )

Rivers ( )

1. Location in the state
2. Gender of respondent:

Male ( ) 1

Female ( ) 2

1. Age:

15 – 24 ( ) 1

25 – 34 ( ) 2

35 – 49 ( ) 3

50 – 60 ( ) 4

61 years and above ( ) 5

1. What is your highest level of education?

Non-formal, religious literacy class, or adult education ( ) 1

Primary School ( ) 2

Secondary/Technical/teachers College ( ) 3

Post secondary polytechnic/college of education ( ) 4

University ( ) 5

## Occupation:

Unemployed ( ) 1

Farming, fishermen, petty trading self employed artisan ( ) 2

Junior Staff of government or companies ( ) 3

Intermediate staff of government or companies ( ) 4

Self employed ( ) 5

Retired ( ) 6

Development or social worker ( ) 7

Others (please specify)

1. If retired what was your last occupation?

## Marital status:

Single ( ) 1

Married ( ) 2

Divorced ( ) 3

Widow ( ) 4

Others

## Religion:

Christianity ( ) 1

Islam ( ) 2

Traditional ( ) 3

Others (specify) ( ) 4

## How long have you live in your area?

Less than 1 year ( ) 1

1 – 5 Years ( ) 2

6 – 9 Years ( ) 3

10 Years and above ( ) 4

## SECTION B: (Main research Questions)

Please read the questions below carefully and tick the appropriate option in the column that best indicate your responses.

RQ1 in the developed world, good governance is regarded as a mandatory condition for sustainable growth and development. Then why is it that good governance is unattainable in Nigeria? Because……………………………..

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (1) It cannot be achieved in Nigeria |  |  |  |  |
| (2) The culture of the people does not  allow it |  |  |  |  |
| (3) All necessary measures are  neglected |  |  |  |  |
| (4) Nigerians don‟t deserve it |  |  |  |  |

RQ2 Do you subscribe to the assertion that, severe “corruption” among other factors is most responsible for the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (5) Yes, the stakeholders entrench  corruption practices in the region |  |  |  |  |
| (6) No, the corrupt practices could not  have resulted to underdevelopment |  |  |  |  |
| (7) No attempts have been made to  develop the region |  |  |  |  |
| (8) The resources that are meant for the region have been siphoned by the  leaders |  |  |  |  |

RQ3 Do you subscribe to the assertion that says: All the resources that are meant for the development in Niger Delta region have been siphoned by the corrupt leaders and thereby leading to……………….

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| Unemployment |  |  |  |  |
| Criminality |  |  |  |  |
| Youth Agitation |  |  |  |  |
| Violent Conflict |  |  |  |  |

RQ4 Do you agree to the idea of using the language Niger Delta Youths “Militant” to describe those agitating for resource control?

SA A SD D

RQ5 The “militant” groups in the Niger Delta are?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| Unemployed |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployed Youths |  |  |  |  |
| Greedy Youths |  |  |  |  |
| Lazy Youths |  |  |  |  |

RQ6 What are the causes of the militants‟ acts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (17) The need for sustainable  democracy |  |  |  |  |
| (18) The need for amenities and  development |  |  |  |  |
| (19) Selfish interest and greed |  |  |  |  |
| (20) Resource Control |  |  |  |  |
| (21) Environmental degradation |  |  |  |  |
| (22) All of the above |  |  |  |  |

RQ7 What are the best ways of conflict management in the Niger Delta?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (23) Avoidance |  |  |  |  |
| (24) Third party Intervention |  |  |  |  |
| (25) Joint problem solving,  collaboration and compromise approach |  |  |  |  |
| (26) Military and Para-military |  |  |  |  |
| (27) Militancy, confrontation and  sabotage |  |  |  |  |

RQ8 Why is it that the joint problem solving approach has not been employed in the Niger Delta conflict?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (28) It is not the best approach to the  Niger Delta region conflict |  |  |  |  |
| (29) Conflictuals are not sincere |  |  |  |  |
| (30) There is no need for peace  negotiation |  |  |  |  |
| (31) Stakeholders are the problem |  |  |  |  |

RQ9 Has the JTF intervention in the Niger Delta conflict helped to achieve the needed sustainable peace?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (32) Yes, it has helped to reduce the  conflict proliferation |  |  |  |  |
| (33) Yes, it has helped to terminate  the conflict totally |  |  |  |  |
| (34) No, the aim and objectives of JTF have not been achieved because JTF is  partisan |  |  |  |  |
| (35) Forceful combat operation was a  total wrong approach |  |  |  |  |

RQ 10 How do active Niger Delta youths perceive the JTF operation?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **SA** | **A** | **SD** | **D** |
| (36) A governmental agent of  oppression and tyranny |  |  |  |  |
| (37) Enemy of their ambitions and  struggles |  |  |  |  |
| (38) A peacekeeping agent |  |  |  |  |
| (39) As opportunists who come to  make fortune |  |  |  |  |

RQ11 How do the Niger Delta NGO‟s perceive the JTF intervention?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Multi-dimensional | **SA** | **A** | **SD** | **D** |
| (40) As part of the multidimensional |  |  |  |  |
| (41) A well intended governmental  intervention measures |  |  |  |  |
| (42) a peacekeeping agent |  |  |  |  |
| (43) a military outfit meant to stem out  criminality in the Niger Delta |  |  |  |  |

RQ12 How do members of the public perceive the JTF operation?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (44) A governmental agent of oppression and tyranny |  |  |  |  |
| (45) Enemy of their ambitious and struggles |  |  |  |  |
| (46) A peace keeping agent of peace |  |  |  |  |
| (47) As opportunities who came to plunder resources  only |  |  |  |  |

RQ13 Do the State governments in the Niger Delta region perceive the JTF as a necessary peace mechanism?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (48) No, the governments in the region do not |  |  |  |  |
| (49) Yes, the governments applause and embrace it |  |  |  |  |
| (50) The governments do not see it as a necessary  mechanism |  |  |  |  |
| (51) The JTF roles and functions were described as  magnificent |  |  |  |  |

RQ14 What are the approaches adopted by the JTF in dealing with the Niger Delta conflict?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (52) The use of force |  |  |  |  |
| (53) The use of dialogue |  |  |  |  |
| (54) Use of negotiation |  |  |  |  |
| (55) All of the above |  |  |  |  |

RQ15 Is peace in the Niger Delta in sight with JTF intervention?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (56) Yes, peace is attainable in the near future |  |  |  |  |
| (57) No, peace will continue to elude |  |  |  |  |
| (58) No, JTF will never achieve its objective of  sustainable peace |  |  |  |  |
| (59) There will be peace if JTF operations strategies  are changed |  |  |  |  |

RQ16 What are the effects of the JTF intervention on the Niger Delta conflict?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (60) It has proliferated and perpetuated the conflict |  |  |  |  |
| (61) It has reduced the conflict effect to the barest  minimum |  |  |  |  |
| (62) Many lives and properties have been  deliberately destroyed by JTF |  |  |  |  |
| (63) It has achieved the needed positive peace |  |  |  |  |

RQ17 How do you perceive the security situations in the Niger Delta, under the JTF operation?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (64) The lives and properties of the populace are  secured |  |  |  |  |
| (65) There is a zero tolerance for threats |  |  |  |  |
| (66) Sustainable peace has been achieved |  |  |  |  |
| (67) No security for lives and properties at all |  |  |  |  |

RQ18 Is the establishment of the JTF in the Niger Delta justifiable, judging by your perceived success or failure?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (68) It is highly justifiable |  |  |  |  |
| (69) It is a total failure and not justifiable |  |  |  |  |
| (70) It has merely ensured fragile peace |  |  |  |  |
| (71) It has entrenched sustainable peace |  |  |  |  |

RQ19 Are there observable mistakes made by the JTF during their operations in the Niger Delta? If yes what are these flaws?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (72) High handedness |  |  |  |  |
| (73) Connivance with oil bunkerers |  |  |  |  |
| (74) Connivance with anti government agencies |  |  |  |  |
| (75) Activities result into collateral damages |  |  |  |  |

RQ 20 What to you are the challenges facing the Niger Delta region?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (76) Inadequate logistics |  |  |  |  |
| (77) lack of good will and support from indigenes |  |  |  |  |
| (78) lack of proper co-ordination between JTF  (military, police, SSS etc) |  |  |  |  |
| (79) Poor communication between JTF and the  community |  |  |  |  |
| (80) All of the above |  |  |  |  |

RQ21 How do you perceive the activities of the various youth organizations in the Niger Delta?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (81) Criminal |  |  |  |  |
| (82) Sometimes good |  |  |  |  |
| (83) Nationalistic |  |  |  |  |
| (84) Environmentalistic |  |  |  |  |
| (85) Economic Saboteurs |  |  |  |  |

RQ22a. What are the roles being played by stakeholders in the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (86) Fence mending (peacemaking efforts) |  |  |  |  |
| (87) Fueling crisis |  |  |  |  |
| (88) Reducing conflict |  |  |  |  |
| (89) Indifference (Complacency) |  |  |  |  |

RQ22b. Political Elites (Elites, Politicians)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (90) Fence mending (Peacemaking efforts) |  |  |  |  |
| (95) Fueling Crisis |  |  |  |  |
| (96) Reducing conflict |  |  |  |  |
| (97) Indifference (complacency) |  |  |  |  |

RQ22c. Oil and Gas Companies?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (98) Fence mending (Peacemaking efforts) |  |  |  |  |
| (99) Fueling Crisis |  |  |  |  |
| (100) Reducing conflict |  |  |  |  |
| (101) Indifference (Complacency) |  |  |  |  |

RQ22d. Youths

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (102) Fence mending (Peacemaking efforts) |  |  |  |  |
| (103) Fueling Crisis |  |  |  |  |
| (104) Reducing conflict |  |  |  |  |
| (105) Indifference (Complacency) |  |  |  |  |

RQ22e. Niger Delta Communities?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (106) Fence mending (Peacemaking efforts) |  |  |  |  |
| (107) Fueling Crisis |  |  |  |  |
| (108) Reducing conflict |  |  |  |  |
| (109) Indifference (Complacency) |  |  |  |  |

RQ22f. Community Leaders?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (110) Fence mending (Peacemaking efforts) |  |  |  |  |
| (111) Fueling Crisis |  |  |  |  |
| (112) Reducing conflict |  |  |  |  |
| (113) Indifference (Complacency) |  |  |  |  |

RQ22g. Joint Military task Force (JTF)?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | SA | A | SD | D |
| (114) Fence mending (Peacemaking efforts) |  |  |  |  |
| (115) Fueling Crisis |  |  |  |  |
| (116) Reducing conflict |  |  |  |  |
| (117) Indifference (Complacency) |  |  |  |  |

# APPENDIX 2 - ASSESSMENT OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE IMPACT ON THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT

Section A: Unstructured Interview with JTF Personnel

1. What is the mandate and mission of the JTF? Is it conflict termination, conflict prevention or preventive diplomacy or combat operations?

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1. Why and when was the JTF established?

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1. At what stage of the restive Niger Delta was the JTF established?

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1. What is the National/Strategic, operational and tactical strategy behind the establishment of the JTF?
2. What are security challenges of the Niger Delta conflict?

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1. What are the approaches adopted by the JTF in dealing with the Niger Delta crisis?

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1. What are the challenges of the JTF in its bid/effort to stem the on-going Niger Delta crisis?

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1. A Joint Task Force is supposed to be a temporary operation meant to solve specific problem in a given time limit. Why is the JTF taking too long to achieve its objective?

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1. What are strategic limitations of current responses, particularly the military JTF responses?

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1. Inadequate logistics and lack of communications were among several factors hampering the successful achievement of the JTF mandate. How do you improve on this?

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1. To what extent is the JTF Op RESTORE HOPE successful in restoring peace and security in the Niger Delta?

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1. To what extent is the JTF Op RESTORE HOPE a failure in its operation towards restoration of peace in the Niger Delta?

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1. Is the establishment of the JTF in the Niger Delta justifiable, judging by the success or failure

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1. To what extent, if any, does the State (government) perceive the JTF mission in the Niger Delta sustainable and attainable

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1. Please comment freely on the Niger Delta conflict.

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1. From your own opinion, how do we resolve/manage the Niger Delta conflict for sustainable development?

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## SECTION B: Unstructured Interview on the Communities within Niger Delta Please endeavour to provide suitable answers for this section.

1. How do you perceive the youth organization activities in the Niger Delta region?

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1. Who are those behind confrontational youth organizations in the Niger Delta?

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1. From your personal assessment, what are the achievement of the JTF so far?

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1. Can you please suggest any other preferred options other than that of JTF approach.

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1. Who are the main role‟s players in the militant activities?

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1. How do the militants mobilized for resources?

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1. How does the Niger Delta communities perceived the JTF operations?

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1. Who are the extant stakeholders the JTF ought to have partnered with towards the management of the Niger Delta crisis?

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**APPENDIX 3 : LIST OF KEY PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED (PRIMARY SOURCES)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| S/N | INFORMANTS | ADDRESS | OCCUPATION/  STATUS | AGE(YR) | DATE OF INTERVIEW |
| 1. | Maj Gen S.Y. Bello | Bori Camp, PortHarcourt | Commander | 54 | 27 December, 2008 |
| 2. | Brig Gen N.W. Rimtip | JTF Camp, Warri | Commander | 53 | 29 December. 2008 |
| 3. | Maj Gen I. D. Pennap | DHQ Abuja | Chief of Operations | 55 | 02 April, 2009 |
| 4. | Maj Gen E.C.G Nwanguma | DHQ Abuja | Director Plans | 55 | 13 February, 2009 |
| 5. | Maj Gen L.P Ngubane | NWC Abuja | Former Commander JTF/Deputy Commandant | 53 | 09 January, 2009 |
| 6. | Colonel O. A. Umahi | JTF Warri | JTF Commander Army | 49 | 20 July, 2008 |
| 7. | Colonel A. O. Mohammed | JTF Warri | JTF Commander Army | 48 | 22 July, 2008 |
| 8. | Commodore H. Babalola | NTGp Warri | JTF Naval Commander | 50 | 17 May, 2011 |
| 9. | Commodore E.D. Agba | NTGp Warri | JTF Naval Commander | 51 | 30 December, 2008 |
| 10. | Lt. Col. M. A. Yekini | 2 Brigade Garrison Port Harcourt | Commanding Officer | 46 | 27 December, 2008 |
| 11. | Lt. Col. J.A Ogunlade | 2 Battalion P.H | Commanding Officer | 45 | 27 December, 2008 |
| 12. | Lt. Col. C.G. Musa | JTF Yenagoa | Commanding Officer | 44 | 28 December, 2008 |
| 13. | Lt. Col. N. U. Efik | JTF Yenagoa | Commanding Officer | 45 | 28 December, 2008 |
| 14. | Lt. Col.A.T. Lawal | Warri | Commanding Officer | 46 | 29 December, 2008 |
| 15. | Lt. Col. Fejokwu | Warri | Commanding Officer | 43 | 29 December, 2008 |
| 16. | CSP Tokunbo Afolabi | NPFTG Warri | JTF Police Force Commander | 46 | 29 December, 2008 |
| 17. | Wing Cdr A.A Umaru | JTF Warri | JTF Air Force Liaison Officer | 44 | 30 December, 2008 |

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 18. | CSP Ahmed Magaji | JTF Warri | JTF Police Commander | 48 | 29 December, 2008 |
| 19. | Mr. J. O. Agbara | SPDC West Warri | Vice President Security International | 56 | 30 December, 2008 |
| 20. | Mr. H. Ugbede | CNL Warri | Acting Area Manager | 53 | 30 December, 2008 |
| 21. | Colonel L. M. Bello | DHQ Abuja | Soldiering | 46 | 15 June, 2009 |
| 22. | Air Vice Marshall Ogunsanmi | DHQ Abuja | Director Operations | 53 | 15 June, 2009 |
| 23. | Commodore Sekoni | NTG Yenagoa | Naval Commander | 52 | 30 March, 2011 |
| 24. | Maj. Gen Ochoga | JTF HQ Yenagoa | JTF Commander | 54 | 30 March, 2011 |
| 25. | Brig. General U. Chima | JTF HQ Yenagoa | JTF Commander | 52 | 30 March, 2011 |
| 26. | Colonel E.M. Ukagu | JTF Warri | Field Commander | 50 | 31 March, 2011 |
| 27. | Colonel M. A. Lasisi | JTF Yenagoa | Field Commander | 49 | 30 March, 2011 |
| 28. | Lt. Col Z. L Abubakar | Army Barracks Elele | Commanding Officer | 47 | 30 March, 2011 |
| 29. | Lt. Col. Sagir Musa | JTF Port Harcourt | JTF Public Relations Officer | 45 | 15 August, 2009 |
| 30. | Group Captain O.A Mohammed | JTF Warri | JTF ATG Warri | 43 | 30 December, 2008 |
| 31. | Colonel Rabe Abubakar | JTF Warri | JTF Public Relations Officer | 47 | 26 May, 2011 |
| 32. | Mr A. T. Akene | Port Harcourt | Civil Servant | 56 | 15 August, 2009 |
| 33. | Chief J. K. Ileberi | Southern Ijaw L.G.A | Politician | 52 | 30 December, 2008 |
| 34. | Mr. Nimizuo Itonyo | Yenagoa | Politician | 48 | 30 December, 2008 |
| 35. | Surv. H. I. Festus | Southern Ijaw L.G.A | Private Practice | 46 | 30 December, 2008 |
| 36. | Prince Bebenimibo | Gbaramatu Kingdom | Businessman | 47 | 24 July, 2008 |
| 37. | Mr. Gbenga Obembe | Warri | Private Practice | 44 | 24 July, 2008 |
| 38. | Mr. S. O. Aminu | Port Harcourt | Manager Security Eastern Operations – CHEVRON Nig.  Ltd. | 48 | 15 August, 2009 |

**Appendix 4- Details of Identified Militants Camps in Niger Delta**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Seria  l | Camp Location | Leadership | State | Facility/  Installation | Remarks |
| 1. | Ajakurama | Henry  Binidogogha | Delta State | Oil Field |  |
| 2. | Agge community along Ramos River general area Ekeremor  LGA | John Asiyagh | Delta State |  |  |
| 3. | Bulobama Camp | Near camp  Iroko | Delta State |  |  |
| 4. | Egbema |  | Delta State |  | 2 camps co-  located |
| 5. | Ezetu Camp North West of Dodo River | Victor Ben Ebikabowei  (Alias General Boyloaf) | Delta State | Oil Field |  |
| 6. | Ogbotobo in Ogunlagha kingdom  Burutu LGA | Bonny Gawei | Delta State | Yokri SPDC |  |
| 7. | Okerenkoko (Camp 5) Warri South West LGA | Chief Government Ekpemukpolo (Alias  Tompolo) | Delta State | SPDC  Otumara, Odidi Batan |  |
| 8. | Bennett Island | Ebikoko | Delta State |  |  |
| 9. | Opuye Camp near  Koko general area | Kingsley Opuye | Delta State |  |  |
| 10. | Okpagbe camp area | Ogodobiri | Delta State |  |  |
| 11. | Isreal Camp Near  Ayakoroma | John Togo | Delta State |  |  |
| 12. | Amatu and Bilabiri | Comd Edi Iguni | Bayelsa  State |  |  |
| 13. | Egbelege (in Odioma  Creek) | Woki Ibralaye  (aka Kitikata) | Bayelsa  State | Oil field |  |
| 14. | Peremabiri around Diebu flow station in  Southern Ijaw | Ateke Tom | Bayelsa State |  | New Camp |
| 15. | Opuama community in  Southern Ijaw |  | Bayelsa  State | Oil field | Camp leader  killed |
| 16. | Sangana, Brass LGA | Abraham Ngobere | Bayelsa State | Conoil, Chevron, Texaco,  Funiwa field |  |
| 17. | Egbemoa Ngalaberi (Near Opukushi flow station Yenagoa) | Commander: Livinus Odudu (Alias Lokiri)  Nathaniel Bidel | Bayelsa State |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | ThankGod Mussi (Alias MOPOL)  Kemelayel Ideinotu |  |  |  |
| 18. | Azazwuama Community | Commander Darukoro Camp | Bayelsa State |  |  |
| 19. |  | Ideinotu | Bayelsa  State | Oil field |  |
| 20. | Dasaba | Woki Godswill Ibralagu (Alias  Kitikata) | Bayelsa State |  |  |
| 21. | Azuguama Creek Azazwuama | Commander  Jackson (young shall Grow) | Bayelsa State |  | Camp 5 |
| 22. | Ekula II | Afro | Bayelsa  State |  |  |
| 23. | Ezetu Camp 2 | Boyloaf (Ezetu) | Bayelsa  State |  |  |
| 24. | Ezetu Camp 3 | Boyloaf (Ezetu) | Bayelsa  State |  |  |
| 25. | Eririmobou Camp-  Ekebiri | Joshua  Machaiva | Bayelsa  State |  |  |
| 26. | Pastor Reuben Camp  at Koluama 1. | Pastor Reuben | Bayelsa  State |  |  |
| 27. | Marine Base  Diobu/Borokiri Camp | Sogboma/Farah  Dagogo | Bayelsa  State |  |  |
| 28. | Korokorosei | Africa owei | Bayelsa  State |  |  |
| 29. | Olugbobiri, Southern  Ijaw LGA | Commander  Africa | Bayelsa  State |  | Africa  Camp 2 |
| 30. |  | Albert Ebi | Rivers State |  | Camp loc  unknown |
| 31. | Kregani/Ogba/Egbema  Ndoni LGA | Mr Dike  Elemenaya | Rivers State |  |  |
| 32. | Okochiri, Okrika LGA Ateke Tom‟s “Evil forest camp” | Ateke Tom | Rivers State |  | Camp destroyed in December  2007 |
| 33. | Abonema, Akukutoru LGA (Egberinpapa militant group) | Sogboma George | Rivers State |  | Operates in both Rivers and Bayelsa  States |
| 34. | Marine Base  Diobu/Borokiri Camp | Sogboma/Farah  Dagogo | Bayelsa  State |  | Camp  destroyed |
| 35. | Rumuekpe Water front | Sk Agala | Rivers State |  |  |
| 36. | Fara (Kula) | Farah Dagogo | Rivers State |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 37. | Ikang | Unknown | Cross River |  |  |
| 38. | Tom Short in Atabong | Unknown | Cross River |  |  |
| 39. | Abise Camp | Boma  Abiyesiku | Rivers State |  |  |
| 40. | Buguma Camp | Awalla George | Rivers State |  |  |
| 41. | Bile Camp | Alili Horse | Rivers State |  |  |
| 42. | Cawthorne Channel  Camp 1 and 2 | Ateke Tom | Rivers State |  |  |
| 43. | Cawthorne Channel  Camp 3 | Onegi Ofori  alias Egbele | Rivers State |  |  |
| 44. | Idama Camp | Abiye Dokubo | Rivers State |  |  |
| 45. | Tombia Camp | Opulapuye  Abey | Rivers State |  |  |
| 46. | Khana, Hskhana LGA | Ateke Tom | Rivers State |  | New Camp |
| 47. | Angola 1 | Ateke Tom | Rivers State |  |  |
| 48. | Angola 2 | Ateke Tom | Rivers State |  |  |
| 49. | Shinning Roof | Ateke Tom | Rivers State |  |  |
| 50. | New Shinning Roof | Ateke Tom | Rivers State |  |  |
| 51. | Elem Tombia | Farah Dagogo | Rivers State |  |  |
| 52. | Bokokiri | Obese | Rivers State |  |  |

**APPENDIX 5 STATISTICS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS RECOVERED FROM ILLEGAL BUNKERING FOR YEARS 2001 – 2008**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Serial | Month | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
| 1. | January |  |  | 600 | 4,248 | 2,600 |  |  |  |
| 2. | February |  |  | 1000 | 60 |  |  |  |  |
| 3. | March |  | 250 | 1300 | 1980 |  |  |  |  |
| 4. | April |  |  | 902 | 12,663 |  |  |  |  |
| 5. | May |  |  | 1837 | 1,110 | 803 |  |  |  |
| 6. | June |  | 3,500 |  | 1000 | 150 |  |  | 12 |
| 7. | July | 2000 |  | 18,946 | 159 | 12 |  |  |  |
| 8. | August |  | 500 |  | 72 | 6 |  | 18 |  |
| 9. | September |  |  | 1,012 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10. | October |  |  | 1,012 | 32 |  |  |  | 22 |
| 11. | November |  |  | 32 |  | 11 |  |  |  |
| 12. | December |  | 4,250 |  |  |  | 15 |  |  |
| Total |  | 2000 | 8,500 | 40,838 | 23,307 | 3,576 | 15 | 18 | 34 |